Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking page 178, lines 11-36 in their entirety and inserting the following:
/ (7) (A) A legal proceeding pending on the date of a decedent's death in which the decedent was a necessary party shall be suspended until a personal representative is appointed to administer the decedent's estate, unless a court otherwise orders.
(B) Pursuant to Section 62-3-104, this subsection does not apply to a proceeding by a secured creditor of a decedent to enforce the secured creditor's right to its security. It does apply to a proceeding for a deficiency judgment against a decedent or the estate of a decedent."
This section establishes the mechanism for presenting claims. The claim may be delivered to the personal representative and must be filed with the court. Certain information must be included for claims not yet due, contingent, unliquidated, and secured claims. In lieu of presenting a claim, a proceeding may be commenced against a personal representative in any appropriate court, but the commencement must occur within the time for presenting claims. No claim is required in matters which were pending at the time of decedent's death. Actions on claims must be commenced within the thirty days after the personal representative has mailed a notice of disallowance, but the personal representative or the court may consent prior to the expiration of the thirty-day period to extensions that do not run beyond the applicable statute of limitations. The 2013 amendment requires a creditor seeking appointment to attach a written statement of its claim to the application or petition for appointment. Allowing a creditor to present a claim in this manner creates an exception to the general rule of Section 62-3-104 and Section 62-3-804(6), otherwise precluding the presentation of a claim prior to the appointment of a personal representative. The 2013 amendment further clarifies that, as earlier stated in Section 62-3-104, an in rem proceeding by a secured creditor is not suspended until a personal representative is appointed, unless that proceeding includes an action for a deficiency judgment against a decedent or his estate. /
Amend the bill further, as and if amended, by striking page 300, lines 21-43; page 301, lines 1-43; page 302, lines 1-43, and page 303, lines 1-32 in their entirety and inserting the following:
/ Section 62-7-401. (a)(1) A trust described in Section 62-7-102 may be created by:
(1)(i) transfer of property to another person as trustee during the settlor's lifetime or by will or other disposition taking effect upon the settlor's death;
(2)(ii) written declaration signed by the owner of property that the owner holds identifiable property as trustee; or
(3)(iii) exercise of a power of appointment in favor of a trustee.
(2) To be valid, a trust of real property, created by transfer in trust or by declaration of trust, must be proved by some writing signed by the party creating the trust. A transfer in trust of personal property does not require written evidence, but must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, pursuant to Section 62-7-407.
When any conveyance shall be made of any lands or tenements by which a trust or confidence shall or may arise or result by the implication or construction of law or be transferred or extinguished by act or operation of law, such trust or confidence shall be of like force and effect as it would have been without Section 62-7-401(a) A trust that arises by act or operation of law does not require the existence of a writing.
(c) A revocable inter vivos trust may be created either by declaration of trust or by a transfer of property and is not rendered invalid because the settler retains substantial control over the trust including, but not limited to, (i) a right of revocation, (ii) substantial beneficial interests in the trust, or (iii) the power to control investments or reinvestments. This subsection does not prevent a finding that a revocable inter vivos trust, enforceable for other purposes, is illusory for purposes of determining a spouse's elective share rights pursuant to Article 2, Title 62. A finding that a revocable inter vivos trust is illusory and thus invalid for purposes of determining a spouse's elective share rights pursuant to Article 2, Title 62 does not render that revocable inter vivos trust invalid, but allows inclusion of the trust assets as part of the probate estate of the settlor only for the purpose of calculating the elective share. In that event, the trust property that passes or has passed to the surviving spouse, including a beneficial interest of the surviving spouse in that trust property, must be applied first to satisfy the elective share and to reduce contributions due from other recipient of transfers including the probate estate, and the trust assets are available for satisfaction of the elective share only to any remaining extent necessary pursuant to Section 62-2-207.
This section is based on Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 10 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996), and Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 17 (1959). Under the methods specified for creating a trust in this section, a trust is not created until it receives property. For what constitutes an adequate property interest, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts Sections 40-41 (Tentative Draft No. 2, approved 1999); Restatement (Second) of Trusts Sections 74-86 (1959). The property interest necessary to fund and create a trust need not be substantial. A revocable designation of the trustee as beneficiary of a life insurance policy or employee benefit plan has long been understood to be a property interest sufficient to create a trust. See Section 62-7-103(11) ("property" defined). Furthermore, the property interest need not be transferred contemporaneously with the signing of the trust instrument. A trust instrument signed during the settlor's lifetime is not rendered invalid simply because the trust was not created until property was transferred to the trustee at a much later date, including by contract after the settlor's death. A pourover devise to a previously unfunded trust is also valid and may constitute the property interest creating the trust. See Unif Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act Section 1 (1991), codified at Uniform Probate Code Section 2-511 and SCPC Section 62-2-510 (pourover devise to trust valid regardless of existence, size, or character of trust corpus). See also Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 19 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996).
Section 62-7-401(a) provides different methods to create a trust, creating a distinction between third-party-trusteed trusts in subsection (a)(1)(i) and self-trusteed trusts in subsection (a)(1)(ii). Subsection (a)(1)(i) provides that, if a third party is to serve as trustee, transfer of property to that other person, whether during life or at death, is sufficient to create a trust; no writing is required.
Subsection (a)(1)(ii) requires that, if the settlor is also to be the trustee, then some written declaration signed by the settlor is required to create the trust. Such a declaration need not be a trust agreement, but can be some written evidence signed by the settlor sufficient to establish that the settlor intended to hold the property in trust.
While this section refers to transfer of property to a trustee, a trust can be created even though for a period of time no trustee is in office. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 2 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts Section 2 cmt. i (1959). A trust can also be created without notice to or acceptance by a trustee or beneficiary. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 14 (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts Sections 35-36 (1959).
The methods set out in Section 62-7-401 are not the exclusive methods to create a trust as recognized by Section 62-7-102. A trust can also be created by a promise that creates enforceable rights in a person who immediately or later holds these rights as trustee. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 10(e) (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996). A trust thus created is valid notwithstanding that the trustee may resign or die before the promise is fulfilled. Unless expressly made personal, the promise can be enforced by a successor trustee. For examples of trusts created by means of promises enforceable by the trustee, see Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 10 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 1, approved 1996); Restatement (Second) of Trusts Sections 14 cmt. h, 26 cmt. n (1959).
Pre-SCTC South Carolina law made a distinction between trusts for personal property and trusts in land. Trusts in personal property could be proved, as well as created, by parol declarations. See Harris v. Bratton, 34 S.C. 259. 13 S.E. 447 (1891). On the other hand, for a trust of any "land, tenements, or hereditaments" to be valid, former South Carolina Probate Code Section 62-7-101 mandated that the trust be proved by a writing signed by the party creating the trust. An exception to the requirement of a writing to establish a trust in land was found in former SCPC Section 62-7-103 for trusts arising by operation of law, such as resulting and constructive trusts. Because the SCTC applies only to express trusts and not to trusts implied in law (Section 62-7-102), Sections 62-7-401(a)(1)(i) and (1)(ii) codify existing law that trusts of real property must be established by a writing, transfers in trust of personal property do not have the same requirement, and trusts containing real property that arise by operation of law do not require evidence of writing to be valid.
Former SCPC Section 62-7-112 has been retained as SCTC Section 62-7-401(c). Former SCPC Section 62-7-112 was enacted after the Siefert decision, Seifert v. Southern Nat'l Bank of South Carolina, 305 S.C. 353, 409 S.E. 2d 337 (1991), to clarify that the settlor's retention of substantial control over a trust, such as a right to revoke, does not render that trust invalid.
While a trust created by will may come into existence immediately at the testator's death and not necessarily only upon the later transfer of title from the personal representative, Section 62-7-701 makes clear that the nominated trustee does not have a duty to act until there is an acceptance of the trusteeship, express or implied. To avoid an implied acceptance, a nominated testamentary trustee who is monitoring the actions of the personal representative but who has not yet made a final decision on acceptance should inform the beneficiaries that the nominated trustee has assumed only a limited role. The failure so to inform the beneficiaries could result in liability if misleading conduct by the nominated trustee causes harm to the trust beneficiaries. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts Section 35 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No 2, approved 1999).
While this section confirms the familiar principle that a trust may be created by means of the exercise of a power of appointment (paragraph ((a)(1)(iii)), this Code does not legislate comprehensively on the subject of powers of appointment but addresses only selected issues. See Section 62-7-302 (representation by holder of general testamentary power of appointment). For the law on powers of appointment generally, see Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers Sections 11.1-24.4 (1986); Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers (in progress). /
Amend the bill further, as and if amended, by striking page 326, lines 10-14 in their entirety and inserting the following:
/ when the conditions have changed). See also All Saints Parish, Waccamaw, a South Carolina non-profit corporation, a/k/a The Episcopal Church of All Saints and a/k/a The Vestry and Church Wardens of the Episcopal Church of All Saints Parish, 358 S.C. 209, 595 S.E. 2d 253 (Ct. App 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 385 S. C. 428, 685 S.E. 2d 163 (2009). /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.