Indicates Matter Stricken
Indicates New Matter

The Senate assembled at 11:00 A.M., the hour to which it stood adjourned and was called to order by the ACTING PRESIDENT, Senator SHEALY.

TO: The Clerk of the Senate

The Clerk of the House
FROM: Thomas H. Pope, III

Chairman, Judicial

Screening Committee
DATE: January 31, 1991

In compliance with the provisions of Act 119 of 1975, it is respectfully requested that the following information be printed in the Journals of the Senate and the House.

Respectfully submitted,

Thomas H. Pope, III

Chairman

/s/ Rep. Larry E. Gentry, Vice Chairman
/s/ Sen. John A. Martin
/s/ Sen. Isadore E. Lourie
/s/ Sen. Glenn F. McConnell
/s/ Rep. Daniel E. Martin, Sr.
/s/ Rep. B. L. Hendricks
/s/ Rep. James H. Hodges

Pursuant to Act 119 of 1975, this Committee was convened to consider the qualifications of candidates seeking reelection to the Appeals Court and to the At Large seats on the Circuit Court. Also the Committee considered active retired judges and the candidates for the nine newly created Circuit Court judgeships.

The Judicial Screening Committee is charged by law to consider the qualifications of candidates for the Judiciary. When notice is received that an individual intends to seek election or reelection to the Bench, the Committee conducts such investigation of the candidate as it deems appropriate and reports its findings to the General Assembly prior to the election. It is not the function of the Committee to recommend one candidate over another or to suggest to the individual legislator for whom to vote. Our role is instead that of determining whether a candidate is qualified to sit as a Judge and under the statute our determination in that regard is not binding upon the General Assembly.

Having completed the investigation as required by the Act, the Committee by this report respectfully submits its findings to the members of the General Assembly for their consideration.

The report consists of the Transcripts of the Proceedings before the Screening Committee, held at the State House on October 16, 1990, December 11, 1990 and January 10, 1991, and the portions of the documents submitted by the respective candidates which were made part of the public record. Interested witnesses filing affidavits were given an opportunity to testify regarding the qualifications of the candidates and that testimony is contained in the Transcripts. Each candidate's file includes an extensive Personal Data Questionnaire, a Statement of Economic Interests, five letters of reference, including one from the candidate's banker, and the report of a background investigation by SLED. Those documents may be viewed in the office of the Judicial Screening Committee in Room 402 Gressette Building until the date and time of the election.

The candidates were present at the screenings and testified under oath.

(AN EXECUTIVE SESSION OF THE JUDICIAL SCREENING COMMITTEE WAS HELD PRIOR TO ITS BEING CALLED TO ORDER.)

REP. ROGERS: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, IF YOU WILL GIVE ME YOUR ATTENTION, I WILL CALL THE SCREENING COMMITTEE TO ORDER. THE PROCEDURE WE WILL FOLLOW THIS MORNING IS RANK DOES HAVE CERTAIN PRIVILEGES AND I WILL CALL THE APPELLATE COURT JUDGES, THE SERVING CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES, AND THEN THE RETIRED JUDGES. THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS WILL BE TO HEAR FROM JUDGE ALEX SANDERS.I WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT WE WILL NOT HAVE ANY LENGTHY HEARINGS UNTIL LATER IN THE MORNING. WE DO HAVE PERSONS WHO HAVE INDICATED A DESIRE AND HAVE PROPERLY FILED AFFIDAVITS TO BE HEARD ON A NUMBER OF THESE CASES BUT I BELIEVE ALL OF THEM ARE THE RETIRED JUDGES; SO, WE WILL DISPOSE OF THE SITTING JUDGES. JUDGE SANDERS, IF YOU WILL COME FORWARD AND BE SWORN.

(CHIEF JUDGE ALEXANDER M. SANDERS, JR., FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Alexander M. Sanders, Jr.

Home Address: Business Address:

406 Springlake Road South Carolina Court

Columbia, SC 29556 of Appeals

P.O. Box 11629

Columbia, SC 29211

2. He was born in Columbia, South Carolina on September 29, 1938.

Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Zoe Dutrow on December 19, l964. They have one child, Zoe Caroline, age 23 (student, USC Law School, employed part-time, law firm of Adams, Quackenbush, Herring & Stuart).

5. Military Service: U. S. Army, SN #FRl4641940, Active duty July 1, 1957-December 31, 1957; U.S. Army Reserve 1957-1965. Honorable Discharge Rank E-4.

6. He attended USC 9/56 - 6/57, 1/58-8/59, receiving a B.S. Degree and the School of Law from 1959-1963, receiving a LLB Degree (replaced by a JD Degree in 1970). He Attended the University of Virginia, 6/88 -8/89, earning a LLM Degree 5/90.

7. College Activities: Student Senate, USC, 1958-59; President, USC Law Federation (Law School student body), Summer 1962; South Carolina Law Review, l962; Class Vice President, University of Virginia Graduate Program for Judges, l988-90.

8. JCLE Evidence Seminar, 2-85, Columbia; JCLE Rules of Civil Procedure Seminar, 6-85, Charleston; JCLE Family Court Seminar, 8-85, Columbia; JCLE Circuit Court Seminar, 10-85, Columbia; JCLE Equitable Distribution Seminar, 12-85, Columbia; JCLE Trial Management Seminar, 2-86, Columbia; JCLE Family Court Seminar, 4-86, Columbia; JCLE Specialized Trial Problems Seminar, 6-86, Columbia; ABA Convention, Judicial Administration Division Programs, 8-86, New York, NY.; ABA Council of Chief Judges Seminar, 10-86, New Orleans, La.; JCLE Seminar on Adoption and Equitable Distribution Statutes, 12-86, Columbia; JCLE Criminal Law Seminar, 2-86, Columbia; ABA Convention, Judicial Administration Division Programs, 8-87, San Francisco, Ca.; JCLE Appeals and Administrative Procedure Seminar, 10-87, Columbia; JCLE Family Court Seminar, 11-87, Columbia; JCLE Criminal Law Update, 1-88; JCLE Child Abuse Cases Seminar, 3-88; JCLE Circuit Court Seminar, 5-88; JCLE Evidence & Statutory Law Update, 11-88; JCLE Criminal Law Update, 1-89; JCLE Child Victim in Court, 2-89; Appellate Judges Seminar 3-89; JCLE Issues in Civil Litigation, 4-89; JCLE Items of Interest, 10-89; JCLE Issues in Family Law, 11-89; JCLE Criminal Law Update, 1-90; JCLE Circuit and Family Court Seminar, 3-90; ABA Council of Chief Judges Seminar, 10-87, 88, 89; South Carolina Judicial Conference, 8-85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90.

9. Teaching Positions and Lectures: Adjunct Faculty, University of South Carolina, 9-64 to present, Columbia; Instructor, American Institute of Banking, various lectures, Columbia; Instructor, Certified Property and Casualty Underwriters School, various lectures, Columbia; Adjunct Faculty, Harvard Law School (Trial Advocacy Workshop), 1-82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, Cambridge, Mass. In addition, he has lectured at numerous South Carolina JCLE and CLE programs. (The South Carolina Bar can supply a complete list if necessary.) He also lectured at "Bridge the Gap" (a one-week course required by the South Carolina Supreme Court for applicants to the Bar) 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90; and spoke at the ABA Council of Chief Judges of Courts of Appeal Seminars, 10-87, 88. He made speeches at State Bar meetings in Missouri 9-89 and Arkansas 11-89.He made the graduation speech at Newberry College 5-86, the College of Charleston 5-87, the University of Virginia 5-88 and Tulane University 5-90.

10. Published Books or Articles: Sanders, "What Else Did Shakespeare Write?: Startling New Evidence," (Kosmos Club 1989).

Sanders, "Chief Judge John Belton O'Neall and the South Carolina Court of Appeals," (Kosmos Club 1988).

Sanders, "Three Strategies for the Trial Lawyer: Modest Proposals," Journal of the SCTLA Convention, August 1988 at __.
Sanders, "To Celebrate a Constitution," (S.C. Bicentennial Commission 1987; republished in various periodicals 1987-88).

A. Sanders & J. Swerling, Criminal Procedure and Trial Practice in South Carolina, (S.C. Bar 1987).

A. Sanders and others, South Carolina Appellate Practice Handbook (S.C.Bar 1985).

Sanders, "You Don't Have to Paint My Portrait," Vol. 29, No. 6, The Transcript, June 1985 at 8.

Sanders, "The South Carolina Court of Appeals: Not Like a Mule," Vol. IV, Carolina Lawyer, 3 (1984).

Sanders, "Langley v. Boyter, et al.," Vol. 28, No. 12, The Transcript, December 1984 at 14.

Sanders, "Brief Writing: 25 Tips From the Appellate Bench," Journal of the SCTLA Convention, August 1984 at 181.

Sanders, "Judicial Wit," Vol. 28, No. 7, The Transcript, July 1984 at 10.

Sanders, "The Jealous Mistress," Vol. 28, No 5, The Transcript, May 1984 at 7.

Sanders, "Progress at the Court: Taking the Show on the Road," Vol. 28, No. 4, The Transcript, April 1984 at 10.

Sanders, "Observing Computer Prudence," Vol. 26, No. 12, The Transcript, December 1982 at 4.

Sanders, "Cross-examination in a Nutshell," Journal of the SCTLA Convention, August 1982 at 186.

Sanders, "How to Object Without Being Objectionable," id. at 187.

Sanders, "How to Win Your First Case," id. at 188.

Sanders, "On the Desecration of the Columbia Jewish Center," Vol. I, Journal of the South Carolina Senate, 550 (1981).

Sanders, "Some of My Best Friends Are Republicans," The Democrat, Spring 1981 at 1.

Sanders, "The Essence of Democracy" (remarks regarding S-908), Vol. I, Journal of the South Carolina Senate, 1412 (1980).

In addition to these, a number of his lectures at JCLE and CLE seminars have been published in the journals of those proceedings. (See answer to question 9.)

12. Legal Experience since graduation from law school:
1962-63 Associate, firm of Belser & Belser, Columbia
1963-74 Private practice, Columbia, (in association with various lawyers)
1974-83 Senior Partner, Sanders & Quakenbush, Columbia
1983 "Of Counsel," Adams, Quakenbush, Herring & Stuart, Columbia
1983-now Chief Judge, SC Court of Appeals

1965-now Adjunct Professor, USC

1982-89 Harvard Law School, Winter Semesters

20. Judicial Office: He served as Municipal Judge for Forest Acres 1965-66 (appointed office), and resigned to run for the House. He was elected by the General Assembly as Chief Judge of the SC Court of Appeals and has served since September, 1983.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) State v. Williams, 331 S.E.2d 354 (S.C. App. 1985). Chief Judge Sanders delivered the opinion of the court, reversing the lower court and remanding the case. The reversal was based upon the trial court's erroneous admission of prejudicial hearsay evidence offered from a police officer relating to statements allegedly made by the wife of the defendant charged with armed robbery.

(b) Palmetto Dunes Resort v. Brown, 336 S.E.2d 15 (S.C. App. 1985). In an action involving the interpretation of a restrictive covenant regarding developer approval of building plans in a subdivision, Chief Judge Sanders affirmed the lower court. The court held that granting the developer authority to make subjective judgments regarding aesthetic considerations was not so arbitrary a covenant as to be impermissibly vague or ambiguous and that the disapproval of appellant's house plan was reasonable in so much as it did not relate to the general plan of the subdivision.

(c) S.C. Dept. of Social Services v. Father & Mother, 366 S.E.2d 40 (S.C. App. 1988). Judge Sanders delivered the opinion of the court in this child abuse and neglect case in which he concluded that the lower court was correct in deciding that excessive corporal punishment inflicted upon a 13-year old girl by her father was excessive and constituted child abuse as defined by statute and also that the child abuse statute in question was not unconstitutional on freedom of religion grounds.

(d) C. Ray Miles Construction Co., Inc. v. Weaver, 373 S.E.2d 905 (S.C. App. 1988). Chief Judge Sanders wrote the opinion for the court in this case dealing with implied warranty of fitness and quality in a personal property lease in which he expounded upon the South Carolina common law doctrine of caveat venditor.

(e) Stanley v. B.L. Montague Co., Inc., 382 S.E.2d 246 (S.C. App. 1989). In this products liability action, Judge Sanders held the manufacturer was not entitled to plead defense of completion and acceptance by a third party.In addition, the defendants were not allowed to implead the purchaser.

22. Public Office: He was elected to SC House of Representatives in 1966, served until 1974. He was appointed in 1974 by Governor John West as Chairman of the Consumer Advisory Board created pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code, serving until 1976 when he resigned to run for the Senate. Elected to the SC Senate in 1976, he served until elected Chief Judge of the SC Court of Appeals in 1983. While a member of the General Assembly, he was appointed to serve on several Boards and Commissions.

23. He was an unsuccessful Candidate for both Lt. Governor and Governor of South Carolina in 1974. He ran for Lt. Governor in the Democratic Primary and was nominated from the floor at the State Democratic Convention for Governor.

24. Other occupation, business or profession: Served as Board Member and General Counsel for several corporations which he represented in his law practice, no longer serving in any such capacity.

27. He is unaware of any conflict of interest. If one should arise, he would disqualify himself as provided by the Code of Judicial Conduct.

28. He was charged by a game warden when he was 14.

30. The SC Tax Commission made claim against him in 1980 for the collection of income tax (less than $125). It was over a disputed deduction on his personal income tax which the Federal government allowed. The matter was quickly settled to the satisfaction of the Tax Commission.

31. He has been made a party to legal proceedings in a representative capacity (e.g. , as a Guardian Ad Litem) . In addition, he was sued in federal court by a disgruntled litigant. The name of the case was Green v. Sanders, et al., 3:89-2117-OH (U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina). It is his impression that the plaintiff sued him by mistake. His case was decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court, not the Court of Appeals. In any event, the suit was summarily dismissed as frivolous.

33. His health is good. He wears contact lens for correction of vision to 20/20 and is under treatment for diabetes. His last physical was in October, 1989. His doctor is Ronald Elliott, 1705 Brabham Avenue, Columbia.

39. Bar Associations and Professional Organizations:

American Bar Association: 1962 - date

South Carolina Bar: 1962 - date

Richland County Bar: 1962 - date

Secretary/Treasurer & Board

of Governors: 1965 - 1969

American Trial Lawyers Assn.: 1962 - 1983

SC Trial Lawyers Association: 1962 - 1976

Secretary: 1964 - 1966;

President: 1968;

Board of Governors: 1966 - 1970

Am. Judicature Society appr: 1965 - 1983

ABA Council of Chief Judges

of Courts of Appeal: 1984 - date

Treasurer: 1989,

President-Elect: 1990,

Executive Committee: 1988 - date

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations: Trinity Episcopal Cathedral; Salvation Army, Advisory Board; Kosmos Club; John Belton O'Neall Inn of Court.

42. Five letters of reference:

(a) Mr. Robert T. Bone, Jr., First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., P.O. Box 29, Columbia, SC 29202

(b) The Honorable John E. Montgomery, Dean, School of Law University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208

(c) Thomas H. Pope, Esquire

P.O. Box 190, Columbia, SC 29108

(d) James H. Quackenbush, Jr., Esquire

P.O. Box 394, Columbia, SC 29202

(e) Morris D. Rosen, Esquire

P.O. Box 893, Charleston, SC 29402

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: YOU CAN EITHER TESTIFY THERE OR HAVE A SEAT IF YOU WANT TO.

CHIEF JUDGE SANDERS: I WILL SIT, IF THAT'S ALL RIGHT. MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I AM AT YOUR DISPOSAL.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: COUNSEL.

Q. JUDGE SANDERS, YOU RECEIVED BACK A COPY OF THE PERSONAL DATA QUESTIONNAIRE AND MADE SURE THERE WERE NO CHANGES ON THAT?
A. I NOTED NONE.
Q. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE, AS WELL AS THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION, HAS INFORMED US THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO COMPLAINTS OR REPRIMANDS FILED AGAINST YOU. YOUR DRIVING RECORD IS REPORTED AS CLEAR, AS WELL AS THE RECORDS OF THE RICHLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE COLUMBIA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT IN YOUR NAME. SLED INDICATES NO RECORDS IN YOUR NAME. ALSO, THE FBI FINGERPRINT CARD CAME BACK CLEAR. ALTHOUGH, I WILL NOTE THAT YOU DID IN YOUR RECORDS DISCLOSE THAT YOU WERE CHARGED BY A GAME WARDEN AT THE AGE OF 14 FOR SOMETHING.
A. I WAS NOT GUILTY.

A. THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM FAILED.
Q. IN CHECKING THE RECORDS OF THE RICHLAND COUNTY COURTHOUSE AND THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE, THERE WERE A COUPLE OF ACTIONS THAT WERE FOUND IN WHICH YOU WERE A DEFENDANT; ONE OF WHICH WAS AN ACTION TO CLEAR A TAX TITLE IN THE MASTER IN EQUITY'S COURT IN RICHLAND COUNTY IN 1976. I BELIEVE YOU WERE NAMED AS A PARTY BY VIRTUE OF HOLDING A MORTGAGE ON THAT PROPERTY.
A. I HAD FORGOTTEN ABOUT THAT, FRANKLY, UNTIL I HAD GOT THE PACKAGE AND I NOTED THAT THE MORTGAGE WAS IN THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF $200. I ALSO NOTED THE IRONY OF THE FACT THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S LAWYER WHO SUED ME IN THAT ACTION WAS JUDGE CURETON.
Q. YES, SIR.
A. 23 YEARS AGO.
Q. THERE IS ALSO A FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION MAINTAINED BY AN INMATE AGAINST, I BELIEVE, ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN 1989 AND THAT WAS SUMMARILY DISMISSED BY JUDGE PERRY; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT. THAT INMATE ALLEGED VARIOUS IMPROPRIETIES ON OUR BEHALF. AS IT TURNED OUT, HE MEANT TO SUE THE SUPREME COURT. HE SUED US BY MISTAKE, SO WE DODGED THAT BULLET.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. THE ONLY OTHER RECORDS OF THAT NATURE FOUND, YOU DISCLOSED THERE WAS IN 1980 A SOUTH CAROLINA TAX LIEN ON A DISPUTED DEDUCTION ON YOUR TAX RETURN IN THE AMOUNT OF $125 AND THAT WAS QUICKLY SETTLED.
A. YES.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. ON YOUR FINANCIAL INFORMATION, YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST INDICATED NO CONFLICTS. WE WERE SATISFIED WITH BOTH YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT AND YOUR CREDIT REPORT. YOU REPORTED YOUR HEALTH IS GOOD. YOUR LAST SCREENING WAS, I BELIEVE, IN 1985; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. AND PRIOR TO THAT, 1983 WHEN YOU WERE INITIALLY ELECTED TO THE SEAT OF THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. THERE HAVE BEEN NO COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS RECEIVED IN REGARD TO YOUR CANDIDACY AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY TODAY IN REGARD TO YOUR REELECTION. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS YOU WOULD LIKE TO MAKE OR THINGS THAT MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN COVERED IN THIS HEARING OR IN THE APPLICATION?
A. I BELIEVE THE APPLICATION COVERED MY LIFE COMPREHENSIVELY FROM BEGINNING TO DATE. AS I SAY, I AM AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE COMMITTEE.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS FOR JUDGE SANDERS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU SO MUCH. JUDGE CURETON. FOR THE RECORD, SO THAT EVERYONE WILL KNOW EXACTLY HOW WE ARE OPERATING TODAY, WE WILL NOT TAKE ANY VOTES TODAY. WE WILL GET THE TRANSCRIPTS BACK OF THIS HEARING; SO, AT THE CONCLUSION OF YOUR TESTIMONY, IF YOU WISH TO LEAVE, YOU MAY CERTAINLY BE EXCUSED.

(THE HONORABLE JASPER M. CURETON, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Jasper M. Cureton
Home Address: Business Address:
911 Old Manor Road P.O. Box 11629
Columbia, SC 29210 Columbia, SC 29211

2. He was born in Walhalla on April 26, 1938.

Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He was married to Joan Milligan Cureton on December 31, 1979. There is a divorce action pending where he is the moving party.
He has two children (the first by a former marriage): Indira Desree, age 23 (instructor at Upstate Theater); Jason Marshall, age 5.

5. Military Service: He served on active military duty February 1961 to February 1963. QM, 1st Lt., 05310495. In June of 1990 he retired from the US Army Reserve after 30 years of service, holding rank of Col. JAG Corps.

6. He attended SC State College, 1956-60, earning a BSA Degree. He did graduate work at SC State from 1963-64 and attended SC State College Law School, 1964-65. He transferred to USC Law School, attending from 1965-67, and earned his Juris Doctor.

7. While in college he was an officer in Alpha Kappa Mu Honor Society, Senior Class Vice President, member of Omega Psi Fraternity, Scabbard and Blade Military Honor Society and others. In law school he was a member of Wig and Robe.

8. He has attended all judicial continuing education seminars sponsored by the Bar during the last 5 years. He has attended numerous lawyer continuing education seminars. He attended a 2-week seminar for Judges in New York in July 1985 and a 3-day seminar in Charleston in February 1989.

9. He has been invited to lecture at USC Law School next year. He has participated as a lecturer in several Bar Association Seminars to include those on Family Law, Military Law, Master-In-Equity, and Appellate Procedure.
10. Published books or articles written: He was one of the authors of the SC Appellate Practice Handbook. He authored the Bridge The Gap materials for Masters-In-Equity.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
June '67-Dec. '68 Legal Aid Service Agency, Staff Attorney

Jan. '69-Feb. '76 Private Practice, General

Feb. '76-Sept.'82 Master-In-Equity, Richland County
Sept.'82-Sept.'83 Family Court Judge
Sept.'83-present Associate, Judge, SC Court of Appeals

20. Judicial Office: Master-In-Equity, Richland County, February 1976-February 1982, appointed by Governor with consent of the Senate, to hear civil non-jury cases. He was elected by the General Assembly as a Family Court Judge in February, 1982 and as an Associate Judge on the Court of Appeals in July 1983.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) Hussey v. Hussey, 280 S.C. 418, 312 S.E.2d 267 (S.C. App. 1984). Judge Cureton issued the opinion of the court in this divorce action which dealt with issues of alimony, equitable distribution, and attorney fees. Most notably, the opinion discussed the nature of inherited property in equitable distribution.

(b) Todd v. S.C. Farm Bureau, 283 S.C. 155, 321 S.E.2d 602 (S.C. App. 1984), quashed, 287 S.C. 418, 336 S.E.2d 472 (1985) (as to one issue only). This action arose out of allegations of intentional interference of contractual relations and breach of an employment contract. Judge Cureton reversed the lower court, holding that an employee-at-will had no right to recover damages for termination of his employment on the basis of outrage, intentional interference with a contract, and bad faith termination of a contract.

(c) Anderson Cty. School District 1 v. Anderson Cty. Board of Education, 296 S.C. 260, 371 S.E.2d 807 (S.C. App. 1988). cert. dism., ___ S.C. ___, 388 S.E. 2d 815 (1990). Judge Cureton held that the board of education lacked the discretionary authority to disapprove the disbursal of capital improvement funds to school districts which were remitted by the state to the county treasurer.

(d) Martin v. Martin, 296 S.C. 436, 373 S.E.2d 706 (S.C. App. 1988). In this domestic case, Judge Cureton's opinion held that vested military retirement benefits constitute marital property and that a present cash value of lump-sum distribution of the wife's share of the husband's military pension did not work an inequity on the husband.

(e) Chavous v. Brown, 299 S.C. 398, 385 S.E.2d 206 (S.C. App. 1989), reversed, Opinion No. 23254 (Davis Advance Sheet No. 18 filed August 6, 1990). The Court of Appeals' holding, articulated by Judge Cureton, extended the application of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), which prohibits the exercise of peremptory challenges in a state criminal action in a racially discriminatory manner by the prosecutor, to state civil actions as well. That holding was later reversed by the S.C. Supreme Court.

22. Public Office: Zoning Board of Adjustment, City of Columbia, appointed by City Council, served 1972-76.

24. Other occupation, business or profession:
Teacher, McCrarey Liston High School, Blair,SC, August 1963-September 1964; Social Investigator, New York City, May 1960-February 1961 and February 1963-August 1963.

31. Sued professionally: In his capacity as Master-In-Equity, but none alleged that he was personally guilty of any wrong doing and none were decided against him. Sued also as member of Court of Appeals, Green v. Sanders, et al., 3:89-2117-OK (U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of S.C.). The suit was promptly dismissed.
Sued personally: He was the plaintiff in the proceeding which resulted in his divorce from his first wife. He is presently the plaintiff in a proceeding in which he is seeking divorce from his second wife. She has counterclaimed and the matter is now being litigated, involving the issue of child custody as well as other ancillary issues. DSS has been made a party in connection with the issue of child custody.

33. His health is generally good. He wears glasses to correct near sightedness and is being treated for mild hypertension by Dr. Albert Humphrey of Columbia. His last physical was in November, 1989.

39. Bar Associations and Professional Organizations:
Richland County Bar Association, SC Bar Association, American Trial Lawyers Association, American Bar Association.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations: Omega Psi Phi Fraternity; Elks; Zion Baptist Church, Trustee Board; United Way of the Midlands, Board of Directors; Sandhills Academy, Advisory Board; Boys Club of Columbia, Board of Directors; YWCA, Advisory Board; USC School of Medicine, Advisory Board; USC Law School, Minority Advisory Board.

42. Five letters of reference:

(a) Andre Lewis, President, Victory Savings Bank

1545 Sumter Street, Columbia, SC 29201

(b) I. S. Leevy Johnson, Esquire

1108 Blanding Street, Columbia, SC 29201

(c) Silas Evans, Evans Accounting Service

7430 Fairfield Road, Columbia, SC 29203

(d) Osborne E. Powell, Jr., Administrative Law Judge

Strom Thurmond Building, Columbia, SC

(e) Rev. A. W. Goforth, Pastor, Zion Baptist Church

801 Washington Street, Columbia, SC 29201

JUDGE CURETON: MAY I SIT, ALSO?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: YES, INDEED.

Q. JUDGE CURETON, YOU'VE REAPPLIED TO RECEIVE YOUR SEAT WHICH IS NUMBER SIX ON THE COURT OF APPEALS WHICH YOU WERE INITIALLY ELECTED TO IN 1983; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AND HAVE YOU FOUND ANYTHING THAT NEEDS TO BE CLARIFIED OR ELABORATED UPON IN SUMMARY OF YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE?
A. NO, I DON'T THINK SO. I, LIKE JUDGE SANDERS, I OVER-LOOKED A 1976 FORECLOSURE ACTION WHERE I WAS MADE A PARTY BY VIRTUE OF AN INTEREST IN SOME REAL ESTATE. IT WAS IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT. I THINK I WAS DISMISSED AS A PARTY. I DON'T BELIEVE IT RESULTED IN ANY JUDGMENT AGAINST ME.
Q. THAT'S RIGHT, SIR. THAT'S WHAT OUR RECORDS INDICATE. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORT THERE WERE NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW; AND THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION REPORTS NO REPRIMANDS. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WELL AS THE RECORDS OF THE RICHLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE COLUMBIA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. ALSO FOUND TO BE NEGATIVE WERE THE SLED RECORDS SECTION CHECK AND FBI FINGERPRINT CARD CHECK. AS FAR AS JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS IN WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN A PARTY, YOU'VE JUST ALLUDED TO ONE. ALSO, IN RICHLAND COUNTY YOU WERE THE PLAINTIFF IN A DIVORCE ACTION BACK IN 1979, 1980; I BELIEVE THAT WAS DISCLOSED; AND YOU'RE CURRENTLY IN LITIGATION IN FAMILY COURT INVOLVING A SECOND DIVORCE; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT IS CORRECT.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. AND BESIDES THE 1976 FORECLOSURE ACTION YOU JUST ALLUDED TO, YOU WERE ALSO A PARTY IN THE 1989 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION BY THE INMATE THAT JUDGE SANDERS SPOKE OF.
A. RIGHT.
Q. AND THAT WAS DISMISSED BY JUDGE PERRY.
A. YES.
Q. FINANCIAL INFORMATION: YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST DOES NOT INDICATE ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS; AND THE COMMITTEE WAS SATISFIED WITH YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT AND CREDIT REPORTS. YOU NOTED THAT YOUR HEALTH WAS GOOD AND THAT YOUR LAST PHYSICAL WAS IN 1989. AS WITH JUDGE SANDERS, YOU WERE SCREENED, I BELIEVE, LAST IN 1985.
A. YES.
Q. PRIOR TO THAT, IN 1983 WHEN YOU WERE FIRST ELECTED TO THE BENCH.
A. YES, SIR.
Q. THERE HAVE BEEN NO COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS RECEIVED IN REGARD TO YOUR CANDIDACY AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY TODAY IN REGARD TO YOUR REELECTION. ARE THERE ANY STATEMENTS YOU WOULD LIKE TO MAKE TO THE COMMITTEE AT THIS TIME OR ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO ELABORATE UPON ON YOUR APPLICATION?
A. NO, SIR.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: DOES ANY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS FOR JUDGE CURETON?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: IF NOT, THANK YOU.

THE REPORTER: CHAIRMAN ROGERS, COULD I REQUEST THAT IF THEY ARE SEATED THAT THEY MOVE OVER JUST A LITTLE BIT SO THAT I CAN SEE THEIR FACES?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WOULD YOU PREFER THAT THEY SIT OVER HERE? WE'LL DO THAT.

THE REPORTER: THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: JUDGE ANDERSON.

(HONORABLE RALPH KING ANDERSON, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Ralph King Anderson

Home Address: Business Address:

2997 Pamplico Hghwy P.O. Box 1562

Florence, SC 29505 Florence, SC 29503

2. He was born in Florence County on November 13, 1936.

Social Security: ***-**-*****

4. He has been married to Loretta Lynch Anderson since August 31, 1957. They have two children: Ralph King,III (Assistant Attorney General); Debra Arlene Anderson Vause (Part-time music teacher and church pianist).

5. Military Service: None

6. He attended Clemson 1954-56, receiving ninety credits, and transferred directly to USC Law School under an arrangement existing at that time. He attended USC Law School 1956-59, receiving an LLB Degree, which was changed to Juris Doctor September 3, l970.

7. Extracurricular activities were severely limited, due to financial situation. While at Clemson he worked as a bellhop at the Clemson Hotel while taking a full academic load and making the Dean's List. While at USC Law School, he worked two jobs: page in the Senate and law clerk at a Columbia law firm.

8. Continuing legal/judicial education: He attended the Judicial College in Reno, Nevada for a week and has attended numerous Legal/Judicial Seminars conducted at USC Law School and other locations.

9. Courses taught or lectures given:
He has taught many courses on law and has lectured on numerous occasions. Illustrative of the yearly activities is his schedule for 1990 only:

January 9, 1990 Law School for Non Lawyers

An Overview of the SC Court System

Sponsored by the South Carolina Bar

Charleston, South Carolina;
April 3, 1990 Law School for Non Lawyers
An Overview of the SC Court System
Sponsored by the South Carolina Bar
Florence, South Carolina;
March 5, 1990 Bridge The Gap - SC Law School, Nuts and Bolts, Sponsored by the South Carolina Bar;
July 30, 1990, Bridge The Gap/SC Law School Nuts and Bolts Sponsored by the South Carolina Bar;
August 22, 1990 SC Judicial Conference Lecture on Model Jury Charge in Death Penalty Cases, The materials and lecture were sponsored by a special Judicial Committee chaired by Justice A. Lee Chandler, Columbia, South Carolina;
August 22, 1990 Law Clerks' and Staff Attorneys' Conference Lecture on Ethics
Columbia, South Carolina;
September 7, 1990 Legal Ethics and Lawyer's Malpractice Seminar, Lecture on Common Pleas Perspective;
October 19, 1990 SC Criminal Practice Seminar University of South Carolina Law School Columbia, South Carolina;
October 26, 1990 Conference on Civil Trial Advocacy University of South Carolina Law School Columbia, South Carolina.

10. Published books or articles: "Nuts and Bolts" published by the Continuing Legal Education Division of the South Carolina Bar in 1989 for use in the CLE Seminar, Bridge the Gap, a one-week course required by the SC Supreme Court for applicants to the Bar. He has written numerous materials for use at Judicial/Legal Seminars. One example, prepared for the 1990 Law Clerks' and Staff Attorneys' Seminar, is a 512 page publication on "Ethics."

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
Practiced law in Columbia with R.K. Wise, July, 1959-December, 1959.
Opened practice in Florence in December, 1959, running through 1960.
Most of 1961 he practiced law in Marion under a share arrangement with Waddell Byrd.
Yarborough, Parrott and Anderson, December 1961-September 1979.
Sworn in as Circuit Judge, September 1979, serving continuously since.

20. Judicial Office: At-Large Circuit Court Judge, September 14, 1979, serving continuously until present.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) State v. James Russell Cain, 377 S.E.2d 556 (S.C. 1988).
This is a Death Penalty Case. Numerous issues were involved in this trial relating to the Death Penalty law. The Defendant received the Death Penalty. The Supreme Court affirmed this Death Penalty trial. Certiorari has been denied by the United States Supreme Court.

(b) Alvin Davis, Jr. v. The State of South Carolina, (Docket Number 85-CP-40-1771). This case was tried in Richland County and involved the unique scenario wherein Davis had been convicted of serious crimes, including armed robbery. By an administrative snafu, Davis was released from jail through an error without serving his jail time. Davis was arrested approximately ten (10) years after his original conviction. My Order disposes of numerous due process and constitutional issues. The order was reported by the National Law Journal in detail, including interviews of legal scholars on the subject. After filing Notice of Intent to Appeal, the State dismissed its appeal from the Order.

(c) Dillon County School District Number Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc., et al. 332 S.E.2d 555 (Court of Appeals 1985, Certiorari denied by the South Carolina Supreme Court). This case involves the application of the Statute of Limitations to a roofing case. The discovery rule is discussed in detail in this matter.

(d) Columbia East Associates, a Limited Partnership, v. BiLo, Inc. 386 S.E.2d 259 (Court of Appeals, 1989). This case involves an action initiated by shopping center against the Defendant supermarket alleging breach of commercial lease and violation of Unfair Trade Practices Act.

(e) Karen E. Rushton v. Allstate Insurance Company, Robert E. Pierce, III, and Brentwood Baptist Church (Docket Number 89-CP-10-1922). This is a declaratory judgment action involving the construction of a liability insurance policy. The case is on appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court.

22. Public Office: Elected to SC House of Representatives from Florence County, 1972, serving continuously till elected Judge in 1979.

23. Was defeated as a candidate for the House in 1962 and again in 1970 by less than 200 votes.

31. Sued: Sued by a Pro Se litigant along with several other court officials and judges in Donald J. Strable vs. The State of South Carolina; Clyde N. Davis, Jr., Clerk of Court, et al #6:89-1533-17K. The litigant alleged various matters in regard to numerous rulings made by different judges. Judge Anderson made one ruling in one case. The lawsuit was dismissed by US District Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr. in July, 1989. It was appealed to the US Court of Appeals and dismissed finally on February 1, 1990.

33. His Health is excellent. He wears eyeglasses and takes medicine for gout. His last physical was April, 1990 by Dr. E.C. O'Bryan.

39. Bar Associations and Professional Organizations: South Carolina Bar Association, Florence County Bar Association, SC Circuit Judges Association, SC Inn of Court.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations: Member, General Board of SC Baptist Convention, 1971-75; Chairman of Board of Deacons, Greenwood Baptist Church, Florence 1968-75; Board of Trustees, Bethea Baptist Home, 1976-81; Moderator, Florence Baptist Association, 1968-70; President, Southside High School PTSA, 1971-73; President, Greenwood Elementary School PTA, 1966-68; Chairman, County Democratic Party, 1966-70; Chairman, County Board of Registration, 1971-72; Board of Directors, SC Citizens for Life, 1975-79 and Chairman of Board of Deacons of Unity Baptist Church of Florence, two terms, 1978-81, 1988- .

42. Five letters of reference:

(a) Ashpy Lowrimore, Senior Vice Pres., Southern National Bank P.O. Box 1351, Florence, SC 29503

(b) Honorable Billie G. Richardson, Clerk of Court, Horry Co. P.O. Box 677, Conway, SC 29526
(c) Honorable William C. Barnes, Sheriff, Florence County

Drawer P Room 703, City-County Complex, Florence, SC 29501

(d) Dr. William T. Monroe, Pastor, Florence Baptist Temple, 2308 South Irby Street, Florence, SC 29501

(e) Honorable Joyce A. Jinnette, Clerk of Court, Dillon County P.O. Box 1220, Dillon, SC 29536

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: IF YOU DON'T MIND, MOVE OVER SO THE REPORTER CAN HEAR YOU WELL. I KNOW THAT SHE COULD IN ANY EVENT.

Q. JUDGE ANDERSON, YOU ARE SEEKING REELECTION TO THE CIRCUIT COURT AT LARGE SEAT NUMBER ONE; IS THAT CORRECT, SIR?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. IN REVIEWING YOUR PERSONAL DATA QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY, DID YOU FIND ANYTHING THAT NEEDED TO BE CLARIFIED OR ELABORATED?
A. YES, SIR. I WAS A PARTY TO A MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT THAT I HAD FORGOTTEN. THE WAY I GOT TO BE A PARTY WAS I HAD IN 1977 OBTAINED AN ATTORNEY FEE OF $250 FROM JUDGE MCGOWAN WHILE I REPRESENTED A LADY NAMED JUANITA M. KEEFE. THAT APPARENTLY MADE ME A PARTY TO THIS, ACCORDING TO THE FILE THAT I FINALLY FOUND. I NEVER RECEIVED MY ATTORNEY FEE AND I FORGOT THAT ACTION WAS PENDING AGAINST ME BUT IT WAS--THE ONLY INTEREST I HAD WAS THAT $250 ATTORNEY FEE THAT JUDGE MCGOWAN HAD GIVEN ME IN THAT ACTION. IN REGARD TO SOME OTHER LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURT, I DO WANT TO MAKE SOME COMMENTS BECAUSE I DO NOT BELIEVE I WAS A PARTY. AFTER I RECEIVED THIS NOTICE, I HAVE INVESTIGATED AND FOUND NO SERVICE IN REGARD TO THOSE CASES AND I WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON THOSE.
Q. YES, SIR.
A. SHALL I DO THAT NOW?
Q. YES, SIR, YOU MAY.
A. ALL RIGHT. I WAS A LITTLE AMAZED WHEN I GOT THE LIST ABOUT THESE CASES WHERE I WAS A PARTY BECAUSE I KNEW I DID NOT KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THEM; AND IN REGARD TO CV-85-2730, IT'S A CASE OF ROBERT L. WILSON VERSUS CITY OF GREENVILLE, MAYOR WILLIAM WORKMAN AND RALPH KING ANDERSON, JR. THIS WAS AN ACTION FILED IN FEDERAL COURT RELATING TO A LOCAL SIGN ORDINANCE IN THE CITY OF GREENVILLE. THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT WAS FILED ON OCTOBER 10, '85. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE WILKINS DISMISSED THE ACTION 14 DAYS LATER ON OCTOBER 24, 1985. THE RECORDS MAINTAINED AT THE DISTRICT COURT INDICATE THAT I WAS NEVER SERVED. ALSO, THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS NO CASE FILE OR RECORDS IN THIS ACTION. WE HAVE VERIFIED THAT. I HAVE A LETTER FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IN THAT REGARD.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR.
A. IN REGARD TO CV-86-1444, THAT WAS AN INMATE BY THE NAME OF JASPER BUCHANAN WHERE HE SUED GOVERNOR RICHARD RILEY, TRAVIS MEDLOCK, WILLIAM LEEKE, THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WOODROW LEWIS, THE CHIEF JUSTICE, DONALD ZELENKA, THE CHIEF DEPUTY PROSECUTOR, RALPH KING ANDERSON, JR., AND OTHERS. IT WAS A PRO SE ACTION BROUGHT BY AN INMATE OF THE STATE CORRECTIONS DEPARTMENT. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE GAMBRELL RECOMMENDED DISMISSAL CONCLUDING THAT THE ACTION WAS FRIVOLOUS ON JUNE 3, 1986. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE BLATT ENTERED JUDGMENT FOR ALL DEFENDANTS ON JULY 16, 1986. ACCORDING TO THE DOCKET SHEET AT THE DISTRICT COURT, THE DEFENDANTS WERE NEVER SERVED. HE WAS NEVER GIVEN PERMISSION TO SERVE THOSE DEFENDANTS ACCORDING TO MY RECORDS. AND I HAVE FURTHER VERIFIED WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE THAT THERE ARE SEVERAL FILES PENDING AGAINST INDIVIDUALS BROUGHT BY JASPER; I'M NOT INVOLVED IN ANY OF THOSE. I REMEMBER JASPER QUITE WELL BECAUSE I DID HIS POST CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING IN DARLINGTON; BUT I WAS NEVER SERVED IN THIS LAWSUIT AND I CERTAINLY DO NOT REMEMBER IT. CV-80-1640 WAS AN ACTION FILED BY ANNIE MAE TIMMONS, WHO LIVES IN COLUMBIA, AGAINST ALL MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE. THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE GAMBRELL ADVISED THE PLAINTIFF THAT A VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WOULD BE DIRECTED BECAUSE THE DEFENDANTS WERE NEVER SERVED; OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MAGISTRATE GAMBRELL GAVE THE PLAINTIFF A CERTAIN NUMBER OF DAYS TO SERVE THE DEFENDANTS PROPERLY. THIS LETTER WAS DATED JULY 27, 1982. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE WILKINS ISSUED AN ORDER DATED OCTOBER 13, '82 STAYING THE CASE FOR SIX MONTHS IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE PLAINTIFF TO PETITION TO REOPEN IT FOR SERVICE OR IT WOULD BE DISMISSED. THIS IS THE LAST ENTRY IN THE FILE. THE RECORDS AT THE DISTRICT COURT INDICATE THE DEFENDANTS WERE NEVER SERVED. CV-82-401 IS JASPER BUCHANAN AGAIN AND IN THAT ONE HE SUED--APPARENTLY TRIED TO SUE ME AS JUDGE, SIDNEY TYSON, HIS LAWYER THEN AND DONALD, REPRESENTING THE STATE THEN. THIS WAS A PRO SE HABEAS CORPUS BROUGHT BY THE INMATE. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE GAMBRELL RECOMMENDED DISMISSAL MARCH 1, 1982. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE HEMPHILL DISMISSED THE CASE ON APRIL 5, '82, SOME FEW DAYS LATER. THE DISTRICT COURT RECORDS INDICATE THE DEFENDANTS LISTED IN THAT CASE WERE NEVER SERVED. AND I HAVE THAT INFORMATION. I WAS UNAWARE OF THAT. MY NAME WAS LISTED IN THOSE LAWSUITS BUT I DO NOTE THAT IT WAS LISTED WITH VARIOUS OTHER PEOPLE LIKE THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE GOVERNOR.
Q. YES, SIR.
A. NOW THERE'S ONE SUIT THAT I MADE YOU AWARE OF AND THAT'S THE ONE THAT WAS SERVED AND THAT'S TO MR. STRABLE. HE'S A PRO SE FROM AROUND GRAY COURT. HE SUED ME; HE SUED THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE STATE SUPREME COURT; HE SUED SIX CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES. AND HE SERVED ME BY MAIL AND I DID RECEIVE THAT. I HAVE GIVEN YOU A COPY OF THE ORDER OF JUDGE JOE ANDERSON DISMISSING THE CASE. I AM NOT RELATED TO JOE ANDERSON. AND I GAVE YOU A COPY OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT THAT DISMISSED THE CASE IN REGARD TO MR. STRABLE. MY NEXUS WITH THAT WAS I WAS DOWN IN FLORENCE AS THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE AND I CALLED THE DOCKET AND MR. STRABLE HAD A CASE ON THE DOCKET; HE DIDN'T SHOW UP. SO THE NEXT DOCKET, I CALLED IT THEN AND HE DIDN'T SHOW UP; SO, I ASKED BERNICE PARKER, THE DEPUTY CLERK TO WRITE HIM A PERSONAL LETTER THAT IF HE DIDN'T SHOW UP, I WAS GOING TO DISMISS HIS CASE. AND SURE ENOUGH, I DISMISSED IT WITHOUT PREJUDICE BY THE WAY, AND I GOT SUED. I DID GET SUED, AND IT HAS BEEN DISMISSED BY THE FEDERAL COURT AND IT HAS BEEN DISMISSED BY THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.
Q. YES, SIR. WE APPRECIATE YOUR ELABORATION ON THAT, JUDGE ANDERSON; AND IF YOU WANT TO, AT THE END OF THE HEARING OR THE END OF YOUR SCREENING, HAND THOSE MATERIALS UP, WE WILL BE GLAD TO TAKE THEM.
A. THERE THEY ARE, SIR.
Q. FURTHER REVIEW ON YOUR RECORD, THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE HAVE FOUND NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW AND THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPRIMANDS AGAINST YOU FILED WITH THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION WHILE ON THE BENCH. ALL RECORDS ARE FOUND TO BE CLEAR WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS ON YOUR DRIVING RECORD; ALSO, WITH THE FLORENCE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE FLORENCE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, AS WELL AS WITH SLED AND THE FBI. I BELIEVE YOU HAVE COVERED ALL THE LAWSUITS IN WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN A NAMED PARTY, WHETHER SERVED OR NOT. AND YOUR FINANCIAL INFORMATION THAT WAS DISCLOSED TO THE COMMITTEE SHOWS THAT YOU HAVE NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS AS SHOWN BY YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST. WE HAVE ALSO REVIEWED YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT AND YOUR CREDIT REPORT AND FIND THEM TO BE IN GOOD ORDER. YOUR LAST SCREENING, I BELIEVE, WAS ALSO, IN 1985?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AND YOU WERE FIRST ELECTED TO THE BENCH IN 1979.
A. YES, SIR.
Q. I WOULD LIKE TO NOTE FOR THE RECORD THAT AS FAR AS ANY STATEMENTS RECEIVED, WE DID RECEIVE AN AFFIDAVIT FROM ATTORNEY DAVE MASSEY. IT WAS VERY FAVORABLE. AND MR. MASSEY DID CALL AND ASK WHETHER HE NEEDED TO TESTIFY OR NOT AND I DID INFORM HIM THAT THERE WERE NO ADVERSE STATEMENTS OR AFFIDAVITS FILED AND THAT WE WOULD JUST MAKE SURE THAT HIS AFFIDAVIT WAS MADE A PART OF THE RECORD.
A. ALL RIGHT, SIR.
Q. ARE THERE ANY OTHER STATEMENTS OR ANY WORDS YOU WOULD LIKE TO SAY TO THE COMMITTEE?
A. NO, SIR.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS OF JUDGE ANDERSON?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, AGAIN.

JUDGE ANDERSON: THANK YOUR, SIR. GOOD TO SEE EVERYONE.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: JUDGE HOWELL.

(HONORABLE WILLIAM T. HOWELL, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. William Tindall Howell

Home Address Business Address

242 Overhill Drive P.O. Box 168

Walterboro, SC 29488 Walterboro, SC 29488

2. He was born March 8, 1941 in Walterboro.

Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He has been married since August 23, 1964 to Susan Gail Dooley. They have three children: Lesli Peyton Howell Pryor, age 24 (DSS in Walterboro); William T., Jr., age 22; John Asher, age 17.

5. Military Service: None

6. He attended Clemson, 1959-63, B.S. Degree in Animal Husbandry; USC School of Law, 1964-67, J.D. Degree Cum Laude.

7. In college he was the recipient of the Danford Fellowship awarded to one rising senior from each land grant college or university in the U.S. In USC Law School he was a member of the Order of Wig & Robe; was given the American Jurisprudence award for excellence in Constitutional Law & Torts; was runner up in the Prince Competition in Appellate Advocacy; graduated second in class.

8. He has met all requirements for CLE and met all Judicial Conferences.

9. He made presentations at the 1989 and '90 annual Judicial Conferences, at the SC Defense Lawyers Association and twice in 1989 at the Charleston County Bar Association CLE. He was a speaker at JCLE programs twice in 1985 and from 1981 to the present he has been a member of the clinical faculty at Harvard Law School teaching Trial Advocacy to third year law students.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:

April 1967-69 Practiced law in Walterboro with Thomas M. Howell, Jr.

June 1969-79 Partnership with Gerald C. Smoak, adding partners Auburn J. Bridge, Lee Pay Moody and associate Paul N. Siegel.

1979-present Circuit Court Judge-at-Large

20. Judicial Office:
1971-72 Elected by City Council to be City Recorder, City Court, Walterboro (traffic violations and misdemeanors)
1979-present Elected by General Assembly to be Circuit Court Judge-at-Large Seat #2

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:
(a) Allen E. VAUGHAN, William A. Vaughan,Tom S. Bruce, and James R. Mann, Respondents v. James T. KALYVAS and Anne B. Kalyvas, Appellants. 342 S.E. (2d) 617. Judge Howell, as Administrative Judge, heard this case on appeal arising out of an action to recover on a promissory note for $45,000. The issue of usury was central.

(b) Betty SLIGH, Administratrix of the Estate of Martha Murphy, Appellant v. James H. Johnson, Jr., M.D., and Stanmore E. Reed, M.D., Respondents. 342 S.E. (2d) 620. This case was appealed in a survival and wrongful death action involving alleged medical malpractice in which the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Respondents. The appeal for a new trial hinged on the ground that the trial judge erred in admitting the results of a drug screen for which a complete chain of evidence had not been established. The reviewing court affirmed the trial judge's denial of the original motion.

(c) Jack L. CHANDLER, Deceased Employee, Millie M. Chandler, Widow, Jack L. Chandler, Jr., Son, and Pamela Chandler Hopkins, Daughter, Claimants, of whom Millie M. Chandler is Appellant v. SUITT CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Employer, and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company,Carrier, Respondents. Appeal of Millie M. CHANDLER. 343 S.E. (2d) 633. This appeals the Circuit Court's reversal of the Industrial Commission's decision to award worker's compensation benefits in a claim alleging Mr. Chandler died in an auto accident which arose out of and in the course of his employment. The sole question on appeal was whether the death was proximately caused by his intoxication, a complete defense and bar to recovery. Judge Howell reversed the order of the Circuit Judge, agreeing with the Commission that the Respondents failed to prove by the preponderance of evidence either that the deceased was intoxicated or that intoxication was the proximate cause of his accident.

(d) THE MAYOR'S HOUSE, Inc., Respondent v. Albert MOSSERI, Soloman Mosseri and Soloman Castro, Appellants. In this case the Respondent leased commercial property from Appellants, then sued, alleging their construction work on adjacent property damaged the leased property and the Respondent's business. Appellants moved to add previous lessees as third party defendants, alleging that an invalid lease assignment precluded any recovery by Respondent. Howell affirmed the trial judge's denial of their motion.

(e) Dorchester County School District Three, Leon Addison, Ellis Boyd, Jr., William Boyd, Jr., Gladys Gardner, Nancy Hargrove, Rachel Jenkins, and Larry Marchant, in their official capacity as members of the Board of Trustees with Dorchester county School District Three, Plaintiffs, vs. Dorchester County Council, et al., Defendants. C.A. No. 85-CP-18-528. In this case strong disagreement between the Dorchester County School District Three and Dorchester County Council led to failure of the School Board to present a budget to Council that complied with the EFA, to the failure of council to act on a budget as required, or to comply with the ministerial function of a minimum effort of local funding (by way of tax millage) required by the EFA to qualify for state funding. Judge Howell issued a Writ of Mandamus compelling these actions.

22. Public Office: He was elected to the State Senate, 1977-79.

24. Other occupation, business or profession:
Between undergraduate and law school, he was employed by Clemson Extension Service as assistant county agent in Bamberg. From 1975-79 he owned a one-half interest in a restaurant. He was formerly on the Board of Directors and President of State Savings & Loan Association, Walterboro. He is a timber farmer.

25. He is presently a general partner in Howell Farms, A Partnership (timber farm).

31. Sued: He was a Plaintiff in an action as an organizer and director of State Savings and Loan Association of Walterboro -vs- the Directors of First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Walterboro in the Court of Common Pleas. The cause of action was malicious delay of their application to establish an additional savings and loan association in Walterboro. The action was answered by the Defendants and a counterclaim was served on the Plaintiffs. State Savings was eventually chartered and at present is operational and the suit was dismissed by a consent of parties with prejudice.

33. He is presently in good health; his most recent physical having occurred in 1989. In April 1989 he had surgery for a ruptured appendix and was out of work for approximately five weeks. He has mild nearsightedness and mild high blood pressure.

39. Bar Associations and Professional Organizations:
American Bar Association; SC Bar Association and Colleton County Bar Association.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
Bethel United Methodist Church; Clemson Alumni Association.
42. He feels he has the character, integrity and temperament to fill the position.

42. Five letters of recommendation:

(a) Michael G. Davenport, Vice President, C&S National Bank P.O. Drawer 1188, Walterboro, SC 29488

(b) Morris D. Rosen, Esquire

P.O. Box 893, Charleston, SC 29402

(c) Senator Edward E. Saleeby

P.O. Box 519, Hartsville, SC 29550

(d) D. Reese Williams, III, Esquire

P.O. Box 944, Columbia, SC 29202

(e) Thomas E. McCutchen, Esquire

P.O. Drawer 11209, Columbia, SC 29211-1209

(f) Colleton County Bar Association

Q. JUDGE, YOU HAVE REAPPLIED FOR THE CIRCUIT COURT AT LARGE SEAT NUMBER TWO WHICH YOU WERE FIRST ELECTED TO IN 1979; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT, YES.
Q. IN REVIEWING THE SUMMARY OF YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE, DID YOU FIND ANYTHING THAT WE MIGHT NEED TO CLARIFY OR ELABORATE?
A. I FOUND ONE THING THIS MORNING. I POINTED IT OUT TO MRS. TURNIPSEED AND SHE HAS NOTED IT.
Q. ALL RIGHT, IT WILL BE NOTED IN THE RECORD. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE INFORMS US THERE HAVE BEEN NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE YOU PRACTICED LAW. LIKEWISE, THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPRIMANDS ISSUED BY THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION WHILE YOU HAVE BEEN ON THE BENCH. YOUR DRIVING RECORD, AS WELL AS THE RECORDS OF THE COUNTY SHERIFF FOR COLLETON COUNTY AND WALTERBORO CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT ARE ALSO CLEAR, AS WELL AS THE RECORDS OF SLED AND THE FBI. IN REGARD TO ANY JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS THAT MIGHT BE FILED IN WHICH YOU WERE A PARTY, THERE WAS ONE STATE COURT ACTION AND ONE FEDERAL COURT ACTION WHICH HAVE BOTH BEEN DISMISSED. I BELIEVE THE FEDERAL COURT ACTION WAS A CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION AGAINST ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE. I BELIEVE JUDGE ANDERSON REFERRED TO THAT IN 1980 AND IT WAS DISMISSED. AND THERE WAS A CASE IN WHICH YOU WERE A PLAINTIFF, I BELIEVE, IN A SAVINGS AND LOAN CASE AND YOU DEFENDED ON A CROSS-CLAIM---
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ---ON A DELAY OF CHARTER APPLICATION.
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AND THAT WAS DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE BY CONSENT OF THE PARTIES; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. ALL RIGHT; WE FOUND NO OTHER RECORDS OF LAWSUITS IN WHICH YOU WERE A PARTY. FINANCIALLY YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST SHOWS NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS; AND THE COMMITTEE WAS SATISFIED WITH THE FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT AND THE CREDIT REPORTS THAT WERE SUBMITTED. YOUR HEALTH IS REPORTED AS GOOD AND YOUR LAST PHYSICAL WAS IN 1989. YOUR LAST SCREENING WAS IN 1984 OR '85; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. '85, YES.
Q. '85; AND AS STATED EARLIER, YOU WERE FIRST ELECTED IN 1979, IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES.
Q. LIKEWISE, WITH JUDGE ANDERSON, ATTORNEY DAVE MASSEY ALSO SUBMITTED AN AFFIDAVIT ON YOUR BEHALF QUITE FAVORABLE AND I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT THERE WOULDN'T BE ANY REASON FOR HIM TO TESTIFY, THAT WE WOULD JUST MAKE THAT AFFIDAVIT A PART OF YOUR RECORD.
A. THANK YOU, SIR.
Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY STATEMENT YOU WOULD LIKE TO MAKE TO THE COMMITTEE OR ANY OTHER WORDS?
A. NO, SIR. I WILL BE GLAD TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS.
Q. REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS FOR JUDGE HOWELL. IF NOT, THANK YOU, SIR.

JUDGE HOWELL: THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: JUDGE SHULER.

(HONORABLE M. DUANE SHULER, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Malcolm Duane Shuler

Home Address: Business Address:

Rt. 2. Box 29 #2 Courthouse Square P.O. Box 708

Kingstree, SC 29556 Kingstree, SC 29556

2. He was born in Kingstree, South Carolina on May 9, 1948.

Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He was married to Glenda Brown Shuler on June 6, 1970. They have two children: Jonathan Duane, age 17 and Elizabeth Brown, age 14.

5. Military Service: None.

6. He attended Clemson University from l966-70, earning a B.A. degree. He earned a JD degree from USC School of Law in l973 (1970-73).

8. He has attended the required CLE Seminars, Seminars relative to criminal defense, and more recently attended the Solicitors' Conference (1988,1989).

12. Legal Experience since graduation from law school: General practice with emphasis on insurance Tort claims, real estate, criminal practice.

1973-1979 Town Recorder

1980-1988 Public Defender

1988-now Assistant Solicitor

October 1, 1990 Circuit Court Judge

14. Frequency of appearances in court:

Federal - infrequent

State - very frequent

Other - Bankruptcy, Industrial Commission -- occasionally

15. Percentage of litigation:

Civil: 60% Criminal: 25% Domestic: 15%

16. Percentage of cases in trial courts:

Jury: 70% Non-Jury: 30%
Tried numerous cases as sole counsel, but has associated or been associated in approximately 40% of cases tried. A number of civil cases were tried with partner. Criminal cases were tried as co-public defender.

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) State v. Clifton McKnight. 291 SC 110 (1987), 255 SE 2d 471, through appellate process. Significant recent decision regarding search and seizure.

(b) State v. Nathaniel Williams. 90-MO-045 (recent cite), through trial court. Significant death penalty matter. (Associated with other attorneys.)

(c) State vs. Eddie Dean Wilson -- Death Penalty. (Associated with other attorneys.)

(d) State v. Benadad White. Through trial prosecution of local drug dealer.

(e) State v. Robert Gamble. Through trial prosecution of murderer.

18. Civil appeals:

(a) Travelers Insurance Co., and Aetna Insurance Co. vs. John David Floyd and J. D. Floyd. Defense through trial court and Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, #86-3859 (1987). Declaratory Judgment Action with Counter claim (Associated with other attorneys.)

(b) Harry J. Norwood, Deceased Employee, Sandra G. Norwood vs. American Tobacco Company, Employer, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Carrier, and Michelle Denise Lowder, G.A.L. for Josephine Marie Lowder, a Minor. S.C. Court of Appeals, Opinion No. 1224, October 24, l988.

(c) Carl P. Baker vs. Coastal States Life Insurance Company. S.C. Supreme Court Memorandum No. 85-MO-55, filed March 20, l985.

(d) Orie Grannison vs. Toney Graham, Jr., M.D. S.C. Supreme Court Case No. 88-CP-21-738, in process.

(e) Janie Scott, et al. vs. G. B. Boyle. citation unknown. S.C. Supreme Court -- tax title.

20. Judicial Office: From l973-79 he was City Recorder of the City of Kingstree, SC; elected to Circuit Court At Large Seat #3, May, 30, l990 to begin service October 1, l990.

27. He is unaware of any potential conflict of interest. He owns beach property with law partner, which, if necessary, he would convey interest in to third person.

33. Health is excellent. He has never had a complete physical.

39. Bar and professional organizations: South Carolina Bar Association.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social, and fraternal organizations: Board of Deacons, Williamsburg Presbyterian Church; Session, Williamsburg Presbyterian Church; Member, State Advisory Board for the SC Aquarium, Marine Science Museum.

42. Five letters of reference:

(a) Alan K. Chandler, Vice-President

Williamsburg First National Bank

P.O. Box 1066, Kingstree, SC 29556

(b) William H. Chandler, Esquire

P.O. Box 218, Hemingway, SC 29554

(c) Jack M. Edwards

108 S. Academy Street, Kingstree, SC 29556

(d) J. D. O'Bryan, Jr., Esquire

P.O. Drawer 1105, Kingstree, SC 29556

(e) Wendell O. Brown, Esquire

P.O. Box 708, Kingstree, SC 29556

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: IT'S ALMOST AS THOUGH YOU JUST LEFT US.

JUDGE SHULER: YES, SIR, GLAD TO BE BACK.

Q. JUDGE SHULER, YOU REAPPLIED FOR THE AT LARGE CIRCUIT SEAT NUMBER THREE WHICH YOU WERE ELECTED TO THIS PAST SPRING; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR
Q. DID YOU FIND ANYTHING THAT NEEDED TO BE CLARIFIED OR ELABORATED IN YOUR APPLICATION FORM?
A. NO, SIR.
Q. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW. IN THE LAST 16 DAYS OF YOUR TENURE ON THE BENCH THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPRIMANDS ISSUED BY THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WELL AS RECORDS IN YOUR NAME WITH THE WILLIAMSBURG COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE KINGSTREE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. LIKEWISE, THE SLED AND FBI RECORDS ARE ALSO NEGATIVE. THERE WERE FOUND TO BE NO JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS IN YOUR NAME; ALTHOUGH, JUDGING FROM THE PAST SCREENING APPLICANTS, YOU WILL PROBABLY GET SOME WHILE YOU ARE ON THE BENCH AT SOME TIME; NO FEDERAL OR STATE COURT JUDGMENTS OR ACTIONS. FINANCIAL INFORMATION: YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST DOES NOT INDICATE ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS AND YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT AND CREDIT REPORT WERE BOTH FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY, AS WELL AS YOUR HEALTH. YOU WERE LAST SCREENED IN MAY WHEN YOU WERE ELECTED AND I BELIEVE YOU ASSUMED YOUR DUTIES OCTOBER 1ST; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. IN LIEU OF THAT, IS THERE ANY OTHER THING YOU WOULD LIKE TO SAY TO THE COMMITTEE? THERE ARE NO WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY, NO COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS HAVE BEEN FILED.
A. NO, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS OF JUDGE SHULER?

REPRESENTATIVE MCEACHIN: YES, I DO. I NOTICE THAT JUDGE SHULER HAS IN HIS QUESTIONNAIRE IN THE APPEALS THAT HE HAS BEEN INVOLVED, CITED TRAVELERS VERSUS THE FLOYDS. I WOULD LIKE TO TELL THE COMMITTEE I WAS IN THAT CASE WITH JUDGE SHULER AND HE PULLED A RABBIT OUT OF THE HAT BY WINNING THAT CASE; I WILL HAVE TO SAY THAT.
A. I THOUGHT YOU WERE GOING TO CATCH ME. I WAS GOING TO SAY THAT I WAS PLANNING TO CARRY YOU BIRD HUNTING THIS YEAR; YOU BETTER NOT JUMP ME. THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, JUDGE. JUDGE MCGOWAN.

(HONORABLE FRANK P. MCGOWAN, JR., FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Frank P. McGowan, Jr.
Home Address: Business Address:
1723 North Main Suite 303, Greenville
Greenville, SC 29609 County Courthouse

Greenville, SC 29601

2. He was born in Columbia, June 22, 1934.

Social Security No.: ***-**-*****.

3. He has been married to Eugenia Bryant McGowan since March 28, 1959. They have two children: Frank P., III, age 30 (retail sales); Eugene Bryant, age 28 (insurance adjuster GAB).

5. Military Service: U.S. Army, September 1953-September 1955, service in Europe, attaining rank as Corporal, honor graduate of Special NCO Academy, Serial # US53203117, Honorable Discharge. S.C. National Guard 1956-59; attaining rank of Sergeant, Palmetto Officer Academy, first honor graduate. Cryto and secret clearance. Inactive reserves after 1959.

6. He entered USC in 1951 from 11th grade. Following a serious auto accident, he dropped several classes. He attended Davidson College, June 1952-May 1953. Continued eye problems and several operations, led to medical recommendation to avoid heavy reading. This led to military service interrupting schooling. USC 1955-58, recognition as an outstanding accounting student and subsequent B.S. Degree in accounting. USC School of Law 1958-61, LL.B. Degree; Juris Doctor, September 1970.

7. Activities in college/law school include Kappa Alpha Fraternity, pledge class officer; Phi Delta Phi Legal Fraternity; Freshman Honor Council representative in Law School.

8. He has attended all required JCLE programs except one held during a jury trial. He has also attended many legal seminars during trial lawyer and defense lawyer meetings. National Judicial College General Jurisdiction, graduate 4-week course, Reno, 1987.

9. For five years he taught real estate and mortgage matters twice a year as part of the "Bridge The Gap" program for Bar applicants. In recent years, he has presided over Moot Court competitions in Greenville and at USC Law School.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
1961-67 Associated in general practice, Haynesworth, Perry, Bryant, Marion & Johnstone, Greenville
1966- Special Hearings Officer for US Department of Justice in conscientious objector hearings
1968-82 Master-In-Equity for Greenville County (4 terms)
Served as special Circuit Judge on occasion
1982-now At Large Circuit Judge

20. Judicial Office: Special Hearing Officer, US Department of Justice, appointed conscientious objector hearings; appointed Master-In-Equity (4 terms) by four Governors after nomination by Greenville County Bar Association and approval by Senate and House. Special Referee and Circuit Judge. Elected Circuit Court Judge at Large, Seat #4, April 1982, by General Assembly, reelected 1985 and serving continuously since.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) Townes Associates LTD v. City of Greenville 266 S.C. 81, 221 S.E.2d 773 (1976). This case has been cited many times in recent years. Judge McGowan presided in the initial stages of this case and was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court. The significant principle in this case deals with review on appeal but the landmark holding is that a governmental body may be equitably estopped to deny monetary claims or responsibility based upon the actions or failure to timely act by a governmental employee who is acting within his proper scope of authority.

(b) Almers v. S.C. National Bank of Charleston 265 S.C. 48,
217 S.E. 2d 135 (1975). Judge McGowan presided in this case in the initial stages. The Supreme Court affirmed his ruling and recognized in this case a limit denying the enforceability of a covenant not to compete which was unlimited in its terms of time and geographic extent.

(c) Lowndes Products, Inc. v. Brower 259 S.C. 322, 191 S.E. 2d 761 (1972). This matter in which Judge McGowan initially presided was both lengthy and complicated. Contrary to the majority throughout the country, he was reversed. The prime ruling was that former employees do owe unto a former employer a duty "not to do disloyal acts looking to future competition," regardless of the finding that there were no violations of trade secrets, employment contracts or covenants not to compete. This decision was a break in tradition.

(d) Greenville Mall Partners v. Kinnev Order granting temporary injunction to prevent leasee from closing store before end of lease. Order was upheld on supersedeas January 25, 1990.

(e) Ballou v. Sigma Nu Fraternity, Inc. et al. This Order addresses the issue of the immunity of the University of South Carolina under the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity. There has been no appellant review of this issue from this case.

23. He ran for Circuit Judge in early 1982 for Judge Price's unexpired term. Judge Victor Pyle won.

24. Other occupation, business or profession:
In college he worked part time as an interior decorator at the nurses' offices, Ft. Jackson (with Frank Eppes) 1951-52; He also waited tables and worked for a CPA firm. In Law School, he did extensive part-time work with CPA firm, Clarkson, Hardin & Gantt, auditing and related matters. He was also a page in the SC House in 1960 and a page for the Lt. Governor in the Senate in 1961.

31. Sued: In US District Court by Jan L. Chapman, violation of her civil rights having denied jury trial in her suit vs. S.C. Tax Com. #3:85-0425 2/13/85. Case dismissed Order US District Judge 4/30/85. Also sued in US District Court along with the Honorable Chief Justice of the State of S. C. et al by Donald J. Strable, for abuse of discretion. #6:89-1533-17K. Case was dismissed, Order of US District Judge, filed 7/24/89, affirmed US Court of Appeals 4th Circuit 89-3299, 2/1/90.

33. His last physical was by Dr. Edmund P. Gaines, Jr. of Greenville and he has very good health. He wears prescription glasses.

39. Bar Associations and Professional Organizations:
SC Bar Association, subsequently SC State Bar; American Bar Association; Greenville County Bar Association.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
First Presbyterian Church, Greenville, SC, Elder; Poinsett Club. Greenville; Rotary Club of Greenville; St. Andrews Society of Upper South Carolina; Cotillion Club of Greenville; Metropolitan Club.

41. He points out that he is a hard working judge who puts in many hours and has resolved and settled many very difficult litigation disputes. Also he has moved forward through consummation of litigation of thousands of cases successfully.

42. Five letters of recommendation:

(a) Mr. Mac P. Smith, Assistant Vice President,

First Union National Bank, P.O. Box 1329, Greenville, SC 29602

(b) Leo H. Hill, Esquire

P.O. Box 2585, Greenville, SC 29602

(c) Bradley P. Morrah, Jr., Esquire

P.O. Box 10248, Greenville SC 29603

(d) J. D. Todd, Jr., Esquire

P.O. Box 87, Greenville, SC 29602

(e) David L. Freeman, Esquire

P.O. Box 10207, Greenville, SC 29603

(f) Greenville County Bar Association

Q. JUDGE, YOU SEEK REELECTION TO YOUR SEAT, THE CIRCUIT COURT SEAT AT LARGE NUMBER FOUR; IS THAT CORRECT, SIR?
A. YES.
Q. IN REVIEWING YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY, DID YOU FIND ANYTHING THAT WE NEED TO CHANGE?
A. I DON'T BELIEVE IT WAS MENTIONED THAT THERE WAS A VERY KIND AND FAVORABLE LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE GREENVILLE COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, WHICH WAS NOT MENTIONED IN THERE AS A FORM OF A RECOMMENDATION. THAT WAS OPTIONAL; AND I HAVE A COPY OF IT IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IT.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR, WE CAN SO NOTE. WE DO HAVE A COPY OF THAT IN OUR FILE AND THAT WILL BE SO NOTED.
A. ALL RIGHT. ONE MATTER I FEEL NOT PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT, IT CAME TO MY THOUGHT PROCESS A FEW DAYS AGO, THAT I DID SIGN AS A GUARANTOR ON A CREDIT CARD FOR ONE OF MY SONS SOME NUMBER OF YEARS AGO THAT ALLOWED HIM TO PROCESS A CREDIT CARD; IT COULD HAVE BEEN SIX OR EIGHT YEARS AGO. I BELIEVE IT WAS A MAXIMUM OF $1,000 OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT AND THEY KINDLY EXTENDED THE CREDIT TO 1900. I HAVEN'T BEEN CALLED UPON ON THE MATTER AND I DON'T ANTICIPATE I WILL BUT THAT WAS SOMETHING THAT WAS AN OVERSIGHT ON A CONTINGENT LIABILITY.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR.
A. I DON'T THINK THAT WILL BE A PROBLEM.
Q. NO, SIR.
A. IT HASN'T BEEN A PROBLEM.
Q. WAS IT FOR YOUR SON WHO WAS SEATED IN HERE TODAY?
A. A DIFFERENT ONE.
Q. YOU WILL PROBABLY BE OKAY THEN. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS THERE ARE NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES THAT WERE FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW AND THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPRIMANDS ISSUED BY THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION WHILE YOU'VE BEEN ON THE BENCH. THE GREENVILLE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE GREENVILLE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT REPORT NEGATIVE RESULTS IN LOOKING THROUGH THEIR RECORDS, AS WELL AS YOUR DRIVING RECORD BEING CLEAR. SLED AND FBI ALSO REPORT NOT HAVING ANY RECORDS IN YOUR NAME. AS FAR AS JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS IN WHICH YOU WERE A NAMED PARTY, WE CHECKED WITH GREENVILLE COUNTY AND WITH THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THERE WERE FOUND TO BE TWO CIVIL RIGHTS SUITS THAT WERE FILED; ONE IN 1985 AND ONE IN 1989 WHICH WERE INCLUDED IN YOUR APPLICATION, AND IN BOTH CASES THEY WERE BOTH DISMISSED.
A. YES, SIR.
Q. IS THAT YOUR RECOLLECTION?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. I BELIEVE ONE OF THEM WAS THE STRABLE CASE IN WHICH JUDGE ANDERSON---
A. A VERY SIMILAR MATTER AS JUDGE RALPH KING ANDERSON.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR.
A. THEY WERE BOTH DISMISSED. I NEVER FULLY GRASPED WHAT THEY WERE PURSUING BUT THEY FELT GENUINE ENOUGH ABOUT IT TO FILE PAPERS; BUT THEY WERE DISMISSED IN BOTH INSTANCES.
Q. YES, SIR. FINANCIAL INFORMATION: YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST DOES NOT INDICATE ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS. YOU NOTED THE CHANGE ON YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT THAT WE NEED TO MAKE. OF COURSE, THAT IS CONFIDENTIAL AND WILL NOT BECOME A PART OF THE RECORD. AND YOUR CREDIT RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY. YOU NOTED THAT YOU HAD YOUR LAST PHYSICAL IN AUGUST AND THAT YOUR HEALTH WAS GOOD. YOU WERE FIRST ELECTED, I BELIEVE, IN 1982?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AND WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SCREENED IN 1985?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. HAS THERE BEEN ANYTHING TO HAPPEN IN THE INTERIM OF THAT PERIOD THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE OR ANY OTHER STATEMENT YOU WOULD LIKE TO MAKE?
A. IT'S BEEN AN HONOR AND PRIVILEGE TO SERVE AS A CIRCUIT JUDGE IN THIS STATE AND IT'S AN ONGOING CHALLENGE OF SOME MAGNITUDE, AND I APPRECIATE IT.
Q. THANK YOU, JUDGE. THERE HAVE BEEN NO COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS FILED EITHER AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY TODAY. UNLESS OTHER COMMITTEE MEMBERS HAVE QUESTIONS, THAT'S ALL.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS? (PAUSE.) I HAVE ONE.

Q. I COULDN'T STAND IT, FRANK. NUMBER 24: "OTHER OCCUPATION, BUSINESS OR PROFESSION: IN COLLEGE HE WORKED PART TIME AS AN INTERIOR DECORATOR AT THE NURSES' OFFICES, FT. JACKSON (WITH FRANK EPPES) 1951-52"; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. WHEN I FIRST MET FRANK EPPES HE WAS CUTTING HAIR IN THE DORMITORY AND IF YOU WERE A VETERAN HE CUT IT, I THINK, FOR 25 CENTS; AND IF YOU WERE NOT A VETERAN, FOR 50 CENTS. SO, I MET HIM AND HE WAS LOOKING FOR SOME ASSISTANCE IN HANGING CURTAINS AND SHADES AND WITH MY HEIGHT, HE GOT ME INVOLVED WHICH WAS QUITE AN EXPERIENCE. WE WERE ABLE TO MAKE A LITTLE SPENDING MONEY AND ASSISTED IN WHAT NEEDED TO BE DONE. THAT WAS MY FIRST MEETING OF JUDGE EPPES AND I ALWAYS HAVE ENJOYED A VERY WARM FRIENDSHIP WITH HIM SINCE THEN.
Q. IT WAS TOO INTRIGUING NOT TO ASK YOU ABOUT THAT.
A. HE IS A MAN OF KEEN INSIGHT AND IT'S BEEN A PRIVILEGE TO KNOW HIM OVER THE YEARS.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, SIR.

JUDGE MCGOWAN: THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: JUDGE STEPHEN.

(HONORABLE JAMES B. STEPHEN, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. James B. Stephen
Home Address: Business Address:
538 Otis Boulevard Spartanburg County Courthouse
Spartanburg, SC 29302 Spartanburg, SC 29301

2. He was born May 17, 1925 in Spartanburg.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He has been married to Virginia Lutz Stephen since February 12, 1977. They have three children: Susan Stephen Bergmann, age 37 (Baptist Hospital, Columbia); Kathy Stephen McCart, age 34 (Parent training for handicapped children, Winthrop College); James G. age 33, (M.D., Stockton, CA).

5. Military Service: U.S. Navy, March 1943-September 1945; U.S. Naval Reserve 1945-63, Lt. Cmdr., USNR (retired), Serial # 441913/1109.

6. He received his A.B. Degree from USC in 1945 and his LL.B. Degree from Duke University School of Law in 1949.

7. He was the President of his fraternity in college.

8. He has attended all mandatory JCLE courses for Circuit Judges, (three or four a year).

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
General practice of law. First 10 years associated with the late Harvey W. Johnson, doing considerable real estate and commercial work. Beginning in 1961, was sole practitioner (except for partnership in 1973-74 with George H. Thomason) until elected to the bench in 1979. In the last twenty years of practice, he had a very high volume of Social Security cases, in addition to Workmen's Compensation and some plaintiff's work. Since being admitted to the bar, he also has had occasion to do some criminal defense from time to time, including court appointments to murder cases.

20. Judicial Office: Elected to Circuit Court bench in August 1979, serving continuously since that time.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) The State vs. Eddie Crane; Oconee County; Signed 2/18/87. The Defendant, convicted of trafficking in marijuana after 37 1/2 lbs was seized just outside his residence, moved for a new trial, maintaining the insufficiency of the "bare bones" affidavit and oral testimony in establishing probable cause to issue a search warrant, based on an informant's tip. Judge Stephen denied the motion.

(b) Sally G. Young vs. Century Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.; Greenville County; Case #87-CP-23-2095; Signed 5/12/88. The major question was whether there were prejudicial errors committed during trial which would warrant a new one.

(c) Shaw Travel Services, Inc. vs. Genesis Travel, f/k/a/ Travel Ventures, Inc., and Eastern Airlines; Beaufort County; Case #87-CP-07-1328; Signed 10/14/88. This case involves whether a commission override agreement wherein Eastern Airlines would pay the travel agency 15% on each ticket sold was a violation of the SC Unfair Trade Practices Act which prohibits unfair methods of competition. In this order denying Defendent's motions for summary judgment, Judge Stephen held that, in light of the strong public policy in fostering competition and the novel question involved, the case should be tried on its merits.

(d) Amiran Corporation vs. Hilton Head Auction Galleries, Inc., Joseph Sirgany, Joseph Capello and Caprita Capello; Beaufort County, Case #87-CP-07-1799; Signed 11/16/88. This case involves the application of the Bulk Sales Law when goods transferred are no longer in possession of the defendant/transferee.

(e) Richard H. Sagar vs.Marine Corps Air Station Federal Credit Union vs. Leila Prince Sagar; Beaufort County; Case #87-CP-07-1501; Signed 9/7/88. This case arose out of an incident wherein Mrs. Sagar deposited into her individual account a federal tax refund check made out to her and her estranged husband as co-payees. Though the check bore only her endorsement, the Credit Union accepted it without inquiry. Judge Stephen denied post trial motions for a new trial by both the Credit Union and Mrs. Sagar.

22. Public Office: He served in the SC House of Representative from 1961-68; in the SC Senate from 1969-79.

33. His last physical examination was in August, 1990 by Dr. E.M. Busch of Spartanburg. He suffers from Charcot-Marie Tooth Disease (atrophy of the muscles in the lower legs) This causes problems with balance and walking.

39. Bar Associations and Professional Organizations:
Spartanburg County Bar Association; SC Bar, Circuit Vice President, 1957; American Bar Association; American Judicature.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
St. John's lodge 333, AFM; American Legion, Scottish Rite; Hejaz Shrine

41. Five letters of reference:

(a) John. S. Poole, Vice President, Senior Banking Executive NCNB, P.O. Box 1988, Spartanburg,SC 29304

(b) Robert H. Long, Rector, Church of the Redeemer,

P.O. Drawer 9, Orangeburg, SC 29116-0009

(c) Roy McBee Smith, Smith & Haskell

P.O. Box 5306, Spartanburg, SC 29304-5306

(d) George Dean Johnson, M.D.

544 Otis Blvd., Spartanburg SC 29302
(e) R. Bruce Ford, M.D.

5124 Westwind Way, Anderson, SC 28524

Q. JUDGE STEPHEN, YOU HAVE REAPPLIED FOR YOUR SEAT ON THE CIRCUIT COURT BENCH, AT LARGE SEAT NUMBER FIVE; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. IN REVIEWING YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY, HAVE YOU FOUND ANYTHING THAT NEEDS TO BE CLARIFIED OR ELABORATED FOR THE RECORD?
A. YES, I FAILED TO REPORT THAT I WAS A PLAINTIFF IN A PARTITION ACTION IN BEAUFORT COUNTY. THERE WERE SEVEN CO-OWNERS AND WE COULDN'T AGREE ON A SALE AND WE FILED SUIT IN '86 AND IT PENDED FOR ABOUT THREE YEARS AND WE FINALLY SOLD OUR PROPERTY AND DISMISSED THE ACTION.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR.
A. I WAS A PLAINTIFF. THEN I LEFT OFF A LITTLE BIT ON MY FINANCIAL STATEMENT. CAN I GIVE THAT TO MRS.TURNIPSEED LATER?
Q. YOU SAID YOU HAVE AND YOU WANT TO---
A. YES, SIR, I HAVE SINCE DISCOVERED SOME ERRORS.
Q. ALL RIGHT, YES, SIR, YOU CAN FIX THAT WITH HER TO MAKE SURE THE CORRECTIONS ARE MADE. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS THERE WERE NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE YOU PRACTICED LAW. THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION REPORTS NO REPRIMANDS AGAINST YOU. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR; AND IN CHECKING WITH THE SPARTANBURG COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE SPARTANBURG CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, THEY WERE ALSO FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WELL AS THE RECORDS WITH SLED AND THE FBI. AS FAR AS JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS GO IN WHICH YOU WERE A NAMED PARTY, THE ONLY RECORD WE HAVE IS TO THE ONE ACTION THAT YOU JUST NAMED.
A. YES, SIR.
Q. OTHERWISE, THEY WERE CLEAR. FINANCIAL INFORMATION: YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST INDICATES NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS. YOU JUST STATED THAT YOU WANT TO MAKE A COUPLE OF CORRECTIONS TO YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT; THAT'S FINE. YOUR CREDIT REPORT CAME BACK SATISFACTORY. YOU WERE FIRST ELECTED, I BELIEVE, ALSO IN 1979?
A. RIGHT, '79.
Q. WHEN THE SEATS WERE CREATED; AND YOU WERE SCREENED LAST IN 1985, IS THAT CORRECT, SIR?
A. YES.
Q. ATTORNEY DAVE MASSEY ALSO SUBMITTED AN AFFIDAVIT ON YOUR BEHALF, ALSO VERY FAVORABLE; AND AS WITH THE OTHER TWO JUDGES, I TOLD HIM THAT THERE REALLY WASN'T ANY NEED FOR HIM TO COME TESTIFY, THAT WE WOULD MAKE HIS AFFIDAVIT A PART OF THE RECORD. THERE HAVE BEEN NO OTHER STATEMENTS RECEIVED OR WITNESSES TO CONTACT THE COMMITTEE. AND THERE WERE NO COMPLAINTS RECEIVED WHATSOEVER IN REGARD TO YOUR REELECTION. DO YOU HAVE ANY STATEMENTS THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO MAKE TO THE COMMITTEE OR ANY OTHER THING YOU WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK ON?
A. NO, I DON'T THINK SO.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: DO ANY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, JUDGE STEPHEN. JUDGE LOCKEMY.

1. James Edward Lockemy
Home Address: Business Address
ll0 Ellen Lane P.O. Box 750 Room 306
Dillon, SC 29536 Dillon City-County Complex

Dillon, SC 29536

2. He was born in Dillon, South Carolina on September 23, l949.

Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Ellen Bullard on August 7, l968. They have 2 children: James Michael, age 21 (Manager, Lockemy's Grocery) and William Travis, age 14 (student).

5. Military Service: US Army, November l974-December l977; Captain, Judge Advocate General's Corps; SS# ***-**-*****; Honorable Discharge; presently Major, SC Army National Guard.

6. He attended The Citadel, l967-1968; Coastal Carolina, fall of 1968; Pembroke State University, l969-1971, (B.A. History); University of South Carolina Law School, l971-l974 (JD Degree); Georgetown University, l977, Masters Degree Program; USC Graduate School, l989-present.

7. College Activities: Officer in fraternal organization.
Law School: Chief Justice (President), Phi Alpha Delta Law Fraternity, l974; member Law School Honor Council, l973-4.

8. Attended all facets of CLE/JCLE Seminars (amounting to more than 98 hours), as well as those presented by the U. S.Army Judge Advocate General's Corps.

9. Taught business law at small college in North Carolina, l976; taught American National Government at Campbell College, Ft. Bragg campus, l976-77.

12. Legal Experience since graduation from law school:
1974-77 US Army, Judge Advocate General's Corps. Trial Counsel for court martials; legal assistance to service members and dependents.
1977-78 Associate, Law Offices, A. Glenn Greene, Jr. general practice.

1978-79 Legislative Assistant, U. S. Senator Strom Thurmond, Judiciary Committee Counsel.

1979-89 Greene, Lockemy and Bailey, partner in general practice of law.

1989-now Circuit Court Judge, June 12, l989-present.

20. Elected to South Carolina Circuit Court June 12, l989, continuing to serve to date. Has acted as Summary Court Officer in the SC National Guard (similar to Magistrate in civil court system).

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:
(a) Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v. Old Republic Insurance Company (Docket Number 89-CP-40-3646); September 5, l990. This was a declaratory judgment action brought to determine insurance coverage issues in a collision between a tractor trailer rig and a motor vehicle. Judge Lockemy found that the insurer of the tractor had primary responsibility and exposure and rightly bore the major cost of defending the action. The policy of insurance which covered the trailer was excess to the other policy and the company was not obligated to pay indemnity benefits until the applicable liability limits of the first were exhausted; however, the second company owes the first, reimbursement for half the attorneys fees and costs incurred in defending the underlying action.

(b) NCNB National Bank of South Carolina v. Cherryvale Baptist Church (Docket Number 90-CP-43-141); August 31, l990. In this action by the bank against the church to recover a loan made through its associate pastor (who is no longer there, having engaged in some fraudulent and deceptive practices with other church business in addition to the matter before the Court), the church maintained that he acted without authority and that the corporate resolutions granting authority were forgeries. The church admitted to having received funds or benefit of funds from these loans. Judge Lockemy granted partial summary judgment to the bank for that part of the loan for which the church received benefits, plus interest, attorney's fees and costs. As to the portion of the loan which the associate pastor received directly, the Court declined to grant summary judgment, but left the matter open for a hearing on the merits.

(c) Julius G. Lopez, Personal Representative of the Estate of Elsie H. Lopez v. National General Insurance Company (Docket Number 89-CP-28-103); October 13, l989. This dispute concerned allegations that the defendant failed to offer underinsured motorist coverage to Elsie Lopez prior to the accident in October, 1988, in which she was killed. Judge Lockemy found that the defendant's premium renewal notice and insert constituted a meaningful and sufficient offer of underinsured motorist coverage.

(d) Mike Hinkle v. City of Sumter (Docket Number 90-CP-43-228); August 31, l990. Judge Lockemy found for the defendant in an action to invalidate the annexation of Shaw Air Force Base by the City of Sumter.

(e) Horry County, a body politic and Horry County Council, its governing body v. The Horry County Higher Education Commission (Docket Number 89-CP-26-2789); May 8, l990. This was a dispute in which was challenged the constitutionality of Acts amending the tax levy provision for the support of Coastal Carolina College. Judge Lockemy found the Acts valid and that Horry County Council had no authority to reduce the tax levy for support of Coastal beyond the statutory minimum imposed by the Acts.

22. Public Office: South Carolina House of Representatives, District 55, November 1982-June 1989.

24. Other occupations have been as a History professor at Campbell College - 1976-77; as Chief Legislative Aide to Senator Strom Thurmond - 1978-79; as a member of the SC Army National Guard - 1978-present.

25. He is a partner in Westside Properties, which deals in rental property and owns several rental properties. He is a corporate officer in Lockemy's Grocery, Inc.

27. If any legal matter occurred concerning those enterprises in which he is involved, he would disqualify himself from hearing anything related.

33. His health is good. His last physical was in February, l990, by the US Army, Ft. Jackson, SC.

35. He wears glasses.

39. Bar and professional organizations: American and South Carolina Bar Associations and the South Carolina Circuit Judges Association.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations: Disaster Preparedness Agency, Dillon; Dillon Kiwanis Club, past President; Kiwanis Rangers Baseball Team Coach; sustaining member, University of South Caroliniana Society; Dillon County Chamber of Commerce; Trustee, East Dillon Baptist Church; Dillon County Veterans Monument Committee; V. Commander, American Legion Post No. 32; Board of Visitors, Medical University of South Carolina, l986; Greater University of South Carolina Alumni Board, l986; District Chairman, Boy Scouts of America, 1980-81; selected one of the Outstanding Young Men in America, 1980; Board Member, Dillon County Theatre, Inc.

41. He asks consideration of his desire, determination, ability and judicial demeanor as reflected by his responses to the application and his record over the last 15 months.

42. Five letters of reference:

(a) Charles Curry, Esquire

South Third Avenue, Dillon, SC 29536

(b) Reverend Fred Gough

St. Barnabas' Episcopal Church

P.O. Box 330, Dillon, SC 29536

(c) Charles S. McLaurin, III, Senior Vice President

First Citizens Bank, P.O. Box 1049, Dillon, SC 29536

(d) William S. Derrick, Esquire, Public Defender

P.O. Box 844, Marion, SC 29571

(e) Mary E. Buchan, Esquire, Whittington and Buchan

P.O. Box 653, Mullins, SC 29574

(f) Dillon County Bar Association

(g) Marion County Bar Association

Q. LIKE JUDGE SHULER, IT SEEMS LIKE WE JUST SAW YOU. YOU HAVE REAPPLIED FOR YOUR SEAT ON THE CIRCUIT COURT BENCH, AT LARGE SEAT NUMBER SIX; IS THAT CORRECT, SIR?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. AND IN LOOKING OVER YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY, DID YOU FIND ANYTHING THAT YOU MIGHT WANT TO ELABORATE ON OR THAT NEEDS TO BE CLARIFIED OR CORRECTED?
A. NO.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR; THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW. THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION REPORTS NO REPRIMANDS WHILE ON THE BENCH. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WELL AS THE RECORDS WITH THE DILLON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE DILLON CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. LIKEWISE, THE SLED AND FBI RECORDS CHECK WERE ALSO CLEAR. THERE HAVE BEEN NO JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS FILED AGAINST YOU IN WHICH YOU WERE A PARTY IN CHECKING WITH THE DILLON COUNTY COURT RECORDS AND WITH THE FEDERAL COURT RECORDS. FINANCIAL INFORMATION: YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST INDICATED NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS; AND YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT AND CREDIT RECORD WERE FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY. YOU WERE ELECTED IN 1989 TO TAKE THE SEAT WHICH YOU HOLD; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. THERE HAVE BEEN NO COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS RECEIVED IN REGARD TO YOUR CANDIDACY AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY TODAY ALSO IN THAT REGARD. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS FOR THE COMMITTEE OTHER THAN THE MATERIALS WE HAVE JUST COVERED?
A. NO, SIR, OTHER THAN IT HAS BEEN RECENTLY THIS LAST YEAR, IT'S BEEN A REAL EXCITING CHALLENGE AND WITHOUT THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIARY, IT WOULD BE A LOT MORE DIFFICULT THAN IT HAS BEEN. THEY'VE HELPED ME A GREAT DEAL. AND I HAVE--AND I REALLY APPRECIATE THE FAITH THE PEOPLE IN THE LEGISLATURE AND THE STATE HAVE GIVEN TO ME TO DO THIS JOB AND I WISH TO CONTINUE TO DO IT. THE ONLY OTHER ASIDE I WOULD MAKE IS THAT REPRESENTATIVE GEORGE BAILEY, MY FORMER DESK MATE, THREATENED TO COME TESTIFY AGAINST ME BUT I THINK THE SERGEANT RAN HIM OUT AWHILE AGO. HE WAS HERE ABOUT FIVE MINUTES AGENT; OTHER THAN THAT, NOTHING.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS FOR JUDGE LOCKEMY?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU.
A. THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WE NOW HAVE COMPLETED ALL OF THE SITTING JUDGES AND WE HAVE COME TO THE RETIRED JUDGES. JUDGE BRISTOW.

1. Walter J. Bristow, Jr.
Home Address: Business Address
203 S. Waccamaw Ave. P.O. Box 1147
Columbia, SC 29205 Columbia, SC 29202

2. He was born in Columbia on October 14, 1924.

Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He has been married since September 12, 1952 to Katherine Stewart Mullins Bristow. They have two children: Katherine Mullins, deceased; Walter J., III, age 32 (Gastroenterologist).

5. Military Service: June 1943-Feb. 1946, Army, S/Sgt. SN 13187051. Honorable Discharge. Presently Brigadier General (retired) SC Army National Guard.

6. He attended Virginia Military Institute September 1941-June 1943. Called to active duty, US Army. University of North Carolina, 1946-47, A.B.; UNC Law School, Sept. 1947-49, LL.B., cum laude; Harvard Law School, Sept. 1949-50, LL.M.

7. In college (UNC) he was elected to Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity and was Worthy Master (President) 1948; he was also in Pi Gamma Mu, honorary social science fraternity. In Law School he was admitted to Wig & Robe, honorary legal fraternity.

8. He has attended every judicial legal education seminar presented within the last five years.

9. He was Faculty Adviser, National Judicial College, October 1981.

10. Published books or articles written:
Article, "Organization of Corporations," 15 S.C. Law Review 346.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
1950-53 Sole Practitioner - general practice
1953-64 Partner, Marchant & Bristow, general practice
1956 Attorney, Legislative Counsel of South Carolina
1956-57 Special Counsel, US Senate Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections
1964-76 Partner, Marchant, Bristow & Bates, general practice
1976 Elected Circuit Judge
1982 Reelected Circuit Judge
1988 Retired Circuit Judge

20. Judicial Office: Elected Resident Judge, Fifth Judicial Circuit July 22, 1976; reelected, 1982; retired July 1, 1986.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) Nancy Stevenson v. James B. Ellisor, et al., 77-CP-40-2214, reviewed and affirmed 270 S.C. 560, 243 S.E.2d 445 (1978). Judge Bristow found in this case that a name, (Nancy), derivative of a given name, (Ferdinan), acquired through usage as a name under the principles of the common law, used in good faith and for honest purposes, is such a name as should be printed as the official election ballot and is that which will give the voter the best notice for whom he is voting.

(b) Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company v. John W. Lindsay, etc., 78-CP-40-1588, reviewed and affirmed 279 S.C. 355, 306 S.E. 2d 860 (1983). In this case, Judge Bristow considers and affirms the finding of the Chief Insurance Commissioner and the Governing Board of the SC Reinsurance Facility that Grain Dealers had excessively utilized the Facility's reinsurance mechanisms in FY1975-76 and that the added assessment of Facility losses included in its distribution statement was proper.

(c) State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Rogers T. Smith, etc., 82-CP-40-426. reviewed and affirmed 281 S.C. 209, 314 S.E.2d 333 (1984). Judge Bristow considers declaratory judgment actions on eight cases which raise almost identical issues and which challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 76 of Act 178 of the 1981 Acts and Joint Resolutions, alleging that it wrongfully and improperly delegates the taxing power of the General Assembly to the Chief Insurance Commissioner.

(d) Otis C.Carter v. S.C. Department of Highways and Public Transportation, 279 S.C. 332, 306 S.E.2d 614 (1983), order adopted by the Supreme Court. The Department of Highways and Public Transportation's denial of outdoor advertising permits, upheld by a hearing commissioner, was reversed by Judge Bristow.

(e) Lester Hite v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 288 S.C. 616, 344 S.E.2d 173 (1986), order adopted by the Court of Appeals. This case arises out of an action against Hartford seeking $8,000 in damages for alleged breach of contract. Question is whether Hite, who was hit by a car driven by an uninsured driver, should be construed as an "insured" under the uninsured motorist law, as he was not in, on or touching the vehicle insured by Hartford. Judge Bristow granted a directed verdict for Hartford.

22. Public Office: Elected SC House of Representatives, 1956-58; Elected SC Senate, 1958-76.

23. Sued: Partition of real estate of which he was part owner. Case entitled Jackson v. Jackson, et al., preserved in the office of the Clerk of Court for Richland County in Judgment Roll #117439. Ended by order of partition March 21, 1979.

Three condemnation actions, one by the City of Columbia and two by the County of Richland, to take for public use certain property of which he was part owner. Preserved in judgment rolls in the office of the Clerk of Court for Richland County.

33. His last physical by Dr. J. Robert Brennan of Columbia was January 1990, and his health is good. He has myopia, corrected by lenses.

39. Bar Associations and Professional Organizations:
SC Bar; Richland County Bar Association, Secretary-Treasurer, 1952-57.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
First Presbyterian Church, Deacon; American Legion; Veterans of Foreign Wars, Post Commander, 1959; Regular Veterans Association, National Judge Advocate, 1988-to date; Executive Sertoma Club; American Hellenic Educational and Progressive Association; Judge Advocate General School, Alumni Association; Forest Lake Country Club; The Palmetto Club; Capitol City Club; The Cotillion Club; The Columbia Ball; The Flamenco Club; The Tarantella Club, President, 1958; The Caprician Club; USC Alumni Association; Harvard Law School Alumni Association.

41. National President, Conference of Insurance Legislators, 1974-75; Graduated, National College of State Judiciary, July 1977; Graduated US Army Command and General Staff College, with honors, June 1972.

42. Five letters of recommendation:

(a) Cosmo L. Walker, Vice President, Standard Federal S&L

1339 Main Street, Columbia, SC 29202-2826

(b) Roy A. Little, Roy A. Little & Company

1623 Pickens Street, Columbia,SC 29201

(c) Earl W. Stradtman, President, Metal Distributors, Inc.

P.O. Box 9191, Atlas Road, Columbia, SC 29290-0191

(d) John W. Cullum, Manager, USC System Credit Union

P.O. Box 12309, Columbia, SC 29211

(e) O. Jack Kaneft, Jr.

353 Pine Cliff Court, Columbia, SC 29209

Q. JUDGE BRISTOW, YOU RESIGNED, YOU RETIRED, SO TO SPEAK, FROM THE BENCH IN 1986; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. BUT HAVE CONTINUED TO SIT AS A SPECIAL JUDGE AT THE DIRECTION---
A. WELL, I DIDN'T INTEND TO BUT THE CHIEF JUSTICE ASKED ME TO. ONE OF OUR REGULAR JUDGES GOT SICK AND SINCE THEN I HAVE BEEN DOING IT UPON HIS REQUEST. AS YOU KNOW, I CAN'T HOLD COURT UNLESS HE REQUESTS IT.
Q. YES, SIR.
A. AND NOW I CAN'T HOLD COURT UNLESS HE BOTH REQUESTS IT AND Y'ALL APPROVE IT.
Q. YES, SIR. DID YOU FIND ANY INFORMATION ON THE SUMMARY OF YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE THAT MAY NEED TO BE CORRECTED OR CLARIFIED?
A. LET ME SAY THAT I HAVE NO RECOLLECTION WHATSOEVER OF THIS LAWSUIT THAT WAS BROUGHT AGAINST ME IN THE FEDERAL COURT. I THINK, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS ONE THAT WAS TESTIFIED TO BY JUDGE RALPH KING ANDERSON, THOUGH I MAY BE MISTAKEN. IT JUST SAYS THAT THERE WAS ONE CIVIL SUIT WHICH NAMES MR. BRISTOW AND A NUMBER OF OTHER SOUTH CAROLINA STATE OFFICIALS, ALLEGING A VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS AND THAT IT WAS DISMISSED. I DON'T BELIEVE I WAS SERVED BECAUSE I DON'T HAVE ANY RECOLLECTION OF IT AT ALL.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR.
A. OTHER THAN THAT, I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING ELSE.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTED THERE WERE NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW. LIKEWISE, THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION REPORTED NO REPRIMANDS OR OTHER ACTION. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR; AND IN CHECKING WITH THE RICHLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE COLUMBIA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, THEIR RECORDS ALSO WERE CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS OF SLED AND THE FBI. AS FAR AS JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS IN WHICH YOU WERE A NAMED PARTY, YOU JUST SPOKE OF ONE. THE ONLY OTHER ONES APPEARING: I BELIEVE IN 1989 YOU WERE A PARTY TO A CONDEMNATION ACTION BY RICHLAND COUNTY?
A. I HAVE THE FORTUNE OR MISFORTUNE TO OWN SOME REAL ESTATE WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER PEOPLE. I USED TO OWN SOME WITH MR. ROY BATES, AND THE CITY OF COLUMBIA WANTED TO CONDEMN THAT AND MAKE A WATERFALL OUT OF IT. IN ANY EVENT, CONDEMNATION SUITS ARE SOMETHING YOU HAVE NO CONTROL OVER. LIKEWISE, PARTITION SUITS; IF SOMEBODY, IF ONE OF YOUR OTHER CO-OWNERS DESIRES TO PARTITION, THEY HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DO IT. THOSE ARE THE KIND OF SUITS I HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN.
Q. AND YOU'VE JUST ALLUDED THAT THERE WAS A 1979 PARTITION ACTION; THAT'S THE OTHER LAWSUIT YOU REFERRED TO?
A. AND I HAVE THE JACKSON PETITION AND THERE WAS--I BELIEVE THAT'S THE ONLY PARTITION CASE. ALL THE REST OF THEM HAVE BEEN CONDEMNATION.
Q. YES, SIR. ALL RIGHT, SIR, FINANCIAL INFORMATION: YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST INDICATED NO CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS OR OBLIGATIONS AND YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT, AS WELL AS YOUR CREDIT REPORT, WERE BOTH SATISFACTORY. YOU REPORTED YOUR HEALTH AS GOOD. THERE ARE NO COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN RECEIVED IN REGARD TO YOUR QUALIFICATION HEARING. YOU WERE FIRST ELECTED, I BELIEVE, IN 1976?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. I REMEMBER ATTENDING YOUR SWEARING-IN CEREMONY, AS A MATTER OF FACT.
A. THAT WAS A LONG TIME AGO.
Q. AND YOU WERE SCREENED AGAIN IN 1982 AND THEN RETIRED FROM FULL-TIME WORK IN 1986.
A. RIGHT.
Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER COMMENTS YOU WOULD LIKE TO MAKE TO THE COMMITTEE?
A. I DON'T EXCEPT TO SAY THAT IT'S BEEN A REAL PRIVILEGE TO SERVE AS A JUDGE. WHEN YOU STAY IN THE LEGISLATURE AND ON THE BENCH AS LONG AS I HAVE, YOU'RE BOUND TO MAKE YOURSELF SOME ENEMIES AND I'M SURPRISED SOMEBODY DIDN'T WRITE AGAINST ME OR APPEAR TODAY AND SINCE THEY DIDN'T, I'LL BE GLAD TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS ANYBODY HAS.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: DOES ANY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, SIR.

JUDGE BRISTOW: ALL RIGHT, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: JUDGE MORRIS.

1. James M. Morris
Home Address: Business Address:
Route 3, Box 667 P.O. Box 10
Manning, SC 29101 Manning SC 29102

2. He was born in New Zion, South Carolina on April 24, 1928.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He has been married to Martha P. Morris since August 11, 1972. He obtained a divorce from his first wife in the Court of Dominican Republic, by Mutual Consent in June of 1972. In December 1981, the parties brought action in the Family Court, third Judicial Circuit, Clarendon County, SC, confirming and approving their divorce obtained in 1972. He has four children: Sandra Joyce Morris Brewer, age 42 (clerk for the Clarendon Health Department); Evelyn Marie Morris Nies, age 40 (school teacher); Karen Maxine Morris Barfield, age 36 (policy service manager); Marian Loretta Morris Lindsey, age 31 (victims assistance coordinator, State Parole Board).

5. Military Service: He was a S/STG. in the Air Force from June 30, 1946 till June 29, 1949, Serial # 14234799. Honorable Discharge.

6. He attended USC for his academic and law degree -- attending undergraduate classes from 1949-50 and Law School from 1951-55, receiving an LL.B. Degree.

7. During his college and law school career he was the Secretary of the Young Democrats and became a member of the Order of Wig & Robe in November of 1954.
8. He has attended JCLEs as required.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
General practice from December of 1954 till September 1979 when he became a Judge.

20. Judicial Office: Elected Circuit Court Judge September 1979 and served until September 30, 1990, when he retired.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) Victor G. Ramage & Jack Ramage v. Fred H. Ramage & J. Everett Ramage (Docket Number 80-CP-40-1846). In this case Judge Morris found the quitclaim deed conveying a tract of Saluda County land from Mrs. Evans to the Defendants violated the terms of the trust wherein the trustees were to transfer all real properties held by them into the estate of Mrs. Evans. Judge Morris' order set aside the deed and directed the Defendants to transfer the property to her estate for distribution according to her will.

(b) James Morris Hughes v. John Doe (Docket Number 81-CP-40-0745). Randolph Dale Hughes died in an automobile accident in the State of Georgia and the Administrator of his estate brought an action for wrongful death under the applicable South Carolina statute. At issue is whether the tort liability and the substantive rights are to be determined by the lex loci or the lex forum. There are also questions as to the statute of limitations, the eligibility of the suing party to bring a wrongful death actions and the doctrine of collateral estoppel.

(c) Ronald Knight v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (Docket Number 86-CP-29-458). At issue in this case was whether underinsured motorist coverage was available to Plaintiff under an automobile insurance policy issued to him. Judge Morris found that the State Farm premium notice and insert did not meet the statutory burden of providing the insured with adequate information and in such a manner as to allow the insured to make an intelligent decision of whether to accept or reject the coverage.

(d) State of South Carolina v. Clyde Bradley. The question in this case is whether the jury panel chosen to determine Mrs. Bradley's case in magistrate's court was valid under temporary magisterial jury selection provisions.

(e) R. J. Marsh, Inc. v South Carolina National Bank (Docket Number 84-CP-40-0389). This case involves a loan from the bank to finance the purchase of real estate. The Plaintiff alleged SCN breached the contract to fund the loan. At issue is whether there was agreement upon certain material terms sufficient to constitute a binding contract.

22. Public Office: He was elected to the House of Representatives, serving 1955-62; he was elected to the Senate, serving 1963-66, 1968-76.

23. He ran for judicial office in 1976 when six additional judgeships were created, but lost to Judge Finney. He ran for SC Senate in 1966 and 1976 and lost.

24. Other occupation, business or profession:
He was a self-employed farmer, 1955-65.

31. Sued: State v. Billy Ray Strickland Strickland Pro Se sued in Federal Court after being convicted of reckless homicide. He had been charged with murder when, while driving drunk, he ran over a girl on her bike, causing her death. The suit, for alleged negligence in representation of Defendant, was dismissed by Federal Court upon Motion.

33. His health is fair. He is under treatment for Cancer of the prostate by Dr. Alex Ramsey of Charleston. His last physical was September 13, 1990.
39. Bar Associations and Professional Organizations:
South Carolina Bar.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations: He received the Silver Scales of Justice for outstanding public service for victims of crime, given by the SC Victim Assistance Network in 1988; he was given the Leadership Award in November 1985 by the SC Department of Parole and Community Corrections for outstanding contributions in criminal justice.
41. Though he is unable to work full time, he can work part time, and is eager to do so.

42. Five letters of reference:

(a) Howard Elkins, President, Bank of Clarendon

Eagle Point Sub-Division, Manning, SC 29102

(b) M. M. Weinburg, Jr., Esquire

P.O. Drawer 1289, Sumter, SC 29151-1289

(c) Mrs. H. P. Bozard

Route 4, Manning, SC 29102

(d) Harold W. Detwiler, President, Clarendon Co. Bar Association P.O. Box 131, Summerton, SC 29148

(e) Jacob H. Jennings, Esquire

P.O. Box 106, Bishopville, SC 29010

Q. JUDGE MORRIS, YOU RETIRED EARLIER THIS YEAR VERY RECENTLY, IS THAT CORRECT?
A. LESS THAN A MONTH.
Q. THE SEAT THAT JUDGE SHULER NOW HOLDS?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. IN REVIEWING YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY, DID YOU FIND ANYTHING THAT YOU MAY WANT TO ELABORATE ON OR CORRECT FOR THE COMMITTEE?
A. THERE WAS ONE LAWSUIT THAT I FAILED TO LIST WHERE I WAS A DEFENDANT BROUGHT IN 1979 BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL CONCERNING THE ASSIGNMENT OF CIRCUIT JUDGES TO PRESIDE ON THE P.S.C.; I DIDN'T LIST THAT ONE.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR, THANK YOU. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORT THERE WERE NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE YOU PRACTICED LAW AND THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION, LIKEWISE, REPORTS THERE WERE NO REPRIMANDS FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE SITTING ON THE BENCH. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR; AND IN CHECKING WITH THE CLARENDON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE MANNING CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, THOSE RECORDS WERE ALSO FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS WITH SLED AND THE FBI. AS FAR AS JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS ARE CONCERNED, IN ADDITION TO THE ONE THAT YOU JUST BROUGHT TO OUR ATTENTION, YOU WERE ALSO NAMED IN TWO 1985 ACTIONS, CIVIL RIGHT ACTIONS, BY INMATES AND BOTH OF WHICH WERE SUMMARILY DISMISSED BY FEDERAL JUDGE SIMONS; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR; ON YOUR FINANCIAL INFORMATION, YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST INDICATES NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS. THE COMMITTEE WAS SATISFIED WITH YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT, AS WELL AS THE CREDIT REPORT THAT WAS SUBMITTED. YOUR HEALTH, YOU REPORTED AS FAIR; ALTHOUGH, WE UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE HAD EVIDENCE OF SOME HEALTH PROBLEMS OF LATE.
A. YES, SIR.
Q. YOUR EARLIER SCREENING, I BELIEVE YOU WERE FIRST ELECTED TO THE BENCH IN 1979?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AND YOU WERE SUBSEQUENTLY SCREENED IN 1985, IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. THERE HAVE BEEN NO COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS RECEIVED IN REGARD TO YOUR QUALIFICATION HEARING HERE TODAY AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES TO TESTIFY. DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER STATEMENT YOU WOULD LIKE TO MAKE TO THE COMMITTEE OR ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO SPEAK ON?
A. NO, SIR, OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT THIS HAS BEEN THE MOST ENJOYABLE 11 YEARS THAT I HAVE SPENT IN MY LIFE, AS A MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY. I HAVE ENJOYED IT. IT'S AN OPPORTUNITY TO RENDER PUBLIC SERVICE TO YOUR PUBLIC MAN, AS WELL AS THE TIME THAT I SPENT IN THE HOUSE AND IN THE SENATE. I'M JUST SORRY THAT I HAD TO RETIRE.

MR. BATES: THANK YOU, JUDGE. MR. CHAIRMAN. REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS OF JUDGE MORRIS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, JUDGE MORRIS.

JUDGE MORRIS: THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: JUDGE GASQUE.

(HONORABLE S. NORWOOD GASQUE, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Samuel Norwood Gasque

Home Address: Business Address:

411 West Main St P.O. Box 1022

P.O. Box 368 Dillon, SC 29536

Latta, SC 29565

2. He was born in Marion, South Carolina on July 1, l918.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Mary Elizabeth Benton on February 8, 1941. They have five children: James Robert, age 41 (works for IBM); Paul Edgar (SLED Agent); Samuel Norwood, Jr. age 41 (Electronic Technician); Nancy Ruth G. Finklea, age 45, (Coordinator JTPA); Judith G. Moody, age 48 (Secretary SCDC).

5. Military Service: Army Air Corps, PFC 33-752-442, 1/13/44-12/19/44; Honorable Discharge, Service Connected Disability.

6. He attended the National University Law School, Washington, D.C., 1942-43, 1945-49; (Service interruption) He received a Certificate of Graduation.

8. Continuing Legal/Judicial Education: He attended all JCLE Seminars.

12. Legal Experience since graduation from law school:
General law practice in Dillon, SC from 1/1/51 till he became a Family Court Judge, 7/1//77.

20. Judicial Office: He was elected Family Court Judge July 1, l977 and served until he retired.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) Cannarella v. Cannarella, 275 S.C. 516, 273 S.E.2d 529. Wife sought pendente lite alimony, attorney fees, and suit money from husband. The Supreme Court held that record revealed that wife lacked sufficient means of her own to support and maintain herself and was entitled to temporary alimony. Justices Harwell and Gregory dissented.

(b) Eagerton v. Eagerton, 285 S.C. 279, 328 S.E.2d 912 (S.C. App. 1985). Court of Appeals officially recognized rehabilitative alimony. The court listed seven factors to be considered in awarding same.

(c) Atkinson v. Atkinson, 279 S.C. 454, 309 S.E.2d 14 (S.C. App. 1983). An award of lump sum alimony must be based on specific findings identifying the circumstances that make such an award advisable.

(d) Anderson v. Anderson, 282 S.C. 162, 318 S.E.2d 566 (Supreme Court 1984). Held husband's retirement plan was not marital property subject to equitable distribution; value of improvements made to inherited property during marriage was subject to equitable distribution.

(e) Toler v. Toler, 292 S.C. 374, 356 S.E.2d 429 (S.C.Appeals 1987). The proceeds from the sale of the husband's inherited property lost their non-marital character when the husband used them to purchase the farm, which was titled jointly in both names and was used as the primary source of support for the marriage.

22. Public Office: Member of SC House of Representatives from 1/1/75 until elected Family Court Judge in 1977. Appointed to Board of Trustees, Latta School Dis. #3, 1957-77, Chairman for 19 years.

23. He was an unsuccessful candidate for the SC Senate in 1968 and 1972, defeated in the primaries.

24. Other occupation, business or profession: He was with the FBI in Washington, DC 1940-43; with the US Civil Service Commission in Washington, 1943-1946; with Veterans Administration in Washington, 1946-1950.

33. His health is good. Dr. J. B. Berry of Marion gave him his last physical in February.

39. Bar Associations and Professional Organizations:
Dillon County Bar, Past President, l976; South Carolina Bar Association; American Trial Lawyers Association; American Bar Association; National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges; American Judicature Society.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations: Latta Rotary Club, 1951-78; Latta United Methodist Church; Master Mason, Dalcho Lodge 160, A.F.M., Latta; Shriner, Omar Temple, Charleston.

42. Five letters of reference:

(a) R. Walton Brown, President, South Trust Bank of Dillon County P.O. Box 38, Latta, SC

(b) Nancy H.Bailey, President, Dillon Co. Bar Association

P.O. Drawer 1658, Dillon, SC 29536

(c) Martin S. Driggers, President, Darlington Co. Bar Association P.O. Box 1439, Hartsville, SC 29550

(d) H. F. Bell, President, Chesterfield Co. Bar Association

P.O. Box 189, Chesterfield, SC 29709

(e) William A. Rogers, President, Marlboro Co. Bar Association 111 North Marlboro Street, Bennettsville, SC 29512

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: JUDGE EPPES, I BROKE THE RULE THIS ONCE.

JUDGE EPPES: THAT'S ALL RIGHT.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: JUDGE GASQUE HAS A CASE IN LEE COUNTY THAT HE WISHES TO GET BACK TO. WE ARE GOING TO TAKE HIM OUT OF ORDER. HOPEFULLY, THAT WON'T TAKE TOO LONG.

Q. JUDGE GASQUE, I BELIEVE YOU ARE RETIRED FROM THE FAMILY COURT BENCH.
A. YES, SIR.
Q. WHEN DID YOU RETIRE FROM THE BENCH, SIR?
A. JUNE 30TH OF 1988.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. YOU WERE FIRST ELECTED IN 1977; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. IN REVIEWING THE PERSONAL DATA QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY THAT WE SENT BACK, DID YOU FIND ANYTHING THAT YOU WANT TO CORRECT OR CLARIFY?
A. NO, SIR.
Q. ALL RIGHT. CHECKING THE RECORDS, THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS THAT THERE WERE NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW. YOU DID NOTE IN YOUR APPLICATION THAT THERE HAD BEEN A FEW FRIVOLOUS COMPLAINTS WHICH WERE DISMISSED WITHOUT ANY TYPE OF HEARING.
A. YES, SIR.
Q. THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION NOTES THERE WERE NO REPRIMANDS AGAINST YOU WHILE YOU WERE A MEMBER OF THE BENCH. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR. IN CHECKING WITH THE DILLON COUNTY SHERIFF AND THE LATTA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, THEIR RECORDS WERE ALSO FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS OF SLED AND THE FBI. THERE WERE NO JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS FOUND IN CHECKING THE RECORDS OF DILLON COUNTY AND THE FEDERAL COURTS IN YOUR NAME. FINANCIAL INFORMATION: THE STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST INDICATED NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS AND YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT, AS WELL AS YOUR CREDIT REPORT, WERE BOTH FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY. YOU NOTED THAT YOUR LAST PHYSICAL WAS SOMETIME THIS YEAR AND YOUR HEALTH IS GOOD.

A. I WOULD LIKE TO ADD THERE THAT, JUST AS A MATTER OF FACT, I WENT BY TO SEE DR. BERRY YESTERDAY AND HE SAID THAT IF I WOULD PAY HIM, HE WOULD GIVE ME A GOOD BILL OF HEALTH.
Q. YOUR MOST RECENT SCREENING WAS--WELL, YOUR FIRST ONE WAS IN 1977. THE NEXT ONE WAS 1981?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AND THEN 1985, IS THAT CORRECT, SIR?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. WE HAVE RECEIVED AN AFFIDAVIT FROM ONE PERSON, MR.BUNYAN WATERMAN ANDERSON---
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ---THAT HAS REQUESTED TO TESTIFY HERE TODAY IN REGARDS TO YOUR QUALIFICATION SCREENING. WHAT WE CUSTOMARILY DO, UNLESS YOU WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A STATEMENT BEFOREHAND, IS ALLOW THE WITNESS TO TESTIFY AND TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS THAT THE COMMITTEE MAY HAVE AND THEN ALLOW YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THOSE STATEMENTS. SO, WOULD YOU PREFER TO PREFACE HIS REMARKS OR---
A. I'D PREFER HIM TO GO AHEAD AND SAY ANYTHING HE HAS TO SAY.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. OTHER THAN THAT, THERE HAVE BEEN NO OTHER STATEMENTS RECEIVED; SO, AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS TESTIMONY AND THEN YOUR TESTIMONY, THAT WILL CONCLUDE THE SCREENING ON YOUR QUALIFICATIONS.
A. ALL RIGHT.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN, AT THIS TIME I THINK WE NEED TO HAVE MR. ANDERSON COME FORWARD.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, JUDGE GASQUE. YOU MAY MOVE BACK, IF YOU WISH. NOW UNDER OUR RULES, WE DO NOT ALLOW YOU TO CROSS-EXAMINE MR. ANDERSON BUT IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS TO HIM, YOU MAY SUBMIT THOSE AND THE COMMITTEE WILL ASK THOSE FOR YOU.

JUDGE GASQUE: I HAVE COUNSEL HERE THAT I WOULD LIKE TO CROSS-EXAMINE HIM, IF I MAY. IF YOU DON'T ALLOW IT, THAT'S ALL RIGHT, I WILL TAKE CARE OF IT AT THE PROPER TIME.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS; ALL RIGHT, SIR. MR. ANDERSON.

(BUNYAN WATERMAN ANDERSON, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: IF YOU WILL HAVE A SEAT ON YOUR RIGHT. FOR THE RECORD, LET ME STATE THAT MR. ANDERSON IS A RESIDENT OF BENNETTSVILLE WHOM I KNOW WELL. I MAY HAVE DONE SOME LIMITED LEGAL WORK FOR MR. ANDERSON AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER AND I WILL RECUSE MYSELF FROM VOTING ON THIS MATTER. COUNSEL.

Q. MR. ANDERSON, WE RECEIVED A WITNESS AFFIDAVIT FORM FROM YOU, AS WELL AS SOME ATTACHMENTS. IF YOU WOULD PREFER, IT MAY BE BEST IF YOU WOULD JUST GO THROUGH WHAT STATEMENTS YOU HAVE IN REGARD TO THE QUALIFICATIONS OF JUDGE GASQUE AND THEN FIELD THE QUESTIONS FROM MYSELF AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE.
A. ALL RIGHT, SIR. I BELIEVE I FAILED TO GIVE YOU TWO OTHER THINGS I WANTED TO INCLUDE THIS MORNING.

Q. THESE DEAL WITH THE SAME MATTER WHICH---
A. YES, THEY DO. IN MAILING IT TO YOU, I REFERRED TO TWO EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS; I ONLY SENT YOU TRANSCRIPTS OF ONE, I BELIEVE. I WILL TAKE THE FIRST ONE THAT I OMITTED; I WILL DISCUSS THAT FIRST. THIS HAD TO DO WITH A DIVORCE CASE THAT STARTED IN 1979. MY WIFE, EX-WIFE, LEFT MY BEDROOM THE NIGHT MY FATHER DIED AND THEN SHE VACATED OR DESERTED THE HOME THE NIGHT AFTER MY--THE AFTERNOON THAT MY FATHER'S ESTATE WAS SETTLED IN WHICH I INHERITED SOME PROPERTY. I'LL TRY TO KEEP THIS TO FACTS. OF COURSE, I DISAGREED WITH HER A LOT. BUT ON THE CASE OF THE ATTORNEYS' FEES, DURING THE CASE WE DISCOVERED A NUMBER OF ERRORS IN THE TIME AND TRIP REPORTS FOR THE OPPOSING ATTORNEYS AND IN ORDER TO--WE SENT IT BACK SEVERAL TIMES TO ASK HIM TO CORRECT IT AND SO WE PUT BOTH OF HER ATTORNEYS ON THE STAND; AND ON NOVEMBER THE 12TH MR. EUGENE ROGERS, ONE OF THE ATTORNEYS, TESTIFIED CONCERNING A PRIVATE MEETING ON MARCH THE 27TH, 1981 WITH THE TRIAL JUDGE. HE ADMITTED THAT HE DID GO TO DILLON TO DISCUSS MY CASE WITH THE JUDGE. MY ATTORNEYS, NOR I, WAS INFORMED AT ALL.

A. OF COURSE, THE OTHER ATTORNEY IS HARRY EASTERLING; HE IS THE ONE THAT HAD THE INACCURACIES OR THE ERRORS AND HE FINALLY SAID HE DID NOT GO AND AFTER SOME ARGUMENT; ALTHOUGH, HIS FINAL--HIS FINAL BILL SHOWED THAT HE DID GO AND CHARGED ME SO MANY HOURS WITH IT, HE WAS FINALLY OVERRULED BY THE JUDGE THAT HE HAD ANSWERED THE QUESTION. ON THE OTHER EX PARTE MEETING, IT HAD TO DO WITH A QUITE LENGTHY MEETING OF--IT WAS AN ORDER THAT WE WERE UP FOR SETTLING THE RECORD AND WE GOT INTO--WE RECEIVED SOME CORRESPONDENCE FROM--IT WAS REALLY TO HAVE A--TO SETTLE THE RECORD WITHOUT A COURT REPORTER AND WE DULY ASKED THE JUDGE TO GIVE US A COURT REPORTER AND HE DENIED IT WITH THE REASON THAT THE-- (PAUSE)--BECAUSE OF THE BACKLOG OF WORK OF A COURT REPORTER. THAT WAS ACTUALLY, MY JUDGE WENT--I MEANT, MY ATTORNEY WENT INTO COURT THAT DAY WITHOUT A COURT REPORTER AND WAS DENIED, SO HE HAD A TAPE RECORDER AND THERE WAS MUCH CONVERSATION WHICH YOU HAVE OF--AND I WON'T GO INTO IT, ABOUT THE COURT REPORTER. SO HE ACTUALLY TOOK THE TAPE RECORDER. INSTEAD, THE TAPE RECORDER WAS USED AND THEN THE JUDGE TOOK THE TAPE RECORDER AND CUT IT OFF. AND WE HAD SOME CORRESPONDENCE THAT CAME FROM THIS ORDER THAT IT WAS ADDRESSED TO MY EX-WIFE'S ATTORNEY; BUT, YET, THE--IT WAS SENT TO MY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. AND, OF COURSE, WE OPENED IT WITH SOME OTHER MAILS AND IT WAS AN EX PARTE--IT WAS A LITTLE NOTE ON IT THAT SAID THAT "I UNDERSTAND A JUDGE IN RALEIGH JUST PUT A LAWYER IN JAIL FOR 60 DAYS FOR REFUSING TO CUT A TAPE RECORDER OFF. I AM NOT TOO SURE I AM GOING TO DO THE SAME THING." I REALLY BELIEVE THAT--AND I FEEL I HAD GOT AN INJUSTICE ON MY CASE. I REALLY BELIEVE THAT IN DUE PROCESS WE DON'T NEED TO HAVE SOMEONE THAT WAS PASSING THESE LITTLE NOTES BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN OPPOSING ATTORNEYS, TALKING ABOUT PUTTING SOMEONE IN JAIL. OF COURSE, THIS ORDER WENT ON; IT WAS AN UNDATED ORDER AND IT WAS A LOT OF INACCURACIES ON IT, IN IT. IT REALLY COST ME DEARLY IN ESPECIALLY PRINTING TRANSCRIPTS TO THE SUPREME COURT. AND IN A NUMBER OF CASES THINGS WERE JUST PRINTED OVER AND OVER AS DUPLICATION. FOR INSTANCE, THE--MY--I FILED FOR A DIVORCE ON THE GROUNDS OF DESERTION AND ONE-YEAR SEPARATION.

A. THAT YOU HAVE, THE TRANSCRIPT AND SO FORTH. THIS WAS A COUNTER-SUIT. THE ORDER SETTLING THE RECORD, THE UNDATED ORDER, TRIED TO SAY AND IT TRIED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT I REQUESTED A DIVORCE ON THE GROUNDS OF NO-FAULT. THIS IS PRINTED TWO OR THREE TIMES, I KNOW TWO TIMES, THROUGHOUT THIS TRANSVERSE WHEN I WAS REPORTED TO GO TO THE SUPREME COURT. IT'S PRINTED THREE TIMES AND YOU HAVE THESE TRANSCRIPTS.I THINK SUBSTANTIAL SELECTION, DELETING OF MUCH OF THE TESTIMONY THAT WAS DAMAGING TO THE WIFE, IT WAS VERY OBVIOUS THAT THINGS THAT WERE VERY FRIVOLOUS WAS REPORTED SUCH AS MANY, MANY PAGES OF JUST CHECKS WHICH WAS MEANINGLESS WAS REPORTED--WAS COPIED AND I HAD TO COPY AND TEAR OUT; THEY MADE A MOTION, THE JUDGE IN HIS UNDATED ORDER SAID THAT THE OPPOSING ATTORNEYS WENT THROUGH AND SELECTIVELY DELETED 300 PAGES AND I THINK HE DID DELETE THEM BUT HE CUT THEM OUT IN VARIOUS PLACES AND WE HAD TO REPASTE AND RETYPE; BUT WHAT HE LEFT WAS SOME OF MY MAIN--MY CHIEF WITNESSES OUT AND THEN PRINTED SUCH THINGS AS CHECKS, AS YOU CAN SEE IN THIS TRANSCRIPT. YOU HAVE A COPY OF THE VARIOUS--OF THE OTHER MAJOR THINGS THAT HE LEFT OUT OF DEPENDED ON THE CREDIBILITY OF MY WITNESSES AND ET CETERA. SPEAKING OF MY WITNESSES, IN HIS ORDER OF MAY 4TH, 1982 HE CONSIDERED THE EXPERIENCE AND QUALIFICATIONS OF THE WIFE'S EXPERTS WHEN COMPARED TO THE HUSBAND'S EXPERTS; OF COURSE, HE FOUND THEM SOUND AND THE ONLY REASON HE FOUND THEM SOUND WAS THAT SENATOR SALEEBY WAS PRACTICED LAW WELL OVER 30 YEARS AND MR. THOMAS PRACTICED FOR OVER A QUARTER OF A CENTURY. AND MY CHIEF--ONE OF--MY ONLY EXPERT PRACTICED FOR ABOUT 5 YEARS; AND, OF COURSE, YOU HAVE THIS AND IT'S PART OF HIS ORDER. I WOULD LIKE TO CONCLUDE AND THERE, AGAIN, I WANTED TO MAKE THIS CONCISE IN THAT OVER OUR OBJECTION OF MANY RULES THAT WERE VIOLATED, IN PRE-TRIAL ORDERS ESPECIALLY WE HAD A NUMBER OF CHIEF WITNESSES ON HER SIDE COMING IN AT THE VERY LAST MINUTE, ESPECIALLY THE APPRAISAL OF MY FARMLAND CAME IN AND WE ONLY HAD 30 MINUTES TO LOOK OVER IT. WE HAD A PERSON BY THE NAME OF DR. PRITCHARD WHOSE TESTIMONY WAS SOLELY ON THE VALUE OF MY CIVIL SERVICE--I AM A CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEE--FOR EQUITABLE DIVISION PURPOSES. HE FOUND, AND THE COURT CONCLUDED, THAT MY PROPERTY WAS SUBJECT TO DIVISION OF $135,758, WAS MY CIVIL SERVICE. IT WAS SO RARE THAT WE ALL AGREED THAT MY EX-WIFE'S RETIREMENT WAS 15,000, WHICH IT WAS ABOUT A SWAP-OFF. HERS WAS 15,000 AND MINE WAS 14,900. HER CHIEF WITNESS, WHICH THE COURT TOOK, SAID THAT HERS AT THE TIME OF THE DESERTION OF THE FAMILY WAS $40,000, GREW TO 40,000; WHERE MINE INCREASED TO 135,000. OF COURSE, AS YOU KNOW, I'M NOT EVEN 55 YET. I'M NOT EVEN ELIGIBLE TO GET THE 55--I MEANT TO GET ANY. OF COURSE, MY EX-WIFE'S FATHER WHO WAS A CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEE TESTIFIED THAT HIS--IT WAS HIS RETIREMENT AND NOT HIS WIFE'S; YET, THE JUDGE PUT IT IN THERE. HE SAID THAT--OF COURSE, THE JUDGE HIMSELF--AND THIS IS ONE OF THE AREAS THAT WE DID A PASTEING JOB, THAT HE CUT OUT; BUT ONE PART THAT WAS LEFT IN AS AN OVERSIGHT, I THINK, THE COURT HIMSELF, THE JUDGE SAID, "I KNOW, BUT THIS MAN'S RETIREMENT WON'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THIS CASE BEFORE US"; YET, HE PUT IT IN THE ORDER. I WENT TO THE SUPREME COURT AND, OF COURSE, THE SUPREME COURT HELPED ME CONSIDERABLY. THE SUPREME COURT ORDER SAID, "HE CONTENDS THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRONEOUSLY CHARACTERIZED THE CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT PLAN AS MARITAL PROPERTY. WE AGREE. THIS COURT HAS REPEATEDLY HELD THAT THE SPOUSE'S RETIREMENT IS NOT MARITAL PROPERTY SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DIVISION." AS YOU--OTHER PARTS OF MY CASE, SUCH AS THE NO- FAULT, OF COURSE, WAS OVERTURNED BY THE SUPREME COURT. AND UNFORTUNATELY WHEN IT WAS REMANDED BACK DOWN FOR MY PROPERTY, I HAD A VERY SERIOUS HEART ATTACK SO I HAD TO LOSE A LOT OF MY PROPERTY AND, OF COURSE, I WON'T GO INTO THAT; THAT'S OVER. BUT THE LAST THING--AND THIS IS ONE THING I JUST REALIZED THAT I DID NOT GIVE YOU AND I WILL HAND IT TO YOU--I WOULD LIKE TO SAY IN ADDITION TO MY--THE JUDGE BEING OVERTURNED BY THE SUPREME COURT, I HAVE SIX OTHER CITATIONS WHERE HE WAS OVERTURNED. SOME--MOST OF THEM REVERSED; SOME IN PART; SOME AFFIRMED IN PART. THE INTEREST IN THE CASE OF WASHINGTON CANNARELLA VERSUS CANNARELLA; THE MATTER OF PERKINS.
Q. MR. ANDERSON, DO ANY OF THOSE SAY THAT THE JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR ARE THEY JUST OVERTURNED ON A LEGAL BASIS?
A. ALL I HAVE IS REVERSED IN PART, JUST THE PART OF MY TRANSCRIPT.
Q. WE WILL TAKE THAT. I DON'T THINK WE NEED TO READ THROUGH ALL OF THAT. WE WILL TAKE THEM.
A. AS A MATTER OF TIME, THAT'S ALL I HAVE.
Q. ALL RIGHT, MR. ANDERSON, IS IT FAIR TO SAY THAT YOUR MAIN COMPLAINTS WITH JUDGE GASQUE ARE THE HANDLING OF THE SETTLING OF THE RECORD IN YOUR DIVORCE ACTION HAVING TO DO WITH HAVING THE COURT REPORTER PRESENT, AN ALLEGATION OF AN EX PARTE COMMUNICATION WITH THE OPPOSING COUNSEL, AND THEN THE FINDINGS OF FACT THAT JUDGE GASQUE MADE THAT ULTIMATELY WENT UP ON APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT; DOES THAT PRETTY MUCH CAPSULE YOUR COMPLAINT?
A. MOSTLY, YES, SIR, RIGHT NOW. I HAD OTHER COMPLAINTS BUT THAT PRETTY-WELL--I JUST FELT THAT I DIDN'T GET A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE OF MY WITNESSES, SOME OF MY MAIN WITNESSES WERE NOT ALLOWED TO ACTUALLY TESTIFY. THEY WERE CALLED DOWN.
Q. ALL RIGHT, YOU UNDERSTAND THAT IN THE FAMILY COURT THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE MADE BY THE FAMILY COURT JUDGE; RIGHT?
A. YES, SIR, THAT'S THE MAIN REASON I'M HERE BECAUSE HE WAS MAKING--HE WAS CUTTING THESE THINGS OUT AND I DIDN'T HAVE A JURY TRIAL. HE WAS, IN FACT, MAKING THESE DECISIONS WITHOUT---
Q. YOU WERE REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ALL RIGHT, AND YOU PURSUED THROUGH THE APPEAL PROCESS ALL OF THOSE ISSUES WHICH YOU COULD; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. UNTIL MY HEALTH AND MONEY FAILED. THEY ACTUALLY TOOK MY INHERITED PROPERTY. THEY DID NOT WAIT FOR THE SUPREME COURT TO MEET AND MAKE AN AFFIRMATION. ALL MY TIMBER GOT CUT BEFORE, AND WHICH WAS INHERITED.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR, AND IN REFERRING TO THE NOTE THAT SPOKE OF A JUDGE IN RALEIGH SENTENCING SOMEONE TO 60 DAYS, WERE YOU EVER HELD IN CONTEMPT OR SENTENCED TO ANY TIME OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT BY JUDGE GASQUE?
A. NO, SIR.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR.
A. THERE WAS A COMPLAINT. THERE WAS A CONTEMPT CHARGE BUT AS WELL AS I REMEMBER, IT WAS DROPPED. WE HAD A NUMBER OF THESE.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN, IF OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS FOR MR. ANDERSON.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: SENATOR POPE.

SENATOR POPE: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: SENATOR POPE.

SENATOR POPE: ANYBODY ELSE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?

Q. I WANT TO ASK YOU ONE THING, MR. ANDERSON, MYSELF. I'M LOOKING THROUGH WHAT YOU SUBMITTED AND I'M TRYING TO FIND OUT WHERE IS THIS EX PARTE COMMUNICATION? IS THERE A WRITTEN COMMUNICATION?
A. YOU MEAN THE---

REPRESENTATIVE MCEACHIN: IT'S THE LAST THING.
Q. (BY SENATOR POPE) THE AFFIDAVIT OF MR. LEE REFERS TO THE FACT THAT, HE SAYS THAT THE JUDGE ATTEMPTED AN EX PARTE COMMUNICATION TO PETITIONER'S COUNSEL, WHICH WAS ERRONEOUSLY MAILED TO RESPONDENT'S COUNSEL," BUT I DON'T SEE A COPY OF IT.

REPRESENTATIVE MCEACHIN: IT'S THAT HANDWRITTEN NOTE.
A. I THINK I HANDED THAT TO YOU.
Q. (BY SENATOR POPE) THIS IS A HANDWRITTEN--IS IT THE LAST PAGE, MR. ANDERSON, RIGHT HERE?
A. THAT'S IT, YES, SIR.
Q. THIS WAS AFTER THE MOTION WHERE THE ARGUMENT WAS MADE ABOUT THE TAPE RECORDER?
A. YES, SIR, THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. AND THE RECORD WAS SETTLED, IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THIS WAS SOMETIME AFTERWARDS, YES, SIR.
Q. THERE WAS NOTHING PENDING AT THAT TIME, WAS THERE, OTHER THAN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE RECORD?
A. WE HAD APPEALED THE ORIGINAL ORDER AND THIS IS WHERE ALL OF THIS AND A NUMBER OF THE--IT WAS ALL PENDING IN THE SUPREME COURT. NOTHING HAD BEEN SETTLED AT THE TIME IN THE SUPREME COURT. THIS WAS PROBABLY A YEAR PROBABLY AFTER WE HAD APPEALED TO THE SUPREME COURT, THE FIRST ORDER.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR, I DON'T HAVE ANY OTHER QUESTIONS.
A. ON EQUITABLE DIVISION.

SENATOR POPE: THAT SATISFIES ME AS TO WHAT I WAS INQUIRING ABOUT. HAS ANYBODY ELSE GOT ANYTHING?

SENATOR POPE: THANK YOU, MR. ANDERSON.

MR. BATES: JUST STEP DOWN, MR. ANDERSON, AND WE WILL HAVE JUDGE GASQUE ADDRESS YOUR TESTIMONY. WE MAY POSSIBLY ASK YOU TO COME STEP BACK UP. IT DEPENDS ON WHAT THE COMMITTEE DESIRES.

JUDGE GASQUE: MR. CHAIRMAN, AT THIS TIME I WOULD LIKE TO CALL MR. EUGENE ROGERS AS A WITNESS TO TELL WHAT HE SAID.

MR. ROGERS: MR. CHAIRMAN.

(EUGENE ROGERS, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY SENATOR POPE, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

Q. HAVE A SEAT OVER THERE, MR. ROGERS, IF YOU WOULD. THAT MAY BE MORE COMFORTABLE. MR. ROGERS, WE DON'T HAVE A FORMAT SPECIFICALLY. YOU CAN GO AHEAD, IF YOU WOULD, AND GIVE YOUR TESTIMONY.
A. MY NAME IS GENE ROGERS. I PRACTICE LAW IN COLUMBIA WITH SHERRILL AND ROGERS. I HAVE BEEN PRACTICING LAW FOR ABOUT 38 YEARS. BY WAY OF OVERVIEW, I REPRESENTED THE PLAINTIFF, MRS. ANDERSON, IN THIS CASE. IT STARTED IN 1979 WHEN THE YOUNGEST--THE OLDEST CHILD WAS, I BELIEVE, A SOPHOMORE IN COLLEGE--A SOPHOMORE IN HIGH SCHOOL. IT ENDED IN 1985 AFTER THAT CHILD HAD--OR THE YEAR THAT CHILD GRADUATED FROM COLLEGE. IT WAS A VERY BITTER, NO HOLDS BARRED CONTEST. MR. ANDERSON WAS REPRESENTED INITIALLY BY MR. KILGO. AFTER THREE OR FOUR OR FIVE MONTHS HE WAS REPLACED BY A JAN WARNER. THOSE OF YOU WHO KNOW MR. WARNER KNOW HE IS NOT A SHRINKING VIOLET. YOU KNOW THE TENACITY WITH WHICH HE REPRESENTS HIS CLIENT. AND IN THIS CASE, WHEN I SAY IT WAS A NO HOLDS BARRED CONTEST, IT WAS. THE PARTIES UNFORTUNATELY WERE VERY BITTER WITH EACH OTHER. WITH RESPECT TO THE PROCEEDINGS, THERE WERE SEPARATE APPEALS FROM ORDERS TAKEN BY MR. WARNER. THERE WERE THREE SEPARATE CONSOLIDATED BRIEFS. EVERY ISSUE OF ANY CONSEQUENCE, EVERY ISSUE, WAS CONTESTED AND APPEALED. THERE WERE APPEALS FROM ORDERS CORRECTING MATHEMATICAL ERRORS ON THE PART OF THE RESPONDENT. THERE WERE APPEALS FROM AN ORDER CORRECTING A TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR. IT WAS THAT DETAILED. THE APPEALS WERE HEARD BY THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT ON THE EX PARTE PROCEEDINGS. THAT WAS HEARD ON MOTION BY THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT WITHIN DAYS OF THE TIME THE ALLEGED OCCURRENCE TOOK PLACE. THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT DISPOSED OF THOSE ISSUES AND THOSE ISSUES WERE HANDLED IN 115 PAGES OF MATERIALS FILED BY MR. WARNER WITH THE COURT WITH AN ORDER BY JUDGE LEWIS WHICH SIMPLY SAID THE MOTION IS DISMISSED. THAT WAS FOLLOWED BY AN EXHAUSTIVE PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND A REQUEST FOR A REASON FOR TURNING DOWN THE MOTION. THAT WAS HANDLED IN JUDGE LEWIS' INIMITABLE WAY BY SAYING THE FIRST MOTION WITHOUT MERIT; THIS MOTION ALSO WITHOUT MERIT. THAT WAS APPEALED TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. AND THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, IN WHAT MUST HAVE BEEN A RECORD DECISION, TURNED DOWN THAT PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IN NO TIME FLAT. THAT MATTER, THE EX PARTE PROCEEDINGS, WAS--I'M NOT SURE I'M AT LIBERTY TO, SO I WON'T GO INTO ANY OTHER MATTERS, BUT I TELL YOU THAT IT DID NOT REST AT THAT POINT.THERE WAS NO--IT WAS CONSIDERED BY ALL OF THE BODIES THAT COULD CONSIDER IT THAT I KNOW ABOUT AND IT WAS UNIFORMLY UNANIMOUSLY HELD TO BE WITHOUT MERIT. WHAT THAT MEETING WAS AT THAT TIME--THIS WAS IN 1980, I BELIEVE. AT THAT TIME IT WAS NOT UNUSUAL FOR A JUDGE TO CALL ONE OF THE LAWYERS AND SAY, "I WOULD LIKE YOU TO PREPARE AN ORDER AND THIS IS WHAT I WANT IN IT." NOW THE RULE HAS BEEN CHANGED OR THE CUSTOM IS THAT I GET LETTERS FROM JUDGES SAYING, "I FIND SO AND SO AND I'M GOING TO ASK ONE OF YOU TO PREPARE THE ORDER." WELL, AT THAT TIME IT WAS NOT UNUSUAL, AND THE COURT FOUND THAT IT WASN'T UNUSUAL, FOR THE JUDGE TO CALL ONE OF THE LAWYERS. AND THOSE OF YOU WHO WERE PRACTICING IN THE FAMILY COURT BACK IN THE EARLY 80'S OR THE LATE 70'S KNOW ONE LAWYER WOULD GET A CALL FROM THE JUDGE. THAT'S WHAT HAPPENED. THIS CASE HAD TAKEN UP OVER 2,000 PAGES OF TESTIMONY, AND NUMEROUS WITNESSES HAD BEEN CALLED. I WAS IN COURT ON 20 SEPARATE DAYS IN CONNECTION WITH THESE PROCEEDINGS. THE JUDGE SUGGESTED THAT INSTEAD OF TELLING ME OVER THE PHONE WHAT HE WANTED IN THE ORDER--I WAS GOING TO BE IN DILLON IN CONNECTION WITH SOME OTHER CASE AND HE SUGGESTED THAT IF I WAS GOING TO BE IN THAT VICINITY, HE SUGGESTED THAT I DROP BY HIS OFFICE. I DROPPED BY HIS OFFICE FOR THE PURPOSE OF HIS GIVING ME INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW HE WANTED THE ORDER PREPARED. IT WAS PREPARED THAT WAY. NOW EVERY ADVERSE INNUENDO THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO RAISE WAS RAISED BEFORE THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT, BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, AND IT WAS UNIFORMLY TURNED DOWN. IN THIS CASE MR. WARNER RAISED 159 EXCEPTIONS. THOSE EXCEPTIONS MOSTLY WERE DISMISSED UNDER RULE 23. THE CASE WAS DECIDED AT 282 SOUTH CAROLINA 1623 18 SOUTHEASTERN SECTION 566. AND THE RESPONDENT, MR. WARNER, FILED ABOUT 300 AND--I BELIEVE IT WAS 370 PAGES OF BRIEFS WITH THE SUPREME COURT. I FILED MAYBE ABOUT HALF THAT MANY. AND THE SUPREME COURT DISPOSED OF 159 EXCEPTIONS WHICH THEY RAISED, AND I RAISED 8 OR 10, I THINK, WITH A THREE-AND-A-HALF PAGE ORDER. IT WAS VERY BRIEF. IT SAID IN THE ORDER THAT--IT SAID SOMETHING ABOUT THE PARTIES WERE DEVOTING--THEY SUGGESTED THAT THE PARTIES TRY TO MINIMIZE THE LITIGATION, THAT MUCH OF THE MARITAL ESTATE WAS BEING TAKEN UP BY LITIGATION. THE COURT--AND I DIDN'T KNOW THIS WAS COMING UP UNTIL LATE LAST NIGHT AND THIS MORNING I GOT TOGETHER SOME EXHIBITS THAT ARE ON THE WAY DOWN CONSISTING OF PARTS OF THE RECORD, INCLUDING THE ORDER FROM THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE, AND I WILL HAND THAT UP TO YOU IF IT GETS HERE IN TIME; IF NOT, I WILL SUPPLY MR. ANDERSON AND YOU WITH COPIES OF THE COURT'S ORDER. THE COURT LARGELY CONFIRMED JUDGE GASQUE. JUDGE GASQUE ON ONE ASPECT WAS THINKING TOO FAR AHEAD. AS YOU KNOW, TODAY PENSION AND PROFIT SHARING PLANS ARE INCLUDED AS PART OF THE MARITAL ESTATE. AT THAT TIME, AND THE COURT SAID THIS, AT THAT TIME OUR SUPREME COURT HAD NOT SPOKEN ON THAT ISSUE. BETWEEN THE TIME JUDGE GASQUE MADE HIS DECISION AND THE TIME THE CASE WAS HEARD BY THE SUPREME COURT, IT HAD SPOKEN ON THE ISSUE AND IT HAD RULED ADVERSELY TO THE POSITION JUDGE GASQUE TOOK IN THE CASE. I SAID JUDGE GASQUE WAS AHEAD OF HIS TIME. AS YOU NOW KNOW, UNDER THE LAW PROFIT SHARING AND PENSION PLANS ARE INCLUDED AS A PART OF THE MARITAL ESTATE; AND IF THE CASE WERE HELD TODAY, IT WOULD BE INCLUDED. ALSO, BECAUSE IT EXCLUDED THAT, IT REMANDED THE CASE FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE AMOUNT OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION. IT MODIFIED THE ATTORNEYS' FEES SOMEWHAT. IN CONNECTION WITH ATTORNEYS' FEES, THE AMOUNT OF WORK NECESSARY CAN BE ILLUSTRATED BY THIS OCCURRENCE: AFTER THE CASE WAS ENDED, THE LAST PROCEEDING BEFORE JUDGE GASQUE TOOK PLACE IN THE SUMMER OF '82. INCIDENTALLY, JUDGE GASQUE HAS BEEN BEFORE YOU FOR RECONSIDERATION, I BELIEVE, IN, WHAT, '81 AND '85. THE--OH, THERE WERE NUMEROUS APPEALS GOING ON AFTER THE TESTIMONY HAD ENDED. WE SOUGHT TO ENFORCE THE COURT'S JUDGMENT AND IN CONNECTION WITH THAT, WE HAD SOME PROCEEDINGS BEFORE JUDGE LEWIS AND THE SUPREME COURT. THE LAWYERS HAD NOT BEEN PAID; THAT IS, MRS. ANDERSON'S LAWYERS. SO, I PETITIONED THE COURT FOR A PENDENTE LITE ATTORNEY'S FEE. THAT WAS HEARD BEFORE THE FULL SUPREME COURT ON A PENDENTE LITE BASIS; AND THE COURT, UPON HEARING IT, AWARDED THE WIFE'S ATTORNEYS A PENDENTE LITE FEE OF $30,000. NOW THAT MIGHT NOT BE A RECORD, BUT THAT INDICATES WHAT THE COURT AT THAT TIME THOUGHT ABOUT THE DEFENDANT'S CONTENTIONS. THAT WAS AFTER THE CONTENTION ON THE EX PARTE PROCEEDING. THE OTHER THINGS THAT WERE COMPLAINED ABOUT, LET'S SEE, ONE THING WAS THE EX PARTE PROCEEDING; THAT HAS BEEN LITIGATED AS FAR AS I THINK IT COULD GO. THE SECOND THING WAS THE--WAS THE RETIREMENT PLAN, AND THERE WAS AN INDICATION OF A LACK OF A FAIR TRIAL. YOU CAN'T READ THE RECORD WITHOUT CONCLUDING THAT JUDGE GASQUE HANDLED ALL OF THE OBJECTIONS--I THOUGHT HE RULED FAVORABLY TO MR. WARNER MOST OF THE TIME. MR. WARNER CERTAINLY RAISED MOST OF THE OBJECTIONS AND HE RULED FAVORABLY TO HIM MORE THAN HE RULED FAVORABLY TO ME. IT'S UNFORTUNATE THAT THE PARTIES HAD THE BITTERNESS THAT THEY HAD TOWARD EACH OTHER. THEY WERE VERY BITTER. THE LAWYERS LITIGATED IT. IT WAS A CASE THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SETTLED, BUT YOU CAN'T SETTLE A CASE BY YOURSELF. THE LITIGATION WAS DESTRUCTIVE. IT WAS UNFORTUNATE. BUT IT WAS HANDLED AS FAIRLY AS I FELT IT COULD BE HANDLED. NOW I CAN GO ON AND ON. I HAVE GONE ON MUCH LONGER THAN YOU PROBABLY WANTED ME TO. IF YOU WILL ASK ME QUESTIONS, I WILL BE HAPPY TO ANSWER THEM.

SENATOR POPE: ANYBODY ON THE COMMITTEE HAVE A QUESTION?

Q. MR. ROGERS, WAS JUDGE GASQUE--WAS HE EVER CITED FOR ANY KIND OF WRONGDOING BY THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT?
A. HE WAS NOT CITED. NOW THERE WERE ALL SORTS OF PROCEEDINGS AND I DON'T KNOW TO WHAT EXTENT I HAVE LIBERTY TO GO INTO THOSE, BUT THEY WERE ALL DISMISSED. EVERYTHING WAS DISMISSED.
Q. MR. ANDERSON, I THOUGHT, MADE THE COMMENT ABOUT THE CUTTING OF THE TIMBER BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT MADE A DECISION. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON THAT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. WHAT WAS THAT ABOUT?
A. THE SUPREME COURT PASSED AN ORDER--MR. ANDERSON TOOK THE POSITION THAT HE DIDN'T HAVE THE MONEY TO PAY THE SUPPORT TO HIS WIFE AND FAMILY OR ATTORNEYS' FEES TO US; SO, THE SUPREME COURT ORDERED THE SALE OF SOME TIMBER AND THERE WAS SOME NEGOTIATIONS AND ULTIMATELY I BELIEVE WE REACHED AN AGREEMENT ON THAT. NOTHING WAS DONE IMPROPERLY. IF IT HAD BEEN, EVERYBODY WOULD HAVE HEARD ABOUT IT.

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: THANK YOU.

SENATOR POPE: ANYBODY ELSE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?

SENATOR POPE: THANK YOU, MR. ROGERS.
JUDGE, DO YOU WANT TO COMMENT NOW?

JUDGE GASQUE: THAT'S ALL I HAVE TO OFFER UNLESS SOME MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE, OF COURSE, WANTS TO ASK ME A QUESTION. THIS CASE, AS MR. ROGERS STATED, STARTED 11 YEARS AGO, IN 1979; AND I JUST COULD POSSIBLY NOT REMEMBER IT; SO, WHEN I GOT A CALL YESTERDAY AFTERNOON THAT MR. ANDERSON HAD FILED A COMPLAINT AGAINST ME--I AM IN ANOTHER CIRCUIT NOW HOLDING COURT--I JUST ASKED MR. ROGERS WOULD HE COME UP AND GIVE YOU A RESUME AS TO WHAT HAPPENED, NOTHING BUT JUST THE FACTS, GOOD OR BAD. IT IS JUST A LITTLE AMAZING--KEEP IN MIND NOW THE CASE STARTED IN '79--I WAS SCREENED IN 1970 WHEN I STARTED. I WAS SCREENED AGAIN IN 1981, I BELIEVE. MR. ANDERSON NEVER FILED A COMPLAINT WITH THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS. I WAS SCREENED AGAIN IN 1985. HE HAS NEVER FILED A COMPLAINT AGAINST ME IN ANYTHING. AND EVEN THOUGH THIS CASE WENT ON FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, THE ONLY THING THAT THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT EVER REVERSED ME ON WAS THE FACT THAT THE RETIREMENT PAY WAS NOT A PART OF THE MARITAL RECORD, WHICH I HELD IT WAS. THEY SAID, NO, IT'S NOT. TODAY IT IS. I ASSUME THAT'S WHAT MR. ROGERS MEANT WHEN HE SAID I WAS THINKING AHEAD OF TIME. AS TO THE PRINTING THAT HE TALKS ABOUT: ALL THE PAPERS HE HAS ATTACHED HERE ARE PAPERS THAT HIS ATTORNEY PUT IN THE RECORD. I REFUSED TO LET THEM PRINT THE RECORD AND PUT ALL THIS UNNECESSARY, IRRELEVANT THING IN THE RECORD. HIS ATTORNEY WENT OUT ON HIS OWN AND I THINK IT WAS 185 PAGES PRINTED THAT I REFUSED TO LET BE PRINTED. NOW IF HE HAS GOT A COMPLAINT, HE OUGHT TO FILE IT AGAINST HIS ATTORNEY; WHICH THIS IS SORT OF AMAZING JUST A LITTLE BIT, IF HE'S RIGHT, IF I WAS WRONG 11 YEARS AGO, WHERE IS HIS ATTORNEY OF RECORD? WHY ISN'T HE HERE TO SPEAK IN HIS BEHALF? THAT'S JUST A LITTLE BIT AMAZING TO ME.
GENTLEMEN, I HAVE NOTHING ELSE TO SAY. KEEP IN MIND I WAS REVERSED ONCE. THE SUPREME COURT HAS NOW REVERSED ITSELF AND SAID YOU ARE RIGHT. AND YOU ARE PRACTICING LAW, YOU SHOULD KNOW IT BECAUSE IT'S CALLED TO MY ATTENTION EVERY DAY. I APPRECIATE YOUR COURTESY OF LETTING ME APPEAR BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE. I PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT I WENT BEFORE MY DOCTOR YESTERDAY ABOUT 5:00 O'CLOCK; I SAID, "J.B., I'VE GOT TO GO BEFORE THE SCREENING COMMITTEE TOMORROW, HOW ABOUT CHECKING ME OVER AND SEE IF I'M ALL RIGHT." HE CHECKED ME OVER AND HIS NURSE CHECKED ME OVER, WHICH I ENJOYED, AND THEN HE SAID: IF YOU PAY ME, I WILL GIVE YOU A GOOD RECORD. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. I APPRECIATE YOUR COURTESY AND IF YOU WANT ME TO--I'M THE ONLY RETIRED JUDGE THAT'S WORKING. JUDGE MCLEOD PULLS JUST STRICTLY--I MEANT FAMILY RETIRED JUDGE THAT'S WORKING. JUDGE MCLEOD, I THINK, ONLY HEARS NON-JURY. IF YOU WANT ME TO CARRY ON IN THE FUTURE AS I HAVE IN THE PAST, I APPRECIATE YOUR COURTESY. IF YOU DON'T THINK I'M UP TO IT, LET YOUR CONSCIENCE BE YOUR GUIDE. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

SENATOR POPE: JUDGE, THANK YOU FOR BEING WITH US. I GUESS WE HAVE ONE MORE MATTER, MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: JUDGE EPPES. WOULD THE COMMITTEE LIKE TO TAKE A LITTLE BREAK NOW? BEFORE WE START, LET'S TAKE A BREAK.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: I CALL THE COMMITTEE BACK TO ORDER. IT APPEARS THAT WE HAVE A QUORUM. JUDGE EPPES.

(HONORABLE FRANK EPPES, FIRST DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Frank Eppes

Home Address: Business Address:

8 Hickory Lane None

Greenville, SC 29609

2. He was born in Greenville, November 28, 1922.

Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He has been married to Frankie Norrie Eppes since November 27, 1959. They have four children: Frank Langston, age 29 (attorney); Elizabeth McCall, age 28 (teacher); John Albert, age 26 (Lt. in U.S. Navy); Martha Cary, age 18 (sophomore, Washington & Lee).
5. Military Service: He served in the Army Air Force, March 1943-46 as PFC, Serial # 34651201, Honorable Discharge.

6. He attended USC, earning an AB Degree in 1950. He attended USC School of Law for 6 semesters, took and passed the Bar Exam in 1953 and did not return to graduate.

7. In college he was President of Blue Key Honorary Society (1949).

8. He has attended CLEs (Judicial) as required.

9. Before his retirement he was on the panel of Continuing Legal Education (Judicial).

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
He was in general practice from 1953 until he was sworn in a Circuit Judge in March 1962. He served until his retirement in July, 1985 and has since served as a Special Judge.

20. Judicial Office: Circuit Court Judge of 13th Circuit, March 1962- July 1985, elected by the General Assembly in January, 1962. Since August 1986, he has held Court continuously by special assignment of Chief Justice Ness and Gregory.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) State v. Edward Richburg, 250 S.C. 451, 158 S.E.2d 769 (S.C. Supreme Court 1968).reversed and remanded. Murder case in which deputy sheriff was killed after an exchange of gunfire following a chase because of an alleged traffic violation.

(b) State v. Linda A. Rutledge, 250 S.C. 451, 158 S.E.2d 250 (S.C. Supreme Court 1973). Murder case in which defendent was convicted of the murder of her husband by means of a hired assassin and later appealed. The Supreme Court upheld, finding no prejudice from joint trial or from order of proof allowed by the court or from curtailment of cross examination of State's witnesses as to the deceased husband's illegal activities.

(c) State v. Charles Wakefield, 270 S.C. 293, 242 S.E.2d 219 (S.C. Supreme Court 1978). Murder case. The defendent was convicted of murder of a father and son while in the commission of an armed robbery and sentenced to death, pursuant to the Act of 1974, which the U. S. Supreme Court found to be unconstitutional as it relates to the death sentence. The S.C. Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, reversing only the imposition of the death penalty and remanded to the lower court for the purpose of sentencing him to life imprisonment.

(d) Lowndes Products, Inc. v. Claude A. Browder, et al., 259 S.C. 322, 191 S.E.2d 761 (S. C. Supreme Court 1972). A former employer brought suit against former employees and others for injunction against misappropriation of trade secrets and for damages for same and breach of duty of loyalty. The Master-In-Equity recommended all relief sought by plaintiff be denied, the injunction be dissolved and plaintiff be charged with attorney's fees. Judge Eppes affirmed the Master's report. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

(e) State v. Goode, Saluda County, 89-41-0343 and 89-41-0344, l990. Recent murder case.

(f) City of Greenville v. Noigra C. Yarn, Order written January 15, l963. Greenville News, May 8, l962 and January 16, 1963. Mr Yarn appealed his two convictions for trespassing under a city ordinance forbidding Negro occupancy of residences in a "White block". Mr. Yarn was attempting to move into and occupy property owned by him. Judge Eppes ruled the ordinance unconstitutional, pointing out that an ordinance which prevents a freeholder from occupying a self-owned dwelling in a residential neighborhood is clearly an abuse of the police power of a municipality and in violation of the U.S. and State Constitutions.

22. Public Office: He was elected to S.C. House in 1949, was reelected 7 times, serving until he was elected Judge in 1962.

23. He ran for Governor in 1986 and was defeated in the Primary.

31. Sued: Earl Nash vs. William H. Ballenger, et al. (including Frank Eppes) Case No. 90-CP-04-887. This is a recent suit arising out of some suits in Anderson County and is unclear as to relief sought. It has just been dismissed.

33. His health is good. His last physical was in May, 1990 by Dr. Arthur Meakin of Greenville. He takes medication for heart fibrillation.

39. Bar Associations and Professional Organizations:
County, State and Federal Bar.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
Deacon, ARP Church.

42. Five letters of recommendation:

(a) Thomas C. Vandiver, Chairman Emeritus, Carolina First Bank P.O. Box 1029 Greenville, SC 29602

(b) Leo H. Hill, Esquire

P.O. Box 2585,Greenville, SC 29602

(c) Joseph C. Coleman, Esquire

1338 Main Street, Suite 500, Columbia, SC 29201

(d) Rex L. Carter, Esquire

P.O. Box 10828, Greenville, SC 29603

(e) B.O. Thomason, Jr., Esquire

P.O. Box 10045, Greenville, SC 29603

(f) Greenville County Bar Association

(g) Anderson County Bar Association

(h) Pickens County Bar Association

Q. JUDGE, WE ARE HERE FOR YOUR SCREENING AS A RETIRED SPECIAL JUDGE. I BELIEVE YOU RETIRED IN 1986 FROM---
A. NO, I RETIRED IN 1985, JULY THE 30TH.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. AND YOU WERE FIRST ELECTED TO THE BENCH IN 1962, IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ALL RIGHT, IN LOOKING OVER THE QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY THAT WE PROVIDED FOR YOU, AFTER RECEIVING YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE, DID YOU FIND ANYTHING THAT WE NEED TO CLARIFY OR ELABORATE ON?
A. NO, SIR.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. IN CHECKING WITH THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE, WE FOUND THERE WERE NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW. IN CHECKING WITH THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION, THERE WERE NO REPRIMANDS ISSUED AGAINST YOU WHILE ON THE BENCH. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR; AND IN CHECKING WITH THE GREENVILLE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND WITH THE GREENVILLE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, THOSE RECORDS WERE ALSO FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS WITH SLED AND THE FBI. IN CHECKING WITH THE RECORDS OF THE GREENVILLE COUNTY COURTHOUSE AND THE FEDERAL COURTS HERE IN SOUTH CAROLINA FOR ANY JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS FOR WHICH YOU WERE A NAMED PARTY, THERE WERE A FEW AND WE CAN GO THROUGH THOSE RIGHT NOW. I BELIEVE IN 1985 THERE WAS A CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION ALLEGED BY AN INMATE AND ALSO A HABEAS CORPUS ACTION THAT SAME YEAR AND WITH THE FIRST ONE BEING DISMISSED BY JUDGE HAWKINS, FEDERAL JUDGE HAWKINS, AND THE OTHER ONE BY JUDGE HAMILTON; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AND THEN IN 1990, THIS YEAR, THERE WAS AN ACTION RISING IN ANDERSON COUNTY, EARL NASH VERSUS BALLENGER, ET AL., FOR WHICH, I BELIEVE, YOU WERE A NAMED PARTY AND YOU INCLUDED THAT IN YOUR PACKET. COULD YOU GIVE US A LITTLE MORE EXPLANATION?
A. HE WAS A--JUDGE LANEY DISMISSED THAT SEVERAL WEEKS AGO, THE 27TH, AND I THINK PLACED THE PLAINTIFF IN JAIL FOR CONTEMPT. I HAVEN'T SEEN THE COMPLETE ORDER; BUT HE ONLY CAME IN FEDERAL COURT--I MEAN CAME IN CRIMINAL COURT AND MADE A MOTION FOR A CIVIL JUDGMENT, AND I JUST WROTE "MOTION DENIED," AND, OF COURSE, I WAS MADE A PARTY BUT IT HAS BEEN DISMISSED.
Q. IN REVIEWING THE FINANCIAL INFORMATION THAT WAS SUPPLIED TO THE COMMITTEE, YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST DID NOT INDICATE ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS AND THE FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT AND THE CREDIT REPORT THAT WERE SUBMITTED ALSO WERE SATISFACTORY. YOU REPORTED YOUR HEALTH WAS GOOD WITH YOUR LAST PHYSICAL SOMETIME THIS YEAR. THERE HAVE BEEN SOME STATEMENTS RECEIVED AND SOME WITNESS AFFIDAVIT FORMS RECEIVED IN REGARD TO YOUR QUALIFICATIONS AND THERE ARE SOME WITNESSES HERE TODAY TO TESTIFY. WE WILL HEAR FROM THOSE FOLKS, FIRST OFF FROM THE PEOPLE WHO SUBMITTED THE WITNESS AFFIDAVIT FORMS. DID YOU RECEIVE THE PACKET OF INFORMATION?
A. YES, I RECEIVED IT FROM YOU.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR, HAVE YOU HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK OVER THAT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. YOU CAN EITHER MAKE A STATEMENT TO THE COMMITTEE AT THIS POINT, IF YOU WOULD CARE TO, OR WE COULD GO AND LISTEN TO THE WITNESSES TESTIFY AND THEN ALLOW YOU A CHANCE TO ADDRESS THOSE STATEMENTS.
A. I WOULD RATHER LISTEN TO THE WITNESSES TESTIFY AND THEN ADDRESS THE ISSUES.

MR. BATES: ALL RIGHT, SIR, IF YOU WILL STEP DOWN, PLEASE, JUDGE. THE LIST OF PEOPLE THAT WE HAVE THAT HAVE SIGNED UP, FIRST OFF THOSE THAT HAD SUBMITTED AFFIDAVITS WITHIN THE 48 HOUR TIME PERIOD PRIOR TO THE HEARING WHICH IS REQUIRED BY OUR RULES AND BY THE STATUTE ARE JIM GREGO, GINGER TUCKER OWEN, MARK OWEN, AND BOB MORROW. THOSE WHO HAVE SIGNED UP DESIRING TO TESTIFY, IN ADDITION TO THOSE PEOPLE, BUT HAVE NOT SUBMITTED AFFIDAVITS, ARE MR. STRATOS, MR. MURDAUGH, JR., AND MR. MURDAUGH, III, AND MR. MIZZELL. I BELIEVE I HAVE NAMED--IF THERE IS ANYBODY ELSE, PLEASE, LET US KNOW.

MR. CHAIRMAN, IT WOULD PROBABLY BE EASIEST FOR MR. GREGO TO TESTIFY FIRST. MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, YOU WILL NOTICE A BLACK PLASTIC FOLDER IN FRONT OF YOU. THIS WAS SUBMITTED BY MR. GREGO AND INCLUDES NOT ONLY HIS AFFIDAVIT FORM, BUT ALSO SOME OTHER--SOME NEWSPAPER ARTICLES, AS WELL AS SOME STATISTICS AND THE AFFIDAVITS OF MR. AND MRS. OWEN AND MR. MORROW.

SO, MR. GREGO, IF YOU WILL COME FORWARD AT THIS TIME.

MR. GREGO: EXCUSE ME, MR. CHAIRMAN, WITH YOUR PERMISSION, I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE DR. MORROW AND MR. OWEN AND MS. TUCKER GO FIRST, IF I MAY.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WE HAVE AFFIDAVITS FROM THEM?

MR. GREGO: YES, YOU HAVE AFFIDAVITS FROM ALL THREE OF THEM.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: IF YOU WISH.

MR. GREGO: THANK YOU, SIR.

MR. BATES: ALL RIGHT, IS THERE ANY PREFERENCE OF ORDER YOU WANT?

MR. GREGO: DR. MORROW.

MR. BATES: DR. MORROW?

MR. GREGO: YES, SIR.

MR. BATES: ALL RIGHT, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: HAVE A SEAT, PLEASE.

DR. MORROW: COULD I JUST STAND?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WELL, YOU CAN STAND OR YOU CAN SIT OVER THERE, IF YOU LIKE.

DR. MORROW: IF I DON'T PASS OUT FROM NERVES FIRST, IT SHOULDN'T TAKE BUT ONE OR TWO MINUTES. I APPRECIATE YOU HEARING ME.

MY NAME IS BOB MORROW AND I'M A PRACTICING GENERAL DENTIST IN CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA, AND HAVE BEEN SO SINCE 1981. I WOULD MUCH RATHER BE UP HERE TALKING TO YOU ABOUT DENTAL HYGIENE BUT THAT'S NOT THE PURPOSE. I'M HERE FOR A DIFFERENT PURPOSE AND THAT'S TO REQUEST THAT JUDGE EPPES NOT BE ALLOWED TO BE SEATED BACK ON THE BENCH FOR THE LAW.

IF YOU DON'T MIND, I HAVE A FEW NOTES TO GO BY. I CAN'T READ THEM BUT IT MIGHT BE MORE COMFORTABLE IF I HAVE THEM IN FRONT OF ME TO LOOK AT THEM.

MR. BATES: ALL RIGHT, SIR. EXCUSE ME, DR.MORROW. FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, IF YOU HAVE THE BLACK FOLDER IN FRONT OF YOU, PULL TAB "H." THAT'S WHERE HIS AFFIDAVIT, DR. MORROW'S AFFIDAVIT IS. DR. MORROW.

DR. MORROW: I JUST QUESTION HIS QUALIFICATIONS NOW BASED ON THE AMOUNT OF TIME THAT GOES BACK TO 1986 WHEN I WAS CALLED TO JURY DUTY. I HAD NOT HEARD OF HIM BEFORE THAT TIME, TO BE FRANK, AND I HAVE NOT REALLY HEARD OF HIM SINCE THAT TIME UNTIL THURSDAY WHEN I HEARD ABOUT THE HEARING IN THE CHARLESTON PAPER AND THEN I IMMEDIATELY REQUESTED THAT I BE ALLOWED TO COME DOWN HERE TO TESTIFY. THIS, AGAIN, GOES BACK TO WHEN I WAS CALLED TO JURY DUTY IN 1986 AND JUDGE EPPES WAS PRESIDING. AND AS A PRACTICING DENTIST, I GUESS LEGALLY WAS ALLOWED TO REQUEST THAT I BE GIVEN TIME OFF AND NOT ATTEND MY JURY DUTY BUT I DECIDED NOT TO DO THAT; I SAT ON THE JURY.

TO TRY TO GET STRAIGHT TO THE POINT, I QUESTION HIS ABILITY TO RENDER A FAIR JUDGMENT BASED JUST ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE; AND THAT I ALSO QUESTION HIS PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCY IN A COURT OF LAW. WHEN I HAD THE JURY DUTY THAT WEEK AND WE SAT WITH PROSPECTIVE JURORS IN THE AUDIENCE, HE WAS REAL FRANK WITH US AND REAL CASUAL AND I APPRECIATED THAT; HE TALKED TO THE JURY BETWEEN CASES ON WHY HE RENDERED THE DECISIONS AND HOW HE DID THAT; AND I DON'T KNOW A WHOLE LOT ABOUT LAW, SO, YOU KNOW, HE MAY BE RIGHT OR WRONG, I'M JUST GIVING YOU A VERSION OF HOW I, THE JUROR, FELT AND HOW I, THE CITIZEN, FELT LATER ON, AND HOW I, AS A FATHER, FELT.

LIKE I SAID, HE CASUALLY TALKED TO US AND I ENJOYED IT REALLY THE FIRST COUPLE OF DAYS AS IT WENT ON; AND AS CASE BY CASE WENT ON, AND AS DAY BY DAY WENT ON, I STARTED RATIONALIZING THAT HE WAS REALLY BASING HIS DECISION, NOT ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE, BUT MORE ON THE ABILITY OF THE PRISON SYSTEM TO COMPENSATE--KEEP ALL THESE CRIMINALS WHO HAD PLEADED GUILTY, AND TO ME THAT REALLY WASN'T HIS JOB TO SEE HOW WELL THEY WERE CARED FOR, TO SEE WHETHER THEY HAD ONE ROOM AND A BATHROOM AND A SHOWER, BUT TO SEE IF THEY BELONG IN JAIL BECAUSE OF THE FACTS OF THE CASE, THEN THEY SHOULD BE IN JAIL. ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS ON THESE LITTLE FIRESIDE CHATS, HE WOULD RELATE TO US THAT THE PRISONS WERE TOO CROWDED AND THAT THEY COULDN'T TAKE ANYMORE PRISONERS AT THE TIME. THEY WERE JUST TOO CROWDED. HE ALSO, IN HIS LITTLE CHATS, WOULD TALK ABOUT HOW THIS PERSON MAY NOT REALLY BE REFORMED IN A PRISON SYSTEM. TO ME, AS A CITIZEN, I DON'T CARE IF HE IS REFORMED. IF HE BELONGS IN JAIL, PUT HIM IN JAIL. DON'T WORRY ABOUT THAT. LET THEM REFORM THEM. TO ME, A JUDGE SHOULDN'T WORRY ABOUT WHETHER THE GUY IS REFORMED. THE CASE IN PARTICULAR THAT I'M LEADING UP TO IS VERY EMOTIONAL AND SO IF I CRY, JUST BEAR WITH ME. I JUST DON'T THINK THAT ANYTHING SHOULD BE A DETERMINING FACTOR OTHER THAN THE FACTS OF THE CASE. IF A MAN PLEADS GUILTY, HE IS GUILTY. WE SET GUIDELINES AND LAWS FOR WHAT THE MAXIMUM PENALTIES ARE FROM THE FACTS IN THE CASE AND THEN I EXPECT THE VERDICT OR THE SENTENCE TO BE IN RELATION TO THE CRIME. GETTING ON TO HIS PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCY AS A JUDGE IN A COURT OF LAW, I, AS A DENTIST, AM BOUND BY MANY GUIDELINES AS A DENTIST. I AM BOUND BY THE SOUTH CAROLINA DENTAL ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES, THE AMERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES; I'M BOUND BY OSHA AND I'M ALSO BOUND BY THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH. I TAKE THOSE GUIDELINES SERIOUSLY. TO ME HE IS BOUND BY THE LAWS THAT ARE SET FORTH FOR HIM TO RENDER HIS JUDGMENT AT ALL TIMES IN A COURT OF LAW. AND THE ONE CASE, WHICH I THINK YOU ARE GOING TO HEAR FROM THE PARENTS LATER, AND I DON'T KNOW IF YOU REALLY WANT ME TO BRING UP THE FACTS OF THE CASE OR MAYBE THEY WILL DO THAT, TO ME IT'S A LITTLE BIT PERTINENT AND I WON'T REALLY GET INTO IT BUT I WILL SAY THAT THE MAN PLEADED GUILTY; THE CRIME WAS A PLANNED CRIME; IT WASN'T SOMETHING THAT HE WAS PUT INTO THE SITUATION; THE CRIME WAS PLANNED; IT WAS THOUGHT OUT AND THE EVENT TOOK PLACE. THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE WAS 30 YEARS. I DON'T REALLY UNDERSTAND THE SENTENCE COMPLETELY. I DO KNOW THE MAN DIDN'T GO TO JAIL. I BELIEVE THERE WAS A TWO-YEAR SENTENCE, SUSPENDED SENTENCE. I BELIEVE IT DID HAVE TO DO WITH COUNSELING WITH INDIVIDUALS; AND I BELIEVE THERE WAS A PROBATIONARY PERIOD WITH THE INDIVIDUAL, BUT HE DID NOT GO TO JAIL. AFTER HE SUSPENDED THE MAN'S SENTENCE AND HE WALKED OUT OF THE COURT, AND I DON'T RECALL WHO WAS IN THE COURT AT THE TIME THAT THIS WAS SAID BUT IT WAS DURING ONE OF HIS CHATS BETWEEN THE TRIAL HEARINGS, AND HE WAS TALKING TO THE JURORS AND HE MADE THE STATEMENT THAT I BELIEVE I PUT BEFORE YOU, THAT "I DON'T KNOW WHY THE FATHER DIDN'T KILL HIM, THAT THERE IS NO COURT OF LAW THAT WOULD CONVICT HIM, THE FATHER, OF KILLING HIM." AND TO ME, IT UPSET ME SO MUCH AT THE TIME, NOT ONLY AT THE SENTENCE THAT THE PERSON RECEIVED, BUT WHEN HE MADE THE SENTENCE OR THE STATEMENT AT THE END, THAT WAS SORT OF THE STRAW THAT BROKE THE CAMEL'S BACK; IT WAS AT THIS TIME THAT I REQUESTED TO SEE JUDGE EPPES IN HIS CHAMBERS AND THAT I REQUESTED TO BE DISMISSED FROM FURTHER JURY DUTY AND HE GRANTED IT. AND THAT'S ALL I HAVE TO SAY. THANK YOU.

Q. DR. MORROW, I HAVE JUST A FEW QUESTIONS FOR YOU. IN THE CASE YOU WERE SPEAKING OF, YOU SAID THAT THE DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY; IS THAT TRUE? IS THAT CORRECT?
A. I BELIEVE SO, YES.
Q. SO THERE WAS NO JURY TRIAL?
A. THERE WAS NO JURY TRIAL.
Q. SO YOU WERE NOT PRIVY TO ANY OF THE OTHER FACTS OF THE CASE EXCEPT--WERE YOU SITTING IN THE COURTROOM DURING THE SENTENCING PHASE?
A. I WAS SITTING IN THE COURTROOM DURING THE HEARING AND THE FACTS PRESENTED FOR THE HEARING AND THE SENTENCING PHASE, YES.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT JUDGE EPPES' SENTENCE IN ANY WAY WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES OF THE LAW THAT DICTATED THE PENALTY FOR THAT CRIME?
A. I DO IN THE FACT THAT IT WAS AN ADMITTED CRIME; IT WAS A PLANNED CRIME; I SEE NO REASON WHY THAT CRIME WOULDN'T HAVE RECEIVED THE MAXIMUM PENALTY. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE THE MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM PENALTY TO ME. IN A CASE JUST LAST THURSDAY, I GUESS, I CAN'T GIVE YOU ALL THE FACTS, BUT THE PERSON--THE HUGO WORKER WHO CAME TO TOWN AND WENT TO A HOUSE OF AN OLDER WOMAN FOR A GLASS OF WATER AND RAPED HER, THAT IS NO MORE A PLANNED CRIME THAN THE CRIME THAT TOOK PLACE HERE. IT WAS PREMEDITATED; IT WAS THOUGHT OUT; IT WAS A THOUGHT PROCESS THAT TOOK PLACE; AND TO ME, YOU LOOK AT A PERSON FOR WHO HE IS. THERE'S ONE THING THAT I'VE LEARNED IN MY SHORT LIFE IS THAT YOU DON'T CHANGE A PERSON'S SEXUAL PREFERENCE AND THIS CASE INVOLVED THAT. IF A MAN IS GAY, HE IS GAY. IF A WOMAN IS LESBIAN, SHE'S A LESBIAN. IF A PERSON IS A PEDOPHILE, HE'S A PEDOPHILE. YOU DON'T CHANGE THAT. IT'S NOT UP TO US TO CHANGE HIM BY GIVING HIM COUNSELING. IT'S UP TO US TO GET THESE PEOPLE, AND I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT HOMOSEXUALS OR LESBIANS, BUT PEDOPHILES, THE ONES THAT ARE ABUSING THESE SMALL CHILDREN, OFF THE STREETS. WE WILL CHANGE THEM LATER, BUT WE'VE GOT TO GET THEM OFF THE STREET. THE CHILD HAS NO DEFENSE. AND I THOUGHT THAT THIS PERSON SHOULD RECEIVE THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE. BUT MORE IMPORTANTLY, THAT STATEMENT SHOWS HIS NON-PROFESSIONALISM.
Q. WAS THAT MADE ON THE RECORD OR AS PART OF THE COURT PROCEEDING?
A. I DON'T THINK SO. IT WAS ANOTHER ONE OF HIS FIRESIDE CHATS. I DON'T THINK HE RECORDED FIRESIDE CHATS BETWEEN TRIALS, HEARINGS.
Q. IT WAS NOT PART OF AN OPEN PROCEEDING THAT YOU KNOW OF?
A. IT WAS IMMEDIATELY AFTER.
Q. IT WAS A CASUAL CONVERSATION BETWEEN HIM AND THESE OTHER JURORS?
A. AND THE JURORS.
Q. YOU SAID YOU HAD A DISCUSSION WITH HIM IN HIS CHAMBERS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THAT?
A. (NODDED HIS HEAD), WELL, THE FIRST BREAK THAT WE HAD.
Q. ALL RIGHT.
A. I BELIEVE ANOTHER CASE DID TAKE PLACE, BUT THE FIRST BREAK THAT WE HAD AFTER THAT CASE.
Q. WHAT TOOK PLACE IN THAT DISCUSSION?
A. I KNOW I WAS PROBABLY VISIBLY UPSET. I DID NOT BRING UP THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. I ONLY BROUGHT UP THE FACT THAT I WAS A DENTIST AND I NEEDED TO GET BACK TO MY PRACTICE. THAT'S ALL I SAID. AND HE SAID--AND HE--I DON'T REMEMBER WHAT HE SAID BUT HE SAID, OKAY, AND LET ME OFF.
Q. SO YOU DIDN'T DISCUSS THE---
A. I DID NOT DISCUSS THE CASE IN THAT MATTER.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN, I DON'T HAVE ANY OTHER QUESTIONS OF THIS WITNESS.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE MCEACHIN: I HAVE A QUESTION.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: OKAY, REPRESENTATIVE MCEACHIN.

Q. DR. MORROW, WHAT, IF ANY, RECOMMENDATION DID THE SOLICITOR MAKE IN THIS CASE THAT YOU WITNESSED?
A. PLEASE, REPEAT THAT. I DON'T UNDERSTAND.
Q. WHAT RECOMMENDATION, IF ANY, DID THE SOLICITOR, THE PROSECUTOR MAKE CONCERNING THE SENTENCE IN THIS CASE THAT YOU ARE TESTIFYING ABOUT?
A. ALL I REMEMBER WAS THE REQUEST FOR THE MAXIMUM 30 YEARS.
Q. WAS THERE ANY REPORT FROM A PROBATION OFFICER OR ANY OTHER COURT PERSONNEL BEFORE THE JUDGE PASSED SENTENCE?
A. THE DEFENSE RECOMMENDED THE COUNSELING THAT HE GRANTED.
Q. ANYTHING ELSE?
A. THAT'S ALL I REMEMBER.

REPRESENTATIVE MCEACHIN: THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY OTHER QUESTIONS?

Q. DOCTOR, YOU MENTIONED THAT AS FAR AS YOU ARE CONCERNED, YOU ARE NOT INTERESTED IN REFORMING SOMEBODY, YOU JUST FEEL LIKE THEY OUGHT TO BE PUNISHED; DID I UNDERSTAND YOU TO SAY THAT?
A. INSIDE THE COURTROOM, YES, SIR.
Q. NOW ONCE THAT FELLOW IS PUNISHED AND GETS OUT, WOULDN'T IT BE MUCH BETTER FOR SOCIETY IF HE WERE REFORMED AND WAS NOT A MENACE TO SOCIETY WHEN HE GOT OUT?
A. IT'S NOT THAT I DON'T BELIEVE IN REFORM, IT'S JUST THAT I BELIEVE THE REFORM SHOULD TAKE PLACE LATER AFTER HE HAD BEEN SENTENCED TO A JAIL TERM. THE REFORM COULD TAKE PLACE IN THE JAIL SYSTEM AFTER HE HAD BEEN TAKEN OFF THE STREETS.
Q. I THOUGHT I UNDERSTOOD YOU TO SAY THAT REFORM OR THE POSSIBILITY OF REFORM SHOULD NOT BE A CONSIDERATION OF THE SENTENCING JUDGE?
A. CORRECT.
Q. I WOULD DISAGREE WITH YOU. I THINK THAT REHABILITATION IS CERTAINLY A VITAL PART OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, AS WELL AS PUNISHMENT, FOR THE GOOD OF SOCIETY BECAUSE THAT MAN WHEN YOU SENTENCED HIM, MOST OF THEM ARE GOING TO GET BACK OUT; AND IT'S GOOD FOR SOCIETY WHEN THEY GET OUT, THAT THEY BE REHABILITATED; NOT FOR HIS OWN GOOD, BUT FOR SOCIETY'S GOOD. THAT'S ALL I HAVE.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: SENATOR MCCONNELL.

Q. DOCTOR, YOU--NOW I WANT TO MAKE SURE I UNDERSTAND YOUR TESTIMONY. YOU WERE THERE AND HEARD THE FACTS AND THE GUILTY PLEA THAT WERE BEING GIVEN; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. CORRECT.
Q. SO YOU WERE, AT LEAST AT THAT POINT, KNOWLEDGEABLE WITH THE FACTS THAT WERE PUBLISHED IN THE COURT?
A. CORRECT.
Q. AND DO I HEAR YOUR TESTIMONY RIGHT, THAT PART OF YOUR CONCERN IS THAT CHILD MOLESTERS WHO PLEAD GUILTY TO THIS GRIEVOUS OFFENSE COULD BE TURNED BACK OUT AND PUT OTHER CHILDREN AT RISK?
A. THAT'S CORRECT. THAT'S CORRECT.

Q. DOCTOR, SO THAT I CAN UNDERSTAND YOUR AFFIDAVIT, I GATHER THAT THIS WAS A DEFENDANT WHO HAD MOLESTED A FIVE-YEAR-OLD GIRL BUT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT THE FATHER.
A. THAT'S RIGHT.
Q. THE COMMENT THAT SO BOTHERED YOU WAS A COMMENT THAT THE JUDGE MADE ABOUT THE FATHER; IS THAT CORRECT? (PAUSE.) OR DO I NOT MAKE MYSELF CLEAR?
A. THAT'S CLEAR. HE MADE THE COMMENT REFERRING TO THE FATHER AS A PERSON WHO WOULD KILL THE DEFENDANT WHO WAS THE PERSON WHO COMMITTED THE VIOLATION.
Q. AND THE DEFENDANT WAS UNRELATED TO THE FAMILY?
A. I DON'T KNOW THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE DEFENDANT. IT DID APPEAR THAT HE LIVED DOWN THE STREET. I DON'T KNOW IF IT WAS A RELATION, OR A NEIGHBOR, OR A FRIEND.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU. ANY OTHER MEMBERS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, DOCTOR.

DR. MORROW: THANK YOU.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN, AT THIS TIME MRS. GINGER OWEN OR MR. MARK OWEN, EITHER ONE OF THEM; I THINK THEY ARE GOING TO TESTIFY ESSENTIALLY TO THE SAME THING; WHICHEVER ONE MIGHT GO FIRST.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MRS. OWEN.

(GINGER TUCKER OWEN, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

MRS. OWEN: I WANT TO SIT DOWN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: YES, IF YOU WISH.

MRS. OWEN: THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WHERE IS HER AFFIDAVIT?

MRS. TURNIPSEED: TAB "G."

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: TAB "G."

MR. BATES: IF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE WILL TURN TO TAB "G," THEY WILL FIND THE AFFIDAVIT OF MRS. OWEN.

Q. MRS. OWEN, I DON'T BELIEVE WE HAVE A MICROPHONE OVER THERE WHERE YOU ARE SITTING, BUT THAT'S FINE JUST AS LONG AS YOU SPEAK LOUD ENOUGH FOR THE MEMBERS AND THE COURT REPORTER DOWN HERE TO HEAR EVERYTHING THAT YOU SAY.
A. THANKS A LOT.
Q. FROM LOOKING AT YOUR AFFIDAVIT, IT APPEARS THAT YOU ARE THE MOTHER OF THE FIVE-YEAR-OLD CHILD WHO WAS MOLESTED BY THE DEFENDANT IN THE CASE THAT DR. MORROW WAS SPEAKING OF; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AND YOU WOULD LIKE TO TESTIFY IN REGARDS TO THOSE COURT PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED AND SPEAK ABOUT THE SENTENCE ITSELF; RIGHT?
A. YES, THAT'S RIGHT.
Q. PLEASE, GO AHEAD.
A. MY DAUGHTER, SHE WAS FIVE, AND SHE WAS MOLESTED; AND MY HUSBAND CAUGHT THE PERPETRATOR IN THE ACT AND WITNESSED THE WHOLE THING. THAT WAS IN APRIL OF '86. IN NOVEMBER OF '86 JOHN HENRY BEESON WENT BEFORE JUDGE EPPES. I WASN'T AT THE COURTROOM. I WAS UNDER THE--I HAD NO IDEA IT WAS GOING ON. BUT MY EX-HUSBAND TESTIFIED AS TO WHAT HE SAW AND WHAT HAPPENED AND EVERYTHING, AND MEDICAL DOCTORS TESTIFIED AS TO THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF THE ASSAULT; AND JUDGE EPPES GAVE HIM A SENTENCE OF 20 YEARS SUSPENDED ON 5 YEARS PROBATION AND PAID ME $150 A MONTH, AND LET HIM WALK OUT OF THAT COURTROOM SO THAT MY DAUGHTER COULD WALK IN--JUST WALK INTO HIM ON THE STREET (CRYING).
Q. TAKE YOUR TIME.
A. (PAUSE) WHAT WAS THE POINT OF TAKING HIM TO COURT WHEN HE WAS GOING TO LET HIM WALK TO DO THAT TO SOME OTHER CHILD, OR MAYBE TO MY CHILD AGAIN? (CRYING.) THAT WAS NO SENTENCE. HE WASN'T PUNISHED FOR ANYTHING. HE WASN'T BEING REFORMED FOR ANYTHING EITHER BECAUSE A YEAR LATER HE WENT TO JAIL FOR COCAINE. IT'S ALL RIGHT TO MOLEST MY CHILD, BUT DON'T HAVE DRUGS; THAT'S WHAT HE SAID. THAT'S HOW IT WORKED OUT FOR ME. THAT'S HOW I SEE IT.
Q. WAS JUDGE EPPES THE SENTENCING JUDGE IN THE SECOND CASE?
A. NO, NOT THAT I KNOW OF. FROM WHAT I UNDERSTAND, IT WENT TO THE FEDERAL AND HE JUST AUTOMATICALLY WENT TO JAIL. BUT IF HE HAD BEEN SENTENCED--IF HE HAD GONE TO PRISON FOR WHAT HE DID TO MY CHILD, THEN HE WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN OUT THERE THE SECOND TIME TO DO SOMETHING TO SOMEBODY ELSE; HE COULD HAVE BEEN SELLING THE DRUGS TO ANOTHER FIVE-YEAR-OLD CHILD. HE JUST--YOU CANNOT KNOW WHAT IT WAS LIKE WHEN I FOUND OUT THAT HE WAS WALKING THE STREETS, THAT I COULD JUST WALK INTO HIM ANYWHERE, ANY TIME AND NOT BE ABLE TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT. IT'S LIKE MY CHILD DOESN'T COUNT. OKAY, BIG DEAL, SO YOU MOLESTED A FIVE-YEAR-OLD BABY; WELL, THAT'S OKAY (PATTED HER HAND). I JUST THINK THE SENTENCE WAS FAR TOO LENIENT. I JUST THINK THAT--I JUST WONDER WHAT HE WOULD HAVE DONE IF THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN HIS FIVE-YEAR- OLD DAUGHTER OR HIS FIVE-YEAR-OLD GRANDDAUGHTER. WOULD HE HAVE BEEN SO LENIENT? (PAUSE.) I DON'T SEE HOW HE CAN SIT THERE AND SAY HE REPRESENTS THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM WHEN IT'S MY CHILD THAT PAID. THE ASSAILANT DIDN'T PAY ANYTHING. MY DAUGHTER PAID. AND THEN HE'S FIXING TO COME UP, HE'S FIXING TO MAX OUT AND HE WILL BE OUT ON THE STREET AGAIN.
Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER STATEMENTS FOR THE COMMITTEE, ANY OTHER THINGS YOU WOULD LIKE TO TELL US?
A. I JUST REALLY ASK YOU NOT TO--TO UNSEAT HIM. RETIRE HIM FOR GOOD. (PAUSE.) IF NOTHING ELSE, FOR FIVE-YEAR-OLD BABIES.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS? SENATOR MCCONNELL.

Q. MRS. OWEN, DID Y'ALL KNOW THE DAY OF THE HEARING THAT THE HEARING WAS COMING UP? DID ANYBODY NOTIFY Y'ALL THEY WERE GOING TO TRY THE CASE THAT DAY?
A. I DIDN'T FIND OUT ABOUT IT UNTIL MARK CALLED ME. WELL, I DIDN'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT IT. FROM WHAT I WAS TOLD, AT MY HOUSE THEY HAD CALLED ME AT ABOUT 4:00 O'CLOCK THE AFTERNOON BEFORE THE HEARING AND I DIDN'T RECEIVE THE MESSAGE UNTIL AFTER MARK CALLED ME AT WORK AND SAID THEY LET HIM GO. I DIDN'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT IT.
Q. SO YOU WEREN'T PRESENT IN THE COURTROOM AND DIDN'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT IT UNTIL AFTER THE FACT?
A. I DIDN'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT IT.
Q. JUST SO I MAKE SURE I UNDERSTAND THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I UNDERSTAND YOUR TESTIMONY IS THAT YOUR HUSBAND WITNESSED IT, SO THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THE EVIDENTIAL SIDE OF IT, NO EVIDENTIAL QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT OCCURRED?
A. THAT'S RIGHT.

Q. MRS. OWEN, DO YOU KNOW WHERE THE DEFENDANT NOW IS? IS HE STILL INCARCERATED?
A. YES, HE'S IN CCI.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ALL RIGHT.

MRS. OWEN: THANK YOU.

MR. BATES: MR. MARK OWEN.

(MARK ANTHONY OWEN, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: HAVE A SEAT, PLEASE, SIR.

MR. BATES: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, IF YOU'LL LOOK IN YOUR BOOKLET UNDER TAB "F," YOU WILL FIND THE WITNESS AFFIDAVIT FORM FOR MR. OWEN.

Q. MR. OWEN, LIKEWISE, IF YOU WILL JUST SPEAK LOUD ENOUGH SO THAT THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE AND THE COURT REPORTER CAN HEAR WHAT YOU HAVE TO SAY.
A. (NODDED HIS HEAD; NO VERBAL RESPONSE.)
Q. YOU MAY MAKE A STATEMENT, IF YOU WISH, AT THIS TIME.
A. I WOULD JUST LIKE TO SAY THAT THE ONLY DEALINGS I HAD WITH JUDGE EPPES WAS IN THIS CASE AND AS I APPEARED BEFORE HIM, I, YOU KNOW, I PLEADED FOR THE MAXIMUM PENALTY TO GET THIS MAN OFF THE STREET BECAUSE I, YOU KNOW, I HAVE EVEN HAD OTHER PEOPLE TELL ME THIS WAS NOT HIS FIRST OFFENSE, ALTHOUGH, YOU KNOW, THAT WAS WHAT PEOPLE HAVE TOLD ME; WHETHER HE HAS BEEN PROSECUTED OR NOT, I DON'T KNOW, FOR IT; BUT I PLEADED WITH JUDGE EPPES AND---
Q. THIS WAS AT THE SENTENCING HEARING?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. YOU WERE PRESENT?
A. YES, SIR. AND, YOU KNOW, AS I WAS PLEADING WITH HIM, JUDGE EPPES DID NOT EVEN LOOK AT ME; NOR DID--I FELT LIKE HE DIDN'T EVEN HEAR ME. I WAS JUST IN A STATE OF SHOCK. I JUST DIDN'T KNOW WHAT TO THINK ABOUT IT. AND AS THE TRIAL WENT ON AND I RETURNED TO MY SEAT, JUDGE EPPES DID TELL ME THAT I SHOULD HAVE KILLED THE MAN BECAUSE NO JURY WOULD CONVICT ME OF MURDER. AND, FURTHERMORE, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT JUDGE EPPES, HE TRIED TO--YOU KNOW, TO ME IT FELT LIKE THAT HE WAS TRYING TO MAKE ME FEEL BETTER BY OFFERING ME MONEY, $200 A MONTH FOR FIVE YEARS, WHICH I REFUSED. I WANTED NOTHING TO DO WITH THE MAN'S MONEY. AND I JUST FELT LIKE--YOU KNOW, HE DIDN'T EVEN LOOK AT ME THE WHOLE TIME THAT I WAS PLEADING WITH HIM TO GIVE THIS MAN THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE SO HE WILL NEVER HAVE THE CHANCE TO MOLEST ANOTHER CHILD, AT LEAST FOR THE DURATION OF HIS SENTENCE. AND I WAS SHOCKED, AS WELL AS EVERYBODY ELSE, THAT THE MAN WAS ABLE TO WALK OUT THE COURTROOM. I JUST COULDN'T BELIEVE IT. I MEAN, YOU KNOW, I JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND WHAT IT'S ALL COMING DOWN TO. AND I JUST DON'T THINK HE IS QUALIFIED TO BE ON THE BENCH IF HE IS GOING TO LET PEOPLE GO LIKE THAT.
Q. PART OF THE SENTENCE THAT JUDGE EPPES MADE WAS RESTITUTION OF $150 A MONTH FOR THE PERIOD OF THE FIVE-YEAR PROBATION; IS THAT RIGHT, THAT YOU REMEMBER?
A. WELL, I THOUGHT IT WAS 200, BUT.
Q. REGARDLESS, YOU REFUSED THE RESTITUTION?
A. THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY SUGGESTED THAT I GIVE THE MONEY TO MY EX-WIFE, WHICH I--I DIDN'T WANT IT. I DIDN'T WANT NOTHING TO DO WITH ANYTHING OF HIS.
Q. WHERE WERE YOU WHEN JUDGE EPPES MADE THE STATEMENT THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE KILLED THE DEFENDANT?
A. I WAS SITTING BACK DOWN.
Q. THIS WAS IN THE COURTROOM?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. WAS IT PART OF THE PROCEEDINGS OR WAS IT AFTER THE---
A. IT WAS AFTER THE SENTENCING, I BELIEVE.
Q. WAS THIS IN FRONT OF SOME OTHER JURORS THAT WERE SEATED AROUND?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER THINGS YOU WANT TO BRING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE?
A. WELL, IT'S LIKE I SAY, AGAIN, I JUST DON'T THINK THAT JUDGE EPPES IS QUALIFIED TO HAND DOWN SENTENCING IF HE IS GOING TO LET, YOU KNOW, CONVICTED CHILD MOLESTERS LIKE THIS GO. I JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND IT.

MR. BATES: THANK YOU, MR. OWEN. MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS?

SENATOR LOURIE: MR. CHAIRMAN:

Q. DID YOU KNOW THE DEFENDANT, MR. OWEN?
A. SIR?
Q. DID YOU KNOW THE DEFENDANT?
A. YES, I DID.
Q. WAS HE A NEIGHBOR OF YOURS, OR A FRIEND?
A. HE WAS A FRIEND OF MY MOM'S.
Q. A PLATONIC FRIEND OR A BOYFRIEND?
A. I REALLY DIDN'T KNOW. I HAD ONLY BEEN THERE, YOU KNOW, LIKE I SAY, I GOT MY LITTLE GIRL ON THE WEEKEND AND I DON'T FEEL LIKE I WOULD BE QUALIFIED TO ANSWER THAT.

SENATOR LOURIE: THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: SENATOR MCCONNELL.

SENATOR MCCONNELL: THANK YOU, SIR.

Q. JUST TWO QUICK QUESTIONS. ONE, WERE YOU ADVISED ANY TIME BEFORE THE TRIAL THAT THERE WAS A NEED TO HAVE A PLEA BARGAIN WITH THIS MAN?
A. I HAD HEARD A LOT ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING. HE HAD KEPT POSTPONING THE TRIAL BECAUSE FROM WHAT I REALIZED THAT HE WAS WAITING ON A CERTAIN JUDGE TO COME BEFORE THE BENCH BEFORE HE'D TRY HIM, WHICH WAS JUDGE EPPES. AND THEN I DID GET WORD THAT JUDGE EPPES WOULD BE UP ON THE BENCH AND THAT HE WOULD GET HIS CASE BROUGHT FORWARD.
Q. WHO TOLD YOU THAT? DO YOU RECALL?
A. I BELIEVE THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY KAYE KOONCE. I THINK THAT IS WHAT HER NAME IS.
Q. AND FROM AN EVIDENTIAL STANDPOINT--WHAT I'M TALKING ABOUT IS THE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE, THE WITNESSES, YOU WERE THE WITNESS AND YOU EYEWITNESSED THE SITUATION, THE INCIDENT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AND WERE YOU EVER ADVISED--DO YOU RECALL EVER BEING ADVISED THAT Y'ALL HAD AN EVIDENTIAL PROBLEM IN THE PROSECUTION OF THIS FELLOW?
A. WELL, NOT REALLY, NOT THAT TO THAT EFFECT; BUT I DID KNOW THAT THEY KEPT POSTPONING THE TRIAL UNTIL HE COULD GET HIS JUDGE THAT HE WANTED ON THE BENCH. I MEAN, WE WAS ALL AWARE OF THAT, BY IT BEING POSTPONED.

SENATOR MCCONNELL: THANK YOU, SIR.

Q. MR. OWEN, WHO WAS THE SOLICITOR WHO WAS INVOLVED IN THE CASE?
A. I BELIEVE HER NAME WAS KAYE KOONCE, IS HER NAME.
Q. IS SHE HERE TODAY?
A. NO, SIR.
Q. DID SHE HAVE A RECOMMENDATION TO THE COURT?
A. THE RECOMMENDATION WAS THE MAXIMUM PENALTY, 30 YEARS, YOU KNOW.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: YES, SIR.

Q. DID I UNDERSTAND YOU TO SAY THAT THE CASE WAS CONTINUALLY POSTPONED UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT JUDGE EPPES WOULD BE SITTING?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AND DID I UNDERSTAND YOU TO SAY THAT KAYE KOONCE REQUESTED THIS POSTPONEMENT?
A. NO, SIR. HIS DEFENSE ATTORNEY WAS HANDLING IT. I BELIEVE HIS LAWYER WAS BARRY KRELL.
Q. BARRY KRELL KEPT REQUESTING THE POSTPONEMENT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. DID KAYE KOONCE GO ALONG WITH THIS, AGREE TO IT?
A. I REALLY DID NOT GET INTO ALL THAT MUCH DETAIL ON THAT BUT I DO KNOW THAT IT REPEATEDLY HAD BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL, YOU KNOW, IT WAS WAITING ON A CERTAIN JUDGE TO COME FORWARD.
Q. WELL, DO YOU KNOW WHETHER OR NOT THE SOLICITOR'S OFFICE GRANTED OR WENT ALONG WITH THE POSTPONEMENT?
A. I REALLY DON'T KNOW OF HER, YOU KNOW,DENYING IT OR ANYTHING; NOT THAT I KNOW OF; OR REJECTING IT. I HAVE NO IDEA OF THAT.
Q. ONE OTHER QUESTION: YOU STATED THAT JUDGE EPPES TOLD YOU THAT YOU SHOULD HAVE KILLED HIM, AND THAT YOU WERE SITTING IN THE BACK OF THE COURTROOM?
A. NO, SIR, I WAS JUST--I WAS SITTING BEHIND THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S, RIGHT IN FRONT.
Q. YOU WERE SITTING---
A. AT THE TABLE.
Q. YOU WERE FACING THE BENCH?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AND THE JUDGE TOLD YOU THAT FROM THE BENCH, OR DID HE COME DOWN TO YOUR TABLE?
A. FROM THE BENCH.
Q. FROM THE BENCH?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. WHICH MEANS THAT EVERYBODY AROUND THERE HEARD IT?
A. YES, SIR, EVERYBODY HEARD IT.

REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN: ALL RIGHT.

REPRESENTATIVE MCEACHIN: ONE QUESTION.

Q. MR. OWEN, WHO TESTIFIED IN FRONT OF THE JUDGE WHEN THE SENTENCING OF MR. BEESON TOOK PLACE?
A. ON WHOSE BEHALF?
Q. BOTH SIDES; WHO ALL TESTIFIED OR SPOKE TO THE JUDGE BEFORE HE SENTENCED MR. BEESON?
A. JUST LIKE I SAID, BARRY KRELL AND THE DIRECT ATTORNEY AND ME.
Q. HOW OLD WAS MR. BEESON?
A. I BELIEVE RIGHT NOW HE'S ABOUT, I WOULD SAY 37.
Q. WAS HE STAYING WITH YOUR MOTHER?
A. NOT THAT I KNOW OF, NO, SIR.
Q. DID THIS HAPPEN AT YOUR MOTHER'S HOUSE?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. DID YOU HAVE A PRIOR RECORD?
A. ME?
Q. YES.
A. NO, SIR, I HAVE NO PRIOR RECORD.

REPRESENTATIVE MCEACHIN: THANK YOU.

Q. MR. OWEN, IS MR. BEESON SERVING NOW THE 20-YEAR SENTENCE OR IS HE SERVING ANOTHER DRUG SENTENCE, OR DO YOU KNOW?
A. IT'S FOR--FROM WHAT I KNOW ABOUT THE CASE IS THAT HE WAS IN DRUG TRAFFICKING AND HE IS IN JAIL RIGHT NOW FOR THAT.
Q. YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT HIS SENTENCE WAS?
A. I BELIEVE MY EX-WIFE--IS IT 20? 20 YEARS?

MS. OWEN: FOR THE DRUG SENTENCE.
A. THAT'S WHAT I TOLD HIM, THAT IT WAS FOR THE DRUGS.
Q. BUT YOU DO NOT KNOW THE TIME PERIOD?
A. NO. DO YOU KNOW HOW LONG HE GOT?

MRS. OWEN: SEVEN YEARS, I BELIEVE.
A. I'M NOT AWARE OF THAT TRIAL.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

Q. IS HE IN THE FEDERAL PENITENTIARY OR THE STATE PENITENTIARY?
A. I WAS NOT AWARE OF HIS CASE. I BELIEVE MY EX-WIFE KNOWS MORE ABOUT IT THAN I DO. I WAS NOT EVEN AWARE OF IT UNTIL AFTER HE WAS ALREADY IN JAIL, WAS I EVEN AWARE OF IT.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, MR. OWEN.

MR. OWEN: THANK YOU.

MR. BATES: I ASSUME WE START AT TAB "A" WITH YOU, RIGHT, MR. GREGO?

MR. GREGO: YES, SIR.

MR. GREGO: MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I'M APPEARING TODAY ON BEHALF OF CITIZENS AGAINST VIOLENT CRIME IN OPPOSITION TO THE QUALIFYING OF JUDGE FRANK EPPES. JUDGE EPPES RETIRED FROM THE BENCH SEVERAL YEARS AGO AND WE BEG YOU TO SIMPLY PLACE HIM IN FULL RETIREMENT.

IN ADDITION TO THE MATERIAL YOU RECEIVED VIA EXPRESS MAIL, I BELIEVE YOU HAVE ALSO RECEIVED MANY OTHER LETTERS AND NOTARIZED STATEMENTS AND THINGS OF THAT SORT. I ALSO HAVE SOME ADDITIONAL THINGS I WANT TO LEAVE WITH YOU; IF YOU CAN STILL ACCEPT THEM, THAT'S FINE.

I THINK IT'S IMPORTANT FOR YOU TO KNOW SOME OF THE HISTORY OF THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN CAVE AND JUDGE EPPES. SHORTLY AFTER CAVE WAS FOUNDED IN FEBRUARY OF 1984 AND IN PURSUIT OF ONE OF OUR INITIAL GOALS, CAVE HAD A PANEL OF RETIRED PROFESSIONALS MONITOR EVERY CASE THAT CAME BEFORE THE GENERAL SESSIONS COURT FOR THE NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT FOR A FULL SIX-MONTH PERIOD. A COPY OF THIS STUDY IS PROVIDED AT TAB "A." THIS WAS A VERY INTENSIVE STUDY.

IN SUMMARY, JUDGE EPPES GAVE SUSPENDED OR PROBATIONARY SENTENCES IN AN AMAZING 72 PERCENT OF THE VIOLENT CRIME CASES IN WHICH HE IMPOSED A SENTENCE. ALL OTHER JUDGES WERE VERY CLOSE TO 50 PERCENT, WHILE JUDGE RICHTER WAS AT 25 PERCENT.

THIS INFORMATION WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THEN GOVERNOR RILEY. OUR COMPLAINT WAS SUPPOSEDLY FILED WITH THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR BY THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE. THAT'S AT TAB "B." AFTER NOT HEARING FROM THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR FOR SOME MONTHS, CAVE MADE AN INQUIRY TO THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE REGARDING THE STATUS OF OUR COMPLAINT. THAT LETTER IS AT TAB "C." THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE HAD NEVER FILED OUR ORIGINAL COMPLAINT WITH THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR AT ALL. THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR THEN RESPONDED SO RAPIDLY, 24 HOURS BY THE WAY, AND SOLICITOUSLY TO THIS LATEST INQUIRY, AT TAB "D," THAT I BECAME IMMEDIATELY SUSPICIOUS THAT OUR COMPLAINT WAS PROBABLY CONSIDERED TO BE MERELY THE WORK OF SOME RABBLE ROUSING LAYMEN; AND IT WAS APPARENT TO ME AT THE TIME THAT FURTHER EFFORTS WOULD BE FUTILE. AS A RESULT, WHAT WAS PROBABLY THE MOST EXTENSIVE STUDY EVER DONE IN THE COURTROOM IN THE STATE OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA QUIETLY PASSED INTO LIMBO.

COLONEL WILLIAM THOMAS, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, RETIRED, COORDINATED THIS TREMENDOUS EFFORT. COLONEL THOMAS WANTED TO APPEAR TODAY BUT IS OUT OF STATE WORKING WITH THE RED CROSS AND ASKED THAT I PROVIDE YOU WITH A STATEMENT OF HIS OVERALL FEELINGS OF THE STUDY AND SPECIFICALLY THE ATMOSPHERE THAT PREVAILED IN JUDGE EPPES' COURTROOM. THIS NOTARIZED STATEMENT IS PROVIDED AT TAB "E." VERY BRIEFLY, COLONEL THOMAS AND OTHER COURT MONITORS FELT THAT THE DIGNITY AND DECORUM OF THE COURT, WHICH SHOULD ALWAYS BE PARAMOUNT, WAS FORSAKEN IN JUDGE EPPES' COURTROOM AND THE ATMOSPHERE THERE WAS MORE APTLY DESCRIBED AS A CIRCUS. OUR FAILURE TO PERSIST IN OUR ATTEMPT TO UNSEAT JUDGE EPPES AT THAT TIME HAS CAUSED AS MANY HEARTACHES AS THE YEARS PASSED AND MORE PEOPLE WERE VICTIMIZED; FIRST BY THE ASSAILANT AND THEN THE CONTINUING SAGA OF JUDGE EPPES' FOLLY IN THE COURTROOM.

YOU HAVE HEARD FROM THE PREVIOUS THREE WITNESSES REGARDING THE ACT THAT TOOK PLACE IN 1986 AND ABOUT THE ONLY THING THAT I CAN ADD TO THAT IS TO ANSWER SOME OF THE QUESTIONS, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE SOLICITOR'S OFFICE. THE MAN PLED GUILTY. THE PROSECUTOR OFFERED NO CHARGE REDUCTIONS, RECOMMENDED NO LENIENCY, AND ASKED FOR THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE OF 30 YEARS. THE OFFENDER WALKED OUT OF THE COURTROOM ON A SUSPENDED SENTENCE. THERE WERE NO EXTENUATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE. THE PROSECUTOR WAS SHOCKED AT SOMETHING THAT VERY SIMPLY NEVER OCCURRED BEFORE; AND SHE VERY SIMPLY JUST DIDN'T EXPECT SOMETHING LIKE THIS TO HAPPEN. THE REST OF THE TESTIMONY YOU HAVE HEARD FROM THE PREVIOUS WITNESSES, AND I WON'T GO INTO IT. THE DETAILS OF ALL OF THESE--OF THIS PARTICULAR CASE AND PRESS CLIPPINGS REGARDING THE CASE THAT WILL GIVE YOU SOME MORE OF THE DETAILS, SHOULD YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, ARE AT TAB "I" AND I WOULD ASK THAT YOU PLEASE NOTE THE EDITORIALS, THE COMMENTS BY CHARLESTON'S NATIONALLY RENOWNED COLUMNIST ASHLEY COOPER AND VARIOUS OTHER LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

ALSO, IN 1986 I RECEIVED A CALL FROM CAPTAIN JAMES A. KENNEY, UNITED STATES NAVY. HE WAS THE CHIEF OF STAFF AT THE NAVAL BASE, CHARLESTON AT THE TIME AND WANTED TO KNOW, QUOTE, "WHAT KIND OF STUPID JUSTICE ARE WE PASSING OUT IN SOUTH CAROLINA?" THE NAVY HAD APPARENTLY WORKED ON A DRUG CASE FOR SOME TIME, AFTER GETTING EVERYTHING SET UP, THE CASE WAS PASSED TO THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES BECAUSE THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA HAD STIFFER PENALTIES FOR TRAFFICKERS AND THEY WANTED TO THROW THE BOOK AT THIS PARTICULAR INDIVIDUAL. THE OFFENDER WALKED OUT OF JUDGE EPPES' COURTROOM WITH A SUSPENDED SENTENCE. A NOTARIZED STATEMENT OF JAMES A. KENNEY, UNITED STATES NAVY, NOW RETIRED, AND VARIOUS NEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS REGARDING THIS INCIDENT ARE PROVIDED AT TAB "J." IN 1988 THE GREENVILLE NEWSPAPERS CONDUCTED AN EXTENSIVE STUDY ON DRUG OFFENSES AND SENTENCES HANDED OUT BY VARIOUS JUDGES. IT IS MOST INTERESTING THAT EVEN THOUGH GREENVILLE IS JUDGE EPPES' TERRITORY, THE PAPER SAW FIT TO MENTION THAT ONE JUDGE WAS GLARINGLY WORSE THAN ALL OTHERS; THE ONE WHO WAS THE MOST LENIENT TO DRUG DEALERS AND OFFENDERS, JUDGE FRANK EPPES. AGAIN, IT IS EVEN MORE INTERESTING TO READ THE STATEMENT MADE BY JUDGE EPPES IN A NEWSPAPER ARTICLE PUBLISHED ONE YEAR LATER IN 1989. JUDGE EPPES STATES IN THIS ARTICLE THAT HE, QUOTE, "USUALLY DOESN'T GIVE DRUG DEALERS PROBATION."THE GREENVILLE NEWS SAYS OTHERWISE. IT SHOWS THAT THE JUDGE GAVE PROBATIONARY SENTENCE TO 10 COCAINE DEALERS AND DID NOT SENTENCE CONVICTED DRUG TRAFFICKERS TO JAIL IN 53.6 PERCENT OF THE CASES HE HEARD OVER THE PREVIOUS TWO YEARS. EVEN AFTER HE READS ABOUT THESE TRAVESTIES, IS CONFRONTED WITH SOLID EVIDENCE, HE PERSISTS IN DENYING THAT HE GIVES PROBATIONARY SENTENCES. I PLEAD WITH EVERY MEMBER OF THE PANEL TO PLEASE READ THE GREENVILLE ARTICLES VERY CLOSELY. AND BY THE WAY, TAB "J," I BELIEVE IT IS, WAS A LITTLE UNLEGIBLE. WE HAD TO USE A FAX COPY. IN THE MEANTIME, I HAVE GOTTEN LEGIBLE COPIES AND I WILL PASS THOSE OUT TO YOU SO YOU CAN READ THEM LATER.

LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS AND FELONS ALIKE, IN THIS ARTICLE, OPENLY RECOGNIZE THE LENIENCY OF JUDGE EPPES AS IT RELATES TO DRUG CRIMES. NOTE IN PARTICULAR ONE QUOTE IN THIS ARTICLE: QUOTE, "ONE CONVICTED COCAINE DISTRIBUTOR, BERNARD BROWN, TOLD THE NEWS THAT HE WANTED TO WAIT FOR EPPES TO COME TO COLUMBIA SO HE WOULD HAVE A BETTER CHANCE AT A LIGHT SENTENCE. BUT HE SAID HIS ATTORNEY COULD NOT GET THE CASE POSTPONED AND HE RECEIVED A NINE-YEAR SENTENCE FROM CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE JOHN HAMILTON SMITH OF SUMMERVILLE."THE GREENVILLE ARTICLES AND EDITORIALS FROM THE NEWS AND COURIER ARE PROVIDED AT TAB "K." THE PUBLIC RELATIONS ARTICLE COVERING THE PERSONAL SIDE OF JUDGE EPPES IS AT TAB "L."

I HAVE INCLUDED AT TAB "M" SEVERAL INCIDENTS WHERE WE FEEL JUDGE EPPES SEVERELY LOWERED THE DIGNITY OF THE COURT THROUGH ANTICS, SUCH AS HAVING SOUL SINGER JAMES BROWN BROUGHT TO HIS CHAMBERS, ORDERING A CONVICTED FELON NOT TO HAVE CHILDREN AS PART OF HIS SENTENCE, AND SUSPENDING THE SENTENCE OF A THREE-TIME DRUG OFFENDER OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF THE SOLICITOR. THIS LATTER CASE OCCURRED IN GREENVILLE AND DESERVES SOME DIRECT COMMENT. IT IS OUR STRONG--EXCUSE ME. FROM HIS ACTIONS IN THE COURTROOM, IT IS OUR STRONG BELIEF THAT JUDGE EPPES SOMETIMES BELIEVES THAT HE CAN REHABILITATE DRUG, ALCOHOL, AND PEDOPHILIA ADDICTIONS BY GIVING THEM A CHANCE IN LIFE. WE SERIOUSLY ADMIRE THE INTENT AND THE OBVIOUS COMPASSION THAT JUDGE EPPES DISPLAYS IN THESE CASES, BUT WE ALSO BELIEVE HE SHOULD GET SOME GUIDANCE FROM COUNSELORS IN THESE FIELDS ABOUT THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THIS APPROACH. WE BELIEVE HE IS HONESTLY, BUT UNKNOWINGLY, CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONTINUANCE OF THEIR ADDICTIONS. AND HE HAS BEEN DOING THIS FOR YEARS.

NOW I CALL TO YOUR ATTENTION THAT ON THE GREENVILLE ARTICLES, YOU DO NOT HAVE IT AT YOUR TAB, BUT IT IS LISTED, BECAUSE I DIDN'T HAVE THE WHOLE ARTICLE WHEN IT WAS FAXED TO ME. BUT THE ONE CASE I REFERRED TO, AND I DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT IT AT THE TIME I WROTE THIS PRESENTATION, THE THREE-TIME OFFENDER THAT --WHERE THE SOLICITOR OBJECTED TO THE SUSPENDED SENTENCE WAS LATER, EXACTLY ONE YEAR AND TWO DAYS LATER, PICKED UP ON ANOTHER DRUG CHARGE. JUDGE LANEY TOOK ALL OF HER SUSPENDED SENTENCES, SENT HER TO JAIL FOR 12 YEARS, AND SHE'S BACK IN THE PRISON SYSTEM. THAT WAS IN JANUARY OF 1988. YES, '88, APRIL OF 1988 RIGHT AFTER SHE WAS GIVEN A SUSPENDED SENTENCE BY JUDGE EPPES.

I HAVE A CASE, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT CAME UP YESTERDAY. I DON'T HAVE IT NOTARIZED. IT IS NOT A CERTIFIED AFFIDAVIT. I THINK THAT IT'S VERY IMPORTANT. I WOULD, AT THE LEAST, LEAVE IT WITH YOU TO BE USED AT YOUR DISCRETION. IT'S A LETTER THAT CAME UP--AND I HAVE 10 COPIES OF IT; I WILL DISTRIBUTE IT--REGARDING ANOTHER CASE THAT TOOK PLACE IN CHARLESTON WITH AN INDIVIDUAL THAT WAS GIVEN A SUSPENDED SENTENCE FOR GROSS EMBEZZLING. AS A RESULT, THE PARTICULAR BUSINESS WENT OUT OF BUSINESS AND THE INDIVIDUALS WENT BANKRUPT. THE DOWN-HOME, FOLKSY TYPE PERSONALITY DISPLAYED BY JUDGE EPPES THROUGHOUT THE STATE AND DOCUMENTED AT TAB "L" WOULD BE MORE ACCEPTABLE WERE HE AN ELECTED OFFICIAL CURRYING FAVOR FROM CONSTITUENTS. IT IS SIMPLY NOT THE TYPE OF CONDUCT THAT IS APPROPRIATE IN THE COURTROOM. THERE SHOULD BE NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE DIGNITY, DECORUM AND SOLEMNITY OF A GENERAL SESSIONS COURTROOM IN CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA THAN ONE WOULD EXPECT IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. THERE ARE SIMPLY SOME THINGS IN LIFE ABOUT WHICH ONE DOES NOT JOKE. THE DIGNITY OF THE COURT IS ONE SUCH ITEM.

I WOULD LIKE TO SUMMARIZE BY ASKING THAT YOU CONSIDER THE BROAD IMPRESSION OF LENIENCY THAT JUDGE EPPES HAS DEVELOPED WITH THE FORM OF DOWN-HOME COUNTRY JUSTICE. HE HAS ABUSED THE PRIVILEGE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION GREATLY.

THOMAS JEFFERSON STATED THAT: "LAWS ARE FOR MEN OF ORDINARY UNDERSTANDING AND SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE CONSTRUED BY THE ORDINARY RULES OF COMMON SENSE."

THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR SET CAVE'S COMPLAINT ASIDE BASED ON THE ISSUE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION. COMPLAINTS TO THIS COMMITTEE ARE FREQUENTLY SET ASIDE FOR THE SAME REASON. THIS IS MOST OFTEN JUSTIFIED. CAVE BELIEVES STRONGLY IN JUDICIAL DISCRETION. IN JUDGE EPPES' CASE, HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE EVEN MORE STRONGLY THAT COMMON SENSE SHOULD PREVAIL. A LONG, DOCUMENTED AND SUBSTANTIATED HISTORY OF EXCESSIVE LENIENCY DEMANDS THAT THE EXCUSE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION BE OVERRIDDEN BY PLEAS FROM THE PUBLIC AND VICTIMS FOR THE EXERCISE OF BASIC COMMON SENSE. JUDGE EPPES IS RETIRED. I READ THAT HE HAS A LOVE FOR HORSES. WE WOULD UNDERSTAND THAT HE IS READY TO BE PUT OUT TO PASTURE. HE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT HE IS READY TO BE PUT OUT TO PASTURE. WE DON'T WANT HIM IN OUR COURTROOMS. BEING NOVICES IN THE SYSTEM AT THE TIME, WE FAILED TO PURSUE OUR COMPLAINTS TO ALL APPROPRIATE CHANNELS. WE HAVE HAD TO LIVE WITH THE FALL-OUT OF OUR FAILINGS FOR SIX YEARS. I ASK THAT OUR DEFICIENCIES NOT BE COMPOUNDED BY THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT YOU STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT JUDGE FRANK EPPES GO INTO FULL RETIREMENT.

AND I THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY.

Q. MR. GREGO, DO YOU HAVE ANY ALLEGATIONS THAT JUDGE EPPES HAS ISSUED SENTENCES THAT WERE NOT WITHIN STATUTORY GUIDELINES OF THOSE CRIMES?
A. I DO NOT.
Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY ALLEGATIONS OF BEHAVIOR THAT VIOLATED THE JUDICIAL CANNONS OF ETHICS OR THAT HE TOOK PART IN ANY TYPE OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES?
A. I AM A RETIRED NAVAL OFFICER; I DON'T KNOW WHAT YOUR CANNON OF ETHICS IS IN THE COURTROOM BUT--AND I DON'T KNOW IF THEY ARE WRITTEN CANNONS OF ETHICS; I WOULD SAY THAT THE DESCRIPTION OF HIS CONDUCT IN THE COURTROOM BY MANY PEOPLE, RETIRED PROFESSIONALS, WOULD SAY THAT IT EITHER DOES VIOLATE OR BORDERS VERY CLOSELY ON VIOLATING THOSE CANNONS, IF, OBVIOUSLY, I KNEW WHAT THE CANNONS WERE. I CAN'T IMAGINE THAT THE CANNONS PERMIT ME TO GET THE KINDS OF REPORTS FROM A WIDE VARIETY OF PEOPLE THAT I GET THESE REPORTS FROM, ALL SUBSTANTIATING EACH OTHER; I THINK PROBABLY THE MOST DRAMATIC--AND I REALLY REGRET THAT COLONEL THOMAS COULDN'T BE HERE--COLONEL THOMAS HAD STATED ON MANY OCCASIONS, AND VARIOUS MEMBERS, I HAVE TALKED TO VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE GROUP THAT DID THE MONITORING AT THE TIME, ALL AGREED THAT IT APPEARED THAT THE DEGREE OF DIGNITY AND DECORUM WITHIN THE COURTROOM WAS DIRECTLY PROPORTIONAL TO THE RIGIDITY OF THE JUDGE IN SENTENCING. JUDGE JOHN HAMILTON SMITH AND JUDGE FINNEY'S COURTROOM WERE JUST THE EPITOME OF DIGNITY AND DECORUM. JUDGE RICHTER AT THE TIME, SIMILAR; NOT QUITE AT THE SAME LEVEL AS JOHN HAMILTON SMITH AND JUDGE FINNEY.
I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT AT THE TIME JUDGE JOHN HAMILTON SMITH, JUDGE FINNEY, JUDGE RICHTER, JUDGE EPPES WERE THE PRINCIPAL JUDGES THAT WE MONITORED. THERE WERE ABOUT THREE OR FOUR OTHERS WHOSE CASE LOAD WAS MUCH LESS, BUT ALL FELL WITHIN THAT 50 PERCENT I TALKED ABOUT.
Q. SO BASICALLY YOU ARE ASKING THE COMMITTEE TO FIND JUDGE EPPES UNQUALIFIED ON THE BASIS OF GIVING SENTENCES THAT FALL OUTSIDE OF YOUR ORGANIZATION'S IDEA OF LENIENCY?
A. NOT OUR ORGANIZATION'S IDEA OF LENIENCY. IF YOU--I WOULD SAY THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA'S IDEA OF LENIENCY. IF YOU BELIEVE THAT DRUG DEALERS AND DRUG TRAFFICKERS, AT THE RATE THAT THEY ARE RELEASED IN JUDGE EPPES' COURTROOM, THAT IS WITHIN THE PROPER DEGREE OF LENIENCY, WE HAVE A SERIOUS PROBLEM THROUGHOUT THE STATE BECAUSE HIS IDEA OF LENIENCY FAR EXCEEDS EVERYONE ELSE'S IDEA OF LENIENCY; OTHERWISE, WE WOULDN'T HAVE THE GREENVILLE NEWS AND EVERYONE ELSE REPORTING--AND, YOU KNOW, IT'S KNOWN THROUGHOUT THE--LET'S BE HONEST, IT'S KNOWN THROUGHOUT THE STATE: WE WILL WAIT UNTIL JUDGE EPPES COMES TO TOWN BEFORE WE GET OUR MAN ON THE BENCH. WE HAVE INMATES SAYING IT. WE HAVE EVERYONE ELSE SAYING IT. WHAT ELSE DO WE NEED? WHAT IS THE PROPER DEGREE OF LENIENCY?
TO HAVE SOMEONE USE JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO A CERTAIN DEGREE IS A VERY PROPER THING TO DO BECAUSE EVERY CASE IS DIFFERENT; BUT WHEN YOU GET THE SUBSTANTIATED BACKGROUND OF SIX, SEVEN YEARS THAT WE HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN OF EXTENSIVE LENIENCY, THEN YOU ARE WELL BEYOND ANY BOUNDS OF LENIENCY THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH CAROLINA WANT; AND SOONER OR LATER, COMMON SENSE HAS TO PREVAIL AND SAY THAT JUDICIAL DISCRETION HAS GOT TO END HERE.
Q. THOSE BOUNDS OF LENIENCY THAT JUDGE EPPES MAY HAVE EXHIBITED DO FALL WITHIN THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES THAT ARE PRESCRIBED BY THE LAW; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. AS FAR AS I KNOW, THEY DO. I SAID THAT BEFORE.
Q. CAPTAIN KENNEY, YOU ALLUDED TO HIM EARLIER?
A. CAPTAIN KENNEY GAVE ME A NOTARIZED STATEMENT. HE IS RETIRED NOW. I DID NOT HAVE THE TIME TO GET TO THE NAVY RECORDS TO GET ALL THE BACKGROUND ASSOCIATED WITH THAT CASE. THIS WAS AN INDIVIDUAL THAT THEY HAD WORKED ON FOR SOME TIME AND AT THE TIME OF THE BUST, THEY--THE INDIVIDUAL INVOLVED--YOU WOULD HAVE TO READ THE ARTICLE; BUT SOMEHOW GOT INTO A CAR AND TRIED TO ESCAPE, ALMOST HIT A NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES AGENT; SHE ESCAPED BY, I THINK, JUMPING WELL OUT OF THE WAY, JUST BARELY SAVING HER LIFE; DAMAGED TWO GOVERNMENT VEHICLES AND THEN WAS APPREHENDED. THEY HAD BEEN WORKING ON IT FOR SOME TIME AND IT WAS A VERY SENSITIVE CASE. HE WALKED OUT. HE WALKED OUT OF THE COURTROOM.

MR. BATES: ALL RIGHT, SIR, I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU FOR THE ORGANIZED MANNER IN WHICH YOU PRESENTED THIS AND GOT IT TO THE COMMITTEE FOR OUR USE. MR. CHAIRMAN, I DON'T HAVE ANY OTHER QUESTIONS OF MR. GREGO, UNLESS SOME OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE DO.

Q. MR. GREGO, DID YOU PURSUE THE MATTER ANY FURTHER WITH THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR--FIRST, LET ME ASK YOU: WERE YOU AWARE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR'S OFFICE BEFORE YOU FILED IT WITH THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE?
A. SIR, WHEN WE DID THIS IN 1984, WE WEREN'T SURE HOW TO GET TO COLUMBIA, LET ALONE KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT A COURT ADMINISTRATOR OR ANYTHING ELSE.
Q. I'VE SEEN YOU AROUND THE STATE HOUSE A GOOD BIT SINCE THEN, SO I THINK---
A. WELL, I LEARNED THAT. I HAVE FOUND OUT WHERE IT IS.
Q. DID Y'ALL PURSUE THE MATTER ANY FURTHER WITH THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR?
A. WE DIDN'T KNOW WE COULD. THAT WAS OUR FAILING. I DIDN'T EVEN KNOW ABOUT THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR. WHEN THE GOVERNOR OF THE STATE TELLS ME I CAN TAKE IT OR HE SENT IT TO THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, I WOULD ASSUME THAT THAT WAS THE PROPER DIRECTION THAT THIS REPORT SHOULD GO.

SENATOR LOURIE: THANK YOU, SIR.
A. THEN WE LET IT DROP.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MR. MCEACHIN.

Q. MR. GREGO, WAS THE SENTENCE THAT JUDGE EPPES GAVE SAMUEL GREEN, JR., APPROPRIATE?
A. THE--SAMUEL GREEN?
Q. THAT'S ON TAB "I," THE NEWSPAPER REPORT FROM THE NEWS AND COURIER OF NOVEMBER 20, '86.
A. TAB "I"?
Q. YES, SIR.
A. TAB "I" IS--(PAUSE; VIEWING DOCUMENTS)--TAB "I" IS ALL ABOUT BEESON. DO YOU HAVE THE WRONG NAME?
Q. I DON'T KNOW, MY TAB "I"---
A. OH, I'M SORRY, THERE WAS A SECOND CASE THAT JUST HAPPENS TO BE A PART OF THAT ARTICLE.
Q. THAT IS THE ONE I'M ASKING YOU ABOUT.
A. I WOULD HAVE TO READ IT.
Q. THAT WAS A CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT CASE, AS WELL, INVOLVING A YOUNG--TWO YOUNG CHILDREN.
A. NO, I WOULD HAVE TO SAY THERE, AGAIN, HE SENTENCED GREEN TO 12 YEARS, SUSPENDED DURING SIX YEARS, FOLLOWED BY FIVE YEARS PROBATION. I'M NOT SURE WHAT THAT MEANS, "SUSPENDED DURING SIX YEARS," WHETHER THEY WROTE IT UP WRONG OR WHAT, BUT I'M NOT SURE WHAT THAT MEANS.
Q. LET'S ASSUME THAT IT MEANS THAT HE GAVE THE FELLOW SIX YEARS IN JAIL.
A. SIX YEARS. SIX YEARS IN JAIL FOR FIRST DEGREE CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT MEANS HE IS ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE AFTER TWO YEARS AND WHICH ALSO MEANS HE IS ELIGIBLE FOR--I'M SORRY, IT WOULD BE LESS THAN TWO YEARS BECAUSE OF THE EMERGENCY POWERS RELEASE ACT REDUCED THAT BY--THE WHOLE THING BY ONE YEAR; SO, IT WOULD BE LESS THAN THREE YEARS THAT HE WOULD BE ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE. I WOULD SAY THAT THIS INDIVIDUAL, WITHOUT EVEN CHECKING, AND I COULD CHECK ON IT FOR YOU, I WOULD SAY THIS INDIVIDUAL WAS PROBABLY OUT IN THE STREETS IN ABOUT A YEAR TO A YEAR-AND-A-HALF; AND IS THAT SUFFICIENT FOR SEXUALLY ASSAULTING A THREE-YEAR-OLD AND AN EIGHT-YEAR-OLD BETWEEN OCTOBER '85 AND MARCH '86? - NO.
Q. DO YOU KNOW THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THOSE TWO CASES?
A. NO, I DON'T.
Q. LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT YOUR STATISTICS THAT WERE COMPILED FROM FEBRUARY THROUGH JULY OF 1984, WHICH ARE ON TAB "A." WELL, I GUESS THAT'S RIGHT. DO YOU KNOW WHO--WAS JUDGE EPPES THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME?
A. TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, THE ONLY ADMINISTRATIVE-- I DIDN'T KNOW THAT THEY WERE AT THE TIME, BUT SINCE THAT TIME THE ONLY JUDGES THAT I KNEW WERE THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES WENT BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN JUDGE FIELDS, JUDGE RICHTER, AND JUDGE JOHN HAMILTON SMITH. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER HE WAS OR NOT.
Q. JUDGE EPPES HAD 332 CASES---
A. THAT'S RIGHT.
Q. ---BEFORE HIM DURING THIS PERIOD OF TIME.
A. HE CARRIED THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE CASES.
Q. THE NEXT CLOSEST JUDGE HAD, IT APPEARS TO ME, 64 CASES BEFORE HIM.
A. PROBABLY FOR THE REASON I'M TALKING ABOUT: JUDGE EPPES IS RECOGNIZED AS A PLEA JUDGE; HE IS IN TOWN, LET'S GET RID OF ALL OF THESE CASES.
Q. BUT THE SOLICITOR BRINGS THE CASES, DOESN'T HE?
A. OH, ABSOLUTELY. I'M NOT SAYING THAT PLEA BARGAINING AND--THAT THERE IS ANYTHING WRONG WITH PLEA BARGAINING; I'M NOT SAYING THERE IS ANYTHING WRONG WITH CONTINUANCES. I'M REALLY NOT SAYING THERE'S ANYTHING WRONG WITH A PLEA JUDGE; BUT I HAVE TO GO BACK TO THIS TREMENDOUSLY LONG EXPERIENCE OF LENIENCY, EXCESSIVE LENIENCY, AND THAT'S WHAT THIS WHOLE THING IS ALL ABOUT. JUDGE EPPES IS--I'VE HAD AN OCCASION TO TALK TO HIM ON A COUPLE OF OCCASIONS AND HE IS A WONDERFUL PERSON. THAT'S NOT THE ISSUE. JUDGE EPPES IS NOT THE ISSUE.
Q. IS IT YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE SYSTEM THAT THE SOLICITOR DECIDES WHEN TO BRING THE CASE AND, IN FACT, DECIDES WHICH JUDGE TO BRING THE CASE IN FRONT OF?
A. NOT TOTALLY.
Q. SIR?
A. NOT TOTALLY.
Q. WILL YOU AGREE WITH ME THAT THE CIRCUIT---
A. CONTINUANCES CAN BE GRANTED ON THE BASIS OF VERY MINOR CONSTITUTIONAL TEST OF THE ACCUSED; SO, IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT THE ACCUSED WILL GET THE CONTINUANCE THAN IT IS THE SOLICITOR.
Q. WOULD YOU AGREE WITH ME THOUGH THAT THE CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE HAS ABSOLUTELY NO CONTROL OVER THE GENERAL SESSIONS DOCKET, THAT THAT IS TOTALLY UP TO THE SOLICITOR'S OFFICE?
A. YES, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE MCEACHIN: THANK YOU, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS?

SENATOR POPE: I WOULD LIKE TO ASK ONE.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: SENATOR POPE.

Q. MR. GREGO, ARE YOU AWARE THAT IT'S BEEN WRITTEN AND TALKED ABOUT THAT JUDGE EPPES HAS A PHILOSOPHY THAT IS WITHIN THE GUIDELINES OF THE STATUTORY LAW, THAT HE FREQUENTLY WILL PUT PEOPLE ON PROBATION AND GIVE A SUSPENDED SENTENCE ON THE FIRST OFFENSE BUT IF THEY VIOLATE IN ANY WAY THE TERMS OF THAT PROBATION, HE REVOKES THE WHOLE THING AND THEY SERVE A MAXIMUM SENTENCE?
A. YES, SIR, I AM ALSO AWARE OF THE CASE LOAD IMPOSED ON ALL THE PROBATION OFFICERS AND THE ATTEMPT TO TRY TO MAINTAIN THIS RECORD--THIS PROCESS IS NEXT TO IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE TREMENDOUS CASE LOAD. I WOULD NOT GUARANTEE THAT ALL THESE INDIVIDUALS WOULD BE RETURNED IF THEY DO THAT. AND, BY THE WAY, THE CASES THAT WE BROUGHT UP BEFORE YOU, THE THREE-TIME OFFENDER IN GREENVILLE WAS NOT A FIRST OFFENSE. THIS WAS A CASE OF A WOMAN WHO WAS A THREE-TIME OFFENDER WHO WAS SENTENCED BY JUDGE EPPES TO SIX YEARS ONE DAY; CALLED BACK IN THE NEXT DAY AND HAD THE SENTENCE CHANGED TO A PROBATIONARY SENTENCE, AND SHE WALKED OUT. I KNOW WHAT YOU ARE SAYING, BUT I THINK THAT'S ALSO THE GENERAL RULE WITH MOST OTHER JUDGES WHEN THEY PROVIDE THEM WITH PROBATIONARY SENTENCES.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, MR. GREGO.

MR. GREGO: THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: YOU ALSO SENT A NUMBER OF LETTERS. THEY ARE IN OUR FILES.

MR. GREGO: YES, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THEY DO NOT MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR RULES, SO WE ARE NOT PUTTING THEM IN OUR RECORDS BUT THEY ARE AVAILABLE TO ANY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE TO LOOK AT THEM.

MR. GREGO: THAT'S FINE. I WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE THE--THIS IS A REPLACEMENT FOR THE ONE TAB.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: OKAY.

MR. GREGO: THE ONE TAB IS JUST SIMPLY NOT LEGIBLE.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: YOU HAVE NO FURTHER WITNESSES TO CALL?

MR. GREGO: NO, SIR.

JUDGE EPPES: I THINK THERE WAS ONE AFFIDAVIT THAT DID COME IN THE RULE, AND IT WAS SOME PEOPLE COMPLAINING ABOUT A CASE THAT LASTED A YEAR-AND-A-HALF PLED BEFORE ME FOR SIMPLE ASSAULT AND I GAVE THEM 30 DAYS; AND I DON'T WRITE PEOPLE UP FOR 30 DAYS--IT'S A LOT OF PAPERWORK--AND I GAVE THE PERSON 30 DAYS OR PAY $100--STAY AWAY FROM THE VICTIM AND PAY $1OO TO THE PUBLIC DEFENDER. I DON'T KNOW WHY THE CASE WAS A YEAR-AND-A-HALF OLD. I DON'T KNOW WHY THE PEOPLE WEREN'T NOTIFIED. BUT I--LISTEN, I'LL TAKE UP THE FIRST CASE--THE LAST CASE FIRST.

THE LADY WHO HAD BEEN UP THREE TIMES: I DID CALL HER BACK IN AND I DID LET HER OUT. SHE WAS A BLACK LADY, NO EDUCATION WHATSOEVER. AND I HATE TO TALK ABOUT IT, SHE WAS FAT. HER BROTHER WAS DEALING WITH DRUGS AND EVERY TIME THEY WOULD RAID THEM, THEY COULD ALL GET OUT OF THE HOUSE AND SHE WAS TOO FAT TO GET OUT; AND HER MOTHER IS TOTALLY BLIND, WAS 90 YEARS OLD AND I LET HER OUT TO TAKE CARE OF HER MOTHER AND I'M NOT GOING TO APOLOGIZE TO ANYBODY FOR LETTING HER OUT. HER BROTHERS WERE DRUG DEALERS. SHE GOT CAUGHT.

ON THE SURVEY FROM THE GREENVILLE PAPER WHERE YOU SAY I PUT TRAFFICKERS ON PROBATION: THEY ARE TRAFFICKERS BECAUSE OF THE QUANTITY THEY HAD ON THEM. YOU TAKE A POOR DEVIL ADDICTED TO DRUGS, THEY CATCH A MAN DEALING DRUGS AND THEY SAY WE WILL LET YOU SLIDE IF YOU WILL CATCH US FIVE. HE KNOWS FIVE ON DRUGS. HE CALLS THEM: I WILL MEET YOU. I'VE GOT AN EIGHT BALL CHEAP, AND THEY BUY AND THE SOLICITOR DROPS THEM FROM TRAFFICKING TO POSSESSION. I HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH WHAT THE SOLICITOR DOES.

I HAVE A LITTLE PRINTOUT HERE FROM THE PENITENTIARY. I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE SYSTEM IS BUT I'VE GOT 2,031 IN THE PENITENTIARY SINCE 9--UP TO 9/30 STARTING AT 1/90; THAT'S FOR Y'ALL'S RECORD. 1989, IN 1988, I HAD 1202 IN THE PENITENTIARY AND THE CLOSEST ONE TO ME, I THINK, IS 380, LUKE BROWN.

I GO TO THE DRUG CASE IN CHARLESTON WHERE THE NAVAL OFFICER WAS COMPLAINING. WE MET WITH THE ASSISTANT SOLICITOR IN MY OFFICE, THE JUDGE'S CHAMBER. THEY WENT OVER THE CASE. I SAID: IF THOSE ARE THE FACTS AND HE PLEADS GUILTY TO ME IN OPEN COURT, I'M GOING TO PUT HIM ON PROBATION. THIS WAS ON A TUESDAY. IF YOU WANT HIM TO GET THE MAXIMUM, YOU TRY HIM AND CONVICT HIM AND I WILL GIVE HIM THE MAXIMUM. THEY HAD PUT ONE IN PRE-TRIAL DIVERSION AND DISMISSED THE CASE. THE YOUNG BOY WAS FROM CUBA TRYING TO BE A CITIZEN. HE HAD LOANED SOME--PAWNED SOMETHING; HE WENT UP AND ALL THESE PEOPLE WITH UNMARKED SURROUNDED HIM. HE HAD $800 WHERE HE HAD PAWNED A CAMERA TO SOMEBODY. THEY GOT THE CAMERA. HE HAD GIVEN THEM MONEY. HE BROUGHT THE MONEY. ANYHOW, HE TOOK OFF. I MADE THEM PAY 10,000 OR WHATEVER DAMAGE HE DID. I DID THAT. YOU'VE GOT TO LOOK AT EACH CASE, EACH CASE ON ITS MERITS.

I DID PUT THE FELLOW ON PROBATION FOR MOLESTING A FIVE-YEAR-OLD CHILD. I HAD THAT CASE IN SEPTEMBER AND I DEFERRED SENTENCE AND ASKED FOR A PRESENTENCE REPORT. THE VICTIM WAS A YOUNG CHILD TAKEN CARE OF BY HER GRANDMOTHER; AND I DON'T WANT TO GET INTO ALL THE PROBLEMS THAT THEY WERE HAVING. THE VICTIM (SIC) WAS NOT COMPLETELY RETARDED; HE WAS DULL; HE LIVED THERE. AND I WILL SAY I DID LOOK AT THE FATHER OF THAT CHILD. HE STOOD UP AND POINTED HIS FINGER AT ME AND SAID: I DEMAND THAT HE GETS 30 YEARS IN JAIL. SAID: HE ASKED ME TO GO PICK UP--HE WAS LIVING WITH MY MOTHER AND HE ASKED ME TO GO PICK UP A PICKUP TRUCK AT THE FILLING STATION AND I THOUGHT SOMETHING WAS GOING TO HAPPEN, SO I RAN ALL THE WAY TO THE FILLING STATION AND I HURRIED BACK AND CAUGHT HIM. IT WAS TRAGIC. THE PSYCHIATRIST THAT INVESTIGATED THE CASE TOLD ME THAT THE TRAUMA ON THAT CHILD TO TESTIFY WOULD BE TERRIBLE.

ALL RIGHT; THE DEFENSE LAWYER WASN'T BARRY KRELL. AS I RECALL IT WAS A LITTLE BOY NAMED THEO. HE SAID: I'M NOT GOING TO PLEAD HIM GUILTY IF HE GETS ANY TIME. ALL RIGHT, I HAVE TRIED CASES LIKE THAT; AND THREE OR FOUR YEARS DOWN THE LINE THEY GET REVERSED AND COME BACK AND THEN YOU'VE GOT A 9 OR 10 YEAR-OLD-GIRL AND THEY DON'T WANT THEM TO TESTIFY. IT'S HARD ON THEM. THAT CHILD NEEDED SOME MEDICAL ATTENTION. THE MOTHER AND FATHER WERE SEPARATED. THE LAWYER TRIED TO FIND THE MOTHER, THE DEFENSE LAWYER TRIED TO FIND THE MOTHER TO TALK TO HER. I THINK HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN THE ONE THAT CALLED HER. BUT I PUT IT OFF FROM SEPTEMBER TO NOVEMBER, WHEN I SENTENCED HIM; AND I MAY HAVE NOT SAID IT, BUT I PROBABLY--IF THE FACTS WERE LIKE HE SAID AND HE GOT THERE, I DON'T KNOW WHY HE DIDN'T KILL HIM. BUT I FEEL SORRY FOR THE LITTLE CHILD BECAUSE IF HE THOUGHT SOMETHING WAS GOING TO HAPPEN, I DON'T KNOW WHY HE DIDN'T TAKE THE CHILD WITH HIM OR SAY, "YOU NO GOOD SO-AND-SO, YOU GET OUT OF THIS HOUSE AND YOU NEVER COME BACK TO SEE MY MOTHER." I THINK HE WAS PAYING THE RENT THERE. I'M NOT SURE. BUT I MADE HIM MOVE BACK HOME. HE WAS THERE WHEN THE PLEA WAS FIRST ENTERED. THE VICTIM WAS LIVING WITH THE GRANDMOTHER. THE MAN, I HAD HIM CHECKED BY A PSYCHIATRIST; HE WAS NOT A PEDOPHILE. HE WAS RETARDED, DULL, AND HE HAD A JOB; AND I MOVED HIM BACK HOME WITH HIS FAMILY. AND THE REPORT I GOT SAID THAT THE LITTLE GIRL--THE GRANDMOTHER COULD USE THAT MONEY IN HELPING WITH MEDICAL SUPPLIES AND FOR HELPING THE GIRL.

THEY BOTH MISSED THE POINT OF THE SENTENCE. I GAVE HIM 30 YEARS, SUSPENDED ON FIVE YEARS OF PROBATION AND PAY 150 A MONTH TO BE DISBURSED BY SOMEBODY THAT WAS GOING TO TAKE CARE OF THAT CHILD. I DIDN'T KNOW WHETHER IT WAS GOING TO BE THE GRANDMOTHER, THE NATURAL MOTHER, OR THE FATHER. I DIDN'T KNOW. BUT I LEFT THERE AND I CHECKED UP ON IT. HE GOT SENTENCED BY SOMEBODY ELSE AND THEY NEVER REVOKED HIS PROBATION; IN FACT, THEY TERMINATED IT. I HAD BOB SHAW, WHO WAS THE PROBATION OFFICER--THAT'S THAT CASE ON THIS SURVEY THAT THEY MADE ABOUT ME PUTTING ALL THESE VIOLENT OFFENDERS ON PROBATION, I MADE AN APPOINTMENT THROUGH MY LAW CLERK AND THE CAVE GROUP TO GO OUT TO THEIR MEETING PLACE SOMEWHERE IN THE NORTH AREA, I THINK, CLOSE TO WHERE THE NEW COURTHOUSE IS NOW. WE WENT OUT ON A RAINY, COLD NIGHT AND I GOT THERE. WE CARRIED THE DOCKET FROM THE COURTHOUSE. MR. GREGO WAS NOT PRESENT. TWO WOMEN WERE THERE AND I WENT OVER EVERY SENTENCE I GAVE AND TOLD THEM WHAT I DID. I CAN'T REMEMBER ALL THE CASES NOW THAT I HANDLED. I HANDLED 174 LAST WEEK IN SPARTANBURG. I HANDLED 74 YESTERDAY IN GREENVILLE. THEY'RE LOSING A DAY TODAY. YES, I DID RETIRE AND THE CHIEF JUSTICE ASKED ME TO WORK AND I HAVE BEEN MORE THAN GLAD TO WORK. BUT I REVOKED A GIRL YESTERDAY, A BEAUTIFUL GIRL, BEAUTIFUL: DRUGS; SHE FLUNKED A SCREENING, THE URINE TEST. SHE HAD BEEN UP BEFORE ME ONCE AND I WENT AGAINST MY BETTER JUDGMENT AND CONTINUED HER. THREE OTHER JUDGES CONTINUED HER BUT I REVOKED HER PROBATION YESTERDAY. AND THERE IS SOMETHING ABOUT THE SYSTEM I USE THAT'S GOT MORE IN THE PENITENTIARY THAN THE OTHERS. I DON'T BRAG ON THAT. AND I DID SEND FOR JAMES BROWN. DRUGS WERE AT THE PENITENTIARY. I DIDN'T WANT TO--I THOUGHT I COULD FIND OUT FROM HIM. THESE YOUNG PEOPLE WON'T LISTEN TO ME. HE KEPT THEM FROM BURNING DOWN AUGUSTA, GEORGIA AND WASHINGTON, D.C. HE IS ALIVE TODAY BECAUSE HE IS IN JAIL. HE WAS ON PCP, AND I WANTED TO DISCUSS WITH HIM THE DRUG PROBLEM AT THE PENITENTIARY AND WHO WAS GETTING DRUGS IN THERE. I THOUGHT WITH HIS KNOWLEDGE AND ALL, HE WOULD KNOW. YES, I SAID I HAD HIM UP FOR AN AUTOGRAPH BUT I THINK I COULD HAVE GOTTEN HIM KILLED. HE IS NOT THERE NOW BUT I DID NOT GET TO TALK WITH HIM. I HAD HIS LAWYER. BUT THAT IS WHAT I BROUGHT HIM UP THERE FOR AND I HAVE NO APOLOGY TO MAKE FOR THAT. IT WASN'T IN JEST. IT WASN'T TO BE A CLOWN. IT WAS TO FIND OUT SOMETHING ABOUT THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. I FOUND OUT FROM COLONEL MANNING WHO USED TO BE ON THE COMMITTEE; I'VE WORKED WITH HIM. YOU KNOW, SOME PEOPLE, THEY ALL WANT EVERYBODY IN JAIL FOR THE MAXIMUM HELD UP BY THEIR TOENAILS UNLESS IT'S THEIR CHILD OR THEIR KIN PEOPLE. I DON'T KNOW, AND I DON'T KEEP STATISTICS, BUT I THINK MR. GREGO HAS BEEN TO THE PAROLE BOARD TO GET ONE OUT EARLY. I WASN'T THERE BUT, YOU KNOW, EVERYBODY CALLS HIM AND TELLS HIM WHAT I DO; WELL, THERE'S A FEW PEOPLE CALLING ME AND TELLING WHAT HE DOES; SO, I DON'T KNOW WHAT IT IS. BUT ANY OF YOU GOT ANY QUESTIONS? OH, LET'S SEE. THE 18-YEAR-OLD BOY. I DO GIVE MAXIMUM SENTENCES AND PROBATION. I DO NOT WRITE PEOPLE UP FOR 30 DAYS. I DO NOT WRITE PEOPLE UP FOR SIX MONTHS. I THINK THE PAPERWORK AND THE PAROLE BOARD--THERE'S TOO MUCH PAPERWORK TO WRITE SOMEBODY UP AND I TRY TO GET A FINE ON THOSE TYPE SENTENCES.

Q. JUDGE, IN THE CASE THAT MR. AND MRS. OWEN TESTIFIED ABOUT AND DR. MORROW, DO YOU REMEMBER MAKING THE STATEMENT, SIDE BAR OR WHATEVER, TO THE JURORS?
A. YES, I TOLD HIM THAT. I'LL TELL YOU; SHE SAID WHAT WOULD I HAVE DONE IF IT WAS MY CHILD OR GRANDCHILD--I DON'T HAVE ANY GRANDCHILDREN; MY SON IS IN THE NAVY AND HE JUST MADE LIEUTENANT AND I'M PROUD OF HIM. BUT IF IT WAS MY GRANDCHILD, THE FIRST THING I WOULD DO IS DISQUALIFY MYSELF AND LET SOME IMPARTIAL JUDGE SENTENCE THAT PERSON BECAUSE YOU COULDN'T BE RATIONAL ABOUT IT IF IT WAS YOUR CHILD. I DID SAY IF--HE SAID HE HURRIED, HE RAN TO THE FILLING STATION AND HURRIED BACK SO HE COULD CATCH HIM; WELL, I DID--I DID PROBABLY SAY THAT; I SAID: WELL, YOU KNOW, HE WOULD HAVE BEEN PAID FOR IF HE HAD KILLED HIM. I PROBABLY SHOULDN'T HAVE SAID IT BUT IT'S A THING THAT WAS SAID, AND YOU CAN'T UNSCRAMBLE EGGS.
Q. WAS THAT SAID AS PART OF THE SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS?
A. NO, IT WAS A GOOD WHILE AFTER I SENTENCED HIM. BUT I JUST THOUGHT IT WOULD BE TERRIBLE TO HAVE THAT LITTLE CHILD AND THAT GRANDMOTHER--INCIDENTALLY, I THINK THE LADY IS 62. I'M NOT SURE. DON'T HOLD ME TO THESE FIGURES. I THINK SHE WAS 62 AND THIS BOY WAS IN HIS 30'S AND HE WAS DULL; HE WAS A MANUAL LABORER TYPE MAYBE, PROBABLY WORKED IN A NURSERY OR SOME TYPE OF LANDSCAPING. I'M NOT SURE. BUT HE WAS NOT A PEDOPHILE. I HAD A PRESENTENCING INVESTIGATION. I HAD THE PROBATION OFFICERS TO CHECK SOME BACKGROUND AND THAT WAS BEFORE WE HAD--WE DIDN'T HAVE THIS TEAM TO REALLY DO--NOW THEY DO AN EXCELLENT JOB ON A PRESENTENCING. THEY DIDN'T DO IT THAT WELL AT THAT TIME.
Q. HOW MANY TERMS OF COURT HAS THE CHIEF JUSTICE CALLED ON YOU TO---
A. SINCE AUGUST OF 1986 I HAVE HELD FOUR WEEKS, PRACTICALLY EVERY WEEK OF COURT, OTHER THAN THREE OR FOUR WEEKS IN EACH YEAR SINCE THEN.
Q. FOUR WEEKS?
A. FOUR WEEKS A MONTH.
Q. FOUR WEEKS A MONTH, ALL RIGHT, SIR.
A. THE WAY THEY PAY ME, YOU HAVE TO WORK THREE WEEKS EACH MONTH IN A PAY PERIOD TO DRAW THE MONEY. AND I DON'T--I DRAW THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RETIREMENT AND FULL SALARY AND I PUT IT INTO DEFERRED INCOME AND WHEN I GET TO A CERTAIN AMOUNT, I TELL THEM TO CUT IT OFF SO I DON'T MAKE TOO MUCH TO DRAW AND SO THEY GET ME FOR NOTHING THAT TIME.
Q. JUDGE, IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT WE RECEIVED A GREAT DEAL OF LETTERS AS A RESULT OF THE AD THAT WAS PLACED IN THE PAPER BY CAVE. I WOULD JUST ON YOUR BEHALF ALSO LIKE TO PUT ON THE RECORD THAT WE RECEIVED A GREAT DEAL OF LETTERS VERY FAVORABLE TO YOU, ALSO.
A. I TELL YOU WHAT I TRY TO DO, I DON'T STUDY THE CASES WHERE I GET AFFIRMED. I ALWAYS READ THE CASES WHERE I GET REVERSED SO I WON'T MAKE THE SAME MISTAKE. I GET A LOT OF MAIL. IN FACT, I GOT A LETTER IN AN ENVELOPE JUST LIKE THIS; AND IT REALLY GOT ON MY BALD HEAD PRETTY GOOD, AND IT DIDN'T HAVE A RETURN ADDRESS AND IT DIDN'T HAVE ANYBODY'S NAME BUT IT WASN'T ANY PROBLEM TO FIND OUT. THERE'S A LITTLE NUMBER RIGHT THERE (INDICATING). IT WAS NOT CAVE. IT WAS CADRE WHO HAD SENT IT; AND THEN I SAID: WELL, IF SOMEBODY DON'T SIGN IT, I WON'T ANSWER IT. BUT I CALL PEOPLE. IN FACT, IN CHARLESTON RIGHT AFTER THIS, I WAS BACK THERE FOR I HAD TO GO BACK ON THE CASE OF A FELLOW THAT EMBEZZLED A LOT OF MONEY FROM A CAR DEALER, AN AUTOMOBILE--THEY HAD A USED CAR LOT AND I HAD TO GO BACK AND SENTENCE HIM BECAUSE JUDGE NESS DID KEEP ME OUT OF CHARLESTON FOR AWHILE. HE THOUGHT SOMEBODY WAS GOING TO THREATEN MY LIFE OR SOMETHING PROBABLY; BUT I DIDN'T HAVE ANY PROBLEM. I WENT THERE AND I HAD THAT CASE AND EVERYBODY I'D GOT A NEGATIVE LETTER FROM, I CALLED THEM; AND THE ONES THAT WOULD TALK TO ME, I TALKED TO THEM; AND THE ONES THAT WOULDN'T, I INVITED THEM TO THE COURTHOUSE.

MR. BATES: I MAY BE JUMPING A LITTLE AHEAD. THERE MAY BE SOME COMMITTEE MEMBERS THAT HAVE SOME QUESTIONS FOR YOU BUT I WANTED TO LET YOU KNOW THAT WE SAID AT THE OUTSET THAT SEVERAL OTHER FOLKS HAD SIGNED UP TO TESTIFY THAT HAD NOT SUBMITTED AN AFFIDAVIT. THE WAY OUR COMMITTEE TRADITIONALLY HANDLES THAT IS WE DO NOT ALLOW THEM TO TESTIFY UNLESS THE CANDIDATE ASKS FOR THEM TO COME FORWARD AS WITNESSES ON HIS BEHALF AND ADDRESS ANY TESTIMONY THAT HAS ALREADY COME BEFORE THE COMMITTEE. I NOTICE MR. STRATOS AND MESSRS. MURDAUGH AND MIZZELL HAVE SIGNED UP AND I THINK THEY ARE STILL HERE IN THE CHAMBER. IF YOU---

JUDGE EPPES: YES, I WOULD CALL ON THE SENIOR MEMBER OF THAT GROUP FIRST, MR. BUSTER MURDAUGH.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN, IS THAT ALL RIGHT?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MR. MURDAUGH, COME FORWARD.

(RANDOLPH MURDAUGH, JR., FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

MR. MURDAUGH: I WOULD PREFER, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT YOU LET ME STAND UP. I CAN'T SIT DOWN AND TALK.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: GO AHEAD.

MR. MURDAUGH: SOME OF YOU PEOPLE DON'T KNOW ME. I HAVE BEEN SOLICITOR IN THE 14TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT SINCE 1940 TO 1987, 46 YEARS. AT THE TIME I RETIRED, I WAS THE OLDEST PROSECUTING ATTORNEY WHO EVER SERVED IN THE UNITED STATES.

I HAVE KNOWN FRANK EPPES FROM THE TIME HE--I HAD BEEN THE SOLICITOR 20-SOME YEARS WHEN WE GOT ELECTED JUDGE. I WAS TWO YEARS ASSISTANT TO MY FATHER BEFORE I GOT TO BE SOLICITOR; AND I HAVE BEEN TWO YEARS ASSISTANT TO MY SON WHO IS THE PRESENT SOLICITOR; SO, IF THERE HAS EVER BEEN A SOLICITOR WHO KNOWS SOMETHING ABOUT JUDGES, I THINK I DO. AND I WANT TO TELL Y'ALL NOW, FRANK EPPES IS BY FAR THE NICEST, MOST COMPETENT, MOST INTELLIGENT JUDGE THAT I HAVE EVER WORKED WITH. SOME OF THESE PEOPLE, THAT FELLOW FROM CHARLESTON WHO IS THE RETIRED NAVAL OFFICER WHO CAME DOWN HERE TO TAKE OVER LAW ENFORCEMENT APPARENTLY IN SOUTH CAROLINA SAYS HE DOESN'T LIKE FRANK EPPES. HE JUST DOESN'T HANG AROUND THE COURTHOUSE AND SEE HOW FRANK EPPES OPERATES. I DON'T LIKE SOME OF HIS DECISIONS. HE DIRECTED A VERDICT AGAINST ME WHEN I WAS PRACTICING CIVIL LAW IN A RAILROAD CASE AND I CUSSED HIM FOR ABOUT 24 HOURS AND THEN REALIZED THAT WHAT HE DID WAS RIGHT. WHILE I WAS SOLICITOR, HE SENTENCED SOME PEOPLE TO LESS THAN I THOUGHT THEY OUGHT TO HAVE; BUT WHEN YOU LOOK AT IT IN RETROSPECT, HE WAS RIGHT. HE HAS GOT A HEART. YOU KNOW, MOST PEOPLE TODAY THINK THAT EVERY TIME YOU VIOLATE THE LAW, YOU OUGHT TO SERVE THE MAXIMUM. THAT IS JUST NOT THE WAY IT IS. NUMBER ONE, YOU DON'T HAVE THAT MUCH ROOM IN THE PENITENTIARY. YOU JUST DON'T PUT EVERYBODY IN JAIL YOU WOULD LIKE ON A CASE; BUT FRANK EXAMINES THE CASE, HE LOOKS INTO IT, HE LOOKS AT THE DEFENDANT; HE LISTENS TO THE SOLICITOR; HE LISTENS TO THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY; AND HE HANDS DOWN A DECISION WHICH I THINK IS FAIR AND PROPER. NEVER HAVE I OUT OF ONE TIME IN THE NUMBER OF YEARS THAT HE HAS BEEN JUDGE--AND WE HAVE HAD HIM IN OUR CIRCUIT NUMEROUS TIMES--HAVE I EVER SEEN HIM DISPLAY ANY CONDUCT THAT WAS REPREHENSIBLE OR WAS IMPROPER. HE GIVES SENTENCES WHEN YOU DESERVE--WHAT I LIKE ABOUT HIM, YOU GET A FELLOW IN COURT: FIRST TIME, PLEAD GUILTY OR FOUND GUILTY BY THE JURY, AND FRANK WILL ASK HIM QUESTIONS AND HE TALKS TO THE PEOPLE LIKE PEOPLE OUGHT TO BE TALKED TO. HE IS NOT ARROGANT. HE DOESN'T BE NASTY TO THEM AND IT DOESN'T MATTER TO HIM WHETHER THEY ARE WHITE OR BLACK. EVERYBODY IS TREATED THE SAME BY FRANK EPPES. IF A FELLOW DOESN'T DESERVE TO GO TO JAIL, HE SLAPS A BIG PROBATION SENTENCE ON HIM. AND I DARE YOU TO LET HIM COME UP BEFORE FRANK THE SECOND TIME. IT HAS TO BE A VERY RARE CIRCUMSTANCE. AND DOWN IN JASPER COUNTY JUST SEVERAL WEEKS AGO--I'M STILL AN ASSISTANT AND I DON'T DO MUCH WORK; I DRAW--YOU CAN'T DRAW MUCH--YOU LEGISLATORS HAVE MADE IT WHERE WE CAN'T DRAW BUT ABOUT $8,OOO A YEAR AS AN ASSISTANT AND DRAWING RETIREMENT; SO, I STARTED PRACTICING LAW AGAIN AND I FOUND OUT IT'S MORE LUCRATIVE THAN IT WAS WHEN I QUIT PRACTICING TO TAKE FULL-TIME SOLICITOR. I'VE GOT A BUNCH OF YOUNG BOYS IN THE OFFICE THAT ARE MAKING ME AN AWFUL LOT OF MONEY. BUT FRANK GOT THIS WOMAN IN THE COURT THE SECOND TIME FOR DRUGS. THE FIRST JUDGE HAD GIVEN HER A PROBATION SENTENCE. HE WOUND UP GIVING HER 25 YEARS THE SECOND TIME SELLING DRUGS. THAT JUST KIND OF SHOWS YOU HOW HE OPERATES.

I WENT TO A--I'M STILL THE PRESIDENT EMERITUS OF THE SOLICITOR'S ASSOCIATION BECAUSE I SERVED AS THE PRESIDENT FOR 20-SOME YEARS. I WENT TO A MEETING WE HAD, THE SOLICITORS CONVENTION TWO WEEKS AGO AND AT THAT TIME THE QUESTION ABOUT FRANK EPPES HAVING PEOPLE OBJECTING TO HIM BEING SCREENED TO SERVE AS A RETIRED JUDGE, OUT OF THE 15 SOLICITORS THERE--SOLICITOR CONDON'S WIFE WAS HAVING A BABY AND HE WASN'T THERE, BUT OUT OF THE REST OF THEM, THEY VOTED UNANIMOUSLY TO WRITE LETTERS TO THIS COMMITTEE TO TELL THEM THAT THEY APPROVE FRANK EPPES; NOT ONE OBJECTION WAS RAISED BY A SOLICITOR. AND THAT'S THE PEOPLE WHO OUGHT TO OBJECT TO FRANK EPPES IF THERE'S ANYTHING WRONG; AND NOT ONE PERSON OBJECTED TO FRANK BEING APPROVED TO CONTINUE TO JUDGE.

I APPRECIATE THE OPPORTUNITY OF APPEARING BEFORE YOU GENTLEMEN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN; AND IF THERE'S ANY QUESTIONS I CAN ANSWER OR ANY INFORMATION I CAN SUPPLY, I WANT YOU TO CALL ON ME.

MR. BATES: THANK YOU, SIR. ANY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?

MR. BATES: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

MR. MURDAUGH: THANK YOU.

JUDGE EPPES: B.J. STRATOS.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MR. STRATOS.

(DEMETRIOS JOHN STRATOS, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

MR. STRATOS: MY NAME IS DEMETRIOS JOHN STRATOS FROM CHARLESTON. I FIRST MET THE HONORABLE JUDGE EPPES IN SEPTEMBER 1950 WHEN WE BOTH WENT TO LAW SCHOOL AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA. I HAVE KNOWN HIM EVER SINCE. I PRACTICE MAINLY CRIMINAL LAW. I THINK I UNDERSTAND THE CRIMINAL LAW A LOT BETTER THAN MOST PEOPLE BECAUSE THEY WALK IN; THEY WALK OUT. I DON'T SAY MY REPUTATION EARNS--IN OTHER WORDS, WHEN YOU WIN A CASE, YOU USUALLY WALK OFF AND YOU DON'T THINK ANYTHING ABOUT IT. AND FOR SEVEN YEARS, I DIDN'T LOSE A CASE. I THOUGHT I WAS INVINCIBLE. NOW I DON'T THINK I CAN WIN ONE, SO I HAVE JUST ABOUT QUIT. BUT ANYHOW, I HAVE KNOWN FRANK, IF YOU WILL INCORPORATE MR. MURDAUGH'S STATEMENT IN ANYTHING I MIGHT SAY, IT'S EQUALLY TRUE. NOW I LISTENED TO THE DANCE AND LET ME TELL YOU, I HAVE PRACTICED BEFORE FRANK; THEY SAY SOME OF THESE--SOME OF THESE LAWYERS LIKE TO DUCK JUDGES, BUT I DON'T THINK I HAVE EVER DUCKED ANY OF THEM. AT ONE TIME FOR YEARS AND YEARS, I NEVER HAD A CRIMINAL IN THE PENITENTIARY BECAUSE I FIGURED THAT I AM A COMMON SENSE PERSON; I FIGURED I OUGHT TO KNOW THE SENTENCE THAT THE JUDGE SHOULD GIVE. AND IF YOU REALIZE THAT THE STATE COURTS, THEY DON'T HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY THAT THEY HAVE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS IN WHICH YOU HAVE A PRESENTENCE REPORT AND YOU'VE GOT AN INDIVIDUAL UP THERE WHO SITS DOWN AND LOOKS AT ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL FOR A PERIOD OF FIVE MINUTES AND HE MUST MAKE A FIRM COMMITMENT OF WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN TO THIS INDIVIDUAL. NOW WHETHER YOU REALIZE IT OR NOT, A JUDGE HAS THREE PURPOSES WHEN AN INDIVIDUAL IS STANDING BEFORE HIM. NUMBER ONE, HE MUST SATISFY THE GENERAL PUBLIC AS TO THE SENTENCE. NUMBER TWO, HE MUST DO BY THIS DEFENDANT A--GIVE HIM A SENTENCE IN SUCH A MANNER IN WHICH IT WILL BENEFIT THE DEFENDANT AFTER HE COMES OUT OF JAIL OR WHATEVER SENTENCE THAT HE RECEIVES. AND HE SHOULD ALSO TRY TO SATISFY THE VICTIM OR TRY TO APPEASE THE VICTIM.

NOW, LIKE I SAY, I'VE KNOWN JUDGE EPPES ALL OF THESE YEARS, I THINK 38 YEARS; 38 YEARS I HAVE KNOWN HIM. AND I HAVE WATCHED HIS CONDUCT IN COURT AND IF YOU REALIZE HE GIVES A DEFENDANT A CHANCE, HE GIVES THEM THE KEY TO THE JAIL HOUSE. HE GIVES THEM A SENTENCE, WHICH I WOULD NOT LIKE TO BE UNDER ANY PROBATIONARY SENTENCE; BUT HE GIVES THE INDIVIDUAL A SENTENCE THAT GIVES THEM THE OPPORTUNITY TO GO BACK TO JAIL OR EITHER TO KEEP OUT OF JAIL. NOW I HAVE SEEN THESE PEOPLE--GETTING BACK TO THE DENTIST, I BROUGHT UP, I THOUGHT OF THIS ONE LITTLE THING. THE DENTIST SAID THAT HE DOESN'T FEEL THAT THE SENTENCES THAT THE JUDGE WAS GIVING WERE PROPER. HE THINKS THAT THEY SHOULD--HE SHOULD HAVE SENT HIM TO JAIL. NOW I ASK YOU, IN ALL SINCERITY, TO REALLY REALIZE WHAT JAIL IS; JAIL IS THE ANSWER TO IGNORANCE. WE DON'T KNOW WHAT TO DO WITH THESE INDIVIDUALS AND; SO, THEREFORE, WE SEND THEM TO PRISON. THIS IS THE LAST RESORT. NOW IF YOU DON'T THINK IT'S ONE TERRIBLE PRESSURE TO PUT ON AN INDIVIDUAL TO SAY WHAT IS BETTER FOR HIM OR HER OR IN ORDER TO DO JUSTICE FOR THE STATE. THIS DENTIST HERE, HE'S AN EDUCATED MAN APPARENTLY; HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THE PEOPLE OUGHT TO BE SENT TO JAIL. WELL, I SAY THIS: HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THEY OUGHT TO BE GIVEN SOME SORT OF TREATMENT WHILE THEY ARE IN JAIL, WHICH IS A MATTER OF FACT WE KNOW THAT ISN'T THE TRUTH. NOW IF THESE PEOPLE THAT ARE AGAINST FRANK EPPES HAVE A SOLUTION, I WANT THEM TO GIVE IT TO THIS BOARD. WHAT IS THE SOLUTION? BECAUSE WE KNOW THAT JAIL IS NOT THE ANSWER. WE KNOW THAT HE'S PROVEN HERE THAT HE SENDS MORE PEOPLE TO JAIL EVERY YEAR, SO THAT'S NOT THE ANSWER. JAIL IS NOT THE ANSWER. IF THEY HAVE A SOLUTION, LET THEM TAKE ALL OF THEIR ACTIVITIES AND ALL OF THEIR ENERGY AND PUT IT INTO FINDING OUT WHAT EACH INDIVIDUAL NEEDS TO KEEP THEM FROM COMMITTING THE CRIME; AND, ALSO, LET'S JAIL--THE SENTENCE IS TO DETER OTHERS. WHY WOULD SOMEBODY RATHER GIVE AN INDIVIDUAL A PROBATIONARY SENTENCE RATHER THAN SEND THEM TO JAIL? I BELIEVE IN MY 38 YEARS OF PRACTICE THAT THE FEAR OF JAIL KEEPS MORE INDIVIDUALS OUT OF JAIL THAN IT DOES FROM GOING TO JAIL.

IN MY EARLY PRACTICE, I HAD A YOUNG BOY WHO WAS GETTING IN LITTLE SMALL TROUBLES AND I TOLD HIS FATHER, I SAID, LET'S SEND HIM TO JAIL FOR SIX MONTHS. WE DID AND THAT FELLOW HAS BEEN IN JAIL EVER SINCE. JAIL IS NOT THE DETERRENT. THE FEAR OF JAIL IS THE DETERRENT.

NOW I CAN UNDERSTAND--I WILL LEAVE YOU WITH THIS LITTLE STATEMENT. I CAN UNDERSTAND THE JUDGE'S FEELINGS OR I KNOW HOW HE IS BECAUSE I HAVE KNOWN HIM FOR ALL OF THESE YEARS; BUT THERE'S A LITTLE STORY IN WHICH A SNAKE WENT UP TO A RIVER AND THERE WAS A WIDE RIVER WITH A ROARING CURRENT; AND THERE WAS A TURTLE AND THIS TURTLE--AND THE SNAKE SAYS TO THE TURTLE: MR. TURTLE, WILL YOU GIVE ME A RIDE ACROSS THIS RIVER? AND THE TURTLE SAID: NO, YOU WILL BITE ME. AND THE SNAKE SAID: NO, I WOULDN'T BITE YOU. YOU COULD GIVE ME A RIDE; I WOULDN'T BITE YOU. AND IN THE MIDDLE OF THE RIVER WHILE THIS TURTLE IS PADDLING ACROSS WITH THE SNAKE ON HIS BACK AND HIS HEAD UP, THE SNAKE REACHES OVER AND BITES HIM IN THE HEAD. THE TURTLE SAID: MY GOD, WHAT DID YOU DO THAT FOR? NOW I'M GOING TO DIE AND YOU ARE GOING TO DROWN. AND THE SNAKE SAID: IT'S MY NATURE. AND I SAY TO YOU: EVERY DEFENDANT, IF HE IS GIVEN PROBATION, WILL SHOW HIS NATURE. THIS IS THE ONLY ADEQUATE--FIRST OFFENSE, THIS IS THE ONLY ADEQUATE MEASURE FOR US TO TEST THE INDIVIDUAL. I SAY MY JUDGE IS A GOOD MAN. HE'S AN HONEST JUDGE AND HE'S--I KNOW THIS, THEY USE ADJECTIVES, THEY SAID "FOLLY IN THE COURTROOM"; LIKE MR. MURDAUGH SAID, LET THEM COME DOWN THERE AND SPEND THEIR HOURS AND YEARS IN THE COURTROOM AND THEY WILL SEE HOW MUCH THAT HAS TO GO ON IN THERE. SAID, "STUPID GESTURES"; EVERYTHING THAT DOESN'T APPLY TO THEM IS STUPID. I TELL YOU, THE CHIEF JUSTICE KEEPS RECOMMENDING OUR JUDGE TO TAKE OVER THESE CIRCUITS AND YOU KNOW WHY, BECAUSE THEY KNOW THAT IF JUDGE EPPES IS THERE, THEY CAN GET A FAIR DEAL AND, SO, THEY WILL USUALLY PLEAD RATHER THAN PUT THE STATE UP. IF EVERY LAWYER THAT WAS TO SAY ANYTHING AGAINST JUDGE EPPES WOULD BE HERE, THEY WOULD BE STANDING RIGHT HERE; AND THERE ARE NONE. IF EVERY LAWYER THAT WERE TO SAY SOMETHING GOOD FOR JUDGE EPPES WERE HERE, YOU COULD NOT HOLD THE LAWYERS IN THIS HOUSE HERE. IF EVERY SOLICITOR WAS TO DO THE SAME THING, IF THIS LADY KOONCE--I DON'T KNOW WHO SHE WAS OR WHO SHE IS, BUT IF MRS. KOONCE HAD ANYTHING TO SAY AGAINST JUDGE EPPES, SHE WOULD HAVE BEEN HERE TODAY. I SUBMIT TO YOU BY HER ABSENCE THAT IT IS A PROOF. THANK YOU.

JUDGE EPPES: MR. MIZZELL, THE SOLICITOR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MR. MIZZELL. FIRST, ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS?

SENATOR MCCONNELL: YES, I WANTED TO ASK HIM SOME QUESTIONS.

MR. STRATOS: I'M SORRY.

Q. MR. STRATOS, I JUST WANT TO MAKE SURE I UNDERSTAND YOUR TESTIMONY. YOUR TESTIMONY THEN IS YOU THINK THAT A SENTENCING SYSTEM THAT HAS PROBATION BEFORE WE GIVE THEM JAIL TIME IS A GOOD SYSTEM, GIVING THEM A CHANCE; IS THAT---
A. I SAY IN MOST INSTANCES. AND WHERE YOU'VE GOT A WILD ANIMAL, YOU DON'T TAKE THE WILD ANIMAL IN AND SAY THAT THAT WILD ANIMAL WITH RABIES IS GOING TO BE A GOOD CITIZEN. YOU PUT THAT WILD ANIMAL TO DEATH. NOW YOU CAN'T TAKE MY ATTRIBUTES FOR THE WORDS FOR THE ACTUAL MANNER IN WHICH THINGS GO; BUT YOU CANNOT--SOME PEOPLE IN SOME INSTANCES, YOU CANNOT USE PROBATION. I DON'T THINK YOU CAN FIND ANYTHING LIKE THAT IN JUDGE EPPES' RECORD.
Q. LET ME ASK YOU ABOUT, YOU ADDRESSED SEVERAL OF THE INSTANCES HERE WHEN YOU TESTIFIED BUT YOU DIDN'T TESTIFY TO THE THING WITH MR. JOHN BEESON, WHO ACCORDING TO THE TESTIMONY HERE TODAY, THEY HAD AN EYE WITNESS THAT SAW HIM IN THE ACT OF SEXUALLY ABUSING THE CHILD.
A. RIGHT.
Q. NOW DO YOU AGREE WITH PROBATION ON A SENTENCE LIKE THAT?
A. I DIDN'T KNOW THE CASE BUT IF YOU WANT TO GET DOWN TO IT, WHAT WAS THE GUY'S RECORD? DID HE HAVE ANY OTHER PREVIOUS SEXUAL CONDUCT RECORD? I DON'T KNOW THAT. WHAT WAS THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE SOLICITOR? YOU HAVE BEEN A LAWYER LONG ENOUGH TO KNOW THAT THE SOLICITOR MAKES A RECOMMENDATION TO THE JUDGE, WHETHER IT'S IN THE OPEN COURT OR WHETHER IT'S IN HIS CHAMBERS, AND THE JUDGE USUALLY GOES ALONG WITH THE SOLICITOR'S RECOMMENDATION. HERE IS MR. MURDAUGH WHO HAS BEEN SOLICITOR LONGER THAN ANYBODY I EVER KNEW AND YOU GO DOWN INTO HIS SECTION OF THE COUNTRY, HE IS THE LAW. AND I SAY THIS: THE SOLICITOR RECOMMENDS TO THE JUDGE. THE JUDGE VERY SELDOM GOES OUT ON HIS OWN AND SAYS, NO, I'M NOT DOING THAT. BUT IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE IN WHICH THIS CHILD WAS MOLESTED, IT'S BAD, IT'S TERRIBLE AND--BUT THE JUDGE SAID HE DID EVERYTHING HE COULD DO. HE WENT AND SAID THAT THE MAN OUGHT TO GET A PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION AND THE PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION SAYS--I DON'T KNOW, I HEARD IT ALL JUST LIKE YOU DID FOR THE FIRST TIME--THAT THE FELLOW WAS NOT A PERSON THAT WAS OF A NATURE IN ORDER THAT HE HAD TO HAVE SEX FROM CHILDREN. Y'ALL HAVE GOT A SPORTY NAME FOR IT, BUT THAT WASN'T IN MY VOCABULARY. BUT ANYHOW, SO, I SAID, WELL, IF JUDGE EPPES DID IT, HE HEARD THE CASE; THEN AS YOU KNOW, WELL, YOU HAVE PRACTICED LAW, HOW LONG DOES THAT JUDGE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO REALLY STUDY IT? BUT IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE, HE SAID HE PUT THE CASE OFF FOR THREE MONTHS IN ORDER TO STUDY THE THING. THERE WASN'T ANY OBJECTION. AND I AGREE WITH HIM 1,000 PERCENT, THAT IT WOULD DO MORE HARM TO THAT CHILD TO HAVE A TRIAL. AND AS YOU KNOW AS A DEFENSE LAWYER, IF THEY ARE GOING TO THROW THAT STICK OR THE WHOLE BOOK AT THE DEFENDANT, HE IS GOING TO REQUEST A TRIAL BECAUSE THERE'S ALWAYS A CHANCE OF WINNING THE TRIAL AND THERE IS NO CHANCE OF SAYING I'M GUILTY.
Q. WITH AN EYEWITNESS THAT SAW IT?
A. WELL, I'VE WON THEM WITH AN EYEWITNESS THAT HELD--I WON THEM WITH AN EYEWITNESS THAT HELD THE DEFENDANT UNTIL THE POLICE CAME. THAT IS WHY I THOUGHT I WAS INVINCIBLE; SO, DON'T TELL ME WHAT A JURY CAN DO.
Q. SO I JUST WANT TO MAKE SURE I UNDERSTAND YOUR TESTIMONY; I MEAN, YOU DON'T SEE ANYTHING WRONG WITH A SUSPENDED SENTENCE, FOR INSTANCE, WITH SOMEBODY FOR CHILD MOLESTING?
A. NO, SIR, I DON'T.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS?

JUDGE EPPES: MR. MIZZELL.

MR. MIZZELL: MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE, I---

MR. BATES: IF YOU WILL, JUST STATE YOUR FULL NAME SO WE WILL HAVE THAT ON RECORD.

MR. MIZZELL: MY NAME IS JOSEPH P. MIZZELL, JR. I'M THE SOLICITOR OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT. I'VE BEEN SOLICITOR DOWN THERE SINCE 1983. I APPRECIATE YOU HEARING FROM ME TODAY. AS THE SOLICITOR EMERITUS SAID, WE ALL AGREED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO THAT WE WOULD WRITE TO YOU. I NEGLECTED TO DO SO; SO, I CAME TODAY AND TOLD JUDGE EPPES IF HE NEEDED ANY SUPPORT THAT I WAS HERE ON HIS BEHALF, IN HIS CORNER. AND I WILL BE VERY, VERY BRIEF AND LET YOU KNOW THAT HE HAS PRACTICED IN MY CIRCUIT ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND I FIND THAT HE IS IMMINENTLY QUALIFIED. HIS JUDICIAL DEMEANOR IS IMPECCABLE AND I RECOMMEND THAT THIS SCREENING COMMITTEE RECOMMEND HIM TO CONTINUE PRACTICE ON OUR CIRCUIT. I WILL ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS ANY OF YOU MAY HAVE.

Q. DO YOU HAVE ANY SPECIFIC RECOLLECTION OR INFORMATION ABOUT THE CASE DOWN IN CHARLESTON THAT THESE FOLKS HAVE TESTIFIED ABOUT?
A. NO, SIR, I DO NOT. I HAVE READ IT IN THE NEWSPAPER BUT MY CIRCUIT IS CALHOUN, ORANGEBURG, AND DORCHESTER COUNTIES, AND I AM NOT INVOLVED IN THAT.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?

Q. MR. MIZZELL, I WAS JUST HANDED A LETTER FROM DONNIE D. MYERS, SOLICITOR IN THE ELEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN HIS CAPACITY APPARENTLY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SOLICITORS ASSOCIATION, SAYING THAT SOLICITORS AT YOUR MOST RECENT MEETING UNANIMOUSLY ENDORSED JUDGE EPPES FOR QUALIFICATION TO CONTINUE SITTING; IS THAT OR WAS THAT AN ACTION TAKEN AT THE ASSOCIATION MEETING?
A. YES, SIR. MR. CHAIRMAN ROGERS, IT CERTAINLY WAS AND AS I SAID, I HAD PROMISED TO WRITE A LETTER AND NEGLECTED TO DO SO; THAT IS WHY I'M HERE TODAY.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU.

JUDGE EPPES: INCIDENTALLY, MR. MYERS SAID HE WOULD COME IF NECESSARY.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU.

JUDGE EPPES: QUESTIONS OF ME?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: SENATOR.

(HONORABLE FRANK EPPES, HAVING BEEN PREVIOUSLY SWORN, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

Q. JUDGE, I'VE GOT TO GO BACK TO THE SITUATION WITH JOHN HENRY BEESON; AND IN YOUR RESPONSE YOU MADE THE POINT, YOU MADE SOME REFERENCES TO THE FACT THAT MAYBE THE COUPLE WAS HAVING SOME PROBLEMS AND THAT WHEN THE FATHER LEFT THE CHILD THERE THAT HE MIGHT HAVE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE CHILD MIGHT BE AT RISK; BUT I DON'T UNDERSTAND HOW THAT WOULD AFFECT THE SENTENCE.
A. HE SAID THAT. HE SAID THAT AND THERE WAS SOME QUESTION ABOUT IT AT THE TRIAL BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T WANT TO GO TO--WHEN IT FIRST CAME UP BEFORE ME IN SEPTEMBER, I DEFERRED SENTENCE BECAUSE NONE OF THEM--I DON'T EVEN THINK HE WAS THERE THE FIRST TIME. I DON'T THINK SO; NOW HE COULD HAVE BEEN BUT I DID NOT SEE HIM. AND I ASKED TO GO BACK. AND THE PSYCHIATRIST SAYS THAT IT WOULD BE TERRIBLE FOR THIS LITTLE GIRL TO HAVE TO GO THROUGH A CASE. THERE WAS SOMETHING INVOLVING THE GRANDMOTHER AND I DON'T WANT TO GET INTO ALL THAT. THEY--THE ATTORNEY, HE SAYS, WELL, I WILL NOT PLEAD HIM GUILTY IF. AND I THINK IT WAS A BAD CRIME NO MATTER WHAT HE DID TO THE CHILD BUT IF I HUNG 30 YEARS OVER HIM AND 5 YEARS; THEN IF HE VIOLATED IT DOWN THE LINE, THERE WOULD BE NO APPEAL; THERE WOULD BE NO APPEAL AND IF HE STOOD TRIAL HE WOULD GET THE 30 YEARS. AND, OF COURSE, I QUESTIONED HIM AT LENGTH. I MADE A GOOD RECORD ON QUESTIONING HIM ABOUT ENTERING HIS PLEA. AND THEN THAT SAVED A TRIAL; THAT PUT HIM IN--AND I'VE PUT A LOT OF PEOPLE JUST LIKE THAT IN JAIL ON CASES; BUT THIS CASE, THE CHILD WAS NOT A HEALTHY CHILD, IS MY RECOLLECTION. AND IT'S BEEN--I HAVE HAD A LOT OF CASES BEFORE THAT. BUT HE SAID HE THOUGHT SOMETHING WAS GOING TO HAPPEN AND I REALLY-- IT'S BAD THAT THE THING DID HAPPEN. IT'S HORRIBLE BUT THE BOY--THE BOY, HE WAS DULL AND HE WAS NOT A PEDOPHILE, IS WHAT THEY SAID.
Q. SO THE PROBLEM I'M HAVING IS THAT I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY WHETHER OR NOT THE FATHER HAD THAT APPREHENSION OR NOT, THAT HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE SENTENCE. THE FACT IS THAT THERE WAS AN EYEWITNESS TO IT; THAT APPARENTLY IT IS UNCONTROVERTED THAT MINOR CHILD WAS SEXUALLY MOLESTED; AND I'LL BE HONEST WITH YOU, AND I DON'T SEE WHERE THERE WAS AN EVIDENTIAL PROBLEM. I MEAN, I'M GOING TO BE HONEST WITH YOU, I---
A. WELL, I DON'T SEE WHY THE SOLICITOR--I DON'T KNOW WHY THEY TOOK--I THOUGHT THAT THE ATTORNEY SAID HE WOULD NOT PLEAD HIM GUILTY IF HE GOT TIME AND HE WOULD STAND TRIAL. AND I WEIGHED EVERYTHING AND I THOUGHT IF HE PLED GUILTY AND KEPT THE CHILD--HE HAD A CLEAN RECORD; THEY COULD REVOKE THE PROBATION AND THE FELLOW WOULD BE IN JAIL. I DIDN'T FOLLOW UP ON IT. I DID GO OUT TO THE THING, BUT HE WAS CONVICTED OF SOMETHING ELSE AND SOMEBODY TERMINATED HIS PROBATION AND DID NOT REVOKE THAT 30 YEARS, WHICH I WOULD HAVE DONE.
Q. YES, SIR, YOU KNOW, I JUST HAVE TO TELL YOU, I--YOU KNOW, I THINK IT'S AN OUTRAGEOUS SENTENCE.
A. WELL, IF YOU HAD SEEN ALL THE FACTS AND ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES THERE AT THE TIME, AND YOU HAVE TO WEIGH EVERYTHING.
Q. YES, SIR, WELL, I'VE TRIED TO FIND OUT TODAY IF THERE WERE EVIDENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH IT. I QUESTIONED VERY CLEARLY THAT THERE WAS AN EYEWITNESS TO IT AND EVERYTHING AND, YOU KNOW---
A. I DON'T KNOW WHAT STAGE HE CAUGHT HIM IN OR ANYTHING ABOUT THAT. THEY DIDN'T BRING IT UP. THEY NEVER--THE MOTHER WASN'T THERE. THE MEDICAL REPORT, THERE WAS A MEDICAL REPORT, THE SOLICITOR HAD THAT.
Q. BECAUSE, I MEAN, WITH AN EYEWITNESS, THE CHILD'S TESTIMONY IS NOT THAT OVERPOWERING.
A. WE HAD OTHER INFORMATION AND IT WASN'T IN THE RECORD.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE MCEACHIN: I'VE GOT A QUESTION, MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MR. MCEACHIN.

Q. JUDGE, YOU RECALL, AND IT'S BEEN FOUR YEARS OR BETTER, SAMUEL GREEN, JR., WHO EVIDENTLY PLED BEFORE YOU AROUND THE SAME TIME AS MR. BEESON? DO YOU RECALL THAT ONE?
A. I HAD ONE THAT WAS A TRIAL AND I KNOW CAVE WROTE ME A LETTER AND THANKED ME FOR THE SENTENCE IN THAT. I THOUGHT THAT WAS THE ONE.
Q. LET ME JUST READ THE NEWSPAPER ACCOUNT TO YOU AND MAYBE IT WILL JOG YOUR MEMORY. IT SAYS: SAMUEL GREEN, JR., PLEADED GUILTY TUESDAY--THIS IS IN THE NOVEMBER 20, 1986 NEWS AND COURIER--TO TWO COUNTS OF FIRST DEGREE CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT. EPPES SENTENCED GREEN TO 12 YEARS SUSPENDED DURING SIX YEARS FOLLOWED BY FIVE YEARS PROBATION. GREEN WILL BE ELIGIBLE FOR PAROLE AFTER SERVING FOUR YEARS, BUT HE COULD BE RELEASED SOONER IF HE PARTICIPATES IN SENTENCE REDUCTION AND EARLY RELEASE PROGRAMS. DO YOU RECALL THAT PLEA?
A. I DON'T RECALL THAT. I REMEMBER THIS ONE BECAUSE A LADY WROTE ME A LETTER AND I WENT AND TALKED TO HER ABOUT IT.
Q. WHICH LADY WAS THAT?
A. SOME LADY THAT'S NOT HERE WROTE ME A LETTER IN REGARDS TO THE OTHER CASE AND I WAS BACK THERE HOLDING COURT AND I TALKED WITH HER AND I LOOKED AT THAT FILE.
Q. DO YOU RECALL IF THE SOLICITOR MADE ANY RECOMMENDATION TO YOU?
A. I DON'T REMEMBER HER SAYING ANYTHING. I KNOW THE FATHER DID. I KNOW THE FATHER DID.

REPRESENTATIVE MCEACHIN: THANK YOU, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, JUDGE EPPES.

JUDGE EPPES: I GOT SWORN IN AND I SAID I TOOK AN OATH AND I REMEMBER WHAT IS IN THE BIBLE: DO JUSTICE TO LOVE, MERCY, AND WALK HUMBLY WITH MY LORD. AND THAT'S WHAT I TRY TO DO.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ARE THERE ANY FURTHER WITNESSES WHO HAVE FILED AN AFFIDAVIT WHO HAVE NOT BEEN CALLED? (PAUSE.) BEAR WITH US JUST A MOMENT.

JUDGE EPPES: SOMEBODY DID. I HAVE ONE. HARKEN, MR. AND MRS. HARKEN FILED ONE.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ARE MR. AND MRS. HARKEN HERE?

JUDGE EPPES: HARKEN, H-A-R-K-E-N.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THEY DON'T APPEAR TO BE PRESENT.

JUDGE EPPES: THAT IS THE CASE THAT WAS A YEAR AND FOUR MONTHS OLD AND THEY BROUGHT IT BEFORE ME AND PLED GUILTY TO SIMPLE ASSAULT, WHICH I DIDN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH WHY IT WAS A YEAR AND FOUR MONTHS OLD, BRINGING IT OR DROPPING IT. I COULD HAVE SENT IT BACK TO MAGISTRATES COURT, BUT I GOT RID OF IT.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MADAM COURT REPORTER, HOW LONG BEFORE THE TRANSCRIPT CAN BE READY?
MR. BATES: EXCUSE ME, MR. CHAIRMAN, I NEED TO ASK JUDGE EPPES ONE OTHER QUESTION.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ALL RIGHT.

Q. ONE QUESTION THAT YOU WERE ASKED AND I THINK YOU MAY HAVE ADDRESSED THIS ALREADY; BUT THE SENTENCE THAT YOU DELIVERED IN THE CASE THAT WE HAVE HEARD TESTIMONY ABOUT, WAS THAT WITHIN THE STATUTORY GUIDELINES FOR THAT CRIME?
A. 30 YEARS, YES, SIR. YES, I GAVE HIM 30 YEARS AND 5 YEARS PROBATION, PAY $150 A MONTH BECAUSE THE INFORMATION THAT I HAD WAS THAT THE CHILD NEEDED SOME SUPPORT.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR.
A. THE GRANDMOTHER WAS 62 YEARS OLD AND TAKING CARE OF HER; AND I THINK THE FELLOW WHO WAS THE DEFENDANT WAS LIVING THERE AND PAYING THE BILLS.
Q. DID YOU TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE SOLICITOR IN THAT CASE?
A. THE SOLICITOR DIDN'T MAKE A RECOMMENDATION THAT I RECALL. THE FATHER DID SAY WHAT HE SAID IN COURT.

MR. BATES: ALL RIGHT, SIR, THANK YOU, JUDGE. SORRY, MR. CHAIRMAN.

THE REPORTER: IT'S POSSIBLE THAT I COULD HAVE IT BY FRIDAY, BUT I WOULD NEED TO CHECK WITH MY OFFICE BECAUSE OF SCHEDULING.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THE COMMITTEE WILL, WHEN THE TRANSCRIPTS ARE COMPLETE, WE WILL STUDY THE TRANSCRIPT AND MAKE A DECISION. WE HAVE A NUMBER OF OTHER SCREENING HEARINGS IN THE NEXT MONTH OR SO, SO WE WILL BE BACK TOGETHER WITH SOME FREQUENCY. I SAY THAT TO THE PUBLIC SO THAT YOU WILL REALIZE WHY WE ARE NOT TAKING A VOTE TODAY. WE CUSTOMARILY GET THESE TRANSCRIPTS WHEN IT'S A CONTESTED MATTER AND STUDY THOSE BEFORE WE MAKE A DECISION. IF THAT SUITS WITH THE COMMITTEE.

SENATOR LOURIE: WE WILL ACT ON THE UNCONTESTED RACES?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ON THE UNCONTESTED RACES, IT SUITS ME VERY WELL TO PROCEED WITH THOSE. AND FOR THAT REASON, I WILL ASK THAT THE PUBLIC CLEAR THE ROOM FOR JUST A MOMENT.

JUDGE EPPES: WHAT ABOUT WILLIAM MCLEOD? DID WE RUN HIM OFF?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: BILL MCLEOD WAS EXCUSED. SARAH HAD TO GO TO THE HOSPITAL.

JUDGE EPPES: I'M SORRY.
(EXECUTIVE SESSION AT 1:46 P.M.; EXECUTIVE SESSION ENDED AT 2:10 P.M. AND THE MEETING WAS ADJOURNED.)

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, WE WILL GO ON AND GET STARTED. WE NOW HAVE A PROXY; ACCORDING TO OUR RULES, WE MUST HAVE AT LEAST TWO MEMBERS OF THE SENATE AND TWO MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE TO CONDUCT A HEARING. THERE IS A LIST WHICH I BELIEVE HAS BEEN POSTED SHOWING OUR AGENDA FOR TODAY. FIRST, WE WILL HEAR ON JUDGE MCLEOD; THEN COSTA PLEICONES; THEN I'M GOING TO TAKE THE TWO UNCONTESTED RESIDENT SEATS FIRST, COSTA PLEICONES, AND THEN I'M GOING TO JUMP DOWN AND TAKE JACK GREGORY. THEN WE WILL FOLLOW THE LIST THAT IS POSTED--WILLIE, YOU WILL BE NEXT--EXCEPT JUDGE PATTERSON, AND I HATE TO SAY THIS, JUDGE, BUT YOU WILL BE LAST; SO, IF YOU NEED TO GO GET YOUR CHRISTMAS SHOPPING DONE, HELP YOURSELF. WE HAVE ALSO ONE VARIATION, D. LIDE HAS ASKED TO--HE IS IN THE TRIAL OF A CASE IN FEDERAL COURT AND HE IS COMING AT 11:45. HE GOT THE JUDGE TO LET HIM OUT A LITTLE BIT EARLY; SO, HE'S COMING AT 11:45 AND WE WILL JUST TAKE HIM AT ABOUT THE LUNCH HOUR OUT OF ORDER. WE HAVE A LIST FOR CANDIDATES TO SIGN UP ON THE TABLE IN FRONT. AND DO WE HAVE A LIST FOR WITNESSES?

MS. TURNIPSEED: YES, THE WITNESS LIST IS UP HERE IF YOU HAVEN'T SIGNED IT.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WE WILL FOLLOW OUR RULES, WHICH I'M SURE YOU ARE ALL ACCUSTOMED TO. ANY ADVERSE MATERIAL THAT WAS SUBMITTED 48 HOURS PRIOR TO THE HEARING HAS BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE APPLICANT AND WE WILL HEAR FROM THOSE PERSONS WHO REQUESTED AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD AND WHO DID FURNISH AN AFFIDAVIT. IF THERE ARE OTHERS, WE WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER THAT AS IT DEVELOPS; BUT WE, ALSO, ON REQUEST WILL CONSIDER ANYONE'S REQUEST FOR AN EXECUTIVE SESSION. THE COMMITTEE AT SOME POINT TODAY IS GOING TO HAVE EXECUTIVE SESSIONS TO TAKE UP SOME ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS THAT REALLY DON'T RELATE TO THIS SCREENING. IT APPEARS THAT WE NOW CAN BEGIN. KELLY, COME UP, PLEASE. I HATE TO DISTURB ALL OF YOU BUT, AS ALWAYS, LEARNED COUNSEL SUGGESTS THAT WE DO NEED A BRIEF EXECUTIVE SESSION BEFORE WE HEAR THE FIRST WITNESSES; SO, IF YOU DON'T MIND, YOU CAN LEAVE YOUR MATERIAL BUT JUST STEP OUT FOR A MOMENT AND WE WILL BE VERY BRIEF.

(EXECUTIVE SESSION OFF THE RECORD AT 10:11 A.M.OFF THE RECORD; RECONVENED PUBLIC SESSION AT 10:35 A.M.)

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THANK YOU. I APPRECIATE YOUR PATIENCE IN ALLOWING US TO HAVE THAT BRIEF EXECUTIVE MEETING. WE WILL NOW BEGIN. THOSE OF YOU WHO ARE GOING TO TESTIFY OR BE HEARD, TAKE YOUR CHOICE; YOU CAN EITHER TAKE THIS ROSTRUM OR YOU CAN SIT AT THE TABLE, BOTH OF WHICH HAVE MIKES THAT WILL PICK UP ANYTHING YOU SAY.

MS. TURNIPSEED: THE TABLE DOES NOT.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: OH, THE TABLE DOESN'T; OKAY, WELL, YOU'LL HAVE TO SPEAK UP IF YOU SIT AT THE TABLE. THE MIKE DOESN'T WORK. BEFORE BEGINNING, I HAVE ONLY ONE OTHER THING THAT I WOULD LIKE TO COVER AND THAT IS TO INTRODUCE TO YOU THE NEWEST MEMBER OF THE JUDICIAL SCREENING COMMITTEE WHO HAS SERVED ON THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE FOR FOUR YEARS BUT HAS THE DISTINCTION OF BEING THE FIRST NON-LAWYER MEMBER OF THE JUDICIAL SCREENING COMMITTEE AND THAT IS THE HONORABLE B.L. HENDRIX.

REPRESENTATIVE HENDRIX: THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: JUDGE MCLEOD.

JUDGE MCLEOD: YES, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: COME FORWARD AND BE SWORN.

(THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. MCLEOD, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS):

1. William J. McLeod

Home Address: Business Address:

600 E. Jackson St. P.O. Box 1027

Dillon, SC 29536 Dillon, SC 29536

2. He was born March 24, 1919, in Timmonsville, South Carolina.

Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He has been married to Sara Carmichael McLeod since April 24, 1948. They have two children: William J., Jr. (Regional Supervisor for South Eastern Services), and Martha M. Lee (Public School Teacher).

5. Military Service: U.S. Marine Corps Captain 1942-46, SN ***-**-*****; S.C. National Guard, Brigadier General, 1949-75. Present status: Retired.

6. He attended Furman University, 1936-39, leaving to go to Law School. He attended USC School of Law from 1939-42, receiving an LLB degree.

7. He was a member of the Student Council at Furman University, 1936-39; President of Pan-Hellenic Council, 1939; member of ODK at USC, and President of Phi Delta Phi, 1941-42.

8. He has attended all JCLE programs and seminars for Family Court Judges.

12. Legal Experience since graduation from law school:

He had a General Practice in Dillon, 1946-78.

He was elected Family Court Judge, 1978.

20. Judicial Office: He was first elected by the General Assembly as Family Court Judge in 1978, serving until he retired in 1989. He was also elected by City Council to be the Recorder for the City of Dillon, 1953-60.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) Lide vs. Lide 277 SC 155 Involved question of alimony. He did not order alimony. The Supreme Court remanded for setting of alimony and set forth factors to be considered.

(b) Moore vs. Moore - Court of Appeals Opinion No. 90-MO-060 filed March 26, l990.
Question: Whether accounts receivable of a professional association representing income producing property from which child support and alimony could be paid precluded their being included in the marital estate.

(c) Southeastern Steel Co. vs. W.A. Hunt Construction Co., Inc. - Court of Appeals No. 1446, filed February 26, l990.
Question: Whether defendant was entitled to a set-off and whether he had given notice pursuant to Sec. 2-607(3) (a) of the UFC.

(d) Laverne H. Cherry vs. State of S.C. - Supreme Court Opinion No. 23110 filed December 4, 1989.
Question: Whether trial counsel was ineffective.

(e) Goodman vs. Goodman - Court of Appeals Opinion No. 90-MO-053, filed March 22, 1990.
Question: Whether a prior order was modifiable.

22. Public Office: SC House of Representatives, elected 1966-78; appointed by delegation to the County Board of Education 1962-64; elected by City Council as City Recorder of Dillon, 1953-60.

31. Sued: A suit was filed several months ago naming him and several other judges, as well as others as defendants. It arises out of suits in Anderson County wherein he heard a motion in one of the suits. There are no specific allegations and the relief sought is unclear.

33. The state of his health is good. His last physical was in January 1989, with another scheduled for September 18, 1990. Dr Phil Wallace of Dillon is his physician.
39. Bar Associations and Professional Organizations: Dillon County Bar Association, former President; SC Bar Association; National Council of Family Court Judges; American Judicature Society.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations: Served on various committees of the Main Street United Methodist Church; on the Advisory Board of the St. Eugene Community Hospital; Dillon Lions Club, American Legion; Veterans of Foreign Wars.

42. Five letters of reference:

(a) Paul Craven, Vice President

S.C. National Bank, Dillon, SC 29536

(b) Charles S. McLaurin, III, Regional Vice President

First Citizens Bank, Dillon, SC 29536

(c) John D. McInnis, Jr., Esquire

302 W. Harrison Street, Dillon, SC 29536

(d) Charles E. Curry, Esquire

S 3rd Avenue, Dillon, SC 29536

(e) W. Lee Youngblood, Esquire

P.O. Box 216, Pageland, SC 29728

Q. JUDGE MCLEOD, DID YOU RECEIVE BACK A COPY OF THE PERSONAL DATA QUESTIONNAIRE AND LOOK OVER IT AND SEE IF THERE ARE ANY CORRECTIONS THAT NEEDED TO BE MADE?
A. I GLANCED AT IT, YES.
Q. AND IT LOOKED IN ORDER?
A. IT LOOKED IN ORDER.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR; THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS THERE'S BEEN NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW; AND, LIKEWISE, THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION ALSO REPORTS NO REPRIMANDS. IN CHECKING RECORDS WITH YOUR DRIVING RECORD AND WITH THE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICES AND THE COUNTY SHERIFF AND THE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT IN DILLON, THE RECORDS WERE FOUND TO BE CLEAR IN YOUR NAME, AS WELL AS THE RECORDS WITH SLED AND THE F.B.I. THERE WERE FOUND TO BE NO JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS IN THE RECORDS OF DILLON COUNTY OR FEDERAL JUDGMENTS OR SUITS IN SOUTH CAROLINA. AS FAR AS FINANCIAL INFORMATION, YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST, FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT, AND YOUR CREDIT REPORT WERE ALL SATISFACTORY AND NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS WERE APPARENT. YOU REPORTED YOUR HEALTH IS GOOD, YOUR LAST PHYSICAL BEING IN 1989. YOU WERE FIRST ELECTED TO THE FAMILY COURT BENCH IN 1978 AND YOU RETIRED IN 1989; IS THAT CORRECT, SIR?
A. YES, SIR, THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. AND YOU ARE CURRENTLY BEING ASSIGNED AS A SPECIAL JUDGE IN FAMILY COURT MATTERS; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. CIRCUIT COURT AND FAMILY COURT.
Q. CIRCUIT COURT AND FAMILY COURT; ABOUT HOW MUCH ARE YOU---
A. A COUPLE, TWO OR THREE WEEKS A MONTH.
Q. JUDGE MCLEOD, WHEN WAS YOUR LAST SCREENING? DO YOU REMEMBER THE--(PAUSE)---
A. NO, I'M SORRY, I DON'T.
Q. WELL, IS THERE ANYTHING THAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE YOUR RETIREMENT OR SINCE YOUR LAST SCREENING THAT YOU FEEL LIKE YOU SHOULD BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COMMITTEE?
A. NO, SIR, I CAN'T THINK OF ANYTHING.
Q. ANY OTHER COMMENTS---
A. MIGHT BE, BUT I DON'T REMEMBER.
Q. ANY OTHER COMMENTS YOU CARE TO MAKE TO THE COMMITTEE AT THIS TIME, SIR?
A. NO.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OF JUDGE MCLEOD?

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: NO, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE HENDRIX: BILLY, I HAVEN'T SEEN YOU SINCE YOU'VE BEEN ON THE BENCH SO MUCH. ARE YOU ENJOYING RETIREMENT?
A. YES, SIR. HOW IS YOUR WIFE?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: AS ALWAYS, JUDGE MCLEOD, IT'S A PLEASURE TO SEE YOU. AS WAS EXPECTED, YOUR SCREENING WAS VERY BRIEF. THANK YOU FOR BEING WITH US.
A. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: YOU MAY BE EXCUSED FOR THE BALANCE OF THE DAY IF YOU WISH.
A. WELL, LOOKING AT THE CROWD YOU HAVE, I BELIEVE I WILL, SIR. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. B.L., GOOD TO SEE YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WE WILL PROBABLY RENDER A DECISION ON THE UNCONTESTED JUDGES AT THE CONCLUSION OF TODAY'S HEARING.
A. IF IT WILL BE DIFFERENT THAN I ANTICIPATE, PLEASE, CALL ME.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, SIR.
A. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: COSTA PLEICONES.

(COSTA M. PLEICONES, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Costa M. Pleicones

Home Address: Business Address:

525 Congaree Avenue 1513 Hampton Street

Columbia, SC 29205 Columbia, SC 29201

2. He was born in Greenville, South Carolina on February 29, l944.

Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Donna Singletary on August 14, l965. They have two children: Sara Venetia, age 20 (part-time student, temporarily employed with Quantum Resources); Laura Suzanne, age 17 (Freshman at University of Georgia).

5. Military Service: From July to November, l968 USAR Control Group (Honorable Discharge); from November, l968 to March, 1973 he was on Active Duty with the U. S. Army (REFRAD), Serial #RA12850052, SSAN: ***-**-*****. Since then he has been a Colonel in the U. S. Army Reserve, Commander of the 12th JAG Military Law Center.
6. He attended Wofford College, September l961 through December 1964, and was awarded an AB Degree in English in June 1965. He attended USC Law School from September 1965 to June 1968, earning his JD Degree.

7. In College he was a Student Assistant to the Chairman of the English Department, 1963-64, was active in his fraternity and officiated in intramural sports. In Law School he served on the Legislative Council, 1967-68.

8. Continuing Legal/Judicial Education:
National Judicial College, Reno, Nevada - Traffic and Alcohol Related offenses (February, 1985)
PLI, State of Mind Defenses - New York City (December, 1985)
American Academy of Judicial Education, Stanford University Law School, Palo Alto, California (August, 1987)
Judge Advocate General's School, International Law, Criminal Law, Military, Courses, Charlottesville, Virginia (1986,1989, 1990)
South Carolina Bar, Various CLE Courses: Domestic, Rules, etc. (1985-1990)
USC Law School Faculty, SCITA, (1985 or 1986)
"Bridge The Gap" Instructor, (Magistrates and Municipal Courts)
Annual JAG Conference, USC Law School Military legal subjects (1985-1990)

9. Courses taught or lectures: CLE Panels on Criminal Law (Mid to late 1970's); SCITA Faculty, USC Law School; USC Law School, Moot Court Competitions; "Bridge the Gap" (Magistrates and Municipal Courts); Military Legal Subjects (Lawyers and Non Lawyers).

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
1968-1968 Compiled materials and edited same in order to start a bar review course for South Carolina. Later sold interest.
1968-1969 (Basic Training, Ft. Dix, NJ)
1969-1969 Judge Advocate General's School Basic Course
1969-1973 Judge Advocate General's Corps, US Army. Duties included: providing legal assistance; defending courts-martial; prosecuting courts-martial; Chief of Military Justice (analogous to a Solicitor); Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (advised Commanding General And Chief of Staff on legal matters)
1973-1977 Assistant & Chief Deputy Public Defender, Richland County. Defense and Appellate advocacy for indigent defendants in criminal matters.
1975-1976 Associate in general practice of law at Law Offices of N. Welch Morrisette, Columbia, while also contracted to Richland County Public Defender
1977-1981 Partner, Harrison and Pleicones, Columbia. General Practice. At the same time, was an Assistant Richland County Attorney (1977-1979), and County Attorney for Richland County (1979-1981). In these capacities, advised the Richland County Council on legal matters, and represented the County's interest in all courts.
1981-1984 Private general practitioner, Law Office of Costa M. Pleicones.
1982-1988 Municipal Court Judge, Columbia.
1984-now Partner in Lewis, Babcock, Pleicones & Hawkins, Columbia. Diverse practice of law emphasizing litigation of all types.

14. Frequency of appearances in court:
Federal - infrequent, 1 to 2 times per year.
State - Very frequent, motions, trials and general litigation matters.
Other - Military courts (occasional); Administrative tribunals, moderately frequent.

15. Percentage of litigation:

Civil: 65%_ Criminal: 12%_ Domestic: 27%_

16. Percentage of cases in trial courts:
Jury: 36%_ Non-Jury: 64%_
and of those tried (28 cases), sole counsel in 54%_; in rest, chief counsel in 10 cases, associate in 3.

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) State v. James D. Motes, 264 SC 317, 215 S.E.2d 190 (1975) Mr. Pleicones tried this case at both the trial and appellate levels. Its significance lies in the fact that it abrogated the husband-wife privilege in holding that the privilege belongs, not to the communicating spouse, but rather to the spouse who receives the communication. Justice Bussey wrote a well-reasoned dissent supporting his position, but the majority ruled against him.

(b) Lee v. Southern Bell, et al., 89-CP--420. This case is still pending. Already litigated is a significant aspect which deals with a change of venue motion made on behalf of the defendant and granted. The individual defendant is a resident of Lexington County, while the corporate defendant could properly have been sued in either Richland or Lexington. He moved on behalf of the individual defendant to have venue changed to Lexington. The corporate co-defendant waived its right to be tried in Richland county, and the question presented was the clash between the plaintiff's right to bring the action in any appropriate venue, and the individual defendant's right to be tried in the county of his residence. He argued that the clash was really between an election belonging to the plaintiff, and a substantial right belonging to the individual defendant. No precise case authority exists for or against this proposition and he felt that he significantly enhanced his client's position by persuading the court to his point of view.

(c) State v. Thomas, 264 SC 159, 213 S.E.2d 452 (1975). He tried this case at both trial and appellate levels. The defendant was a co-accused with 2 others in a sensational and highly publicized murder trial. One of the first, if not the first trial in this state in which extensive individual voir dire of prospective jurors was submitted and allowed. He is convinced that this jury selection process, coupled with his use of suggested juror "profiles" provided by professionals, resulted in his client's acquittal of murder and several other serious charges, notwithstanding his conviction on a minority of charges against him.

(d) Funderburk v. Funderburk, Supreme Court of South Carolina, April 2, 1985, 286 SC 129, 332 S.E.2d 205 (on certiorari); Court of Appeals for South Carolina, February 24, 1984, 281 SC 246, 315 S.E.2d 126. He was involved in this case on the appellate level. It was among the first cases in which the Supreme Court of South Carolina granted certiorari and quashed a Court of Appeals decision. It reaffirmed or established, depending upon one's point of view, Family court jurisdiction over an executed contract between husband and wife. He was successful in persuading the Supreme Court in his view, after contrary opinions from the trial judge and the Court of Appeals.

(e) Lutz v. Skenes, et al. (unreported) (1982) (Richland County) In this case, he obtained a verdict for the plaintiff against the owners of a night club, as well as against its "bouncers". The significance of the case was that the plaintiff was admittedly drinking, and from the defense testimony was unruly and menacing. He was able to persuade the jury that the club's policy was to use excessive force in ejecting unwanted patrons. The jury returned a verdict for $30,000, including $10,000 in punitive damages.

18. Five civil appeals personally handled:

(a) Peoples Federal Savings & Loan Association, et at. v. Myrtle Beach Retirement Group, Inc., et al. Supreme Court of South Carolina, October 16, 1989, ____ SC _____, 387 S.E.2d 672.

(b) Barnwell v.Barber-Coleman Company, October 9, 1989, Supreme Court in South Carolina, ____ SC ____, 393 S.E.2d 162. Amicus Brief only.

(c) Truett v. Georgeson, Supreme Court of South Carolina, August 28, 1979, 273 SC 661, 258 S.E. 2d 499.

(d) Dale, et al v. South Carolina Tax Commission, Richland County Treasurer, et al. Supreme Court of South Carolina, March 9, 1981, 276 SC 110, 2765 S.E.2d 293.

(e) Funderburk v. Funderburk, Supreme Court of South Carolina, April 2, 1985, 286 SC 129, 332 S.E.2d 205 (on certiorari); Court of Appeals for South Carolina, February 24, 1984, 281 SC 246, 315 S.E.2d 126. Note: Domestic appeal, but involved issues of Circuit Court/Family Court jurisdiction.

20. Judicial Office: Municipal Court Judge, City of Columbia, (part-time) Sept 1982-March 1988. Appointed by City Council. Criminal and traffic jurisdiction with sentencing limit of 30 days or $200.

22. Public Office: Richland County Attorney, appointed by County Council, 1979-81; Board Member, Richland County Department of Social Services, appointed by Governor upon recommendation of Legislative delegation, 1989-present.

23. He was a candidate for nomination for Richland County Council in June 1982, but lost in the Democratic primary.

24. Occupation, business or profession other than the practice of law: Part-time jobs while in high school, college and law school, such as short-order cook; warehouse worker, file clerk.

27. The only financial arrangements which might constitute a conflict of interest are his present law practice and ownership of building with partners and some stock. Resolution would be through sale, divestiture or recusal.

33. His last physical exam was in April, 1990 at the 3270th USAR Hospital at Ft. Jackson. His health is good, though he has been advised that his cholesterol level is high and that he should stop smoking, which he intends to do.

35. He is near sighted, corrected by glasses.

39. Bar Associations and Professional Organizations:
South Carolina Bar, House of Delegates, 1986; Richland County Bar Association; American Inns of Court, John Belton O'Neall Chapter, Charter member (Master), Reporter, 1987-88.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
Commissioner, Columbia Housing Authority, 1988-present; Chairman, Board of Directors, Richland County Defender Corp., 1989-present; Order of AHEPA (American-Hellenic Educational and Progressive Association), religious and charitable organization; Wildewood Country Club; Capitol City Club; USC Faculty House; Former President, Midlands Muscular Dystrophy Association; Former member, Richland County Detention Center Citizens Committee.
42. Five letters of recommendation:

(a) Thomas E. Suggs, Executive Vice President

South Carolina Federal, 1500 Hampton Street

P.O.Box 69, Columbia, SC 29202

(b) William C. Hubbard, Esquire

P.O. Box 11070, Columbia, SC 29211

(c) Kenneth M. Suggs, Esquire

P.O. Box 8113, Columbia,SC 29202

(d) I. S. Leevy Johnson, Esquire

P.O. Box 1431, Columbia, SC 29202

(e) Francis P. Mood, Esquire

P.O. Box 11889, Columbia, SC 29211

Q. MR. PLEICONES, DID YOU HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK OVER THE SUMMARY OF YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE?
A. I DID.
Q. DID YOU FIND ANYTHING THAT YOU NEEDED TO CLARIFY OR THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO ELABORATE ON?
A. WELL, MY DAUGHTER IS A YEAR OLDER. AND I HAVEN'T BEEN A COLONEL IN THE ARMY RESERVE FOR THE LAST 17 YEARS. I'VE BEEN A CAPTAIN TO A COLONEL. AND THE ONLY OTHER THING I CLARIFY IS THAT ON THE U.S.C. LAW SCHOOL FACULTY ON THE SUMMARY IT'S SCITA OR THE SOUTH CAROLINA INSTITUTE OF TRIAL ADVOCACY FACULTY ONLY AND NOT THE ACTUAL LAW SCHOOL FACULTY.
Q. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW. THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION, LIKEWISE, NO REPRIMANDS THERE. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WELL AS THE RECORDS OF THE RICHLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT AND THE COLUMBIA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. THE SLED RECORD CHECK WAS CLEAR AND AN F.B.I. FINGERPRINT CARD HAS BEEN SENT TO THE F.B.I. THERE HAS BEEN NO WORD ON THAT, BUT WE DON'T ANTICIPATE FINDING ANYTHING. IN CHECKING JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS, THERE WAS ONE ACTION FILED, I BELIEVE, IN RICHLAND COUNTY, C.W. HAYNES VERSUS PLEICONES IN RE DEBRA POWERS. THAT WAS DISMISSED IN 1988 WITHOUT PREJUDICE. YOU WERE NAMED, I BELIEVE, AS A DEFENDANT BY VIRTUE OF BEING A JUDGMENT CREDITOR; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, OUR LAW FIRM HELD A JUDGMENT AGAINST THE DEFENDANT IN A FORECLOSURE ACTION, SO WE HAD TO BE NAMED.
Q. ALL RIGHT. THERE WERE NO FEDERAL JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS FOUND. FINANCIAL INFORMATION: YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT SHOWED NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR ANY OBLIGATIONS. YOU DID REPORT THAT YOUR FIRM CURRENTLY REPRESENTS THE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT AND U.S.C. AT TIMES.
A. YES.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. YOUR CREDIT REPORT WAS FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY. AS FAR AS EXPERIENCE, YOU NOTED THAT YOU HAD BEEN A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE IN COLUMBIA FROM 1982 TO 1988; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT, YES, SIR.
Q. AS FAR AS TRIAL EXPERIENCE, YOU NOTED THAT APPROXIMATELY 65 PERCENT OF YOUR PRACTICE IS IN THE CIVIL AREA WITH 12 PERCENT AND 27 PERCENT RESPECTIVELY IN CRIMINAL AND FAMILY MATTERS.
A. YES, SIR; AND I'M NOT MUCH OF A MATHEMATICIAN BECAUSE THAT ADDS UP TO 104 PERCENT, AND I JUST NOTICED THAT.
Q. MOST LAWYERS ARE OVERWORKED THOUGH, AREN'T THEY?
A. YES.
Q. THIS IS YOUR FIRST SCREENING; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, IT IS. YES, SIR.
Q. WE'VE RECEIVED NO COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS IN REGARD TO YOUR CANDIDACY AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES THAT HAVE SIGNED UP TO TESTIFY HERE TODAY. WOULD YOU CARE TO MAKE ANY COMMENTS TO THE COMMITTEE IN REGARDS TO YOUR QUALIFICATIONS AT THIS TIME?
A. NONE, MR. BATES, OTHER THAN I FEEL THAT I AM QUALIFIED OR I WOULD NOT HAVE OFFERED.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN, DOES THE COMMITTEE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: NO, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, MR. PLEICONES.
A. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: JACK GREGORY.

(JACKSON V. GREGORY, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Jackson V. Gregory
Home Address: Business Address:
800 Ireland Hills Dr. 215 W. Washington St.
Walterboro, SC 29488 Walterboro, SC 29488

2. He was born March 15, 1941 in Charlotte, NC.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He was married to Brenda Brown on May 31, 1969. They have three children: Frances E., age 18, (Student at Clemson), Hallie L. age 16, and Anna J, age 10.

5. Military service: None

6. He attended USC from 1959-60, transferring to Clemson, where he attended from 1960-64, receiving his BS in Agricultural Economics. He attended USC School of Law, 1964-67, receiving his J.D. Degree.

7. Significant Activities in school: Law Review Candidate, 1965; Phi Delta Phi Legal Fraternity; American Jurisprudence Prize for Excellence in Criminal Law, 1965.

8. Continuing legal/judicial education:
1986, 87, 88 and 90 - attended the SC Trial Lawyers Annual Convention, where the program deals with many civil and criminal topics of interest.
1985 - attended two SC Bar Association Seminars on Civil Procedure and on Scientific Evidence.
1989 - Attended SC Bar. Association Seminar by Professor Jas. McEhaney on Trial Advocacy, also General Practice Update.

9. Courses taught or lectures given: He was on the program at the SC Trial Lawyers Convention in 1982.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
1967-1968 Law Clerk, Justice Bruce Littlejohn
1968-1969 Associate, Office of Roy McBee Smith, Spart.
1969-1971 Associate, Jas P. Harrelson
1971-1982 Partner, Harrelson & Gregory
1982-now Sole Practitioner General practice, Plaintiff oriented, also a good bit of real estate.

14. Frequency of appearances in court:
Federal - very infrequent
State - almost weekly in some court,such as Common Pleas, General Sessions, Family Court, Magistrate's or Municipal

15. Percentage of litigation:
Civil: 33 1/3% Criminal: 33 1/3% Domestic: 33 1/3%
16. Percentage of cases in trial courts:
Jury: 50% Non-Jury: 50%

Sole counsel mostly, occasionally as associate counsel

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) State vs. Michael Linder, 276 SC 304, 278 S.E.2d 335 (1979-80) Capital Murder, Defendant accused of murder of State Trooper. He was not involved in the appeal or re-trial.

(b) State vs. Charles Timothy White, 90-GS-15-001. Defendant charged with murder. There was a three day trial ending with a "hung jury," eleven for acquittal and one for involuntary manslaughter. The solicitor has recently nol prossed the case.

(c) David Lee Shaw vs. William Aiken & Sinclair Albany, 88-CP-07-222. Beaufort County auto wreck case. Settled with one Defendant for $10,000 after the first day of the trial. Jury verdict for $67,000. Gregory represented the Plaintiff. Both Defendants had counterclaimed and received nothing.

(d) Louise J. Tarrent Jones vs. William T. Polk, 88-CP-13-439. He defended this case where the Plaintiff alleged total disability from an accident where her auto struck the client's hogs which were running loose on the highway at night. Verdict for the Defendant.

(e) Norma Chisolm, Administratrix of the Estate of Cecil Chisolm vs. Colleton Regional Hospital (1982). Medical Malpractice action settled after two days for over $100,00. He represented the Plaintiff with Ellis Kahn, Esquire.

18. Civil appeals:
(a) Williams vs. Bordens, Inc., 274 SC 275, 262 S.E.2d 881 (1980) This appeal dealt with legislative continuances. The legislator in question was the late Paul Cantrell, then a member of the SC House of Representatives.

22. Public Office: Member, SC House of Representatives from Feb 1980 to present. County Attorney for Colleton County, 1969-76 (part-time).

24. Occupation, business or profession other than the practice of law: None except as an investor more than 10 years ago in certain real estate in partnership with two other individuals.

25. He is a member of the Board of Directors of the First National Bank (Orangeburg) and is on the Advisory Board for the Walterboro Branch of this bank.

27. The only financial arrangement or business relationship of which he is aware which might constitute a conflict of interest is the directorship he holds in the First National Bank. If so, he would resign from the Board.

30. Tax Lien: Dec. 5, 1972, a SC tax lien in the amount of $14.77 was filed against him as a partner in H.R.G. Company. It was satisfied Dec 11, 1972.

31. Sued: He has been named party defendant in a representative capacity in two cases:
Bunch, Administratrix, vs. J. V. Gregory, Administrator of John Wesley Cook, Dec (1970). Case # 477-100-40 - Colleton County Common Pleas.
Strickland vs. J. V. Gregory, GAL for Baby John, 85-DR-15-210 Colleton County Family Court. Adoption action.

33. His last physical was about three years ago by Dr. John B. Johnston of Walterboro. He is in good health.

35. He wears glasses or contact lens for nearsightedness.

39. Bar associations and professional organizations:
Colleton County and S.C. Bar Associations and the American Trial Lawyers Association.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
Bethel United Methodist Church in Walterboro and Dogwood Hills Country Club.

42. Five letters of recommendation:

(a) J. Forrest Eley, Vice President, First National Bank

P.O. Box 1167, Walterboro, SC 29488

(b) W.J. McLeod, Jr., Esquire

P.O. Box 230, Walterboro, SC 29488

(c) Randolph Murdaugh, Jr., Esquire

Box 457, Hampton SE 29924

(d) Jas. H. Moss, Esquire

P.O. Drawer 507, Beaufort, SC 29901

(e) Gerald C. Smoak, Esquire

P.O. Drawer 1108, Walterboro,SC 29488

Q. MR. GREGORY, DID YOU FIND ANYTHING THAT WE NEED TO CLARIFY ON THE SUMMARY OF YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE?
A. I DIDN'T READ IT IN ANY DEPTH, BUT I THINK IT'S SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WELL AS WERE THE RECORDS OF THE COLLETON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE WALTERBORO CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. THE SLED RECORDS CHECK WAS ALSO CLEAR; AND YOUR FINGERPRINT CARD HAS BEEN SENT TO THE F.B.I. THERE WERE NO RECORDS IN THE COLLETON COUNTY COURTHOUSE OF ANY JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS. AS FAR AS FEDERAL JUDGMENTS OR SUITS, THERE WERE, I BELIEVE YOU WERE A DEFENDANT IN A SUIT DEALING WITH A REFERENDUM WHILE YOU WERE A HOUSE MEMBER.
A. RIGHT; I APOLOGIZE FOR NOT MENTIONING THAT BUT, FRANKLY, I HAD FORGOTTEN ABOUT IT. IT DEALT WITH A SCHOOL REFERENDUM.
Q. ALL RIGHT; YOU DID, HOWEVER, DISCLOSE A COUPLE OF THINGS THAT WE DIDN'T FIND, SO WE APPRECIATE THAT. IN 1972 YOU NOTED THAT THERE WAS A $34.77 TAX LIEN FILED AGAINST YOU AS A PARTNER IN A COMPANY AND THAT IT WAS SATISFIED APPROXIMATELY A WEEK AFTER IT WAS FILED. AND IN 1977--EXCUSE ME, IN 1970 YOU WERE A PARTY IN A SUIT AS THE ADMINISTRATOR OF AN ESTATE; AND THEN LATER YOU WERE ALSO A PARTY AS A GUARDIAN AD LITEM IN AN ADOPTION ACTION?
A. RIGHT.
Q. THOSE ARE THE ONLY ACTIONS YOU WERE INVOLVED IN AS A PARTY; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. ALL RIGHT. FINANCIALLY, WE RECEIVED YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST, AS WELL AS YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT AND YOUR CREDIT REPORTS, AND NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS WERE FOUND. YOU REPORTED YOUR HEALTH IS GOOD, YOUR LAST PHYSICAL WAS IN 1987. YOU HAVE BEEN IN PRIVATE PRACTICE SINCE ABOUT 1968; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. AND THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT YOU HAVE OFFERED FOR A JUDGESHIP?
A. YES.
Q. YOU NOTED THAT YOUR TRIAL EXPERIENCE IS PRETTY MUCH DIVIDED EQUALLY BETWEEN THE CIVIL, THE CRIMINAL, AND THE DOMESTIC SIDE.
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. THERE HAVE BEEN NO COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS RECEIVED IN REGARD TO YOUR APPLICATION TO THE 14TH CIRCUIT SEAT THAT HAS JUST BEEN CREATED AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY. IF YOU WISH TO MAKE A STATEMENT AT THIS TIME, YOU ARE WELCOME TO.
A. THANK YOU, BUT I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING MORE TO ADD.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS FOR MR. GREGORY?

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: MR. CHAIRMAN, THIS IS NOT A QUESTION. I JUST WANT TO MAKE A COMMENT. I WANT TO WISH JACK THE VERY BEST IN THE FUTURE, AND WE ARE GOING TO MISS YOU.
A. THANK YOU VERY MUCH, LARRY. I APPRECIATE IT.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, JACK.
A. THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MR. CONDON.

(LOUIS E. CONDON, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Louis E. Condon
Home Address: Business Address:
235 Wandolea Dr. County Judicial Center
Mt. Pleasant, SC 29464 2144 Melbourne Ave.

North Charleston, SC 29405

2. He was born in Charleston on April 3, 1927.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Betty Jean Metze on June 14, l952. They have two children: L. David, age 30, (Attorney); Christopher L., age 21, (College of Charleston student).

5. Military service: USNR, May, 1945-July, 1946, Seaman, Honorable Discharge, Serial Number: 582-22-67.

6. He attended the College of Charleston, 1946-49, earning a BS Degree. He attended graduate school, majoring in economics, 1949-51, at USC, leaving to accept position in US Dept. of Labor. He received his LLB Degree (JD) in 1962 from USC Law School.

7. Significant activities in school:
College of Charleston: Pi Delta Kappa, President; Intramural sports.
Law School: Phi Delta Phi, Vice President; worked as a researcher in USC Bureau of Business Research and page in SC Senate.

8. Continuing legal/judicial education:
Real Estate Practice Update: Feb 1986
Specialized Trial Problems: Jun 1986
Construction Litigation: Oct 1986
Recent Development in State and Fed. Courts: Nov 1986
Zoning and Land Use: Jun 1987
Current Issues in Civil Litigation: Apr 1989
Items of Interest in Circuit Court: Oct 1989
Law & History, Art, Lit. & Religion: Apr 1990
Items of Current Interest in Circuit Courts: Oct 1990
Also attended CLE's at the SC Bar Annual and Mid-Year meetings as well as the ABA and at the National Judicial College.

9. Classes taught or lectures given:
At the SC Bar CLE in the last several years he lectured on the following --
The Trial of a Mechanic's Lien - the Judicial Perspective
The Master's Report
Complex Mortgage Foreclosure Actions
Equitable Remedies
Mandatory Vs. Permissive Counter Claims in Mortgage Foreclosures

In 1989 and 90 he lectured for Forman Education Services on Foreclosures and Repossession in SC.

Palmer College-Trident Tech, lectured to paralegals and legal secretaries, also taught creative thinking.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
1962-1975 General practice
1967-1970 Municipal Judge, City of Charleston
1975-now Master in Equity

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) Charles McDonald v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. Wrongful death case arising out of 1974 crash. Settled for $900,000 while jury was out. Also handled workmen's compensation claim.

(b) R.A. Carter v. Palmetto Ford. Cross complaints between defendants. Tried in 1975, he represented the dealer. Suit for breach of oral warranty. While he lost the case, it was a learning experience - no matter how prepared one may be, an uninformed judge can cause your case to fail. The judge refused to charge that "sales talk" doesn't constitute a warranty. Jury could not agree on any of three forms of verdict given by the Judge but worked out a compromise. While he had no doubt that they could have won on appeal, it would have cost more than settling.

(c) Mihalek v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. Survivors suit arising out of 1974 crash. Also included workmen's comp claim. Jury verdict appealed. Settled without retrying.

(d) In the Matter of John Jeffrey Harmon 1963. Suit by Grandmother for custody of grandson after death of his father. Grandmother alleged daughter-in-law was unfit mother. Case ran over several years. After hearings in Charleston and Greenville, it was settled while appeal to Supreme Court pending with Grandmother getting visitation on alternate holidays and two months in the summer.

(e) State v. Robert Mathews 1963. Defendant charged with murder. After investigation he got charge reduced to manslaughter. Defendant was sentenced to ten years, suspended on service of one year with five years probation and credit for time served.

20. Judicial office: City of Charleston, Municipal Court Judge, June 1967-March 1970, Appointed; Master in Equity for Charleston County, Oct. 1975 to present. Nominated by Governor, confirmed by legislature.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) F. Gregorie & Son, et al v. Osgood Hamlin, et al. Not appealed. This is a matter referred by Judge Paul Moore wherein the Plaintiff is asking for specific enforcement of an equitable right to redemption and the Master is to determine what is owing between the parties as the result of their loans, advances and mortgages. A central issue is whether the transaction concerning Oakland Plantation was a conveyance or a security interest.

(b) Dockside Assoc., Inc., et al v. Detyens, Simmons and Carlisle, et al. Affirmed-337 SE2d 887. Involves a class action by "Dockside" homeowners for alleged construction defects in a condominium project in Charleston.

(c) D. R. Allen & Son, Inc. v. Harwell, Inc., et al. Under appeal. A complicated foreclosure matter involving the St. James Inn in Fayetteville, NC.

(d) T. A. Nye & Sons, Inc v. College of Charleston. Settled on appeal. This was a dispute concerning the construction of a College of Charleston student resident hall involving 24 days of testimony, 6020 transcript pages and over 400 exhibits. Judge Condon concluded that the contractor was responsible for the delays and defects on this job, that money still due for work performed by subcontractors should be paid by the College directly to the subcontractors and that the College has a judgment against the contractor.

(e) Brenda L. May, et al v. Evelyn W. Hopkinson. Affirmed 347 SE2d 508. This matter involved allegations of fraud in the sale and purchase of a home wherein Judge Condon found that the Defendants conspired to make cosmetic repairs and to conceal from the buyer the severe structural, moisture and termite damage to the house. He awarded actual and punitive damages in the total amount of $90,000; found that the seller has a valid judgment on the note and mortgage owned by her for $100,000 with interest, that the plaintiff-buyers should be given the option to use their verdict as a set-off against the seller judgment and if they do not so choose, the mortgage be foreclosed and the property sold.

22. Public office: Appointed to the following -- Election Commission, City of Charleston, 1965-66; City of Charleston Planning and Zoning Commission, 1967-69; Bulls Bay Water District, member 1972-75, Chairman of Board, 1973-75.

24. Occupation, business or profession other than the practice of law:
Economist, US Dept. of Labor,Bureau of Labor Statistics-Federal agency engaged in gathering and analyzing data on employment, hours, wages, working conditions, cost of living, 1951-53.
Westvaco - accounting and market research - pulp and paper manufacturers,1953-59.
Labor Arbitrator 1964-75, now on inactive status.

33. His last physical was in March 1990 by Dr. Timothy E. West. He is in good health.

35. He wears glasses and an aid for partial loss of hearing in left ear.

39. Bar associations and professional organizations:
ABA, member since 1962, Member of the Judicial Administration Division (JAD), since 1976; Special Courts Conference member, Secretary 1987-89; Education Committee, Chairman, 1987-90; National Judicial College Curriculum Committee, 1987-90; Committee on Technology in the courts, 1986-90; Continuing Judicial Education Committee, JAD, 1985, 1990. National Judicial College 25th Anniversary Celebration Committee; American Judicature Society, member since 1987; South Carolina Bar Association, member since 1962. Founding member of the South Carolina Equity Court Council, President since 1977; Committee on Computerization of the Courts, Chairman, 1988-1990; Committee on Reorganization and Modernization of the Courts, 1977-1990; Charleston County Bar Association, member since 1962. Founding member of the Charleston County Judicial Council, 1980-present.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
Charleston Interfaith Crisis Ministry, Board of Directors; Council of Governments Regional Forum; Charleston Exchange Club, member 1962-90, Vice-President 1967, Secretary of Exchange Club Fair Board 1966; Piccolo Spoleto Planning Committee; Neighborhood Legal Assistant Program, former Board member and Chairman; Trident Chamber of Commerce, former member of Board of Directors; former Charleston Jaycee, Board of Directors; former president Low Country Muscular Dystrophy Association; Charleston County Bi-Centennial Committee, former Parade Chairman; former president Charleston Symphony Orchestra; member and former vestryman Grace Episcopal Church; Boy Scouts of America former board Member and Merit Badge Counselor; former member of Porgy and Bess Catfish Row Company.

41. He wishes to point out that in addition to attempting to do a good job in the two judicial positions he has held, he has striven to take advantage of every opportunity for judicial enlightenment through the National Judicial College and CLES, as well as keeping abreast of changes in statutory and case law. Further, he has worked with others to improve judicial education for judges at all levels and worked for other improvements in the judicial system such as computerization.

42. Five letters of recommendation:

(a) Thomas H. Gaillard, V.P. South Carolina National Bank

P.O. Box 700, Charleston, SC 29402

(b) David A. Merline, Esquire

P.O. Box 10798, Greenville, SC 29608

(c) Thomas Waring, Esquire

P.O. Box 858, Charleston, SC 29402

(d) A. Arthur Rosenblum, Esquire

42 Broad St., Charleston, SC 29401

(e) James C. Harrison, Jr., Esquire

P.O. Box 1549, Columbia, SC 29202

(f) Past Presidents of the Charleston County Bar Association

Q. MR. CONDON, YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR THE NEWLY FORMED SEAT ON THE 9TH CIRCUIT; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. DID YOU FIND ANYTHING IN YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY THAT WE NEED TO CORRECT OR YOU WOULD LIKE TO ELABORATE ON?
A. NO, I BELIEVE MRS. TURNIPSEED AND I HAVE COVERED ABOUT EVERYTHING I HAVE IN THERE.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR; THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WELL AS WERE THE RECORDS OF THE CHARLESTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE CHARLESTON CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. A SLED'S RECORDS SECTION CHECK WAS ALSO CLEAR AND YOUR F.B.I. FINGERPRINT CARD HAS BEEN SENT TO WASHINGTON. THE RECORDS OF CHARLESTON COUNTY, THERE WERE NO RECORDS FOUND IN YOUR NAME IN REGARDS TO JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS. AS FAR AS FEDERAL JUDGMENTS OR SUITS, YOU LISTED THAT YOU HAD BEEN--I BELIEVE THIS WAS IN FEDERAL COURT--YOU LISTED THAT YOU HAVE BEEN AN ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AN ESTATE OF HENRY G. HESS AND VERNA D. HESS IN 1969; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. NO, SIR; ARE YOU SURE YOU ARE LOOKING AT MINE?
Q. LET ME CHECK. (PAUSE; VIEWING DOCUMENT.) YOU DID NOT LIST IT BUT IT DID APPEAR IN A SLED REPORT. DO YOU REMEMBER THAT ACTION?
A. NO, SIR. IS IT LOUIS OR CHARLES CONDON? I KNOW THERE'S A---
Q. LOUIS E. CONDON.

MRS. TURNIPSEED: IT'S IN YOUR SUMMARY.
Q. DID YOU CHECK THROUGH THE SUMMARY OR THE ATTACHMENTS?
A. I HAVE NEVER RECEIVED A SUMMARY BACK.

MRS. TURNIPSEED: YOU DIDN'T?
A. WE HAVE BEEN OVER THE APPLICATION A NUMBER OF TIMES.
Q. IN ANY EVENT, MR. CONDON, I JUST, FOR THE RECORD, WE HAD FOUND THAT; ARE THERE ANY OTHER LOUIS E. CONDONS PRACTICING LAW IN CHARLESTON?
A. NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE. THERE ARE LOTS OF CONDONS BUT I DON'T KNOW ANOTHER LOUIS CONDON. (PAUSE; VIEWING DOCUMENT.) NO, SIR, I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THAT IS.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR, NOT THAT WE ARE---
A. AT LEAST I WAS THE PLAINTIFF; SO, OBVIOUSLY IF I PAID SOME MONEY, I'M SURE I WOULD HAVE HAD AN ANSWER.
Q. WE DIDN'T--THERE WAS NO FINDING OF WRONGDOING OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT WHATSOEVER. WE WERE JUST NOTING THAT FOR THE RECORD, THAT YOU HAD BEEN A PARTY ACCORDING TO THE SLED CHECK.
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AS FAR AS YOUR FINANCIAL INFORMATION, WE RECEIVED YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT; THERE WERE NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS FOUND IN THOSE AND YOUR CREDIT REPORT WAS SATISFACTORY. YOUR HEALTH, YOU STATED IT WAS GOOD, YOUR LAST PHYSICAL COMING IN 1990. I BELIEVE YOU ARE CURRENTLY THE MASTER IN EQUITY FOR CHARLESTON COUNTY?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AND HAVE BEEN SINCE 1975; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AND PRIOR TO THAT YOU SERVED AS A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE FROM 1967 TO 1970?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. PRIOR TO THAT HOW MANY YEARS WERE YOU IN PRIVATE PRACTICE BEFORE GOING ON THE BENCH FULL-TIME?
A. I STARTED IN PRACTICE IN 1962.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. IS THIS---
A. MUNICIPAL JUDGE WAS A PART-TIME POSITION.
Q. IS THIS THE FIRST TIME YOU HAVE OFFERED FOR A CIRCUIT COURT SEAT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. WE RECEIVED NO COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS IN REGARD TO YOUR APPLICATION TO THE 9TH CIRCUIT SEAT AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY. THERE IS, HOWEVER, SOME ADMINISTRATIVE THINGS THAT WE NEED TO TAKE UP WITH YOU IN EXECUTIVE SESSION.
A. ALL RIGHT, SIR.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS OF MR. CONDON?

SENATOR POPE: NO, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: NO, SIR.
A. I WOULD LIKE TO CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO SOMETHING THAT DOESN'T APPEAR. YOU'VE GOT ALL OF THE LETTERS AND SUCH BEFORE YOU; SOME THINGS THAT ARE NOT IN THE MATERIAL I SUPPLIED YOU, I HAVE BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN OBTAINING OVER A QUARTER OF A MILLION DOLLARS IN GRANTS OVER THE LAST THREE YEARS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM. IT DIDN'T COST THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA A DIME. NOW OVER $200,000 OF THAT WAS FOR EDUCATING JUDGES AT ALL LEVELS FROM MAGISTRATE THROUGH THE CIRCUIT COURT. AS A MATTER OF FACT, LESS THAN TWO WEEKS AGO WE GOT THE WORD THAT WE RECEIVED ANOTHER GRANT WHICH WILL PROVIDE 30 WEEKS OF SCHOOLING FOR JUDGES AT THE NATIONAL JUDICIAL COLLEGE; THAT IS, TUITION, ROOM AND BOARD, AIR FAIR AND NOT A DIME OF EXPENSE FOR THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA. THESE ARE FOR JUDGES, MASTERS, CIRCUIT JUDGES, OR FAMILY COURT JUDGES WITH FIVE YEARS EXPERIENCE. THIS IS PART OF WHAT I THINK I HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN THE PROFESSION IN DOING OVER AND ABOVE WHAT IS REQUIRED OF A JUDGE. I WILL BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS IF ANYBODY HAS ANY.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MR. CONDON, I NOTICED AND I COMMEND YOU ON YOUR LISTING OF THE FIVE SIGNIFICANT LITIGATING MATTERS; I THOUGHT THAT WAS INTERESTING AND YOU HAVE HAD A VARIED PRACTICE; AND THE FIVE SIGNIFICANT ORDERS AND OPINIONS, YOU GAVE US QUITE SOMETHING TO STUDY THERE. I COMMEND YOU ON THAT.
A. THANK YOU, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ---ON THAT EXCELLENT RESPONSE THAT YOU MADE. WE DO HAVE A MATTER THAT WE NEED TO TAKE UP PRIVATELY. AND I HATE TO RUN PEOPLE IN AND OUT, BUT I THINK THAT IS THE ONLY WAY TO GET IT DONE; SO, IF YOU DON'T MIND, IF ALL OTHERS WILL CLEAR THE ROOM FOR JUST A MOMENT, THIS WILL BE VERY BRIEF.

(EXECUTIVE SESSION AT 10:53 A.M.)

(EXECUTIVE SESSION ENDED AT 10:56 A.M.; OFF THE RECORD; RECONVENED THE PUBLIC RECORD AT 10:58 A.M.)

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: VIC.

MR. ROGERS: YES, SIR.

(A. VICTOR RAWL, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Alfred Victor Rawl
Home Address: Business Address
32 Beverly Road 1612 Marion Street
Charleston, SC 29407 Columbia, SC 29202

2. He was born in Norfolk, Virginia on January 5, l946.

Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Laura Hamilton on November 2, l968. They have 2 children: Alfred Victor, Jr., age 21 and Michael Hamilton, age l5.

5. Military Service: South Carolina National Guard (Army); July 7, l968 to present; LTC (*********) Active Reserves.

6. He received a B.S. Degree in History from The College of Charleston (l964-1968). He attended the University of Texas School of Law from June l968 to August l968 and left because of his military obligation. He received his Law Degree from the USC School of Law (l970-l973).

7. Significant activities in school: State Student Legislature, 1966; Worthy Master, ATO Fraternity, 1966-67; Attended National ATO Fraternity Conclave, 1967; Dean's List, 1967, 1968; Law School Dean's List, 1973; PAD Legal Fraternity; Law School Moot Court, 2nd Place, 1971.

8. Continuing legal/judicial education:
SC Trial Lawyers Association Annual Convention -- 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990; US Army Reserve Judge Advocate Generals On-Site Conference -- 1986, 1987, 1988,1989,1990; SC Workers' Compensation Claimant's Association Conference -- 1985, 1986, 1987, 1989, 1990; SC Workers' Compensation Educational Conference -- 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990; Southern Association of Workers' Compensation Administrators -- 1987, 1988; US National Guard Judge Advocate Generals Conference -- 1986; SC Defense Trial Lawyers Association Annual Conference -- 1988; SC Workers' Compensation Workshops -- 1987, 1988, 1989; SC Reorganization Commission Prison Overcrowding and Sentencing Guidelines Project -- 1984, 1985.

9. Courses taught or lectures: Lecturer at the following -- National Business Institute Workers Comp. Seminar, 1990; SC Trial Lawyers Association Workers' Comp. Section, 1987; SC Workers' Comp. Educational Conference, 1988 & 89; SC Workers' Comp. Medical Seminar, 1988; SC Bar Association Appellant Practice Seminar, 1989; SC Defense Trial Lawyers Seminar on Workers' Comp., 1988; SC Workers' Comp. Claimant's Attorneys Association Seminar, 1986, 1987, 1989.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
General practice of law; small firm and sole practitioner l973-1986
Assist. Solicitor, 9th Judicial Circuit Mar.l976-Dec. 1976
Workers' Compensation Commission 1986-present
Reserve Judge Advocate Generals Corp. 1975-present

14. Frequency of appearances in court:
Federal - one to two per year
State - ten per year
Other - Family Boards and Commissions 20 per year
(Since July, l986, full time Workers' Compensation Commissioner -- this data represents appearances prior to July 1, l986).

15. Percentage of litigation:
Civil: 45% Criminal: 35% Domestic: 20%

16. Percentage of cases in trial courts:
Jury: 50% Non-Jury: 50%
mostly sole counsel

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) The Charleston After Hours, Inc. vs. Charleston County Police Department. The issues involved were: 1) whether or not a corporation has a right to privacy; 2) the scope of administrative search, 3) damages. The facts were: The Charleston County Police Department, its agents and employees, entered into a course of action which included continuous nightly searches of the entire premise of the Plaintiff under the authority of the SC Alcohol Beverage Control Statutes. The course of action included the use of police dogs, harassing management and customers and searches of bathrooms, private offices, brief cases and dressing rooms. The result of this activity effectively closed Plaintiff's business. He tried it before Judge Don Rushing without a jury and received a verdict for the Plaintiff for intentional interference with on-going business and violation of constitutional right to privacy. Attorney fees and costs were also awarded.

(b) Ken Dougherty vs. W.H. Burhalter. The issues involved were: 1) does the failure of a landlord to accept rent tendered on time and thereafter attempting to evict in Magistrate Court, twice, unsuccessfully, constitute the tort of abuse of process and if so, 2) what are the damages. The facts were: The Defendant, landlord, attempted on two separate occasions to evict the Plaintiff, tenant, for failure to pay rent. On both occasions, the Plaintiff proved in Magistrate Court that the rent had been paid on time or tendered on time and refused by the Defendant. Thereafter Plaintiff proved to Judge Clyde Elzroth that the abusive use of the Magistrate Court to evict the Plaintiff without cause constitutes abuse of process. Damages were awarded to Plaintiff for actual costs of defending Magistrate actions, lost time and punitive damages.

(c) State of South Carolina vs. William Foster. The issue was what constitutes a Legend Drug. The facts were: William Foster was arrested in an undercover drug bust. At that time he possessed 30 caffeine tablets and two Sinaquine tablets. He had no prescription for the Sinaquine. The charges were possession and sale of Legend Drugs. At trial before Judge Clyde Robinson, a directed verdict for the Defendant resulted after the SLED chemist could not show that the components of Sinaquine were listed in the Legend Drug Statute.

(d) The City of Hanahan vs. Martha Phillips. The issue was the constitutionality of the city's disorderly conduct statute. Mrs. Phillips' daughter was wanted by the police for drug violations. The daughter did not live in Mrs. Phillips' home. The police were having the home watched and when the daughter showed up, they, without any warrant, stormed the home. Mrs. Phillips resisted and was arrested for disorderly conduct for resisting the search, and using abusive language. The City of Hanahan's ordinance was exactly the same as the State statute, except it did not distinguish between publicly and privately owned property. The City Magistrate dismissed the charges and found the City ordinance unconstitutional as being overly broad and violative of ones right to privacy and free speech.

(e) United States vs. Robinson. The issue was proof of Defendant's involvement in a cocaine transaction. The facts were: Defendant was found with a gun near the place, a motel room, where Co-Defendant A and Co-Defendant B bought and sold two kilos of cocaine. The Federal Prosecutor proved to the jury's satisfaction that Defendant was the body guard of Defendant A. and he was convicted before Judge Falcon B. Hawkins.

18. Appeals are handled as Workers' Compensation Commissioner on Review.

20. Judicial Office: Since July 1, l986, he has been South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commissioner, similar to Administrative Law Judge; appointed position with Senate confirmation. Jurisdiction set by Title 42 of the South Carolina Code of Laws and includes all matters dealing with on-the-job injuries, employment relationships, damage, insurance coverage, an, in some instances, crime victim compensation.

22. Public Office: SC House of Representatives, District 119, June 1977-November 1978; SC Reorganization Commission, 1978-1980 (appointed); SC House of Representatives, District 119, November 1980-July 1, 1986; SC Workers' Compensation Commission, July 1986-present; Assistant Solicitor's Office 9th Judicial Circuit, March 1976-December 1976.

23. Unsuccessful Candidate: Charleston County Legislative Delegation - 1973 (lost); SC House of Representative, District 119 - l978 (lost); At Large Circuit Court Seat #4 - 1982 (withdrew); At Large Circuit Court Seat 6 - 1989 (withdrew).

24. Occupation, business or profession other than the practice of law: Summer or part time jobs prior to 1973, clothing sales, college recruiter, farm worker, post office and industrial worker.

25. He manages his own small real estate holdings.

27. No potential conflicts of interest of which he is aware. If one developed, he would recuse himself if appropriate.

29. Investigation: In 1986 the Charleston County police investigated him with regard to a client dispute with one Terry Hess, who claimed he had committed forgery. The matter was resolved completely without charges filed.

31. Sued: In 1990 under the Landlord Tenant Act for disputed return of deposit. This was in reality a magistrate action against partnership real estate.

33. His health is excellent. He was last examined in May, 1990 at the Ft. Jackson Medical Center for the SC National Guard.

35. His eyesight is corrected to 20/20 by contact lens.

39. Bar Associations and Professional Organizations:
Charleston County and South Carolina Bar Associations; American Trial Lawyers and South Carolina Trial Lawyers Associations.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social, and fraternal organizations: College of Charleston Foundation; SC Lions Club; SC Heart Fund; Charleston County Fraternal Order of Police; John Wesley Methodist Church; S.C. Nature Conservancy.

42. Five letters of reference:

(a) T. Stannard Hurteau, Vice President

Southern National Bank of South Carolina

P.O. Box 935, Charleston, SC 29402

(b) W. N. Epps, Jr., Esquire

P.O. Box 2167, Anderson, SC 29622

(c) Charles B. Barnwell, Jr., Esquire

P.O. Drawer 329, Orangeburg, SC 29116-0329

(d) Robert A. Patterson, Esquire

120 Meeting Street, Charleston, SC 29402

(e) D. Michael Kelly, Esquire

P.O. Box 8113, Columbia, SC 29202

Q. MR. RAWL, YOU'VE APPLIED FOR THE NEWLY CREATED SEAT ON THE 9TH CIRCUIT; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. DID YOU RECEIVE BACK A QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY TO LOOK OVER?
A. YES, I DID.
Q. ALL RIGHT; DID YOU FIND ANYTHING ON THERE THAT WE NEED TO CLEAR UP OR ELABORATE ON?
A. NO, I HAVE GOT A COUPLE OF ADDITIONS SINCE I'VE FILED WHERE I'M NO LONGER ON THE WORKERS' COMP. COMMISSION AS OF NOVEMBER THE 15TH; I AM NOW WORKING FOR THE SOUTH CAROLINA SECOND INJURY FUND, ESPECIALLY IN THE DIVISION DEALING WITH THE SOUTH CAROLINA WORKERS' COMPENSATION UNINSURED EMPLOYERS FUND WHICH IS A NEW LAW CHANGE AND I'M TRYING TO GET THAT UP TO SPEED.
Q. ALL RIGHT, THANK YOU. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR. AS WERE THE RECORDS WITH THE CHARLESTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT AND THE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT IN CHARLESTON. THE SLED AND F.B.I. CHECKS ALSO WERE CLEAR. IN OUR RECORDS CHECK OR THE SLED RECORDS CHECK, THERE WERE NO RECORDS OF JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS IN CHARLESTON COUNTY OR FEDERAL JUDGMENTS OR SUITS. YOU DID NOTE THAT YOU WERE SUED UNDER THE LANDLORD/ TENANT ACT IN 1990 FOR THE RETURN OF A DEPOSIT AND THAT WAS IN MAGISTRATE'S COURT, I BELIEVE?
A. THAT WAS A REAL ESTATE PARTNERSHIP WHERE ALL THE PARTNERS WERE SUED AND THAT HAS BEEN PAID AND RESOLVED.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR; YOU ALSO NOTED OR DISCLOSED IN ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 29 THAT IN 1986 YOU WERE INVESTIGATED BY THE CHARLESTON POLICE DEPARTMENT IN REGARD TO A CLIENT, TERRY HESS, WHO CHARGED FORGERY BUT THERE WERE NO CHARGES FILED IN THAT AT ALL; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. IT'S BEEN COMPLETELY RESOLVED. I WILL BE GLAD TO GIVE YOU ALL THE DETAILS OF THAT DEBACLE; HOWEVER, I DON'T THINK WE WANT TO WASTE YOUR TIME ON IT.
Q. FINANCIALLY YOU SUBMITTED YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST, AS WELL AS YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT, AND YOUR CREDIT REPORT WAS FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY. NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS WERE FOUND ON YOUR PART. YOUR HEALTH IS REPORTED AS EXCELLENT WITH YOUR LAST PHYSICAL BEING SOMETIME THIS YEAR. AS FAR AS EXPERIENCE, YOU NOTED THAT YOU HAVE BEEN A WORKERS' COMP COMMISSIONER SINCE 1986 UP UNTIL LAST MONTH. AND I ASSUME IT WAS PRIOR TO THAT THAT YOUR TRIAL EXPERIENCE WAS DIVIDED BETWEEN THE CIVIL, CRIMINAL, AND FAMILY COURT AREAS 45/35/20; IS THAT ABOUT RIGHT?
A. CORRECT.
Q. AND YOU WERE IN PRIVATE PRACTICE PRIOR TO 1986; IS THAT RIGHT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT. I ALSO SERVED AS A SOLICITOR IN CHARLESTON COUNTY UNDER BOB WALLACE FOR A YEAR.
Q. OKAY. YOU WERE SCREENED, WAS IT EARLY IN 1990 OR WAS IT 1989 THAT YOU WERE LAST SCREENED?
A. 1989 AND 1982.
Q. WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS IN REGARD TO YOUR CANDIDACY HERE TODAY AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES TO TESTIFY. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD OR ANYTHING BESIDES WHAT YOU HAVE ALREADY TOLD US THAT IS DIFFERENT SINCE YOUR LAST SCREENING?
A. I DON'T BELIEVE SO. I BELIEVE THAT THE MATERIALS SUBMITTED ON BEHALF OF MY APPLICATION ARE RATHER SUBSTANTIAL AND I THINK THEY SPEAK BETTER THAN I CAN FOR IT.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS OF MR. RAWL?
A. I'M DISAPPOINTED THAT WE CAN'T PLAY GOLF ANYMORE, MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: YOU ARE, I AM SURE, NOT THE ONLY ONE. THANK YOU, SIR.
A. THANK YOU, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: HAMILTON.

(ERNEST HAMILTON, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Ernest Hamilton

Home Address: Business Address:

208 Dove Tree Road Suite 113 Courthouse Annex

Greenville, SC 29615 Greenville, SC 29601-2192

2. He was born in Greenville, SC on April 24, 1951.

Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Lois Andreia Weir on June 11, l977. They have two children: Ryan Ernest, age 10, and Lindsay Brooke, age 6.

5. Military service: None

6. He attended Michigan State University from 1969-73, earning a B.S. Degree, and received his J.D. Degree from USC Law School (1981-83).

7. Significant activities while in school:
He played Varsity Football at Michigan State and was on the USC Law School Honor Council.

8. Continuing legal/judicial education: Northwestern University School of Law, short course for Prosecuting Attorneys; National College of District Attorneys; Attorney General's Leadership Convention; Solicitor's Association of SC Convention.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
Assistant Solicitor, 13th Judicial Circuit, 1984-present.

14. Frequency of appearances in court: State - 100%
15. Percentage of litigation: Criminal: 100%

16. Percentage of cases in trial courts:
Jury: 20% Non-Jury: 80%
Sole counsel.

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) State vs. Stanley E. Woods, 84-GS-23-3956, Armed Robbery, 84-GS-23-3955, Kidnapping, 84-GS-23-3954, Rape. A 17 year old store clerk was the victim. Police initially rejected her story of a perpetrator being a black male with a wig and make up. No one charged. In her statement she mentioned the defendant took her pocket knife. He read through inventory sheets of property found in defendant's car from another case and found a knife which victim identified as hers. He worked this case up for Court and was associate counsel in trial with Judge Traxler (then Solicitor).

(b) State vs. Robert Lagore, 90-GS-23-3427, Felony DUI X 3; 90-GS-23-3428, 90-GS-23-3426. Serious bodily injury. Issue was whether Defendant was impaired at .09 and the admissibility of blood test not taken at the direction of the arresting officer in accordance to statute.

(c) State vs. John David Coleman, 86-GS-23-2361, DUI. Jury returned guilty in six minutes, shortest deliberation returned in Greenville County General Sessions Court.

(d) State vs. Robert W. Davis, 90-GS-23-4332 Felony DUI-Death. New Year's morning collision with both drivers with a .20BA. The passenger killed had a.25BA. Issue was whether both automobiles were on the wrong side of the road (cross center line) and whether Defendant was under 17 when incident happened at 2:00 a.m. on his birthday. Defendant's birth records show that he was born at 3:45 p.m.

(e) State vs. Thomas Lynn Porter, 85-GS-23-0899, Setting Up Lotteries. Defendant was biggest gambler in Southeast and had eluded law officers in the past. Defense was that he was at the location to use phone. Evidence admitted showed personal interest.

24. Occupation, business or profession other than the practice of law: Probation Agent; Criminal Investigator, 13th Circuit Solicitor's office.

33. His health is good.

39. Bar Associations and Professional Organizations:
Member of SC and Greenville Bars.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
Kappa Alpha Psi, Parliamentarian; Greenville Cultural Exchange, Board member.

41. He has had over ten years working experience in General Sessions Court.

42. Five letters of recommendation:

(a) John M. Hilley

American Federal Bank

603 Asheton Way, Simpsonville, SC

(b) B. O. Thomason, Jr., Esquire

410 E. Washington Street, Greenville, SC

(c) James R. Burhart

USC Law Center, Columbia, SC

(d) Dean John Montgomery

USC Law Center, Columbia, SC

(e) Rex L. Carter, Esquire

900 E. North Street, Greenville, SC

Q. THANK YOU, MR. HAMILTON; YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR THE NEWLY CREATED SEAT ON THE 13TH CIRCUIT, IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. DID YOU RECEIVE A QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY BACK?
A. I DID.
Q. ALL RIGHT; HAVE YOU BEEN ABLE TO CHECK OVER THAT TO SEE IF WE NEED TO CHANGE ANYTHING OR HAVE ANYTHING CORRECTED?
A. I LOOKED AT IT AND THERE IS ONE ON MY LIST, IT'S NO. 6, ATTENDED, GRADUATED U.S.C. LAW SCHOOL, IT SAYS 1993 AND IT SHOULD BE '83. ALSO, MEMBER OF THE BAR ASSOCIATION AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, I HAVE RECENTLY BEEN ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AND THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT. AND THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS CASHED MY CHECK BUT HAVEN'T SENT ME MY--(PAUSE).
Q. ALL RIGHT, THANK YOU FOR BRINGING THOSE THINGS TO OUR ATTENTION.
A. AND, ALSO, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SOCIETY.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS IN GREENVILLE WITH THE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT AND THE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. THERE WERE NO JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS FOUND IN YOUR NAME, EITHER WITH GREENVILLE COUNTY OR THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM. IN CHECKING FINANCIAL INFORMATION, YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT WERE BOTH SATISFACTORY, AS WERE YOUR CREDIT REPORT; AND WE FOUND NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS ON YOUR PART. YOU HAD REPORTED YOUR HEALTH AS GOOD. EXPERIENCE-WISE YOU NOTED THAT, I BELIEVE, YOU'RE CURRENTLY THE ASSISTANT SOLICITOR IN THE 13TH CIRCUIT; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. AND HAVE BEEN SINCE 1984?
A. CORRECT.
Q. SO AS A RESULT OF THAT, YOUR PRACTICE HAS BEEN TOTALLY IN THE CRIMINAL SECTION; IS THAT RIGHT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. WERE YOU IN PRIVATE PRACTICE AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO---
A. NO PRIVATE PRACTICE PREVIOUSLY.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. AND THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT YOU HAVE OFFERED FOR A JUDICIAL SEAT; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. YOU NOTED THAT APPROXIMATELY 20 PERCENT OF YOUR CASELOAD OR YOUR TIME IN COURT HAS BEEN BEFORE A JURY?
A. THAT'S CORRECT; 20 PERCENT EITHER--YOU KNOW, IT'S EITHER A JURY TRIAL OR A GUILTY PLEA, AND I BROKE IT UP, NON-JURY BEING PLEAS AND MOST OF THE CASES ARE PLEAS.
Q. YES, SIR.
A. AND APPROXIMATELY 20, MAYBE MORE, JURY TRIALS.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. THERE HAVE BEEN NO COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS RECEIVED IN REGARD TO YOUR APPLICATION AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY TODAY. IF YOU WISH, YOU MAY MAKE A STATEMENT TO THE COMMITTEE OR IF ANY COMMITTEE MEMBERS HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MR. HAMILTON?
A. NO COMMENT, NO STATEMENT.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, SIR.
A. THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: JUDGE WILLIE T. SMITH.

(HONORABLE WILLIE T. SMITH, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Willie T. Smith, Jr.
Home Address: Business Address:
601 Jacobs Road P.O. Box 757
Greenville, SC 29605 Greenville, SC 29602

2. He was born in Sumter on January 17, 1920.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Anna Marie Clark on June 9, 1955. They have one child, Willie T. III, age 34, who is a sports writer for the Greenville News.

5. Military service: US Army, Feb. 1942-Dec. 1945, serving in North African, Mediterranean and Pacific Theaters of Operations; US Air Force during the Korean Conflict, May 1949-Nov. 1952. Honorable Discharge. Rank, Technician 4th Class, Serial No. 34 250 614.

6. Attended Benedict College, Sept. 1936-Feb. 1939; In the Army, Sept. 1941-Feb. 1942; Johnson C. Smith University, Charlotte, NC, Sept. 1946-August 1947, AB Degree; School of Law, SC State College, Sept 1947-Feb. 1949, Feb 1953-May 1954, LLB Degree, now JD.

8. Continuing legal/judicial education:
He has met and exceeded all requirements of the Supreme Court for JCLE.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
1954-1967 General practice of law and cooperating attorney with the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
1967-1973 Assistant Director Legal Services of Greenville County
1977-now Family Court Judge

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) City of Greenville v. James Richard Peterson, et al., 239 S.C. 298, 122 S.E. (2d) 826. Significant sit-in case; defendants convicted of trespass. US Supreme Court ruled that Ordinance of the City of Greenville requiring the separation of the races in public eating facilities was unconstitutional.

(b) City of Rock Hill v. Arthur Mann, Jr., 241 S.C. 420, 128 S.E. (2d) 907. Conviction of trespass reversed by US Supreme Court, 1962.

(c) State v.Charles Edward Brooks, 235 S.C. 844; 111 S.E. (2d) 686. Conviction for double rape, death sentence eventually committed to life imprisonment.

(d) Elaine Whittenberg v. Greenville County School District, et al., C.A. No. 4396, 1963 U.S. District Court for District of South Carolina. Very significant case. Begun by him with one plaintiff, it brought about the integration of the School District.

(e) James Mackey v. R. V. Chandler,Jr. and Glens Falls Insurance Company, C.A. 1716, 1955 U.S. District Court for the Western District of S. C. Suit brought against Sheriff of Greenville County for unlawful entry and search of the home of a black family without proper warrant.

18. Civil appeals: From Aug. 1967-till June 1977, he was Assistant Director and Executive Director of the Legal Services Agency of Greenville County, Inc. He handled numerous number of civil cases and trained young lawyers in civil litigation, including appeals. The files and records in all of these cases are not available, but he can furnish requested information.

20. Judicial office: 1977-now, elected unanimously by General Assembly, Family Court Judge, 13th Judicial Circuit.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) Linda Klitzner Bivens vs. Henry Frank Bivens, File #82-DR-23-3423. Not reported. Supplementary Decree in a divorce action, issued after 3 separate hearings totally 12 1/2 hours of presenting testimony, exhibits and witnesses, dealing with alimony, child support, equitable division of considerable property and other assets and custody of the two adopted children.

(b) S.C. Department of Social Services vs. The Father and Mother, Filed February 29, 1988, Opinion No. 1100, (Court of Appeals). Parents of 5 children were found guilty of abuse and neglect of their 13 year old daughter. The father, a college graduate and quality control engineer, punished her disobedience by "beating her black and blue", inflicting physical injury as a result of excessive corporal punishment. The mother, a school teacher and counselor, was guilty of neglect by failing to intervene or report. The parents appealed, one ground being denial of their right to religious liberty, invoking the Bible as the ultimate binding authority. The Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Smith's finding of guilt and his remedy, noting that the First Amendment embraces two concepts, the freedom to believe (unlimited) and the freedom to act - subject to regulation even if based on what they believe.

(c) Nicholas J. Pappas, Jr. vs Angela M.C. Pappas, Filed November 13, 1989, Opinion No. 1416, (Court of Appeals). A divorce action in which the contested issue was the equitable distribution of a sterling silver service set. The husband sought to have the silver declared marital property and apportioned between him and his former wife. She asserted the silver was her separate property -- a gift to her from her grandmother. Family Court Judge Smith found for Mrs. Pappas and the SC Court of Appeals affirmed his decision.

(d) John W. Panhorst, Jr. vs Barbara P. Panhorst, Filed February 20, 1990, Opinion No. 1464, (Court of Appeals). One of the main issues on appeal here was the exclusion from equitable distribution of gifts of money totally $25,000-$30,000 which the husband had given to his mother over the course of the twenty years of marriage. Also at issue was the charge of adultery and whether the wife's "non-expert testimony" of her paramour's impotency should have been admitted as proof that there was no adultery. The SC Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Family Court Judge Willie Smith.

(e) John D. Ellenburg vs. Alice F. Ellenberg, Filed April 19, 1990, Memorandum Opinion No. 90-MO-071, Court of Appeals). A domestic case, Judge Smith granted the parties a divorce on the basis of one year continuous separation, equitably divided the marital property, awarded respondent-wife alimony of $1500 per month and $25,000 in attorney's fees. From the order the husband appealed the valuation of certain assets, the apportionment of marital property and the award of alimony and attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Family Court.

22. Public Office: Elected by Board of Trustees to the Board of Trustees of a School District of Greenville County, serving three years, 1973-76.

23. He ran unsuccessfully at-large for the School Board of Greenville County, 1971.

31. Sued: Melvin Julian Robinson vs. State of South Carolina, Travis Medlock, Willie T. Smith, Jr., Nancy Rentz, CA No. 3:90-143-13K. Plaintiff brought this suit because he was held in contempt and sentenced to jail on a Rule presented by the Anderson Clerk of Court for non-payment of child support. Dismissed by Order of US District Judge G. Ross Anderson, Jr., dated August 24, 1990.

33. His health is good. His last physical was in September, 1989, by Dr. Lawrence Oliver.

34. He was hospitalized in December 1980, for prostate surgery.

39. Bar associations and professional organizations:
American Bar Association, South Carolina Bar, Law School Board and Law-Related Education Advisory Committee; Judicial Council of National Bar Association; Greenville County Bar; National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
Former member of the Board of Directors PUSH; Board of Directors Phyllis Wheatley Association; Board of Directors of Greater Greenville Chamber of Commerce; Board of Trustees of School District of Greenville County; charter member and treasurer of Greenville County Redevelopment Authority; Vice President and member of Community Council of Greenville County; Board of Family and Children Services; Chairman of Board of Trustees of Fairfield-McClelland Presbytery of the United Presbyterian Church in the USA; past member of the Board of Directors of the Greenville Urban League; member of the Joint Task Force on Student Achievement of the School District of Greenville County and Greenville Urban League Inc.; former Board member and treasurer of Community Action Programs, Inc. (now SHARE); presently serving on the Board of the Greenville TEC Foundation; member and former Director of Rotary Club of Greenville; Past Commander of American Legion Post 2312; Past Basileus Phi Alpha Chapter of Omega Psi Phi Fraternity; Past President Greenville Branch NAACP; Mason; Shriner, Mattoon Presbyterian Church, Elder; Past Moderator of the Foothills Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church USA; Omega Man of the Year, Phi Alpha Chapter, Omega Psi Phi Fraternity, Inc., 1967; Humanitarian Award, Greenville County Human Relations Commission, 1978; Johnson C.Smith University Outstanding Alumnus Award, 1982; special award from Bonner R. Kidd Home for Alcoholics "for his fairness and compassion in discharging his responsibilities as a Family Court Judge for the 13th Judicial Circuit", 1982; ORDER OF THE PALMETTO, 1986; Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity Martin Luther King Freedom Award, 1986; Springfield Baptist Church Black Heritage Award, 1988; Listed in Who's Who in South and Southwest; Who's Who in American Law,1st and 2nd editions; International Who's Who; Who's Who in the World, 9th edition; Who's Who Among Black Americans; Personalities of the South' Black Leaders of America.

41. He asks consideration of his record as a Family Court Judge, and of his extensive legal experience.

42. Five letters of recommendation:

(a) H. Ray Davis, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer

First Federal of South Carolina, P.O. Box 408

Greenville, SC 29602

(b) Julius B. Aiken, Esquire

403 Pettigru St., Greenville, SC 29601

(c) Harry A. Chapman, Esquire

P.O. Box 10224 FS, Greenville, SC 29603

(d) Richard J.Foster, Esquire

P.O. Box 2146, Greenville, SC 29601

(e) Ernest J. Howard, Esquire

P.O. Box 10383, Greenville, SC 29603-0383

Q. JUDGE SMITH, DID YOU HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK OVER THE SUMMARY OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE?
A. YES, I DID.
Q. DO WE NEED TO CORRECT ANYTHING FOR YOU?
A. JUST ONE MINOR THING AND THAT HAS BEEN CORRECTED.
Q. ALL RIGHT, THANK YOU. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE YOU PRACTICED LAW. THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION, LIKEWISE, REPORTS NO REPRIMANDS WHILE ON THE BENCH. THE GREENVILLE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, AS WELL AS THE GREENVILLE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT RECORDS HAVE BEEN CHECKED AND FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WELL AS THE RECORDS OF SLED AND THE F.B.I. IN YOUR NAME. THERE WERE NO JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS FILED AGAINST YOU, EITHER IN THE GREENVILLE COUNTY, NOR THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM, WHICH SEEMS TO BE A RARITY AMONG ANYONE WHO HAS SAT ON THE BENCH FOR THE NUMBER OF YEARS YOU HAVE.
A. I THINK YOU HAVE ONE.
Q. DO WE HAVE ONE?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. YOU WANT TO TELL US ABOUT THAT ONE THEN?
A. IT'S NOT ON THERE? A GENTLEMAN IN ANDERSON ON A CLERK'S RULE SUED THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, THE CLERK OF COURT IN ANDERSON AND ME BECAUSE HE WAS HELD IN CONTEMPT FOR NON-PAYMENT OF HIS SUPPORT. OF COURSE, IT WAS DISMISSED BY THE HONORABLE ROSS ANDERSON; NO APPEAL FROM THE DISMISSAL AND IT'S ALL OVER, BUT IT WAS FILED, SIR.
Q. I APPRECIATE YOUR BRINGING THAT TO MY ATTENTION. THAT WAS ROBINSON VERSUS THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AND THAT WAS---
A. I GUESS SO. I WAS A PARTY.
Q. AND THAT WAS DISMISSED IN AUGUST OF THIS YEAR?
A. RIGHT.
Q. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. FINANCIALLY YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT AND CREDIT REPORT WERE ALL FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY WITH NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS ON YOUR PART. YOU REPORTED YOUR HEALTH AS GOOD WITH YOUR LAST PHYSICAL BEING IN 1989. I BELIEVE YOU WERE FIRST ELECTED TO THE FAMILY COURT BENCH IN 1977; IS THAT CORRECT, SIR?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AND HAVE SERVED CONTINUOUSLY SINCE. YOUR LAST SCREENING WAS IN 1988; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. '89. IT EXPIRED IN `92 AND I GOT THE LAST OF THOSE WITH A FOUR-YEAR TERM; SO, IT WOULD BE `88 OR `89.
Q. OKAY, SIR. WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS IN REGARD TO YOUR CANDIDACY FOR THE 13TH CIRCUIT SEAT AND NO WITNESSES ARE HERE TO TESTIFY TODAY. DO YOU HAVE ANYTHING THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD OR BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COMMITTEE THAT HAS CHANGED SINCE YOUR LAST SCREENING?
A. NOTHING EXCEPT MY DESIRE TO SERVE ON THE CIRCUIT COURT BEFORE I LEAVE THE LEGAL FIELD, AND I THINK I'M QUALIFIED FOR IT AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL TO SERVE IN THAT CAPACITY.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS FOR JUDGE SMITH?

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: NO, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, SIR.
A. THANK YOU, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WE WILL MOVE NOW TO THE 15TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, JOHN L. BREEDEN.

(JOHN LUTHER BREEDEN, JR., FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. John Luther Breeden, Jr.
Home Address: Business Address:
2007 Ye Olde Kings Hwy. P.O. Box 1665
N. Myrtle Beach, SC 29582 Conway, SC 29526

2. He was born in Columbia on December 27, 1942.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Sylvia Ann Floyd on May 4, 1968. They have two children: Jessica Tatum, age 20, and John Luther, III, age 14, both students.

5. Military service: None

6. He attended USC, 1961-66, earning a BA Degree in English and received his JD Degree from the USC School of Law, 1970-73.

7. Significant activities in school:
Attended USC on a football scholarship and was a three year letterman; Sigma Nu Fraternity; In Law School elected to the Student Bar, 1973.

8. Continuing legal/judicial education:
Seminars mostly with an emphasis on property law, ethics and environmental law and particular emphasis on Municipal government while Horry County Attorney.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
1973-78 General practice, emphasis on real estate
1978-80 Assistant Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Solicitor
1981-88 Horry County Attorney and part-time Master in Equity for Horry County
1988-now Full-time Master in Equity for Horry County

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) Dick F.Elliott vs.Ada P.Dew, 212 SE2d 421, 264 SC 40 (1975). He assisted at trial and personally handled the appeal, his first, and they prevailed. The Court, in affirming the lower Court, cited many of the cases he had cited in his brief. Mr. Elliott is now a member of the SC House.

(b) Edwin Earl Starnes vs. Grady H. Jordan, (1975). This is the first trial he handled by himself. A fraud action, it involved his client purchasing a tractor/trailer rig which was misrepresented to him as being a later model than it actually was. The verdict for the Plaintiff was $8,000.

(c) Coastal Harley Davidson, Inc. vs. Robert M. Grissom, Horry County Treasurer, (1982). He represented the Horry County Treasurer and lost. The significance was that it was a small case, but one he thought he should have won. The issue was whether or not the Delinquent Tax Collector collected some delinquent taxes from the Plaintiff. He learned to accept the notion that sometimes you simply can't convince twelve people that your client is telling the truth even when he is.

(d) Gerald D. Hoff vs. Glen D. Fleming dba Glen Fleming Landscaping, (1975). He represented the plaintiff in this lawsuit, filed April 10, 1975, the first lawsuit he lost in Court. It was a suit on an oral agreement. He learned the difficulty in proving an oral contract, especially when the defendant was a native of the area and the client was in the military.

(e) Charles M. Hecker and Virginia B. Hecker vs. Coastal Investment Properties, a S.C. Ltd. Partnership and Smith-Williams and Associates, a S.C. Corporation, (1976). A fraud suit concerning the purchase of a Timeshare Interval at a Myrtle Beach Resort. This was the first, and last, suit he ever brought in which he represented members of his family. The Court awarded his clients a $12,000 Judgment. The significance of the case was that he learned several things: 1) Family members are more demanding than ordinary clients and it's virtually impossible to make any money representing them. 2) How to negotiate a settlement of a lawsuit after judgment has been rendered. 3) You cannot rely on what some lawyers tell you.

These cases, while significant to the litigants, were especially significant to him as a young lawyer because of what he learned from them.

18. Civil appeals:
(a) Dick F. Elliott vs. Ada P. Dew, SC Supreme Court, February 25, 1975, 212 SE2d 421, 264 SC 40.

20. Judicial office:
Part-time Master in Equity for Horry County, 1981-88, appointed by the Governor with advise and consent of the Legislature, serving full-time since 1988, hearing primarily non-jury civil matters of an equitable nature referred to it by Circuit Courts.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) South Carolina Federal Savings Bank vs. Thornton-Crosby Development Company, Inc., et al. Action for damages for breach of contract. The Bank sued to foreclose a construction loan mortgage on a condominium project naming the developer, the surety and the prime contractor. After trial the Master entered judgment for the developer on all claims and awarded damages. The two other defendants did not contest liability, but appealed on the issue of damages. The SC Court of Appeals affirmed the Master.

(b) Preferred Savings Bank vs. Abdo Elkholy, et al. The Bank brought action for breach of twenty contracts for purchase of condominium units in Royal Garden Resort and sought to have the deposit paid to it. The defendant counterclaimed and the Master directed a verdict for the Bank on each counterclaim except breach of contract. From an Order of the Master awarding judgment of $124,000 to the Bank and dismissing the counterclaim for breach of contract, the defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Master.

(c) Peoples Federal Savings and Loan Association and Loyola Federal Savings and Loan Association vs. Myrtle Beach Retirement Group, Inc., et al. The S&L's brought a foreclosure action. Deficiency judgment was not waived, the mortgaged property was sold at judicial sale for $8,300,000 and deficiency judgment of $2,880,000 was entered against the developers. They petitioned for an appraisal of the property. A Board of Appraisers was appointed pursuant to statute. Master-In-Equity Breeden confirmed the appraiser's report and the SC Court of Appeals affirmed.

(d) Paul's Electric Service, Inc. vs. South Seas, Inc., et al. Paul's Electric Service (PES) sued South Seas and others to foreclose a mechanic's lien. The action arose out of an agreement for PES to wire a 24 room annex to the South Seas' motel. The Master found that while PES failed to complete the work in a timely and satisfactory manner, the cause was due largely to things beyond PES' control and to errors made by those other than PES. He found for PES, South Seas appealed and the SC Court of Appeals affirmed.

(e) The Landing Development Corporation, et al. vs. City of Myrtle Beach, a Municipal Corporation. Action was brought to permanently enjoin the city from denying the opportunity to rent condominium units on a short-term basis, based on a provision of the zoning ordinance restricting the classification to enumerated types of residences for "permanent occupancy." Master-In-Equity Breeden enjoined the city and they appealed. The SC Supreme Court held that (1) the city was estopped from enforcing the ordinance, and (2) the rental of the individually owned condominium units did not constitute a "motel operation" expressly forbidden by the ordinance. Affirmed.

24. Occupation, business or profession other than the practice of law:
1966-67, service representative, Geigy Pharmaceutical Company
1967, salesman, Eastern Alloy Steel Corporation
1968-70, salesman, Van Lott Equipment Company

27. Any financial arrangements or business relationships that would constitute a conflict of interest: He served as Horry County Attorney for about 7 1/2 years and any case that came before him as Circuit Judge which had arisen while he was County Attorney, would require disclosure and possible recusal.

31. Sued: Yes, for malpractice in 1978 by Leonard Aluminum Outdoor Utility Buildings, Inc. involving the non-disclosure of a lien on real estate. He did not represent these people, nor was he requested to represent them and the Court found for him in that since there was no attorney-client relationship, there was no duty to disclose any liens on the property.

33. He has high blood pressure; his health otherwise is good. His last physical was in 1989 given by Dr. J. Garnett Ramsbottom, Jr.

35. He has some high frequency hearing loss, but it does not pose a problem.

39. Bar associations and professional organizations:
SC Trial Lawyers Association and State and Local Bar Associations.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
North/South All Star Football, Board of Directors, 1988; O.D. Shag Club; Ducks Unlimited; Trinity United Methodist Church.

42. Five letters of recommendation:

(a) John C. Griggs, Vice President, First Citizens Bank

P.O. Box 706, Conway, SC 29526

(b) John C. Thompson, Esquire

1318 Third Avenue, Conway, SC 29526

(c) Howell V. Bellamy, Jr., Esquire

1000 29th Ave. N., Myrtle Beach, SC 29577

(d) J. Jackson Thomas, 1215 48th Ave., N.

Myrtle Executive Park, Myrtle Beach, SC 29577

(e) Robert W. Dibble, Jr., Esquire

P.O. Box 11390, Columbia,SC 29211

Q. MR. BREEDEN, DID YOU HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK OVER YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE?
A. I DID.
Q. DID YOU FIND ANYTHING WE NEED TO CORRECT?
A. A COUPLE OF MATTERS; ONE OF WHICH INVOLVED THE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE WHICH I TOOK UP WITH JUDY; ANOTHER WAS QUESTION 27: ANY FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS OR BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS THAT MAY CONSTITUTE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST. IT INDICATES THAT I SERVED 7 1/2 YEARS AS HORRY COUNTY ATTORNEY AND ANY CASE THAT CAME BEFORE ME AS CIRCUIT JUDGE WHICH HAD ARISEN WHEN I WAS A COUNTY ATTORNEY WOULD REQUIRE MY RECUSAL; OF COURSE, THAT IS ONLY CASES THAT WOULD INVOLVE HORRY COUNTY, NOT ANY CASE.
Q. RIGHT.
A. OTHER THAN THAT, NO.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION REPORTS NO REPRIMANDS ON YOUR PART. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS WITH THE HORRY COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE NORTH MYRTLE BEACH CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. THE SLED RECORDS SECTION CHECK, LIKEWISE, WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR AND YOUR FINGERPRINT CARD HAS BEEN SENT TO THE F.B.I. AS FAR AS JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS, WHEN CHECKING THE RECORDS OF HORRY COUNTY AND THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM, YOU NOTED IN ANSWER TO QUESTION NO. 31 THAT YOU HAD BEEN SUED IN 1978 FOR MALPRACTICE.
A. YES.
Q. AND THAT THE COURT ULTIMATELY FOUND FOR YOU; WOULD YOU LIKE TO EXPOUND ON THAT?
A. I WOULD TELL YOU THE SAME THING MR. RAWL DID, I WOULD BE GLAD TO GO THROUGH THE GORY DETAILS; THE COURT DISMISSED IT. I WAS ACCUSED OF NOT DISCLOSING A LIEN ON SOMEONE WHO ACCUSED ME OF REPRESENTING THEM. I DID NOT. THE COURT FOUND THAT I DID NOT REPRESENT THEM. THERE WAS NO ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; AND, THEREFORE, NO DUTY TO DISCLOSE ANY LIEN THAT I MAY KNOW OF. WENT TO THE GATOR BOWL AND LOST.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. FINANCIAL INFORMATION: THE STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT WERE FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY, AS WELL AS YOUR CREDIT REPORT WITH NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OF OBLIGATIONS. YOU NOTED THAT YOUR LAST PHYSICAL WAS IN 1989, YOUR HEALTH BEING GOOD EXCEPT FOR HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE.
A. YES, SIR, THAT'S UNDER CONTROL. THAT WAS BROUGHT ABOUT IN 1981 WHEN WE WENT TO THE GATOR BOWL AND LOST.
Q. AS FAR AS YOUR LEGAL EXPERIENCE, YOU HAVE BEEN THE MASTER IN EQUITY FOR HORRY COUNTY SINCE 1988 ON A FULL-TIME BASIS; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT; ON A PART-TIME BASIS PRIOR.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR; AND WHILE IN A PART-TIME BASIS YOU'RE ALSO IN PRIVATE PRACTICE?
A. NO, SIR, I DID NOT. I REPRESENTED HORRY COUNTY ONLY.
Q. ALL RIGHT. YOU REPRESENTED THEM AS A COUNTY ATTORNEY ALONG WITH MASTER IN EQUITY, IS THAT---
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. AND THIS IS THE FIRST TIME YOU HAVE OFFERED FOR A SEAT ON THE BENCH ON A STATEWIDE BASIS?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY COMPLAINTS OR ANY STATEMENTS IN REGARD TO YOUR CANDIDACY AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES THAT APPEARED HERE TODAY TO TESTIFY. WE DO HAVE ONE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER THAT, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE NEED TO TAKE UP VERY BRIEFLY.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ALL RIGHT, SIR. JOHN, IT'S ALWAYS GOOD TO SEE SOMEONE WITH MARLBORO ROOTS DOING WELL, BUT I'M GOING TO HAVE TO ASK THAT EVERYONE NOW CLEAR THE ROOM SO THAT WE CAN TALK JUST A MINUTE.

(EXECUTIVE SESSION AT 11:12 A.M.)

(EXECUTIVE SESSION ENDED AT 11:16 A.M.; RECONVENED PUBLIC RECORD.)

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: JUDGE MARING.

(HONORABLE DAVID H. MARING, SR., FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. David Henry Maring, Sr.
Home Address: Business Address
P.O. Box 806 P.O. Box 806
Georgetown, SC 29442 Georgetown, SC 29442

2. He was born in Charleston, South Carolina on July 21, 1945.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Judy K. on June 23, 1973. He was divorced from his first wife, Vickie, on grounds of desertion on February 18, 1972 after two years separation. He has 3 children: Lorie Leigh Ann, age 23, (student); David H, II, age 21, (student); Robert Wade, age 20, (student).

5. Military Service: He was in the Marine Corp Reserves from l971-l973 and a member of the SC National Guard from 1973-1976.

6. He graduated from William Carey College in May, 1968 (received BA Degree) and the University of South Carolina School of Law in June, l971 (received Juris Doctor Degree).

8. He has earned 15 hours per year of JCLE.

9. Taught courses or lectured: August 27, 1982, SC Supreme Court Law Clerks and Staff Attorneys Seminar; February 23, 1983, SC Dept. of Social Services, Duties of Solicitors in Child Abuse or Neglect Cases; March, 1983, The SC Bar, Bench Bar Conference; October 15, 1983, SC Association of Legal Secretaries; February 10, 1984, Low country Mediation Network, Joint Custody' March 1984, The SC Bar, Bench Bar Conference; December 6, 1984, JCLE, Circuit and Family Court Legal Writing; May 1985, Judicial Conference, Mental Health Commitments; September 1985, The SC Bar, Bench Bar Conference; March 1988, The SC Bar, Child Abuse Seminar; March 1988, JCLE, Problems when Divorce, Custody and Allegations of Child Abuse are Intertwined; November 1988,The SC bar, Evidence and November 1988, The SC Bar, Mandamus and Injunctive Relief.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
Admitted to SC Bar, September 21, 1971; Andrews City Judge, 1972-1973; Georgetown City Judge, 1973-1975; Georgetown County Public Defender, 1975-1977; and Family Court Judge, 1977-present.
Until he became Family Court Judge, he was a sole practitioner involved in many types of cases, while serving part-time as City Judge and Public Defender.

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) Cooper v. Tindall, et al. 226 S.E.2d 888. He and James B. Moore, Sr. represented Tindal. The case involved the issue of a bond for title and the legal ramification flowing therefrom. After several days of trial before a jury, the Judge took the matter from the jury and directed the issues on the equity side of the court. The decision was adverse to his client. On appeal the Supreme court reversed the Trial Judge and ruled in favor of the client.

(b) State v. Duncan 238 S.E.2nd 205. He handled this on appeal from Magistrates Court to Circuit Court. Unable to obtain relief in Circuit Court, he filed an appeal to the State Supreme Court. The basis of the appeal was that Magistrates should be required to be attorneys. Although the appeal was not decided in his client's favor by the Supreme Court, because of this case, the Supreme Court instituted mandatory judicial training for Magistrates. After completing the brief, he was elected Family Court Judge, so another attorney argued the case before the Supreme Court.

(c) State v. Singleton Memorandum Opinion No. 76-112. The issues were kidnapping, house breaking, grand larceny, armed robbery and burglary and the trial lasted several days. The client wanted to file an appeal from the verdict of guilty. Unable to find ground for an appeal, Douglas Hinds and he filed a brief in compliance with Anders v. California, 368 U.S. 738.

(d) State v. Mazeck. He represented the defendant at trial, charged with armed robbery and assault and battery with intent to kill. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty. Besides resulting in his client's release, the significance of the case was that law enforcement started conducting line ups in compliance with the Federal decision.

(e) State v. Gardner 239 S.E.2nd 729. This matter involved a trial on the charge of strong armed robbery. The alleged victim refused to answer questions on cross examination. A motion for mistrial was denied. On appeal the Supreme Court stated this wasn't grounds for reversal. After completing the brief, he was elected Family Court Judge, so another attorney argued the case before the Supreme Court.

(f) Mary Elizabeth Sutton Johnson v.Lavon M. Fenters, Fidelity Dependant Insurance Company of Maryland. This matter involved the conversions of his client's funds by her guardian during her minority. The jury returned a verdict for actual damages in favor of his client.

20. Judicial Office: Andrews City Judge, 1972-1973; Georgetown Municipal Judge, 1973-1975; and Family Court Judge, 1977-present.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) T. J. Schudel v. South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission, Agency of the State of South Carolina, Donald E. Trent, Robert E. Simpson and Delores J. Simpson, 276 S.E.2d 308. The applicant petitioned the ABC Commission for a transfer of his beer and wine permit and the issuance of a sale or consumption license. The Commission denied both petitions, the Circuit Court of Georgetown County, Special Circuit Judge Maring affirmed and the applicant appealed his finding. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, holding that an appeal from the Commission is controlled by the Administrative Procedures Act; and that although the suitability of proposed location of business of applicant is not listed in the statute giving Commission authority to grant a "mini-bottle" license, such a consideration is proper, and thus decision of the Commission denying applicant a minibottle license on the ground that the proposed location of applicant's business was not suitable was not clearly erroneous.

(b) State of S. C., Ex rel. Howard G. Love, Secretary-Treasurer of the S.C. State Board of Architectural Examiners, Relator v. George L. Howell, d/b/a George L. Howell and Associates, 316 S.E.2d 381 (S.C. 1984). Judge Maring, as a Special Circuit Judge, enjoined the individual from practicing architecture without a license, after holding himself out as an architect. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed on appeal.

(c) Eric John Hossenlopp, By and Through his Guardian ad Litem,. John Hossenlopp v. William J. Cannon, Jr. and Yong H. Cannon, 329 S.E.2d, 438. The child and guardian in this case brought action to recover for injuries sustained when the dog attacked child, alleging negligence by dog owners. Judge Maring, as a Special Circuit Judge, based on depositions and affidavits, granted summary judgement in favor of the child as to liability, leaving the assessment of damages for trial by jury in the usual fashion. The dog owners appealed contending that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether they had previous notice of the propensity of their dog to bite people. The Supreme Court affirmed. Two members of the Court wrote dissenting opinions to the majority concerning the antiquated nature of the dog-bite law in South Carolina, upon which additional ground the majority sustained Judge Maring.

(d) In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d, 877 (S.C. 1987).In this case Judge Maring's order held that the appellant husband was responsible for the support of a child born to his wife as a result of artificial insemination and awarded child support to the wife. The husband's argument was that in absence of written consent, he cannot be declared the legal father. On appeal the Supreme Court agreed with Judge Maring that the husband's knowledge of and assistance in his wife's efforts to conceive through artificial insemination constitute his consent to the procedure and they upheld his decision to declare the husband the legal father of Baby Doe.

(e) Nichols Motorcycle Supply, Inc. v. Regency Kawasaki, Inc, 367 S.E.2d, 438. In this case a Motorcycle dealer's business creditor brought suit to set aside the dealer's sale of used motorcycles and parts for violation of the Uniform Commercial Code governing bulk transfers. The case arose from a sale of inventory by Kawasaki of Charleston, a retail dealer, to Regency Kawasaki, another dealer. Nichols, a business creditor, alleged the transfer was ineffective against it because Regency did not comply with the Code. Judge Maring, in Common Pleas Court, entered judgement for the business creditor and the buyer appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

22. Public Office: None.

23. He was an unsuccessful candidate in l972 for Probate Judge, defeated at the polls.

31. There was a suit in Federal Court in the case of Oliver H. Claypool, Jr., v. David H. Maring, Sr., et al., dismissed by pre-trial motion.
Another case filed July, l979 was Y. Garnett, a minor, by and through his mother and next friend, Y. Ruth v. various school and school Board officials and various court officials, including Judge Maring. This case was also dismissed by pre trial motions.

33. His health is excellent. His last physical was July, 1989 by Dr. Troy Gamble.

35. He wears reading glasses.

39. Bar associations and professional organizations:
S. C. Bar Association

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations: None

42. Five letters of reference:

(a) Carol R. Jayroe, Asst. Vice President

C & S Bank, P.O. Drawer 439

Georgetown, SC 29442

(b) Thomas J. Rubillo, Esquire

P. O. Drawer l956, Georgetown, SC 29442

(c) Meyer Rosen, Esquire

P.O. Box 557, Georgetown, SC 29442

(d) Robert H. O'Donnell, Esquire

P. O. Box 662, Georgetown, SC 29442

(e) Betty L. Williams, Clerk of Court

Georgetown County, Georgetown, SC 29442

(f) Georgetown County Bar Association

Q. JUDGE MARING, DID YOU FIND ANYTHING ON THE SUMMARY OF YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE THAT WE NEED TO CLARIFY?
A. I DID NOT.
Q. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW; LIKEWISE, THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION REPORTS NO REPRIMANDS WHILE ON THE BENCH AS A FAMILY COURT JUDGE. AS WE KNOW, YOU APPLIED FOR THE NEWLY CREATED SEAT ON THE 15TH CIRCUIT. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS WITH THE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN GEORGETOWN; ALSO, AS WELL AS WITH SLED AND THE F.B.I. IN CHECKING WITH THE JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS THAT HAVE BEEN FILED IN GEORGETOWN COUNTY OR THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM, I BELIEVE WE FOUND THREE, OR YOU REPORTED TWO AND WE FOUND ONE; EITHER GARRETT OR GARNETT, I'M NOT SURE WHICH ONE IT WAS, VERSUS MARING WAS LISTED IN 1979 AS A SUIT VERSUS THE SCHOOL OFFICIALS IN GEORGETOWN AND VARIOUS COURT OFFICIALS AND THAT WAS DISMISSED BY A PRE-TRIAL MOTION; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. CORRECT.
Q. ALSO LISTED, YOU DISCLOSED CLAYPOOL VERSUS MARING; THAT WAS ALSO DISMISSED BY PRE-TRIAL MOTION?
A. CORRECT.
Q. WHAT TYPE OF ACTION WAS THAT?
A. THAT WAS WHERE I LOCKED UP SOMEONE FOR NON-SUPPORT AND HE SUED I AND JUDGE WILBURN AND ABOUT EVERYBODY WHO HELD PUBLIC OFFICE IN SOUTH CAROLINA.
Q. ALSO, THERE WAS AN ACTION LISTED IN 1976 WOODBERRY VERSUS MARING.
A. YES, WE WENT THROUGH THIS AT MY LAST SCREENING. I WAS NEVER SERVED THOSE PAPERS AND KNOW NOTHING ABOUT IT. IT APPARENTLY HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH ME AS A--I WAS A PUBLIC DEFENDER. I BELIEVE SENATOR LONG WAS NAMED AS A DEFENDANT. I WAS NEVER SERVED.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. AS A MATTER OF LAW, AFTER EVERY SCREENING WE HAVE TO DESTROY ALL OF OUR RECORDS AND START FROM SCRATCH.
A. I UNDERSTAND.
Q. FINANCIAL INFORMATION: YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT WERE RECEIVED AND SHOWED NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS. YOUR CREDIT REPORT WAS FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY. YOUR LAST PHYSICAL WAS IN 1989. YOUR HEALTH IS EXCELLENT. AS FAR AS LEGAL EXPERIENCE, YOU NOTED THAT YOU SERVED AS A CITY JUDGE FROM 1972 TO `75; WAS THAT AT GEORGETOWN?
A. RIGHT; PART-TIME, OF COURSE.
Q. AND HAVE BEEN A FAMILY COURT JUDGE SINCE 1977?
A. RIGHT.
Q. I BELIEVE YOU WERE IN THE PUBLIC--WORKED IN THE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE FROM '75 TO '77?
A. PART-TIME.
Q. SINCE YOU HAVE BEEN A FAMILY COURT JUDGE HAVE YOU EVER SAT AS A SPECIAL CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE?
A. I HAVE.
Q. ABOUT HOW MUCH?
A. PROBABLY ABOUT EIGHT OR NINE WEEKS A YEAR.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. YOUR LAST SCREENING, WAS THAT '89 OR '90?
A. I BELIEVE IT WAS MAY OF '89.
Q. THOSE ALL START RUNNING TOGETHER FOR ME.
A. RIGHT.
Q. AS FAR AS COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS RECEIVED, WE RECEIVED A FAVORABLE AFFIDAVIT FROM GLENN SMITH AND RATHER THAN HAVE MR. SMITH TESTIFY, JUST NOTE THAT FOR THE RECORD. AT THIS POINT I DON'T BELIEVE ANYBODY ELSE HAS COME FORWARD WITH A COMPLAINT OR STATEMENT OR WITNESS TO TESTIFY UNLESS THEY HAVE JUST ARRIVED.

MS. TURNIPSEED: NO.
Q. THERE ARE NO OTHER MATTERS AT THIS POINT THAT WE NEED TO BRING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE UNLESS YOU WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT OR ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS.
A. I HAVE NO STATEMENT.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS?

EXAMINATION BY REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN:
Q. I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW, WHO IS MR. GLENN SMITH?
A. FAMOUS FAMILY COURT PRACTITIONER FROM RICHLAND COUNTY AND BROTHER OF HAMILTON SMITH.

REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN: WAS THERE ANY PARTICULAR REASON WHY HE WROTE A LETTER, A FAVORABLE LETTER?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: IT'S IN AFFIDAVIT FORM.

MS. TURNIPSEED: BASICALLY, HE SAID HE WAS EXTREMELY COMPETENT. HERE IS A COPY.

REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN: WELL, WAS THAT ONE OF THE FIVE LETTERS?

MS. TURNIPSEED: NO, NO, IT WAS A SEPARATE SWORN AFFIDAVIT THAT THE MAN SENT.

REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN: DID HE GIVE ANY PARTICULAR REASON WHY HE GAVE US THIS LETTER, WHICH IS SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL?

MS. TURNIPSEED: HE SAYS IN HIS STATEMENT THAT HE WANTS TO LET THE COMMITTEE KNOW WHAT A COMPETENT JUDGE JUDGE MARING IS.
Q. (BY REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN) WERE YOU AWARE OF THIS LETTER?
A. YES, MS. TURNIPSEED SENT ME A COPY OF IT.

REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN: I HAVE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: FRANKLY, JUDGE MARING, I THINK THIS IS THE FIRST TIME I RECALL RECEIVING A SWORN AFFIDAVIT WHICH IS SO COMMENDABLE. IT'S UNUSUAL BUT HELPFUL.
A. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. ANYTHING FURTHER?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THAT'S IT.
A. THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WE NOW MOVE TO THE AT LARGE SEATS AND H. DEAN HALL WILL BE FIRST.

(H. DEAN HALL, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. H. Dean Hall
Home Address: Business Address
110 Carter Hall Drive P. O. Box 4046
Anderson, SC 29621 Anderson, SC 29622

2. He was born in Anderson, South Carolina on May 20, 1943.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Lily-Roland Ebert on August 30, 1969. They have no children.

5. Military Service: He served in the Army National Guard of South Carolina, HHB 2dBn (AW) (SP) 263dADA, from December 12, 1968 to December 11, 1974, (SN ***-**-***** - Honorable Discharge).

6. He attended Clemson University from September, 1961 - September, 1962; transferred to Anderson College from January, 1963 - August, 1963; transferred to the University of South Carolina from September, 1963 - August, 1966, receiving a B.S. in Business Administration. He received a Juris Doctor Degree from the University of South Carolina, June 5, 1971.

7. Significant activities in school: In college he worked on The Gamecock student newspaper, and was the business manager of WUSC-FM, the student radio station. In law school he was a member of Phi Delta Phi, legal fraternity and of the International Law Society.
8. Continuing legal/judicial education: He has attended the Family Court JCLE programs beginning in March, 1986. He attended a two day seminar for new Family Court Judges in March, 1986.

12. Legal Experience since graduation from law school:
Family Court Judge, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 3, March 1986 - present
Hall Law Firm (Anderson) 1979-1986
Hall and McClain (Anderson) 1973 - 1979
Anderson, Kenyon and Epps (Anderson) 1971 - 1973
Anderson and Chapman (Anderson) 1969 - 1971
Berry, Lightsey, Gibbes and Bowers (Columbia) 1967 - 1968

Concurrent--
Assistant Solicitor, Tenth Judicial Circuit, 1976 - 1980
City Recorder, Anderson, South Carolina, 1974 - 1976

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) State vs. Lu Ann Upchurch; State vs. Frank Nathan Dunn; State vs. William Joel Jackson; 78-GS-04-346, Anderson County; Defendants Jackson and Dunn appealed, appeals dismissed under Rule 23, see Memorandum Opinions No. 79-149 and No. 79-150 filed July 31, 1979. He and L. Henry Raines, Solicitor, represented the State. These cases were the first in which bifurcated trials were conducted in South Carolina under the Capital Punishment Act (effective June 8, 1977), Section 16-3-20, 1976 Code of Laws of South Carolina, as amended.

(b) Jimmy Lee Herndon vs. Stuart Tomlinson, d/b/a Mister T's Restaurant and Lounge, 82-CP-040665. He represented plaintiff who was assaulted with a pistol in defendant's lounge. The issue was whether the owner of an establishment dispensing intoxicating liquor upon the premises owes a duty to members of the public while they are in his place of business to protect them from violent acts of other individuals frequenting the establishment. Jury verdict for plaintiff.

(c) State vs. Jeffrey Lamont Timpson, 83-GS-04-1076 (armed robbery) and 83-GS-04-1079 (murder). Death penalty was sought by the State. He and Tom W. Dunaway, III, represented the defendant. Defendant was a young, black male who had attained the age of seventeen years a few weeks prior to his allegedly attacking and slaying a white female convenience store clerk. Defendant was found guilty of armed robbery and murder. After more than eight hours of deliberating in sentencing phase of trial, jury announced that they were deadlocked. Judge declared mistrial as to sentencing phase of trial and imposed life sentence for murder and twenty-five years, consecutive, for armed robbery.

(d) Perpetual Federal Savings and Loan Association vs. Marshall Willingham, Judy W. Willingham, Southern Bank and Trust Company, et al.; 83-CP-04-1147; on appeal to The Supreme Court of South Carolina docketed as Case No. 85-2. He represented Southern Bank and Trust Company, holder of a mortgage junior to that of the plaintiff's mortgage. Plaintiff also holds document titled, "Real Property Agreement". The primary issue on appeal is whether or not the plaintiff should be afforded lien status since the document does not contain the essential requisites of a mortgage.

(e) State vs. Harry Allen Plyler; 78-GS-04-55; first trial commenced September 13, 1978, jury deadlocked, mistrial declared; second trial commenced January 11, 1979, convicted of murder, appealed to The South Carolina Supreme Court, 270 S.E.2d 126, 1980. He and L. Henry Raines, Solicitor, represented the state. Significant issues at trial included: voice identification; admission of out of court declaration; evidence of prior ill feelings between the accused and the victim.

18. Five civil appeals:

(a) Jesse J. Floyd, M.D., Facog, and all others similarly situated, for themselves and their patients v. J. Ernest Lathem, M./D., President,State Board of Medical Examiners; N. B. Heyward, Executive Director, State Board of Medical Examiners; State Board of Medical Examiners of South Carolina and their Agents and those Acting in Concert With Them, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Case No. 84-1232, January 31, 1985, Unpublished.

(b) Oscar H.Fisher v. Una L. Teasley, et al; South Carolina Supreme Court, May 2, 1977, 234 S.E.2d 655, 268 S.C. 451 (1977).

(c) Audra D. Owens v. Casper W. Weinberger, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare; appeal from Administrative Law Judge decision to United States District Court for the District of South Carolina; Order dated July 17, 1975, Civil Action Number 74-2026. Not reported.

(d) Anne D. Cromer v. Joseph A. Califano, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare; appeal from Administrative Law Judge to United States District Court of South Carolina; Anderson Division; Order dated September 26, 1978, Civil Action Number 77-731. Not reported.

(e) Fannie Mae Williams v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare; appeal from Administrative Law Judge to United States District Court of South Carolina, Anderson Division; Order dated August 28, 1978, Civil Action Number 77-1135. Not reported.

20. Judicial Office: March, 1986 - present, Family Court of South Carolina, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 3, elected by South Carolina Legislature, jurisdiction over juvenile and domestic matters; July, 1974 - July, 1976, City of Anderson Municipal Court, Appointed by City Council, jurisdiction over all city ordinances, state statutes where penalty does not exceed fine of $200 or 30 days incarceration.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) Laura Litt Sattler v. Jon I. Sattler, 80-DR-40-1835 and 82-DR-40-0396 (Richland Co.), settled while appeal pending. Consolidated divorce case to resolve ambiguities of the prior Agreement and Addendum as to complex issues of alimony with arrearage, child support with arrearage and attorneys fees.

(b) Dan Kevin Walters vs. Teresa Elizabeth Walters, 86-DR-04-380 and 86-DR-04-527 (Anderson County) Appeal abandoned. Judge Hall's Order was in response to an action for separate maintenance and included the issue of alleged sexual and physical abuse of the child by the father (denied), child custody, visitation rights, child support and equitable distribution.

(c) Henderson v. Henderson, 379 S.E.2d 125; 298 S.C. 190, 1989. This appeal from Judge Hall's Order was on the issue of the court's construction of their separation agreement. Other issues includes alimony, child support, refusal to hold husband in contempt and attorney's fees. The SC Supreme Court affirmed with regard to construction of the separation agreement, alimony, child support and contempt, and reversed and remanded on the issue of attorney fees.

(d) Honea v.Honea, 357 S.E.2d 191; 292 S.C. 456, 1987. The wife petitioned for divorce on ground of continuous separation for one year without cohabitation. Judge Hall entered judgment denying wife alimony and awarding her 40.4% share of marital estate and she appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Family Court, holding that (1) the evidence supported finding that the husband made greater material contribution to the marriage and to acquisition of marital property, justifying division of marital estate by Judge Hall and (2) family court could deny wife's prayer for alimony, where evidence established that he was older and nearing retirement, she had earning capacity and financial assets to support herself and she voluntarily left marital home without cause or excuse.

(e) Rollins v. Butler, Memorandum Opinion No. 89-M0-008; In The Court of Appeals, filed January 4, 1989. Wife appealed Judge Hall's decision awarding husband, because of changed circumstances including the new husband's physical abuse of the wife, custody of the parties' minor child. She also appealed the Family Court's failure to find the husband in contempt of court for failing to pay child support as ordered, and the court's determination of the amount of child support arrearage. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, as to the arrearage.

33. His last physical examination was approximately ten years ago by Dr. William M.Turner.

35. He wears corrective lens.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social, and fraternal organizations: former member, Board of Directors, Salvation Army; Electric City Sertoma Club (inactive); Anderson County Art Council; Anderson County Historical Society; First Baptist Church, Anderson

41. He feels that he has obtained a tremendous amount of experience while serving as a Family Court Judge that has prepared him to carry out the duties and responsibilities of a Circuit Court Judge.

42. Five letters of reference:

(a) Robert W. Wilkes, Jr., Senior Vice President

Citizens & Southern National Bank of SC

P.O. Box 319, Anderson, SC 29621

(b) V. Laniel Chapman, Esquire

P.O. Box 2506, Anderson, SC 29622

(c) William Douglas Gray, Esquire

Watkins, Vandiver, Kirven, Gable & Gray

P. O. Box 4086, Anderson, SC 29622

(d) Cary C. Doyle, Esquire

812 W. Whitner Street, Anderson, SC 29621

(e) The Hon. George M. Ducworth

Solicitor, Tenth Judicial Circuit

Anderson, South Carolina 29622

Q. JUDGE HALL, YOU ARE CURRENTLY A FAMILY COURT JUDGE; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. AND YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR THE NEWLY CREATED AT LARGE CIRCUIT COURT SEAT NO. 7?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. IS THERE ANYTHING ON THE SUMMARY OF YOU QUESTIONNAIRE THAT WE NEED TO ELABORATE UPON OR CLARIFY?
A. NO, EVERYTHING APPEARS TO BE IN ORDER.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS IN ANDERSON COUNTY AND THE CITY OF ANDERSON AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, ALSO, AS WELL AS WITH SLED; AND YOUR FINGERPRINT CARD WAS ALSO CLEARED WITH THE F.B.I. AS FAR AS JUDGEMENTS OR LAWSUITS THAT HAVE BEEN FILED IN WHICH YOU WERE A PARTY, WHEN WE CHECKED WITH ANDERSON COUNTY AND THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM, THERE WAS ONE MATTER, JOHNNIE HANKS VERSUS YOU AS YOUR--IN YOUR CAPACITY AS A GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR JACKIE ALLEN HANKS IN 1979. I THINK THAT JUST HAD TO DO WITH THE SALE OF REAL PROPERTY BY A MINOR; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, I WAS COURT-APPOINTED GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR THE MINOR CHILD.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR; THAT WAS THE ONLY LAWSUIT WE FOUND IN WHICH YOU WERE BROUGHT AS A PARTY. FINANCIALLY, THE STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT YOU SUBMITTED SHOWED NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS AND YOUR CREDIT REPORT WAS FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY. YOU HAVE BEEN ON THE FAMILY COURT BENCH SINCE 1986, IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT, MARCH OF '86.
Q. AND PRIOR TO THAT YOU WERE IN PRIVATE PRACTICE AND AN ASSISTANT SOLICITOR AND ALSO AT ONE TIME CITY RECORDER FOR ANDERSON; IS THAT RIGHT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. I BELIEVE YOUR LAST SCREENING WAS IN 1986; IS THAT RIGHT?
A. NO, THE LAST SCREENING WAS 1989.
Q. I'M DOING A TERRIBLE JOB GUESSING ON THESE DATES.
A. MY FIRST SCREENING WAS 1986.
Q. ALL RIGHT. WE HAVE RECEIVED NO COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS IN REGARD TO YOUR APPLICATION TO THIS SEAT AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY TODAY. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS YOU WOULD LIKE TO MAKE TO THE COMMITTEE AT THIS TIME IN REGARD TO YOUR CANDIDACY?
A. I HAVE NO STATEMENT.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ONCE AGAIN, IF WE COULD HOLD YOU FOR JUST A MOMENT AND ASK EVERYONE TO GET A LITTLE MORE EXERCISE. THIS WILL BE VERY BRIEF.

(EXECUTIVE SESSION AT 11:25 A.M.)

(EXECUTIVE SESSION ENDED AT 11:28 A.M.; RECONVENED PUBLIC SESSION.)

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, NEXT WE WOULD HAVE MORDECAI JOHNSON BUT WE HAVE RECEIVED A LETTER THAT MR. JOHNSON IS IN THE HOSPITAL AND CANNOT GET HERE THIS MORNING; THEREFORE, WE WILL NOT CONSIDER MR. JOHNSON AT THIS TIME. WE WILL PROBABLY RECONVENE IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO SCREEN MR. JOHNSON AND TAKE UP ANY OTHER MATTERS THAT WE MIGHT NEED TO. CLYDE DAVIS. CLYDE, WOULD YOU MIND WAITING. I'M SORRY. I SEE D. LIDE AND WE HAD PROMISED TO--D. IS IN THE TRIAL OF A CASE IN FEDERAL COURT AND HAS GOTTEN THAT FEDERAL JUDGE'S PERMISSION TO TAKE A BREAK AND COME AND APPEAR BEFORE US; SO, IF YOU'LL PERMIT, WE'LL TAKE MR. LIDE NOW.

(VINTON D. LIDE, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Vinton D. Lide
Home Address: Business Address:
5185 Sunset Blvd. 400 Gervais St., Suite 101
Lexington, SC 29072 Columbia, SC 29202

2. He was born May 4, 1937 in Greenville.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. His first marriage ended in divorce on the grounds of one year continuous separation in March, 1979. He married Carol Jean Keisler on July 8, 1979. He has three children: Jennifer L. Infinger, age 24 (realtor); Wade Patrick, age 4, and Emily Elizabeth, age 1 month.

5. Military service: None

6. He attended Davidson College, 1955-1959, earning an AB Degree. He received his J.D. Degree from the University of Virginia School of Law (1959-62).

7. Significant activities in school: Intercollegiate basketball, 1955-56; Intercollegiate baseball, 1955-59; Interfraternity Council, 1958-59; Delta Theta Phi Law Fraternity, Dean, 1961-62; Student Assistant to the Dean, 1961-62; Student Government Council, 1961-62.

8. Continuing legal/judicial education: Completed mandatory requirements. Subjects included Trial Advocacy, Automobile Insurance Law, Techniques and Principles of Cross-Examination, Appellate Advocacy, Federal Guideline Sentencing, Criminal Trial Advocacy, "Trying Cases to Win," "Hearsay and Expert Witnesses."

9. Courses taught or lectures presented:
Panel Participant, CLE Seminars:
(a) Bench Bar Conf. on Criminal Trial Advocacy, Oct., 1986;
(b) Attorneys and Judges Seminar "Alcohol and Drug Addiction," Dec. 1986
Guest Lecturer, Campbell University School of Law, 1985.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:

1962-78: Private Practice--
1962-64, Associate, Shand & Wilmeth, Attorneys, Hartsville, SC, general practice.
1964-65, Partner, Shand & Wilmeth, Attorneys, Hartville, SC, general practice.
1965-79, Partner, Shand,& Lide (later, Shand, Lide & Stanton), Attorneys, Hartsville, SC, general practice.
1968-76 Public Defender for Darlington County (part-time position, supposedly) criminal trial and appellate practice.

1978-1989: Government Service:
April, 1978-Jan. 1979, Executive Assistant/Legal Advisor, Governor James B. Edwards, Columbia
Jan. 1979-Oct. 1979; Assistant Attorney General, Prosecution Support Unit--prosecuted criminal cases throughout the States
Oct. 1979-May 1981, General Counsel, State Dept. of Social Services--established legal department and served as chief legal advisor for the Department
June 1981-Dec. 1984, Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate, Washington
Aug. 1985-April 1098, US Attorney for the District of South Carolina, Columbia.

April, 1989 to date;
May 1989-April, 1990, Partner, Lewis, Lide, Bruce & Potts, Attorneys, Columbia, civil and criminal litigation practice.
April 1990-to date, Partner, Lide Montgomery & Potts, P. C., Columbia, civil and criminal litigation practice.

14. Frequency of appearances in court:
Federal - 1985-89, almost daily; 1989-to date, regularly
State - Since April 1989, regularly

15. Percentage of litigation:

Civil: 30% Criminal: 70% Domestic: 0%

16. Percentage of cases in trial courts:
Jury 80% Non-Jury 20%
As U.S. Attorney was lead counsel in 6/8 major cases. In private practice, normally has been sole counsel

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) State v. Brian O'Neal Sullivan, et al., 277 S.C. 35, 282 S.E.2d 838 (1981). Served as lead prosecutor. Case believed to be the first major drug conspiracy prosecution in State. Involved "The Company," a national criminal organization.

(b) State v. Best, et al., 257 S.C. 361, 186 S.E.2d 272 (1972). Represented, as Public Defender, the lead defendant in the "Lamar Riot" trial, a very emotional and lengthy rial. Handled appeal before Supreme Court. Established limitations on a trial Judge's ability to later modify a sentence.

(c) Coker v. Piggly Wiggly of Darlington, 274 S.C. 55, 261 S.E.2d 699 (1979). Represented Plaintiff who was awarded one of the largest "slip and fall" verdicts as of that time.

(d) United States v. Robert Roosevelt Woods, 812 F.2d 1483 (4th Cir., 1987). One of several "public corruption" cases that he prosecuted personally as U.S. Attorney. Argued Appeal before U.S.Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

(e) United States v. Cox and Carter, 859 F.2d 151 (Table). Personally tried and convicted defendants of perjury when they had previously been found not guilty of armed robbery in Marion County Court of General Sessions. They then obtained a verdict for $750,000 in U.S.District Court against police officers who shot one of them. Perjurious testimony was "It was a fake robbery." Had to prove robbery real to convict them.

18. Civil Appeals:
Coker v. Piggly Wiggly of Darlington, Supreme Court of South Carolina, 274 S.C. 55, 261 S.E.2d 699. (1979).

20. Judicial office: From 1963-68, served as Municipal Judge (Recorder) in Hartsville. Appointed by City Council. Jurisdiction was up to $100 fine and/or 30 days in small.

22. Public office: US Attorney for the District of south Carolina, appointed by President of US, August 1985-April 1989.

23. Candidate for elective office: Republication candidate for State Senate, Darlington. Defeated in 1972 General Election.

25. Officer or director in business enterprise: Red Fox Partnership, Hartsville. Owns and leases business property. President elected annually. No real duties other that to conduct annual meeting.

27. He is a member of the professional corporation of Lide, Montgomery & Potts, Attorneys at Law. He would recuse himself from hearing cases in which former law partners or business partners involved.

31. Sued: In the late 1970's in his capacity as Successor Trustee of a real estate development trust. Settled prior to trial.

33. In excellent health, his last physical was in 1989 by Dr. Henry Martin, Jr., Lexington.

34. In 1982 he had surgery for removal of gall bladder.

39. Bar associations and professional organizations:
South Carolina Bar, House of Delegates, 1989- ; American Bar Association, Member of House of Delegates representing South Carolina Bar, 1978-82; John Belton O'Neill Inn of Court, Columbia, 1988- , Master.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
St. Stephen's Lutheran Church; Golden Hills Country Club; Columbia Area Combined Federal Campaign, Chairman, 1986; Federal Executive Council, President, 1988.

42. Five letters of recommendation:

(a) Raymond Caughman, President, Lexington State Bank

Box 8, Lexington, SC

(b) Steven A. Smith, Captain, SLED

100 Lake Front Drive, Columbia, SC

(c) Kenneth M. Mathews, Esquire

321 Pond View Lane, Lexington, SC

(d) James B. Edwards, D.M.D

171 Ashley Avenue. Charleston, SC 29425-1010

(e) Robert J. Ivey, FBI SAC, Ret.

1028 Old Forge Court, Chapin, SC 29036

Q. YOU GOT HERE A LITTLE EARLY, DIDN'T YOU, MR. LIDE.
A. JUDGE PERRY WAS VERY GRACIOUS THIS MORNING.
Q. DID YOU HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK OVER THE SUMMARY OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE THAT WAS SENT BACK TO YOU?
A. YES, I HAD IT WITH ME.
Q. DO WE NEED TO MAKE ANY CORRECTIONS ON THAT?
A. NO, SIR, IT SEEMS TO BE IN ORDER.
Q. ALL RIGHT, MR. LIDE, YOU'VE APPLIED FOR THE AT LARGE CIRCUIT COURT SEAT NO.9; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT IS CORRECT.
Q. AND THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS OF THE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN LEXINGTON AND LEXINGTON COUNTY. AND WE ALSO CHECKED WITH SLED AND THEIR RECORDS SECTION CHECK WAS CLEAR AND YOUR F.B.I. FINGERPRINT CARD HAS BEEN SENT UP THERE. AS FAR AS JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS, WE CHECKED THE RECORDS OF LEXINGTON COUNTY, AS WELL AS WITH THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM IN WHICH YOU HAD BEEN A PARTY; YOU DISCLOSED THAT IN THE LATE 1970'S THAT YOU WERE A PARTY IN ONE ACTION AS A SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE OF A REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENT TRUST AND THAT THAT WAS SETTLED PRIOR TO TRIAL.
A. THAT IS CORRECT.
Q. IS THAT THE ONLY ACTION THAT YOU CAN RECALL THAT YOU'VE BEEN INVOLVED IN?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AS FAR AS FINANCIAL INFORMATION, YOU PROVIDED FOR US A STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND A FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT; BOTH OF THOSE SHOWED NO CONFLICT OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS. DID YOU DISCLOSE THAT YOUR FIRM CURRENTLY REPRESENTS THE INSURANCE RESERVE FUND HERE IN THE STATE?
A. THAT IS CORRECT. AND IT IS THEY, IN FACT, THAT I'M REPRESENTING IN FEDERAL COURT RIGHT NOW.
Q. ALL RIGHT. YOU REPORTED YOUR HEALTH AS EXCELLENT; YOUR LAST PHYSICAL BEING IN 1989. AS FAR AS LEGAL EXPERIENCE, YOU NOTED THAT FROM 1983 TO 1986 YOU SERVED AS A MUNICIPAL JUDGE IN HARTSVILLE; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES.
Q. AND SINCE THAT TIME YOU HAVE BEEN IN PRIVATE PRACTICE, HAVE BEEN THE U.S. ATTORNEY FOR SOUTH CAROLINA, AND CHIEF COUNSEL FOR THE U.S. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, AMONG OTHER POSTS; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES.
Q. CURRENTLY YOUR TRIAL WORK IS DIVIDED APPROXIMATELY 30 PERCENT ON THE CIVIL SIDE AND ABOUT 70 PERCENT CRIMINAL; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. CURRENTLY IT'S PROBABLY MUCH MORE EVENLY BALANCED. IT PROBABLY IS MORE CIVIL THAT IT IS CRIMINAL AT THE MOMENT; BUT IT RESPONDS TO THAT, I WAS REFERRING BACK TO MY ENTIRE CAREER.
Q. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME TAT YOU HAVE OFFERED FOR A STATEWIDE JUDGESHIP?
A. YES.
Q. WE HAVE RECEIVED NO COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS IN REGARD TO YOUR APPLICATION. THERE ARE NO WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY TODAY IN REGARD TO YOUR CANDIDACY. I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING ELSE TO COVER UNLESS, MR. CHAIRMAN, ANYBODY FROM THE COMMITTEE HAS ANY QUESTIONS.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE?

SENATOR MARTIN: HOW IS YOUR CASE GOING?
A. VERY WELL, THANK YOU, SENATOR. IT INVOLVES FAIRFIELD COUNTY.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WE FIGURED THAT OUT. ANY OTHER MEMBER?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, MR. LIDE.
A. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: NOW MR. DAVIS.

(CLYDE N. DAVIS, JR., FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Clyde Norwood Davis, Jr.
a/k/a Woody Davis
Home Address: Business Address:
1009 Lonsdale Dr. P.O. Box 11330
West Columbia, SC 29169 Columbia, SC 29211

2. He was born October 28, 1946 in Greenville.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Celia Rose McLeod on June 4, 1967. They have three children: Clyde Norwood, III, age 20 (Senior at The Citadel); Preston Lee, age 19, (Freshman at Spartanburg Methodist); Joel Anthony, age 14, (student, Airport High).

5. Military service: Active Duty - US Army - 1968-72 (Captain, Corps of Engineers); Inactive and Active Reserve - 1972-80; Honorably Discharged - 1980 (Captain, JAG Corps).

6. He attended Bob Jones University from 1964-68, earning a BS in Accounting, and earned his Juris Doctor from USC Law School (1972-75).

8. Continuing legal/judicial education:
He has attended a number of SC JCLE seminars on a variety of subjects. He has also attended at least one three day ABA sponsored seminar per year on appellate courts.

9. Courses taught or lectures given:
He has lectured at SC Bar Association CLE and JCLE seminars on Supreme Court practice, Circuit Court and Probate Court rules.

10. Published books or articles: Motions in the South Carolina Supreme Court. South Carolina Lawyer. Volume 1, (Number 2,) Sept/Oct 1989, Page 13.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
1975-76 Law Clerk to J. Woodrow Lewis, Chief Justice
1976-77 Private practice, real estate, domestic, probate, business and tax
1977-83 Chief Staff Attorney, SC. Supreme Court - 70% Criminal, 20% Civil, 10% Domestic, supervised 9 other attorneys
1983-now Clerk of Court, SC Supreme Court

14. Frequency of appearances in court: He is regularly in court; however, it is as Clerk to the Supreme Court, a position he has held for over seven years. His previous legal experience includes over six years as Chief Staff Attorney at the Supreme Court, one year as law clerk to former Chief Justice J.Woodrow Lewis and one year in the general practice of law with Timothy Farr of Greenville.

22. Public office: U. S. Army 1968-72 - Captain - Company Commander for 2 years, Assistant Adjutant.

Notary Public - 1976-86.

23. He applied for Municipal Judge in Greer, SC in 1976.

24. Occupation, business or profession other than the practice of law: Numerous summer and part-time jobs in the accounting field, including general accounting, auditing and tax.

27. Unaware of any financial arrangements constituting a possible conflict of interest. If one arose, he would remove himself.

31. Sued: A prose appellant sued several Supreme Court Justices, Circuit Court Judges and him. Summary judgment was granted in US District Court and affirmed by the fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

33. His present health is good. Last Physical in July, 1990, by Dr. Robert Boyd, Columbia.

35. He has lost partial vision in his right eye, but is not impaired in his work, driving or physical activities. His doctor is John Hindersman of Columbia.

39. Bar associations and professional organizations:
South Carolina and Lexington county Bar Associations; currently member of the Executive Committee of the National Conference of Appellate Court Clerks; Former member of the Executive Committee of the Committee on Appellate Staff Attorneys.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
Grace Bible Alliance Church, Lexington: Elder, Chairman of Christian Education Committee, Chairman of Building Committee; Exodus Discipleship Ministries, Chairman.

42. Five letters of recommendation:

(a) Rebecca G. Cates, Vice President

Standard Federal Savings Bank, P.O. Box 2826

Columbia, SC 29202
(b) Reverend Charles Leckie

15121 Yawl Street, Garden Grove, Calif. 92643

(c) Preston B. Haines, III, Esquire

P.O. Box 357, Myrtle Beach, SC 29578

(d) George M. Hearn, Jr., Esquire

1206 Third Avenue, Conway, SC 29526

(e) J. Woodrow Lewis, Chief Justice, Ret.

P.O. Box 53, Darlington, SC 29532

Q. MR. DAVIS, YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR THE AT LARGE SEAT NO. 8; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. HAVE YOU FOUND ANYTHING ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY THAT WE NEED TO CLARIFY?
A. I HAVE NOT.
Q. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS OF THE LEXINGTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE WEST COLUMBIA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT; ALSO, FOUND TO BE CLEAR WITH SLED; AND YOUR FINGERPRINT CARD HAS BEEN SENT TO THE F.B.I. IN CHECKING JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS IN WHICH YOU WERE A PARTY, WE FOUND NONE, NO ENTRIES WITH THE RECORDS OF LEXINGTON COUNTY OR THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM. FINANCIALLY, YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT SHOW NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS AND YOUR CREDIT REPORT WAS FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY.
A. LET ME STOP YOU THERE. THERE WAS ONE LAWSUIT THAT I REPORTED ON MY STATEMENT BY A PRO SE LITIGANT AND THE SUPREME COURT. IT WAS DISMISSED.
Q. IN YOUR CAPACITY AS CLERK?
A. THAT'S RIGHT.
Q. THANK YOU. AS FAR AS LEGAL EXPERIENCE, YOU HAVE BEEN CLERK OF THE STATE SUPREME COURT SINCE 1983.
A. THAT'S RIGHT.
Q. PRIOR TO THAT FROM 1977 TO 1983 YOU WERE THE CHIEF OF STAFF ATTORNEY FOR THE COURT?
A. THAT'S RIGHT.
Q. AND YOU WERE IN PRIVATE PRACTICE FOR ONE YEAR; IS THAT RIGHT?
A. YES.
Q. WOULD YOU CARE TO EXPOUND A LITTLE BIT TO THE COMMITTEE AS TO HOW THAT MIGHT AFFECT HOLDING THE TRIAL COURT, PRESIDING OVER THAT?
A. OKAY. I DON'T BELIEVE IT WILL HAVE A GREAT DEAL OF EFFECT. I AM VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE TRIAL PROCESS, THE TRIAL PROCEDURE, FROM HAVING READ LITERALLY HUNDREDS OF TRANSCRIPTS AT THE SUPREME COURT. WORKING WITH THE CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT, I AM VERY FAMILIAR WITH THE JUDICIAL PROCESS. SO, I DON'T FEEL LIKE THAT'S A DETRIMENT. MY OTHER RANGE OF EXPERIENCE THAT I'VE HAD, BOTH IN THE MILITARY, AND AS CHIEF STAFF ATTORNEY, AS THE CLERK OF COURT, HAS GIVEN ME A LOT OF EXPERIENCE IN DECISION-MAKING, LEADERSHIP, ADMINISTRATIVE ABILITIES, THAT I THINK WILL OVERCOME THAT LACK OF ACTUAL COURTROOM EXPERIENCE.
Q. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME YOU'VE APPLIED FOR A JUDICIAL SEAT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. WE HAVE RECEIVED NO COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS IN REGARD TO YOUR CANDIDACY AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY TODAY IN REGARD TO YOUR APPLICATION. MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN: I HAVE ONE QUESTION.

EXAMINATION BY REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN:
Q. MR. DAVIS, WITH YOUR ONE YEAR OF PRIVATE PRACTICE, DO YOU FEEL THAT YOUR JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT HAS BEEN TESTED BASED ON THE OTHER ACTIVITIES THAT YOU HAVE ENGAGED IN?
A. YES, SIR, I DO. REALLY, AS CLERK OF COURT I HAVE HAD TO DEAL WITH A WIDE VARIETY OF PEOPLE, LAWYERS, PRO SE LITIGANTS, MANY OF THEM WHO ARE DISGRUNTLED AND HAVE PROBLEMS, AND I FEEL LIKE I HAVE DEVELOPED THE ABILITY TO DEAL WITH THOSE PEOPLE IN A COURTEOUS AND FAIR MANNER. I THINK THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE WHO HAVE HAD APPEALS IN THE SUPREME COURT WOULD BE AWARE THAT I HAVE ALWAYS INSISTED THAT MY STAFF BE COURTEOUS AND HELPFUL; SO, YES, SIR, I FEEL LIKE I KNOW HOW A JUDGE SHOULD ACT AND HOW HE SHOULD THINK, AND HOW HE SHOULD MAKE HIS DECISIONS.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY OTHER MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, MR. DAVIS.

MR. HALL: MR. CHAIRMAN, MAY I BE EXCUSED?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: YES, SIR.

MR. HALL: THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THAT GOES FOR ALL CANDIDATES; WE CERTAINLY DON'T MEAN FOR YOU TO STAY. AFTER YOU HAVE BEEN THROUGH THE SCREENING, THERE IS NO NEED TO STAY AROUND. WE MAY WELL GET TO A DECISION ON THE UNCONTESTED RACES LATE THIS AFTERNOON OR IT MAY BE LATER; BUT YOU WILL CERTAINLY BE INFORMED. ALL RIGHT, NEXT IS PAUL SHORT.

(PAUL SHORT, JR., FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Paul E. Short, Jr.
Home Address: Business Address:
120 West End P.O. Box 547
Chester, SC 29706 Chester, SC 29706

2. He was born in Gastonia, NC, on January 13, 1947.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Linda Ruth Huffstetler on June 14, 1968. They have two children: Lindy Lee, age 20 (Junior at Presbyterian College) and Melanie Lynne, age 15 (Sophomore at Chester High).

5. Military service: Commissioned 2nd Lt. US Army, June 1968; entered active duty August 1971; discharged from active duty November, 1971; served SC National Guard until 1973; discharged US Army Reserve, 1974; Highest Rank attained was 1st Lt., serial # ***-**-*****; present status, Inactive Reserve List; Honorable Discharge.

6. He attended The Citadel, 1964-68, receiving a BA Degree in Political Science. He received his J. D. Degree from USC School of Law (1968-71).

7. Significant activities in school: The Citadel: Asst. Manager Basketball Team, 1964-65; ROTC, 1964-68, Squad Sergeant, 1966, 2nd Lt. Corps of cadets, 1968; Member Senior Class Board of Directors.
USC Law School: Phi Delta Phi Legal Fraternity; Law clerk, Attorney Betty Sloan and Claude Sapp, 1969-71.

8. Continuing legal/judicial education:
1990 General Practice Update, SC Bar: 12/8/89 6.33 hrs. Corporations SC Bar: 12/15/89 6.00 hrs.
1989 Evidence SC Bar: 12/9/88 6.00 hrs.

Corporations SC Bar: 12/16/88 3.00 hrs.
1988 Insurance Law SC Bar: 12/11/87 5.50 hrs.

Workers' Comp SC Chamber: 9/15/87 9.75 hrs.
1987 Legal Ethics SC Bar: 12/12/86 6.25 hrs.

Adoption SC Bar: 12/18/86 6.00 hrs.
1986 Civil Trial Advocacy SC Bar: 11/15/85 6.25 hrs.

Drunk Driving PES: 12/3/85 5.00 hrs.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
Began practicing law, Nov. 1971 with Fred Strickland and E.K. Hardin in Chester. Been continuously practicing law in the same firm. In late 1972 he became a partner and in June, 1973 Mr. Hardin left to become Probate Judge. In July, 1973, Mr. Strickland was killed in a house fire and Rep. Short became senior partner at age 26. Mr. William Keels joined the firm upon graduation from law school in June, 1973.

14. Frequency of appearances in court:
Federal - Occasionally
State - Often - on a regular basis
Other - Significantly - Worker's Comp. and Social Security Cases

15. Percentage of litigation:

Civil: 20% Criminal: 50% Domestic: 30%
16. Percentage of cases in trial courts:
Jury 95% Non-Jury 5% Usually sole counsel and occasionally chief counsel.

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) Walter Neal and Industrial Chemical Company, Inc. v. J.Simpson Darby, L. H. Schwieterman, John Archie Lucas, Donald B. Murray, Marion M. Thomas, and J. F. Martin as members of the Chester County Council and the County of Chester (1984) Court of Appeals opinion #0207 filed June 22, 1984. He was Chester County Attorney in 1980 and the Chester County Council was in the process of adopting an ordinance pertaining to the handling and storage of hazardous chemicals in Chester County. Mr. Neal brought suit in Common Pleas Court to question the constitutionality of the ordinance and the county counter claimed on the ground that Mr. Neal's landfill site was a public nuisance. The case was significant both at the trial level and the appellate level, because a small rural county was attempting to protect its citizens and their environment from the disposal of out-of-state hazardous waste. The trial judge and the Court of Appeals both found that the landfill constituted a public nuisance by virtue of its location and upheld the permanent injunction to prevent further disposal of hazardous chemical waste at the site.

(b) Chester County Hospital and Nursing Center v. J. F. Martin, Simpson Barby, John Lucas, Marion M. Thomas, Don Murray, Carlisle Roddey, Lowell Schweiterman, individually and as members of the Chester County Council, and the Chester County Council (1984) South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion #22053 filed March 6, 1984. In 1981 the Chester County Council was in the process of adopting an ordinance to increase the size of the Chester County Hospital Board and to provide that Council would appoint said Board members. This Board had previously been created by a local act of the General Assembly in 1947 which provided that vacancies would be filled by a two-thirds vote of the remaining Board members themselves. The Board petitioned the Circuit Court for an injunction to prevent the Council from enacting the ordinance.
After an extensive hearing on the matter, which included the testimony of many respected leaders of the community such as US District Court Judge Robert W. Hemphill, deceased, the lower Court issued a permanent injunction on the grounds that the County was attempting to exercise power beyond its limitations in violation of Section 4-9-170, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, as amended.

The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the case and vacated the injunction. The Court stated that it was well recognized that a Court could not restrain by injunction the exercise of legislative power by counties. The Court cited 43A C.J.S., which states that the restraining power of a Court should be directed against enforcement rather than passage of ordinances. The case is very significant because the Court upheld the County's actions which were undertaken because of the Home Rule Act.

(c) Vera B. Lawson, Executrix of the Estate of Robert Smith Lawson, deceased vs. Bowaters Carolina Corporation US Fourth Circuit Court of Ap[peals #77-8320 Order filed October 31, 1977. In this case he represented the Estate of a painter who was killed while painting the Defendant's plant in Rock Hill. The Plaintiff was employed by Robert's Paint Co., which had a contract with Bowaters to paint their facility. The Plaintiff's husband was killed when an employee of Bowaters drove a fork lift into the scaffold supports there by knocking the deceased to the ground. A death claim against Robert's Paint Company was filed for Workmens' Comp. benefits before the SC Industrial Commission and the claim was approved. Subsequently, he filed a wrongful death action against Bowaters Carolina Corporation in US District Court. The Defendant moved for Summary Judgment contending that under the provisions of the SC Workmen's Compensation Act the Plaintiff's deceased husband was the "statutory employee" of the Defendant, and therefore, the Plaintiff's sole remedy would be under the provisions of that act.
After considering the briefs filed by the Plaintiff's attorney and after oral arguments of counsel, Judge Hemphill issued his Order on Sept. 15, 1977, in which he denied the Motion for Summary Judgment and ordered the case be calendared for Jury trial. The Defendant petitioned the US Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for permission to appeal Judge Hemphill's Order, basing its argument on the grounds that there was a conflict between interpretation of controlling state law between the US Supreme Court and the SC Supreme Court. They denied the Defendant's petition and the case was later settled. This case was significant because it involved the question of the definition of a statutory employee under the SC Workman's Comp. Act.

(d) Canzadia White, as Administratrix of the Estate of Richard C. Carter, deceased, vs. Holsum Bakery, Inc. (1972) This was a wrongful death case and all of the witnesses of the accident of the Plaintiff were minor children of the deceased. A lot of preparation was required to ensure that the minor children would be qualified by the Court to testify. A verdict was returned for the Plaintiff, and it has been said that this was the highest jury verdict returned in Chester County for the wrongful death of a black man.

(e) Crystal J. Harmon, Committee for Benjamin Joseph Harmon, an Incompetent, v. Aegis Corporation, Long Mill Rubber Company and Ryder Truck Rental Company US District Court, Greenville Division, Complaint filed August 1, 1985. The Plaintiff, Benjamin J. Harmon, was 21 years old and on July 14, 1983, his automobile was struck when the Defendant's truck disregarded a traffic control device. The Plaintiff suffered a severe brain injury as a result of the accident and is totally and permanently disabled.
He began representing the Plaintiff shortly after his accident and through negotiations with the Defendants' insurance carrier, he successfully got the carrier to agree to pay for immediate medical care. This was very significant since it is very important that a brain injured person receive extensive rehabilitation immediately after the injury. During his representation, he traveled rather extensively and learned that there are not many facilities in the US which can adequately care for the head injured.
A jury was drawn, however, approximately one week before the trial was scheduled to begin, the case was settled in 1986. It was a significant case in that it was the largest settlement he had ever obtained and required more preparation than any other legal matter he had ever handled.

18. Civil appeals:
(a) Walter Neal and Industrial Chemical Company, Inc. v. J.Simpson Darby, L. H. Schwieterman, John Archie Lucas, Donald B. Murray, Marion M. Thomas, and J. F. Martin as members of the Chester County Council and the County of Chester. SC Court of Appeals, June 22, 1984; 282 S.C. 277; 318S.E.2d. 18.

(b) Chester County Hospital and Nursing Center v. J. F. Martin, Simpson Barby, John Lucas, Marion M. Thomas, Don Murray, Carlisle Roddey, Lowell Schweiterman, individually and as members of the Chester County Council, and the Chester County Council. SC Court of Appeals; March 6, 1984; 281 S.C. 25; 314 S.E. 2d 25.

(c) Thomas Beckham vs Sara Kay B. Short. SC Supreme Court; and SC Court of Appeals, June 5, 1989 and Jan. 25, 1988; 380 S.E. 2d 826; 298 S.C. 348; 365 S.E. 2d. 42; 294 S.C. 415.

(d) Patricia Moore Lucas v. Ernest Wendell Lucas. SC Supreme Court; May 9, 1983; 302 S.E. 2d. 863; S.C.

(e) Willie Mach Thomas, Sr. and Naomi F. Thomas v. George Wilson, individually and d/b/a Palmetto Mobile Homes. South Carolina Court of Appeals; March 9,1984; Memorandum Opinion No. 84-MO-007.

22. Public office: Member of SC House of Rep., 1982-present.
Chester County Airport Commission (appointed), 1978-80.
Chester County Attorney (appointed), 1980-82.

24. Occupation, business or profession other than the practice of law: Textile employee during summers while in college.

25. He owns 1/3 of Chester Broadcasting Corp., Inc, which owns and operates Radio Station WGCD. He is the Secretary-Treasurer of the corporation and does not actively participate in the management of the business.

27. He knows of no financial arrangements or business relationships which would constitute a possible conflict of interest. Obviously, if elected, he would sell his interest in the law firm. They are currently attempting to sell Radio Station WGCD, which is the only asset of Chester Broadcasting Co., Inc.

31. Sued: As a member of the Chester County Legislative Delegation by a taxpayer who demanded that the Delegation, rather than the Chester County Board of School Trustees, set the school tax mileage. The circuit Court later ruled that the Chester County Board of School Trustees had the taxing authority.

33. He is in good health, having last seen his family physician, Dr. M. L. Marion of Chester, in Oct. 1990.

35. Wears glasses for nearsightedness, corrected to 20/20.

39. Bar associations and professional organizations:

American, SC Trial Lawyers and SC Bar Associations.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
Purity Presbyterian Church: Sunday School Teacher, Board of Deacons; Chester County Democratic Party: Precinct Executive Committeeman, former Vice President; Chester Rotary Club; Chester Sertoma Club; Chester Shrine Club; Chester Masonic Lodge; American Legion; Board of Trustees, Presbyterian College.

41. He had served on the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline.

42. Five letters of recommendation:

(a) Brenda McBrayer, c/o C&S National Bank of SC

J. A. Cochran By Pass, Chester, SC 29706

(b) Charles Montgomery

P.O. Box 455, E. Black St, Rock Hill 29730

(c) Sheriff Leroy I. Montgomery

Fairfield Court Courthouse

Winnsboro, SC 29180

(d) Charlie I. Foster

131 Church Street, Chester, SC 29706

(e) Brooks Goldsmith

P.O. Box 947, Lancaster, SC 29720

Q. MR. SHORT, YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR THE AT LARGE SEAT NO. 8 THAT HAS BEEN CREATED; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. DID YOU FIND ANYTHING ON THE SUMMARY OF YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE THAT WE NEED TO CHANGE OR CLARIFY?
A. NO, SIR, I BELIEVE THE INFORMATION IS CORRECT AS STATED.
Q. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORT NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS IN CHESTER COUNTY AND THE CITY OF CHESTER. ALSO, THE SLED RECORDS CHECK WAS CLEAR IN YOUR NAME; AND YOUR FINGERPRINT CARD HAS BEEN SENT TO THE F.B.I. AS FAR AS JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS IN WHICH YOU WERE A PARTY, WE CHECKED THE RECORDS OF CHESTER COUNTY AND THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM AND THEY WERE FOUND TO BE CLEAR, ALSO. FINANCIAL INFORMATION: YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT SHOW NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS; AND YOUR CREDIT REPORT WAS SATISFACTORY. YOU REPORT THAT YOUR LAST PHYSICAL WAS IN OCTOBER OF THIS YEAR AND YOUR HEALTH WAS GOOD. AS FAR AS EXPERIENCE, YOU NOTED THAT YOUR TRIAL WORK BREAKS DOWN TO APPROXIMATELY 20 PERCENT ON THE CIVIL SIDE AND 50 PERCENT CRIMINAL AND 30 PERCENT DOMESTIC AREA; IS THAT ACCURATE?
A. THAT IS PRETTY ACCURATE. I MAY DO A LITTLE MORE CIVIL NOW THAN FAMILY PRACTICE.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME YOU HAVE OFFERED FOR A JUDICIAL POSITION?
A. YES, IT IS.
Q. WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS IN REGARD TO YOUR CANDIDACY AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY TODAY IN REGARD TO YOUR APPLICATION. MR. CHAIRMAN, FURTHER QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: MR. CHAIRMAN, I DON'T HAVE ANY QUESTIONS, BUT I JUST WANT TO LET MR. SHORT KNOW THAT WE ARE CERTAINLY GOING TO MISS YOU IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THANK YOU FOR YOUR SERVICE.
A. THANK YOU, LARRY.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, SIR.
A. YES, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WHEELER TILLMAN.

(WHEELER TILLMAN, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: IT HASN'T BEEN LONG SINCE WE DID THIS BEFORE.

1. Wheeler M. Tillman
Home Address: Business Address:
8726 Antler Drive 2149 Ashley Phosphate Road
Charleston Heights, SC 29418 North Charleston, SC 29418

2. He was born in Charleston, SC on August 25, 1941.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He was divorced from Suzanne Paul Tillman on August 25, 1982 in Dorchester County. He has one child: Holly Michelle, age 11.

5. Military service: Active duty, U.S. Air Force, June, 1966-June, 1970. Highest rank attained, Captain; Service # 3156528FV. Now on inactive US Air Force reserve list. Honorable discharge.

6. College and law school attended:
University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee - 1959-1963, BA, majored in Political Science.
George Washington University, Washington, DC - Semester from January 1962-June 1962, Exchange in Government and Political Science. Credits transferred to Sewanee and were applied toward graduation requirements.
USC, Summer semester, 1962, Courses in Political Science and Economics. Part of graduation requirements at Sewanee.
USC School of Law, Sept. 1963-Feb. 1966, Juris Doctor.
University of California at Santa Barbara, Fall semester, 1967. One course in Magic, Myths, and Demons. Audit basis, taken as a matter of personal interest.
Trident Technical College, Fall quarter, 1983; Winter quarter, 1984, Summer quarter, 1987, course in Shorthand and Lotus 1-2-3, personal interest.

7. Significant activities in school:
University of the South: Sigma Alpha Epsilon, social fraternity, 4 years, House manager 1960-1962; Order of the Gownsmen (academic society, based on GPA; sports reporter for college newspaper, The Purple; Intramural sports for ___ - touch football team field goal kicker; worked part-time in Alumni Office.
George Washington University: S__ social fraternity; member of South Carolina Society (SC delegation and South Carolina residents working in DC; observed legislative process -- committee hearings and both house of Congress.
USC Law School: Phi Alpha Delta, legal fraternity, American Law Student Association - Chairman of Freshman Orientation; President of Clariosophic Society, literary society on campus.

8. Continuing legal/judicial education:
1985
"Bankruptcy - Its impact on state court Proceedings"-Feb
"Brain Damaged Infants"-May
"SC Rules of Civil Procedure"-June
"Annual Review of SC Law" (SC Trial Lawyers Conven.)-Aug.

1987
"Defending DUI Cases"-Oct.
"Recent Development in State & Federal Courts"-Oct.
"Tax Law for the General Practitioner"-Nov.
"Insurance Law Issues and Litigation"-Dec.

1989
"Probate"-Sept.
"SC Automobile Insurance Law"-Sept
"Bankruptcy: Recent Devel. on Important Issues for
1990 & Beyond"-Dec.
1990

"Legal Ethics and Lawyer Malpractice"-Sept.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
Kemper Insurance Companies, Summit, NJ: Feb-May, 1966
Full time, handling fidelity bond claims in the Eastern US. Work included claims under policies for employee dishonesty, bank teller shortages, counterfeit money, burglaries, robberies and patients' stolen property in hospitals.
Judge Advocate, Vandenberg, AFB, California: June 1966-68
Worked as a military lawyer reviewing US Government procurement contracts for purchase of services and equipment in support of the missile programs at the Air Force Western Test Range on that base facility.
Air Force Logistics Command Procurement Law School, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: 1966
Attended school studying legal requirements of Federal Procurement Contracts.
Judge Advocate, Pleiku AB, Vietnam: 1968-69
Worked as a military lawyer defending and prosecuting U.S. military servicemen before military Courts-Martial, handling civil claims against the US Air Force for accidental and/or negligent damage to property or injuries to persons, and providing legal assistance to US military personnel.
Judge Advocate, Mather AFB, Sacramento, Calif.: 1969-70
Worked as a military lawyer, defending and prosecuting before Courts-Martial, reviewing Contracts for purchase of goods and services and providing legal assistance to military personnel.
Private Law Practice: 1970-80
Full time, in North Charleston. Emphasis on contract disputes, real estate closings, family court matters, personal injury cases, workmen's comp., defending DUI charges, criminal defense, election law disputes, Federal Voting Rights cases and SC Supreme Court appeals.
Private Law Practice: 1980-present
Emphasis on personal injury, wrongful death, workmen's comp., Defending DUI charges, criminal defense, family court matters, estates and appeals to SC Appellate and Supreme Courts.

14. Frequency of appearances in court:
Federal - Federal Bankruptcy, 5 times per year
Federal District Court, once in last five years, 30 times in career.
State - about 30 times a year, CP, GS, Family, and Magistrates
Other - Public Service Commission, Worker's Comp. Commission, U.S. Civil Service Commission, Medical University Employee Grievance Hearings, from time to time.

15. Percentage of litigation:

Civil: 69.3% Criminal: 10.8 Domestic: 19.9%

16. Percentage of cases in trial courts:

Jury 70% Non-Jury 20%
Sole Counsel in about 88% of the cases

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) Corros v. United States, 439 F. Supp 592 (1977), Reversed 630 F.2d 224 91980), cert denied ___ S.Ct ___ (1980). A wrongful death case brought in the Admiralty Division of the US District Court. Mr. Tillman was chief counsel for Mr. Corros' Estate, assisted at trial level by his partner, L. Mendel Rivers, Jr. The claim arose out of a motor boat collision with a steel dike sticking out from one of the islands in the Charleston Harbor into the Cooper River. This Suits in Admiralty Case was brought on behalf of Mrs. Corros and her 3 minor children against the US Coast Guard alleging improper warning by the Coast Guard of the dangerous dike, 1,100 feet in length, with only 6 inches above the water line. Mr. Corros, while operating a 16" pleasure boat at dusk struck the dike and died. A non-jury case tried before Judge Sol Blatt, Jr., for two days, a decision was rendered in favor of the estate. Dividing the negligence between the Estate and the U.S. Coast Guard, the Estate entitled to 25% of its provable damages. (In this bifurcated case only the liability issue was tried). On appeal, the 3 judge panel of the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the trial judge with a 3-0 vote. Petition to re-hear was denied by the full panel of Appellate Justices, as was the writ of certiorari by the US Supreme Court. The case is significant because of its complexity and because at issue was a stationary object under the control of the SC Coast Guard being held responsible for damages to a moving object, an unusual situation in admiralty.
(b) Woods v. Hamilton, 473 F. Supp. 641 (1979) A case in Federal Court pursuant to the 1965 Federal Voting Rights Act to trigger a referendum in Charleston County allowing people to vote on the method of electing county council. The old method (still in use) is 9 council members voted on at large by all county voters, but residency areas are established and candidates must reside in certain areas of the county to be eligible to run for the council. Four private litigants (including two members of the SC House) were joined by the USA as principal parties. Tillman was sole counsel for the private litigants and lawyers from the Civil Rights Division of the Dept. of Justice represented the US. Heard by a 3 member panel of Federal Judges in Columbia, Spartanburg, Florence and Charleston, the plaintiffs were denied the right to a countywide referendum. Notice of intent to appeal the adverse decision was filed and served by both the US Dep. of Justice and the private litigants. The Justice Department decided to abandon the appeal and the private litigants, not able to fund the appeal to the US Supreme Court, were forced to abandon their appeal. Focusing attention on the method of electing council members in Charleston County under the SC Home Rule Act, this significant case has been selected for inclusion in a history paper now being written for publication by a college professor.

(c) Brownlee v. Wetterau Food Services, 288 SC 82, 339 SE2d 694 (SC App 1986). In this workmen's comp. case for death benefits Tillman represented the widow and 2 minor children of an employee of Wetterau Food who died in a company car while attending a seminar in St. Louis, Mo. The collision occurred on an Interstate Highway away from the hotel which was the site of the seminar. Four company employees were riding in a company furnished car and were filled with a pick-up truck crossed the median and struck the can head-on. A substantial sum was collected for the wrongful death of Mr. Brownlee from the third-party liability carrier on the pick-up truck in a tort suit brought in the Missouri State Trial Court with Mr. Tillman appearing as counsel of record by special appearance. The workmen's comp. case was denied by a commissioner and upheld on appeal to the Full Commission by a 5-1 vote. Appeals to the Court of Common Pleas and the SC Court of Appeals resulted in no change. At issue is the "coming and going" or travelling employee's rule under the Workmen's Comp. cases, which many states have applied in similar cases and found them to be compensable. A subsequent SC law review article criticized the holding and argued that the Appeals Court should have applied the travelling employees rule, arguing that the decision pushes SC into the minority of states that do not and therefore the Brownlee case should be overruled. 39 SCLR 236 (1987) (David A. Raeker)

(e) McSwain v. Holmes, 269 SC 293, 237 SE2d 363 (1977). A post-divorce case by a mother to obtain custody of her child, Charles, and to obtain back child support for the child, Michael, then in her custody and then obtain future child support. In the original divorce decree no child support or alimony was awarded, it was agreed that each parent would get custody of one of the children. The mother married 5 days after the divorce decree issued and this was 3 years later. Trial court denied all of the petition and the mother appealed. While the appeal was pending, the trial judge signed an ex parte order allowing the father to remove the child, Charles, from the continental limits of the US to Cuba and the mother appealed this order also. The Supreme Court affirmed that no retroactive child support payments be allowed since the mother had waited 3 years to ask. They also agreed that custody was not to change for the child, Charles. The trial judge was reversed on the issue of future child support for Michael, then in the mother's custody. The case was remanded for a determination of the amount of support. The Supreme Court took the trial judge to task for issuing an ex parte order removing the child from the US. She was not given notice of the application or issuance of the order until after the child was gone. The Supreme Court warned both the bench and the bar that ex parte orders are reserved for those rare instances where there is no adverse interest or where exigent circumstances clearly require that action be taken before there is time for a full hearing. This warning makes the case significant, as does its holding that the rule of "changed conditions" applies to both contested and uncontested cases. the mother was in default when the original custody decisions were made, and that divorce case proceeded on an uncontested basis.

18. Civil appeals:
(a) Brunner v. Brunner, 296 SC 60, 370 SE2d 614 (SC App 1988).

(b) McSwain v. Holmes, 269 SC 293, 237 SE2d 363 (1977).
(c) Brownlee v. Wetterau Food Services, 288 SC 82, 339 SE2d 694 (SC App 1986).

(d) State b. Wiggins, 262 SC 517, 205 SE2d 833 (1974).

(e) Corros v. United States, 439 F. Supp 592 (1977), Reversed 630 F.2d 224 (1980), cert denied __ S. Ct __ (1989).

(f) State v, Key, 277 SC 214 , 284 SE2d 783 (1981).

22. Public Office: House of Representatives, 1972-78. Elected in 1972 as one of 12 members at large from Charleston County. Reelected from single member district (117) 1974 and 1976.

23. Unsuccessful candidate for office: Lost in the Democratic primary in a special election in 1971 to fill vacancy in the SC House created by the death of Rep. Abney Smith; was second in a four candidate primary in June 1980 to choose the democratic candidate for US House of Representatives, 1st Congressional District; was the Democratic nominee in November 1988 for the 1st Congressional District US House seat, lost to the incumbent; was the Democratic nominee for SC House seat from Charleston in November 1990, lost by 350 votes.

24. Occupation, business or profession other than the practice of law: Worked for Kemper Insurance from Feb-May 1966, otherwise have been in full-time private practice of law.

25. Officer/director or management of business enterprise: Owner and manager of a sole proprietorship for private practice of law with 1 paralegal and 1 file clerk, renting the office but owning the books and equipment used in the practice.

27. Has no potential conflicts of interest apparent in any financial arrangements or business relationships.

29. Ever under federal, state, or local investigation: In 1973 he was interrogated at the Charleston county Police Department as a suspect in a case involving attempted rape. The case was solved and the accusations against him were totally false , and he was not involved in any way, except as an innocent and falsely accused suspect.

30. Tax lien: State lien filed 8-5-86, for an original assessment of $68.99, for tax year 1984. He was unaware of the original notice, sent while he was providing round-the-clock care for his terminally ill father (brain tumor). Full tax and penalty was paid promptly, upon discovery, on 4-29-88.

31. Sued: (1) In 1974 a collection action brought in connection with a limited partnership for the operation of a service station. He was involved in private litigation with two individuals arising out of the termination of the partnership. The Court had placed the service station business into receivership and Bankers Trust filed its Petition to intervene in the private litigation. The Bank was found to have no lien status and became only an unsecured creditor of the General Partners in individuals and not even an unsecured creditor of the Limited Partnership (his interest).
(2) In June 1976 a declaratory judgement action was filed against him and others arising out of a petition effort in Charleston County for a countywide referendum on election of County Council. He had been very active and vocal in opposition to the present at large with residency requirement method and was leading the public debate about single member election districts. Complaint filed 6-28-76 by a private citizen in class action of registered voters being denied equal protection of the election laws. Appealed to the SC Supreme Court who, in an unreported decision on 6-28-77, declared the issues "moot".
(3) Sued in an action to challenge the constitutionality of the 1975 Home Rule Act. He sent the service copies to the Attorney General for handling since the suit challenged the constitutionality of a state law. Despite a formal motion having been adopted by the SC House Judiciary Committee that he provide a defense of this suit, the Attorney General declined. Tillman, having no attorney, defaulted and the County Judge issued a default order stopping, once again, the referendum calling for a countywide vote on the issue.
(4) Collection action by First National Bank on a promissory note for $1,918.11 in April 1981. Arose out of marital problems. Resulting judgement paid in full in March 1988 and satisfaction recorded.
(5) Mortgage foreclosure action against his marital residence in 1981. Residence in her name, both had signed the mortgage. Brought by the First Federal Savings and Loan Association in Dorchester County, the foreclosure resulted in a sale by the Sheriff. Equity in the home was $25,000 at the time of the sale.
(6) Claim and delivery action brought by Moye M. Tillman, his mother, against him and his wife for the recovery of a set of gold china dishes, valued at about $20,000. Filed in June 1982 and arising also out of his marital problems, the case was tried before the Court alone, no decision or order for judgment ever having been issued. The dishes were voluntarily returned to the mother about December 1986 by his ex-wife.

33. His health is good. His last physical was on 4-24-87 by Dr. C.C. Wannamaker, North Charleston.

35. He wears magnifying eyeglasses, not prescription, to read and write.

39. Bar Associations and Professional Organizations:
South Carolina and Charleston County Bars; American Trial Lawyers Association.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
Northwoods, Sertoma Club, North Charleston; Goose Creek American Legion; Sewanee Alumni; USC Alumni; Old Friends Club, North Charleston.

41. He is a workaholic. He is an excellent typist and computer "buff" and personally types many of his complex and involved papers.

42. Five letters of recommendation:

(a) Thad C. Goodson, National Bank of SC

P.O. Box 5787, North Charleston, SC 29406

(b) Al Cannon, Jr., Charleston County Sheriff

Courthouse Square, Charleston, SC 29201

(c) Geoffrey H. Waggoner, Esquire

2850 Ashley Phosphate Road, North Charleston, SC 29418

(d) C. C. Wannamaker, M.D.

1082 E. Montague Ave., North Charleston, SC 29406

(e) Robert H. Hood, Esquire

P.O. Box 1508, Charleston, SC 29402

Q. MR. TILLMAN, YOU'VE APPLIED FOR THE AT LARGE SEAT NO. 8 THAT WAS CREATED LAST YEAR; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. HAVE YOU FOUND ANYTHING ON THE SUMMARY OF YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE THAT WE NEED TO CLARIFY AT THIS TIME OR CHANGE?
A. A COUPLE OF MINOR THINGS; IN ITEM 17, 17 (A), THE LAST TWO LINES SAY "THE SC COAST GUARD"; THAT OUGHT TO BE THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD. IT'S REALLY MINOR.
JUST ONE OTHER ITEM, NO. 18, 18 (F), IT'S REAL MINOR; THE 18 (F), THE CASE, THE DEFENDANT THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN KEY, K-E-Y; THE CITATION IS CORRECT.
Q. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.
A. THERE'S ONE ADDITION THAT PROBABLY I OUGHT TO MENTION THAT HAS OCCURRED AFTER THE SUBMISSION OF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE: I HAVE OFFERED OR TENDERED A CONTRACT FOR THE PURCHASE OF REAL ESTATE IN CHARLESTON COUNTY, IN ANOTHER PART OF CHARLESTON COUNTY, AND I HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED WORD WHETHER IT'S ACCEPTED; ALTHOUGH, IT'S INDICATED THAT THEY PROBABLY WOULD, FOR A PIECE OF LAND.
Q. THANK YOU FOR BRINGING THAT TO OUR ATTENTION. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS OF THE CHARLESTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE CHARLESTON CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. THE SLED RECORDS SECTION CHECK WAS ALSO CLEAR AND YOUR FINGERPRINT CARD HAS BEEN SENT TO THE F.B.I. AS FAR AS JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS, WE CHECKED THE RECORDS OF CHARLESTON COUNTY AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM AND I BELIEVE THERE WERE SIX THAT YOU NOTED THAT YOU HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN IN SOME CAPACITY IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION NO. 31 ON OUR QUESTIONNAIRE. IF WE CAN JUST GO THROUGH THOSE BRIEFLY FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE COMMITTEE, APPRECIATE IT. NO. 1, IN 1974 YOU WERE INVOLVED IN A COLLECTION ACTION.
A. THE 1974 CASE WAS ONE IN WHICH I PARTICIPATED WITH TWO OTHER INDIVIDUALS WHEREBY WE PURCHASED A SERVICE STATION IN NORTH CHARLESTON. I WAS A LIMITED PARTNER AND PUT UP THE MONEY; AND THE OTHER TWO PARTNERS WERE THE GENERAL PARTNERS AND THEY PUT UP LABOR. THE PARTNERSHIP WENT SOUR AND IN THE MIDST OF LITIGATION OVER THE TERMINATION OF THE PARTNERSHIP, (A), THE CIRCUIT COURT PUT THAT BUSINESS INTO RECEIVERSHIP; AND, (B), A BANK CAME ALONG AND TRIED TO INTERVENE TO ATTACK PARTNERSHIP ASSETS. IN LITIGATION AGAINST THE BANK, THE BANK LOST AND THEY WERE BASICALLY DECLARED TO BE A CREDITOR OF THE GENERAL PARTNERS IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES AS OPPOSED TO BEING A CREDITOR OF THE PARTNERSHIP. IN OTHER WORDS, THE TWO GENERAL PARTNERS BORROWED MONEY PRIVATELY BEFORE THEY ENTERED INTO THE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. THE SECOND ONE WAS IN JUNE OF 1976. THAT WAS A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION, I BELIEVE.
A. THAT SUIT WAS BROUGHT BY A PRIVATE CITIZEN IN CHARLESTON COUNTY REPRESENTING A CLASS OF REGISTERED ELECTORS WHO WERE OPPOSED TO A COUNTYWIDE VOTING REFERENDUM THAT I WAS HELPING TO BRING ABOUT. I WAS ONE OF THE ACTIVE LEADERS IN 1976 TO TRIGGER AN ELECTION IN CHARLESTON COUNTY SO THAT WE COULD DETERMINE THE METHOD OF ELECTING CHARLESTON COUNTY COUNCIL MEMBERS. THE CASE ENDED UP BEING DECLARED TO BE MOOT BY THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT LATER ON FOR OTHER REASONS.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR; THE NEXT ONE HAD TO DO WITH THE HOME RULE ACT; IS THAT---
A. THAT'S WHERE--I THINK I GOT SUED AGAIN IN THAT ONE BECAUSE OF MY ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH A SECOND COUNTYWIDE REFERENDUM. WE HAD CIRCULATED PETITIONS TO GET ABOUT 17,000 SIGNATURES AND WE DID THAT TWICE; SO, THERE WERE ABOUT TWO OR THREE YEARS INTERVENING AND I THINK THIS WAS THE SECOND PETITION DRIVE AND THE REGISTERED ELECTORS IN ANOTHER CLASS ACTION NAMED ME AS A PARTY DEFENDANT AND BY THAT TIME I THINK WE WERE KIND OF WORN OUT AND WE JUST DEFAULTED IN IT. I COULDN'T GET THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA TO REPRESENT ME, EVEN THOUGH I WAS STILL IN THE HOUSE AND THAT'S WHY THEY WERE NAMING ME, I THINK, AS A DEFENDANT.
Q. THE FOURTH ACTION YOU LISTED WAS A COLLECTION ACTION BY FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN 1981.
A. YES, THAT WAS A SMALL COLLECTION SUIT BROUGHT AGAINST ME. IT AROSE OUT OF SOME MARITAL FINANCING AT A TIME WHEN I WAS IN THE THROWS OF A DIVORCE AND THE PAPERWORK THAT WAS SUBMITTED TO ME IN SUMMARY FORM BY YOUR STAFF CONTAINED COPIES OF THAT LITIGATION BUT IT OMITTED THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ITEM AND THAT IS A SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT WHICH I HAVE HERE AND I'LL BE GLAD TO LEAVE THAT WITH THE COMMITTEE.
Q. WE HAVE IT NOTED IN THE SUMMARY. IT DOES NOTE THAT IT WAS PAID IN FULL IN MARCH OF 1988 AND SATISFIED.
A. ALL RIGHT, THERE'S ANOTHER CORRECTION. IT ENDED UP BEING PAID--WELL, THE SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT IS DATED MAY OF 1988.
Q. OKAY. THE FIFTH ONE WAS A MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE ACTION IN 1981.
A. YES, THAT WAS AN ACTION BY THE SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION AGAINST THE MARITAL RESIDENCE. AGAIN, IT AROSE OUT OF THE DETERIORATION OF THE MARRIAGE. I GUESS I WAS NAMED AS A TECHNICAL PARTY SINCE I HAD SOME SORT OF MARITAL INTEREST IN THE DIVISION OF THE EQUITY. I WAS NOT THE RECORD OWNER OF THE PROPERTY. MY WIFE WAS 100 PERCENT RECORD OWNER; BUT AT THE SAME TIME, THE PROPERTY HAD $25,000 WORTH OF EQUITY IN IT AND SO I GUESS THAT'S WHY I WAS NAMED.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. THE SIXTH ONE WAS A CLAIM AND DELIVERY ACTION.
A. YES, THAT AROSE OUT OF SOME ANTIQUE DISHES THAT WERE FAMILY HEIRLOOMS THAT CAME DOWN THROUGH ABOUT THREE GENERATIONS OF MY FAMILY AND THEY ENDED UP IN THE POSSESSION OF MY EX-WIFE AND SHE DIDN'T GIVE THEM UP AND MY MOTHER--MOTHER SUED US BOTH IN COMMON PLEAS COURT AND---
Q. THAT NEVER WENT TO JUDGMENT THOUGH, RIGHT?
A. IT NEVER DID. IT WAS HEARD, HOWEVER; TESTIMONY WAS TAKEN AND IT WAS HEARD BY JUDGE WALTER COX BUT HE NEVER ISSUED A FINAL DECISION BUT THE DISHES WERE FINALLY RETURNED TO MY MOTHER.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR, ONE OTHER THING THAT YOU HAD LISTED WAS THAT YOU HAD A TAX LIEN FILED AGAINST YOU IN 1986 FOR $68.99 AND THAT WAS PAID UPON DISCOVERY OF THE LIEN.
A. YES, I WAS--I DIDN'T EVEN KNOW IT HAD COME INTO THE OFFICE. I WAS IN THE HOSPITAL WITH MY FATHER AT THE TIME WHO WAS TERRIBLY ILL AND WHEN I LEARNED THAT IT HAD BEEN BILLED, WE PAID IT.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR; AS FAR AS THE FINANCIAL INFORMATION THAT WAS PROVIDED TO THE COMMITTEE, YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENTS WERE RECEIVED WITH NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS APPARENT; AND YOUR CREDIT REPORT WAS FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY. YOU REPORTED THAT YOUR LAST PHYSICAL WAS IN 1987, YOUR HEALTH BEING GOOD. AS FAR AS EXPERIENCE, YOU NOTED THAT YOU HAD BEEN IN PRIVATE PRACTICE, I BELIEVE, SINCE 1970; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. AND AS FAR AS THE BREAKDOWN, APPROXIMATELY 69 PERCENT OF YOUR PRACTICE IS CIVIL AND 11 PERCENT CRIMINAL AND 20 PERCENT FAMILY; YOU WERE MORE PRECISE IN YOUR---
A. THAT CAME OFF A COMPUTER. WHAT I DID, I COULDN'T DETERMINE WHETHER THE QUESTION WAS DIRECTED AT A PERCENTAGE OF LITIGATION IN REFERENCE TO TIME EXPENDED OR WHETHER IT WAS A PERCENTAGE OF LITIGATION IN REFERENCE TO INCOME COLLECTED. WHAT YOU SEE THERE IS A PERCENTILE OF INCOME COLLECTED, AS OPPOSED TO TIME STUDIES, AND IT CAME OUT OF A COMPUTER FOR A FIVE-YEAR AVERAGE AND THEY ARE PRECISE.
Q. YES, SIR, VERY. HAVE YOU EVER OFFERED FOR A JUDICIAL POSITION BEFORE AND BEEN SCREENED BY THIS COMMITTEE?
A. NO, I HAVE NOT.
Q. WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS FROM ANYONE IN REGARD TO YOUR APPLICATION FOR THIS JUDGESHIP AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY TODAY. OTHER THAN WHAT WE'VE COVERED, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT'S ALL I HAVE.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY OTHER QUESTIONS BY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THIS IS ONE OF THOSE MATTERS WHERE WE, AGAIN, MUST ASK THOSE OF YOU IN THE ROOM TO GIVE US JUST A MOMENT PRIVATELY.

(EXECUTIVE SESSION AT 11:50 A.M.)

(EXECUTIVE SESSION ENDED AT 11:48 A.M.; RECONVENED PUBLIC SESSION AT 11:50 A.M.)

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MARK WESTBROOK.

(MARK WESTBROOK, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Marc Herbert Westbrook
Home Address: Business Address:
115 Cedar Lane Parkway Lexington County Courthouse
West Columbia, SC 29169 Lexington, SC 29072

2. He was born in Charleston, South Carolina on October 3, 1946.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Linda Louise Lawhon on August 23, 1969. They have 2 children: Thadeous Herbert, III, age 16 and Richard Neal, age 13.

5. Military Service: None.

6. He attended Anderson Junior College, 1964-1966 (A.A. Degree); University of South Carolina, 1966-1968 (B.A. Degree); Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1968-1970; University of South Carolina Law School, 1970-1973 (J.D. Degree).

7. Significant activities in school:
Anderson College: Student Government, Debate Team, Track Team, Baptist Student Union (President), Annie Denmark Society, Graduation Marshall, Honor Society, Who's Who in American Junior Colleges.
USC: Baptist Student Union (State President), Concert Choir, Alpha Phi Omega.
USC Law School: Moot Court Team, Prince Court Competition (2nd Place).

8. Continuing legal/judicial education:
A minimum 18 hours per year

9. Courses taught or lectures presented:
Seminar on Domestic Abuse Act (1985)

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:

1973-1979 Bryan, Crosby & Bates - Associate
1979-1980 Turnipseed, Dew & Westbrook - Partner
1980-1983 Marc H. Westbrook - Sole Practitioner
1983 Westbrook & Dolce - Partner
1983-present Family Court Judge, Eleventh Circuit

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) Smith v. Smith. Strongly contested equitable distribution case which pivoted around the level of contribution of a housewife who did not work outside the home. It was significant in the late 1970's when the question of a housewife's contributions was still being debated extensively. The trial lasted two days on this issue.
(b) Tollison v. Tollison. Another equitable distribution case, this time involving a housewife whose husband had an extensive business network and substantial investment properties. The two major questions were the value of his assistance in acquiring the businesses and the impact of adultery on equitable distribution.

(c) George v. D.S.S. A case in which a non-custodial parent sought the return of a child after the child had been removed from the home of the custodial parent. The more interesting question, however, was the rights of foster parents and whether they had a right to intervene.

(d) D.S.S. v. Bowman. A termination of parental rights case, the major issue here was the level of rehabilitation of the parents and whether it was enough to order the children not separated from the parents legally. One matter that kept popping up was that of problems with some of the terminology in the old termination statute.

(e) State v.Baughman, et al. A criminal case in which eleven men were charged with conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The trial listed a week and a half and involved close questions in the area of conspiracy.

18. Civil appeals:

(a) Hendrix v. Mason, et al. This appeal involved the question of a circuit judge handling a domestic issue when it was wrapped in other issues. The Supreme Court, without hearing, remanded it to the Family Court to hear the domestic issues.

(b) ____________ v. _______________. This case involved the nature of contempt (civil v. criminal) in the Family Court.

(c) Murphy v. Goff. Involved the question of approval of an agreement, particularly as to areas relating to the children which had been left out in an earlier hearing. Disposed of by the old Rule 23.

20. Judicial Office: He was Deputy Recorder for the Town of Springdale, 1975-1976, appointed by Springdale Town Council, with jurisdiction limited to the Town of Springdale. He has been an Eleventh Circuit Family Court Judge from November 1983 to the present.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) Griffin v. Inman (Not appealed) Involved the question of grandparent visitation in a situation where the natural parent were still intact, i.e., had never been separated or divorced, nor had marital problems of any kind. His Order denied the visitation.

(b) In re ___________: Juvenile case in which the Defendant was charged with the murder of her brother. This was a waiver hearing where the question of mental illness played a major factor in deciding whether to waive the case to General Sessions. The Order denied the waiver and ordered the juvenile tried in Family Court.

(c) Freeman v. Freeman: Involved question of a mother returning to college, after having two small children, and custody issue that resulted from it. Also involved question of assistance from husband in her return to college.

(d) Hall v. Fleming: Involved question of deceased mother's parent (i.e., the maternal grandparents) requesting visitation rights with child. Complicating factor was fact that father was Jehovah's Witness and grandparents were Lutherans, and serious religious differences that were involved.

(e) Wood v. Wood: This case involved questions of equitable distribution and alimony, particularly pivoting around the question of father's ability to continue working two jobs in addition to his profession as a professor.

22. Public Office: He was elected to Lexington County Council, serving as Chairman, 1977-1978, and was elected to the South Carolina House of Representatives, serving 1978-1983.

23 He was an unsuccessful candidate in 1974 for the South Carolina House of Representatives.

30. Tax Lien: A South Carolina tax lien was filed in error in November 1983, but was withdrawn.

31. He has been sued in his capacity as Chairman of Lexington County Council, named in suits filed against Lexington County, as well as a member of the SC House of Representatives. None of these suits, or any others have been filed personally nor professionally against him as an individual.

33. His health is excellent. His last physical was June 1989, by Dr. David Hobbs.

35. He wears glasses to correct slight nearsightedness.

39. Bar associations and professional organizations:
South Carolina and Lexington County Bars; South Carolina Trial Lawyers; American Trial Lawyers, SC Family Court Judges' Council, National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social, and fraternal organizations: Springdale Baptist Church, Deacon; Anderson College, Board of Trustees; Woodmen of the World; Masons; Dixie Youth Baseball, President and Coach; Recreation League Football, President; Recreation League Basketball, Coach.

42. Five letters of reference:

(a) Raymond S. Caughman, President

Lexington State Bank, P.O. Box 8

Lexington, SC 29072

(b) H. Hugh Rogers, Esquire

P. O. Box 396, Lexington, SC 29072

(c) Rev. Ronald E. Pelfrey

101 Pine Ridge Drive, West Columbia, SC 29169

(d) Preston H. Callison, Esquire

P.O. Box 6009, West Columbia, SC 29171-6009

(e) Carroll E. McGee

560 Meeting Street, West Columbia, SC 29169

Q. JUDGE WESTBROOK, YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR THE AT LARGE SEAT NO. 8; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR, THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. IS THERE ANYTHING ON YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE THAT WE NEED TO CLARIFY OR THAT YOU NEED TO ELABORATE ON?
A. NO, IT'S ACCURATE.
Q. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS OF THE LEXINGTON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE WEST COLUMBIA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. THE SLED RECORDS CHECK AND F.B.I. FINGERPRINT CHECK WERE NEGATIVE. IN CHECKING WITH JUDGMENTS OF LAWSUITS OF LEXINGTON COUNTY AND THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM IN WHICH YOU WERE A PARTY, I DON'T BELIEVE THERE WERE ANY; IS THAT OR---
A. I THINK THERE WAS ONE THAT I WAS A PARTY WITH AS A MEMBER OF THE LEGISLATURE BACK IN THE EARLY 1980'S AND IT WAS SOMETHING TO DO WITH REAPPORTIONMENT. EVERY MEMBER OF THE LEGISLATURE WAS NAMED. I DON'T KNOW, THIS PANEL PROBABLY HAS SOME CO-DEFENDANT'S FROM THAT CASE.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. FINANCIAL INFORMATION: YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT WERE RECEIVED AND THERE WERE NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS APPARENT FROM THOSE. YOUR CREDIT REPORT WAS FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY. YOU REPORTED THAT YOUR HEALTH WAS EXCELLENT WITH YOUR LAST PHYSICAL BEING IN 1989. YOU ARE CURRENTLY A FAMILY COURT JUDGE FROM THE 11TH CIRCUIT; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. YOU HAVE SERVED IN THAT CAPACITY SINCE 1983?
A. RIGHT.
Q. I BELIEVE WE SCREENED YOU IN THE LAST YEAR OR TWO.
A. LAST YEAR.
Q. LAST YEAR; FOR REELECTION TO THAT SEAT. ATTORNEY GLENN SMITH ALSO SENT A FAVORABLE AFFIDAVIT ON YOUR BEHALF AND RATHER THAN HAVE HIM TESTIFY, WE WOULD JUST NOTE THAT FOR THE RECORD. AT THIS POINT I DON'T BELIEVE ANYONE ELSE HAS COME FORWARD OR SENT AN AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLAINT IN REGARD TO YOUR TESTIMONY. I DON'T BELIEVE THERE ARE ANY WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY EITHER AT THIS POINT. IS THERE ANYTHING THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COMMITTEE SINCE YOUR LAST SCREENING OR OTHERWISE?
A. NO, SIR; WELL, THE ONLY THING I WOULD NOTE IS THAT I WAS ADVISED THERE WAS A LETTER SENT BY A LADY WHO IS A LITIGANT IN A CASE BEFORE ME A WHILE BACK.
Q. THAT'S CORRECT.
A. AND I UNDERSTAND THAT SHE WAS ADVISED THAT SHE COULD SEND AN AFFIDAVIT. I DON'T KNOW IF SHE HAS DONE IT. IF SHE IS HERE, I DON'T HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO HER BEING HEARD; AND I'VE LOOKED AROUND AND I HAVEN'T SEEN HER, BUT I HAVE NO PROBLEM, WHICHEVER WAY THE COMMITTEE WANTS TO HANDLE IT.
Q. ALL RIGHT, FOR THE RECORD WE DID RECEIVE AN UNNOTARIZED LETTER FROM HER AND SHE WAS SENT BACK AN AFFIDAVIT FORM TO FILL OUT IF SHE CARED TO AND WAS AWARE OF THE HEARING. WE RECEIVED, AGAIN, TODAY A DUPLICATE OF THE SAME LETTER BUT IT STILL WAS NOT NOTARIZED; SO, IT APPEARS THAT SHE WILL NOT TESTIFY.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: AGAIN, WE NEED A MOMENT ALONE WITH JUDGE WESTBROOK.

(EXECUTIVE SESSION AT 12:00 NOON.)

(END OF EXECUTIVE SESSION; RECONVENED PUBLIC SESSION AT 12:02 P.M.)

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: LEE ALFORD.

(LEVY (LEE) S. ALFORD, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Levy (Lee) S. Alford
Home Address: Business Address:
1048 Estate Dr. P.O. Box 219
York, SC 29745 York, SC 29745

2. He was born in York County on May 16, 1942.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Terri Dean Baker on January 29, 1965. They have two children: Matthew Lee, age 17 and Ross Dean, age 8.

5. Military service: US Air Force - AF-14716064-A/2C, July, 1960-July, 1964, Honorable Discharge.

6. He attended Clemson from 1/65 to 6/65, transferring to USC, where he attended from 9/65 to 8/68, earning an AB Degree in History. He attended USC Law School from 8/68 to 6/71, earning a JD Degree. He has earned 12 semester hours of accounting, auditing and federal tax, from 1987-89 at Winthrop, not planning to seek a degree.

7. Significant activities in school: Because he was married and working full or part time, he did not belong to any organization. He belonged to the Phi Alpha Delta Legal Fraternity in law school Page, SC Senate, 1970-71; Honor Roll or Dean's List six of eight semesters in college; top 10% in college and top 20% in law school; has a 3.75 GPR at Winthrop.
8. Continuing legal/judicial education:
1990
Annual Criminal law update, 1/25 & 26, USC Law School, 12 hrs.
Criminal Practice in S.C., 10/19, USC Law School, 7 hrs.
Judicial CLE for Probate Judges, 7/13, USC Law School
Probate Practice Manual, 8/24 USC Law School, 6 hrs.
Civil Trial Advocacy Bench/Bar Conference, 10/26, USC Law School, 6 hrs.
Family Law Issues, 11/9, USC Law School, 6 hrs.

1989
Judicial CLE for Probate Judges, 7/21 USC Law School
Federal Income Tax Course, Fall, Winthrop College, 3 semester hrs.
Auditing Course, Spring, Winthrop College, 3 semester hrs.

1988
Judicial CLE for Probate Judges, 7/22, USC Law School
Family Court Judicial CLE, 11/17 & 11/18, USC Law School, 12 hrs.
Intermediate Accounting Course, Summer, Winthrop College, 3 semester hrs.
Intermediate Accounting course, Spring, Winthrop College, 3 semester hrs.
1987
Mastering the Craft of Trial Advocacy, 1/30 & 1/31, USC Law School, 12 hrs.
Uniform Probate Code and U.P.C.Forms, S.C.P.J.A., Columbia, 3/4, 6 hrs.
Practical Aspects of the New SC Probate Code, 4/24, USC Law School, 6.5 hrs.
Mandatory Training for Probate Judges and Staffs on S.C.P.C., SC Court Administration, 5/20, 6 hrs.
Judicial CLE for Probate Judges, 7/17, USC Law School
Practice Under the New S.C.P.C., York County Bar and Winthrop College, 8/28, Winthrop College, 6 hrs.
Family Court Judicial CLE, 11/19 & 11/20, USC Law School, 12 hrs.

1986
Judicial CLE for Probate Judges, 7/18, USC Law School
Uniform Probate Code, 9/5, USC Law School 6 hrs.
New Chemical Dependency Legislation & Commitment Laws, S.C.P.J.A., Georgetown, 10/13 & 10/14, 6 hrs.
National College of Probate Judges, Estate Planning, Child Protection, Due Process in the Commitment Process, Savannah, 11/13 & 11/14, 6 hrs.

9. Courses taught or lectures given: Speaker at past three Judicial CLE's for SC Probate Judges and a three day training session for new Probate Judges. Topics have included: Conducting a Jury Trial, Probate Court Jurisdiction, Trusts and Annual Update of Supreme Court Decisions Affecting Probate Courts.

He spoke to the SC Bankers' Association about the new SC Probate Code.

Speaker at several SC Bar CLE pertaining to the SC Probate Code. Spoke at a CLE Seminar on the SC Probate Practice Manual, 1990 Edition, on the subject of legislative changes to claims procedures in probate estates in light of Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 108 S.Ct. 1340.

Moderator for a CLE Seminar at Winthrop College for the SC Bar and CPA's on the S.C.P.C.

10. Books or articles written: Wrote materials included in CLE Seminar programs. Helped draft the SC Probate Code, involuntary commitment laws for the chemically dependent and commitment laws for children.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
Practiced law with an experienced attorney from 1971-77 in general practice. In 1977, opened his own office, practicing until 1979, when he took office as Probate Judge for York County. His practice was criminal, civil, family and probate. Tried murder, rape, forgery, armed robbery, assault, driving under the influence, etc., cases. Tried tort, contract, and other civil cases. In Family Court, handled divorce, custody and child support cases. Worked on appeals and post-conviction relief proceedings.

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) Berry B. Jones and Peggy W. Jones v. James Overcash and Snap-on Tools. This was the first civil trial he handled alone from start to finish. Judge William Rhodes, who later served on the SC Supreme Court, was the trial judge. He was patient and kind, but a task master. He made sure Mr. Alford thoroughly researched certain issues and understood the reasons for his rulings. Mr. Alford learned a lot and his clients got a verdict for actual and punitive damages in this case. A key issue was whether a dirt road with only one house, but scraped by the County, required reduced speed and caution in passing by statute.

(b) State vs. Janie Sadler. First murder case he handled alone from start to finish. Key issue was whether self-defense was available to a woman who shot her boy-friend with whom she lived. He was legally blind, but had limited vision, and was threatening to hit her with a chair. The jury believed that she acted in self-defense and found her not guilty.

(c) David Allen White vs. State of South Carolina. An early post conviction relief proceeding he was appointed to handle. Several issues were involved, including whether an appointed attorney at trial had a duty to advise a client of the right to appeal and to protect that right. The trial judge ordered him to file an appeal with the SC Supreme Court.. He did and the Supreme Court ruled that the right to an appeal was not timely filed and there was no merit in the appeal based on the trial record. The law has changed significantly since to guarantee the protection of appellate rights in criminal cases. That did not help this defendant, but he believes this case helped bring it about.

(d) State v. Lovant Voltair Washington. He represented the Defendant who was tried with two other men for breaking and entering. The key issue was whether opening a screen door and going onto a screened-in back porch with only a mop on it was breaking and entering with intent to commit a crime. The trial judge let it go to the jury which found them not guilty. If they had been found guilty, this issue would have gone up on appeal.

(e) State v. Leroy Golden. When he had less than five years experience, he was appointed along with a more experienced attorney to represent a 12 year old and a 14 year old boy charged with the rape of a 9 year old girl. She was hurt and bleeding. They tried to have the case heard in Family Court, but the trial judge refused. Rape was one of the crimes in which a juvenile could be tried as an adult. The law at that time required life imprisonment unless the jury recommended mercy in a rape conviction. The jury found them guilty but recommended mercy. They were sentenced to the Youthful Offender Division of the Department of Corrections. If they had gotten a life sentence, they planned to appeal on the grounds of "cruel and unusual punishment" and to challenge the law which allows 12 and 14 year olds to be tried as adults. The laws pertaining to "criminal sexual conduct" have been changed for the better. This case was certainly justification for the change.

18. Civil appeals:
(a) Eugene Patterson v. J.R. Bogan and Ernest Kerr, 261 S.C. 87, 198 S.E.2d 586. This was an action for malicious prosecution tried in Union county. He represented the Plaintiff who prevailed at trial ($20,000 verdict) and on appeal to the SC Supreme Court. He had to levy execution and advertise a sale of property before the judgment was paid.

(b) Lillian Love Nance, Executrix of the Estate of Alice Hardee Love v. S.C. Tax Commission. Cited by S.C. Tax Commission and Attorney General's Opinions. He is not listed as an attorney of record in this case. It was the first case he worked on after law school. He did research and helped prepare the appeal. It was a case of novel impression in SC and is the leading case on the inclusion of totten or custodian type trusts in estates for estate tax purposes.

(c) James C. Cloniger v. Lamar W. Cloniger, 261 S.C. 603, 193 S.E. 2d 647. Though not listed as attorney of record, he did most of the work in research and preparation of the appeal including the record on appeal and the Brief. They did not prevail at trial or on appeal. Of the cases he has been involved in, this is the one he most profoundly disagreed with the reasoning of the opinion of and the result.

(d) Margaret Patrick Wright v. W. M. Patrick, 262 S.C. 434, 205 S.E. 2d 175. Involved an alleged contract to make a will. They got a jury verdict in Plaintiff's favor after a lengthy trial in York County. One of his favorite judges, William Rhodes, granted Judgment N.O.V to the Defendants. They appealed and the SC Supreme Court affirmed Judge Rhodes.

(e) The Federal Land Bank of Columbia, v. Ida Walker Wood, et al., 334 F Sup. 1124. Again, he did most of the research and preparation of Briefs for the attorney of record. The case involved the construction of a Will. The wife and children of the deceased sought a construction that would close the class of heirs so that they could borrow money to pay debts and keep the real property in the estate out of foreclosure. This was the only chance they had, but the Federal District Court of SC ruled otherwise, and the US Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.

20. Judicial office: Probate Judge for York County, January 1979, reelected continuously since without opposition.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) Estate of Ruby Hucks Wolfe, Case 88ES4600138. This is the first jury trial ever in the York county Probate Court. The jury panel was qualified and drawn from a Common Pleas pool. The case was settled by the attorneys before the jury could decide it, but history was made and the procedures were carried out the same as in jury trials in Common Pleas Court.

(b) Estate of Hiram Clyde Williams, Case 803, File 22727. A case of novel impression in SC. The Circuit judge affirmed his order and was appealed to the SC Court of Appeals, but it was withdrawn prior to a decision. The SC Probate Code, since adopted, affirmed by statute his decision.

(c) W. M. Mauldin, Jr., Trustee, v. Ann M. Faircloth, et al., Case 87-2 (1987). The first trust matter heard under the new S.C.P.C. Under the 1986 Tax Reform Act a family held business could save approximately $25.000 per year in taxes by changing to Subchapter S Corporation. However, Subchapter S status was not available if any stock held in a trust. The trust was terminated pursuant to a single case precedent decided by the SC Supreme Court. Virtually all of the testimony came from CPAs and actuaries.

(d) Estate of J. H. Chappell, Case 86ES4600194. Three Wills were offered for probate in this case. The last dated Will was admitted to Probate. It was contested by two of the children of the deceased. The matter was heard by the Court without a jury. After two full days of testimony and evidence, the Will was upheld. An appeal was taken to the court of common pleas, but dismissed with prejudice.

(e) Estate of James A. Woodruff, Case 88ES4600077. Involved an unusual Will and testamentary trust. The Will was contested by the children and the matter was heard by the Court without a jury. The Will was upheld. As appeal followed to the Circuit Court but was dismissed with prejudice. An action to construe the Will and testamentary trust was then filed. The ruling of the court was appealed to the Circuit court, but later withdrawn. Other matters pertaining to the application of the principal and income law of trust are now pending.

23. He ran unsuccessfully for York county Council against a long-time incumbent in 1976. He ran because the incumbent had announced that he was retiring, but changed his mind and filed. Alford did not campaign and still received 42% of the vote.

24. Occupation, business or profession other than the practice of law: Working his way though college and law school, he was a boilermaker, pipefitter, carpenter, meat cutter and television camera operator. He worked for Daniel Construction Company in 1964, 1965, and 1966. He worked for WNOK-TV in Columbia in 1967. He worked for the A&P in 1968 and 1969. He was a SC Senate page in 1970 and 1971.

27. He is unaware of any business relationships or financial arrangements that could constitute a conflict of interest. If he ever experienced one while serving on the bench, he would follow the judicial canons of ethics to the letter. He would recuse himself if there could be even an appearance of conflict of interest.

33. His last complete physical was by Dr. J. A. Patrick in May 1986. He is in excellent health, maintaining his condition by running about 15 miles per week and playing tennis almost every week.

35. He has worn reading glasses for about two years.

39. Bar associations and professional organizations:
York County Bar Association, Past President of the York county Young Lawyers' Association, 1975; South Carolina Bar Association; SC Probate Judges' Association, President, 1984-85; National College of Probate Judges.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
Past President of SC United Way and of the Western York County United Way; Community Action Vice President of the SC Jaycees; Past President of the York Jaycees; Past President of the Greater York Chamber of Commerce; Past President of the York Red Cross Chapter; Past Chairman of the York County Boy Scout Council; Executive Board of the Palmetto Council of Boy Scouts; Past President of the York Rotary Club; Past President of the York county Mental Health Association; Past President of the Camp Arc Council which established special olympics and residential camps for the mentally handicapped; Judge Advocate for American Legion Post #34 for a number of Years; Trustee and Director of the York county Crescent Shrine Club; Honorary, Chairman of March of Dimes Walk-a-thon; Dixie Youth Baseball Council; Mason;, Elk; Active member of Trinity United Methodist Church, taught sunday school, served on the Administrative Board, council on Ministries, Lay Leader and Chairman of the Pastor Parish Relations Committee; Served as Lay Representative to the Annual Conference of the SC United Methodist Church in 1989; coached basketball in the Rock Hill Church League for several years; twice received "Project of the Year" awards from the York Jaycees, and was named Key Man and Jaycee of the Year; Named outstanding State Vice President of the SC Jaycees; received the York Jaycees' "Distinguished Service Award" in 1976 and named one of the three Outstanding Young Men in SC in 1977; received Jaycee's highest award, J.C. I. Senator in 1977; received Rotary's highest award, Paul Harris Fellow, from the York Rotary Club in 1989; Named "Shriner of the Year" by the York County Shrine Club in 1989; York County's nominee for the "Nine Who Care Award" in 1989.
41. He has worked very hard to upgrade the Probate Court system in SC. With the help of the attorneys who have practiced before him, many contested cases have been amicable resolved. Some cases have been appealed, but, as of this time, none of his Orders have been reversed. He believes this shows his dedication to the law and his ability to apply the law properly in the cases presented to him.

He would like the opportunity to become a legal scholar in areas of the law other than probate. If given the opportunity, he will dedicate himself to giving the time and effort necessary to do an effective job. His goal is to be the best Circuit Judge he can possibly be and to make a contribution to the State as a jurist.

42. Five letters of recommendation:

(a) F. M. Clinton, President, Bank of York

P.O. Box 339, York, SC 29745.

(b) M. H. Carroll, Jr., Clerk of Court

P.O. Box 649, York, SC 29745.

(c) Caldwell A. Barron

P.O. Box 66, York, SC 29745

(d) Rev. J. Frank Manning

22 E. Liberty St., York, SC 29745

(e) Raymond C. Eubanks, Probate Judge

Room 185, County Courthouse, Spartanburg, SC 29301

Q. MR. ALFORD, YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR THE AT LARGE SEAT NO. 9; IS THAT CORRECT, SIR?
A. YES, SIR, THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. DID YOU FIND ANYTHING WE NEED TO CORRECT OR YOU WOULD LIKE TO ELABORATE UPON ON YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY?
A. I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE ONE CORRECTION. I NOTED THAT--AND ALL THIS TESTIMONY TODAY IS JOGGING MY MEMORY--THAT THERE, AND I DIDN'T LIST IT BUT THERE WAS AT ONE TIME A PRO SE ACTION FILED IN FEDERAL COURT BY SOME PERSON IN PENNSYLVANIA REGARDING--AND THEY SUED A NUMBER OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS. I COULDN'T MAKE HEADS OR TAILS OF THE LAWSUIT. I DON'T KNOW WHAT IT WAS ABOUT. IT WAS DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AND THAT WAS ENDED BUT I HAD FORGOTTEN ABOUT THAT UNTIL I STARTED HEARING SOME OF THESE OTHER MATTERS.
Q. THANK YOU.
A. I'M SORRY THAT I OMITTED THAT BUT I JUST DIDN'T RECALL IT IN TIME.
Q. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORT NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW; LIKEWISE, NO REPRIMANDS FROM THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS IN YORK COUNTY AND THE YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. SLED RECORDS CHECK WAS ALSO CLEAR AND YOUR FINGERPRINT CARD HAS BEEN SENT TO THE F.B.I. AS FAR AS JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS, OTHER THAN THE ONE THAT YOU HAVE JUST DISCLOSED IN CHECKING WITH THE RECORDS OF YORK COUNTY AND THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM, THERE WERE NO OTHER ACTIONS FOUND IN WHICH YOU WERE A PARTY. FINANCIAL INFORMATION: YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT WERE FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY WITH NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS. YOUR CREDIT REPORT WAS ALSO FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY. YOU REPORTED YOUR LAST PHYSICAL AS BEING IN 1986 WITH YOUR HEALTH BEING EXCELLENT. AS FAR AS JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE, YOU ARE CURRENTLY A PROBATE JUDGE IN YORK COUNTY AND HAVE BEEN SINCE 1979; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. AND PRIOR TO THAT YOU WERE IN PRIVATE PRACTICE FROM 1971 TO '79?
A. YES, SIR, THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. ALL RIGHT. IS THIS THE FIRST TIME THAT YOU HAVE SOUGHT A STATEWIDE JUDICIAL POSITION?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. WE HAVEN'T RECEIVED ANY COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS IN REGARD TO YOUR CANDIDACY AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY TODAY. UNLESS YOU HAVE ANY OTHER STATEMENTS, MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: LEE, I NOTICE IN YOUR DESCRIPTION OF YOUR FIRST TRIAL YOU MADE REFERENCE TO JUDGE BILL RHODES, DESCRIBED HIM AS BEING PATIENT AND KIND BUT A TASK MASTER. I WOULD AGREE WITH WHAT YOU SAID AND WOULD SAY THAT IF EVERY JUDGE IN SOUTH CAROLINA WAS LIKE BILL RHODES, WE WOULD HAVE A WONDERFUL JUDICIARY.
A. I AGREE 100 PERCENT.

SENATOR LOURIE: I WORKED FOR JUDGE RHODES AS ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATIVE; QUITE A JOB.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: HE'S A WONDERFUL MAN. THANK YOU.
A. THANK YOUR, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MR. TOM DILLARD.

(THOMAS C. DILLARD, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Thomas C. Dillard

Home Address: Business Address:

667 Stafford Avenue 258 N. Church Street

Spartanburg, SC 29302 Spartanburg, SC 29301

2. He was born in Whitmire, South Carolina on October 23, 1942.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. On July 16, 1984, in Newberry County, as the moving party he received a final divorce from his first wife on the grounds of one year separation.
He was married to Brenda Robinson on October 19, 1986. He has three children: Anna Ruth, age 25, (R. N. Baptist Hospice); Deborah S. Maness, age 27, (Production Assistant, Felter's Inc.); and Hope S. Davis, age 25, (Switchboard Operator, Cone Mills).

5. Military Service: None.
6. He attended Newberry College from 1961-63 and from 1968-70, earning a B.A. degree in 1970 (He left school in 1963 to work, returning in 1968). He earned a JD degree from USC School of law in 1973 (1971-73).

7. He worked full time while attending college.

8. He has continued his legal education by attending the Trial Lawyers Association convention seminars since 1986. Prior to that, he attended regular CLE seminars at USC Law School.

12. Legal Experience since graduation from law school:
1973-1981 Associate with Robert C. Lake, Jr. in a general civil and criminal practice.
1981-1986 A sole practitioner in Union, SC, in a general civil and criminal practice.
1986-now Spartanburg County Assistant Public Defender, criminal practice.

14. Frequency of appearances in court:
Federal - none
State - usually monthly
Other - none

15. Percentage of litigation:
Civil: 25% Criminal: 55% Domestic: 20%
(Since 1986, 100% Criminal)

16. Percentage of cases in trial courts:
Jury: 30% Non-Jury: 70%

Sole Counsel.

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) State v. Sole Dowlington. Tried for murder. After a two day trial, the jury returned verdict of Guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter and Defendant was sentenced to 3 years. Significant because he was able to convince a jury that the Defendant had no malice.

(b) State v. Margarito Guiterrez. Tried for murder. He was able to have most of the State's evidence excluded during the trial and, after the State rested their case, they agreed to let the Defendant plead to involuntary manslaughter which reduced the Defendant's sentence from life to 3 years.

(c) Nickey B. Toby v. Secretary of Health and Human Services. A case he carried from the administrative level to U.S. District Court on appeal. This case was significant in the time involved to secure Claimant's retroactive benefits -- from time of filing to last appeal was 7 years.

(d) State v. Jerry Wood. Tried for murder. This case was a significant one in giving him experience in trying felony cases.

(e) State v. James Ferguson. Tried for Armed Robbery. This case was also significant in giving him valuable experience in trying felony cases.

18. Civil appeals: Appellate work is done by the Office of Appellate Defense. He has not participated in appellate work since his association with Robert C. Lake, Jr.

20. Judicial Office: From 1981-86 he was Judge, Town of Whitmire Municipal Court, appointed by Town Council. This jurisdiction was limited to crimes which carried a maximum penalty of 30 days or $200 fine.

24. He worked for the City of Newberry from 1965-68, and as a water plant operator for them while attending college from 1968-70. He was a Page in the SC Senate while attending Law School from 1971-73.

27. He is unaware of any potential conflict of interest, but in the event he became aware of one, he would divest himself of any such business or financial arrangement or recuse himself if he were a sitting Judge.

30. SC tax liens were filed in 1983, and were paid the same year.

33. Health is generally good. His last physical exam was in March, 1988, by Dr. E.J. Dickert of Newberry.

36. He was diagnosed to have mild angina in 1976 (familial) and it is controlled by medication. He is on high blood pressure medication.

39. Bar and professional organizations: South Carolina Bar Association and the South Carolina Trial Lawyers Association.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social, and fraternal organizations: Masons, Amity Lodge #87 in Newberry; York Rite Bodies in Newberry; Shriner, Hejaz Temple in Greenville, and member, Union Elks Lodge.

41. He is on the Register to be eligible for appointment as an Administrative Law Judge position with the Federal Government. To be place on registry he was rated on experience, written examination, personal interview, references and FBI check for security clearance.

42. Five letters of reference:

(a) Mr. W. C. Bennett, Chief Executive Officer

Arthur State Bank, Main Street, Union, SC 29379

(b) Toney Lister, Esquire

P.O. Box 2229, Spartanburg SC 29304

(c) David E. Turnipseed, Esquire

P.O. Box 1904, Spartanburg, SC 29304

(d) Robert C. Lake, Jr., Esquire

P.O. Box 338, Whitmire, SC 29178

(e) Senator Horace C. Smith

P.O. Box 1144, Spartanburg, SC 29301

Q. MR. DILLARD, YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR THE AT LARGE SEAT NO. 9, ALSO; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. DID YOU FIND ANYTHING THAT WE NEED TO CLEAR UP ON THE SUMMARY OF YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE?
A. THERE IS ONLY ONE THING THAT I PROBABLY OMITTED AND I THINK IT WOULD SHOW ON THE FEDERAL COURT JUDGMENT ROLL WAS THE FACT THAT I SERVED ON THE BOARD OF NEWBERRY COUNTY HOSPITAL FROM '74 UNTIL '81 AND I THINK THERE WAS AT THAT TIME--THERE WAS A SUIT FILED BY ONE OF THE DOCTORS AGAINST THE HOSPITAL AND THE BOARD WHICH WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TRIED AND DISMISSED BY, I BELIEVE, JUDGE PERRY.
Q. DR. MANN?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. ALL RIGHT, THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW. YOUR DRIVING RECORD, AS WELL AS THE RECORDS WITH THE SPARTANBURG COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE SPARTANBURG CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT WERE FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WERE THE CHECKS WITH SLED AND THE F.B.I. YOU HAVE NOTED THE ONE CASE IN WHICH WE HAD A RECORD OF YOU BEING A PARTY. IN CHECKING WITH THE RECORDS OF SPARTANBURG COUNTY AND THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM, I BELIEVE YOU ALSO LISTED THAT IN 1983 THERE WAS A TAX LIEN THAT YOU PAID OFF THAT SAME YEAR.
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ALL RIGHT, WAS THAT A SOUTH CAROLINA INCOME TAX LIEN OR?
A. YES, SIR. TO MY KNOWLEDGE IT WAS--AS I RECALL, IT WAS WITHHOLDING AND THERE WAS A DISPUTE AS TO HOW MUCH WAS OWED BUT IT WAS SETTLED AND PAID OFF WITHIN A MATTER OF A COUPLE OF MONTHS OR MORE.
Q. THANK YOU, MR. DILLARD. FINANCIAL INFORMATION: YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT SHOWED NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS ON YOUR PART; AND YOUR CREDIT REPORT WAS SATISFACTORY. YOU NOTED THAT YOUR LAST PHYSICAL WAS IN 1988 WITH YOUR HEALTH GOOD, EXCEPT FOR BEING ON SOME HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE MEDICATION.
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. EXPERIENCE-WISE, YOU HAVE BEEN WITH THE SOLICITOR'S OFFICE IN SPARTANBURG SINCE 1986; IS THAT RIGHT?
A. PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE.
Q. EXCUSE ME, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE. IN '73 TO '86 YOU WERE IN PRIVATE PRACTICE?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. IS THAT SPARTANBURG OR NEWBERRY?
A. THAT WAS FROM `73 TO `81 AND I WAS IN PRACTICE WITH ROBERT C. LAKE IN WHITMIRE IN NEWBERRY COUNTY AND THEN I WAS IN PRACTICE AS A SOLE PRACTITIONER FROM '81 TO '86 IN UNION.
Q. ALL RIGHT; BEFORE GOING TO THE P.D.'S OFFICE, I WOULD ASSUME THESE FIGURES THAT YOU SAID YOUR TRIAL WORK WAS BASICALLY 25 PERCENT ON THE CIVIL SIDE AND 55 ON CRIMINAL WITH ABOUT 20 PERCENT FAMILY WORK?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ALL RIGHT. I BELIEVE WE SCREENED YOU LAST YEAR OR IN THE PAST YEAR ANYWAY FOR A JUDICIAL SEAT?
A. FEBRUARY OF THIS YEAR, YES.
Q. WE HAVEN'T RECEIVED ANY COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS IN REGARD TO YOUR CANDIDACY AND THERE AREN'T ANY WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY TODAY. IS THERE ANYTHING THAT HAS CHANGED SINCE YOUR LAST SCREENING THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COMMITTEE?
A. NO, SIR, NOT THAT I'M AWARE OF.
Q. ALL RIGHT, WE JUST HAVE ONE ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER THAT WE NEED TO TAKE UP WITH YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WE NEED TO, AGAIN, HAVE A VERY BRIEF PRIVATE MEETING WITH MR. DILLARD.

(EXECUTIVE SESSION AT 12:10 P.M.)

(EXECUTIVE SESSION CONCLUDED AT 12:12 P.M; RECONVENED PUBLIC SESSION.)

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: HENRY MCKELLAR.

(L. HENRY MCKELLAR, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. L. Henry McKellar
Home Address: Business Address:
127 Arcadia Springs Circle 1401 Main Street
Columbia, SC 29206 Columbia, SC 29226

2. He was born May 27, 1945, in Augusta, Georgia.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He was married on April 13, 1989, to Jan W. McKellar.
5. Military service: Served in the US Navy, November 1968 through August, 1972; E5 Honorable discharge, July 24, 1974. Serial No. ***-**-*****.

6. He received a BA Degree in History from USC (1963-67) and a JD Degree from USC Law School. He attended Law School from 1967-68 and from 1972-74, with service in the Navy between.

7. Significant activities in school: Page, SC Senate 1963-68; Vice President, Inter-Fraternity Council, 1966; Sigma Chi Fraternity.

8. Continuing legal/judicial education: Corporate litigation, consumer litigation, banking law, trial basics, evidence, civil trial practice, rules of civil procedure, lender liability, damages and remedies, civil litigation, trial advocacy and criminal practice in South Carolina.

9. Courses taught or lectures presented:
Speaker, SC Bar CLE Seminar, April 1986 - "Consumer Litigation."
Speaker, SC Bar Convention, June 1986 - Corporations, Banking and Securities Section.
Speaker, SC Bar Convention, June 1987 - Consumer Law Section.
Speaker, SC Bar Convention, June 1990 - Corporations, Banking and Securities Section.
Lecturer, National Business Institute CLE Seminar, May 1986 - "Foreclosures and Repossessions."
Lecturer, Professional Education Systems, Inc., CLE Seminars, 1981-84 - Collection Law, Bankruptcy, Mortgage Foreclosures, Uniform Commercial Code, Various CLE seminars from 1981-84.
Guest lecturer at various Law School classes during the last 10 years on Commercial Paper and Banking Law.

10. Published books or articles written: Outlines for seminars presented.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
Partner, Holler, Gregory & McKellar Nov. 1974 - Feb. 1978
General practice including civil criminal domestic administrative business, real estate and probate law.
South Carolina National Bank, Law Depart. Feb. 1978 - present
Litigation in State and Federal Courts as plaintiff and defendant. Cases involved issues of the Uniform Commercial Code, consumer laws, RICO Statute, and trust, corporate, contract, tort, banking, property and construction law.

14. Frequency of appearances in court:
Federal - 5 trials, 1 summary judgment
State - 14 trials, 16 summary judgments
In last 5 years

15. Percentage of litigation:

Civil: 100%

16. Percentage of cases in trial courts:
Jury 75% Non-Jury 25%
Sole counsel in 7, chief counsel 6, associate counsel 6

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) Cullum Electric and Mechanical, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Association of South Carolina, 336 F. Supp. 418 (1976), Aff. 569 F. 2d 821 (1978), cert. denied. Defended 20 year old bidding procedure of the mechanical construction industry against allegations that the bidding procedure violated anti-trust laws. This bidding procedure is still in effect and promotes fairness in the bidding process on large construction jobs.

(b) Read v. South Carolina National Bank, 335 S.E. 2d 359 (S.C. 1985). Granted directed verdict in case against bank for paying checks which contained forged signatures. Established duty of bank customer to examine checks and report forgeries. Opinion of lower court reprinted as decision of Supreme Court.

(c) South Carolina National Bank v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 376 S.E. 2d 512 (S.C. 1989). Action by SCN to recover $166,912.22 in taxes paid in a protest. The Supreme Court ruled that new six year statute for assessing taxes could not be applied retroactively to returns prior to the effective date of the statute.

(d) Burwell v. South Carolina National Bank, 340 S.E. 2d 786 (S.C. 1986). Action by guarantor of loan to recover $239, 000.00 actual damages and $250, 000.00 punitive damages on the grounds of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Supreme Court reversed trial jury's verdict of $489, 000.00, holding that the Plaintiff was responsible for the documents he signed and that no fiduciary duty existed between a commercial borrower and the bank.

(e) W.E. Gilbert Associates v. South Carolina National Bank, 330 S.E. 2d 307 (S.C. App. 1985). Action for $800,000.00 against SCN for breach of construction management services contract. Jury returned a verdict for $47,500.00 which was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which held that there was no binding contract.

18. Five civil appeals:

(a) Cullum Electric and Mechanical, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 418 (1976) Aff. 569 F. 2d 821 (1978), cert. denied.

(b) South Carolina National Bank v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 376 S.E. 2d 512 (S.C. 1989).

(c) Read v. South Carolina National Bank, 335 S.E. 2d 359 (S.C. 1985).

(d) Bankers Trust v. South Carolina National Bank, et al., 325 S.E. 2d 81 (S.C. App. 1985).

(e) Rush v. South Carolina National Bank, 343 S.E. 2d 667 (S.C. App. 1986).

22. Public office: Mayor of the Town of Arcadia Lakes, May 1977-October 1985.

24. Occupation, business or profession other than the practice of law: Summer jobs, including police officer, Town of Nantucket, Mass., summer of 1967 and 1968.

27. He has no financial arrangements or business relationships which could constitute a possible conflict of interest.
33. His last physical exam was by Dr. Walt J. Roberts of Columbia. He is in excellent health.

39. Bar associations and professional organizations:
South Carolina Bar; Richland County and American Bar Associations; South Carolina Trial Lawyers Association.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
Wildewood Country Club

42. Five letters of recommendation:

(a) Robert S. McCoy, Jr. Executive Vice President,

SCNB, 1426 Main Street, Columbia, SC 29226

(b) Manton M. Grier, Esquire

P.O. Box 11889, Columbia, SC 29211

(c) John H. Lumpkin, Sr., Esquire

P.O. Box 11390, Columbia, SC 29211

(d) G. Dana Sinkler, Esquire

P.O. Box 340, Charleston, SC 29402

(e) Edward J. Hamilton, Jr., Associate General Counsel

SCNB, 101 Greystone Blvd.-Room 252, Columbia, SC 29226

Q. MR. MCKELLAR, YOU HAVE ALSO APPLIED FOR THE 9TH CIRCUIT AT LARGE SEAT; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. DID YOU FIND ANYTHING ON YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE SUMMARY THAT WE NEED TO CHANGE OR CLEAR UP?
A. THERE'S ONE CLARIFICATION. I'M NO LONGER A CURRENT MEMBER OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA TRIAL LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION. I WAS A MEMBER FOR ABOUT 10 YEARS. I DON'T REMEMBER EXACTLY WHEN I--(PAUSE).
Q. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS OF THE RICHLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE COLUMBIA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. THE SLED RECORDS SECTION CHECK WAS ALSO CLEAR AND YOUR FINGERPRINT CARD WAS SENT TO THE F.B.I. AS FAR AS JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS, WE CHECKED THE RECORDS OF RICHLAND COUNTY AND WITH THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM, SLED REPORTED BACK ONE; HOWEVER, I'M NOT SO SURE IT'S YOU. THERE WAS A--WE ASKED THEM TO CHECK IN THE NAME OF L. HENRY MCKELLAR AND THERE WAS A STUDENT LOAN DEFAULT THAT WAS NOTED AND IT WAS LARRY MCKELLAR.
A. THAT'S NOT ME.
Q. YOUR FIRST NAME IS LOUIS AND I JUST WANTED TO CLEAR THAT UP FOR THE RECORD.
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. AND MAKE SURE THAT YOU UNDERSTOOD THAT THAT DID NOT PERTAIN TO YOU.
A. NO, IT DOESN'T.
Q. AS FAR AS THE FINANCIAL INFORMATION PROVIDED, YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND YOUR FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT WERE SATISFACTORY WITH NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS FOUND. YOUR CREDIT REPORT WAS ALSO FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY. EXPERIENCE: YOU'VE WORKED AS GENERAL COUNSEL FOR S.C.N. SINCE 1978; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. WELL, ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL.
Q. YOU'RE CURRENTLY ASSOCIATE GENERAL COUNSEL?
A. RIGHT.
Q. THUSLY, ALL OF YOUR PRACTICE HAS BEEN IN THE CIVIL AREA; IS THAT RIGHT?
A. WELL, PRIOR TO WORKING FOR THE BANK I WORKED IN PRIVATE PRACTICE WHERE I HANDLED CRIMINAL MATTERS AND DOMESTIC MATTERS.
Q. ABOUT HOW MANY YEARS WERE YOU---
A. ABOUT THREE-AND-A-HALF YEARS.
Q. WAS THAT HERE IN COLUMBIA?
A. HERE IN COLUMBIA, YES.
Q. IT'S NOTED THAT 75 PERCENT OF YOUR WORK IS JURY WORK?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT YOU HAVE APPEARED BEFORE THE SCREENING COMMITTEE; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. WE HAVE RECEIVED NO COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS IN REGARD TO YOUR APPLICATION TO THE JUDICIARY AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY TODAY IN REGARD TO YOUR CANDIDACY. I DON'T HAVE ANY OTHER QUESTIONS, MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY OTHER MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, MR. MCKELLAR.
A. THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: GEORGE O'KELLEY.

(GEORGE H. O'KELLEY, JR., FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. George H. O'Kelley, Jr.
Home Address: Business Address:
U 425 Lost Island P.O. Box 1072
Beaufort, SC 29902 Beaufort, SC 29901

2. He was born in Florence, May 4, 1942.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Yancey Heins on June 20, 1970. They have three children: G. Hamlin, III, age 18, (student); Arthur H. age 15, (student), and Wade P., age 13, (student).

5. He was on active duty from 1968-71 in the US Marine Corps; Captain-0103638, discharged in 1972. Recommissioned in the USMC Reserves in 1984. Currently in USMC Active Reserve. Rank of Major. Service number ***-**-*****.

6. He attended Wingate Jr. College, 1960-61, transferred to The Citadel and earned his BA Degree (1961-65). He attended USC Law School from 1965-68, earning his JD Degree.

7. Significant activities in school:
Citadel: Summerall Guards; Class Editor of Yearbook; Newspaper staff; Platoon Commander; Senior Board of Directors; History Club, Secretary; Calliopean Literary Society, 1964-65.
Law School: Page, SC House of Rep.; Law Clerk; Phi Delta Phi, 1966-68.

8. Continuing legal/judicial education:
1990 Ethics Seminar & Environmental Law Seminar: 14.67 hrs.
1989 JAG School & Personal Injury Seminars: 13.75 hrs.
1988 Evaluating Damages & Discovery Techniques: 10.50 hrs.
1987 Probate, JAG School & Fraudulent Check Seminars: 17.66 hrs.
1986 Recent Sup. Ct. Decisions (2 parts), Probate: 18.50 hrs.
1985 JAG Sch., Naval Just. Sch., Mun. Judges Course: 17.25 hrs.

9. Courses taught or lectures presented: USC at Beaufort, Instructor, Business Law, seven years; Beaufort Academy, Advisor, Moot Court Terms and Law Instructor; Law Center, Parris Island, conducted Trial Advocacy Seminar.

10. Published books or articles written:
"Buying A Home", Marine Corps Gazette, Sept. 1989, Vol. 73, No. 9.
"Willie McGee" column in The Lowcountry Ledger. Pen name used in writing the column in this Beaufort newspaper for about a year.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
1969-71 USMC, Trial & defense; Military Judge, court work.
1971-75 Associate, Levin & Sams; general practice
1975-80 Partner, O'Kelley, Fordham & Reid; general, civil and criminal practice
1980-now Sole practicitioner; general practice.
1982-85 Municipal Judge, City of Beaufort

14. Frequency of appearances in court:
Federal - infrequent, 5 to 7 cases
State - frequent, several cases on each local roster and in other counties.
Other - Magistrate. A few; probate, non-jury, etc.

15. Percentage of litigation:

Civil: 85% Criminal: 5% Domestic: 10%

16. Percentage of cases in trial courts:
Jury 60% Non-Jury 40%
Generally sole counsel; occasionally co-counsel from another firm.

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) U.S. vs. Harris Court Martial in Vietnam, involving a "fragging". Sixty-two wounded and one killed. He defended first accused tried. Trial lasted a week and resulted in not guilty verdict. This was an extremely hard-fought case. It has been recently reported in a new book entitled Marine Lawyers in Vietnam: Trial by Fire.

(b) U.S. vs. Reginauer Court Martial in Vietnam for murder, aggravated assault and other charges. He defended with another Marine lawyer. Acquittal was had on the murder. Sentence was 15 years on other charges. Chief government witness was Medal of Honor winner. Very hard fought case involving attempted plea of temporary insanity due to drug inducement. This didn't work.

(c) Marvil Properties vs. Fripp Island, 258 SE 2d 106, 273 SC 619. Dealt with a partnership suing in its own name. Decision resulted in legislature changing law to allow partnerships to sue in own name.

(d) South Carolina Ins. Co. vs. Estrada, 287 SE 2d 475. Tried twice and to SC Supreme Court once. Involved stacking of UM insurance. Although this issue was resolved by second trial, research and issues were complex and interesting.

(e) Youmans and Parks vs. Ford Motor Co. Case is ongoing. Products liability action concerning hatchback on 1981 Capri vehicle. Case is four years old and has been extremely complex and a great learning experience.

18. Civil appeals:

(a) Marvil Properties vs. Fripp Island, 258 SE 2d 106, 273 SC 619 (1979). Appeal from Beaufort County court of Common Pleas to S.C. Supreme Court.

(b) South Carolina Ins. Co. vs. Estrada, 287 SE 2d 475, (1982). Appeal from Lexington County to SC Supreme Court.

(c) Friedman vs. Town of Port Royal, Beaufort County court of Common Pleas, Case No. 89-CP-07-43, argued before SC Court of Appeals on Sept. 12, 1990.

20. Judicial office: Appointed by Beaufort City Council as Municipal Judge, Served 1982-85. Jurisdiction: Thirty days and/or $200 maximum.
Appointed a Military Judge for Special Courts-Martial in 1970. Served as such in 1970 and '71. Jurisdiction: Six months confinement, bad conduct discharge, forfeitures of pay, reduction in rank.

22. Public office: Elected to Beaufort City Council, 1979-82.

23. He ran for SC House in 1976, losing by 170 votes.

25. He is a member and current secretary of an investment club, a partnership with 14 members. They invest in stocks and real estate.

27. He knows of no financial arrangements or business relationships which could constitute a conflict of interest. If a conflict arose, he would make this known to all counsel and excuse myself from sitting in the matter.

33. His last physical was in August, 1988, at the Parris Island Branch Clinic. His health is excellent.

35. He wears eyeglasses.

39. Bar associations and professional organizations:
South Carolina Bar; Beaufort County Bar, Treasurer 1988, First Vice President 1989, President 1990.
40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
Carteret Street Methodist Church; Beaufort Academy Board of Directors; Chairman, Vietnam Veteran's Memorial Committee, Beaufort; Recipient of Navy Achievement Medal; Beaufort Citadel Club; Director, Association of Citadel Men.

41. He has been engaged in general practice and litigation for approximately 20 years, with much of his practice in the court room. This, coupled with his experience as a municipal judge, has given him the experience and learning which he believes qualifies him as a candidate for this position.

42. Five letters of recommendation:
(a) Raymond Moloney, City Executive

NCNB, P.O. Box 508, Beaufort, SC 29902

(b) Henry C. Chambers, c/o Beaufort Realty

210 Carteret Street, Beaufort, SC 29902

(c) Raymond H. Williams, Esquire

P.O. Box 1027, Beaufort, SC 29901

(d) Rev. James E. Alewine

P.O. Box 788, Beaufort, SC 29901

(e) Maj. Gen. O. F. Peatross, USMC (Ret.)

Rt 2, Box 71, St. Helena Island, SC 29920

Q. MR. O'KELLEY, YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR THE SEAT NO. 9 AT LARGE CIRCUIT COURT; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. DID YOU FIND ANYTHING ON THE SUMMARY OF YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE THAT WE NEED TO FIX?
A. THERE ARE A COUPLE OF UPDATES. I SEE EVERYBODY IS BEING THOROUGH, SO I BETTER BRING THEM UP. SINCE I FILED THIS, I HAVE HAD ANOTHER PHYSICAL IN OCTOBER. AND I HAVE ALSO NOW BEEN ELECTED AS PRESIDENT OF THE BEAUFORT COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION; I HAD VICE PRESIDENT ON THERE. ALSO, QUESTION 31 ASKED IF I HAD EVER BEEN SUED PERSONALLY OR PROFESSIONALLY. I HAVE NOT BEEN SUED PERSONALLY BUT I WAS JOINED IN A RECENT LAWSUIT BECAUSE I WAS STAKE HOLDER. I WAS HOLDING SOME ERNEST MONEY ON A CLOSING THAT DIDN'T DEVELOP BECAUSE OF A BUNCH OF JUDGMENTS AGAINST THE SELLER AND I WAS JOINED SIMPLY IN MY CAPACITY AS BEING THE HOLDER OF THOSE FUNDS AND IT HAS SINCE BEEN SETTLED BY THE PARTIES.
Q. THANK YOU. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORTS NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW; LIKEWISE, THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION REPORTS NO REPRIMANDS. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS OF THE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF BEAUFORT. THE SLED CHECK WAS ALSO CLEAR AND YOUR FINGERPRINT CARD HAS BEEN SENT TO THE F.B.I. AS FAR AS JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS, OTHER THAN WHAT YOU HAVE JUST DIVULGED, ON LOOKING AT THE RECORDS OF BEAUFORT COUNTY AND THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM, NOTHING APPEARS IN YOUR NAME. FINANCIAL INFORMATION: YOUR STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENTS REVEAL NO CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS AND YOUR CREDIT REPORT WAS FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY. AND YOU MADE A NOTATION AS FAR AS YOUR LAST PHYSICAL. FROM A LEGAL EXPERIENCE OR JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE STANDPOINT YOU NOTE THAT YOU HAD SERVED AS A MUNICIPAL JUDGE IN BEAUFORT FROM 1982 TO 1985; IS THAT RIGHT?
A. '82 TO '87, I BELIEVE. IT WAS FIVE-AND-A-HALF YEARS STARTING IN '82, SO.
Q. OKAY; AND HAVE BEEN IN PRIVATE PRACTICE SINCE 1971?
A. IN BEAUFORT, YES, SIR.
Q. ALL RIGHT; AND YOUR TRIAL EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN PREDOMINANTLY CIVIL, 85 PERCENT, WITH 5 PERCENT CRIMINAL AND 10 PERCENT IN THE DOMESTIC AREA; IS THAT ABOUT RIGHT?
A. THAT'S RECENT. PRIOR TO HAVING A PUBLIC DEFENDER IN BEAUFORT IT WAS PROBABLY ABOUT 50/50.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. I DON'T BELIEVE YOU HAVE OFFERED FOR A JUDICIAL POSITION PRIOR TO THIS, HAVE YOU? THIS IS YOUR FIRST SCREENING?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ALL RIGHT. WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS IN REGARD TO YOUR CANDIDACY AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY TODAY IN REGARD TO YOUR APPLICATION. MR. CHAIRMAN, I DON'T HAVE ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS UNLESS MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE DO.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MR. O'KELLEY, WHO WROTE THE BOOK "MARINE LAWYERS IN VIETNAM"?
A. A NOW RETIRED LT. COLONEL NAMED GARY SOLIS, S-O-L-I-S. HE IS NOW STUDYING FOR A DOCTOR OF LAWS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN LONDON. I GOT A LETTER FROM HIM THE OTHER DAY.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN READING THAT BOOK.
A. IT'S A VERY WELL-DONE BOOK AND I HAVE A LOT OF CREDITS IN THERE, HAVING BEEN THERE.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WELL, I ASSUMED THAT YOU WERE MENTIONED.
A. HE SENT ME A FREE COPY.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: OKAY. THANK YOU.
A. THANK YOU, SIR.

(EXECUTIVE SESSION AT 12:21 P.M.)

(EXECUTIVE SESSION ENDED AT 12:28 P.M; RECONVENED PUBLIC SESSION.)

(JOSEPH A. WILSON, II, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

1. Joseph A. Wilson, II
Home Address: Business Address:
15 Sunturf Circle Richland Co.
Columbia, SC 29223 Judicial Center

P. O. Box 192 - Room 314

Columbia, SC 29202

2. He was born in Bishopville, South Carolina on September 20, 1947.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Sharon Burch on October 21, 1972. They have 4 children: Kali, age 15; Kiva, age 8; Joseph, III, age 4, and Steven, age 4 months.

5. Military Service: None.

6. He attended Clark College, Atlanta, Georgia, where he received a B.A. Degree in Business Administration in 1969. He received his J.D. from Yale University Law School, New Haven, Connecticut in 1973.

7. Significant activities while in school:
Officer, Student Government Association, Clark College, 1968; Keeper of the Records, Omega Psi Phi Fraternity, 1968; Member, Legal Services Organization, Yale Law School, 1970.

8. Continuing legal/judicial education:
Speaker, Office of Attorney General In-House CLE Program, 1980-88.
Attended Judicial CLE for Family Court Judges annually as required by Supreme Court Rules.
Attended one week CLE Program on Family Law and Trial Issues, sponsored by the National Conference of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, October, 1989

9. Course taught or lectures delivered:
Lectured at CLE Program -- Federal Practice and 1983 Actions
CLE Program Administrative Law/SC FOI Law and Procedure.
Speaker, Minorities and the Law, SC Bar Law Related Education. Conference, 1990.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
Associate with Sachs, Sachs, and Sachs, Attorneys, New Haven, Connecticut, 1973-1974
Assistant Attorney General, State of South Carolina, 1975-1976;
Private practice of law, 1976-1979, Wilson and Washington (employed in law offices of E. W. Cromartie, October - December, 1976)
Assistant Solicitor, Twelfth Judicial Circuit, Florence, South Carolina (part-time)
Assistant United States Attorney, District of South Carolina, 1980-1982; Partner, Brown, Stanley and Wilson, Attorneys at law, Columbia, South Carolina, 1982-1983.

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) Ernest Patterson v. Susan R. Patterson, Richland County Family Court, 78-DR-40-0444 Significant because it represented a hotly contested divorce involving middle aged parties with strong disagreement as to property division, fault, etc. Legal research, client conferences, extensive negotiation, hearing preparation and patience required.

(b) Taylor v. United States, Civil Action No. 80-378-) U.S.D.C.S.C. A major claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages arising out of the alleged failure of Army counseling personnel to institutionalize a soldier who later murdered Ms.Taylor. Claim was a major interest to the Department of Justice because of the damage claim involved and the disputed compensability of such a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

(c) United States v. Yates, United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, Circuit Court No. 80-1668 -- Unanimous reversal by the Fourth Circuit of a Federal District Court decision which potentially would have thwarted the Veterans Administration's ability to recoup losses incurred as a result of default by its borrowers.

(d) Gregg v. Dorchester County School System and State Workers Compensation Fund, Supreme Court Opinion No. 20595, February 7, 1978 - Total disability case which tested the applicability of the "going and coming from work rule" to a trip by claimant which resulted in a tragic accident and substantial damages suffered by claimant.

(e) Carll v. S.C. Jobs Economic Development Authority, S.C. Supreme Court, Opinion No. 22248, February 26, 1985 -- Lawsuit brought to test the constitutionality of statute which created JEDA. Participated in strategy sessions and made major segment of Circuit Court legal argument on behalf of the Authority and acted as co-counsel in litigation. Circuit Court finding of constitutionality ultimately affirmed by Supreme Court.

(f) Royal Business Machines v. State Budget and Control Board, Richland county Court of Common Pleas, Docket No. 85-CP-40-0881. Case tested the extent of monetary remedies available to a disgruntled bidder under provisions of Consolidated Procurement Code.

18. Five civil appeals: Answers incorporated into question #17.

20. Judicial Office: Family Court Judge, Fifth Judicial Circuit, Seat 2, elected to fill unexpired term commencing July 1, 1988 and expiring June 30, 1989. Jurisdiction includes divorce and related matters, support, juvenile, abuse and neglect matters.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) William Petoskey v. Rebecca Petoskey and James Cates
89-DR-40-0025
This was a complex divorce and custody case which was hotly contested. Issues involved were custody, support, visitation, equitable division, exclusive use of marital home, alimony and attorneys fees. Various expert witnesses and exhibits were submitted relative to the custody issue.

(b) Karen B. Whisnant v. Frank L. Whisnant, Jr.
89-DR-37-316
This complex case was tried for several days and involved issues of divorce, child custody, alimony, equitable distribution, attorneys fees, and costs. More than twenty witnesses were called including several experts by both sides. Issues involving the definition of marital property and transmutation of property were contested as well as the issue of child custody. The final order of approximately thirty-five pages was not appealed.

(c) Susan K. Stephens v. Mark Edward Stephens
89-DR-23-1268
Hotly contested change of custody case, involving numerous experts, psychological testing, exhibits and testimony. Seventeen witnesses testified and more than three dozen exhibits were introduced. Case was heard for three days and vigorously contested.

(d) Edward R. Cornwell, Sr. v. Betty Jean Cornwell
88-DR-19-076
Vigorously contested case involving issues of property division, alimony, attorneys fees and costs. Determination of the marital estate, valuation of assets, and proper division of Retirement Plan were contested and decided.

(e) Susan Allston v. Donald Allston
88-DR-10-2782
This two day hotly contested case involved issues of divorce, child custody, child support, equitable distribution and attorneys fees. Unique issues of transmutation of marital property were raised by the parties and decided. Identification and valuation of the sizable marital estate was vigorously contested.

22. Public Office: Richland County Council member, March 1977 to June 1978 - appointed by the Governor to fill unexpired term; Chief Deputy Attorney General, January 1983 to June 1988.

23. Unsuccessful Candidate: Defeated in a run off election for the South Carolina House of Representatives, 1978.

24. Occupation, business or profession other than the practice of law: Instructor in Business Law, Allen University, 1977 (part-time).

27. He has no known financial arrangements or business relationships which could constitute a conflict of interest. He would consult the Code of Judicial Conduct in resolving any potential conflict and where appropriate, would recuse himself.

33. His health is good. His last physical was in February 1990 by Dr. Waitus O. Tanner.

36. Currently taking prescription for mild hypertension.

39. Bar Associations and Professional Organizations:
South Carolina and Richland County Bar Associations; Columbia Lawyers Association; Elected to House of Delegates, SC Bar, 1986; Richland County Bar Program Committee, 1987-88; Commission of Lawyer Competence, 1981-82 (appointed by Supreme Court); Service to Indigent Committee, SC Bar, 1987-88.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social, and fraternal organizations: Richland Lexington Economic Development Commission; Board Chairman, Columbia Urban League; Board of Trustees and Men's Choir, Francis Burns United Methodist Church; Image Campaign Steering Committee, Columbia Chamber of Commerce; Omega Psi Phi Fraternity; Columbia Action Council.

42. Five letters of reference:

(a) James Bennett, Vice President

Republic National Bank

1208 Washington Street, Columbia, SC 29201

(b) I.S. Leevy Johnson, Esquire

P. O. Box l431, Columbia, SC 29202

(c) H. Ronald Stanley, Esquire

P.O. Box 7722, Columbia, SC 29202

(d) Hardwick Stuart, Jr., Esquire

P. O. Box 394, Columbia, SC 29202

(e) Kermit King, Esquire

P. O. Box 7667, Columbia, SC 29202

Q. JUDGE WILSON, YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR AT LARGE SEAT NO. 10; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. DID YOU FIND ANYTHING ON THE SUMMARY OF YOUR QUESTIONNAIRE THAT WE NEED TO CHANGE OR CLEAR UP?
A. I DID NOT FIND ANYTHING.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. IN CHECKING WITH THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES WERE FILED AGAINST YOU WHILE PRACTICING LAW; NO REPRIMANDS ISSUED BY THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS FOUND TO BE CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS FOR THE RICHLAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE COLUMBIA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. LIKEWISE, CHECKS WITH SLED AND THE F.B.I. WERE ALSO NEGATIVE. IN LOOKING AT JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS IN WHICH YOU MAY HAVE BEEN A PARTY, WE CHECKED THE RICHLAND COUNTY RECORDS AND THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM AND FOUND NO ENTRIES IN YOUR NAME AS A PARTY.
A. NO.
Q. AS FAR AS FINANCIAL INFORMATION, YOU PROVIDED A STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND A FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT, BOTH OF WHICH DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS ON YOUR PART. YOUR CREDIT REPORT WAS FOUND TO BE SATISFACTORY. YOU REPORTED YOUR LAST PHYSICAL AS BEING IN FEBRUARY WITH YOUR HEALTH BEING GOOD. YOU ARE CURRENTLY SERVING ON THE FAMILY COURT BENCH AND HAVE SINCE 1988; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. YOU WERE LAST SCREENED, WHEN, 1989?
A. I THINK SO. I THINK SO.
Q. PREVIOUS TO BEING A FAMILY COURT JUDGE YOU WERE IN PRIVATE PRACTICE AND ALSO WORKED WITH THE U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, THE SOLICITOR'S OFFICE, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. YOU'VE BEEN ALL OVER THE PLACE.
A. THAT'S RIGHT.
Q. THERE HAVE BEEN NO COMPLAINTS OR STATEMENTS RECEIVED IN REGARD TO YOUR CANDIDACY AND THERE ARE NO WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY TODAY. THERE ARE NO OTHER QUESTIONS I HAVE, UNLESS SOME OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE MAY HAVE SOME OR YOU MAY WANT TO MAKE A STATEMENT OF ANYTHING THAT MAY HAVE CHANGED SINCE 1989 OR YOUR LAST SCREENING.
A. I CAN'T THINK OF ANYTHING THAT HAS CHANGED, EXCEPT I HAVE A NEW SON. THAT'S ABOUT IT.
Q. CONGRATULATIONS.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, JUDGE.
A. THANK YOU, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ALL RIGHT, THAT CONCLUDES ALL OF THE CANDIDATES EXCEPT JUDGE PATTERSON AND MORDECAI JOHNSON. JUDGE PATTERSON, IT LOOKS TO ME LIKE IT MIGHT BE AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO BREAK FOR LUNCH. IT'S THE WILL OF THE COMMITTEE AS TO LONG HOW LONG DO YOU NEED FOR LUNCH?

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: ONE HOUR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ONE HOUR.

MR. NORFLEET: EXCUSE ME; BEFORE WE BREAK FOR LUNCH, I HAVE BEEN IN COMMUNICATION WITH JOEL BAILEY THIS MORNING WHO HAS A CASE AT 3:00 O'CLOCK IN FEDERAL COURT AND HE HAD ADVISED ME THAT HE IS ATTEMPTING TO SETTLE IT AND HE INTENDED TO TESTIFY TODAY. HE'S IN FRONT OF JUDGE HOUCK AND HE ASKED ME TO INQUIRE AS TO WHAT Y'ALL PLANNED TO DO AS CONCERNS A CONTINUANCE OR ALLOWING HIM TO TESTIFY ON ANOTHER OCCASION. HE HAD INDICATED THAT HE WANTED TO SUBPOENA SOME WITNESSES AND HE ASKED ME TO JUST INQUIRE AS TO WHAT YOUR INTENTIONS WERE, EITHER TO ALLOW HIM TO TESTIFY AT ANOTHER TIME OR TO SUBPOENA THE WITNESSES THAT HE HAS LISTED.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: HE DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER HE IS GOING TO GET HERE THIS AFTERNOON?

MR. NORFLEET: WELL, HE TOLD ME THAT HE IS AN ACTIVE--HE IS ACTIVELY TRYING TO RESOLVE THE CASE AND THAT HE WOULD HOPE TO KNOW SOMETHING AROUND NOON, BUT HE DOESN'T THINK THE PROSPECTS ARE GOOD. IT'S NELSON- MULLINS THAT'S DEFENDING THE CASE. IT'S IN CHARLESTON COUNTY OR IN CHARLESTON U.S. DISTRICT COURT BEFORE JUDGE HOUCK AND HE DOESN'T THINK THAT HE IS GOING TO GET HERE.

SENATOR LOURIE: WHY DON'T WE RECEIVE THAT INFORMATION AND TAKE IT UP WHEN WE GO INTO EXECUTIVE SESSION.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WE HEAR THE PROBLEM AND WE'LL TAKE IT UP, DEPENDING ON HOW OUR SCHEDULE MOVES AND WE'LL TRY TO FIND SOME WAY TO ACCOMMODATE HIM.

MR. NORFLEET: THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THE COMMITTEE WILL STAND IN RECESS UNTIL 1:30. DOES THAT SUIT EVERYBODY? IS THAT ENOUGH TIME?
JUDGE PATTERSON: MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE A QUESTION, IF I MAY.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: YES.

JUDGE PATTERSON: IN RESPONDING, AM I JUST PUT ON NOTICE TO RESPOND TO WHAT'S IN THE AFFIDAVIT THAT MR. BAILEY FILED? I HAVE NO NOTICE OF ANYTHING ELSE TO RESPOND TO.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: JUDGE, YOU MAY BE ASSURED THAT THE RULES OF THE COMMITTEE GIVE YOU 48 HOURS NOTICE BEFORE YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO ANYTHING, AND THE RULES WILL BE FOLLOWED.

JUDGE PATTERSON: WELL, I'M PREPARED TO RESPOND TO WHAT HAS BEEN INCLUDED IN THE AFFIDAVITS THAT I HAVE TODAY.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ALL RIGHT. THE COMMITTEE WILL STAND IN RECESS UNTIL 1:30. THE ROOM WILL BE SECURED.

(RECESS AT 12:35 P.M.; THE HEARING WILL BE RECONVENED AT APPROXIMATELY 1:30 P.M. ON THIS SAME DATE, DECEMBER 11, 1990.)

(PUBLIC SESSION RECONVENED AT 1:35 P.M.)

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: JUDGE HALL, JUST TO SAVE TIME, WHY DON'T WE GO ON AND CLEAR UP THE ONE LITTLE MATTER YOU WANTED TO DISCUSS; AND I BELIEVE THAT WAS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION, WASN'T IT?

JUDGE HALL: YES, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: Y'ALL EXCUSE US. THIS SHOULD TAKE NO MORE THAN ONE MINUTE.

(EXECUTIVE SESSION AT 1:40 P.M.)

(EXECUTIVE SESSION CONCLUDED AT 1:44 P.M.; RECONVENED PUBLIC SESSION.)
REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: JUDGE PATTERSON, ARE YOU READY?
JUDGE PATTERSON: WELL, SIR, I HOPE SO.

1. Larry Ronald Patterson

Home Address: Business Address:

9 Lake Forest Drive P.O. Box 757

Greenville, SC 29609 Greenville, SC 29602

2. He was born in Piedmont, South Carolina on September 2, 1940.

Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Susan Bowie on August 19, 1962. They have 3 children: Leora, age 24 (Teacher), Ronald, age 22 (U.S Army), and Mark, age 2l (student).

5. Military Service: March 4, 1966 through June 25, 1968; active duty - US Army, Artillery - Officer, Rank: Captain; 1963 to present US Army Reserves (except for active duty) Rank: Lieutenant Colonel; Serial Number: ***-**-*****.

6. He attended Clemson University, receiving a BS Degree in 963 and the University of South Carolina Law School, receiving a J.D. Degree in 1966.

7. Significant activities during school: At Clemson University, 1959-63, member of Block "C" Club; 1962-63, Captain, Basketball Team; 1960, Member, Baseball Team; 1961-63, Blue Key Honor Society; 1961-63, Tiger Brotherhood.

8. Continuing legal/judicial education:
Child Victim in Court (1989); Bits & Pieces (1989); Guidelines in Using Mental Health Professionals in Custody & Child Abuse Cases (1988); Ethics, Rules & Contemporary Issues in Family Court (1988); A Practical Approach in Complex Issues in Evidence in Family Court & Statutory Law Update (1988); Criminal Law Update (1987); A Practical Approach to Complex Issues in Family Court, Statutory Update, and Alimony Perspectives (1987); Bench-Bar Conference on Family Law (1987); Current Issues in Family Court (1986); Evidence in Family Court (1986); The New S.C. Adoption Statute & the Equitable Apportionment Statute (1986); Child Sexual Abuse (1985); Introduction to New Rules of Civil Procedure (1985); Basic Elements of Proof in Family Court (1985); Valuation of Businesses & Professions in Equitable Division Cases (1985)

9. Courses taught or lectures presented:
New Family Court Judges Seminar, July 1988 -- Gave presentation to new judges on "Child Abuse, Neglect and Dependency Actions," included an update on the new evidentiary rules (1988 Act No. 649).
Ethics, Rules, and Contemporary Issues in Family Court, July 15, 1988 -- A JCLE seminar. Responsible for organizing the agenda and arranging speakers for this seminar. Moderator for this seminar and a member of the faculty speaking on the topic of "The New Family Court Rules."
Bench-Bar Conference of Family Court, June 12, 1987 -- A CLE Seminar. Member of the faculty speaking on the topic of "Equitable Distribution Update."
Current Issues in Family Court, April 25, 1986 -- A JCLE Seminar. Member of the faculty speaking on the topic of "Family Law Update (Statutes & Case Law)."
New Family Court Judges Seminar, August 1985 -- Gave presentation to new judges on "Child Abuse, Neglect and Dependency Actions."
Family Court Judicial Conference, May 1983 -- On panel with Chief Family Court Judges from other circuits. Discussed administrative orders, policies and procedures.
Guardian ad Litem Program training -- numerous sessions, Greenville, Lancaster, Moncks Corner and Charleston.

12. Legal Experience since graduation from law school:
1968-1968 associate with Howard Ballenger, Attorney in Walhalla, SC
1969-1972 associate and partner with Love, Thornton, Arnold & Thomason Law Firm, Greenville, SC
1972-1976 partner with Cheros and Patterson Law Firm, Greenville, SC
1976-1980 sole practitioner in Greenville, SC
1980-now Family Court Judge, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Greenville, SC

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) Jack Greer vs. Patsy Greer, Family Court, domestic case involving the President of Texize, included settlement of large amount of assets.

(b) Brenda D. White vs. James T. Boseman, 268 S.E.2d 287, Opinion No. 21268, Filed July 22, 1980. Paternity suit for purpose of requiring support for two children born out of wedlock. Won in lower court and reversed by the Supreme Court.

(c) Church of God, et al. vs. Roy Gilreath, Grove Station Mission, et al, Circuit Court, involved decision as to ownership of local church property.

(d) Rosamond Enterprises, Inc. vs. Lawrence E. McGranahn, Circuit Court, foreclosure of mechanic's lien, on appeal to the Supreme Court.

(e) Arnold vs. Benjamin Booth Co., 257 SC 337, 185 S.E.2d 830 (1971).

18. Civil appeals:
(a) Two appeals covered in answer #17. There were numerous other cases in which he assisted. His litigation concerned complex property matters tried in the Court of Common Pleas, since they represented many financial institutions, such as Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan, Bank of Travelers Rest, and Associates Financial Services. This litigation consisted of complex foreclosure actions and issues involving liens. Most were settled before appeal. During those years it took four years to process appeals, due to the Supreme Court backlog. Before the advent of the Court of Appeals, most appeals were settled before they went to the Supreme Court.

20. Judicial Office: 1968 - Municipal Court Judge in Walhalla, South Carolina; 1980 - 1985, Family Court Judge

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) Theodore A. Watson vs. LeAnn O. Watson, 84-DR-23-1722. A divorce action seeking grounds of adultery. At issue were the grounds, custody of the minor child, use and ownership of property and equitable division of marital assets of over a million dollars. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, modified (attorney's fees) and remanded.

(b) State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs. Candus Ramsey, Candus Ramsey, Administratrix of the Estate of Deana M. Ramsey, Deceased, and Barbara B. Hellebrand, 86-CP-11-369. At issue in this case is whether Ramsey's witnessing her daughter being struck and killed by an automobile was a separate bodily injury for which she was entitled to seek recovery under the standard insurance policy which provides coverage of $25,000 for bodily injury to one person and liability limits of $50,000 in the event of an accident involving bodily injury to two or more persons. The Court of Appeals agreed that negligent infliction of emotional distress is a bodily injury for which damages may be recovered and the Supreme Court affirmed.

(c) David H. Lucas vs. South Carolina Coastal Council, 88-CP-10-66. Case presently on appeal. Suit against the Coastal Council in which Judge Patterson finds for the Plaintiff that there is damage caused by the imposition of building restrictions (set-back lines) which deprives him of any reasonable economic use of his lots and renders them valueless and is the equivalent of the total taking of his property and for which he deserves fair compensation in the amount of $1,232,387.50.

(d) James T. Wise and T. Julian Branham vs. South Carolina Tax Commission, 87-CP-40-175. A State employee grievance matter in which the employees of the SC Tax Commission filed grievances with the Commission alleging that they were reclassified for punitive reasons. DHRM dismissed the grievance on the grounds that the reclassification was not a demotion. The employees appealed to the Circuit Court. Judge Patterson reversed the decision of DHRM and the Supreme Court affirmed.
(e) M. Lowenstein Corporation and Clark-Schwebel Iberglass Corporation vs. South Carolina Tax Commission. Richland County case. Appellants brought this action against SC Tax Commission to recover taxes they had paid under protest. Special Circuit Judge Patterson denied recovery and was affirmed by the SC Court of Appeals.

22. Public Office: 1970 - 1971, elected to SC House of Representatives.

23. He was an unsuccessful candidate in 1971 for reelection to the South Carolina House of Representatives and failed in bid for election as Solicitor, Thirteenth Circuit in 1974.

27. He jointly owns real estate with Attorney John G. Cheros and would hear no contested cases in which Mr. Cheros is involved.
31. Sued: 1975 - Personally by Attorney Hal Warlick as the result of a lawsuit in which they opposed each other. This was amicably resolved upon service of pleadings. They have since handled matters together and are friends.

33. His health is excellent. His last physical was October 1990, at Moncrief Hospital in Fort Jackson.

39. Bar Associations and Professional Organizations:
Greenville County, South Carolina and American Bar Associations; Trial Lawyers Association and Judicial Council.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social, and fraternal organizations: Buncomb Street United Methodist Church, Sunday School Teacher.

41. He has served as a Special Circuit Court Judge for non-jury matters during 38 weeks of court from 1983-1989, serving in Charleston, Greenville/Pickens, Anderson, York/Union, Dillon, Richland, Spartanburg, Lexington, Horry, and Florence/Marion.

42. Five letters of reference:

(a) Thomas M. Creech, President

First Federal Of South Carolina

P.O. Box 408, Greenville, SC 29602

(b) William M. Hagood, III, Esquire

P.O. Box 10045, Greenville, SC 29603

(c) J. D. Todd, Jr., Esquire

P.O. Box 87, Greenville, SC 29602
(d) Kermit S. King, Esquire

P.O. Box 7667, Columbia, SC 29202

(e) Robert B. Wallace, Esquire

P.O. Box 388, Charleston, SC 29402

Q. JUDGE PATTERSON, YOU HAVE FILED FOR THE AT LARGE-- EXCUSE ME--13TH CIRCUIT SEAT, NEWLY CREATED; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. RESIDENCE JUDGESHIP.
Q. YES, SIR.
A. NOT IN CHARLESTON.
Q. HAVE YOU RECEIVED THE SUMMARY OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE?
A. I DID SHORTLY AND I HAVE LOOKED IT OVER AND I REVIEWED PRIOR TO SENDING IT IN AND TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE, IT IS TRUE AND ACCURATE EXCEPT MY RANK IN THE ARMY RESERVES IS NOW A FULL COLONEL INSTEAD OF A LT. COLONEL. THAT IS KEEPING ME OUT OF SAUDI ARABIA.
Q. ALL RIGHT; IN REVIEWING YOUR FILE, THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS ON GRIEVANCES AND DISCIPLINE REPORT NO COMPLAINTS OR CHARGES WHILE PRACTICING LAW. THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMMISSION, LIKEWISE, REPORTS NO REPRIMANDS WHILE ON THE BENCH. YOUR DRIVING RECORD WAS REPORTED AS CLEAR, AS WERE THE RECORDS WITH THE GREENVILLE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND WITH THE GREENVILLE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. IN CHECKING WITH SLED AND THE F.B.I., THE RECORDS WERE ALSO FOUND TO BE CLEAR. IN REVIEWING ANY JUDGMENTS OR LAWSUITS IN WHICH YOU MIGHT HAVE BEEN A LITIGANT, WE CHECKED WITH THE RECORDS OF GREENVILLE COUNTY COURTHOUSE AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM HERE IN SOUTH CAROLINA AND THERE WERE TWO ACTIONS, ONE OF WHICH--FIRST OFF I NEED TO CLEAR UP AND MAKE SURE WHETHER OR NOT WE'VE GOT THE RIGHT LARRY PATTERSON.
A. NO.
Q. AND I DIDN'T THINK WE DID. THERE WAS A 1970 ACTION INVOLVING THE JASPER COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION.
A. I HAVE NO EARTHLY IDEA WHAT THAT IS ABOUT.
Q. I DIDN'T THINK THAT WAS YOU.
A. THERE ARE SEVERAL LARRY PATTERSONS AROUND.
Q. THERE WAS ANOTHER 1983 ACTION IN GREENVILLE, REED VERSUS LARRY AND CAROLYN PATTERSON.
A. AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT CASE AND I HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THAT. THAT'S NOT ME.
Q. ALL RIGHT. OTHER THAN THAT, WE FOUND NO OTHER COURT CASES IN WHICH YOU WERE A LITIGANT; IS THAT ACCURATE?
A. THAT IS ACCURATE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE.
Q. ALL RIGHT. UNDER FINANCIAL INFORMATION, THE STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AND THE FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT THAT YOU PROVIDED, NEITHER SHOW ANY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS ON YOUR PART AND YOUR CREDIT REPORT WAS SATISFACTORY. AS FAR AS EXPERIENCE, JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE, IN 1980, I BELIEVE, YOU WERE ELECTED TO THE FAMILY COURT POSITION WHICH YOU NOW HOLD?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. AND YOU HAVE SERVED AS A SPECIAL CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE, I BELIEVE YOU SAID, FOR APPROXIMATELY 38 WEEKS BETWEEN 1983 AND 1989?
A. I LISTED THEM ALL AND WHERE I WAS ASSIGNED, YES, SIR, 38 WEEKS AS SPECIAL CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE.
Q. YOUR LAST SCREENING HAS BEEN IN THE PAST YEAR-AND-A- HALF OR TWO YEARS, IS THAT RIGHT? 1989, IS THAT WHEN YOU DECIDED---
A. THAT IS CORRECT, THE LAST TIME I WAS HERE FOR THE FAMILY COURT POSITION.
Q. RIGHT. JUDGE PATTERSON, WE HAVE RECEIVED SOME AFFIDAVITS FROM SOME PERSONS DESIRING TO TESTIFY IN REGARD TO YOUR QUALIFICATIONS. THE AFFIDAVITS WE RECEIVED WERE FROM MR. DAN NORFLEET, MR. MICHAEL DAVID WOOD, MS. MARGARET FABRI, MR. JOEL BAILEY, AND MR. ANTHONY O'NEILL. IN ADDITION TO THOSE NAMES, THE PEOPLE WHO HAVE SIGNED UP TO TESTIFY TODAY INCLUDE MARK ANDREWS, KEN LESTER, JAMES MCLAREN, I BELIEVE, AND CATHERINE WILLIAMS. IT HAS BEEN THE PAST PRACTICE OF THE COMMITTEE TO ALLOW THE JUDICIAL CANDIDATE TO MAKE A STATEMENT PRIOR TO THE TESTIMONY OF THOSE WITNESSES AND THEN WE WILL JUST GO THROUGH THE LIST AND ALLOW THOSE WHO HAD SUBMITTED AFFIDAVITS TO TESTIFY; AND IF YOU WISH, YOU CAN EITHER ADDRESS THEIR STATEMENTS AFTER EACH ONE INDIVIDUALLY OR YOU CAN WAIT AND ADDRESS THEM AS A GROUP; AND THEN ANYONE THAT YOU WISH TO TESTIFY ON YOUR BEHALF, WE WILL BE GLAD TO LISTEN TO THEM AT THAT POINT.
A. ALL RIGHT, SIR. AND, MR. SPEAKER, I HAVE RECEIVED THOSE AFFIDAVITS YESTERDAY MORNING. THEY WERE FILED AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR, SO TO SPEAK, WHICH I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THAT. I HAVE NOTHING TO HIDE. I AM WILLING TO DISCUSS ANYTHING OR ANY DECISIONS THAT I MADE IN THE COURT. AND I REGRET THAT MY HONORABLE COLLEAGUES FROM CHARLESTON, THAT WE MAY HAVE A DIFFERENCE ABOUT SOME THINGS. THE THING THAT IS MOST GLARING AND I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION IT, I WANT TO TALK ABOUT THE FACTS AND ISSUES, AND I HAVE SOME OTHER WITNESSES THAT ARE COMING DOWN. WHEN THEY FOUND OUT ABOUT THIS, THEY ARE DRIVING DOWN FROM GREENVILLE AND INSISTED THAT THEY COME. THEY MAY BE HERE BY 2:00 O'CLOCK. MR. J.D. TODD'S NEXT-DOOR NEIGHBOR DIED; HE WAS GOING TO TRY TO GET HERE THIS AFTERNOON IF HE COULD. IT MAY NOT BE NECESSARY. THE MOST GLARING THING IN REGARD TO MY COLLEAGUES HERE, WHO, ACCORDING TO MR. WOOD'S LETTER, THEY DISCUSSED THIS PRIOR TO FILING THESE AFFIDAVITS AMONG THEMSELVES AND IT IS THE ALLEGATION ABOUT EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS. AND JUST TO CLEAR THAT UP, THE TWO--MR. NORFLEET ALLEGES AN EXPARTE COMMUNICATION WITH FRANCIS KANE. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPLAIN THAT BRIEFLY. MS. KANE HAS AN AFFIDAVIT WHICH I HAVE GIVEN TO YOU. FRANCIS KANE WAS IN THE TRIAL OF A DEATH PENALTY CASE, STATE VERSUS JASON MATTHEWS.

MR.MCLAREN: IT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TO HAND THESE OUT AT THIS TIME.

MR. NORFLEET: DO YOU MIND IF I HAVE ONE?

JUDGE PATTERSON: MY POSITION IS THAT THESE SO-CALLED EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS, WHICH REALLY BOTHERED ME, WHEN I SAW THAT IN THE LETTERS, IT REALLY STANDS OUT, WERE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS. ME BEING THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE IN CHARLESTON, I DID ISSUE THIS ORDER IN MY ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITY AS CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE. I DO NOT DENY THAT. THE INFORMATION THAT I RECEIVED FROM FRANCIS KANE--SHE HAD A MATTER WITH MR. NORFLEET--MS. KANE HAD A PROTECTIVE ORDER. SHE WAS INVOLVED IN A DEATH PENALTY CASE IN REGARD TO THE STATE VERSUS JASON WILLIAMS. THE HONORABLE WILLIAM T. HOWELL, PRESIDING JUDGE IN THE 14TH CIRCUIT, ISSUED A PROTECTIVE ORDER PURSUANT TO THE STATUTE THAT PROTECTED HER FROM ALL TRIAL DUTIES FROM AUGUST 18TH, 1989 UNTIL THE COMPLETION OF THE DEATH PENALTY CASE. THE DEATH PENALTY TRIAL WAS SCHEDULED TO BE HEARD ON SEPTEMBER THE 11TH, 1989. ON AUGUST THE 22ND, DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME WHEN THE PROTECTIVE ORDER WAS IN EFFECT--AND AS YOU KNOW, YOU FINE MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE PASSED THE STATUTE PROVIDING THE PROTECTION, SHE SHOWED ME A COPY OF THE STATUTE--ON AUGUST THE 22ND SHE HAD A RULE TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING IN BERKELEY COUNTY BEFORE JUDGE MALLARD AND SHE CALLED THE COURT IN BERKELEY COUNTY FOR A CONTINUANCE FROM THAT HEARING BASED ON THE PROTECTIVE ORDER. SHE EXPLAINED THAT JUDGE HOWELL HAD ISSUED A PROTECTIVE ORDER AND THAT SHE HAD JUST RECEIVED THAT IN THE MAIL AND THE JUDGE'S SECRETARY ASKED THAT SHE SEND THE PROTECTIVE ORDER TO JUDGE MALLARD. MS. KANE, BY HER AFFIDAVIT AND WHAT SHE INFORMED ME, SHE FAXED A COPY OF THE MOTION AND THE ORDER TO MR. DANIEL NORFLEET AND SENT THE ORIGINALS TO THE COURT FOR FILING. ON AUGUST THE 23RD SHE INFORMED ME AND STATED THAT MR. NORFLEET INFORMED HER THAT JUDGE MALLARD DENIED THE MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE. BUT WE COULD NOT FIND ANY ORDER WHERE JUDGE MALLARD HAD DENIED THAT. MS. KANE, IN DISCUSSING THIS WITH ME, WE WERE NOT TALKING ABOUT THE MERITS OF THE CASE; IT WAS PURELY ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE IN REGARD TO A CONTINUANCE. I WOULD DISCUSS THAT WITH YOU. I WOULD DISCUSS IT WITH MR. NORFLEET. WE WERE NOT DISCUSSING THE MERITS OF THE CASE, AND HE ALLEGES THAT THIS WAS AN EXPARTE COMMUNICATION AND THAT BOTHERS ME. SHE TRIED TO CALL JUDGE MALLARD'S OFFICE. SHE CALLED HIS HOME AND SHE CALLED HIS SECRETARY. AND ON AUGUST THE 25TH SHE CAME TO SEE ME TO DETERMINE IF SHE WAS GOING TO BE PROTECTED IN THE FAMILY COURT BASED ON JUDGE HOWELL'S PROTECTIVE ORDER FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT. SHE HAD OTHER HEARINGS IN THE FAMILY COURT OTHER THAN THE HEARING SHE HAD WITH MR. NORFLEET. SHE DID NOT DISCUSS THE MERITS OF THE CASE OF ANY OF THOSE CASES WITH ME, AND SHE SO STATES IN HER AFFIDAVIT. I ADVISED HER THAT WE, I AS THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE IN MY CAPACITY WOULD HONOR JUDGE HOWELL'S PROTECTIVE ORDER, AND THAT ORDER TOOK PRECEDENCE AND SHE DID NOT HAVE TO APPEAR FOR ANY MATTERS IN THE FAMILY COURT. AND I--SHE PREPARED AN ORDER OF CONTINUANCE TO THAT EFFECT AND I SIGNED THAT ON AUGUST THE 28TH, 1989. I DID THAT FOR MS. KANE. AND THEN I SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED THAT ON OCTOBER THE 25TH BEFORE I SIGNED MY ORDER, JUDGE MALLARD HAD, IN FACT, SIGNED AN ORDER OF CONTINUANCE. SO TO BE PERFECTLY HONEST WITH YOU, I THINK THAT AS THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE IT WAS MY DUTY TO MAKE THAT RULING. I COULD DO THAT UNDER THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S ORDER AND PROCEDURALLY I DO NOT SEE THAT I DID ANYTHING WRONG, AND I DO NOT CONSTRUE THAT AS AN EXPARTE COMMUNICATION AND I WANTED TO MENTION THAT. MS. MARGARET FABRI, UNFORTUNATELY, STATES THAT, AGAIN, I HAD EXPARTE COMMUNICATED--I HAD AN EXPARTE COMMUNICATION IN REGARD TO A MATTER WHICH I RESTORED TO THE FAMILY COURT DOCKET. AND THAT TERM "EXPARTE COMMUNICATION" BOTHERS ME. AND THIS WAS ANOTHER ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION THAT I MADE. MS.--A DOMESTIC CASE WAS FILED IN BERKELEY COUNTY, AND YOU HAVE A COPY OF THAT IN MS. FABRI'S AFFIDAVIT, CALLED HINTON VERSUS HINTON FILED BY THE WIFE AGAINST THE HUSBAND; AND AS FAR AS I KNOW, BOTH PARTIES WERE HEALTHY AND WELL. SUBSEQUENT TO THE FILING OF THAT ACTION THE DEFENDANT WAS IN AN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT, WAS IN INTENSIVE CARE AND COMATOSE AND THE CASE COULD NOT BE CALLED FOR TRIAL AND SIX MONTHS WAS EXPIRING. IT CERTAINLY WAS NO FAULT OF THE PLAINTIFF THAT THE DEFENDANT GOT INVOLVED IN THE ACCIDENT. IT WAS PRETTY MUCH AN ACT OF GOD, SO TO SPEAK. AND A PETITION TO RESTORE WAS FILED IN FRONT OF ME AND AS CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE, I CAN HEAR THESE MATTERS AND IF GOOD CAUSE IS SHOWN, AS ONLY THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE CAN RESTORE THE CASE TO THE DOCKET; THE ORDER FROM THE SUPREME COURT, AND I HAVE THE RULE BOOK, SPECIFICALLY STATES THAT I MUST DO IT BY WRITTEN ORDER AND IT MUST BE SET FOR A DATE AND TIME CERTAIN. THERE IS A QUESTION WHICH I WILL NOT GO INTO IN REGARD TO MARITAL PROPERTY, WHETHER PROPERTY EXISTS AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE ACTION UNDER THE NEW EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION ACT; THAT SEEMS TO BE AN IMPORTANT POINT IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE. THE PETITION FILED STATED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WAS COMATOSE, HE WAS IN THE HOSPITAL, AND THEY DIDN'T WANT THE SIX MONTHS TO RUN; THEY WANTED THE CASE RESTORED. WE HAVE MANY CASES THAT GO BEYOND SIX MONTHS. ACCORDING TO THE ORDER TO RESTORE, THE ORDER STATES THAT THE DEFENDANT IS CURRENTLY HOSPITALIZED IN A COMATOSE STATE AND WILL BE ABLE TO ATTEND THE MERITS HEARING AS SCHEDULED FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME. I DID INSTRUCT THE SECRETARY THAT I FELT LIKE THIS WAS GOOD CAUSE TO RESTORE THE CASE. I DID NOT FEEL LIKE IS THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE PREJUDICED IN ANY WAY AND THE NOTE AT THE BOTTOM STATES THAT JUDGE PATTERSON WILL RESTORE THIS CASE WHEN THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN RELEASED FROM THE HOSPITAL AND IS ABLE TO ATTEND COURT. THAT'S WHAT I TOLD MS. BROWN, THE OPPOSING COUNSEL. MS. FABRI WAS NOT PRESENT. IT WAS PURELY AN ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION ON MY PART ACTING AS THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE IN CHARLESTON, AND I DIDN'T KNOW WHETHER HE WAS GOING TO DIE, WHETHER HE WAS GOING TO LIVE, OR WHETHER HE WAS GOING TO RECOVER. SUBSEQUENTLY, THEY CAME BEFORE ME AND TOLD ME HE HAD RECOVERED. I RESTORED THE CASE AND SET IT FOR A DATE AND TIME FOR TRIAL AND HE HAS BEEN GOING BACK AND FORTH, BEING ABLE TO COME AND NOT BEING ABLE TO COME. I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE STATUS IS RIGHT NOW. BUT IN MY OPINION, MR. SPEAKER AND GENTLEMEN OF THIS FINE COMMITTEE, I DO NOT BELIEVE MY ACTIONS IN THOSE CASES WERE EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS. AND THOSE ALLEGATIONS WERE JUST GLARING AS I READ THESE AFFIDAVITS AND I WANTED TO SPEAK TO THOSE TWO ISSUES FIRST. THANK YOU VERY MUCH, AND I WOULD LIKE TO HEAR WHAT THEY HAVE TO SAY BEFORE I RESPOND.

Q. LET ME ASK YOU JUST ONE OR TWO QUESTIONS, IF I MIGHT AT THIS MOMENT. JUDGE PATTERSON, YOU HAD BEEN ASSIGNED AS THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE?
A. YES, SIR, FOR 18 MONTHS I HAD BEEN IN CHARLESTON.
Q. AND WHEN WAS--SO YOU HAD BEEN THERE FOR 18 MONTHS?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. NOW?
A. AND I CHECK WITH COURT ADMINISTRATION WEEKLY TO DETERMINE IF THERE ARE ANY COMPLAINTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE TO COURT ADMINISTRATION OR ANY COMPLAINTS TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE. I TALK TO MR. GEORGE MARKERT. HE COMMUNICATES REGULARLY, I ASSUME, WITH THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND UNTIL FRIDAY I HAD NO KNOWLEDGE THAT ANY ATTORNEY IN COLUMBIA HAD ANY COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE WAY I ADMINISTERED THE COURT.
Q. THE CHIEF JUSTICE MUST HAVE ISSUED THREE SEPARATE ORDERS ASSIGNING YOU AS CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR, THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. YOUR RESIDENT CIRCUIT IS, OF COURSE, GREENVILLE?
A. YES, SIR, IT IS. I DID NOT VOLUNTEER FOR CHARLESTON.
Q. WELL, THAT'S MY INTEREST IS THAT THE CHIEF JUSTICE HAS SENT YOU TO CHARLESTON FOR 18 MONTHS TO SERVE AS CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE.
A. YES, SIR. AND I WILL TELL YOU THAT I WAS--I HAVE BEEN A CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE EVERY YEAR THAT I HAVE BEEN ON THE BENCH, MOST OF THE TIME IN GREENVILLE WHICH IS A HEAVY DOCKET. AND CHARLESTON WAS A HEAVY DOCKET. I WAS SENT THERE AT THE LAST MINUTE IN MAY WHEN THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE WHO WAS ORIGINALLY ASSIGNED WAS WITHDRAWN BY THE CHIEF JUSTICE. HE CALLED ME IN AND WANTED ME TO GO TO CHARLESTON AND THAT IS A DIFFICULT CIRCUIT. THEY HAVE EXCELLENT LAWYERS IN CHARLESTON. THEY HAVE EXTREMELY TOUGH LITIGATED MATTERS. THERE IS A LOT OF MONEY IN CHARLESTON. THE 18 MONTHS HAS PUT A LOT OF GRAY HAIRS IN MY HEAD. I HAVE DONE MY BEST, TO THE BEST OF MY ABILITY, TO SERVE CHARLESTON COUNTY. I HAVE AFFIDAVITS THAT MR. ANDREW SAVAGE INSISTED THAT HE SEND ONE. MR. MORRIS ROSEN WOULD BE HERE AND WAS COMING; HE HAD TO GO FOR A HEART EXAMINATION WHICH HAS BEEN SCHEDULED FOR THREE WEEKS AND YOU HAVE HIS AFFIDAVIT. I HAVE A REPRESENTATIVE OF HIS FIRM HERE. MR. BOB WALLACE HAS WRITTEN A LETTER WHICH YOU HAVE IN YOUR FILE. I AM VERY PROUD OF THE LETTER MR. BILL HAGOOD AND HIS ENTIRE FIRM SIGNED. I USED TO PRACTICE WITH THAT FIRM: LOVE, THORNTON, ARNOLD & THOMASON. AND MR. HAGOOD AND MR. COCHRAN ARE CLOSE FRIENDS OF MINE. I PRACTICED WITH THEM FOR FIVE OR SIX YEARS. HE HAD EVERY MEMBER OF THE FIRM, INCLUDING THE PRESENT GREENVILLE BAR, SIGN THE LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION. AND MR. KERMIT KING WHO HAS TRIED MANY DIFFICULT CASES BEFORE ME AND ALL THE--AND MR. J.D. TODD, WHO HAS TRIED MORE CASES THAN ANYONE ELSE IN FRONT OF ME, AND THEY HAVE WON AND LOST, KNOW HOW I RUN THE COURTS AND THEY HAVE BEEN FAMILIAR WITH MY ABILITIES OVER A NUMBER OF YEARS. AND I WAS JUST THINKING THAT MY FRIENDS HERE FROM CHARLESTON, AND I HAVE NO ANIMOSITY AGAINST THESE PEOPLE; THEIR MOTIVATIONS ARE PURE, I'M SURE, AND I DO NOT HOLD THIS AGAINST THEM IN ANY WAY; BUT I WAS JUST THINKING AND TRYING TO DETERMINE AND REMEMBER HOW MANY CONTESTED CASES MY YOUNG FRIENDS HERE HAVE HAD IN FRONT OF ME AND I CAN RECALL ONLY ONE CASE AND THAT WAS ONE THAT MR. NORFLEET HAD, MR. NORFLEET HAD WITH JOHN WILLIAMS AND IT'S NOT EVEN THE SUBJECT OF THIS ACTION. THE CASES THAT THEY BROUGHT UP ARE JUST RULES AND TEMPORARY MATTERS, IT APPEARS TO ME. Q.
HAVE YOU RECEIVED YOUR ASSIGNMENT FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. WHERE WILL YOU BE?
A. I'M GOING BACK TO GREENVILLE, AND GLADLY GOING BACK. I HAVE ENJOYED IT. I MADE A LOT OF FRIENDS IN CHARLESTON AND I LEARNED A LOT FROM THE ATTORNEYS THERE. AND IN MY 18 MONTHS THERE I HAVE HEARD MANY, MANY CASES. AND I MAKE IT A POINT TO HEAR AS MANY CASES AS ALL OF THE OTHER JUDGES DO. I AM THERE AT 8:00 O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING. MS. FABRI HAS CRITICIZED ME FOR PUBLICIZING THE FACT THAT I AM AVAILABLE. I OFFER NO APOLOGIES FOR THAT AND I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT AS CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE, I WALK THE HALLS. I DO NOT HIDE BEHIND THREE OR FOUR SECRETARIES AND DESKS. YOU DO NOT HAVE TO MAKE AN APPOINTMENT TO SEE ME IF YOU CAN CATCH ME IN THE HALL; AND THE PURPOSE FOR THAT IS TO BE AVAILABLE TO SET CASES AND IF THEY COME IN THERE, AND I THINK THEY CAN ALL TELL YOU, IF THEY WANT A HEARING SET IN CHARLESTON, THEY CAN GET A HEARING. I WILL SET IT MYSELF. I WILL GO TO THE BOOK AND GIVE THEM A HEARING. THEY DO NOT HAVE TO--IF THEY WANT TO SEE ME, I'M THERE AT 8:00 O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING. I LEAVE AT 6:00 O'CLOCK AT NIGHT AND I WILL TALK TO ANYONE ABOUT ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS. I AM THE MAN THAT IS THERE FOR THAT JOB. I MAKE MYSELF AVAILABLE. I MAKE MYSELF AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC, TO THE COURTHOUSE EMPLOYEES, AND TO THE ATTORNEYS; NOT TO DISCUSS THE MERITS OF ANY CASE, BUT TO HANDLE ANY ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS THEY HAVE. AND THEY HAVE GOT REQUESTS FOR CONTINUANCES AND WITNESSES THAT CAN'T BE THERE, JUST ENUMERABLE PROBLEMS AND I AM THERE EVERY DAY TO ANSWER THOSE QUESTIONS. I HAVE NO APOLOGIES FOR THAT. I PUBLICIZED THAT IN THE NEWSPAPER; I MADE THAT KNOWN TO THE BAR IN GENERAL AND I DIDN'T KNOW THAT OFFENDED OR BOTHERED ANYONE UNTIL--I HAD NO--IF MS. FABRI IS UNHAPPY WITH THAT, THAT'S FINE.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU. JUDGE, YOU WILL BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND AFTER THE WITNESSES ARE HEARD AND THEN WE WILL DISCUSS WHETHER OR NOT WE WILL CALL ANY ADDITIONAL WITNESSES. THAT REALLY IS THE PREROGATIVE OF THE COMMITTEE.
A. YES, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WE WILL SEE WHEN WE GET TO THAT POINT. ALL RIGHT, SIR, THANK YOU. I HAVE SOME WITNESSES THAT WERE--INSISTED THEY DRIVE DOWN FROM GREENVILLE. I DON'T KNOW WHO THEY ARE. I THINK SOME OF THEM JUST GOT HERE. I DON'T WANT TO BE HERE ANY LONGER THAN WE HAVE TO. I WOULD JUST AS SOON HIT THE FACTS AND LEAVE, IF WE COULD.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WE WILL BE HERE JUST AS LONG AS NECESSARY, JUST AS YOU WOULD BE IN THE TRIAL OF A CASE.
A. ALL RIGHT.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE GOT THE LIST OF THOSE WHO ARE APPEARING HERE. WE CAN EITHER GO IN THE ORDER THAT THEY SIGNED UP UNLESS THE WITNESSES PREFER TO GO IN ANOTHER ORDER THAT MAY MAKE MORE SENSE TO THEM. THE FIRST NAME ON THE LIST IS MICHAEL WOOD.

A. IF IT PLEASE THE COMMITTEE, I AM A MEMBER OF A SMALL TWO-MAN FIRM IN CHARLESTON. MY PORTION OF THE PRACTICE, I THINK I COULD HONESTLY SAY, IS BETWEEN 80 AND 90 PERCENT DOMESTIC. I HAVE BEEN IN FRONT OF JUDGE PATTERSON PROBABLY MORE THAN I HAVE BEEN BEFORE ANY JUDGE SINCE I WAS SWORN TO THE BAR. I DO NOT QUESTION JUDGE PATTERSON'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW AND I HAVE NEVER HAD A QUESTION WHERE I HAVE A PROBLEM WITH THE WAY HE KNOWS THE LAW. I HAVE A PROBLEM WITH THE WAY JUDGE PATTERSON ADMINISTERS THE LAW. IN MY AFFIDAVIT I CITE TWO CASES. THE FIRST, IF IT PLEASE THE GENTLEMEN OF THE COMMITTEE, IS THE CASE OF LANNERMAN VERSUS LANNERMAN. I WAS OPPOSED IN THAT CASE--I REPRESENT THE DEFENDANT--BY A VERY WELL-KNOWN ATTORNEY, NANCY HAWK OF CHARLESTON. WE HAD A TEMPORARY ORDER, A PENDENTE LITE HEARING AT THE INSTIGATION OF MS. HAWK. MY CLIENT HAD A GROSS INCOME OF $1300 PER MONTH. JUDGE PATTERSON ORDERED THAT HE PAY $750 PER MONTH AS TEMPORARY SPOUSAL SUPPORT. 30 DAYS THEREAFTER, I CAME IN FOR A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. I BASED THE GROUNDS OF THAT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IN THAT I ALLEGED IN MY MOTION THAT NEITHER EQUITY NOR LAW SUPPORTED HIS HONOR'S PREVIOUS RULING. WHEN I WENT TO PRESENT MY CASE, I STATED TO HIS HONOR, I GAVE A NEW FINANCIAL DECLARATION THAT SHOWED THAT MR. LANNERMAN HAD SINCE THE FIRST TEMPORARY HEARING STARTED TO RENT AND I THINK, IF I'M NOT MISTAKEN, HIS MONTHLY RENT WAS $300 A MONTH. JUDGE PATTERSON SAID THAT--ORDERED OR RULED FROM THE BENCH THAT I HAD NOT PROPERLY STATED MY MOTION AND THAT I STATED IN MY MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION THAT HIS PREVIOUS ORDER WAS NOT PURSUANT TO EITHER LAW OR EQUITY. I MADE A VERBAL MOTION TO AMEND TO ADD THE WORDS "A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE"; THAT MOTION WAS DENIED OUT OF HAND WITHOUT ANY ARGUMENT. MS. HAWK, AT THE FIRST HEARING WHICH TOOK PLACE ON MARCH THE 5TH, WAS ORDERED BY JUDGE PATTERSON TO DRAW THE TEMPORARY ORDER. SHE DREW THE TEMPORARY ORDER. JUDGE PATTERSON HAD RULED FROM THE BENCH THE $750 TEMPORARY SPOUSAL PAYMENTS WERE TO BE PAID ON PAYDAYS. AFTER HAVING SUBMITTED THE ORDER AND AFTER IT HAD BEEN EXECUTED BY JUDGE PATTERSON AND HAD BEEN TENDERED BACK TO ALL PARTIES NECESSARY, MS. HAWK REALIZED THAT SHE WAS BASICALLY--SHE WANTED TO CHANGE UP THE PAYMENT DATE, IS WHAT SHE WANTED. SHE CALLED ME ONE AFTERNOON AND SAID, "I WANT TO CHANGE THE PAYMENT DATE BY AGREEMENT." MY RESPONSE TO HER WAS, "NANCY, I'M SORRY, THAT IS NOT WHAT THE JUDGE ORDERED AND THAT WOULD MEAN THAT MY GENTLEMAN WOULD END UP PAYING $375 EXTRA." I SUGGESTED TO HER AT THAT TIME THAT SHE FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH JUDGE PATTERSON. SHE INDICATED TO ME THAT SHE WOULD. AND I REALIZE THIS IS HEARSAY. THIS WAS A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION THAT I HAD WITH HER. I WAS AWAITING HER MOTION, HER FILED MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE PAYMENT DATES. INSTEAD, I GOT IN THE MAIL ABOUT TWO DAYS LATER AN AMENDED TEMPORARY ORDER NUNC PRO HOC, WHICH AFTER MY REVIEW OF BLACK'S, I HAD NEVER HEARD OF AN ORDER NUNC PRO HOC; I ASSUME SHE MEANT NUNC PRO TUNC. IT CHANGED THE PAYMENT DATE. THERE WAS NO HEARING SCHEDULED. I NEVER HAD AN OPPORTUNITY--IT CHANGED THE HEARING DATE AND IT COST MY CLIENT $375, IS WHAT IT DID. I INSTANTLY CALLED MS. HAWK AND I ASKED HER, "I WAS WAITING FOR YOU TO SET A HEARING TO RECONSIDER THIS MATTER. WHAT HAPPENED?" AGAIN, I REALIZE THIS IS HEARSY, BUT MS. HAWK TOLD ME, "I PREPARED AN ORDER. I TOOK IT TO JUDGE PATTERSON AND JUDGE PATTERSON SIGNED IT. YOU HAVE GOT THE CERTIFIED COPY OF THE ORDER." I THEN CALLED JUDGE PATTERSON AND COMPLAINED OF THE EXECUTION OF THIS ORDER WITHOUT A HEARING. JUDGE PATTERSON'S RESPONSE WAS, "MR. WOOD, I HAVE RULED," AND THAT WAS IT. THE SECOND CASE THAT I CITED IN MY AFFIDAVIT WAS A BERKELEY COUNTY CASE. IT WAS A CASE OF HOWELL VERSUS HOWELL. I REPRESENTED THE PLAINTIFF IN THIS MATTER WHO HAD BEEN A SECRETARY OF MY LAW FIRM. SHE HAD BEEN DISCHARGED BY OUR LAW FIRM. HER HUSBAND WAS IN THE MILITARY AND HE HAD AN ANNUAL OR A MONTHLY INCOME OF $1851. HE ADDITIONALLY HAD A JOB THAT HE ADMITTED TO UNDER OATH AT THE TEMPORARY HEARING, BECAUSE HE HAD NOT PREPARED A FINANCIAL DECLARATION, THAT HE EARNED BETWEEN 8 AND $900 A MONTH ON A SECONDARY JOB. JUDGE PATTERSON EXPRESSLY REFUSED TO INCLUDE THAT IN HIS INCOME STATING THAT HE COULD QUIT THAT JOB AT ANY TIME. JUDGE PATTERSON, IF I RECALL AS CLOSELY AS I CAN THE TRANSCRIPT, I DO NOT HAVE A COPY OF IT, HIS FINAL WORDS TO ME WERE: "MR. WOOD, WE ARE GOING TO JUDGE CHILD SUPPORT ON $1851 OR HIS MILITARY PAY, TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT." MY CLIENT WAS UNEMPLOYED. SHE HAD NO MONEY. WE TOOK IT. I PREPARED A FINANCIAL DECLARATION AND IN THE BODY OF THE ORDER, THE TEMPORARY ORDER, I EXPRESSLY PUT LANGUAGE AS THE JUDGE HAD RULED FROM THE BENCH THAT HIS INCOME, "I FIND IN COMPUTING THE AMOUNT OF DEFENDANT'S MONTHLY GROSS INCOME, IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO ONLY CONSIDER THE DEFENDANT'S INCOME EARNED FROM THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE. A COMPLETED CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORK SHEET IS ATTACHED HERETO AND INCORPORATED HEREWITH, SAID WORKSHEET UTILIZING ONLY THOSE MONTHLY SUMS EARNED BY THE DEFENDANT FOR HIS FULL-TIME EMPLOYMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE." THAT WAS DONE BECAUSE JUDGE PATTERSON HAD ORDERED ME TO COMPLETE A WORK SHEET TO VERIFY THAT THE AMOUNT THAT HAD BEEN ORDERED WAS ONLY BASED ON HIS MILITARY PAY. I COMPLETED THE WORK SHEET AND CAME UP WITH A SUM USING THE GUIDELINES, IT LOOKS OR APPEARS TO BE $528.80. WHEN I--AND SENT THE ORDER IN. WHEN I SENT THE ORDER IN, IT CAME BACK FROM THE COURT AND IT HAD BEEN MARKED OUT, I ASSUME BY JUDGE PATTERSON'S SECRETARY; THE CHILD SUPPORT AMOUNT HAD BEEN REDUCED FROM THE STATUTORY GUIDELINES, WHICH HE HAD RULED ON THE BENCH, TO $408.85. AGAIN, MY CLIENT HAD BEEN COST--HAD INCURRED THE EXPENSE OF SOME $128.80 A MONTH IN CHILD SUPPORT. AND THIS, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, PLEASE, REMEMBER WAS NOT EVEN AN ACCURATE ONE FROM THE ON-START BECAUSE HE REFUSED TO EVEN ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THIS GENTLEMAN WAS MAKING BETWEEN 8 AND $900 A MONTH IN EXTRA INCOME. AT THE HEARING I REQUESTED THAT JUDGE PATTERSON ALLOW ME TO PUT IN THE ORDER THAT HIS EXTRA INCOME WOULD BE UTILIZED AND IF HE QUIT, IF HE WAS FIRED OR WAS DISCHARGED, OR IF HE LOST THAT JOB FOR ANY REASON, THEN IT WOULD AUTOMATICALLY GO DOWN TO THE LESSER OF THE AMOUNTS; AND I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD FIGURE BOTH OF THOSE AMOUNTS, AND THE "TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT" WAS MY RESPONSE. JUDGE PATTERSON, HIS--AS I SAID, HIS LEGAL ABILITIES, I HAVE NO QUALMS WITH. IT'S JUST THAT--AND I HAVE HEARD--JUDGE PATTERSON NOTED THAT IN MY COVER LETTER WITH MY AFFIDAVIT I SAID THAT MS. FABRI AND TONY O'NEILL AND MYSELF TALKED. YES, WE TALKED. YOU'VE GOT FOUR YOUNG LAWYERS UP HERE WHO ARE DOING SOMETHING TODAY THAT IS QUITE--OR AT LEAST IN MY CASE, I WON'T SPEAK FOR THEM, IS QUITE AKIN TO BEING A KAMIKAZE PILOT. I HAVE BEEN IN PRACTICE NOW ON MY OWN FOR A YEAR-AND-A-HALF. I WAS SWORN IN TO THE BAR IN THIS STATE IN 1987, AND I AM PICKING A FIGHT WITH THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE. JUDGE PATTERSON CANNOT TELL YOU THAT THIS IS NOT GOING TO GET AROUND TO THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE BENCH. GENTLEMEN, I DON'T BELIEVE THAT. WE ARE PICKING ON A JUDGE. LET'S FACE THE FACTS OF WHAT WE ARE DOING HERE TODAY. JUDGE PATTERSON IS GOING, NATURALLY--I TRY TO HAVE ALTRUISTIC VISION THROUGH THIS AND I TRY TO SAY THAT I HOLD GRUDGES BUT I DO THINK JUDGE PATTERSON WILL HOLD GRUDGES. I DON'T THINK HE WILL BE HUMAN IF HE DIDN'T. THE PROBLEM THAT I HAVE IS THAT JUDGE PATTERSON DOESN'T LIKE ME. JUDGE PATTERSON, I THINK--AND I'M NOT THE GREATEST LAWYER IN THE WORLD. I JUST WORK HARD AND I TRY TO DO THE BEST I CAN. IF JUDGE PATTERSON HAS A PROBLEM WITH ME THAT DOESN'T OFFEND ME. WHAT DOES OFFEND ME IS WHEN THERE ARE TWO OPPOSING COUNSEL IN A FAMILY COURTROOM; ONE SITS AT THE COUNSEL TABLE THAT I'M NOT SITTING AT AND THE OTHER ONE IS SITTING AT THE BENCH. I CAN FIGHT A GOOD, FAIR FIGHT. YOU KNOW, I HAVE TALKED WITH MS. FABRI: YOU BEAT ME FAIR AND SQUARE, THAT'S FINE. YOU BEAT ME AND I RESPECT YOU. AND THERE ARE MANY LAWYERS IN CHARLESTON WHO HAVE BEATEN ME, AND I RESPECT THEM TO THIS DAY. THEY'RE FINER LAWYERS THAN I WILL EVER HOPE TO BE. BUT LET'S HAVE IT ALL OUT IN THE OPEN AND LET'S NOT HAVE IT WHERE ONE LAWYER CAN APPROACH THE JUDGE IN A PARKING LOT WITH A NUNC PRO HOC ORDER AND GET SOMETHING CHANGED WITHOUT A HEARING, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS, WITHOUT THOSE THINGS THAT I WANT. YOU KNOW, MAYBE I'M NOT TOO LONG OUT OF LAW SCHOOL TO WHERE I STILL HAVE TOO MUCH IDEALISM AS FAR AS DUE PROCESS AND THINGS LIKE THAT; BUT IT'S HARD TO EXPLAIN TO MY CLIENTS WHEN WE COME OUT OF THAT COURTROOM, AND IT ONLY HAPPENS IN MY EXPERIENCE IN JUDGE PATTERSON'S COURTROOM, AND IT'S HARD TO EXPLAIN TO THEM WHY FROM A LAYMAN'S POINT OF VIEW THEY SHOULDN'T FEEL LIKE THEY DIDN'T GET A FAIR SHAKE, WHY THEY SHOULDN'T--WHY DOESN'T--WHEN YOU EXPLAIN TO A WOMAN WHO HAS TWO CHILDREN, WELL, HOW DO THEY DECIDE ON CHILD SUPPORT? THEY TAKE HIS INCOME AND YOUR INCOME AND WE HAVE A FAIR MATHEMATICAL FORMULA IN SOUTH CAROLINA. AND THAT'S WHY WE HAVE A MATHEMATICAL FORMULA, BECAUSE IT'S FAIR. THEN YOU WALK OUT OF THE COURTROOM AND SHE SAYS, "WELL, HE IS MAKING $900 OR $800 A MONTH; BUT THAT DIDN'T GET FIGURED INTO THE MATHEMATICAL FORMULA. MIKE, WHY IS THAT?" I HAVE GOT NO ANSWER FOR MY CLIENTS WHO ASK ME THOSE QUESTIONS; AND THAT IS WHY I AM HERE TODAY. GENTLEMEN, I WILL BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS THAT YOU HAVE.

Q. MR. WOOD, IN THE FIRST CASE YOU ALLUDED TO, THE LANNERMAN CASE.
A. YES, SIR.
Q. THE NEW ORDER---
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ---DID IT CHANGE OR WHAT ELSE DID IT CHANGE BESIDES THE HEARING DATE?
A. NO, IT CHANGED THE PAYMENT DATE, SIR; AND BY CHANGING THE PAYMENT DATE, IT INCURRED AN EXTRA $375 IN TEMPORARY SPOUSAL SUPPORT. I THINK IT ALSO, AND I DID NOT MENTION THIS, JUST TO GIVE YOU SOME BACKGROUND FACTS OF THE CASE, THIS WAS AN 11-MONTH MARRIAGE BEFORE THE PARTIES SEPARATED AND, AS I SAID, HE WAS MAKING $1300 A MONTH GROSS AND HE WAS ORDERED TO PAY $750 A MONTH IN TEMPORARY SPOUSAL SUPPORT, OF WHICH AT THE FINAL HEARING JUDGE CREECH SPECIFICALLY RESCINDED ALL SPOUSAL SUPPORT AND SAID THAT SPOUSAL SUPPORT WAS NOT APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE; BUT I DO NOT WISH FOR YOU TO THINK THAT I'M SAYING THAT JUDGE CREECH WAS RIGHT AND, YOU KNOW, I THINK THAT JUDGE WAS RIGHT, IT WAS IN FAVOR OF MY CLIENT; BUT WHAT I HAVE A PROBLEM WITH IN THE LANNERMAN CASE IS NOTHING MORE THAN WHAT I HAVE GROWN TO CALL "THE PARKING LOT ORDER."
Q. WOULD YOU CONSIDER THAT DISCUSSION THAT ALLEGEDLY TOOK PLACE BETWEEN MS. HAWK AND JUDGE PATTERSON TO BE---.
A. EXPARTE.
Q. ---PROCEDURAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE IN NATURE OR---
A. ON THE MERITS.
Q. ---ON THE MERITS?
A. I THINK IT DEALT EXPRESSLY WITH THE MERITS OF THE CASE BECAUSE THERE WAS A QUESTION WITH WHEN YOU TAKE THE WHOLE CASE INTO AN OVERVIEW, HE HAD VOLUNTARILY MADE SUPPORT PAYMENTS AND THEY WERE CREDITED AND THAT WAS WHAT WAS AFFECTING THE PAYMENT DATE AND I THINK THAT THAT'S WHY JUDGE PATTERSON ORIGINALLY RULED AS HE DID IN THE ORIGINAL TEMPORARY ORDER. I THINK THAT IT WAS AN EXPARTE COMMUNICATION, IF THAT IS WHAT YOU'RE ASKING. I THINK IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE ON THE PART OF MS. HAWK AND I THINK IT WAS INAPPROPRIATE ON THE PART OF HIS HONOR. I THINK, WHERE IT TOOK PLACE IN THE CHARLESTON COUNTY PARKING GARAGE, I THINK THAT THAT'S A LESS THAN JUDICIAL SETTING, AS WELL.
Q. YOU SAID THAT YOU SPOKE TO JUDGE PATTERSON ABOUT THIS AFTER YOU KNEW OF THE NEW ORDER?
A. WHEN I RECEIVED THE ORDER--WHEN I RECEIVED THE ORDER, THE FIRST THING THAT I DID WAS THAT I CALLED MS. HAWK AND I CONFRONTED HER WITH IT. MS. HAWK TOLD ME, "I TOOK IT DOWN AND HE SIGNED IT; THAT'S IT." AND I ASKED HER, YOU KNOW, "WHAT HAPPENED TO YOUR TELLING ME YOU WERE GOING TO SETTLE FOR AN INTERPRETATION IN FRONT OF JUDGE PATTERSON?" WE EVEN HAD AN EXPRESS DISCUSSION BEFOREHAND THAT IT WOULD NEED TO BE SET IN FRONT OF JUDGE PATTERSON BECAUSE ONLY JUDGE PATTERSON COULD, YOU KNOW, EXPLAIN OR INTERPRET, RATHER, HIS OWN ORDER. AND SHE SAID, HER LAST WORDS ON THE PHONE WERE, "YOU MAY EXPECT A MOTION SETTING." AND I TOLD HER ANY TIME THAT SHE WANTED TO. WHEN I GOT THE ORDER IN THE MAIL BEFORE I OPENED THE ENVELOPE AND WHEN I SAW THE LETTER WITH HER LETTERHEAD ON IT, I EXPECTED THAT THAT'S WHAT THAT WAS, THAT'S THE ONLY CASE THAT I HAD WITH NANCY HAWK AT THAT TIME; AND I WAS STUNNED TO SEE WHAT I GOT.
Q. WHAT WAS MS. HAWK'S EXPLANATION OF THE ORDER?
A. "YOU HAVE GOT THE ORDER. READ IT." THAT IS WHAT SHE TOLD ME. "I TOOK IT DOWN. HE SIGNED IT. YOU HAVE GOT THE ORDER. READ IT."
Q. YOU MAY HAVE ALREADY STATED THIS, BUT AT WHAT POINT DID JUDGE CREECH--HOW DID THE---
A. THIS WAS ALL RESULTING FROM A TEMPORARY ORDER. THERE WAS A PENDENTE LITE HEARING. THEN THERE WAS MY MOTION TO--MY MOTION TO RECONSIDER WAS ADJOINED BY SEVERAL OTHER MOTIONS, BOTH FROM MS. HAWK AND MYSELF, APPROXIMATELY 30 TO 45 DAYS LATER AND THEN I THINK THIS CASE TOOK FIVE MONTHS IN TOTAL DURATION BUT BEFORE THE SIX MONTHS HAD RAN, YES, WE HAD A FINAL HEARING SET IN FRONT OF JUDGE CREECH.
Q. IN THE HOWELL CASE YOU HAVE NOT MADE ANY ALLEGATIONS OF AN EXPARTE COMMUNICATION?
A. NO, I MADE NO ALLEGATION OF AN EXPARTE COMMUNICATION IN THAT ONE WHATSOEVER. I DREW THE ORDER EXPRESSLY AS JUDGE PATTERSON HAD ORDERED. IN EFFECT, I CAN RECALL WHEN I WAS DRAWING THAT ORDER, I WANTED TO BE VERY CAREFUL THAT I WAS ADAMANT ON THE POINT THAT HIS SECOND JOB WAS NOT INCLUDED AND I EVEN COMMENTED TO MY LAW PARTNER, "I'M WORKING REAL HARD FOR THE OTHER SIDE HERE." AND THEN MY ONLY COMPLAINT ON THAT IS THAT HE CLEARLY DIFFERS BY $130 OR $128 A MONTH FROM WHAT HIS RULING FROM THE BENCH WAS. IT SUBSTANTIALLY CHANGED THE RIGHTS OF MY CLIENT WITHOUT ANY APPEAL OR, YOU KNOW, THERE WAS NOTHING FROM WHICH TO APPEAL BECAUSE AT THAT TIME BY THE--IF WE HAD A PROBLEM WITH THIS ORDER, I THINK WE HAD SENT TWO OR MAYBE THREE COPIES OF THIS ORDER TO THE COURT BEFORE THIS ONE WAS FINALLY SIGNED AND WHEN IT CAME BACK, YOU KNOW, IT WAS TOO LATE. MY LADY COULDN'T AFFORD AN APPEAL.
Q. SO YOU COULD NOT APPEAL BECAUSE YOUR CLIENT COULD NOT AFFORD IT; NOT BECAUSE IT WASN'T AN APPEALABLE ISSUE?
A. I THINK THAT THERE IS AN APPEALABLE ERROR IN HIS HONOR'S RULING BECAUSE IT DOES NOT COINCIDE AT ALL WITH HIS RULING FROM THE BENCH, HIS EXPRESS ORDER TO ME AND I HAD TO DRAW THE ORDER; BUT, NO, MY CLIENT COULD NOT AFFORD AN APPEAL, AND I THINK PARTIALLY BECAUSE SHE WAS $130 A MONTH POORER. SHE HAD THE CHOICE OF FEEDING HER TWO CHILDREN OR APPEALING.
Q. YOU THINK THAT WAS AN ADMINISTRATIVE RULING OR PROCEDURAL OR ONE THAT DEALT WITH THE MERITS OF THE CASE?
A. I THINK IT WAS A PUNITIVE RULING.
Q. PUNITIVE?
A. WHETHER IT WAS ADMINISTRATIVE OR PROCEDURAL, I THINK IT WAS---
Q. TOWARDS YOU OR YOUR CLIENT?
A. TOWARDS ME, SIR.
Q. BECAUSE OF THE LANNERMAN CASE OR BECAUSE OF PROCEEDINGS THAT HAD TAKEN PLACE IN THE HOWELL CASE?
A. I CAN'T TELL YOU AT WHAT POINT I THINK THAT THE RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN JUDGE PATTERSON AND MYSELF CHANGED. THE FIRST SIX MONTHS THAT JUDGE PATTERSON WAS ON THE BENCH, I WAS IN FRONT OF HIM JUST AS MUCH AS I AM NOW WHICH I THINK IS ON A VERY REGULAR BASIS. JUDGE PATTERSON AND I HAD, YOU KNOW, NO EXTRAORDINARY DEALINGS. YOU GO IN, YOU GET YOUR DIVORCES; YOU TRY YOUR CASE, YOU GO OUT. ONE DAY SOMETHING CHANGED. I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT THAT SOMETHING IS.
Q. SO YOU FEEL LIKE HIS ACTIONS TOWARDS YOU WERE PUNITIVE BUT YOU DON'T KNOW THE BASIS FOR---
A. I HAVE NO IDEA, SIR. IF THERE ARE SUCH, IF I HAVE DONE SOMETHING TO OFFEND JUDGE PATTERSON I WOULD LIKE FOR JUDGE PATTERSON TO TELL ME BECAUSE IF I OWE THE GENTLEMAN AN APOLOGY, HE WILL HAVE ONE FROM ME.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: MR. CHAIRMAN, I DO.

Q. MR. WOOD, I BELIEVE YOU TESTIFIED THAT IN THE LANNERMAN CASE, DID YOU CALL THE JUDGE ON THAT OCCASION AND ASK HIM WHY THE DATE WAS CHANGED?
A. THE DATE? - THE PAYABLE DATE, YES, SIR, I DID. THE ONLY ANSWER THAT I GOT FROM JUDGE PATTERSON WAS THAT "I HAVE RULED." HE GAVE ME NO REASON WHATSOEVER. AND THE ORDER WAS ORIGINALLY PREPARED BY MS. HAWK AND THE ORDER, THE NUNC PRO HOC ORDER, STATES AS A REASON, I GUESS, THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS IN NEED OF SUPPORT BUT THAT'S THE SAME LANGUAGE THAT WAS IN THE ORIGINAL TEMPORARY SUPPORT ORDER. THE ONLY THING THAT CHANGED IN THE NUNC PRO HOC ORDER IS THE DATE THAT THE FIRST PAYMENT IS TO COMMENCE OR THE DATE THAT SETS UP THE PAYMENT ACCRUAL DATES. THIS ORIGINALLY HINGED ON HIS PAYDAYS. HE IS PAID AS A FEDERAL EMPLOYEE, I THINK, EVERY OTHER WEEK AND THEY CHANGED IT WITH THE NEXT PAYMENT, WITH THE STARTING DATE, AND IT, IN ESSENCE, COST HIM $375; HE DOUBLE-PAID, IS WHAT HE DID.
Q. MR. WOOD, HOW ABOUT IN THE HOWELL CASE, DID YOU CALL JUDGE PATTERSON WHEN YOU---
A. NO, SIR, I DID NOT.
Q. YOU NEVER DID?
A. NO, SIR, I DID NOT. AT THAT POINT I DID NOT SEE REALLY, TO BE QUITE HONEST, THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TO ANY FRUITION.
Q. MY NEXT QUESTION IS WHY DIDN'T YOU CALL HIM?
A. BECAUSE I HAD BEEN GIVEN--THE LAST WORDS WERE, "TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT, MR. WOOD." AND I TOOK THE LESSER OF WHAT I HAD--I WAS ARGUING FOR A HIGHER AMOUNT AND IT CAME BACK LESS THAN WHAT HE HAD ORDERED AT THE BENCH AND I HAD BEEN GIVEN THAT ULTIMATUM ONCE AND I SAW NO REASON TO CALL JUDGE PATTERSON AND GET ANOTHER "TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT."
Q. ARE YOU SAYING THAT THE RULING THAT HE FIRST MADE ON THE BENCH WAS $528?
A. JUDGE PATTERSON EXPRESSLY RULED FROM THE BENCH AND I THINK OR I AM SURE THAT THE TRANSCRIPT WOULD BEAR OUT THAT MY CLIENT WAS UNEMPLOYED. THERE WAS SOME QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT SHE WAS UNEMPLOYED. I FINALLY, NOT WANTING TO TESTIFY, TOLD JUDGE PATTERSON THAT SHE DID WORK FOR OUR LAW FIRM AND I HAD FIRED HER AND THAT I COULD TESTIFY OR THAT I COULD ASSERT AS AN OFFICER OF THE COURT THAT SHE WAS UNEMPLOYED. THE WORK SHEET WAS CHANGED IN THAT, I ASSUME AN IMPUTED INCOME OF $1,000 WAS PUT IN UNDER THE MOTHER'S EARNING CAPACITY. I HAVE A COPY OF IT; AND, GENTLEMEN, I DON'T HAVE ONE FOR EACH OF YOU; I WILL BE HAPPY TO GIVE YOU THIS COPY THAT I HAVE EXTRA; THE WORK SHEET HAS BEEN WHITED OUT ON PAGE 5 OF THE ORDER. HE RULED FROM THE BENCH THAT HE FOUND THAT SHE WAS UNEMPLOYED: "ADDITIONALLY, I FIND THE PLAINTIFF IS UNEMPLOYED AND HAS NO INCOME"; THAT WAS CHANGED TO: "ADDITIONALLY, I FIND THAT THE PLAINTIFF," AND THEN THIS IS THE NEW LANGUAGE, "HAS EARNED INCOME AND MAY OBTAIN A JOB EARNING $1,000 A MONTH." AND THEN UNDER "D" OF THE CONCLUSIONS WHICH SETS FORTH THE CHILD SUPPORT, "REQUIRE THE DEFENDANT TO PAY THE PLAINTIFF THE AMOUNT OF," AND IT'S $528.80. THE REASON I'M HAVING PROBLEMS READING IT IS BECAUSE IT'S BEEN X'ED OUT WITH A TYPEWRITER AND IT HAS BEEN CHANGED TO $408.85, AND THAT IS OUTSIDE OF WHAT THE GUIDELINES HELD TO BEGIN WITH; AND THE GUIDELINES WERE BASED ON THE LESSER INCOME, NOT UTILIZING HIS SECONDARY JOB. I HAVE NO IDEA--TO THIS DAY, I HAVE NO EARTHLY IDEA HOW JUDGE PATTERSON CAME UP WITH $408.85.
Q. BUT, MR. WOOD, MY QUESTION IS THOUGH, DID JUDGE PATTERSON SAY IN COURT THAT IT WOULD BE 528?
A. NO, JUDGE PATTERSON ORDERED ME TO COMPUTE THE GUIDELINES AND ONLY UTILIZE HIS MILITARY PAY OF 1850 PER MONTH, WHICH IS WHAT I DID. ALL HE TOLD ME TO DO WAS, I'M ORDERING THAT YOU MAY NOT USE THE 8 OR $900 EXTRA INCOME. WHEN I DREW THE ORDER THAT I PUT, I ATTACHED A WORK SHEET TO THE BACK, WHICH I DID; I DID NOT UTILIZE THAT INCOME IN FIGURING THE GUIDELINES AND IT WAS LESS THAN WHAT HE HAD RULED FROM THE BENCH.
Q. WAS ANYTHING SAID ABOUT THE WIFE BEING ABLE TO EARN $1,000 A MONTH?
A. JUDGE PATTERSON WAS OF THE OPINION THAT SHE COULD HAVE A JOB AND HE BASED HER INCOME OF $1,000 A MONTH ON WHAT OUR LAW FIRM HAD PAID HER. SHE WORKED FOR US FOR A GRAND TOTAL OF, I THINK, THREE WEEKS; AND, PLEASE, DON'T HOLD ME TO THAT; AND WE HAD GIVEN HER A SUBSTANTIAL RAISE FROM ALL HER JOBS PREVIOUSLY. $1,000 A MONTH, OR IT MAY HAVE BEEN A LITTLE MORE THAN A MONTH. SHE DID NOT WORK FOR US VERY LONG AT ALL.

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: THANK YOU, SIR.
REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS?

Q. I HAVE A QUESTION FOR YOU.
A. YES, SIR.
Q. GOING BACK TO THIS LANNERMAN CASE, WHAT WAS THE DATE FOR THE PAYMENTS TO BE MADE IN THE TEMPORARY ORDER?
A. THE TEMPORARY ORDER, SIR, CALLED THAT THE DATES BE PAID--(PAUSE; VIEWING DOCUMENT)--"THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT DEFENDANT PAY THE PLAINTIFF $750 PER MONTH IN TWO EQUAL PAYMENTS ON HIS PAYDAYS BUT THE NEXT PAYMENT TO BE MADE ON MARCH 15TH, 1990?
Q. ALL RIGHT, I'M SURE YOU KNOW WHAT MY NEXT QUESTION IS.
A. THE NUNC PRO HOC ORDER: "THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT DEFENDANT PAY THE PLAINTIFF $750 PER MONTH IN TWO EQUAL PAYMENTS ON THE 1ST AND 15TH OF EACH MONTH, WITH THE NEXT PAYMENT TO BE MADE ON MARCH 15TH AND CONTINUING THEREAFTER UNTIL THE FINAL HEARING ON THE MERITS." THE QUESTION IN THE FIRST TEMPORARY ORDER WAS A QUESTION SOLELY OF HIS PAYDAYS. HE WAS TO PAY ON HIS PAYDAYS. HE HAD MADE A PAYMENT. HE HAD MADE SEVERAL PAYMENTS BEFORE THIS MATTER WAS EVER TAKEN INTO COURT AND HE HAD BASICALLY A $375 CREDIT.
Q. OKAY, WELL, YOU LOST ME. YOU HAVE COMPLETELY LOST ME. YOU GAVE ME THE SAME DATE; BOTH TIMES YOU SAID MARCH 15TH. GO BACK AND READ THOSE DATES TO ME AGAIN.
A. ALL RIGHT. THE TEMPORARY ORDER: IN TWO EQUAL PAYMENTS ON HIS PAYDAYS; THAT WAS THE ORIGINAL ORDER, HIS PAYDAYS AND THE NEXT PAYMENT WAS TO START ON THE 15TH. THE FEDERAL PAYDAYS VARY.
Q. OKAY.
A. THEN THE NUNC PRO HOC ORDER CHANGED IT FROM HIS PAY-DAYS UNTIL THE 15TH, THE 1ST AND THE 15TH OF EACH MONTH AND HE WAS DOUBLE-PAID FROM THE BEGINNING BY CHANGING TO THE 15TH. THE WHOLE ORDER, WELL, IF HE HAD BEEN ORDERED TO PAY UNDER THE ORIGINAL TEMPORARY ORDER ON HIS PAYDAY, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN THE 30TH, I THINK, AND THIS IS HISTORY ON THIS FILE, TOO, HE WOULD HAVE BEEN EVEN UP AND THEN HIS PAYDAYS, THEREAFTER. THE PROBLEM WE HAD WAS THAT HE VOLUNTARILY AGREED TO PAY HIS WIFE BEFORE SHE EVER SUED HIM. MS. HAWK WANTED IT PAID ON THE 1ST, AND I REALIZE IT'S ONLY A DAY'S DIFFERENCE BUT IT COST MR. LANNERMAN $375.
Q. YOU STILL HAVE ME CONFUSED. THE FIRST ORDER YOU READ TO ME SAID "PAY ON THE"---
A. PAYDAYS.
Q. "PAYDAYS, THE FIRST PAYMENT TO BE MADE ON MARCH 15TH,1990."
A. YES, SIR.
Q. THE SECOND ORDER SAYS PAY ON THE 1ST AND 15TH?
A. ON THE 1ST AND 15TH OF EACH MONTH.
Q. THE FIRST PAYMENT WAS TO BE MADE ON MARCH 15TH?
A. WITH THE NEXT PAYMENT MADE ON MARCH 15TH. WHAT I'M SAYING, MR. CHAIRMAN, IS THAT PRIOR TO THE COURT'S INVOLVEMENT IN THIS, THE ORDER ALSO STATES THAT HE HAD--THE COURT WAS INFORMED THAT THE DEFENDANT PAID A PAYMENT OF $375 MARCH 1ST. HE HAD PAID BETWEEN $1,000 AND I THINK THE LOWEST AMOUNT HE PAID WAS $800 VOLUNTARILY FROM JANUARY UNTIL MARCH. WE WERE GOING BACK AND LOOKING AND JUDGE PATTERSON, AND I THINK THE TRANSCRIPT SHOWS THAT JUDGE PATTERSON TOOK THAT INTO ACCOUNT, ALL OF THE PAYMENTS THAT HAD BEEN MADE, BOTH THE COURT-ORDERED ONES AND THE VOLUNTARY ONES MADE PRIOR TO THE COURT'S ORDER. (PAUSE.) MR. CHAIRMAN, I GUESS THE WAY I CAN ANSWER YOUR QUESTION, BECAUSE IT WAS CONFUSING BACK THEN AND NOW SOME SIX MONTHS AFTER THE FACT, AND THE ONLY THING THAT I CAN SAY IN RESPONSE IS IT MUST HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT ENOUGH FOR MS. HAWK TO TELL ME SHE WANTED TO HAVE A MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND IT MUST HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT ENOUGH FOR HER TO TYPE UP AN ORDER AND IT MUST HAVE BEEN IMPORTANT IF SHE WAS WILLING TO APPROACH THE JUDGE IN THE PARKING LOT. AND EVEN IF IT ONLY DEALT WITH, YOU KNOW, WITH A DOLLAR, THE BOTTOM LIKE IS, AND I THINK, YOU KNOW, THE CANCELED CHECKS OR STATEMENTS ALONG THAT LINE, WHICH I DO NOT HAVE; THEY ARE ON MY TRUST ACCOUNT; ALL THESE PAYMENTS WERE MADE THROUGH MY TRUST ACCOUNT, WILL SHOW THAT MR. LANNERMAN IS OUT $375 BECAUSE OF THIS. THE BOTTOM LINE IS ONE COUNSEL IS REPRESENTING TO ANOTHER COUNSEL THAT THERE IS A NEED FOR A HEARING AND COUNSEL KNOWS THAT. COUNSEL THEN APPROACHES THE COURT IN WHAT I THINK IS AN EXPARTE MATTER.
Q. I DON'T MEAN TO CROSS-EXAMINE YOU BUT THAT IS MAYBE THE WAY IT SOUNDS.
A. NO, THAT'S FINE, SIR.
Q. BUT THIS IS IMPORTANT AND SERIOUS AND I WANT TO UNDERSTAND IN WHAT WAY YOU ALLEGE THAT THIS JUDGE GRIEVOUSLY OFFENDED YOUR CLIENT, AND YOU HAVE TOLD ME THAT THERE WERE TWO ORDERS.
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AND THAT THOSE TWO ORDERS, ONE SAID THAT THE RESPONDENT OR DEFENDANT WOULD PAY ON THE 1ST AND 15TH WITH THE FIRST PAYMENT BEING MARCH 15TH; THE OTHER ORDER SAYS YOU SHALL PAY ON PAY DATES WITH THE FIRST PAYMENT BEING MARCH 15TH?
A. THE FIRST COURT-ORDERED PAYMENT, MR. CHAIRMAN. I THINK THAT THE SLIP BETWEEN THE CUP AND THE LIP IS THAT THIS COURT ORDER IS DISCUSSING THE FIRST COURT-ORDERED PAYMENT COMMENCEMENT BUT THERE HAD BEEN AND FIGURED INTO JUDGE PATTERSON'S REASONING, THERE HAD BEEN NUMEROUS PREVIOUS OTHER PAYMENTS AND BY CHANGING THE DATE A DAY LIKE THAT, THERE WAS A DOUBLE PAYMENT IN THIS CASE.
Q. I DON'T SEE THAT THERE IS A CHANGE IN THE DATE BUT NOW I SEE THAT PERHAPS THERE COULD HAVE BEEN A VOLUNTARY PAYMENT FOR WHICH SOMEONE DIDN'T GET CREDIT; AND IS THAT WHAT YOU ARE SAYING OCCURRED?
A. YES, SIR, BY CHANGING THE DATE; THAT WAS BROUGHT TO JUDGE PATTERSON'S ATTENTION WHEN I CALLED HIM. I EXPLAINED TO HIM AND GAVE HIM AN ACCOUNTING OF THE PAYMENT DATES ON THE PHONE THAT DAY. I SAID, "JUDGE PATTERSON, IF YOU CHANGE YOUR ORDER THIS WAY, THIS IS GOING TO MAKE MR. LANNERMAN HAVE TO MAKE A DOUBLE PAYMENT," WHICH IS WHAT HE HAS, IN EFFECT, DONE. AND JUDGE PATTERSON'S RESPONSE WAS, "I HAVE RULED."
Q. I STILL DON'T SEE THAT THAT REQUIRES A DOUBLE PAYMENT. A MEMBER OF THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE IS PAID ON THE 1ST AND THE 15TH; CORRECT?
A. NO, SIR, THAT'S NOT CORRECT. MS. HAWK INTRODUCED INTO EVIDENCE THE PAY SCALE AND THEY VARY AS MUCH AS, I THINK, ONE, YOU CAN GET PAID ON THE 18TH, THERE IS AS MUCH AS A THREE-DAY SWING WHEN THEY ARE PAID. THAT'S A MATTER OF RECORD IN THIS CASE. EXCUSE ME. BUT I THOUGHT THAT THEY WERE PAID ON THE 1ST AND 15TH, TOO; HAVING BEEN A FEDERAL JUDGE'S LAW CLERK, YOU KNOW, THAT WAS OUR EXPERIENCE; BUT SHE INTRODUCED AND SUBPOENAED THE RECORDS OF THE PAY MASTER FOR THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AND THEY DO VARY WIDELY.
Q. WELL, I HAVE BEEN RETIRED FOR EIGHT YEARS FROM THE AIR FORCE RESERVE AND I ALWAYS GOT PAID ON THE 1ST AND THE 15TH. BUT YOU ARE SAYING THAT BECAUSE OF THE CHANGE IN THE ORDER---
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ---THAT THE ACTUAL PAY DATE WAS THE 18TH?
A. SIR, THE ACTUAL DATE THAT IT IS, BECAUSE THIS ORDER WENT INTO EFFECT FROM MARCH UNTIL ROUGHLY JULY; AND WHAT I'M SAYING IS THAT WHEN SHE SUBPOENAED THOSE RECORDS SHOWING THE PAYMENT DATES THAT WERE DUE, LOOKING BACK FROM MEMORY, THEY VARIED AS MUCH AS THREE DAYS BUT THE BOTTOM LINE IS BY CHANGING THIS ORDER THAT ONE DAY, IN ESSENCE, CAUSED MR. LANNERMAN, AND I MEAN, THE ONLY WAY I CAN ANSWER YOUR QUESTION, MR. CHAIRMAN, IS, I THINK, TO YOUR SATISFACTION, WHICH I WILL BE HAPPY TO DO, IS TO GIVE YOU A PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF MY LEDGER CARD, WHICH I DO NOT HAVE AND I'LL BE HAPPY WHEN I GO BACK TO MY OFFICE TO SEND IT BECAUSE ALL PAYMENTS WERE TENDERED THROUGH MY LAW FIRM'S TRUST ACCOUNT.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. LET ME GO ON. THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT ALL OF THE PAYMENTS THAT WERE DUE WERE MADE?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. SO THAT YOUR CLIENT COMPLIED WITH THE ORDER ISSUED BY JUDGE PATTERSON?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. IF YOU WERE OR IF YOUR CLIENT WAS OFFENDED, AS YOU SAY HE WAS---
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ---COULD YOU NOT HAVE FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR TO AMEND THE ORDER OR FOR SOME OTHER RELIEF FROM JUDGE PATTERSON?
A. YOUR HONOR, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS LATER---
Q. I'M NOT A "YOUR HONOR."
A. EXCUSE ME. ---WAS LATER FILED AND BECAUSE I PLACED IN THE WORDING OF MY MOTION THAT HIS ORDER WAS NOT--AND, AGAIN, I THINK THIS SHOWS THE PATTERN IN THIS CASE; BECAUSE I MOVED FOR RECONSIDERATION BECAUSE I SAID HIS ORDER WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY EITHER LAW OR EQUITY, I WAS TOLD WHEN I WENT IN TO ARGUE THAT MOTION, I WASN'T ALLOWED TO ARGUE IT EXCEPT TO THE FACT THAT, WELL, MR. WOOD, YOU ARE NOW SAYING THAT THERE IS A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES BY--AND I TENDERED IN SUPPORT OF THAT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION A NEW FINANCIAL DECLARATION. HE SAID WHAT YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT IS A CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES. I MOVED TO AMEND AND THAT MOTION WAS DENIED. AND I CAN'T THINK OF ANY MORE OF AN EQUITABLE MATTER THAN A CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES.
Q. OKAY, MOVING ON TO THE HOWELL CASE.
A. YES, SIR.
Q. YOUR COMPLAINT IN THE HOWELL CASE IS FOR A LEGAL MATTER, ISN'T IT?
A. YES, SIR, IT IS.
Q. AND WHAT CAN YOU DO IF YOU DON'T LIKE THE RESULTS OBTAINED ON THE BASIS OF A LEGAL MATTER?
A. YOU CAN APPEAL, SIR.
Q. YOU CHOSE NOT TO APPEAL IN THIS CASE BECAUSE YOUR CLIENT COULDN'T AFFORD TO DO SO?
A. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE TEMPORARY IN THIS--MY CLIENT COULD NOT AFFORD--AND AS I UNDERSTAND IT THE TEMPORARY ORDER IS NOT AN INTERLOCUTORIAL APPEALABLE MATTER.
Q. BUT EVENTUALLY IT'S AN APPEALABLE MATTER?
A. UNFORTUNATELY IF YOUR CLIENT HAS A CHOICE OF PURSUING HER LEGAL RIGHTS, AND MS. FABRI, MR. O'NEILL, MYSELF, AND MR. NORFLEET, AS I SAID, ARE SMALL LAWYERS; WE USUALLY GET ABOUT A 250 TO $500 RETAINER FROM CLIENTS AND PAYING THEIR LIGHT BILL OR PAYING THEIR LAWYER, THE LAWYER USUALLY LOSES OUT AND THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS USUALLY LOSE OUT. 90 PERCENT OF THE TIME WITH MY CLIENTS, MR. CHAIRMAN, WHAT YOU GET UNDER THE TEMPORARY ORDER IS WHAT YOU ARE GOING TO GET.
Q. WELL, I COMMEND YOU FOR BEING SO DILIGENT IN THE PROTECTION OF YOUR CLIENTS' INTERESTS.
A. AND, MR. CHAIRMAN, I ALSO THINK THAT THE OLD ADAGE "JUSTICE BELIEVED IS OFTEN JUSTICE DENIED" IS PROBABLY THE MOST IMPORTANT ADAGE IN THE FAMILY COURT ON PENDENTE LITE MOTIONS AND I HAVE SEEN THAT TOO MANY TIMES.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE?

Q. MR. CHAIRMAN, I DON'T KNOW WHETHER I'M JUST SLOW TODAY OR WHAT BUT I'M TRYING TO UNDERSTAND THE 15TH AND THE 30TH AND THE 1ST AND THE 15TH TO MAKE SURE---
A. SENATOR, THERE IS ONLY ONE DAY'S DIFFERENCE. THERE'S A--I WILL CONCEDE THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE DAY'S DIFFERENCE; BUT, SENATOR, AS I SAID, THAT ONE DAY, AND I WENT THROUGH IT AND I COUNTED IT MYSELF, USING THE LEDGER CARD AND THE CANCELED CHECKS; THAT ONE DAY MADE MY CLIENT DOUBLE PAY.
Q. FOR THAT MONTH?
A. FOR THAT MONTH HE PAID $375 MORE. WHAT HE HAD DONE, SENATOR, AND, AGAIN, PLEASE, THIS IS FROM MEMORY, OKAY, I DON'T HAVE MY LEDGER CARD AND I APOLOGIZE TO THE COMMITTEE FOR NOT BRINGING IT. I BROUGHT THE REST OF THE FILE AND THAT'S ONE THING I SHOULD HAVE BROUGHT. I BELIEVE HE HAD PAID VOLUNTARILY ON THE 1ST. I BELIEVE HE HAD. AND THEN HE WAS COURT-ORDERED TO PAY ON THE 15TH. HIS NEXT PAYDAY WAS NOT UNTIL THE 1ST OF APRIL. MS. HAWK WANTED THE MONEY ON THE 30TH. SHE THEN WENT, APPROACHED JUDGE PATTERSON AND HE HAD ASKED FOR--IT WAS THE OTHER WAY AROUND; HIS PAYDAY WAS ON THE--HE WAS GOING TO END UP PAYING--WHAT HAPPENED IN THE NUNC PRO HOC, HE ENDED UP PAYING THREE TIMES. HE HAD PAID ON THE 1ST AND THE 15TH AND THE 30TH; AND, AGAIN, SENATOR, THAT'S FROM MEMORY WITHOUT A LEDGER CARD.
Q. WAS IT DISPUTED AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THERE HAD BEEN A VOLUNTARY PAYMENT?
A. OH, NO, IN BOTH ORDERS THE COURT NOTES THAT THERE WAS A VOLUNTARILY PAYMENT. IN BOTH ORDERS' PARAGRAPH, THE 4TH PARAGRAPH: THE COURT WAS INFORMED THAT THE DEFENDANT PAID THE PLAINTIFF $375 ON MARCH 1ST, 1990. IN BOTH ORDERS. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE AMENDED TEMPORARY ORDER NUNC PRO HOC AND THE TEMPORARY ORDER WAS THE TERMS PAYDAYS AND THE 1ST AND THE 15TH. THAT'S THE ONLY CHANGE. I ANTICIPATE OR I WOULD SPECULATE THAT THIS ALL PROBABLY WAS PULLED OFF OF HER WORD PROCESSING MACHINE AND SHE HAD HER SECRETARY CHANGE THAT LAST PART. HE MADE THREE PAYMENTS FOR THE PAYMENT OF MARCH, IS WHAT HE DID.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, MR. WOOD.
A. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: JUDGE.

JUDGE PATTERSON: WELL, THESE WERE TEMPORARY HEARINGS. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER MR. WOOD IS TALKING ABOUT THE TIME OF THE CONTESTED MATTER IN FRONT OF ME OR NOT. BUT IN ANY EVENT, THESE WERE TEMPORARY HEARINGS. IN THE FIRST CASE I CONTINUED WHAT THEY WERE DOING, I BELIEVE. IS THAT CORRECT?

MR. WOOD: I'M SORRY, YOUR HONOR?

JUDGE PATTERSON: DIDN'T I CONTINUE WHAT THEY WERE DOING ON A VOLUNTARY BASIS?

MR. WOOD: NO, SIR, YOUR HONOR, HE HAD PAID VARIOUS AMOUNTS.

JUDGE PATTERSON: OKAY, WELL, ANYWAY I PRETTY MUCH, I THOUGHT, CONTINUED--AS A TEMPORARY MATTER YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT THESE DATES, THE 1ST AND THE 15TH AND THE 15TH AND THE 30TH; AS I RECALL IT, I HAD A LENGTHY DISCUSSION WITH MR. WOOD ON THE TELEPHONE FROM BERKELEY AND WE WENT OVER THIS AND THE WAY I SAW MR. WOOD FIGURING IT, HE WAS GOING TO SKIP A TWO-WEEK PAYMENT IF IT WAS THE 15TH AND THE 30TH INSTEAD OF THE 1ST AND THE 15TH AND I WANTED THE MAN TO CONTINUE ON EVERY TWO WEEKS LIKE I THOUGHT HE HAD BEEN PAYING. I DID NOT WANT HIM TO SKIP A PAYMENT AND THAT WAS THE INTENT OF MY ORDER AND IT WAS NOT ANY EXPARTE. IT WAS JUST THE DATE, WHAT I SHOULD PUT IN AS FAR AS THE DATES. I HAVEN'T REVIEWED THAT FILE IN ANY LENGTH IN ANY TIME BUT I HAVE EXPLAINED IT TO MR. WOOD AND I WENT OVER IT FOR ABOUT AN HOUR ON THE TELEPHONE ONE DAY, JUST ME AND HIM, AND WE TRIED TO WORK IT OUT AND I TRIED MY BEST TO EXPLAIN IT TO HIM WHERE THE MAN WAS NOT BEING DOUBLE-CHARGED. THAT'S ALL I REMEMBER ABOUT THAT TEMPORARY ORDER. THE SECOND MATTER WAS HE WAS REPRESENTING HIS SECRETARY OR A FORMER SECRETARY WHO HAD JUST RECENTLY BEEN LAID OFF; AND HE WAS AN AIRMAN WHO WAS WORKING TWO JOBS. MR. WOOD CAME IN AND SAID: JUDGE, THIS IS A TEMPORARY HEARING; WE HAVE A FINAL AGREEMENT. THE AIRMAN WAS NOT REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY AND MR. WOOD STATED TO ME THAT HE WANTED TO PUT THE FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE RECORD; AND I SAID: WELL, LET ME HEAR THE AGREEMENT. HE GAVE IT TO ME AND HE SAID: I'M INCLUDING IN THAT AGREEMENT THAT THE AIRMAN HAS A SECOND JOB. AFTER HE GETS THROUGH WITH HIS AIR FORCE DAY WHICH IS FROM 7:00 TO 4:00, HE GOES TO WORK AT K-MART OR WALMART--I DON'T KNOW WHERE IT WAS--AND HE WORKS UNTIL 10:00 O'CLOCK AT NIGHT. AND I SAID: MR. SO-AND-SO, WHY ARE YOU WORKING THAT JOB? AND HE SAID: I'M WORKING THAT EXTRA JOB AFTER MY AIR FORCE JOB UNTIL 10:00 AT NIGHT TO ATTEMPT TO PAY THE BILLS OF THE MARRIAGE. AND THEN HE WAS NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AND I TOLD MR.--HE TOLD ME THAT HE WAS SUBJECT TO BE CALLED TO ACTIVE DUTY; I MEAN, HE WAS ON ACTIVE DUTY. HE SAID: I'M SUBJECT TO BE CALLED ON MANEUVERS. HE COULD HAVE BEEN SENT TO SAUDI ARABIA. HE COULD BE SENT ANYWHERE ON A MOMENTS NOTICE AND HE WOULD NOT HAVE THAT SECOND JOB. I DID NOT THINK THAT IT WOULD BE PROPER TO ISSUE A FINAL ORDER INCLUDING THAT SECOND JOB IN THERE WHERE THE MAN WHO COULDN'T AFFORD AN ATTORNEY--THEY HAD TREMENDOUS DEBT--WOULD HAVE TO FILE AN ACTION TO COME BACK IN AND GET IT CHANGED. AND MR. WOOD AGREED ON THE RECORD THAT HIS CLIENT HAD EARNED $1,000 A MONTH; I IMPUTED $1,000 TO HER AND I COMPUTED THE FINANCIAL DECLARATION MYSELF. I MADE THOSE CHANGES AND I FIGURED UP THE SUPPORT WHICH I THOUGHT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN; AND I JUST BASED IT ON HIS AIRMAN'S PAY BECAUSE I TOLD HIM IT WAS COMMENDABLE AND I FELT LIKE HE WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK AT 10:00 O'CLOCK AT NIGHT; I WAS JUST GOING TO ISSUE A TEMPORARY ORDER BASED ON THOSE AFFIDAVITS UNTIL THE MATTER COULD BE HEARD. AND MR. WOOD WAS REPRESENTING HIS CLIENT DILIGENTLY. HE WAS REPRESENTING HIS CLIENT WELL. I HAVE NO QUARREL WITH MR. WOOD. I JUST THOUGHT AT THE TEMPORARY HEARING REPRESENTING THAT GIRL HE WAS BEING A LITTLE OVERREACHING ON THAT AIRMAN. I DIDN'T APPROVE THE AGREEMENT. HE, IN FACT, I BELIEVE, STATED ON THE RECORD THAT HIS CLIENT WOULD HAVE A JOB IN A COUPLE OF WEEKS, THAT SHE HAD APPLIED FOR ONE; I IMPUTED $1,000 TO HER FOR THAT AND FIGURED UP THE INCOME. DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT IT?

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE ONE QUESTION, PLEASE.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: YES, SIR.

Q. JUDGE PATTERSON, IN REGARD TO THE HOWELL CASE, IN COURT DID YOU INDICATE TO MR. WOOD THAT YOU WERE GOING TO INCLUDE $1,000 INCOME FOR HIS WIFE?
A. HE PUT THAT ON THE RECORD AND AT LEAST I THINK THAT HE INDICATED TO ME THAT IS WHAT SHE HAD BEEN EARNING AND I DON'T REMEMBER WHETHER HE SAID HE FIRED HER OR NOT; I KNOW THAT SHE WAS NOT WORKING, BUT SHE HAD BEEN WORKING SHORTLY BEFORE THE HEARING AND I THINK MR. WOOD STIPULATED ON THE RECORD THAT SHE COULD GET A JOB AND WOULD BE WORKING AFTER THE HEARING. THAT'S THE WAY I RECALL IT.
Q. THAT WAS DISCUSSED IN COURT?
A. THAT WAS DISCUSSED IN COURT, YES, SIR. AND THIS WAS A TEMPORARY HEARING, NO TESTIMONY TAKEN, JUST ON AFFIDAVITS.
Q. AFFIDAVITS.
A. THESE TEMPORARY ORDERS ARE A BANDAID TO GET THEM THROUGH IT. I JUST FELT LIKE THAT I DIDN'T WANT TO MAKE A FINAL AGREEMENT THAT DAY FOR THAT AIRMAN WHO WAS UNREPRESENTED. I DIDN'T THINK IT WAS FAIR. I ISSUED WHAT I THOUGHT WAS JUST A JUDGMENT CALL AND A FAIR ORDER; AND I DO THAT 20 TIMES EVERY MONDAY AFTERNOON. I HAVE NOTHING AGAINST MR. WOOD. HE'S A FINE YOUNG MAN.

CONTINUED EXAMINATION OF JUDGE PATTERSON BY MR. BATES:

Q. YOU'VE NEVER HAD ANY RIFF? HE SPOKE OF WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS A PUNITIVE ACTION ON YOUR PART.
A. AS I RECALL, I CAN'T RECALL ANY CONTESTED MATTERS THAT MR. WOOD HAS TRIED IN FRONT OF ME. I'M RACKING MY BRAIN.

MR. WOOD: THREE CONTESTED DIVORCES.
A. WHAT WERE THEY?

MR. WOOD: CONTESTED DIVORCES.
A. WELL, IF YOU SAY SO. I DON'T REMEMBER. I HAVE NOTHING AGAINST MR. WOOD. THOSE--THERE WERE JUST THOSE TWO TEMPORARY MATTERS THAT HE HAS TALKED ABOUT. THERE WAS NOTHING PERSONAL WITH HIM. AND I WILL NEVER HOLD ANYTHING AGAINST HIM AND I KNOW HE MAY NOT BELIEVE THAT. IT'S NOT--I'M JUST NOT THAT TYPE OF PERSON.

SENATOR MCCONNELL: MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE JUST ONE QUESTION.

Q. I JUST WANT TO MAKE SURE--I'M TRYING TO UNDERSTAND THE PAYMENT SCHEDULE. IS YOUR INTENT HERE--DID I HEAR YOU CORRECTLY THAT IT WAS YOUR INTENT THAT THE FELLOW PAY EVERY TWO WEEKS?
A. CONTINUE EVERY TWO WEEKS OR EVERY PAYDAY AND NOT SKIP A PAYMENT. THE WAY I CONCEIVED MR. WOOD HAD IT FIGURED UP, HE WOULD HAVE GONE FOUR WEEKS WITHOUT PAYING AND I DID NOT WANT HIM TO SKIP A PAYMENT. AND I THOUGHT I CLEARLY EXPLAINED THAT TO MR. WOOD. WE TALKED ABOUT IT EXPARTE AFTER I SIGNED THE ORDER AT LENGTH. I MADE EVERY EFFORT; I TALKED TO MR. WOOD FOR ABOUT AN HOUR ON THE PHONE ABOUT THIS ONE DAY WITH THE SECRETARY PRESENT AND WENT OVER IT IN DETAIL AS TO WHY I ORDERED THE PAYMENTS ON THOSE DATES, THAT I DID NOT WANT HIM TO SKIP A PAYMENT AND GO FOUR WEEKS WITHOUT PAYING. I WANTED HIM TO PAY EVERY TWO WEEKS APPROXIMATELY, TWO-AND-A-HALF WEEKS AND NOT MISS A PAYDAY AND THE WAY I FIGURED IT UP, HE WOULDN'T MISS IT EVERY TWO WEEKS. THE WAY I FELT MR. WOOD HAD IT FIGURED UP, HE WOULD HAVE GONE FOUR WEEKS WITHOUT PAYING. WE JUST HAD A DISAGREEMENT ON THAT AND I FEEL LIKE I'M RIGHT BUT I DON'T WANT TO FIGHT ABOUT THAT.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, JUDGE.

MR. BATES: THE NEXT WITNESS IS MR. DANIEL NORFLEET.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS.)

Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR.
A. TO BEGIN WITH, I WANT TO CLARIFY SOMETHING. I HAVE APPEARED IN FRONT OF JUDGE PATTERSON ON A NUMBER OF MATTERS, INCLUDING CONTESTED MATTERS, TEMPORARY HEARINGS, AND AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM IN CASES; I HAVE BEEN IN FRONT OF HIM IN D.S.S. CASES; I HAVE HAD AGREEMENTS APPROVED; SO, I HAVE APPEARED IN FRONT OF HIM IN A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT COUNTIES AND IN A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT CAPACITIES, REPRESENTING DEFENDANTS, REPRESENTING PLAINTIFFS, ALSO. I AM SURPRISED THAT HE CAN'T REMEMBER ANY OF THESE APPEARANCES BECAUSE I WAS IN FRONT OF HIM YESTERDAY AND IN A CASE REGARDING ONE OF THE ONES OF WHICH I HAVE USED AS AN EXAMPLE. I MIGHT ADD THAT NONE OF THESE GENTLEMEN THAT'S COMING TO TESTIFY ON HIS BEHALF KNOWS ABOUT THE SUBSTANCE OF ANY OF THESE CASES OR WAS INVOLVED IN ANY OF THESE CASES. THEY CAN SAY THAT HE IS A WONDERFUL JUDGE AND HE KNOWS THE LAW, BUT THERE IS NOT A SINGLE PERSON HERE TO TESTIFY ON HIS BEHALF, AT LEAST TODAY, ON ANYTHING INVOLVING ME OR THESE SPECIFIC CASES. I MIGHT POINT OUT ALSO THAT THESE CASES ARE ILLUSTRATIVE ONLY. IF I HAD THE TIME OR INCLINATION OR THIS BODY HAD THE TIME TO GO OVER EVERY SINGLE CASE IN WHICH I HAVE APPEARED BEFORE JUDGE PATTERSON IN THE LAST TWO YEARS, I COULD FIND NUMEROUS OTHER EXAMPLES. THE ONE THAT HE MENTIONED, THAT HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED, WAS ONE THAT I DIDN'T MENTION. IT INVOLVED--JOHN WILLIAMS WAS THE ATTORNEY FOR THE OTHER PARTY AND IT INVOLVED AN ATTEMPT TO ENFORCE A 20-YEAR-OLD ORDER SIGNED BY A JUDGE WHO IS NOW DECEASED AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF A 20-YEAR-OLD SUPPORT ORDER IN WHICH A GENTLEMAN HAD NEVER PAID A SINGLE PENNY OF CHILD SUPPORT HAD--WE HAD A PRE-TRIAL HEARING AT WHICH THE JUDGE RULED THAT THERE WAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE MATTER, THAT THE ORDER HAD BEEN RENDERED PROPER IN THE FIRST PLACE; AND FOUR DAYS LATER OR FIVE DAYS LATER, WE HAD A FINAL HEARING IN WHICH HE REVERSED HIS RULING, DISMISSED THE CASE, THREW MY CLIENT OUT OF COURT. AND WHEN I SAID: YOU HAVE ALREADY RULED ON THIS, YOUR HONOR. HIS RESPONSE WAS: DID I RULE ON THE RECORD? - NO, YOU RULED AT A PRE-TRIAL HEARING. SINCE THEN EVERY TIME I GET ANY RULINGS FROM JUDGE PATTERSON, I MAKE SURE I REDUCE THOSE TO AN ORDER. BUT AS I GO THROUGH THESE PARTICULAR CASES THAT I HAVE USED, AGAIN, JUST FOR EXAMPLES, I MIGHT ALSO ADD THAT I'M NOT DISGRUNTLED ON ANY OF THESE PARTICULAR CASES. I PREVAILED ON ALL THREE OF THESE CASES FOR MY CLIENT AND I WAS PAID ON ALL THREE CASES FOR MY CLIENT; AND IN TWO INSTANCES I HAVE BEEN AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND IN THE THIRD INSTANCE I HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO BE PAID ATTORNEY'S FEES BY JUDGE PATTERSON. AND THE MATTER AS FAR AS THE CONTEMPT HEARING THAT WAS TO BE HEARD YESTERDAY UNTIL I ASKED HIM TO RECUSE HIMSELF IS PENDING, I ANTICIPATE THAT I WILL GET ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THAT CASE. SO I WANT Y'ALL TO UNDERSTAND THAT IN NO INSTANCE AM I COMPLAINING BECAUSE HE RULED AGAINST ME OR BECAUSE HE DID SOMETHING THAT PERSONALLY COST ME MONEY. THERE ARE INSTANCES IN WHICH THAT HAS HAPPENED AND THERE ARE INSTANCES IN WHICH I HAVE THOUGHT THAT HE RULED INCORRECTLY AND I'VE ALSO HAD INSTANCES WHERE IF MY CLIENT HAD HAD A LITTLE BIT MORE ASSETS, WE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE APPEALED IT. IN TWO INSTANCES I APPEALED RULINGS OF JUDGE PATTERSON WHERE MY CLIENT COULDN'T EVEN COME UP WITH THE MONEY TO PAY THE COST OF AN APPEAL, MUCH LESS ATTORNEY'S FEES. MY PRACTICE, JUST SO Y'ALL UNDERSTAND THIS A LITTLE BIT, I SPEND A LOT OF TIME IN FAMILY COURT BUT THE BULK OF MY MONEY IN TERMS OF--I HEARD YOU TALKING TO THE POTENTIAL JUDGES IN TERMS OF--THE BULK OF MY INCOME DOESN'T COME FROM FAMILY LAW PRACTICE. I SETTLED PROBABLY TWO CASES LAST YEAR, PERSONAL INJURY CASES, THAT PAID ME 40 OR 50 PERCENT OF MY INCOME. MY TYPICAL FAMILY COURT CASE IS SOMEONE THAT DOESN'T HAVE A LOT OF ASSETS THAT NEEDS REPRESENTATION. AND IN OUR FIRM WE MAKE OUR INCOME AND WE MAKE OUR LIVELIHOOD ON PERSONAL INJURY CASES AND CRIMINAL CASES AND WE HAVE A PRETTY THRIVING REAL ESTATE PRACTICE BETWEEN MY PARTNER AND MYSELF AND WE USE THE FAMILY COURT PRIMARILY TO HANDLE D.S.S. CASES WHICH ARE ASSIGNED AND TO HANDLE OUR PRO BONO. I DO MY 20 OR 40--I TYPICALLY DO 40 OR 60 HOURS A YEAR ON PRO BONO CASES. AND THEN A LOT OF MY FAMILY COURT APPEARANCES ARE WHAT SHOULD BE PRO BONO CASES IN THE SENSE THAT THE PEOPLE SHOULD QUALIFY, BUT FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER, EITHER THEY DON'T HAVE THE TIME TO GET QUALIFIED FOR PRO BONO, THEY NEED SOME IMMEDIATE RELIEF, OR BECAUSE OF SOME TECHNICAL PROBLEM, THEY DON'T APPLY OR QUALIFY FOR EITHER LEGAL AID OR PRO BONO REPRESENTATION AND I GO AHEAD AND HANDLE IT. BUT TURNING SPECIFICALLY TO THESE CASES THAT I HAVE MENTIONED, THE ONE IN WHICH HE HAS TALKED ABOUT-- HANDED UP AN AFFIDAVIT FROM MS. KANE, THAT'S ONE IN WHICH I EVENTUALLY GOT ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR THE PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO SHOW UP AT A DEPOSITION--EXCUSE ME--FOR THE PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE COURT ORDER WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THE RULE TO SHOW CAUSE HERE AND WHICH JUDGE PATTERSON CONTINUED. WE CONTINUE TO SPLIT HAIRS ABOUT "WHAT'S AN EXPARTE COMMUNICATION ON A PROCEDURAL MATTER" AND "WHAT'S AN EXPARTE COMMUNICATION ON A SUBSTANTIVE MATTER." WE SEEM TO SORT OF SLIDE BY, BY CALLING SOME THINGS "PROCEDURAL" THAT MAY OR MAY NOT BE PROCEDURAL AND LET ME ADDRESS THAT A MINUTE. IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE WHAT HAPPENED WAS THAT A RULE TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING HAD BEEN SET. THE LAWYER FOR THE OTHER SIDE AND I HAD DISCUSSED THE CONTINUANCE OF THIS RULE TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING AND I HAD EXPLAINED TO HER IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT I WOULD NOT AGREE TO IT. SHE WAS NOT THE LEAD COUNSEL BUT SHE WAS--FROM WHAT I CAN GATHER, SHE WAS AN ASSOCIATE IN THE FIRM IN WHICH RONALD LOFTON WAS REPRESENTING A GENTLEMAN IN A DEATH PENALTY CASE. THERE WAS AN ORDER THAT HAD BEEN ENTERED; IT WAS A RATHER GENERAL ORDER PROTECTING EVERYONE IN THE FIRM FROM ANY COURT APPEARANCES DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE ACTION. MS. KANE USED THAT ORDER SELECTIVELY. SHE WAS APPEARING IN FAMILY COURT THE WEEK THAT SHE WAS SUPPOSED TO APPEAR IN OUR HEARING. SHE HAD APPEARED THE DAY BEFORE AND, YET, WHEN IT CAME TO OUR HEARING, SHE--THIS ORDER SUDDENLY MATERIALIZED THAT HAD BEEN SIGNED SOME 12 DAYS BEFORE AND WHICH SHE HAD KNOWN ABOUT SOME 12 DAYS BEFORE. IT WAS NEVER GIVEN TO ME. THERE WAS A PROPOSED ORDER OF CONTINUANCE FAXED TO MY OFFICE ON THE DAY OF THE HEARING AFTER I HAD ALREADY LEFT TO GO TO COURT. I HAD A FAX THAT THE FAX SAYS ON THE FAX WHAT TIME IT IS TRANSFERRED BUT I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT IT HAD BEEN FAXED TO ME AFTER I HAD LEFT TO GO TO COURT. SHE HAD SENT A PROPOSED ORDER OF CONTINUANCE TO JUDGE MALLARD, THE TRIAL JUDGE, THE DAY OF THE HEARING WITHOUT COMMUNICATING WITH HIM ABOUT HER NEED FOR A CONTINUANCE. NOW I DON'T DISAGREE WITH JUDGE PATTERSON; AND AS I SAID AND ACKNOWLEDGE IN THE TRANSCRIPT OF THAT EVENTUAL HEARING WHEN I FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, I DON'T DENY THAT IT WAS PROPER FOR JUDGE MALLARD TO HAVE GRANTED HER A CONTINUANCE. UNDER THE LAW OF THIS STATE IF SHE WAS, INDEED, THE LAWYER ON A DEATH PENALTY CASE, SHE WAS ENTITLED TO A CONTINUANCE. I HAVE SOME QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER SHE WAS, INDEED, THE LAWYER BECAUSE GIVEN THE AMOUNT OF TIME THAT SHE HAD BEEN IN PRACTICE, SHE COULDN'T TRY A DEATH PENALTY CASE BY HERSELF; SO, I HAVE SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE THRUST OF THE ORDER THAT ESSENTIALLY PROTECTED EVERY LAWYER IN AT LEAST A THREE-PERSON OFFICE FROM GOING TO ANY CASE, ANY COURT, ANY TIME IF THEY DIDN'T WANT TO. BUT THAT ASIDE, ONCE IT GOT IN THE PROPER HANDS OF THE JUDGE TO MAKE THE DECISION AS TO WHETHER TO GRANT A CONTINUANCE, I DON'T THINK THAT THE JUDGE HAD THE DISCRETION NOT TO GRANT THAT CONTINUANCE. THE PROBLEM THAT I HAD WITH THAT CASE, AND CONTINUE TO HAVE WITH THAT CASE, IS THAT MS. KANE NEVER TOOK IT TO JUDGE MALLARD OR WHEN--OR INITIALLY WHEN HE REFUSED TO GRANT THE CONTINUANCE, CALLED ME IN THE COURTROOM AND SAID: I HAVE HEARD NOTHING OF THIS. I DON'T KNOW WHERE SHE IS. YOU GET HER UP HERE. WE'RE GOING TO HEAR THIS MATTER. THAT WAS IT. I ATTEMPTED FOR ABOUT FOUR DAYS TO GET HER TO RETURN MY PHONE CALLS. I COULD HEAR HER--THE SECRETARY--STANDING BY THE SECRETARY'S PHONE SAYING: TELL HIM I'M NOT HERE. I FINALLY CALLED JUDGE MALLARD AND SAID: JUDGE MALLARD, I CAN'T GET HER TO AGREE TO ANY OTHER TIME. I DON'T KNOW WHAT TO DO. HIS RESPONSE TO ME WAS: FILE A MOTION TO COMPEL. YOU KNOW WHAT TO DO. YOU HAVE GOT A RULE BOOK. AND WHICH I DID. I THEN, THEREAFTER, LEARNED THAT JUDGE PATTERSON HAD SIGNED AN ORDER OF CONTINUANCE SIX DAYS AFTER THE HEARING IN A DIFFERENT COUNTY. NOW I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THIS IS SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT; THE RULES OF ETHICAL CONDUCT AS PERTAINS TO ATTORNEYS SAY THAT YOU CAN'T --YOU CANNOT CONTACT A JUDGE ABOUT A SUBSTANTIVE MATTER. SO MAYBE SHE WAS NOT AT FAULT BUT I THINK THAT ANY JUDGE THAT--THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT JUDGE THAT ENCOURAGES OR ALLOWS PEOPLE TO COME TO HIM AFTER A JUDGE, ANOTHER JUDGE, HAS REFUSED TO SIGN YOUR ORDER IS ASKING PEOPLE TO JUDGE SHOP, TO FORUM SHOP. THAT'S--WE HAVE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT JUDGES IN THE FAMILY COURT, IN CIRCUIT COURT; WE HAVE IN THE COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS, BUT I HAVE NEVER IN SIX-AND-A- HALF YEARS OF PRACTICE, I HAVE NEVER HEARD OF AN INSTANCE WHERE YOU WENT INTO COURT, IN OPEN COURT AND THE JUDGE SAID FOR WHATEVER REASON, "I'M NOT GOING TO SIGN THAT ORDER," AND YOU TURNED AROUND AND TOOK IT TO SOMEBODY ELSE AND SAID, "JUDGE, THE TRIAL JUDGE WON'T SIGN IT, BUT YOU ARE THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT JUDGE; WHY DON'T YOU SIGN IT?" THAT'S WRONG. THEY KNEW THAT I OPPOSED IT. THEY KNEW THAT I OBJECTED TO IT. THEY KNEW THAT THE OTHER JUDGE HAD REFUSED TO SIGN IT AND I DON'T THINK JUDGE PATTERSON CAN JUST SHRUG THAT OFF BY SAYING, "WELL, I WAS THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT JUDGE; I CAN TELL JUDGE MALLARD WHATEVER I WANT TO." IT ENCOURAGES PEOPLE TO MAKE CONTACT, TO GO INTO HIS OFFICE TO SIGN THINGS OVER THE OBJECTION OF THE OTHER PEOPLE. THE SECOND CASE THAT I TALKED ABOUT--I DON'T AGREE THAT JUDGE PATTERSON IS A LEGAL SCHOLAR. ONE OF THE PROBLEMS I HAVE WITH HIM BEING A CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE IS MY PERSONAL EXPERIENCE IS THAT HE CAN'T MASTER THE CONCEPTS THAT HE IS REQUIRED TO MASTER IN FAMILY COURT WHICH ARE LIMITED. HE IS NOT GOING TO BE TRYING A CRIMINAL CASE ONE DAY, A DEATH PENALTY CASE ANOTHER DAY, AND A CLAIM AND DELIVER, OR PERSONAL INJURY THE NEXT WEEK. HE'S GOING TO BASICALLY HAVE THE SAME CONCEPTS IN FRONT OF HIM OVER AND OVER. MY EXPERIENCE WITH HIM IS HE DOESN'T UNDERSTAND CONTEMPT. HE DOESN'T KNOW THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CIVIL CONTEMPT OR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT. HE DOESN'T KNOW THE REASON THAT ONE USES THE COERCIVE POWERS OF CONTEMPT TO GET SOMEONE TO COMPLY WITH A COURT ORDER. MY EXPERIENCE IS THAT HE DOESN'T KNOW THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION WHICH IS A BASIC LAW, LAW SCHOOL, FIRST-YEAR OF LAW SCHOOL CONCEPT. I COULD GO ON. THERE ARE OTHER THINGS THAT HE DOESN'T SEEM TO KNOW. I HATE TO SEE WHAT HAPPENS WHEN HE GETS ON THE CIRCUIT COURT BENCH NOT HAVING PRACTICED IN CIVIL COURT OR CRIMINAL COURT FOR AT LEAST SINCE HE HAS BEEN ADMITTED TO THE BENCH AS A JUDGE. I HATE TO SEE WHAT HE WILL DO IN THAT COURT. TURNING TO THE SECOND CASE THAT I MENTIONED IN HERE IS A CASE I PROVIDED AN ORDER AND A TRANSCRIPT FOR YOU. IT WAS A CONTEMPT MATTER, ONE OF THE NUMEROUS CONTEMPT MATTERS I HAVE APPEARED IN FRONT OF HIM REGARDING. THE PARTICULAR FACTS OF THIS CASE WERE MY CLIENT WAS PAYING ABOUT $7OO A MONTH CHILD SUPPORT FOR TWO CHILDREN. HE WAS ON ACTIVE DUTY AS AN OFFICER IN THE U.S. NAVY STATIONED DOWN IN FLORIDA. HE WAS GIVEN VISITATION IN THE SUMMER AND WHEN HE CAME UP HERE TO EXERCISE HIS VISITATION AFTER HAVING GIVEN HIS WIFE NOTICE OF HIS INTENT TO EXERCISE VISITATION IN WRITING, SHE TOOK THE KIDS OUT OF THE STATE AND HE DIDN'T GET TO SEE THEM. SO WHEN WE FINALLY GOT HIM IN A POSITION WHERE HE COULD FILE A RULE, WHAT WE WERE SEEKING IS A SUBSTITUTE OF REMEDY. WE WANTED EXTRA VISITATION FOR WHAT HE HAD BEEN DENIED. JUDGE PATTERSON'S APPROACH WAS TO TELL ME, WHICH IS HIS RIGHT, THAT HE WAS THE ONE THAT DECIDED WHAT REMEDY TO GIVE; BUT HE GAVE MY CLIENT MONEY AND WHICH JUST CAME OUT OF HIS POCKET BECAUSE HE WAS PAYING CHILD SUPPORT; SO SHE HAD BROUGHT THE CHILDREN TO COURT WITH HER, TELLING THEM THAT THEIR DADDY WAS GOING TO PUT HER IN JAIL WHEN HE REALLY JUST WANTED EXTRA VISITATION. SO HE GAVE ME MONEY; GAVE ME ATTORNEY'S FEES. SHE WROTE A CHECK OUT AND THE WIFE WENT OUT IN THE WAITING ROOM AND TOLD THE CHILDREN THAT WE CAN'T DO SOMETHING THAT WE PLANNED TO DO BECAUSE YOUR DADDY TOOK MY MONEY, WHICH IS EXACTLY WHAT WE DIDN'T WANT. BUT MORE GLARING IN TERMS OF HIS RULING IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE WAS THAT, AS THE TRANSCRIPT INDICATES, HE RULED, NOT ONLY DID HE HOLD HER IN CONTEMPT AND ORDER HER TO PAY ME MONEY, BUT RULED "WHATEVER ELSE THE PARTIES CAN WORK OUT." THAT'S MEANINGLESS, GENTLEMEN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. WHAT DOES THAT MEAN? WHEN I SENT THE PROPOSED ORDER TO THE OPPOSING COUNSEL, SHE DID NOT LIKE THE ORDER. I POINTED OUT TO HER THAT THE JUDGE, IN FACT, HAD GIVEN ME ALMOST A BLANK CHECK AS TO WHAT HER CLIENT HAD TO DO TO PURGE HERSELF OF CONTEMPT AND I SENT HER A COPY OF THE ORDER. NOW, AGAIN, MY CLIENT DIDN'T WANT TO DO THAT; UPON MY ADVICE, IT HAD NO MEANING. I DON'T THINK THAT IT'S A PROPER THING TO USE THE CONTEMPT POWERS TO COERCE ONE PARTY TO DO SOMETHING THAT'S OPEN-ENDED AND HAS NO MEANING, AS WAS DONE, ALMOST DONE IN THIS CASE. HE ORDERED IT; I DIDN'T PUT IT IN THE ORDER, IF YOU COMPARE THE ORDER WITH HIS IN-COURT RULING. THE LAST THING THAT I TALKED ABOUT WAS THE CASE THAT WE CAME IN FRONT OF JUDGE PATTERSON ON YESTERDAY. IT WAS A CASE IN WHICH MY CLIENT WAS SEEKING--HE WAS--SHE WAS SEEKING SOME REHABILITATIVE ALIMONY. SHE IS IN TRIDENT TECHNICAL COLLEGE AT A TWO-YEAR PROGRAM WHERE SHE IS TRYING TO GET SOME EDUCATION SO THAT SHE CAN BECOME SELF-SUPPORTING. HER HUSBAND LEFT HER AND THREE CHILDREN--I BELIEVE IT'S THREE CHILDREN--DID NOT PAY THEM A SINGLE PENNY FOR SIX WEEKS. WE FINALLY FOUND HIM AND SERVED HIM AND GOT HIM TO COURT FOR A TEMPORARY HEARING AND AT THAT POINT JUDGE PATTERSON TOLD HER IN COURT--HE DIDN'T SPEAK TO ME, BUT HE TOLD MY CLIENT THAT SHE HAD NO BUSINESS, THAT A 29-YEAR-OLD WOMAN HAD NO BUSINESS BEING IN COLLEGE. HE CONSTANTLY ABUSES PEOPLE LIKE THAT. I OBJECTED TO IT. I TRIED TO GET HER TO--HIM TO DIRECT HIS COMMENTS TO ME AND TO NOT ABUSE MY CLIENT AND NOT TO MAKE THOSE KIND OF COMMENTS IN COURT. I DON'T THINK THAT KIND OF COMMENT HAS ANY PLACE IN COURT. YESTERDAY WHEN WE WERE BEFORE HIM AFTER--AND I WAS KIND OF SURPRISED, I GOT A CALL FROM THIS COMMITTEE YESTERDAY INFORMING ME THAT JUDGE PATTERSON WAS INFORMED OF MY OPPOSITION TO HIM ALREADY. I SAID: I HAVE A HEARING IN FRONT OF HIM TODAY AND I'LL GO AHEAD AND MAKE A RECUSAL MOTION SO HE WON'T HEAR THIS HEARING; AND HE ACTED LIKE HE DIDN'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT IT. HE DID RECUSE HIMSELF BUT AFTER RECUSING HIMSELF, HE THEN STARTED TALKING TO MY CLIENT AGAIN TRYING TO WORK THE MATTER OUT. HE HAD ALSO TOLD MY CLIENT AT THE TEMPORARY HEARING THAT THEY COULDN'T AFFORD A DIVORCE, THAT THEY NEEDED TO GET BACK TOGETHER. THIS IS TYPICAL OF WHAT HE DOES IN THE COURTROOM. HE TYPICALLY TALKS TO THE CLIENTS, EMBARRASSES THEM, TRIES TO COERCE THEM INTO DOING THINGS THAT THEY DON'T WANT TO DO OR ELSE THEY WOULDN'T BE IN FAMILY COURT LITIGATING THE MATTERS IN THE FIRST PLACE. BACK TO THE EXAMPLE I GAVE ABOUT THE CONTEMPT HEARING IN WHICH HE ORDERED ANYTHING ELSE THAT THE PARTIES CAN WORK OUT; IF THE PARTIES COULD HAVE WORKED OUT ANYTHING, THERE WOULDN'T HAVE BEEN A NEED FOR A COURT HEARING. SO MY BASIC POSITION IS THAT HE IS COMPLETELY--HE'S NOT QUALIFIED TO BE A FAMILY COURT JUDGE; REGARDLESS IF HE COMES IN HERE AND GETS 400 PEOPLE TO SAY WHAT A WONDERFUL JUDGE HE IS, HE IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE A JUDGE. HE DOESN'T KNOW THE LAW. HE DOESN'T EXERCISE THE RIGHT TEMPERAMENT. AND NO MATTER WHAT HE CALLS IT, NO MATTER WHAT HE CALLS IT, SIGNING ORDERS IN THE PARKING LOT AND ALLOWING ATTORNEYS TO COME IN AND SUBMIT ORDERS TO HIM THAT OTHER ATTORNEYS OPPOSE, WHETHER IT'S ON THE MERITS, A PROCEDURAL MATTER, OR WHATEVER, IS WRONG AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED. THERE'S JUST NO TWO WAYS ABOUT IT. Y'ALL--IF--I HAVE NEVER--INCIDENTALLY, I HAVE NEVER CALLED JUDGE PATTERSON AND ASKED TO DISCUSS AN ORDER THAT HE HAD RENDERED, WHETHER IT'S IN FAVOR OF ME OR AGAINST ME. I HAVE BEEN TEMPTED SOMETIMES TO CALL HIM ABOUT ORDERS WHEN THEY HAVE GONE AS MUCH AS SIX MONTHS WITHOUT BEING SIGNED. I HAVE GOT ORDERS THAT I HAVE SUBMITTED TO HIM THAT HAVE SAT ON HIS DESK FOR TWO OR THREE MONTHS WHEN SUPPOSEDLY THEY ARE TO BE SIGNED WITHIN A MONTH OF THE HEARING. I HAVE GOT ONE RIGHT NOW THAT WAS SENT OVER; IT WAS A CONSENT ORDER THAT'S BEEN ON HIS DESK FOR TWO OR THREE WEEKS. I HAVE HAD INSTANCES WHERE AN ORDER HAS COME BACK---

JUDGE PATTERSON: THAT'S NOT TRUE.
A. I CAN---

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: LET'S--JUDGE, YOU WILL GET YOUR CHANCE IN A MINUTE. NOW I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU MIGHT LIKE TO DEBATE IT, BUT---
A. (BY MR. NORFLEET) WELL, HE CAN DEBATE IT; BUT THESE MATTERS--

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: NO, WE WILL LET YOU HAVE YOUR SAY AND THEN WE WILL LET JUDGE PATTERSON RESPOND.
A. (BY MR. NORFLEET) I HAVE GOT ONE NOW THAT'S SITTING ON YOUR DESK, JUDGE PATTERSON. IF YOU WOULD LIKE, I WILL GIVE YOU--I WILL SUPPLY A SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT---
Q. (BY MR. BATES) LET'S DIRECT ALL THE COMMENTS TO THE COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE CAN THEN ASK QUESTIONS OF EACH OF THE WITNESSES.
A. AGAIN, I HAVE NEVER MADE EXPARTE COMMUNICATION WITH HIM AND I DON'T INTEND TO, ALTHOUGH I HAVE BEEN TEMPTED TO. THAT'S ALL I HAVE TO SAY.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: BEFORE ANY QUESTIONS, STEVE, MR. NORFLEET, YOU MADE A COMMENT A MOMENT AGO AND I'M GOING TO RESPOND TO THAT BEFORE WE GET INTO THE SUBSTANCE OF YOUR TESTIMONY; AND YOUR COMMENT WAS IN REGARD TO THE COMMITTEE FURNISHING COPIES OF YOUR AFFIDAVIT TO JUDGE PATTERSON.
A. YES, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WE ARE REQUIRED TO DO SO. IF YOU ARE NOT FAMILIAR WITH OUR RULES, I WANT YOU TO HEAR RULE NUMBER 9 WHICH READS: "EACH CANDIDATE SHALL BE FURNISHED A COPY OF ALL, IF ANY, SWORN STATEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED IN RELATION TO HIS CANDIDACY PRIOR TO THE HEARING AS SOON AFTER THEIR RECEIPT BY THE COMMITTEE AS PRACTICABLE." THAT IS BASIC FAIRNESS. THIS COMMITTEE, ATTEMPTING TO DO ITS JOB, FURNISHED A COPY OF YOUR AFFIDAVIT TO JUDGE PATTERSON AS SOON AS WE COULD GET IT TO HIM.
A. EXCUSE ME, MR. CHAIRMAN, I DIDN'T MEAN TO IMPLY THAT THERE WAS ANY OBJECTION TO THAT. IF I GAVE YOU THAT IMPRESSION, I MISSPOKE. I THINK THAT HE IS ENTITLED UNDER DUE PROCESS TO HAVE EVERY RIGHT TO SEE WHATEVER MATERIALS I HAVE SUPPLIED TO YOU. WHAT I'M ONLY SAYING IS THAT HE ACTED AS IF HE WASN'T AWARE OF MY OPPOSITION TO HIM. HE WAS PREPARED TO GO FORWARD ON A MERITS HEARING IN A MATTER THAT COULD RESULT IN MY CLIENT'S HUSBAND GOING TO JAIL WHEN HE KNEW FULL WELL THAT I HAD GONE ON THE RECORD AS BEING IN OPPOSITION FOR HIS BEING APPOINTED TO A FURTHER JUDGESHIP OR ELECTED TO A FURTHER JUDGESHIP. MY FEELING IS THAT ONCE HE WAS AWARE OF THAT, HE HAD TO AT LEAST SUSPECT THAT I WOULD MAKE A MOTION TO RECUSE AND THAT HE COULD HAVE GIVEN ME THE OPPORTUNITY OR MY CLIENT THE OPPORTUNITY TO SAVE A LOT OF TIME AND TROUBLE DRIVING OVER TO THE COURT, WAITING AROUND FOR 30 OR 40 MINUTES AND THEN MAKING A PERFUNCTORY MOTION. THE OTHER THING IS THAT HE, AFTER HAVING RULED THAT HE WOULD RECUSE HIMSELF, WHICH I THINK WAS PROPER AND I THINK AT LEAST SPEAKS WELL OF HIM IN THIS INSTANCE, I WILL ACKNOWLEDGE THAT, HE SHOULD NOT HAVE QUESTIONED MY CLIENT ABOUT THE SPECIFICS OF THE ORIGINAL HEARING IN FRONT OF HIM. HE SHOULD HAVE JUST LEFT HER ALONE. I DON'T THINK THAT IS PROPER FOR A JUDGE TO DO. IT'S INTIMIDATING AND IT'S EMBARRASSING AND IT'S NOT RIGHT.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: STEVE.
Q. (BY MR. BATES) MR. NORFLEET, I JUST WANT TO GO OVER AND MAKE SURE IT'S CLEAR IN THE COMMITTEE'S MIND THE DIFFERENT THINGS YOU HAVE TESTIFIED ABOUT. FIRST OFF, IN REGARD TO THE PROTECTIVE ORDER WITH MS. KANE. THE CASE YOU HAVE WITH MS. KANE WAS BEFORE JUDGE MALLARD?
A. RIGHT.
Q. AND YOU HAD A HEARING; I DON'T KNOW, WHAT WAS THE HEARING?
A. IT WAS A RULE HEARING.
Q. OKAY.
A. THE HUSBAND PLAINTIFF HAD VIOLATED THE TEMPORARY ORDER.
Q. AND MS. KANE DID NOT APPEAR AT THE HEARING?
A. NO.
Q. AND SHE SENT A PROPOSED ORDER OF CONTINUANCE TO THAT HEARING, IS THAT---
A. TO THE TRIAL JUDGE, THAT'S RIGHT.
Q. AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE HEARING WAS SCHEDULED INSTEAD OF HER PRESENCE?
A. THAT'S RIGHT.
Q. OKAY.
A. BY COURIER.
Q. AND JUDGE MALLARD REFUSED TO SIGN IT?
A. ABSOLUTELY.
Q. ALL RIGHT; SIX DAYS AFTER THAT JUDGE PATTERSON, WHO IS THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE, SIGNED THE CONTINUANCE?
A. SHE TOOK THE ORDER TO HIM IN CHARLESTON COUNTY WITH THE SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT.
Q. AND THE MATTER WAS IN BERKELEY COUNTY, RIGHT?
A. YES. AND INCIDENTALLY, I NEVER SAW THE SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT THAT SHE FORWARDED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT JUDGE UNTIL AFTER THE ORDER HAD BEEN SIGNED. ALSO, WHEN I MADE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THAT ORDER, SHE TESTIFIED, AND IT MAY BE IN THAT PORTION OF THE TRANSCRIPT THAT I GAVE YOU, THAT SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT THAT THAT AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF HER MOTION FOR A CONTINUANCE HADN'T BEEN SENT TO THE JUDGE AT THAT TIME. I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THE SPECIFICS WERE BUT IT WOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE TRANSCRIPT.
Q. YOUR MAIN COMPLAINT IS NOT NECESSARILY THE FACT THAT HE SIGNED THE CONTINUANCE ORDER; IT WAS THE MANNER IN WHICH IT WAS DONE AND THE FACT THAT YOU WERE NOT GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR AT A HEARING ON THAT?
A. WELL, THAT'S--THAT'S ONE--YES, I THINK THAT PROBABLY SUMS IT UP. AGAIN, IF THE--IF THE RULES REQUIRE THAT A PERSON THAT IS PROTECTED IN A DEATH PENALTY CASE DOES NOT HAVE TO MAKE COURT APPEARANCES, THEN I CAN'T KICK WITH THAT. WHOEVER--JUDGE MALLARD, WHO INCIDENTALLY EVENTUALLY SIGNED THE ORDER OF CONTINUANCE, WE DISCOVERED THAT HE HAD SIGNED THE ORDER OF CONTINUANCE AT THE MOTION HEARING FOR THE RECONSIDERATION WHEN WE LOOKED AT THE FILE, THIS ORDER OF CONTINUANCE; SO, THERE ARE ACTUALLY TWO JUDGES THAT SIGNED THE ORDER OF CONTINUANCE. BUT THE--WHAT I'M TRYING TO AVOID IS GETTING BOGGED DOWN INTO THIS QUESTION OF WHAT'S "PROCEDURAL" AND WHAT'S "SUBSTANTIVE" BECAUSE YOU CAN--YOU CAN CALL A LOT OF THINGS "PROCEDURAL." I DON'T THINK IT'S--IT'S LIKE THE QUESTION OF "INDISPENSABLE PARTIES" IN FEDERAL COURT OR EVEN UNDER THE RELATIVELY NEW STATE COURT RULES, WE ARGUE ABOUT WHAT IS AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY ALL THE TIME. I DON'T THINK THERE'S MAYBE BUT TWO LAWYERS IN AMERICA THAT UNDERSTAND WHAT AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY IS. I DON'T THINK IT'S ALWAYS GOING TO BE CLEARCUT EXACTLY WHAT IS SUBSTANTIVE AND WHAT'S PROCEDURAL; BUT WHEN YOU START ALLOWING ATTORNEYS WHO ARE DISGRUNTLED WITH WHAT A TRIAL COURT JUDGE DOES, BRING REVISED ORDERS INTO YOUR OFFICE AND YOU WILL MEET WITH THEM AND SIGN THOSE ORDERS WITHOUT GIVING THE OTHER SIDE THEIR DUE PROCESS RIGHTS, THEN THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS THAT I RECOGNIZE THAT ARE IMPORTANT, YOU'RE SENDING THE WRONG MESSAGE. YOU ARE ENCOURAGING PEOPLE TO START CLOUDING THOSE AREAS WHEN SOMETHING MAY BE SUBSTANTIVE AND MAY BE PROCEDURAL. THAT'S NOT THE WAY TO DO IT. THAT'S MY OBJECTION.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR; AND THE SECOND CASE YOU ALLUDED TO IN THE PLEADINGS, I'M NOT SURE HOW THE LAST NAME IS PRONOUNCED, "KRAWCHECK" OR "KRAWZIC," K-R-A-W-C-Z-Y-K.
A. KRAWCZYK. YES, SIR, THEY SAID IT ABOUT FIVE DIFFERENT WAYS AT THE TRIAL, SO. WELL, ACTUALLY MY CLIENT TOLD ME IT WAS KRAW--IT WAS ACTUALLY "KRAWCHECK," HE SAID; BUT HE SAID EVERYBODY SAYS "KWAWZIC," SO WE SAID IT THAT WAY.
Q. OKAY; IN THAT PARTICULAR CASE THAT WAS WHERE YOUR CLIENT WAS ATTEMPTING TO HAVE A VISITATION SCHEDULE ENFORCED?
A. YES.
Q. AND SO YOU SOUGHT CONTEMPT?
A. WE SOUGHT EXTRA VISITATION. I DON'T WANT TO GET TOO BOGGED DOWN IN THE DETAILS OF THESE CASES.
Q. I UNDERSTAND.
A. BUT WHAT WE WERE SEEKING WAS EXTRA VISITATION AND THE COMPLAINT THAT WENT WITH THE RULE ACTUALLY REQUESTED AN ADDITIONAL WEEK OF SUMMER VISITATION FOR WHAT HAD BEEN DENIED THE YEAR BEFORE AND---
Q. DID YOU SEEK ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THAT? DID YOU REQUEST IT?
A. I HAD REQUESTED IT AT THAT TIME IN THE COMPLAINT ITSELF BUT I HAD, IN FACT, INFORMED THE COURT THAT MY CLIENT DID NOT WANT THEM, THAT I WOULD WAIVE THEM AND THAT I DIDN'T WANT THEM EITHER IF WE COULD GET THE EXTRA WEEK'S VISITATION.
Q. PRIOR TO HIS RULING YOU SAID THAT?
A. YES, I DID; AT WHICH POINT HE TOLD ME THAT HE WOULD BE THE ONE TO MAKE THE DECISION; WHICH, OF COURSE, YOU KNOW, HE CAN MAKE THOSE DECISIONS. I WAS A LITTLE SURPRISED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES BUT WHAT I WAS REALLY SURPRISED AT WAS THAT LANGUAGE IN HIS RULING THAT SAYS: I SENTENCE THIS WOMAN TO JAIL UNTIL SHE PAYS $350 ATTORNEY'S FEES, AND WHATEVER ELSE YOU PEOPLE WORK OUT.
Q. WAS THAT A WRITTEN ORDER OR AN ORDER FROM THE BENCH?
A. THAT'S--IF YOU'LL LOOK AT MY ATTACHMENT, THAT'S--IT WASN'T A WRITTEN ORDER BECAUSE I WAS THE ONE WHO WROTE THE WRITTEN ORDER AND I SOUGHT WITH MY CLIENT'S PERMISSION NOT TO PUT THAT IN THERE. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT THAT WAS ESSENTIALLY MEANINGLESS. IF YOU'LL LOOK AT PAGE 30: "AND WHATEVER OTHER AGREEMENTS Y'ALL CAN WORK OUT." WHAT DOES THAT MEAN? THAT'S ABUSIVE. THAT PUTS ME IN THE POSITION--AND, AGAIN, I'M THE PREVAILING PARTY. MY CLIENT IS THE PREVAILING PARTY BUT THAT PUTS MY CLIENT IN THE POSITION WHERE HE CAN SAY: HEY, STAY IN JAIL WHILE WE WORK OUT THIS AGREEMENT. (PAUSE.) IT'S OPEN-ENDED.

Q. SHE HAD AN ATTORNEY?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. WHO?
A. VERONICA SMALL. SHE'S LISTED ON MY ATTACHMENT AS A WITNESS. YOUR HONOR, WE DIDN'T SEEK TO HOLD HER IN--PUT HER IN JAIL UNTIL WE COULD WORK OUT SOMETHING. I'M NOT SAYING THAT WE DIDN'T--THAT WE DID AND I'M NOT SAYING THAT WE WOULD HAVE; I'M SAYING IT'S WRONG TO MAKE THAT KIND OF RULING. IT EVIDENCES EITHER A MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW AND THE PURPOSE OF CONTEMPT OR IT EVIDENCES A DISCONCERN FOR THE LITIGANTS, EITHER OF WHICH IN MY ESTIMATION IS NOT A GOOD THING FOR A TRIAL JUDGE TO EXHIBIT.

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: YES, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: I HAVE A QUESTION, PLEASE.

Q. MR. NORFLEET, OF COURSE, IN YOUR TESTIMONY YOU USE THE WORD "TEMPERAMENT," THAT JUDGE PATTERSON DIDN'T HAVE THE TEMPERAMENT. WHY DO YOU SAY THAT. DO YOU HAVE ANY SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF THAT?
A. I GAVE YOU A COUPLE OF SPECIFIC EXAMPLES, WHEREIN HE TOLD A WOMAN THAT NO 29-YEAR-OLD WOMAN BELONGED AT COLLEGE. THAT'S NOT ONLY SEXIST; THAT'S ANOTHER MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE LAW. AND I GAVE ANOTHER EXAMPLE---
Q. I HAVE THAT ONE.
A. OKAY. ANOTHER EXAMPLE: WHERE HE HAS TOLD MY CLIENTS BEFORE THAT--IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE HE TOLD THEM THAT THEY COULDN'T AFFORD--THEY COULDN'T AFFORD A DIVORCE, THAT THEY NEEDED TO GET BACK TOGETHER. THESE ARE JUST A COUPLE THAT COME TO MY MIND. I HAVE HAD CASES WHERE I WAS THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM--AGAIN, BY GETTING TOO FAR AFIELD, I DON'T FEEL LIKE I GIVE HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THIS. ALL WE CAN DO HERE TODAY IS TO TOUCH ON SOME SPECIFIC INSTANCES. I HAVE ONLY REFERRED TO THREE CASES. THE MIZZELL CASE, WHICH YOU HAVE, WHERE HE TOLD THE WOMAN SHE NEEDED TO GET BACK WITH THE HUSBAND AND WHERE HE TOLD HER THAT SHE DIDN'T NEED TO--BELONG IN COLLEGE.
Q. MR. NORFLEET, ALSO YOU TESTIFIED, I BELIEVE THAT YOU TESTIFIED ABOUT SOME ORDER NOT BEING SIGNED FOR SIX MONTHS. WHICH ORDER ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT?
A. THAT'S IN ANOTHER CASE. THAT'S AN ORDER--LET ME THINK OF THE CASE. THAT'S ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO. THAT'S THREE TO SIX; LET ME QUALIFY THAT. IT'S MY--IT'S BETWEEN THREE AND SIX MONTHS BEFORE THAT ORDER CAME BACK. THAT'S THE CASE, A CAMPBELL VERSUS CAMPBELL. THAT WAS A BERKELEY COUNTY CASE. THAT'S THE FIRST CASE I EVER TRIED IN FRONT OF JUDGE PATTERSON AND SINCE WE ARE ON THAT CASE, I WILL BE HAPPY TO SUPPLEMENT IT, WHEN THE DATE OF THE TRIAL WAS. AGAIN, I'M GOING ON MEMORY BUT WHATEVER IT WAS, WHETHER IT WAS 30 DAYS, 60 DAYS, 90 DAYS, OR 180 DAYS, OR WHATEVER IT WAS, IT WAS SUBSTANTIALLY IN EXCESS OF THE 30 DAYS ALLOWED BY THE RULES. I CAN DOCUMENT THAT AT A LATTER TIME. IT'S A DEAD FILE. IN A PARTICULAR CASE JUDGE PATTERSON MADE SOME IN-COURT RULINGS TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY AND THEN LATER ON HE BASED HIS RULINGS ON THE EXCLUDED TESTIMONY, WHICH IS ONE OF THE REASONS THAT WE APPEALED THAT CASE. SUBSEQUENTLY, MY CLIENT DID NOT HAVE--SHE WAS IN A POSITION WHERE SHE EITHER HAD TO TAKE WHAT THE JUDGE HAD GIVEN HER OR SHE DIDN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO LIVE ON; SHE COULD NOT ONLY AFFORD--NOT AFFORD ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR AN APPEAL WHICH, QUITE FRANKLY, I WASN'T REAL CONCERNED ABOUT, BUT MY PARTNER HAS SOME CONCERNS ABOUT WHETHER I TAKE CASES WHERE I DON'T GET COSTS; SO, IT WAS EVENTUALLY DISMISSED FOR THAT REASON.
Q. WAS IT A COMPLICATED CASE?
A. WAS THE CASE COMPLICATED?
Q. YES.
A. I THINK IT WAS AN EXTREMELY COMPLICATED CASE. IN FACT, MY CLIENT WAS DIAGNOSED AS SUFFERING FROM A BIPOLAR PERSONALITY AND WE HAD TO HAVE A GUARDIAN APPOINTED FOR HER TO REPRESENT HER INTERESTS JUST AS OUT OF AN ABUNDANCE OF CAUTION.
Q. WHAT I'M TRYING TO SAY IS, THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN ORDER SITTING ON A JUDGE'S DESK FOR 30 DAYS AS OPPOSED TO SIX MONTHS. ARE YOU SAYING IT WAS 30 DAYS OR ARE YOU SAYING IT WAS SIX MONTHS? WHICH ONE IS IT?
A. I'M SAYING THAT IT WAS IN EXCESS OF 60 DAYS AND I DON'T KNOW IF IT'S LESS THAN 180 DAYS, BUT WITHOUT HAVING THE FILE HERE, I COULDN'T TELL YOU AND I'M SAYING THAT I WOULD BE HAPPY TO GO BACK AND PULL THE FILE AND SEND IT TO YOU TO SHOW YOU EXACTLY WHEN IT WAS SIGNED, WHEN I RECEIVED IT, AND WHEN THE HEARING OCCURRED.

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: ALL RIGHT, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS OF ANY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE?

Q. MR. NORFLEET, LET ME ASK YOU JUST A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS. ONE PROBLEM THAT HAS BOTHERED THIS COMMITTEE IS THAT THERE BE NO JUDGES WHO ARE BULLIES. IS JUDGE PATTERSON ABUSIVE OR RUDE TO LAWYERS?
A. YOUR HONOR, I DON'T THINK HE HAS EVER BEEN PARTICULARLY ABUSIVE OR RUDE TO ME; NO, I'M NOT--I'M CALLING YOU "YOUR HONOR," I--MR. CHAIRMAN, NO, I CAN'T THINK HE HAS EVER BEEN ABUSIVE OR RUDE TO ME; AND TO BE QUITE FRANK, THAT WOULD BE SOMETHING THAT I WOULDN'T CONCENTRATE ON TOO MUCH. I STARTED PRACTICING LAW IN BEAUFORT COUNTY AND MY FIRST JUDICIAL EXPERIENCE WAS WITH JUDGE ELTZROTH, WHOM I AM PROBABLY A LITTLE SCARED OF TO THIS DAY; SO, COMPARED TO JUDGE ELTZROTH, MOST JUDGES SEEM PRETTY MILD-MANNERED. HE HAS NEVER BEEN--TO MY KNOWLEDGE, NO, HE HAS NEVER BEEN ABUSIVE TO ME OR RUDE TO ME. HE HAS OFTEN BEEN ABUSIVE TO CLIENTS. HE HAS EVEN BEEN RUDE TO MY CLIENTS. HE HAS OFTEN ENGAGED IN EXAMINATIONS FROM THE BENCH THAT I FELT WERE IMPROPER AND WOULD SOMETIMES DELVE INTO AREAS THAT ATTORNEYS COULDN'T EVEN DELVE INTO. AND I REALIZE THAT PART OF THE JOB OF A FAMILY COURT JUDGE IS TO ATTEMPT TO SEE IF THE PARTIES CAN GET BACK TOGETHER. YOU KNOW, THAT HE'S GOT A MANDATE TO SEE IF HE CAN SOLVE THE PROBLEMS THAT THE PARTIES HAVE, SO HE HAS TO ASK THAT; BUT I DON'T THINK THE WAY YOU APPROACH THAT IS TO BULLY PEOPLE INTO DOING THINGS OR TO TELL THEM THAT THEY DON'T BELONG IN COURT OR TO INDICATE TO THEM THAT THEIR PROBLEMS AREN'T PROBLEMS THAT SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY GOING TO THE FAMILY COURT. I THINK THAT IS WRONG AND ABUSIVE IN ITSELF. BUT, AGAIN, TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTION, NO, HE HAS NEVER BEEN ABUSIVE TO ME. HE HAS NEVER THREATENED TO HOLD ME IN CONTEMPT. HE HAS NEVER BEEN RUDE TO ME, NOT PERSONALLY, NO.
Q. HE HAS BEEN THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE NOW FOR 18 MONTHS--
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ---IN CHARLESTON COUNTY. IN THAT PERIOD OF TIME, YOU, AS A MEMBER OF THE BAR IN CHARLESTON AND IN BERKELEY, WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE HIM AS RUDE OR ABUSIVE?
A. NOT TO ME, NO.
Q. WHAT IS HIS REPUTATION WITHIN THE BAR---
A. YOUR HONOR---
Q. ---AS TO BEING RUDE AND ABUSIVE TO LAWYERS?
A. THERE'S GOING TO BE A NUMBER OF LAWYERS THAT ARE GOING TO TESTIFY ABOUT HOW WONDERFUL HE IS AND THERE ARE A NUMBER OF LAWYERS THAT ARE TESTIFYING THAT HE IS NOT A VERY GOOD JUDGE. I THINK THERE ARE A NUMBER OF LAWYERS THAT ARE JUST SCARED TO BE UP HERE; OTHERWISE, THERE WOULD BE A LOT MORE. THE BEST I CAN SAY IS WHEN I CAME UP HERE TODAY, OR BEFORE I LEFT MY WORK LAST NIGHT, I SAT DOWN WITH MY PARTNER AND I SAID: YOU KNOW, THIS CAME UP RATHER SUDDENLY AND I REALLY DIDN'T GET THE CHANCE TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT THIS WHOLE THING. AND I SAID: IT'S GOING TO IMPACT ON YOU. IT'S-- YOU'RE MY PARTNER AND WE ARE IN THIS TOGETHER AND THIS IS MY DECISION TO TESTIFY THIS MORNING. IN FACT, HE SAID: DAN, DO WHAT YOU THINK IS RIGHT, HE SAID, BECAUSE EVERYTHING THAT YOU SAID, I CONCUR WITH WHOLEHEARTEDLY. THE PEOPLE THAT I TALK TO WANT HIM OFF THE BENCH. BUT I HAVE NO IDEA WHETHER THAT, IN FACT, REFLECTS THE GENERAL OPINION IN CHARLESTON COUNTY. I COULDN'T TELL YOU THAT. BUT I CAN TELL YOU THAT I DON'T COME UP HERE LIGHTLY. I HAD SOME OTHER THINGS THAT I WANTED TO DO TODAY AND I HAVE SOME OTHER COMMITMENTS AND I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING REALLY TO GAIN BY BEING HERE; SO, I CAN ONLY TELL YOU THAT I TAKE THIS SERIOUSLY AND IF I DIDN'T THINK HE WAS UNQUALIFIED TO BE A JUDGE, I WOULDN'T BE HERE. EVERYONE ELSE HAS TO MAKE THEIR OWN DECISION AND I GUESS THE FACT THAT A LOT OF PEOPLE AREN'T HERE SPEAKING AGAINST HIM INDICATES THAT THEY ARE HAPPY WITH THE WAY HE HAS DONE THINGS AND THEY ARE WILLING TO ALLOW HIM TO GO FORWARD AND PERHAPS BE ELECTED A CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PEOPLE, OF COURSE, THAT YOU ARE GOING TO HEAR FROM BEFORE THE DAY IS OVER THAT ARE GOING TO TESTIFY ABOUT WHAT A GREAT JUDGE HE IS AND HOW KNOWLEDGEABLE HE IS AND HOW QUALIFIED. I CAN'T SPEAK FOR THEM. I DON'T THINK I'M REALLY IN A POSITION TO TESTIFY ABOUT THE GENERAL REPUTATION OF THE JUDGE THROUGHOUT THE CHARLESTON AREA.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU. SENATOR.

Q. MR. NORFLEET, I WANT TO MAKE SURE I UNDERSTAND YOUR COMPLAINT ABOUT THE CONTINUANCE. THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT THERE WAS AN ORDER ISSUED BY A CIRCUIT JUDGE ON A DEATH PENALTY CASE FOR THAT LAW FIRM THAT WAS OPPOSING YOU; CORRECT? YOU DON'T DISPUTE THAT THAT ORDER EXISTED?
A. THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT THE ORDER REFERRED TO HIS COUNSEL AS HAVING A GENERAL PROTECTION FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD OF TIME, NO. IN FACT, I DIDN'T DISPUTE AT THE ORDER--AT THE HEARING AS TO WHETHER SHE WAS ENTITLED TO A CONTINUANCE. IN MY MIND THERE IS SOME QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THIS IS A BLANKET ORDER OF PROTECTION FOR EVERYBODY IN THE LAW FIRM WHEN, IN FACT, SHE WAS CHOOSING TO MAKE OTHER FAMILY COURT APPEARANCES AND WHEN, IN FACT, WHEN SHE CALLED ME AT HOME--SHE CALLED ME AT HOME TO DISCUSS THE MATTER A COUPLE OF DAYS BEFORE THE HEARING AND SHE DIDN'T ADVISE ME OF ANYTHING ABOUT THAT ORDER. WE HAD DISCUSSED--I HAD GONE BY HER OFFICE THE DAY BEFORE THE HEARING AND SHE DIDN'T MENTION ANYTHING ABOUT AN ORDER. AND THE FIRST TIME I HEARD ABOUT ANY ORDER OF PROTECTION WAS FIVE MINUTES BEFORE THE HEARING WAS SUPPOSED TO OCCUR. I WALKED IN AND THEY SAID, YOU KNOW, SHE SIGNED A--SENT A PROPOSED ORDER UP HERE. AND, AGAIN, I WANT TO FOCUS IN ON WHAT MY PROBLEM IS. MY PROBLEM IS NOT THE QUESTION, AND I DON'T HAVE ANY QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE ORDER WAS PROPERLY GRANTED, THE ORDER OF CONTINUANCE. WHAT I DO HAVE A PROBLEM WITH IS HOW THAT ORDER WAS OBTAINED, WHEN IT WAS OBTAINED, UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS OBTAINED, WHO IT WAS OBTAINED FROM, AND WHO WAS PRESENT.
Q. WELL, I GUESS MY QUESTION TO YOU IS, IF THE JUDGE IS PRESENTED WITH A--A FAMILY COURT JUDGE IS PRESENTED WITH A CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE'S ORDER THAT SAYS THERE IS PROTECTION AND THE HEARING IS IMMINENT, I MEAN, YOU NEED TO EXPLAIN TO ME WHERE THE JUDGE WOULD HAVE HAD ANY LATITUDE TO HAVE DONE OTHER THAN GRANT A CONTINUANCE.
A. WHO ARE YOU TALKING ABOUT, JUDGE MALLARD OR JUDGE---
Q. I'M TALKING ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE OR TRIAL JUDGE. I GUESS WHAT YOU NEED TO EXPLAIN TO ME IS WHERE THEY WOULD HAVE HAD THE DISCRETION TO HAVE GRANTED OTHER THAN A CONTINUANCE?
A. I DON'T SAY THAT THEY DO. I DON'T DENY THEY DO. JUDGE MALLARD HAD NO DISCRETION. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN AFFIDAVIT THAT MS. KANE ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT JUDGE MALLARD. IF JUDGE MALLARD WERE HERE, I SUSPECT THAT HIS TESTIMONY WOULD BE OTHERWISE. BUT I ASKED MS. KANE TO CONTACT JUDGE MALLARD. I'M NOT SAYING THAT JUDGE MALLARD DID PROPERLY; I DON'T THINK JUDGE MALLARD, IF HE THOUGHT ABOUT IT A MINUTE, WOULD HAVE HAD ANY DISCRETION NOT BUT TO GRANT THE CONTINUANCE. WHAT I'M SAYING IS THAT THE PROPER PERSON TO MAKE THE CONSIDERATION WAS NOT THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT JUDGE BUT THE TRIAL JUDGE HIMSELF; AND THERE WAS NO IMMINENT OR PENDING HEARING BECAUSE THE IMMINENT OR PENDING HEARING WAS AVOIDED SIMPLY BY THE PROCESS OF NOT SHOWING UP. THE GUY DIDN'T COME FROM OUT OF STATE. NOBODY SHOWED UP. SO THERE WASN'T ANY HEARING THAT WAS PENDING. THERE WAS NO NEED FOR THE ORDER TO BE SIGNED. IT WAS A FAIT ACCOMPLI.
Q. BUT YOU WOULD AGREE THEN THAT WHEN THE ORDER WAS PRESENTED TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE, WHATEVER ACTION HE TOOK REALLY COULD IN NO WAY PREJUDICE YOU BECAUSE HE WOULD HAVE HAD NO DISCRETION OTHER THAN TO RENDER CONTINUANCE; THAT'S WHAT I'M TRYING TO GET TO. I MEAN, I'M TRYING TO UNDERSTAND WHERE A JUDGE COULD HAVE ACTED THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN PREJUDICIAL TO YOU UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT YOU RELATE.
A. LET ME ADDRESS THAT. THE WAY IT WAS PREJUDICIAL TO ME ACTUALLY IS THAT MY CLIENT, MS. WORK, SHE PAID ME MONEY TO GO UP THERE; AND, IN FACT, WHAT EVENTUALLY HAPPENED IN THIS CASE IS THAT THE COURT AWARDED ME ATTORNEY'S FEES OR AWARDED MY CLIENT ATTORNEY'S FEES PARTIALLY BECAUSE NO ONE HAD BOTHERED TO TELEPHONE ME OR TELL ME THAT THEY WOULD BE SEEKING A CONTINUANCE AND I HAD DRIVEN UP TO BERKELEY COUNTY FOR NOTHING. I THINK THAT, AGAIN, I MAY HAVE MISSPOKE. I'M NOT COMPLAINING THAT THE ORDER WAS SIGNED. I THINK JUDGE MALLARD, IN FACT, EVENTUALLY SIGNED IT AS JUDGE PATTERSON TESTIFIED. I'M NOT COMPLAINING ABOUT THAT. IT HAD TO BE SIGNED. BUT, AGAIN, I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN TAUGHT AS A BASIC TENET THAT WHEN YOU ARE IN FRONT OF ONE JUDGE AND YOU ARE DISPLEASED WITH WHAT HE DID, EITHER BECAUSE YOU THINK HE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR THAT HE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND THE FACTS OF THE CASE OR THAT HE MISAPPLIED THE LAW, THAT WHAT YOU DO IS YOU ASK FOR A REHEARING IN FRONT OF THAT JUDGE OR YOU APPEAL IT. JUST LIKE Y'ALL WERE ASKING EARLIER ABOUT IF YOU ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THE RULINGS OF THE JUDGE, WHY DON'T YOU APPEAL THEM? WELL, HER PROPER--HER PROPER MODE OF ATTACK WOULD HAVE BEEN TO EITHER ASK JUDGE MALLARD FOR A REHEARING OR TO APPEAL JUDGE MALLARD'S RULING. IT WAS NOT TO GO OVER TO ANOTHER COURT AND SAY: LOOK, JUDGE, YOU ARE THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT JUDGE. THIS GUY DECIDED WRONG. HE HAD NO DISCRETION AND I WANT YOU TO OVERRULE HIM. THAT IS NOT PROPER.
Q. WELL, THEN YOUR COMPLAINT IS MORE WITH THE OTHER LAWYER, ISN'T IT, WITH HOW THE OTHER LAWYER OPERATED?
A. WELL, CERTAINLY I DID HAVE A COMPLAINT ABOUT THE WAY THE OTHER LAWYER OPERATED AND I HAVE EXPRESSED THAT COMPLAINT TO HER AND SHE IS AWARE OF THAT; BUT I'M ALSO CONCERNED WITH A JUDGE WHO INVITES THAT. WHEN YOU GO ON RECORD AS SAYING THAT "MY DOOR IS OPEN ANY TIME TO ANYBODY," AND THERE'S NOTHING IN THERE THAT SAYS--IN THE NEWSPAPER ARTICLE THAT WAS REFERRED TO THERE IS NOTHING IN THERE THAT SAYS "BUT ONLY CALL ME ABOUT PROCEDURAL MATTERS, NOT SOMETHING THAT THE OTHER LAWYER DISAGREES ON." MS. KANE HAD TO KNOW AND THE JUDGE HAD TO KNOW THAT I WAS IN OPPOSITION TO THAT ORDER BEING SIGNED, AT LEAST BEFORE I HAD THE FULL FACTS, AND THAT THE ONLY REASON THAT SHE TOOK IT TO HIM RATHER THAN THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS BECAUSE SHE KNEW I WAS OPPOSED TO IT. I THINK IT'S WRONG TO INVITE THAT. I THINK THAT IT'S WRONG TO HOLD YOURSELF OUT AS, AND GET THE REPUTATION AS BEING SOMEONE THAT WILL SIGN THINGS THAT YOU BRING TO THEM.

SENATOR MCCONNELL: THANK YOU, SIR.
A. THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, MR. NORFLEET.
A. THANK YOU.

JUDGE PATTERSON: MR. CHAIRMAN, JUST 30 SECONDS. JUDGE MALLARD SIGNED THE ORDER OF CONTINUANCE ON OCTOBER THE 25TH--AUGUST THE 25TH. I HAVE GIVEN YOU A COPY OF THAT ORDER WITH MS. KANE'S AFFIDAVIT. JUDGE MALLARD CONTINUED THE CASE. MY ORDER WAS SIGNED ON AUGUST THE 28TH, WHICH GAVE HER PROTECTION IN ALL FAMILY COURT MATTERS HONORING JUDGE HOWELL'S ORDER. I DON'T UNDERSTAND MR. NORFLEET'S ARGUMENT. JUDGE MALLARD SIGNED THE CONTINUANCE ON AUGUST 25TH. HERE IS A COPY OF THAT ORDER WITH JUDGE MALLARD'S BIG SIGNATURE AND INITIALS. HE SIGNED THE ORDER OF CONTINUANCE IN THAT CASE BEFORE I DID. HE WAS THE TRIAL JUDGE. AND I HONORED JUDGE HOWELL'S ORDER PROTECTING HER FROM FAMILY COURT MATTERS AND MY ORDER IS SIGNED AND YOU HAVE A COPY OF THAT DATED AUGUST THE 28TH, LARRY R. PATTERSON; THAT'S MY ORDER. SO, I DON'T UNDERSTAND. AND THE MIZZELL CASE--THAT'S ALL I'M GOING TO SAY ABOUT THAT PROTECTIVE ORDER. THE MIZZELL CASE, THERE WERE TWO INDIVIDUALS; HE REPRESENTED MRS. MIZZELL WHO DID NOT WORK AND ATTENDED TRIDENT TEC. THE FATHER, THE MAN EARNED $1900 A MONTH GROSS INCOME. THEY HAD TWO CHILDREN. I ORDERED THE MAN TO PAY $100 A MONTH CHILD SUPPORT AND TO PAY THE BILLS. I DO THAT QUITE OFTEN. SHE WAS NOT WORKING AND COULD NOT PAY ANY BILLS. I COULDN'T REQUIRE HER TO PAY ANY BILLS. IF THEY DON'T HAVE ENOUGH MONEY TO GO AROUND, SOMEBODY HAS GOT TO WORK IT OUT WITH THE CREDITORS. THEY OWED $4,000 IN DOCTOR BILLS AND THE CHILD SUPPORT HAS JUST GOT TO COME FIRST. I ORDERED SPECIFIC CHILD SUPPORT AND I SAID: YOU PAY THE REST OF THE BILLS; IF YOU CAN'T PAY THEM, WORK IT OUT WITH THE CREDITORS. Y'ALL ARE REALLY HAVING DIFFICULTY LIVING SEPARATE. AND HE IS THE ONLY ONE EARNING INCOME. I'M NOT SURE YOU CAN CONTINUE TO GO TO SCHOOL IF YOU ARE GOING TO BE SEPARATED. THAT WAS MY RULING. I'LL ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS. I CAN'T RESPOND TO ANYTHING ELSE THAT HE ALLUDED TO BECAUSE I'M NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE CASES HE IS TALKING ABOUT BECAUSE THEY WEREN'T IN HIS AFFIDAVIT AND I AM NOT PREPARED.

Q. JUDGE PATTERSON, ONE OTHER CASE THAT WAS IN THE AFFIDAVIT, THE KRAWCZYK CASE WHERE THE CONTEMPT ORDER WAS ISSUED.
A. THAT--(PAUSE)--I---
Q. I JUST WANTED TO ASK A QUESTION FROM THE TRANSCRIPT ON PAGES 29 AND 30 OF THAT TRANSCRIPT, I THINK OF THE LAST TWO PAGES OF MR. NORFLEET'S MATERIALS WHERE YOU ORDERED CONTEMPT AND SAID: SHE IS IN CONTEMPT OF COURT; SHE CAN PAY $350 OR 30 DAYS IN JAIL. I WILL SUSPEND ON PAYMENT OF $350 ATTORNEY'S FEES AND WHATEVER OTHER AGREEMENTS Y'ALL CAN WORK OUT.
A. IF YOU READ UP AT THE OTHER PAGES--I DON'T HAVE THE ENTIRE TRANSCRIPT--THERE WERE OTHER MATTERS IN DISPUTE. I STATE IN THERE I WILL NOT HOLD HER IN CONTEMPT OF THAT. THEY WERE TALKING ABOUT DIVIDING UP PROPERTY. SHE DID NOT ALLOW THE MAN VISITATION, AS I RECALL, AND I FOUND HER IN CONTEMPT. I SAID THAT I THINK THAT VISITATION WITH THE CHILDREN IS JUST AS IMPORTANT AS CHILD SUPPORT. MRS. SMALL REPRESENTED HER. I SAID: YOU ARE IN CONTEMPT FOR NOT LETTING HIM VISIT. I'M GOING TO FINE YOU $325 OR 30 DAYS IN JAIL BECAUSE I THINK YOU INTENTIONALLY VIOLATED OR WILFULLY VIOLATED THE ORDER. I THOUGHT THAT WAS WHAT HE WAS ASKING FOR. I SENTENCED HER TO JAIL TIME AND I SUSPENDED IT UPON THE PAYMENT OF HIS ATTORNEY FEES. THAT'S ALL I REMEMBER ABOUT THE CASE.
Q. OKAY, MY QUESTION HAS TO DO WITH IF YOU THINK IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THE STATEMENT "AND WHATEVER OTHER AGREEMENTS Y'ALL CAN WORK OUT" MEANT?
A. I STATED IN THE BODY OF THAT TRANSCRIPT, IF YOU READ IT EARLIER, THIS IS A 17-PAGE ORDER, A DETAILED ORDER---
Q. YES, SIR.
A. ---YOU HAVE A COURT ORDER WHICH YOU ARE BOUND BY; YOU MUST OBEY THIS COURT ORDER OR YOU ARE IN CONTEMPT. AND THEN BY THAT STATEMENT I THINK I MEANT THAT IF YOU WANT TO CHANGE THAT ORDER, IF Y'ALL WANT TO MAKE ANY AGREEMENTS, IF Y'ALL CAN WORK IT OUT, THAT'S FINE WITH ME; BUT, OTHERWISE, YOU HAVE GOT TO OBEY THIS 17-PAGE ORDER THAT IS IN EXISTENCE. THAT IS THE ORDER OF THE COURT AND I HAVE TO REQUIRE YOU TO OBEY THAT ORDER.
Q. SO YOU WERE NOT GIVING MR. NORFLEET'S CLIENT A BLANK CHECK TO HOLD OVER THE---
A. I WAS NOT GIVING ANYBODY A BLANK CHECK. I SAID YOU HAVE GOT A 17-PAGE ORDER. THAT IS THE LAW OF THE CASE RIGHT NOW AND THAT'S THE ORDER WE ARE ENFORCING AND UNTIL THAT ORDER IS CHANGED, THAT IS WHAT YOU HAVE TO LIVE BY. IF YOU CAN WORK OUT ANYTHING ELSE, THAT'S FINE WITH ME.

MR. BATES: THANK YOU, JUDGE.

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE ONE QUESTION.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MR. GENTRY HAS ONE QUESTION.

Q. IF YOU WOULD RESPOND TO MR. NORFLEET'S TESTIMONY ABOUT YOUR TEMPERAMENT AND ALSO THE ISSUE OF STATEMENTS TO THE CLIENT.
A. I HAVE GONE OUT OF MY WAY TO BE NICE AND COURTEOUS TO MR. NORFLEET. WE HAVE A LITTLE BIT OF TROUBLE COMMUNICATING AT TIMES AND WE WORK AT IT, I THINK; AND I APPRECIATE HIM. I HAVE BEEN COURTEOUS TO MR. NORFLEET. AND YESTERDAY I TOLD HIS CLIENT, IF I SAID THAT-- I DID NOT RECEIVE MR. NORFLEET'S AFFIDAVIT UNTIL THIS MORNING, AS MRS. TURNIPSEED KNOWS. SHE GAVE ME THE AFFIDAVITS THAT--SHE CALLED ME YESTERDAY AND TOLD ME THEY HAD BEEN FILED AND SHE FAXED TO ME, AND I DIDN'T GET THEM UNTIL LAST NIGHT, THE AFFIDAVITS OF MS. FABRI AND MR. BAILEY. I DID NOT HAVE MR. NORFLEET'S AFFIDAVIT YESTERDAY WHEN HE CAME TO COURT AND I DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT IT. I DIDN'T KNOW WHAT WAS THERE. AND SHE WOULD HAVE GLADLY SENT IT TO ME. SHE TOLD ME HER FAX MACHINE WAS BUSY; AND I SAID: WELL, I HAVE SOME ATTORNEY FRIENDS; THEY WILL PICK IT UP AND CAN FAX IT TO ME IN CHARLESTON. AND, SO, I GOT TWO OF THOSE AFFIDAVITS. AND SHE READ TO ME MR. NORFLEET'S, ESSENTIALLY WHAT HE HAD SAID. I DIDN'T REALIZE IT WAS THE MIZZELL CASE. I DID NOT KNOW I HAD IT YESTERDAY. I RECUSED MYSELF. AND I APOLOGIZE FOR THE LADY IF I-- IF WHAT HE SAID ABOUT--I DON'T HAVE A RECORD. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER I SAID THAT OR NOT OR WHAT MY EXACT WORDING WAS. I WOULD LIKE TO THINK IT WAS MORE TO THE EFFECT THAT WITH HIS GROSS INCOME OF $1900 AND YOU ARE NOT WORKING, I'M NOT SURE YOU CAN CONTINUE IN SCHOOL WITH TWO CHILDREN, OR YOU MAY NOT BE ABLE TO AFFORD IT. I WAS TRYING TO GET THEM BACK TOGETHER. I WOULD HAVE LIKED TO HAVE SEEN THEM GO BACK TOGETHER AND THAT'S PART OF OUR JOB. WE ARE CHARGED WITH TRYING TO RECONCILE THESE PEOPLE. AND THEN I APOLOGIZED TO THE LADY, IF I HAD BEEN RUDE TO HER AND I TOLD HER THAT I DID NOT RECALL IT YESTERDAY.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, JUDGE.

MR. BATES: THE NEXT WITNESS IS MARGARET FABRI.

MS. FABRI: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, MY NAME IS--

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MS. FABRI, I NEED TO SWEAR YOU.

MS. FABRI: OH, I'M SORRY.

(MARGARET D. FABRI, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

MS. FABRI: I AM MARGARET FABRI. EXCUSE ME. AS THE OTHER ATTORNEYS HAVE SAID, MOST OF US ARE "SMALL POTATO LAWYERS" IN CHARLESTON. I CONSIDER MYSELF IN THAT CATEGORY FOR A COUPLE OF REASONS. I HAVE A SOLE PRACTICE. I DO CIRCUIT COURT WORK; I DO GENERAL SESSIONS WORK ON A LIMITED BASIS, BUT THE MEAT OF MY PRACTICE IS IN FAMILY COURT. I KNOW FULL WELL THE JEOPARDY THAT I AM IN BY BEING HERE TODAY. I HAVE CONSIDERED IT. IF I WAS TRULY CYNICAL, I WOULD HAVE KEPT MY MOUTH SHUT BECAUSE JUDGE PATTERSON WOULD BE ELEVATED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT BENCH AND I PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE TO PRACTICE IN FRONT OF HIM AGAIN. I AM NOT CYNICAL FOR A LOT OF REASONS, MAINLY BECAUSE I BELIEVE IN OUR JUDICIAL SYSTEM. I BELIEVE IN THIS PROCESS. I BELIEVE THAT IF IT'S GOING TO WORK, WE CAN'T HIDE IN THE SHADOWS; THAT IF WE TRULY BELIEVE THAT SOMEONE IS NOT QUALIFIED TO BE ON THE BENCH, THEN IT'S OUR DUTY AS OFFICERS OF THE COURT TO SPEAK UP AND THAT'S WHY I'M HERE TODAY. I WOULD ALSO SAY IN RESPONSE BRIEFLY TO WHAT JUDGE PATTERSON SAID THAT I DO HAVE A LOT OF PROBLEMS WITH HIS EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS AND THAT IS THE MEAT OF MY AFFIDAVIT IF YOU'VE HAD A CHANCE TO READ IT. I HAVE TOUCHED ON A COUPLE OF CASES THAT I HAVE PERSONALLY BEEN INVOLVED IN. I THINK THEY WERE EGREGIOUS. MOST OF WHAT I HAVE SAID IS NOT HEARSAY. IF IT IS HEARSAY, I HAVE LISTED THE WITNESSES THAT YOU MAY CONTACT TO VERIFY WHAT I HAVE SAID. I HAVE ATTACHED DOCUMENTS WHICH I BELIEVE SUPPORT WHAT I HAVE SAID. I WOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS DOES NOT MAKE A DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS ON A PROCEDURAL MATTER OR EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS ON A SUBSTANTIVE MATTER. IT SAYS A JUDGE SHALL HAVE NO EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS. A JUDGE SHALL AVOID THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY. THE CASE THAT JUDGE PATTERSON SPOKE OF IS HINTON VERSUS HINTON, AND I HAVE ALLUDED TO IT IN MY AFFIDAVIT. MR. HINTON WAS MY CLIENT. HE IS NOW A QUADRIPLEGIC; HAS BEEN ADJUDICATED AN INCAPACITATED PERSON BY THE CHARLESTON COUNTY FAMILY COURT BY JUDGE FIELDING BACK IN THE SPRING OF THIS YEAR. THE ACTION WHICH I WAS INVOLVED IN STARTED IN JULY OF 1989 WHERE HIS WIFE, MR. HINTON'S WIFE, BROUGHT AN ACTION FOR SEPARATE SUPPORT AND MAINTENANCE, CHILD SUPPORT, AND EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION. I BEGAN REPRESENTING MR. HINTON IN DECEMBER OF 1989. MR. HINTON WAS INVOLVED IN A SERIOUS AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT IN JANUARY OF 1990. HE WAS IN A COMA FOR 60 DAYS. DURING THAT TIME A MERITS HEARING HAD BEEN SET AND WAS STRUCK, AS JUDGE PATTERSON SAYS, FOR LACK OF PROSECUTION FOR OBVIOUS REASONS. MR. HINTON WAS NOT EVEN CONSCIOUS DURING THOSE TWO MONTHS OF JANUARY AND FEBRUARY. DURING THIS TIME MRS. HINTON, WHO WAS THE ESTRANGED WIFE, AND THESE PEOPLE HAD BEEN SEPARATED FOR EIGHT MONTHS AT THAT TIME, CAME UP TO THE M.U.S.C. INTENSIVE CARE UNIT AND CONTINUALLY DEMANDED OF THE FAMILY THAT SHE HAVE VISITATION WITH MR. HINTON. NOW THAT WOULD NOT SEEM SO EXTRAORDINARY EXCEPT THAT AT THE M.U.S.C. INTENSIVE CARE UNIT, YOU GET 6 MINUTES EVERY THREE HOURS WITH A PATIENT; SO, OBVIOUSLY, THE FAMILY, WHO LOVED THEIR SON, WANTED THOSE 6 MINUTES WITH HIM. MRS. HINTON HAD SWORN OUT AN ARREST WARRANT FOR MR. HINTON FIVE DAYS BEFORE THE ACCIDENT; SO, GENTLEMEN, I LEAVE YOU TO DECIDE WHETHER THERE WAS ANY LOVE LOST BETWEEN THESE PEOPLE. I CAN ASSURE YOU THERE WAS NOT. I DID A RULE TO SHOW CAUSE ON BEHALF OF MY CLIENT BECAUSE THERE HAD BEEN A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER BEFORE THEM--BETWEEN THEM, EXCUSE ME. I BROUGHT AN ACTION IN THE RULE TO SHOW CAUSE AGAINST MRS. HINTON TO STOP THE CONTINUAL, WHAT I CONSIDERED HARASSMENT OF THE FAMILY OF THIS INJURED PERSON. THEY HAD TO CALL THE CHARLESTON COUNTY POLICE TWICE UP TO THE M.U.S.C. UNIT TO BREAK UP ALTERCATIONS BETWEEN THESE FAMILIES. WHEN I CAME INTO FAMILY COURT, I HAD ALREADY ELICITED A GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR MY CLIENT BECAUSE I WAS AWARE, OBVIOUSLY, THAT SOMEBODY NEEDED TO REPRESENT HIM. WHEN WE WENT INTO COURT ON THAT ISSUE, JUDGE PATTERSON ASKED ME AND OPPOSING COUNSEL TO COME INTO THE COURTROOM TO PRE-TRY THE ISSUE OF THE RULE TO SHOW CAUSE AND WHETHER MRS. HINTON HAD VIOLATED IT. I AGREED. I WENT INTO THE COURTROOM. WE BOTH MADE OUR ARGUMENTS TO THE JUDGE AND HE RULED THAT MRS. HINTON WAS NOT IN CONTEMPT OF COURT. NOW I HAD TWO PROBLEMS WITH THAT AT THE TIME. FIRST OF ALL, WE WERE NOT ON THE RECORD. IT WAS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT WE WERE IN A PRE-TRIAL. I HAD A GUARDIAN AD LITEM WAITING IN THE HALLWAY AND THE FAMILY WAS WAITING IN THE HALLWAY TO BE THERE AT MY SIDE. I WENT OUT AND TOLD THE FAMILY THAT THE JUDGE HAD RULED AND THAT WAS IT AND WE WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THAT. OPPOSING COUNSEL TOOK AN ORDER, WHICH I HAVE ATTACHED, IN TO JUDGE PATTERSON AND HAD HIM SIGN IT, NOT ONLY DENYING MY RULE TO SHOW CAUSE BUT ISSUING A VISITATION ORDER BETWEEN MRS. HINTON, THE ESTRANGED WIFE, AND MY CLIENT, WHO WAS COMATOSE. I IMMEDIATELY WENT BACK INTO THE COURTROOM AND SAID TO JUDGE PATTERSON: JUDGE PATTERSON, THERE WAS NOT EVEN A MOTION BEFORE YOU FOR VISITATION; AND, FURTHERMORE, THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO ORDER VISITATION BETWEEN ADULTS. JUDGE PATTERSON'S ANSWER WAS THAT HE THOUGHT THAT THEY SHOULD HAVE VISITATION AND THAT WAS HIS RULING. NOW WHEN I WALKED OUT--I'M NOT HERE TO ARGUE NECESSARILY THOSE FACTS BECAUSE I'M A BIG GIRL AND I KNOW WHERE THE APPELLATE COURT IN THESE STATES ARE, BUT I SAT DOWN AND TALKED LONG AND HARD WITH MY CLIENTS ABOUT WHETHER THEY WANTED TO WASTE THEIR MONEY APPEALING AN ORDER OF VISITATION WHEN THEY HAD A SON WHO WAS NEXT TO DEATH'S DOOR. AND THAT WAS A VERY HARD DECISION TO MAKE, I CAN TELL YOU; AND IN RETROSPECT, I DON'T KNOW THAT WE MADE THE RIGHT DECISION BECAUSE WE DID NOT APPEAL THAT ORDER. I DID DO A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND I ARGUED AGAIN THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE; AND, AGAIN, JUDGE PATTERSON DENIED MY MOTION AND IT IS ATTACHED IN MY DOCUMENTS WHERE HE SAID BECAUSE IT WAS A FAMILY DISPUTE; THEREFORE, THE FAMILY COURT HAD JURISDICTION. WELL, GENTLEMEN, THAT'S JUST NOT THE STATE OF THE LAW AND JUDGE PATTERSON EITHER SHOULD HAVE KNOWN THAT OR DID KNOW THAT, BUT CHOSE NOT TO RULE THAT WAY. SO WE LIVED UNDER THAT ORDER AND WE'RE STILL LIVING UNDER THAT ORDER AND I CAN ASSURE YOU THERE WERE PROBLEMS BETWEEN THAT FAMILY CONTINUALLY. IN THE SPRING OF 1990 I WENT INTO COURT WITH MRS. HINTON, THE MOTHER OF MY CLIENT, TO HAVE HER APPOINTED AS A GUARDIAN AND CONSERVATOR FOR THIS INCAPACITATED PERSON. DURING THAT HEARING, MS. BROWN, WHO WAS MY OPPOSING COUNSEL, PULLED OUT OF HER BRIEFCASE AN UNSIGNED ORDER OF RESTORATION ON THAT CASE. NOW, AGAIN, I HAVE ATTACHED AND THERE IS A DOCUMENT THAT SHOWS THAT ORDER OF STRIKE WAS FEBRUARY 2ND, I BELIEVE, 1990. IN THE HEARING IN FRONT OF JUDGE FIELDING, SHE HANDED UP AN ORDER THAT SAID: NO, JUDGE FIELDING, THIS ACTION IS STILL PENDING. THIS WAS THE FIRST I HAD EVER HEARD OF IT. AND I KNEW WHY SHE WAS TRYING TO DO IT, BECAUSE THERE WAS A QUESTION OF VENUE AND WHETHER THERE WAS A MARITAL LITIGATION PENDING. MY POSITION WAS THERE WAS NOT; THE ORDER TO STRIKE HAD BEEN SIGNED BY MARY BROWN, CLERK OF BERKELEY COUNTY COURT, BACK IN FEBRUARY. BUT, FURTHERMORE, JUDGE FIELDING, AS WAS I, WAS TOTALLY TAKEN BACK BY AN ATTORNEY WHO WAS WALKING AROUND WITH A SIGNED BLANK ORDER IN HER BRIEFCASE RESTORING A CASE AS OF FEBRUARY 9TH, 1990, THAT I HAD NEVER SEEN. WHEN I QUESTIONED THE CLERK OF COURT ABOUT IT, I WAS TOLD BY SANDRA RUSSELL--AND, AGAIN, THAT'S ATTACHED--"THERE WAS A MISTAKE, MARGARET. JUDGE PATTERSON TOLD ME HE NEVER SHOULD HAVE SIGNED THAT BLANK ORDER. HE TOLD ME TO PUT AT THE BOTTOM OF THE ORDER OF RESTORATION AND FILE IT, "THIS ORDER OR THIS ACTION WILL NOT BE RESTORED UNTIL THE DEFENDANT IS OUT OF THE HOSPITAL AND ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN HIS OWN DEFENSE." THAT, I HAVE ALSO ATTACHED. THAT WAS THE STATE OF THE FILE IN THE SPRING OF THIS YEAR. IN THE SUMMER OF THIS YEAR, LATE SUMMER, WHEN MY CLIENT HAD GOTTEN TO THE POINT WHERE HE WAS OFF A RESPIRATOR, HE WAS AT THE SPINAL CENTER IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA; I RECEIVED ANOTHER EXPARTE ORDER OF RESTORATION ON THIS CASE. NOW AT THIS POINT I WAS SURE THERE HAD BEEN A MISTAKE. HOW COULD YOU RESTORE A CASE AGAINST A LEGALLY INCAPACITATED PERSON WHEN THERE HAD BEEN NO NOTICE TO THE OPPOSING COUNSEL AT ALL AND GOOD CAUSE, GENTLEMEN, WAS NOT SHOWN. I TAKE EXCEPTION WITH JUDGE PATTERSON'S ARGUMENTS ON THAT. IF GOOD CAUSE HAD BEEN SHOWN, IT COULD ONLY HAVE BEEN SHOWN BY ONE SIDE; AND I WOULD ARGUE THAT, IN FACT, NO GOOD CAUSE COULD BE SHOWN BY ONE SIDE BECAUSE THERE IS NO FURTHER ARGUMENT ON THE ISSUE. I DID DO A MOTION TO VACATE THAT ORDER, THINKING THERE HAD TO BE A MISTAKE. MY MOTION WAS DENIED. JUDGE PATTERSON, IN FACT--AND I HAVE ATTACHED EXCERPTS FROM THAT TRANSCRIPT OF RECORD--INDICATED THAT HE THOUGHT MRS. HINTON, THE PLAINTIFF IN THAT CASE, WOULD BE PREJUDICED IF SHE COULD NOT GO FORWARD ON HER ACTION. MY COMMENT TO JUDGE PATTERSON AT THE TIME, AND ITS ON THE RECORD, WAS THAT "JUDGE PATTERSON, THIS MAN NOW IS LEGALLY INCAPACITATED; BY THE PROBATE COURT HE HAS BEEN ADJUDGED AN INCAPACITATED PERSON. HE DOES NO LONGER EXIST IN THE EYES OF THE LAW. TO GET A JUDGMENT AGAINST THIS MAN IN HIS OWN NAME WOULD BE A NULLITY, WOULD BE VIRTUALLY UNENFORCEABLE. AND, FURTHERMORE, I HAD NO CLIENT. I HAD HIS MOTHER WHO HAD AT THAT POINT RETAINED ME TO REPRESENT HER AND TO ARGUE AGAINST THE RESTORATION, BUT I HAD AN INCAPACITATED PERSON WHO WAS IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA, IN SHEPPARD'S SPINAL CENTER. THAT IS NOW ON APPEAL, GENTLEMEN, BECAUSE AT THAT POINT I NO LONGER CONSIDERED IT PROCEDURAL, IF IT EVER WAS. IT WAS AFFECTING THE MERITS OF THAT CASE VIS-A-VIS MY CLIENT WAYNE HINTON AND I BELIEVE IT STILL IS TODAY. FURTHERMORE, AND I HAVE ALLEGED THIS IN MY AFFIDAVIT, ALSO, I HAD A CLAIM FOR PAYMENT OF FEES ON THIS CASE. I DID WHAT YOU ARE SUPPOSED TO DO UNDER THE STATUTE IS I FILED THE CLAIM AGAINST WAYNE HINTON IN THE PROBATE COURT. THIS CLAIM IS STILL UNDER ADVISEMENT BY JUDGE FIELDING IN CHARLESTON. MY ATTORNEY REPRESENTING ME IN THE PROBATE COURT WAS HAZEL FERRI. HAZEL FERRI WAS IN JUDGE PATTERSON'S OFFICE SUBSEQUENT TO THAT HEARING IN PROBATE COURT. JUDGE PATTERSON INITIATED AN EXPARTE CONVERSATION WITH HER, TELLING HER THAT IF I WAS PAID THAT CLAIM BY PROBATE COURT, THAT THE OTHER SIDE WOULD APPEAL IT TO THE SUPREME COURT. FURTHERMORE, HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL AND THAT IT WAS MARITAL PROPERTY THAT I WAS TRYING TO GET PAID OUT OF. NOW, AGAIN, WHETHER IT WAS OR WAS NOT MARITAL PROPERTY, GENTLEMEN, IS NOT THE ISSUE. THE ISSUE IS IT HAS NEVER BEEN LITIGATED WHETHER IT'S MARITAL PROPERTY OR NOT THAT I AM TO BE PAID OUT OF; AND JUDGE PATTERSON AT THAT POINT HAD ALREADY MADE A DECISION WHEN IT HAD, IN FACT, NEVER BEEN BEFORE HIM, NOR ANY OTHER JUDGE, NOR HAS IT YET. I HAVE ALSO HAD ANOTHER CASE, WHICH I ALLUDED TO IN MY AFFIDAVIT, WHERE, AND, AGAIN, I WAS VERY CAREFUL NOT TO SAY THAT THERE WAS EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW; I CANNOT VERIFY IT; BUT THERE WAS A CASE WHERE, UNFORTUNATELY, I HAD WITH ANOTHER ATTORNEY, THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT; THERE WAS A DISPUTE IN THE AGREEMENT AND IT CAME DOWN TO THE ATTORNEY AND MYSELF TESTIFYING AGAINST EACH OTHER AS TO THAT AGREEMENT. THIS WAS IN THE FORM OF A RULE TO SHOW CAUSE AGAINST MY CLIENT. THE RULE HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN SET BY DAVID PEARLMAN AND WAS TO BE HEARD BY JUDGE CREECH. IT HAD TO BE CONTINUED AT THAT TIME BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT TIME TO HEAR THE RULE. I AGREED TO THE CONTINUANCE. THE LAST THING THAT I ASKED DAVID PEARLMAN WAS TO PLEASE WAIT UNTIL I COULD FIND OUT HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE TO GET A TRANSCRIPT OF THE AGREEMENT HEARING SO THAT WE WOULD HAVE THAT FOR THE RULE. THE NEXT THING I KNOW, THAT WAS--THE RULE WAS SET THE NEXT DAY IN FRONT OF JUDGE PATTERSON. IT HAPPENED TO BE SET IN FRONT OF JUDGE PATTERSON AT A TIME THAT I WAS GOING TO BE OUT OF THE STATE. I CALLED THE CLERK AND TOLD HER I WAS GOING TO BE OUT OF THE STATE AND THEY WOULD HAVE TO RESET IT. SHE SAID ALL RIGHT. SHE RESET IT FOR TWO DAYS LATER, I BELIEVE; AND IT WAS IN FRONT OF JUDGE WILBURN. THAT AFTERNOON I GOT ANOTHER CALL FROM THE CLERK; THIS IS BETTY HILTON IN CHARLESTON COUNTY. SHE SAID, "MARGARET, IT'S BEEN RESET IN FRONT OF JUDGE PATTERSON." SHE SAID, "I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY." SHE SAID, "BECAUSE MOMENTS AFTER I CALLED MR. STEINBERG'S LAW FIRM AND TOLD THEM THAT IT HAD BEEN RESET IN FRONT OF JUDGE WILBURN BECAUSE YOU WERE GOING TO BE OUT OF THE STATE, THEY HAD AN AGENT FROM THEIR OFFICE DOWN HERE DEMANDING THAT IT BE SET BACK IN FRONT OF JUDGE PATTERSON." WELL, GENTLEMEN, I DON'T GET REAL PARANOID BUT WHEN I SEE THAT, I THINK THERE IS SOMETHING UP; AND I WROTE A LONG LETTER TO JUDGE PATTERSON, WHICH I HAVE ATTACHED. I ALSO SHOWED THAT LETTER TO BOTH CLERKS, HAZEL SMALLS AND BETTY HILTON BEFORE I SENT IT TO JUDGE PATTERSON TO MAKE SURE THAT I HAD NOT PUT WORDS IN ANYONE'S MOUTH. THEY SAW THE LETTER. THEY SAID, "THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED, MARGARET"; AND I SENT IT TO JUDGE PATTERSON. JUDGE PATTERSON NEVER RESPONDED TO ME. I, ABOUT 10 DAYS LATER, FINALLY WALKED OVER TO HIS OFFICE AND SAID, "JUDGE PATTERSON, I THINK THIS NEEDS TO BE RESET IN FRONT OF JUDGE WILBURN," AND I TOLD HIM THE REASONS WHY. I TOLD HIM EXACTLY WHAT HAPPENED WHICH WAS REFLECTED IN MY LETTER. JUDGE PATTERSON SAID TO ME, "HAVE YOU EVER BEEN IN FRONT OF JUDGE WILBURN?" AND I RESPONDED, "NO." HE SAID, "WELL, HE'S A CRUSTY OLD MARINE." AND I RESPONDED, "WELL, MAYBE THAT'S JUST WHAT WE NEED IN THIS CASE." I SAID, "IT'S GOING TO BE EMBARRASSING. THERE ARE TWO ATTORNEYS THAT ARE GOING TO HAVE TO TESTIFY AGAINST EACH OTHER AND PERHAPS AN OUT-OF-TOWN JUDGE CERTAINLY MAKES MORE SENSE AND I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY THEY WERE SO VEHEMENT ABOUT RESETTING THIS IN FRONT OF YOU." JUDGE PATTERSON INDICATED THAT HE DIDN'T UNDERSTAND IT EITHER. I REQUESTED THAT HE RESET IT IN FRONT OF JUDGE WILBURN AND HE DENIED THAT REQUEST. THAT CASE WAS HEARD. WE STILL DO NOT HAVE AN ORDER ON IT. I WAS NOT ALLOWED TO TESTIFY EVEN THOUGH I HAD WITHDRAWN AND GOTTEN OTHER COUNSEL TO REPRESENT MY CLIENT. BUT, AGAIN, I AM NOT OBJECTING TO WHAT HAPPENED IN THAT COURTROOM. I KNOW HOW TO TAKE CARE OF MY CLIENTS IF THERE IS AN ERROR OF LAW IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT. I AM OBJECTING TO WHAT I BELIEVE, WHAT'S CERTAINLY THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY THAT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED BY JUDGE PATTERSON. I HAVE ALSO INCLUDED WITH MY EXHIBITS "THE NEWS & COURIER" ARTICLE OF JULY 29TH, 1990, WHICH, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TALKED ABOUT A WOMAN WHO WAS SENT TO JAIL FOR NON-PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT UNDER A BENCH WARRANT ISSUED BY JUDGE PATTERSON. IT HAPPENS DAILY. I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THAT. I HAVE AN OBJECTION TO WHAT IS REPRESENTED IN THE ARTICLE ABOUT GEDNEY HOWE PICKING UP A PHONE ON SATURDAY NIGHT AND CALLING JUDGE PATTERSON WHEN HE WAS ON NATIONAL GUARD DUTY ON A SATURDAY NIGHT AND GETTING THE WOMAN OUT OF JAIL. AGAIN, GEDNEY HOWE IS NOT THE ATTORNEY OF RECORD FOR EITHER ONE OF THESE PEOPLE IN THAT CASE. IF, IN FACT, THE WOMAN SHOULD HAVE GOTTEN OUT OF THE JAIL, I WOULD SUSPECT THAT BOTH OF THEIR ATTORNEYS--AND I DO KNOW THIS FOR A FACT--HAD TRIED TO PREVAIL AGAINST JUDGE PATTERSON AS FAR AS KEEPING HER OUT OF JAIL; THEY HAD BEEN UNSUCCESSFUL. AND JUDGE PATTERSON'S COMMENT THAT "I HAVE AN OPEN-DOOR POLICY, GENTLEMEN, I DON'T WANT THAT TO BE CONFUSED WITH AN EXPARTE COMMUNICATION," AND PERHAPS WHAT JUDGE PATTERSON IS SAYING MAY BE TRUE, THAT HE WANTS TO BE OPEN TO PEOPLE; BUT I SUBMIT TO YOU, GENTLEMEN, THAT THAT IS AN EXPARTE COMMUNICATION, PURE AND SIMPLE. THAT IS WHAT IS PROHIBITED BY THE JUDICIAL CODE OF ETHICS, PURE AND SIMPLE. YOU DON'T WALK THE HALLS AND MAKE YOURSELF AVAILABLE TO ATTORNEYS UNLESS THE OTHER ATTORNEY IS THERE. AS FAR AS JUDGE PATTERSON'S COMPETENCE AS TO THE LAW, I THINK THE ISSUE THAT MOST STRUCK ME WAS OBVIOUSLY WHERE HE ORDERED VISITATION BETWEEN TWO ADULTS. IT WAS LUDICROUS. BUT IT WAS AN ORDER THAT WE HAD TO LIVE WITH AND WE THEN HAD TO MAKE A DECISION WHETHER WE HAD THE MONEY AND THE EFFORT AND THE TIME TO APPEAL THAT. THAT HAS NOT ONLY HAPPENED TO ME, GENTLEMEN, IT HAS HAPPENED TO SEVERAL, NUMEROUS ATTORNEYS IN CHARLESTON COUNTY. AS FAR AS JUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT, WHICH THE CHAIRMAN WAS CONCERNED WITH, I WOULD SAY THAT JUDGE PATTERSON HAS ALWAYS BEEN COURTEOUS TO ME. I HAVE NEVER HAD AN OCCASION WHERE HE HAS BEEN BLATANTLY RUDE. I WOULD ALSO NOT BE OFFENDED BY A RUDE JUDGE. I AM A BIG GIRL AND I KNOW HOW TO TAKE THAT. WHAT OFFENDS ME ARE EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS AND I HOPE THAT I HAVE MADE THAT QUITE CLEAR TO THE COMMITTEE. AS FAR AS INTEMPERAMENT TO CLIENTS, I THINK I HAVE SEEN THAT AS RECENTLY AS LAST WEEK WHEN I WAS IN FRONT OF JUDGE PATTERSON ON A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. THE REASON I WAS THERE WAS BECAUSE THE FIRST PARAGRAPH OF THE ORDERING PROVISION SAID: "THIS WOMAN MUST COME BEFORE THIS COURT AND TELL ME WHY SHE DID NOT SHOW UP FOR A RULE TO SHOW CAUSE OR A BENCH WARRANT WILL ISSUE." SO, OBVIOUSLY IN ORDER TO PROTECT MY CLIENT, I DID A MOTION IMMEDIATELY. WHEN WE ENTERED THE COURTROOM AND JUDGE PATTERSON WAS ASKING US WHY WE WERE THERE, I SAID, "WELL, YOUR HONOR, IT'S A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BUT OBVIOUSLY THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS IS I WANT TO TELL THE COURT WHY MY CLIENT WASN'T AT A RULE TO SHOW CAUSE." OUR POSITION WAS THAT SHE HAD NEVER BEEN SERVED WITH A RULE TO SHOW CAUSE. JUDGE PATTERSON LOOKED AT MY CLIENT AND SAID, "IF THERE IS A BENCH WARRANT, THEN I'M GOING TO TELL THAT DEPUTY RIGHT NOW TO ARREST HER." I RESPONDED, "BUT, YOUR HONOR, THAT'S WHY WE ARE HERE, SO SHE DOESN'T GET ARRESTED." I HAVE SEEN THAT ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASION BY JUDGE PATTERSON, WHERE HE TAKES THE PROBLEMS OF THE PEOPLE BEFORE HIM LIGHTLY. THESE ARE VERY DIRE PROBLEMS THAT COME BEFORE A FAMILY COURT JUDGE: THE CUSTODY OF THEIR CHILDREN, THEIR HUSBANDS, ALIMONY, SUPPORT, WHETHER THEY HAVE A ROOF OVER THEIR HEAD AND FOOD IN THEIR CHILDREN'S STOMACHS. THESE ARE NOT ISSUES THAT SHOULD BE TAKEN LIGHTLY, GENTLEMEN. AND FINALLY ONE OF THE LAST MOST EGREGIOUS THINGS THAT I HAVE NOT PERSONALLY HEARD; BUT, AGAIN, I CAN VERIFY, I REPRESENTED A LESBIAN MOTHER IN A CUSTODY CASE; THERE WAS AN ISSUE OF CUSTODY BETWEEN THE PARENTS AND THE HOMOSEXUALITY, OBVIOUSLY, OF MY CLIENT WAS AT ISSUE; WHEN THE CLERK QUESTIONED JUDGE PATTERSON ABOUT THE ISSUE OF HOMOSEXUALITY, HE INDICATED TO HER, "OH, YES, MARGARET'S CLIENT IS A REAL BIG HOMO." NOW I WOULD SUBMIT TO YOU, GENTLEMEN, THAT THERE ARE NOT A LOT OF PEOPLE THAT SUPPORT HOMOSEXUALITY IN OUR SOCIETY. I AM AWARE OF THAT. YOU ARE AWARE OF THAT. BUT I WOULD ALSO SUBMIT TO YOU THAT OUR FAMILY COURT JUDGES SEE THOSE ISSUES BEFORE THEM ON A REGULAR BASIS AND TO HAVE THAT KIND OF COMMENT COME OUT OF THE MOUTH OF A FAMILY COURT JUDGE WHO, IN FACT, WOULD HEAR THOSE ISSUES--HE WAS NOT HEARING THIS PARTICULAR CASE--I FOUND OFFENSIVE. AGAIN, GENTLEMEN, I WOULD JUST SAY THAT MY BIGGEST COMPLAINT WITH JUDGE PATTERSON IS EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS. I DON'T MAKE A DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE. I DO BELIEVE THAT THE EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN THE CASES THAT I HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIVE, HAVE AFFECTED OR COULD AFFECT THE MERITS OF THE CASE AGAINST MY CLIENT; AND I FIND THAT JUDGE PATTERSON IS UNQUALIFIED MAINLY FOR THAT REASON. THANK YOU.

Q. MS. FABRI, IF YOU COULD JUST WALK US BRIEFLY THROUGH THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE RESTORATION OF THE CASE THAT--(PAUSE)---
A. I BELIEVE I HAVE ATTACHED EXHIBIT "A"; IT'S AN ORDER TO RESTORE. IT'S A BLANK ORDER. IT'S SIGNED BY JUDGE PATTERSON. THAT'S THE ORDER THAT I'M REFERRING TO THAT WAS PULLED OUT OF OPPOSING COUNSEL'S BRIEFCASE AT THE PROBATE COURT HEARING IN THE SPRING OF THIS YEAR.
Q. ALL RIGHT. (PAUSE.)
A. EXHIBIT "B"---
Q. WHEN DID YOU SEE OR GET AHOLD OF THIS COPY OF THE SIGNED ORDER?
A. THAT SIGNED--IT WAS PROBABLY MARCH OF 1990. IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN APRIL. IT WAS WHEN WE WERE IN PROBATE COURT AND I CAN GIVE YOU THE DATE IF YOU CAN GIVE ME A MINUTE. I HAVE, I BELIEVE, THE DATE WHEN WE WERE IN COURT BUT IT WAS WHEN I WAS IN PROBATE COURT REPRESENTING MY CLIENT'S MOTHER, OR I REALLY WASN'T REPRESENTING ANYBODY AT THAT TIME. MY CLIENT'S MOTHER WAS THEN IN PROBATE COURT TRYING TO GET APPOINTED HIS GUARDIAN AND CONSERVATOR.
Q. OKAY. BUT YOU DID NOT BECOME AWARE OF THIS ORDER UNTIL LATER THEN? I MEAN, THIS WAS NOT---
A. IT HAD BEEN CARRIED AROUND IN SHIRRESE BROWN'S BRIEFCASE EVIDENTLY.
Q. ALL RIGHT. IN YOUR STATEMENT, YOUR WRITTEN STATEMENT THAT YOU GAVE TO US, IT SAYS, "I LEARNED THAT JUDGE PATTERSON HAD GIVEN MY OPPOSING COUNSEL A BLANK, SIGNED ORDER OF RESTORATION WHICH IS EXHIBIT 'A' AND THE ORDER HAD BEEN CARRIED AROUND IN OPPOSING COUNSEL'S FILE. AUGUST 28, 1990, I WAS SERVED WITH AN EXPARTE ORDER OF RESTORATION." IS THAT THE SAME ORDER?
A. NO; AND I HAVE A COPY OF THAT AND I'M SORRY I DIDN'T ATTACH IT. THIS IS THE ORDER OF RESTORATION THAT I RECEIVED ON AUGUST 28TH. IT'S DATED AUGUST 10TH, SIGNED BY JUDGE PATTERSON AND IT SAYS, "THIS MATTER WILL BE HEARD ON SEPTEMBER 12TH"; IT HAD ALREADY BEEN SET FOR A HEARING.
Q. AT THE TIME ON AUGUST 28TH WHEN YOU RECEIVED THE ORDER TO RESTORE, THE ONE THAT YOU ARE HOLDING, YOUR CLIENT HAD ALREADY BEEN, HAD BEEN---
A. ADJUDICATED.
Q. ---ADJUDICATED AN INCAPACITATED PERSON?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. ALL RIGHT, AND THERE HAD BEEN NO NOTICE FROM YOU OR NO INQUIRY FROM OPPOSING COUNSEL OR THE COURT AS TO HIS CONDITION?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. THE OTHER ORDER OF RESTORATION THAT YOU ALLUDED TO THAT HAD THE NOTATION ON THE BOTTOM FROM THE CLERK OF COURT?
A. EXHIBIT "B."
Q. WHEN DID YOU BECOME AWARE OF THAT, THE EXISTENCE OF THAT ORDER?
A. WHEN I LEFT THE PROBATE COURT HEARING IN THE SPRING OF THIS YEAR, AND I BELIEVE IT WAS EARLY APRIL/LATE MARCH, I IMMEDIATELY WENT BACK TO MY OFFICE; I CALLED SANDRA RUSSELL WHO IS THE CLERK OF COURT FOR BERKELEY COUNTY AND ASKED HER; AND THAT'S WHEN I BECAME AWARE AND I REQUESTED THAT THEY SEND ME A COPY OF THAT ORDER. IT WAS IN THE FILE.
Q. THAT ORDER WAS NEVER--THE ONLY ORDER TO RESTORE THAT WAS ENFORCED WAS THE ONE THAT WAS ULTIMATELY ISSUED AUGUST 28TH?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. ALL RIGHT; THESE OTHER TWO WERE IN EXISTENCE BUT NOT PART OF THE FILE OR ENFORCED AT ANY TIME, WERE THEY?
A. ONLY PART OF THE FILE, IN THAT THIS WRITING ON THE BOTTOM IS VIRTUALLY THE SAME ORDER THAT MS. BROWN HAD PULLED OUT OF HER BRIEFCASE AT THE PROBATE COURT HEARING. THEY ARE VIRTUALLY THE SAME ORDER. ONE WAS NOT SIGNED BECAUSE SHIRRESE BROWN HAD THE SIGNED BLANK COPY; ONLY A BLANK COPY WAS IN THE COURT FILE.
Q. ALL RIGHT. AT WHAT POINT IN THIS PROCESS--WELL, I HAVE NOW GOT THAT ORDER HERE, TOO. THE ORDER OF--WELL, THE HEARING WAS FEBRUARY 20TH, 1990. (PAUSE.) THAT WAS THE ORDER IN WHICH JUDGE PATTERSON ORDERED THE VISITATION; CORRECT?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. THAT WAS HIS HANDWRITTEN---
A. I BELIEVE ACTUALLY THIS ORDER OF FEBRUARY 20TH IS THE ORDER THAT SUBSEQUENTLY WAS RENDERED FROM THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. THE ORIGINAL RULE TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING HAD BEEN HELD PROBABLY TWO TO THREE WEEKS PRIOR TO THAT.
Q. ALL RIGHT. DID YOU RAISE THE POINT THAT VISITATION TO AN ADULT WHO IS INCAPACITATED SHOULD BE SOMETHING BROUGHT UP IN THE PROBATE COURT, RATHER THAN---
A. YES, I DID.
Q. WHAT WAS HIS RESPONSE TO THAT?
A. WHICH, AS YOU SEE BY THE ORDER, HE HANDWROTE IN BEFORE HE SIGNED IT, WAS BECAUSE THIS WAS BETWEEN AN ESTRANGED WIFE AND A HUSBAND THAT HE FELT THAT HE HAD JURISDICTION.
Q. THIS ORDER HAD BEEN PREPARED BY OPPOSING COUNSEL?
A. THAT'S CORRECT.
Q. THEN JUDGE PATTERSON FILLED IN THAT ADDITIONAL SENTENCE. (PAUSE.) WAS THERE EVER A HEARING ON THE MOTION TO RESTORE THE CASE OR IS THAT A---
A. THE ORDER TO RESTORE, I DID A MOTION TO VACATE THAT ORDER. PARTS OF THE EXCERPTS FROM THAT TRANSCRIPT ARE ATTACHED, ALSO, WHERE HE INDICATES THAT THAT WAS NOT HIS WRITING ON THE BOTTOM WHEN SANDRA RUSSELL HAD INDICATED TO ME THAT JUDGE PATTERSON HAD INSTRUCTED HER TO PUT THAT ON THE BOTTOM; AND I INDICATED TO HIM, I SAID, "JUDGE PATTERSON, YOU SAID THIS MATTER WILL NOT BE RESTORED UNTIL MY CLIENT IS OUT OF THE HOSPITAL AND ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN HIS DEFENSE. HE IS IN THE SPINAL CENTER IN ATLANTA." HE INDICATED TO ME, AND HE SHOWS IT IN THE TRANSCRIPT, HE SAID, "THAT'S NOT MY WRITING."

MR. BATES: ANY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?

SENATOR MARTIN: THANK YOU VERY MUCH. JUDGE PATTERSON.

JUDGE PATTERSON: MR. CHAIRMAN, THE FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE IS HERE JUST TO SPEAK BRIEFLY, ABOUT 40 SECONDS, AND THEN HE NEEDS TO LEAVE.

SENATOR MARTIN: WHO IS THAT?

JUDGE PATTERSON: CHIEF JUSTICE NESS.

SENATOR MARTIN: I RECOGNIZED HIM. WOULD YOU LIKE FOR US TO CALL HIM AS YOUR CHARACTER WITNESS? JUDGE PATTERSON: YES, SIR.

SENATOR MARTIN: ALL RIGHT; BE GLAD TO ACCOMMODATE THE CHIEF JUSTICE. CHIEF JUSTICE NESS, WILL YOU COME FORWARD.

HONORABLE J. B. NESS: GENTLEMEN, I SERVED ON THE CIRCUIT BENCH OF THIS STATE FROM 1958 UNTIL 1974 AND I SERVED ON THE SUPREME COURT FROM 1974 UNTIL 1988, A TOTAL OF 30 YEARS, APPROXIMATELY 30 YEARS, OF WHICH THE LAST ABOUT FOUR YEARS I WAS CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT. I DO NOT RECALL HOW MANY YEARS I HAVE KNOWN JUDGE PATTERSON AND I COULD NOT TELL YOU UNDER OATH HOW MANY YEARS I HAVE KNOWN HIM. I CAN TELL YOU THOUGH THAT WHILE I SERVED AS CHIEF JUSTICE, WE HAD PROBLEMS IN THE CIRCUIT COURT WITH HAVING ENOUGH SUFFICIENT JUDICIAL MANPOWER AND, THEREFORE, I USED SOME FAMILY COURT JUDGES AS CIRCUIT COURT JUDGES IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THIS STATE. DURING THAT FOUR-YEAR PERIOD, I RECALL DISTINCTLY USING JUDGE PATTERSON MANY TIMES AS A CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE. HIS RATINGS WERE EXCELLENT. IF YOU RECALL, I HAD A RULE THAT EACH JUDGE WOULD HAVE TO REPORT EVERY MONTH HOW MANY CASES CAME BEFORE HIM, HOW MANY CASES HE DISPOSED OF, HOW MANY HE TRIED BY JURY, HOW MANY HE SETTLED. I UNDERSTAND THAT RULE IS NO LONGER IN EXISTENCE, BUT THE RULE WAS IN EXISTENCE WHILE I WAS CHIEF JUSTICE. JUDGE PATTERSON FILLED OUT HIS REPORT REGULARLY. HE HANDLED HIS WORK MOST ADMIRABLY. I NEVER RECEIVED A COMPLAINT FROM ANYONE AGAINST JUDGE PATTERSON. HE WAS AN EXCELLENT CIRCUIT JUDGE. HE DID HIS JOB WELL. AND FROM THE INFORMATION I RECEIVE, HE DOES HIS JOB WELL AS A FAMILY COURT JUDGE. I HAVE APPEARED BEFORE HIM SINCE I HAVE RETIRED WHILE HE WAS A FAMILY COURT JUDGE BUT ONLY AS TO THE SETTLEMENT OF A CASE WITH MR. MCLAREN, SITTING HERE; NO TESTIMONY WAS TAKEN AND JUDGE PATTERSON DIDN'T HAVE TO MAKE ANY RULINGS WHATSOEVER. THAT WAS ON ONE OCCASION. ON ANOTHER OCCASION LAST WEEK I APPEARED BEFORE JUDGE PATTERSON AND HE MADE NO RULINGS BECAUSE IT WASN'T NECESSARY BECAUSE, AGAIN, I WAS WITH MR. MCLAREN, SITTING OVER HERE, AND WE AGREED ON THAT. I DID SIT IN HIS COURT WHILE I WAS WAITING FOR OUR CASE TO COME UP AND SAW JUDGE PATTERSON HANDLE SOME JUVENILE OFFENDERS, WHICH I THOUGHT HE DID EXCELLENTLY, DID VERY WELL ON AND I COMMENDED HIM ON THAT AFTER HE GOT THROUGH. THAT'S ALL I HAVE. ANY QUESTIONS?

Q. I HAVE ONE, YES.
A. YES, SIR.
Q. A MATTER OF CURIOSITY, I GUESS; NOT NECESSARILY ON JUDGE PATTERSON. HAVING BEEN CHIEF JUSTICE, WHAT INGREDIENT DO YOU LOOK FOR IN A JUDGE WHEN YOU CHOOSE TO APPOINT AN ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE? IS THERE A PARTICULAR SOMETHING THAT YOU LOOK FOR?
A. WELL, REALLY YOU LOOK FOR THE JUDGE THAT YOU THINK IS BEST QUALIFIED TO HANDLE THE MATTERS THAT ARE GOING TO COME UP IN THAT CIRCUIT. YOU ARE ADVISED AHEAD OF TIME IF THERE ARE ANY DEATH PENALTY CASES THAT ARE GOING TO COME UP, OR WHETHER IT'S A RUN OF THE MILL D.U.I., AND RECKLESS HOMICIDE, OR LARCENY CASES; AND YOU KNOW THAT AHEAD OF TIME AND YOU APPOINT THE JUDGES THAT YOU THINK CAN HANDLE THAT BEST. AND I HAD NO HESITANCY IN APPOINTING JUDGE PATTERSON.

SENATOR MARTIN: ANYBODY ELSE CARE TO--JUDGE, IT'S A PLEASURE TO SIT ON THIS SIDE OF THE BENCH. I HAVE STARED AT YOU MANY TIMES AND I CAN MAKE A FACE AT YOU NOW AND I COULDN'T BEFORE; BUT WE'RE GLAD TO HAVE YOU.

HONORABLE J.B. NESS: SENATOR MARTIN, YOU CAN ALWAYS MAKE A FACE AT ME BECAUSE I'VE TAKEN CARE OF YOU SINCE I SERVED IN THE SENATE WITH YOU MANY, MANY YEARS AGO; 1956, I BELIEVE IT WAS. THANK YOU, GENTLEMEN, A PLEASURE BEING WITH YOU.

SENATOR MARTIN: GOOD TO HAVE YOU WITH US.

JUDGE PATTERSON: MR. CHAIRMAN I HAVE THE ATTORNEYS THAT WERE INVOLVED IN THIS HINTON CASE AND THE OTHER CASE WITH MR. PEARLMAN; ALL THESE ATTORNEYS THAT WERE ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THOSE CASES THAT INVOLVED MS. FABRI ARE HERE TO TESTIFY IN REGARD TO THOSE SPECIFIC MATTERS. THEY PROBABLY KNOW MORE ABOUT THEM THAN I DO. AND I DON'T KNOW, MS. FABRI HAS MENTIONED MANY THINGS AND SHE AND I JUST BASICALLY DISAGREE ON WHAT'S ADMINISTRATIVE AND WHAT GOES TO THE MERITS OF THE CASE. I HAVE TO MAKE MANY ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS. AND ON THIS PARTICULAR CASE SHE HAS A BETTER RECOLLECTION OF THAT CASE THAN I DO. MR. DAN DAVID IS HERE, WHO IS--HIS FIRM REPRESENTS THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HINTON CASE. HE CAN EXPLAIN IT TO YOU A LITTLE BIT BETTER THAN I CAN. THE REAL FIGHT IN THAT CASE CENTERS AROUND, I THINK, AN INTERESTING LEGAL QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDS--AND I HAVE DECIDED SOME OF THESE CASE AND HAVE BEEN APPEALED TO THE SUPREME COURT: WATSON VERSUS WATSON; THE SHARILLY CASE; BRANNON AND BRANNON, BRANNON VERSUS BRANNON, AND ALL MY CASES THAT I TRIED AND WERE APPEALED IN REGARD TO EQUITABLE DIVISION. THIS MAY INVOLVE WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDS OF A LAWSUIT THAT IS PENDING IS MARITAL LITIGATION AND THE DATE OF THE FILING OF THE DIVORCE MAY BE IMPORTANT; AND THE PROCEEDS OF THE SETTLEMENT FROM THAT LAWSUIT, I THINK, IS WHAT MS. FABRI AND MR. DAVID'S FIRM ARE FIGHTING SO HARD ABOUT ON THIS HINTON VERSUS HINTON CASE. I DO NOT KNOW THESE PARTIES. I HAVE NOTHING AGAINST MS. FABRI. SHE MENTIONED THE HOMOSEXUAL CASE; I WILL ADDRESS THAT BRIEFLY. I DON'T REMEMBER MAKING THAT COMMENT TO ANYBODY AND I CERTAINLY DIDN'T MAKE IT TO MS. FABRI THAT I KNOW ABOUT. AND THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO ANOTHER JUDGE AND MS. FABRI WON THE CASE. HER CLIENT, IF SHE WERE A HOMOSEXUAL, GOT CUSTODY OF THE CHILD, I THINK.

MS. FABRI: IT WAS AN AGREEMENT, YOUR HONOR. WE SETTLED THE CASE.

JUDGE PATTERSON: OKAY, IT WAS AN AGREEMENT. AND SHE HAD AN EXCELLENT GUARDIAN AD LITEM WHO IS A FRIEND OF MINE AND THAT WAS THE RECOMMENDATION. I DID NOT INTERFERE WITH THAT CASE AT ALL AND I'M SHOCKED AND SURPRISED THAT MS. FABRI WOULD EVEN PUBLICLY MENTION THAT. I HAD NO HAND IN THAT. IN REGARD TO THE SETTING OF THE CASE, JUST LET ME BRIEFLY REFER TO THAT, ABOUT WHETHER JUDGE WILBURN OR I WOULD HEAR THAT. AS I RECALL, NO ONE FROM MR. PEARLMAN'S FIRM--I HAVE AFFIDAVITS FROM MR. PEARLMAN AND MR. GOLDBERG AND THEIR FIRM THAT THEY FILED FOR ME AND THEY ARE VERY RESPECTED ATTORNEYS; AND THEY HAVE A FIRM THAT DOES A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF DOMESTIC WORK: TOM WHITE, MR. HOLMES, AND MR. CROSLAND; THEY DO A LOT OF DOMESTIC WORK; AND EVEN MR. PEARLMAN, HE HAS DOMESTIC CASES. THEY DO A LOT OF LITIGATION. AND HE HAS WRITTEN AN AFFIDAVIT FOR ME. BUT I DON'T RECALL THEM DISCUSSING ME HEARING THAT CASE. IT WAS SET IN FRONT OF ME AND MS. FABRI ASKED THAT I NOT HEAR IT; SHE WAS NOT AN ATTORNEY IN THAT CASE. SHE WAS GOING TO BE A WITNESS AND THEY HIRED DIFFERENT COUNSEL. MR. ANDREWS WAS TO REPRESENT MR. PEARLMAN AND MS. LYNN FOWLER, WHO IS NOT HERE, WAS REPRESENTING MS. FABRI'S CLIENT. I HAD HEARD THE SETTLEMENT ON THE CASE AND IN LOOKING AT THE FILE, AFTER MS. FABRI MADE THE MOTION FOR ME NOT TO HEAR IT, I TOOK THE SETTLEMENT, SIGNED THE ORDER, AND IT WAS AN INTERPRETATION OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN FRONT OF ME AND I DID NOT FEEL THAT I SHOULD RECUSE MYSELF. I FELT THAT THE INTERPRETATION OF THAT ORDER WAS PROBABLY BEST TO BE DONE BY ME. IT INVOLVED THE PLAIN MEANING OF WHETHER THE ORDER WAS AMBIGUOUS OR WHETHER IT WAS CLEAR OR NOT AND AS THE TRIAL JUDGE AND HAVING SIGNED THAT ORDER, I FELT IN A BETTER POSITION TO RULE ON THAT. AS IN HER LETTER STATES, SHE SAYS IN HER OWN LETTER IT'S GOING TO BE A SWEARING CONTEST BETWEEN ME AND DAVID PEARLMAN AND MR. GOLDBERG AND WHATNOT. BY INTERPRETING THAT ORDER, NONE OF THE ATTORNEYS HAD TO COME IN AND IT DID NOT END UP IN A SWEARING CONTEST BETWEEN THE ATTORNEYS; AND I RULED THE WAY THAT I THOUGHT WAS LEGALLY CORRECT AND BASED MY INTERPRETATION AND RULING ON WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND THE LAW DICTIONARY AS TO WHAT "APPLIANCES" MEANT; THEREFORE, THE ATTORNEYS DIDN'T HAVE TO TESTIFY. WHETHER OR NOT APPLIANCES AND WHETHER OR NOT A WASHER AND DRYER SHOULD GO WITH THE HOUSE; MS. FABRI DRAFTED THE ORDER AND USED ALL APPLIANCES WOULD GO WITH THE HOUSE AND I JUST SIMPLY RULED STRAIGHT UP THAT A WASHER AND DRYER WAS AN APPLIANCE AND SHOULDN'T GO WITH THE HOUSE. THAT'S THE LONG AND SHORT OF IT. IT ELIMINATED THE TESTIMONY AND I INTERPRETED MY OWN ORDER. AND IN REGARD TO THE DETAILS OF THE HINTON VERSUS HINTON CASE MR. DAVID IS HERE WHO IS ON THE OTHER SIDE AND CAN EXPLAIN THAT TO YOU A LITTLE BIT BETTER ABOUT THESE ORDERS. AND MR. ANDREWS IS HERE TO EXPLAIN TO YOU THE PROBLEM WE HAD IN THE CASE I JUST TOLD YOU ABOUT.

CONTINUED EXAMINATION OF JUDGE PATTERSON BY MR. BATES:

Q. JUDGE, IF I COULD I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU A COUPLE OF QUESTIONS BEFORE WE GET TO THOSE FOLKS. IN REGARD TO THE FEBRUARY 20TH, 1990, ORDER WHERE YOU HANDWROTE IN, "I FIND THIS IS A FAMILY DISPUTE RESULTING FROM THE MARRIAGE"; I THINK THIS IS--I'M NOT SURE WHAT IT IS, IT SAYS SOMETHING JURISDICTION -"THERE IS JURISDICTION"; HAVING TO DO WITH THE VISITATION TO MR. HINTON. DO YOU CONTEND AT THIS POINT THAT YOU HAD THE JURISDICTION TO GRANT THAT VISITATION?
A. THIS CASE CAME IN FRONT OF ME BASED ON A MOTION, I BELIEVE, BY MS. FABRI; I COULD BE INCORRECT ABOUT THAT. MR. DAVID WOULD KNOW MORE ABOUT THAT THAN I DO. I HEAR SO MANY CASES THAT I CAN'T REMEMBER THEM ALL AND I WILL TRY TO RELATE IT TO YOU AS BEST I CAN. I BELIEVE MS. FABRI BROUGHT A MOTION TO PROHIBIT THE WIFE FROM VISITING THE HOSPITAL. I BELIEVE SHE MIGHT HAVE BEEN REPRESENTING THE GRANDPARENTS AT THAT TIME. I'M NOT SURE. MAYBE NOT; MAYBE THE FATHER. THERE WAS A RESTRAINING ORDER OUT THAT NORMALLY IS ISSUED IN ALL DOMESTIC CASES. WELL, THE MAN WAS IN SERIOUS CONDITION AND THE MOTHER WANTED TO GO BY THE HOSPITAL AND SEE HIM IN INTENSIVE CARE; AND SHE WAS THE MOTHER OF THE CHILD AND THE CHILD WAS HOME LIVING WITH HER. THIS CASE, HINTON VERSUS HINTON, WAS FILED IN THE FAMILY COURT; IT WAS AN ACTIVE CASE, AND I CHOSE NOT TO ENFORCE THE RESTRAINING ORDER TO KEEP THE MOTHER OUT OF THAT HOSPITAL FROM VISITING THE FATHER OF HER CHILD. SHE HAD CUSTODY OF THAT CHILD. I JUST FELT LIKE SHE SHOULD GO BY, AS LONG AS SHE WAS CAUSING NO PROBLEM, AND BE ABLE TO COME HOME AND TELL THAT YOUNG CHILD HOW THE FATHER WAS DOING. I JUST DIDN'T SEE HER GOING BY THAT HOSPITAL IN THIS CASE AND TO SEE HOW THE FATHER WAS DOING--IT COULD HAVE WORKED OUT IN THE RECONCILIATION; I HAD NO EVIDENCE IN FRONT OF ME THAT SHE WOULD CAUSE ANY PROBLEMS; AND IF SHE HAD GONE THERE AND CAUSED ANY PROBLEMS, I WOULD HAVE RESTRAINED HER FROM GOING. I JUST FELT LIKE THE MOTHER OF THE CHILD HAD THE RIGHT TO TELL THEIR CHILD, TO GO BY THE HOSPITAL AND RELATE TO THAT CHILD HOW THE FATHER WAS DOING. THAT'S THE LONG AND SHORT OF IT.
Q. ISN'T THAT TYPICALLY SOMETHING, VISITATION OF AN INCAPACITATED PERSON, SOMETHING THAT IS IN THE PURVIEW OF THE PROBATE COURT?
A. WELL, THAT WAS AN INTERESTING QUESTION. MAYBE THE APPELLATE COURT NEEDS TO TELL US THAT. I DON'T KNOW. THIS WAS AN ACTIVE CASE IN FRONT OF ME WHERE THE RESTRAINING ORDER WAS IN EFFECT AND MS. FABRI ASKED ME TO ENFORCE THE RESTRAINING ORDER AND I CHOOSE NOT TO DO THAT. AND IF WE CAN ISSUE AN ORDER KEEPING THEM AWAY FROM EACH OTHER AND IT'S A FAMILY DISPUTE, I'M NOT TOO SURE THAT WE CAN'T SAY THAT THEY DON'T HAVE TO STAY AWAY FROM EACH OTHER.
Q. IF YOU COULD TELL US, PLEASE, HOW YOU TYPICALLY HANDLE A MOTION AND ORDER TO RESTORE A CASE TO A DOCKET THAT HAS BEEN CONTINUED OR PUT OFF BECAUSE OF A REASON--I DON'T KNOW, MAYBE THIS IS THE FIRST TIME YOU HAVE EVER HAD AN INCAPACITATED PERSON LIKE THIS; I'M JUST---
A. WELL THE LAWYERS FROM GREENVILLE CAN TELL YOU, WE NEVER HAD ANY CASES GO BEYOND SIX MONTHS IN GREENVILLE; AND I FOUND OUT WHEN I GOT TO CHARLESTON THAT MR. ROSEN AND MR. WALLACE AND MS. STERLING, AS SENATOR MCCONNELL AND MR. MARTIN KNOW, THEY CAN'T TRY CASES WITHIN SIX MONTHS IN CHARLESTON AND IT'S JUST A MATTER OF ALMOST A REGULAR THING THAT CASES GO BEYOND SIX MONTHS DOWN THERE AND I--IT WAS SOMETHING I HAD NEVER EXPERIENCED BEFORE. WE HAVE A NAVAL BASE DOWN THERE AND THEY GET SENT OUT OF THE COUNTRY FOR LONG TOURS AND INVARIABLY A MATTER WILL COME IN FRONT OF ME DAILY THAT THE MAN IS AT SEA; HE CAN'T COME TO TRIAL; THE CASE IS BEYOND SIX MONTHS; WILL YOU RESTORE IT? I HAVE TO DO THAT. AND I DO THAT ROUTINELY AS AN ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION. MR. ROSEN, AND THEY SAY, IT'S SUCH A COMPLICATED CASE THAT THERE'S NO WAY WE CAN TRY IT WITHIN SIX MONTHS. SENATOR MCCONNELL HAS CASES LIKE THAT. I ROUTINELY RESTORE THOSE CASES WITHOUT ANY HEARINGS, WITHOUT TAKING ANY EVIDENCE. IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, I SAID THE CASE CANNOT BE TRIED UNTIL THE MAN RECOVERS AND HE CAN COME TO STAND TRIAL. THAT'S AS I RECALL IT.
Q. THERE HAS BEEN A LOT MADE OF WHETHER THERE SHOULD BE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN AN ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER AND SOME MATTER THAT BEARS ON THE MERITS OF A CASE IN REGARDS TO COMMUNICATIONS THAT YOU MAY HAVE WITH COUNSEL. HOW DO YOU VIEW THAT AND WHAT GUIDELINES DO YOU FOLLOW AS FAR AS WHEN YOU DEEM IT APPROPRIATE OR INAPPROPRIATE TO HAVE EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS WITH COUNSEL ON AN ACTIVE FILE?
A. I DO NOT DISCUSS THE MERITS OF A CASE, THE SUBSTANTIVE MERITS OF THE CASE, WITH OTHER ATTORNEYS; ONLY ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS. AND MS. FABRI ALLUDED TO THE FACT THAT THERE IS A MATTER IN THE PROBATE COURT. AS I RECALL MY CONVERSATION WITH HAZEL FERRI, AND I DID HAVE A CONVERSATION WITH THAT LADY WHO WAS REPRESENTING MS. FABRI IN THE PROBATE COURT. I DON'T KNOW WHAT HAPPENED IN THE PROBATE COURT. I HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF THAT. I COMMENTED TO HER, I SAID, "THAT IS AN INTERESTING LEGAL QUESTION THAT I WOULD LIKE TO SEE DECIDED IN THE APPELLATE COURTS, WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDS FROM THAT LAWSUIT IS MARITAL PROPERTY." THOSE WERE MY COMMENTS, AS I RECALL THEM, TO MS. FERRI. I WILL NOT HEAR THE MERITS OF THAT CASE; NEVER INTENDED TO HEAR THAT CASE; NEVER INTENDED TO HEAR IT, PERIOD; AND I HAVEN'T HEARD IT. AND NO ONE--AND MY COMMENTS TO MS. FERRI WAS THAT IS AN INTERESTING LEGAL QUESTION. I AM FAMILIAR WITH THE LAW. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE THAT DECIDED IN THE APPELLATE COURTS." BECAUSE I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THE PROCEEDS OF THAT LAWSUIT IS MARITAL PROPERTY OR NOT. AND THOSE WERE MY COMMENTS TO MS. FERRIZ; NOTHING OTHER THAN THAT, AS I RECALL. MS. FABRI WAS NOT PRESENT. IT WAS JUST ME AND MS. FERRIZ, I BELIEVE.

MS. FABRI: THAT'S TRUE.
A. SHE AGREES WITH THAT.

THE REPORTER: I'M SORRY, I CAN'T HEAR.

Q. THIS WAS ALSO PART OF THE LAWSUIT, I MEAN?
A. THIS WAS ANOTHER LAWSUIT, SENATOR, IN REGARD TO WAGES, LOST WAGES AND OTHER MATTERS; NOT OUT OF THE AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT. IT WAS PENDING. IT WAS NOT--IT'S A REAL INTERESTING QUESTION, I THINK.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS?

Q. JUDGE I WANTED TO ASK YOU ABOUT THE REQUIRED VISITATION ORDER. THAT ORDER SAID THEY MUST COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER? DO YOU HAVE THAT ORDER?
A. NO, SIR.

SENATOR MARTIN: HE JUST LIFTED THE RESTRAINING ORDER.
Q. (BY SENATOR LOURIE) IS THAT ATTACHED TO MS. FABRI'S?
A. THE WIFE WANTED THE VISITATION. I DIDN'T--I DON'T--DIDN'T REQUIRE HER TO GO, SENATOR, AS I RECALL IT. I JUST PERMITTED HER TO GO IF SHE WANTED TO. SHE WANTED TO VISIT THE MAN IN THE HOSPITAL.

Q. JUDGE PATTERSON, WAS THAT A TEMPORARY ORDER ALREADY IN EFFECT BEFORE THE ACCIDENT? WAS THERE ANY TYPE OF AN ORDER IN EFFECT?
A. THERE WAS A RESTRAINING ORDER, I THINK.

MS. FABRI: YES.
A. THERE WAS A RETRAINING ORDER AGAINST EACH PARTY AND MS. FABRI WANTED ME TO ENFORCE THAT ORDER, I THINK, TO KEEP THEM AWAY FROM EACH OTHER.

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: THANK YOU, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS? JUDGE PATTERSON: MR. DAVID, WHO WAS INVOLVED IN THE HINTON CASE WILL ADDRESS THE HINTON MATTER AND MR. ANDREWS WHO WAS INVOLVED IN THE OTHER CASE, THOSE TWO MATTERS.

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: HAVE THEY SUBMITTED AFFIDAVITS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THEY HAVE.

JUDGE PATTERSON: I'M JUST RESPONDING TO HER AFFIDAVITS, SENATOR. JUST REAL BRIEFLY?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WELL, WHY DON'T WE TAKE ABOUT A 5-MINUTE BREAK. THERE'S NO SUCH THING AS A BRIEF WITNESS.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: I CALL THE COMMITTEE BACK TO ORDER. JUDGE, WHAT DO YOU SAY?

JUDGE PATTERSON: I WOULD LIKE FOR MR. ANDREWS TO SPEAK TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF CASES. HE SAID HE WOULD BE BRIEF, MR. CHAIRMAN, MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE.

(MARK OLIVER ANDREWS, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

Q. MR. ANDREWS, COULD YOU STATE YOUR FULL NAME SO WE CAN GET IT DOWN WITH THE COURT REPORTER.
A. YES. I'M MARK OLIVER ANDREWS AND I PRACTICE IN CHARLESTON AND I'M A MEMBER OF THE LAW FIRM OF ROSEN, ROSEN, AND HAGOOD. I'VE BEEN PRACTICING IN THE CHARLESTON AREA FOR 10 YEARS. I PASSED THE BAR IN 1980; AND DURING THAT PERIOD OF TIME I'VE SPENT THE MAJORITY OF MY PRACTICE IN THE FAMILY COURT. MOST OF THE MEMBERS IN MY FIRM, DIFFERENT THAN MANY FIRMS OF ANY SIZE, SPEND A LOT OF THEIR TIME IN PRACTICE IN THE FAMILY COURT; AND IN THE LAST 18 MONTHS I HAVE HAD MANY OPPORTUNITIES, BOTH IN CONTESTED MERITS HEARINGS AND TEMPORARY MATTERS AND RULES TO SHOW CAUSE AND D.S.S. MATTERS AND JUVENILE MATTERS OF MANY DIFFERENT NATURES TO APPEAR IN FRONT OF JUDGE PATTERSON AND I FEEL LIKE, WHILE I'M NOT GOING TO GO INTO ANY DETAIL, I WOULD LIKE TO FIRST ADDRESS THE SIMON VERSUS SIMON MATTER. I DO FEEL LIKE I HAVE A GOOD FEEL FOR THE PERCEPTION OF THE LOCAL BAR, THE LOCAL BAR'S PERCEPTION OF JUDGE PATTERSON, THEIR EXPERIENCES IN FRONT OF HIM, AND CERTAINLY THE MEMBERS OF MY FIRM. MR. DAVID PEARLMAN, AND YOU HAVE HIS AFFIDAVIT, CONTACTED ME, I BELIEVE, IN AUGUST--WELL, IT WAS MID OR LATE AUGUST OF THIS SUMMER, IN REFERENCE TO THE MATTER OF SIMON VERSUS SIMON AND THAT WAS ONE OF THE CASES MS. FABRI BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION A FEW MINUTES AGO. MR. PEARLMAN AND MS. FABRI HAD BEEN IN LITIGATION IN THAT MATTER AND PRESENTED THE FINAL SETTLEMENT FOR JUDGE PATTERSON IN JUNE. THE MATTER HAD BEEN SCHEDULED FOR A RULE TO SHOW CAUSE IN FRONT OF JUDGE CREECH; AND AS MR. PEARLMAN RELATED IT TO ME, WHEN THEY APPEARED ON THAT CASE BEFORE THE MATTER--THEY GOT INTO THE MERITS OF THE RULE TO SHOW CAUSE, AND MR. PEARLMAN'S CLIENT WAS THE MOVING PARTY, THE ONE THAT HAD SOUGHT THE RULE TO SHOW CAUSE. IT BASICALLY CAME DOWN TO A SHOUTING MATCH BETWEEN MS. FABRI AND MR. PEARLMAN AND ACCUSATIONS DIRECTED AT MR. PEARLMAN, OF HIM BEING A LIAR AND MISREPRESENTING THINGS TO THE COURT; AND AT THAT POINT MR. PEARLMAN STATED TO JUDGE CREECH THAT HE COULD NOT CONTINUE ON THE CASE, HE FELT LIKE, IN LIGHT OF OPPOSING COUNSEL, THAT HE MIGHT WELL BE A WITNESS. MS. FABRI SAID, WELL, I MAY BE A WITNESS, ALSO. AND SO, IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THAT IS WHY THAT CASE WAS CONTINUED AT THAT TIME TO BE RESCHEDULED. AN ORDER WAS ISSUED BY JUDGE CREECH DIRECTING EITHER PARTY TO RESCHEDULE THE HEARING. WHEN MR. PEARLMAN CONTACTED ME, MY RECOLLECTION IS IS THAT THE HEARING HAD BEEN SCHEDULED IN FRONT OF JUDGE PATTERSON; AND MY UNDERSTANDING AND MY RECOLLECTION OF THAT INITIAL CONVERSATION--AND TO BE TRUTHFUL, MY CONVERSATIONS WITH MR. PEARLMAN AT THAT POINT WERE BRIEF BECAUSE HE TOLD ME THAT HIS CLIENT DIDN'T HAVE A LOT OF MONEY, IT WAS HIS COUSIN, HE COULDN'T PAY ME MUCH OF ANYTHING IN TERMS OF THE FEE; THEY WANTED ME TO HANDLE THE CASE FOR THEM AND REPRESENT HIS INTEREST AND HIS CLIENT'S INTEREST IN THE RULE TO SHOW CAUSE; AND I ASKED DAVID IF HE WOULD, PLEASE, RESCHEDULE THE CASE AND LET ME KNOW WHEN THE FINAL HEARING WAS GOING TO BE IN ADVANCE ENOUGH SO THAT I COULD MEET WITH MY CLIENT AND MEET WITH HIM AND BE PREPARED. THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO EXPARTE COMMUNICATION BETWEEN MYSELF AND JUDGE PATTERSON AT ANY TIME INVOLVED IN THAT MATTER. MS. FABRI ALLUDED TO HER CONCERNS OR BELIEF, ALTHOUGH SHE SAID SHE HAD NO PROOF OR DIRECT KNOWLEDGE THAT THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS. THERE WAS CERTAINLY NONE ON MY PART. THE MATTER WAS SCHEDULED IN FRONT OF JUDGE PATTERSON. IT WAS THEN BROUGHT TO MY ATTENTION BY MR. PEARLMAN WHO CALLED ME AND SAID, "WELL, MS. FABRI, HAS RESCHEDULED THE HEARING DATE," AND CALLED ME TO LET ME KNOW SO THAT I COULD PUT IT ON MY CALENDAR. AND HE SAID, "IT'S IN FRONT OF JUDGE WILBURN." AND I SAID, WELL, I MEAN, FRANKLY THAT CAUSED ME SOME CONCERN THAT SHE HAD CHANGED THE PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED HEARING THAT WAS ORIGINALLY IN FRONT OF THE JUDGE THAT HAD TAKEN THE AGREEMENT AND WAS KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE BACKGROUND OF THE CASE; BUT BE THAT AS IT MAY, MR. PEARLMAN THEN, THERE IS NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT SOMEONE FROM HIS OFFICE, AND I THINK MS. FABRI IS ACCURATE ON THESE FACTS, WENT BACK TO THE CLERK OR TO THE SECRETARY AND HAD THE MATTER RESCHEDULED IN FRONT OF JUDGE PEARLMAN--EXCUSE ME--JUDGE PATTERSON. NOW THERE WAS A HEARING BEFORE THAT RULE TO SHOW CAUSE CAME BEFORE JUDGE PATTERSON. THERE WAS A PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE, IF YOU WILL, AT WHICH TIME BOTH MARGARET FABRI, DAVID PEARLMAN, MYSELF AND MS. POWELL WERE ALL PRESENT IN THE COURTROOM; AND THE MATTER ABOUT WHETHER IT SHOULD BE HEARD BY JUDGE WILBURN OR JUDGE PATTERSON WAS DISCUSSED AT THAT TIME. AND JUDGE PATTERSON'S COMMENTS, AS I RECALL THEM, OR THE THRUST WAS, YOU KNOW, "I WAS THE JUDGE THAT TOOK THE AGREEMENT. I CERTAINLY THINK THAT I CAN HEAR IT AND I'M NOT GOING TO BE IMPACTED. I MEAN, THERE HAS BEEN NO IMPROPER COMMUNICATIONS. IT'S SCHEDULED IN FRONT OF ME. WE'RE GOING FORWARD. I'M GOING TO HEAR THE CASE." HE HEARD THE CASE, AND I'M NOT GOING TO GET INTO THE ISSUES THAT WERE BEFORE THE COURT. MS. FABRI'S CLIENT HAD SOME PROBLEMS IN THAT CASE; I THINK IT WAS CERTAINLY A MERITORIOUS MATTER THAT WAS BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT BY MR. PEARLMAN; AND, IN FACT, HE DID PREVAIL. BUT THERE WERE NO EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS BY ME, MY FIRM, BY MR. PEARLMAN, AND I HAVE EVERY REASON TO BELIEVE THAT MS. FABRI IS JUST TOTALLY OFF THE WALL IN THAT ASSERTION. I SAT THERE, OF COURSE, EARLIER TODAY AND LISTENED TO THE COMMENTS MADE ABOUT JUDGE PATTERSON AND I FEEL COMPELLED AS A MEMBER OF THE CHARLESTON BAR AND AS A FRIEND OF JUDGE PATTERSON; I DIDN'T KNOW JUDGE PATTERSON BEFORE HE CAME DOWN TO CHARLESTON TO BE ASSIGNED AS ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE, ALTHOUGH I DID HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TRY A CASE IN FRONT OF HIM SOME TWO OR THREE YEARS AGO WHEN HE WAS BRIEFLY ASSIGNED DOWN THERE BUT HE WAS NOT THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE AT THAT TIME. I HAVE APPEARED IN FRONT OF HIM ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS; I HAVE NEVER SEEN HIM BE ABUSIVE TO ANY ATTORNEY, NOR TO ANY LITIGANT IN ANY OF THE MATTERS; AND SOME OF THEM WERE VERY HEATED LITIGATED MATTERS. THAT WOULD ASTOUND ME TO BELIEVE THAT HE WOULD ENGAGE IN SUCH BEHAVIOR. I'VE KNOWN HIM PERSONALLY SINCE HE HAS BEEN DOWN THERE TO BE A COURTEOUS GENTLEMAN AND INTELLIGENT JURIST; AND HE HAS HAD SOME COMPLICATED ISSUES. ONE OF THE WITNESSES EARLIER SUGGESTED THAT THE MATTERS IN FAMILY COURT ARE SIMPLE MATTERS; THAT IF HE CAN'T HANDLE THE MATTERS IN FAMILY COURT, THAT HE CERTAINTY WOULDN'T BE ABLE TO DO A PROPER JOB IN CIRCUIT COURT. AND I HANDLE A LOT OF SMALL-POTATO CASES; I HANDLE SOME COMPLICATED CASES, SOME CASES INVOLVING SUBSTANTIAL ASSETS AND OTHER ISSUES, CUSTODY ISSUES AND THINGS THAT REQUIRE NOT ONLY KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW BUT A SENSITIVITY TO THE ISSUES INVOLVED WITH THE LITIGANTS AND AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE IMPACT OF THE RULINGS ON ALL THE FAMILY MEMBERS. JUDGE PATTERSON, TO MY KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE, HAS ALWAYS DISCHARGED HIS RESPONSIBILITIES IN A CARING MANNER AND AN INTELLIGENT MANNER AND I'M JUST ASTOUNDED TO HEAR THE COMMENTS THAT I HAVE HEARD. MY PARTNERS, SOME OF THEM WANTED TO BE HERE TODAY; I KNOW MORRIS WANTED TO BE HERE, MORRIS ROSEN, AND HE COULD NOT BE; HE HAD TO BE IN THE HOSPITAL. I'M NOT HERE JUST AS THEIR MESSENGER. I'M HERE BECAUSE I BELIEVE THAT JUDGE PATTERSON IS ONE OF THE FINEST JUDGES I'VE EVER BEEN IN FRONT OF IN THE 10 YEARS I HAVE BEEN PRACTICING LAW AND I THINK THAT IT WOULD BE A REAL TRAVESTY FOR THIS COMMITTEE TO GET ANY OTHER MESSAGE THAN THAT HE HAS PROVEN HIMSELF WELL OVER THE YEARS THAT HE HAS BEEN PRACTICING AND BEEN ON THE BENCH IN SOUTH CAROLINA. AND, CERTAINLY, I CAN'T ADDRESS THE YEARS BEFORE THE TIME HE CAME TO CHARLESTON. MY WIFE IS A LAWYER IN CHARLESTON. SHE PRACTICES ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY IN THE FAMILY COURT. ONE OF THE BIGGEST CASE OF HER BRIEF CAREER WAS A CUSTODY MATTER. JUDGE PATTERSON WAS THE JUDGE AND RULED AGAINST HER. SHE CRIED FOR DAYS AND I CRIED FOR DAYS BECAUSE SHE WAS CRYING, AND IT WAS--BUT HE DID, I'M SURE, THE RIGHT THING AND HE DID THE HARD THING. HE RULES AGAINST HIS FRIENDS AND HE RULES FOR PEOPLE ON EITHER SIDE; IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE TO HIM AND I TRUST HIM TO DO WHAT IS RIGHT; AND I THINK THAT THE BAR WOULD BENEFIT GREATLY BY SEEING HIM ON ANY BENCH. I WOULD LIKE TO SEE HIM STAY IN THE FAMILY COURT, FRANKLY, BECAUSE I PRACTICE MORE IN FAMILY COURT THAN I DO IN CIRCUIT COURT; BUT HE WILL DO A FINE JOB WHEREVER HE IS. I WILL BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU.

SENATOR LOURIE: I WANT TO SAY TO THOSE WHO ARE INTERESTED THAT I HAVE HAD A DEATH OF A VERY CLOSE FRIEND AND I WILL HAVE TO TAKE LEAVE OF THE COMMITTEE. AS I UNDERSTAND IT, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE WILL DELIBERATE FURTHER BEFORE WE---

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: OBVIOUSLY, THIS PARTICULAR ONE, WE WILL WAIT UNTIL WE GET THE TRANSCRIPTS BEFORE WE MAKE A DECISION.

SENATOR LOURIE: EXCUSE ME, MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: YOU WILL LEAVE YOUR PROXY.

SENATOR LOURIE: I WILL.

JUDGE PATTERSON: I WOULD LIKE TO GET THIS BEHIND ME, MR. CHAIRMAN. I AM INTERESTED IN MOVING AS QUICKLY AS WE CAN. MR. DAVID HAS SOME INFORMATION IN REGARD TO THIS $38,000 SETTLEMENT, OR WHATEVER IT IS, THAT MAKES THIS HINTON VERSUS HINTON MATTER AND IT'S RESTORATION SO IMPORTANT. IF WE MIGHT COULD JUST ADDRESS THAT BRIEFLY.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ALL RIGHT, SIR.

(DAN MCARTHUR DAVID, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

A. MY FULL NAME IS DAN MCARTHUR DAVID. I AM A PRACTICING ATTORNEY IN CHARLESTON. I'VE BEEN THERE ABOUT 20 YEARS. I HAVE HAD THE PLEASURE OF APPEARING BEFORE THIS GENTLEMAN AS THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE IN CHARLESTON FOR 18 MONTHS. WE HAVE HAD A NUMBER OF THEM SINCE THEY HAVE STARTED CHIEF JUDGES. AS YOU ALL KNOW, THEY ARE SENT THERE TO MOVE CASES. WE ARE NOW ALL COMPUTER-ORIENTED AND SO WE ALL HAVE TO PAY ATTENTION TO HOW MANY CASES ARE THERE. IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THEY HAVE TO ANSWER TO PEOPLE UP THE LINE. BE THAT AS IT MAY, THE PARTICULAR CASE THAT WE ARE IN REFERENCE TO IS THE MATTER OF HINTON VERSUS HINTON, WHICH I CONSIDERED TO BE A VERY SIMPLE CASE. THE ISSUES WERE NOT COMPLEX. TO BEGIN WITH, THE GENTLEMAN WAS REPRESENTED PRO SE. HE WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN A WIFEBEATER. HE BEAT HIS WIFE ON OCCASIONS. AND THE YOUNG LADY WHO REPRESENTED MRS. HINTON DID NOT LIKE THAT AND REPRESENTED THE LADY VERY VIGOROUSLY. WE TOOK SOME DISCOVERY AND WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT A PARTICULAR LAWSUIT THAT THE WIFE HAD HELPED TO INSTITUTE AGAINST WESTVACO OR--EXCUSE ME--ALUMAX BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN TERMINATED. I BELIEVE THAT SHE PROVIDED SOME PAPERS TO THE ATTORNEY WHO WAS IN MS. FABRI'S OFFICE. AS THE CASE WAS GETTING READY FOR TRIAL AND AFTER DISCOVERY HAD BEEN TAKEN, MS. FABRI GOT INVOLVED IN IT. THIS WAS SOMETIME, I THINK, IN THE LATTER PART OF 1989. SHORTLY AFTER THERE WAS A TEMPORARY HEARING RESTRAINING HIM FROM GOING BACK OVER AND BEATING HER AGAIN. I BELIEVE THAT THE TESTIMONY WILL SHOW THAT HE, IN FACT, DID SO SHORTLY THEREAFTER. THAT IS HOW THE RESTRAINING ORDER GOT INTO THE FILE PREVENTING THESE PEOPLE FROM COMING TOGETHER. I WAS NOT PRESENT AT THE HEARING. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT I AM NOT THE ATTORNEY OF RECORD, ALTHOUGH I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER AT SOME LENGTH BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN SO HOTLY CONTESTED BY ALL THE PARTIES. BUT IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING THAT THE WIFE SIMPLY WANTED TO SEE HER HUSBAND BECAUSE SHE THOUGHT HE WAS GOING TO DIE. I DON'T KNOW THAT THAT IS SUCH AN UNREASONABLE REQUEST, NOTHING OTHER THAN TO GO IN THERE AND SEE HIM. I MEAN, SHE HAD SPENT A NUMBER OF YEARS WITH HIM. AS FAR AS EVERYBODY KNEW, HE WAS NOT GOING TO COME OUT OF THAT COMA. I DON'T KNOW, MAYBE THERE IS SOMETHING WRONG WITH THAT, BUT NOT IN MY MIND. THE PARTICULAR THING THAT IS OF IMPORTANCE IN THIS CASE TO OUR CLIENT IS, AS I POINTED OUT IN THIS LAWSUIT, IS A QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THERE IS EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION. THERE ARE A LOT OF CASES THAT WOULD INDICATE THAT IT IS; WE HAVE NEVER BEEN PROVIDED--EXCUSE ME--WE HAVE NEVER BEEN PROVIDED THE INFORMATION UNDER DISCOVERY OR ANYTHING ELSE AS TO THE AMOUNT OF MONEY THAT HAD BEEN OFFERED. IT'S OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT IN NOVEMBER OF 1989 THE AMOUNT OF MONEY HAD BEEN DETERMINED. IT WAS ONLY AS TO HOW IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATED, WHETHER OR NOT IT WOULD BE-- TAX CONSEQUENCES WOULD BE GIVEN TO IT. IT WAS A TOTAL OF $38,000. NOBODY EVER TOLD US THAT AT ANY TIME UNTIL THIS MATTER WAS PUT INTO THE PROBATE COURT AND THEY HAD TO MAKE A FILING. NOW THIS CASE HAS NOT BEEN TRIED AND I CERTAINLY DO NOT WANT TO TRY IT BEFORE YOU. BUT THE ONLY THING THAT I CAN SAY TO YOU IS THAT THERE ARE A LOT OF FAR-REACHING QUESTIONS, NOT ONLY AS TO THE ISSUES OF LAW THAT ARE INVOLVED, BUT AS TO THE ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF TIME THAT HAS BEEN PUT IN AND HAS RUN UP ATTORNEY'S FEES TO A LOT OF MONEY SIMPLY TRYING TO DISCOVER SOMETHING THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD A LONG TIME AGO. AND AS TO THE ISSUE OF GETTING THIS CASE SET, I THINK THAT A MOTION WAS FILED BY MS. BROWN GETTING THE CASE SET BACK BECAUSE MR. HINTON HAD BEEN CALLING HIS WIFE ON THE TELEPHONE FROM THE HOSPITAL, OR IT'S NOT A HOSPITAL; IT'S SOME TYPE OF TREATMENT CENTER IN GEORGIA, SAYING THAT HE WAS COMING BACK HOME AND DURING THEIR COURSE OF CONVERSATION, THEY WANTED TO GET THIS MATTER OVER WITH. SO SHE TOLD MS. BROWN AND MS. BROWN FILED A PETITION AND THE CASE WAS HEARD. MS. FABRI--EXCUSE ME, THE CASE WAS NOT HEARD. AN ORDER TO RESTORE PUT THE CASE BACK ON THE DOCKET. MS. BROWN FILED--EXCUSE ME--MS. FABRI FILED WHAT WAS KNOWN AS A MOTION TO VACATE OR A MOTION TO ELIMINATE OR A MOTION TO AMEND. AT THE TIME OF THE HEARING SHE DID NOT WANT THE CASE TO GO FORWARD FOR WHATEVER REASON. SHE WAS UPSET ABOUT THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION BEING HEARD AND SAID THAT SHE WAS UNFAIRLY PREJUDICED ABOUT IT. JUDGE PATTERSON BROUGHT TO HER ATTENTION THAT THE SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT THAT HAD BEEN FILED BACK IN JULY OF 1989 THAT ORIGINALLY STARTED THE CASE VERY SPECIFICALLY SAID, I THINK IN PARAGRAPH 9, THAT THE QUESTION OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION WAS FOR THE COURT TO CONSIDER. AND IN SOME OF THE HEARINGS THAT I HAVE BEEN PRESENT AT, THERE IS A REAL CONCERN AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE AMOUNT OF MONEY THAT IS BEING PAID OUT OF THE ASSETS IS SOMETHING THAT SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE COURT AS TO HOW IT'S GOING TO BE EQUITABLY DIVIDED. I DON'T KNOW OF ANYTHING THAT JUDGE PATTERSON HAS DONE WRONG IN THE CASE FROM WHAT I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO OBSERVE. THERE HAS BEEN NO EXPARTE AT ALL, OTHER THAN THE FACT THAT THE CASE WAS RESTORED. PRIOR TO HIS COMING, WHENEVER I HAD A PROBLEM WITH SOMEBODY BEING IN THE SERVICE, SOMEBODY BEING OUT OF TOWN, THE SIX MONTHS WAS GETTING READY TO RUN, I SIMPLY GOT AN ORDER TO RESTORE IT BACK OR EITHER I PAID ANOTHER FILING FEE AND THEY PUT THE CASE BACK ON THE DOCKET. I THINK THAT JUDGE PATTERSON PROPERLY EXPLAINED TO US AT ONE OF THE LITTLE SEMINARS THAT HE PUT ON FOR THE CHARLESTON COUNTY BAR, AND WENT OVER THE PARTICULAR RULE, THAT IF HE IS GOING TO SET THE CASE BACK, THAT HE'S GOT--IF HE'S GOING TO RESTORE IT TO THE DOCKET THAT HE HAS GOT TO GIVE A HEARING DATE. I COULD GO ON AND ON ABOUT THIS CASE. IT CONSUMES A VERY LARGE FILE. AS I SAY, IT--THE ISSUES WILL BE HEARD BY THE COURT. THEY ARE ON APPEAL. AS SOON AS THAT COMES BACK, I WOULD ASSUME THAT IT WILL BE HEARD. IT'S MY UNDERSTANDING NOW THAT MR. HINTON, WHILE HE DOES HAVE SOME VERY SERIOUS MEDICAL PROBLEMS, HE IS BACK IN SOUTH CAROLINA NOW. HE IS, I THINK, BACK AT HIS HOME WITH HIS MOTHER OR WHOMEVER. I STAND TO BE CORRECTED ON THAT, BUT THAT'S MY UNDERSTANDING. AS FAR AS--WELL, DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS THAT YOU WOULD LIKE TO ASK ME ABOUT THE CASE? I DON'T WANT (PAUSE).

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: SENATOR MCCONNELL.

Q. MR. DAVID, I GUESS THE QUESTION I'VE GOT IN LIGHT OF SOME PAST TESTIMONY, YOU SAY IT'S "HOTLY CONTESTED"; DO YOU MEAN ON THE ISSUES OR THAT THE LAWYERS--THE LAWYERS HAVE GOTTEN IN A CONFLICT WITH ONE ANOTHER? I MEAN, WHAT?
A. YES, SIR, UNFORTUNATELY THE ATTORNEYS HAVE GOTTEN INTO VERY SERIOUS CONFLICT WITH ONE ANOTHER. MS. BROWN, WHO WORKS IN MY OFFICE AND IS A VERY GOOD ATTORNEY, AS WELL AS MS. FABRI IS A VERY GOOD ATTORNEY, THEY--SOMEHOW OR ANOTHER THEY HAVE GOTTEN PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN THIS CASE. SHERRIE, MS. BROWN, WHENEVER SHE WENT TO TRY AND GET MRS. HINTON THE RIGHT TO SEE HER HUSBAND, WHO THEY THOUGHT WAS DYING IN THE HOSPITAL, DISCOVERED AFTER THE THING WAS OVER WITH WHEN SHE WALKS OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM, THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM, WHO IS--I THINK SHARES AN OFFICE WITH MARGARET, THEY WERE GOING TO SERVE A RULE TO SHOW CAUSE ON THIS LADY AND HAVE HER PUT IN JAIL FOR HAVING GONE UP TO THE HOSPITAL. SHERRIE GOT INCENSED ABOUT THAT. SHE HAS BEEN INCENSED ABOUT THE LACK OF PROVIDING DISCOVERABLE INFORMATION, SAYING, I THINK MS. FABRI HAS FILED A PETITION WITH THE COURT SAYING THAT THE QUESTION OF THE SETTLEMENT WAS SO VAGUE AND UNCERTAIN THAT SHE COULD NOT MAKE A DETERMINATION AND THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE BEFORE THE COURT, WHICH IS CERTAINLY SOMETHING TO BE ARGUED FROM A LEGAL STANDPOINT. BUT THEN WE COME TO FIND OUT THAT WHENEVER SHE TOOK THIS CASE IN NOVEMBER THAT SHE TOOK AN ASSIGNMENT OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE SETTLEMENT OF THIS CASE AS HER FEE, HOW SHE WAS GOING TO GET PAID. THEN WE FIND OUT THAT SOMEWHERE RIGHT ABOUT THE TIME THAT SHE TOOK THIS SETTLEMENT--TOOK THIS ASSIGNMENT, THAT THERE HAD BEEN AN OFFER OF, I THINK, SOME $38,000; AND EVERY TIME WE WOULD ASK THAT QUESTION, WE NEVER COULD GET AN ANSWER. THERE'S SOME MOTIONS TO COMPEL DISCOVERY AND THIS KIND OF STUFF. SO WHEN I SAY IT'S "HOTLY CONTESTED," I MEAN IT'S HOTLY CONTESTED. THE LEGAL ISSUES, IN MY OPINION, ARE FAIRLY SIMPLE. I MEAN, IT'S A MATTER OF LAW. THE JUDGE IS GOING TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT IT'S EQUITABLY DIVIDED. IF WE DON'T LIKE IT, THEN WE ARE GOING TO TAKE IT UP TO THE SUPREME COURT. AND I ASSUME THAT MARGARET IS GOING TO DO THE SAME THING. BUT IF YOU DON'T TELL US WHAT IT IS, THEN HOW ARE WE GOING TO GET IT TO THE COURT TO LET THE COURT KNOW. THAT'S WHAT I MEAN BY IT BEING HOTLY CONTESTED.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU.

JUDGE PATTERSON: REFEREEING THIS MATTER BETWEEN MS. FABRI AND MS. BROWN, I WOULD RATHER REFEREE THE-- THEY ARE REALLY REPRESENTING THEIR CLIENTS AND THEY HAVE GOTTEN PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN IT AND IT'S TOUGH TO HANDLE THOSE MATTERS; BUT MR. BRADLEY WAS INVOLVED IN THE OTHER CASE THAT MS. FABRI MENTIONED. WOULD YOU JUST BRIEFLY ADDRESS THAT?

MR. BRADLEY: YES, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MR. BRADLEY CERTAINLY NEEDS NO INTRODUCTION.

MR. BRADLEY: THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

Q. YOU MAY NOT NEED AN INTRODUCTION TO SOME OF THESE FOLKS, BUT YOU DO TO THE COURT REPORTER. A.
I'M JOHN D. BRADLEY, III. MR. CHAIRMAN, IF YOU WILL INDULGE ME FOR JUST A MOMENT BEFORE I ANSWER THAT PARTICULAR CASE, I CAN'T HELP BUT SAY ANYTHING ON BEHALF OF JUDGE PATTERSON. I, LIKEWISE, HAD NEVER HAD A CASE BEFORE HIM UNTIL HE CAME TO CHARLESTON AND SINCE HE HAS BEEN THERE HE HAS SERVED BOTH IN THE CIRCUIT COURT AND IN THE FAMILY COURT. AND I HAD A PHONE CONVERSATION WITH HIM YESTERDAY AND I SAID, "WELL, GEE, JUDGE, I THINK I HAVE ONLY GOT ABOUT A 50 PERCENT WIN WITH YOU; SO, I GOT MY CURIOSITY UP AND I LOOKED BACK THROUGH MY FILE AND I DON'T THINK I HAVE WON ONE YET. I THINK I WAS TOO GENEROUS THERE, JUDGE, AT "WON 50 PERCENT." YOU ASKED A QUESTION OF A WITNESS EARLIER ABOUT WHAT WAS HIS GENERAL REPUTATION AMONG THE BAR. I PRACTICED 19 YEARS IN CHARLESTON, MR. GENTRY; AND I DON'T EVER RECALL THERE BEING A JUDGE TO ADMINISTER ANY OF OUR COURTS, FAMILY, CRIMINAL, OR CIVIL THAT HAS BEEN AS PLEASANT TO WORK WITH AS JUDGE PATTERSON. I DON'T RECALL ANY JUDGE EVER BEING IN CHARLESTON THAT CREATED AS HARMONIOUS AN ATMOSPHERE AMONG THE ATTORNEYS IN RESOLVING CASES, IN SETTING CASES FOR SCHEDULES, PRE-TRIALS IN MY 19 YEARS AND I FEEL LIKE THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF THE LAWYERS FROM CHARLESTON FEEL THAT WAY. THERE ARE TWO OTHERS IN MY OFFICE THAT PRACTICE IN THE FAMILY COURT AND I SPOKE WITH BOTH OF THEM AND THEY FEEL THE SAME WAY. AFTER I TALKED WITH JUDGE PATTERSON YESTERDAY I EVEN CALLED SOME OTHER LAWYERS AND I SAID, "FELLOWS, GUESS WHAT I JUST HEARD?" AND EVERY ONE OF US WAS SHOCKED. HE HAS DONE A SPLENDID JOB IN CHARLESTON. WITH RESPECT TO THE--OH, ONE OTHER THING. I HAD--SOME PEOPLE CAME INTO MY OFFICE LAST WEEK, A MAN, AND HE WAS NOT HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS JUDGE PATTERSON HAD GIVEN HIM. WELL, OF COURSE, I'M ALWAYS HAPPY TO SEE A NEW CLIENT AND THIS CLIENT STARTED TELLING ME WHAT HAD HAPPENED AND HE PRODUCED A 47-PAGE ORDER. WELL, THEN I'M INTERESTED IN WHO THE LAWYERS ARE: ROBERT ROSEN AND ANN STERLING. AND I STARTED READING THIS 47-PAGE ORDER. AND I WAS ABLE TO COMPARE THE ORDER THAT WAS SUBMITTED TO JUDGE PATTERSON WITH THE ORDER JUDGE PATTERSON ISSUED. HE MUST HAVE MADE 75 CHANGES. THAT SAID A LOT TO JOHN, THAT A JUDGE WOULD TAKE THAT MUCH EFFORT, TIME, AND CONCERN WITH A CASE TO READ THROUGH THAT ORDER BEING SURE EVERYTHING WAS RIGHT. AND WHEN I READ THAT ORDER, I SAID, "FELLOW, YOU MAY NOT LIKE IT BUT I DON'T THINK THERE IS A THING YOU CAN DO. THERE IS NOTHING NOT COVERED IN A 47-PAGE ORDER." THE ONLY PERSON I KNOW CAN WRITE ORDERS THAT LONG--NOW I KNOW MR. ROSEN CAN--WAS MR. MCLAREN. WITH RESPECT TO THIS PARTICULAR CASE THAT THE JUDGE IS MENTIONING TO YOU TODAY THAT I WAS INVOLVED IN, YOU KNOW, NO DAY GOES BY YOU DON'T LEARN SOMETHING; AND YOU KNOW WHAT I LEARNED TODAY? I LEARNED THAT HAZEL FERRI IS MARGARET FABRI'S LAWYER. NOW YOU KNOW WHY THAT'S IMPORTANT TO ME? BECAUSE LAST WEEK IN THIS SAME CASE MS. FABRI MADE A MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT, SENATOR, OF A GUARDIAN AD LITEM AND GUESS WHO SHE RECOMMENDED BE APPOINTED? UH, HUH, MS. HAZEL FERRI, HER OWN LAWYER. BUT SHE DIDN'T TELL ME THAT. SHE DIDN'T TELL THE JUDGE THAT. THAT'S ALL I WANT TO SAY ABOUT MS. MARGARET FABRI; BUT I'M SURE GLAD I CAME TODAY AND LEARNED THAT. I THINK THAT GOES RIGHT TO THE HEART OF THE CREDIBILITY OF THAT WITNESS. AND WHEN SHE SAYS SOMETHING'S GOT TO LOOK RIGHT TO BE RIGHT AND BEING CRITICAL OF THIS MAN, YOU TELL ME THERE'S NOT SOMETHING WRONG WITH THAT? I WAS PRESENT IN COURT THAT DAY. IT'S A CASE WHERE THERE WAS A RULE TO SHOW CAUSE FOR A LADY INTERFERING WITH THE VISITATION OF A CHILD. THE LADY WAS PROPERLY SERVED. SHE DID NOT SHOW UP IN COURT. HER LAWYER DID NOT SHOW UP IN COURT. JUDGE PATTERSON HEARD THE RULE. MY CLIENT TESTIFIED. THE NORTH CHARLESTON POLICEMAN WHO WITNESSED THE WHOLE EVENT TESTIFIED. AND SHE WAS FOUND IN CONTEMPT OF COURT. SHE WAS FINED AND I WAS AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES. THEREAFTER, THE ORDER WAS SENT TO MS. FABRI. MS. FABRI THEN MADE A MOTION TO RECONSIDER THAT ORDER. SHE FILED THE MOTION ON DECEMBER THE 3RD; DID NOT SEE FIT TO SEND IT TO ME UNTIL DECEMBER 4TH AND THE HEARING IS SET FOR DECEMBER THE 5TH; BUT THAT'S ALL RIGHT. I CANCEL THINGS. I MAKE IT THERE. I AM THERE. AND WHEN WE WENT IN THE COURTROOM, IT WAS EXACTLY LIKE WHAT THE JUDGE SAID. HE ASKED, "WHAT IS THIS MATTER BEFORE US?" THE MATTER BEFORE US WAS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. MS. FABRI BEGAN TO SAY THAT IN THE CONTEMPT ORDER THIS LADY WAS SUPPOSED TO BE ARRESTED. WELL, THAT IS WHAT A CONTEMPT IS. I DON'T KNOW HOW ELSE YOU ARE GOING TO GET THEM IF YOU DON'T ORDER IT TO BE ARRESTED. AND HE SAID, "WELL, DO I HAVE TO ARREST HER? WON'T I HAVE TO ARREST HER?" IN A QUESTION FORM. AND WHEN HE DID, MS. FABRI SAID, "WELL, THAT GOES TO THE HEART OF MY MOTION TO RECONSIDER. I WANT TO RECONSIDER BECAUSE WE ARE MAINTAINING SHE WAS NEVER PROPERLY SERVED WITH THE RULE TO SHOW CAUSE." AND THE JUDGE SAYS, "ALL RIGHT," AND WE WENT AHEAD WITH THE HEARING. AND THE FIRST WITNESS CALLED WAS THE PROCESS SERVER AND HE TESTIFIED; AND THEN MS. FABRI'S CLIENT TESTIFIED; AND MS. FABRI'S CLIENT'S MAMA TESTIFIED. AND WHEN HE GOT THROUGH THE JUDGE SAID, "I BELIEVE THE PROCESS SERVER AND NOT MS. FABRI'S CLIENT OR FABRI'S CLIENT'S MAMA," AND THAT WAS THE END OF IT. I DIDN'T SEE A THING WRONG. THE JUDGE IS ENTITLED TO FIND OUT WHAT IS GOING ON IN FRONT OF HIM. I'M JUST AMAZED THAT THAT HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO YOU AS A COMPLAINT. THAT FASCINATES ME. IF I CAN ANSWER ANYTHING, I'M GLAD TO DO THAT. I APPRECIATE YOUR TIME.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MR. BRADLEY, IT'S ALWAYS A PLEASURE TO SEE YOU.

MR. BRADLEY: THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

MS. FABRI: MR. CHAIRMAN, SINCE THIS ATTACK IS DIRECTED AT ME, I WOULD LIKE TO BRIEFLY RESPOND. I DON'T WANT TO KEEP THIS COMMITTEE ANY LATER BUT AT SOME POINT WE HAVE STARTED SCREENING MARGARET FABRI INSTEAD OF JUDGE LARRY PATTERSON IN THIS HEARING. I FIND THAT VERY OFFENSIVE. I DON'T WANT TO TAKE UP THE COMMITTEE'S TIME IN RESPONDING TO IT. ESPECIALLY THE ISSUE OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM; THERE WERE FOUR THAT WERE PROPOSED TO MR. BRADLEY. HE DID NOT WANT ANY GUARDIAN AD LITEM. JUDGE MENDEL RIVERS ORDERED MS. FERRI. I DID NOT CHOOSE HER. BUT I FIND IT VERY OFFENSIVE THAT SOMEHOW THIS HEARING HAS NOW BECOME AN ATTACK ON ME INSTEAD OF THE ISSUE AND THAT'S CALLED AD HOMINEM. I THINK WE ALL REMEMBER THAT FROM LAW SCHOOL. IF YOU CAN'T ATTACK THE ISSUE, YOU ATTACK THE PERSON. THANK YOU. MR. DAVID: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: YES, SIR.

MR. DAVID: I NEGLECTED TO ADD A COUPLE OF THINGS.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ALL RIGHT, SIR, COME ON UP.

MR. WOOD: MR. CHAIRMAN, IN AS MUCH AS MR. DAVID WISHES TO SUPPLEMENT HIS RESPONSES, SIR, I, TOO, WISH TO SUPPLEMENT MINE IN AS MUCH AS THERE WERE QUITE A FEW ALLEGATIONS CONCERNING DISCOVERY. IF YOU ALLOW MR. DAVID TO SUPPLEMENT HIS TESTIMONY, THE SAME COURTESY SHOULD BE EXTENDED TO ME, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ALL RIGHT, SIR. MR. DAVID, YOU CAN HAVE A COUPLE OF MINUTES AND THEN WE WILL CERTAINLY EXTEND THE SAME PRIVILEGE TO MR. WOOD.

MR. DAVID: THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. I SAT DOWN AFTER ONLY ANSWERING THE QUESTIONS THAT PERTAIN TO THIS PARTICULAR LAWSUIT. I, TOO, WOULD LIKE TO ADD THAT IN MY OPINION JUDGE PATTERSON HAS BEEN AN EXEMPLARY JUDGE IN CHARLESTON. HE HAS HAD SOME SEMINARS WHICH I FOUND VERY HELPFUL THAT HE TALKED ABOUT ETHICS. HE TALKED ABOUT SOME OF THE NEW RULES AND NEW THINGS THAT ARE GOING ON IN THE FAMILY COURT. I WILL TELL YOU ONE STORY THAT SAYS A LOT ABOUT THE MAN. A GOOD FRIEND OF MINE WHO DOES NOTHING BUT DOMESTIC LITIGATION IN THIS STATE, AND IN MY OPINION ONE OF THE BETTER ONES, FROM SOME PLACE OTHER THAN CHARLESTON, WAS TRYING A CASE BEFORE HIM IN HIS HOMETOWN. AND THE RESULTS CAME BACK, WHAT MY CLIENT OR WHAT MY FRIEND CONSIDERED TO BE VERY FAIR. HE SAID OF JUDGE PATTERSON, HE SAID THAT HE RULED ON THE LAW AS IT WAS PRESENTED TO HIM AND THAT HE DID NOT "HOMETOWN" ME; MEANING THAT IT DIDN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE WHO HE WAS, THAT WHENEVER HE HEARD THOSE FACTS OF THAT CASE, HE RULED ON THEM AS THEY WERE PRESENTED TO HIM. THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: MR. WOOD.

MR. WOOD: THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: I'M GOING TO BEND IN ORDER TO GIVE YOU JUST AN OPPORTUNITY BUT, PLEASE, KEEP IT VERY BRIEF.

MR. WOOD: VERY BRIEFLY, YOUR HONOR. IN RESPONSE BASICALLY TO MR. DAVID'S STATEMENT ABOUT JUDGE PATTERSON RULING ON THE LAW, I HAD ONE CASE, RUDY VERSUS RUDY; THE GROUNDS OF THAT DIVORCE WAS HABITUAL DRUG USE. I TOOK THE DEPOSITION PURSUANT TO COURT ORDER OF THE DEFENDANT, MR. RUDY, IN THAT CASE AND I ASKED HIM POINTBLANK UNDER OATH, "WHO HAVE YOU RECEIVED YOUR DRUGS FROM?" THERE WERE ALLEGATIONS THAT HE WAS AN HABITUAL COCAINE USER. HIS FIRST RESPONSE WAS THAT THEY WERE GIVEN TO HIM. THE SECOND RESPONSE WAS THAT HE PURCHASED THEM. AND THEN WHEN ASKED WHO HE HAD PURCHASED THEM FROM OVER THE COURSE OF YEARS, "I DON'T REMEMBER." I ASKED HIM IF IT WAS A MAN OR WOMAN, BLACK OR WHITE, OR THE CHARACTERISTICS ABOUT THEM. HIS RESPONSE, AND THE TESTIMONY IN THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE DEPOSITION, WAS TAKEN TO JUDGE PATTERSON WAS, "ER, UH, I'M NOT GOING TO DO THAT TO TELL YOU THE TRUTH HERE." I IMMEDIATELY SUSPENDED THE DEPOSITION AND I FILED A MOTION TO COMPEL HIM TO ANSWER. WE WENT BEFORE JUDGE PATTERSON. JUDGE PATTERSON ASKED OF ME AT THE MOTION TO COMPEL, "WHAT DO YOU WANT ME TO DO, MR. WOOD?" I SAID, "YOUR HONOR, I WANT YOU TO MAKE HIM TELL ME WHO SELLS HIM COCAINE." HE SAID, "MR. WOOD, I CAN'T DO THAT BECAUSE IF I DO THAT, WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO WITH IT?" I SAID, "YOUR HONOR, I'M GOING TO SUBPOENA HIM TO THE FINAL HEARING ON THE MERITS." HE SAID, "WELL, THEN IF YOU PUT HIM ON THE STAND, MR. WOOD, I HAVE TO AT THAT POINT ORDER THAT HE BE ARRESTED AND HELD OVER FOR DISTRIBUTION OF COCAINE." WHEREUPON, I ASKED JUDGE PATTERSON, "I DON'T SEE ANYTHING WRONG WITH THAT." IF WE'RE GOING TO TALK ABOUT JUDGE PATTERSON'S APPLICATION OF THE LAW, JUDGE PATTERSON WAS PRESENTED WITH SWORN TESTIMONY AT A MOTION TO COMPEL. THE GENTLEMAN KNEW THE NAME OF WHOEVER HE WAS BUYING HIS COCAINE FROM. JUDGE PATTERSON REFUSED TO GIVE THAT DISCOVERY ANY IMPORT WHATSOEVER. THAT IS THE CONCLUSION OF MY SUPPLEMENTATION, YOUR HONOR, OR MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU. JUDGE, DO YOU WANT TO RESPOND TO THAT? I THINK WE ALL SEE THE OBVIOUS.

JUDGE PATTERSON: I DON'T REMEMBER IT. I DON'T RECOLLECT THAT WELL ENOUGH TO RESPOND TO IT.

MR. WOOD: IF IT WOULD HELP, MR. CHAIRMAN, THE OPPOSING COUNSEL IN THAT WAS ROBERT PAPA. THAT HEARING TOOK PLACE ROUGHLY IN AUGUST OF 1989 BECAUSE THE FINAL HEARING WAS IN NOVEMBER OF 1989. JUDGE PATTERSON: MY RECOLLECTION WAS THE MAN SAID AT THE TRIAL THAT HE DIDN'T REMEMBER. I DON'T KNOW. I CAN'T RESPOND TO THAT.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ALL RIGHT, LET'S--THERE IS ONE MORE WITNESS, I BELIEVE.

MR. BATES: MR. ANTHONY O'NEILL. HE'S BEEN WAITING VERY PATIENTLY ALL DAY.

THE REPORTER: MR. CHAIRMAN, I NEED TO CHANGE MY PAPER VERY QUICKLY.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: OKAY; HOLD ON. (PAUSE.)

THE REPORTER: THANK YOU.

(ANTHONY B. O'NEILL, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

MR. O'NEILL: MR. CHAIRMAN, MY NAME IS ANTHONY O'NEILL. I'M A MEMBER OF THE CHARLESTON COUNTY BAR. I WAS ADMITTED IN 1975. I'M A SOLE PRACTITIONER. FOR ABOUT SEVEN YEARS I WAS A MAGISTRATE IN CHARLESTON COUNTY. FOR ABOUT THREE YEARS I SERVED AS A JUDGE OF THE SMALL CLAIMS COURT. I DON'T HAVE AN EXTENSIVE PRACTICE IN THE FAMILY COURT BUT I GUESS I CAN CHARACTERIZE IT AS HAVING MORE THAN A FEW CASES. I HAVE BEEN PROBABLY RULED AGAINST AT LEAST AS MANY TIMES AS MY CLIENTS HAVE BEEN RULED IN FAVOR OF. I DON'T TAKE THINGS LIKE THAT PERSONALLY. I DON'T GET PAID TO TAKE THEM HOME WITH ME AT NIGHT, SO I TRY TO LEAVE MY CLIENTS' BUSINESS AT THE OFFICE. MR. WOOD SAID IN HIS OPENING REMARKS THAT WE HAD PICKED A FIGHT WITH JUDGE PATTERSON. WELL, I DON'T COME HERE TO PICK A FIGHT WITH JUDGE PATTERSON. I AM JUST INTERESTED IN FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TREATMENT WHEN I APPEAR IN A COURT WHERE JUDGE PATTERSON PRESIDES. IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE THAT FAIRNESS AND IMPARTIALITY IS NOT THE HALLMARK OF JUDGE PATTERSON'S COURTROOM. I HAVE TWO CASES DOWN HERE THAT I CITED IN MY AFFIDAVIT. YOU KNOW, THE FIRST ONE, I THINK I HAVE REALLY SAID ALL I NEED TO SAY IN THE AFFIDAVIT. ON THE SECOND ONE, THIS WAS A CASE INVOLVING A DIVORCE WHICH TOOK PLACE IN 1984. I DID NOT REPRESENT EITHER OF THE PARTIES TO THAT ACTION AT THAT TIME. IN FACT, I CAME ON TO THIS RATHER LATE IN THE PROCEEDINGS. BUT IN 1989 THE WIFE BROUGHT AN ACTION FOR RULE TO SHOW CAUSE AGAINST HER EX-HUSBAND AND HIS MOTHER IN THE FAMILY COURT OF CHARLESTON BEFORE JUDGE PATTERSON. THE GIST OF THAT ACTION WAS THAT IN 1984 AT THE TIME THESE PARTIES WERE DIVORCED, THE HUSBAND, WHO HAD BEEN DIAGNOSED AS HAVING CANCER, WAS--THERE WERE SEVERAL QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT HE WOULD SURVIVE. THEY DIDN'T THINK HE WOULD SURVIVE AND SO RECOGNIZED--AND THEY HAD CHILDREN AND THEY AGREED ON CHILD SUPPORT AND SOME OTHER THINGS. THEY RECOGNIZED IN THAT DECREE THAT THE WIFE WAS ENTITLED TO ALIMONY BUT BECAUSE OF HIS UNCERTAIN MEDICAL CONDITION, NO PERIODIC PAYMENTS WOULD THEN BE MADE; BUT THEY SET UP A MECHANISM WHEREBY SHE WOULD HAVE SECURITY. IT'S A STRANGE KIND OF DECREE, I ASSURE YOU. BUT SHE WOULD HAVE SECURITY FOR HER CLAIM TO ALIMONY IN THE EVENT OF HIS DEMISE. AND WHAT THEY DID IN THAT DECREE WAS TO SAY, OKAY, YOU ARE ENTITLED TO ALIMONY. NOW SINCE I MAY DIE, WHAT I'M GOING TO DO IS MY MAMA AND I ARE GOING TO AGREE THAT WE SHOULD CONVEY THE MARITAL HOME TO YOU TO BE HELD IN TRUST; AND THEN IF I DIE, YOU WILL HAVE THE MARITAL HOME AS YOUR ALIMONY. IF, HOWEVER, MY MEDICAL CONDITION IMPROVES, THEN YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO COME BACK TO COURT AND WE CAN HAVE A LIFE ESTATE IN THE MARITAL RESIDENCE AND SEE WHETHER OR NOT YOU ARE ENTITLED TO PERIODIC PAYMENTS. THEY HAD SOME OTHER PROVISIONS IN THERE WHERE SHE, IF SHE WERE TO MOVE IN WITH ANOTHER MAN OR REMARRY, HOW THEY WOULD HANDLE IT. MY CLIENT SURVIVED AND, LIKE I SAID, IN 1989, AN ACTION WAS BROUGHT TO HOLD HIM AND HIS MOTHER IN CONTEMPT. NOW IT'S IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT IN 1984, HIS MOTHER WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE ACTION, WAS NOT EVEN A WITNESS IN THE COURTROOM, DID NOT COME ANYWHERE NEAR THE COURTROOM, AS BEST WE CAN DETERMINE. THIS ACTION WAS BROUGHT BY PAT WISE REPRESENTING THE WIFE. AT THE FIRST HEARING ON DECEMBER 11TH RIGHT AT THE OUTSET, MS. WISE MADE HER REPRESENTATIONS TO THE COURT AND I RESPONDED THAT, YOU KNOW, WE ARE HERE ON A RULE TO SHOW CAUSE; YOU CANNOT HOLD THIS MAN IN CONTEMPT BECAUSE HE CANNOT COMPLY. THE PROPERTY DOES NOT BELONG TO HIM. THE PROPERTY WAS TITLED IN HIS MOTHER'S NAME AND THEY HAD JUST BEEN LIVING THERE. MS. PATTERSON URGED--MS. WISE URGED JUDGE PATTERSON TO HOLD HER IN CONTEMPT ANYWAY AND HE RESISTED THAT; AND I AGREED HE MADE A FINE DECISION BUT THERE, THAT'S THE END OF ANY AGREEMENT I HAVE HAD WITH JUDGE PATTERSON EVER SINCE. EARLY-ON--WE NEVER TOOK ANY TESTIMONY IN THIS CASE EXCEPT FOR THE TESTIMONY OF AN APPRAISER. WE HAD FOUR HEARINGS IN HERE AND THERE WAS NEVER ANY TESTIMONY TAKEN. AND IT'S IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE JUDGE MADE NUMEROUS FINDINGS OF FACT WITHOUT HAVING ANY RECORD ON WHICH TO BASE THESE FACTS. I ALLEGED IN MY AFFIDAVIT THAT THE JUDGE MADE A DETERMINATION WITHOUT TAKING ANY TESTIMONY THAT MY CLIENT WAS TRYING TO BACK OUT OF AN AGREEMENT. NOW HOW DO YOU MAKE THAT KIND OF DETERMINATION IF YOU DON'T HAVE SOME RECORD TO SO FIND? YOU CAN'T DO IT. THE JUDGE WENT ON AND MADE FINDINGS LIKE, IT'S YOUR CLIENT'S FAULT THAT WE ARE IN COURT TODAY. IT CAN'T BE SAID TO BE THE WIFE'S FAULT. AND, AGAIN, WE HAVE NO TESTIMONY ON WHICH TO BASE THAT KIND OF A DECISION. HE STATED STUFF LIKE, HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS LITIGATION. THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT. IF HE HAD ABIDED BY THE DECREE, IT'S AS MUCH HIS FAULT AS THE FAULT OF HIS ATTORNEY. HE ENTERED INTO THE AGREEMENT, HE IS GOING TO LIVE UP TO THE AGREEMENT. THE DECREE ITSELF SET FORTH A MECHANISM WHERE IN THE EVENT THAT THE MEDICAL CONDITION IMPROVED THE BURDEN WAS ON THE WIFE TO BRING AN ACTION AND SHE WOULD HAVE TO SHOW THAT THE MEDICAL CONDITION HAD IMPROVED AND THEN SHE COULD PROCEED TO SEE WHETHER OR NOT SHE WAS ENTITLED TO PERIODIC ALIMONY. THE JUDGE DECIDES, WELL, YOU KNOW, YOU'VE GOT A TECHNICAL WAY TO GET THE MOTHER OUT OF THE CONTEMPT CITATION BECAUSE SHE WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE ACTION BUT YOUR MAN AIN'T GOING TO BACK OUT OF THIS. WHEN WE MADE AN OFFER FOR SOME MEDICAL TESTIMONY, THE JUDGE JUST OUT OF HAND REJECTED THAT. HE SAID, I DON'T NEED IT. I WILL GO AHEAD AND RULE. THIS THING HAS BEEN LITIGATED. IT WAS LITIGATED BACK IN 1984. I CAN'T RELITIGATE IT. AND THAT HAS BEEN HIS APPROACH THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF THESE FOUR HEARINGS; AND NO TESTIMONY TO THIS DAY HAS EVER BEEN TAKEN. JUDGE PATTERSON MADE A FINDING THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD TO BE ABIDED BY BECAUSE THE LAWYERS WHO NEGOTIATED THE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO THE AGREEMENT IN GOOD FAITH; BUT I JUST ASK: WHERE IS THE TESTIMONY? I SUBMITTED THE TRANSCRIPTS BECAUSE YOU ALMOST HAVE TO READ THE TRANSCRIPT TO GET THE FEEL OF THE COMPLAINT THAT I HAVE. VIRTUALLY EVERY TIME I ATTEMPTED TO MAKE AN OBJECTION THE JUDGE WOULD INTERRUPT MY OBJECTIONS SO MUCH SO THAT I CAME OUT OF THE COURT AND ASKED MY BUDDY, I SAID, "TELL ME WHO WAS MY ADVERSARY IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE? I KNOW I'VE GOT MS. WISE AS THE ATTORNEY OF RECORD." I SAID, "BUT I'M RUNNING INTO MORE TROUBLE FROM JUDGE PATTERSON." AND THAT'S BEEN THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS. THE JUDGE RULED IN THE INITIAL HEARING THAT THE HUSBAND'S WIFE COULDN'T BE HELD IN CONTEMPT BECAUSE SHE WAS NOT A PARTY; YET, IN HIS ORDER, IN HIS FINAL ORDER, AFTER RECOGNIZING THAT THE PROPERTY THAT WAS IN QUESTION BELONGED TO THE MOTHER OF MY CLIENT, HE CONCLUDES THAT THE WIFE HAS A RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO RESIDE IN THE MARITAL HOME. NOW ON THE ONE HAND HE SAYS, "I HAVE NO JURISDICTION WHATSOEVER TO ORDER THIS LADY TO DO ANYTHING. I CAN'T FIND HER IN CONTEMPT. I'M GOING TO HAVE TO JUST LET HER GO AND I'M GOING TO DISMISS HER AS A PARTY DEFENDANT." AND ON THE OTHER HAND HE SAYS, "WELL, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT I DON'T HAVE ANY JURISDICTION OVER HER, I'M GOING TO CONTINUE TO ORDER THAT THE WIFE CAN LIVE IN HER HOME UNTIL THIS MATTER IS RESOLVED." AND HE DIDN'T HAVE JURISDICTION TO DO THAT. THE JUDGE MADE OTHER FINDINGS, SUCH AS HE MUST---

Q. EXCUSE ME, MR. O'NEILL, CAN YOU POINT TO US IN THE RECORD WHERE HE ADMITTED NOT HAVING JURISDICTION AND THEN MAKING A RULING?
A. YES, SIR. LET ME GET THE RECORD. (PAUSE.) IF YOU LOOK AT THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARING DATED DECEMBER IT'S ONLY A FEW PAGES. I THINK ON PAGE 11 STARTING AT LINE 16 WHERE HE RECOGNIZES THAT SHE WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE ACTION AND THEN, LET'S SEE, GOING ON OVER ON SOME OTHER PAGES. LINE 13 HE TALKS ABOUT "THAT LADY" REFERRING TO THE HUSBAND'S MOTHER. "THAT LADY HAS GOT A TECHNICAL WAY FOR ME NOT TO HAVE TO HOLD HER IN CONTEMPT BUT YOUR CLIENT AGREED TO IT AND HE IS BOUND BY THE AGREEMENT." LINE 13 OR PAGE 13, LINE 23, "THE RULE AS TO ANNA BELL RICHARDSON IS DISMISSED BECAUSE WE DIDN'T HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER HER. SHE DIDN'T PARTICIPATE IN THE FIRST HEARING." THAT'S WHEN HE RULED THAT HE DIDN'T HAVE JURISDICTION. AND I DIRECT YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FINAL ORDER. WELL, IT MIGHT BE THE NEXT TO THE FINAL ORDER BECAUSE THERE WERE TWO FINAL ORDERS, WHICH IS ANOTHER BONE OF CONTENTION WITH ME. IT'S AN ORDER DATED AUGUST 9TH.
Q. DID YOU SEND IN A COPY OF THAT WITH YOUR PACKAGE?
A. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER I DID OR NOT. I KNEW THAT I HAD SENT IN THE TRANSCRIPTS.
Q. ALL RIGHT.
A. BUT ANYWAY, IT GOES ON IN THAT ORDER TO SAY THAT SHE CONTINUED TO LIVE IN THE RESIDENCE.
Q. I'M SORRY TO INTERRUPT YOU. GO AHEAD.
A. THAT'S ALL RIGHT. WHAT I FINALLY CONCLUDED IS THAT FOR SOME UNEXPLAINED REASON, I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THE JUDGE EXHIBITED SOME ANIMOSITY TOWARDS ME OR MY CLIENT, BUT IT BECAME OBVIOUS AS THESE HEARINGS PROGRESSED THAT ANY TIME WE TRIED TO MAKE A POINT OR MAKE AN OBJECTION FOR THE RECORD, WE RAN INTO AN INTERRUPTION ON BEHALF OF THE JUDGE; SO MUCH SO THAT I FINALLY SAID, "LOOK, JUDGE, I KNOW I'M NOT AS SMART AS YOU. I HAVE GOT TO PRESENT THE CASE MY OWN WAY." AND AT THAT POINT HE LET ME GO FORWARD AND FINALLY PUT THE THINGS ON THE RECORD THAT I FELT WERE IMPORTANT. THE OTHER THING, TOO, IS--I HOPE I'M NOT, YOU KNOW, GIVING THE IMPRESSION OF BEING THIN-SKINNED BECAUSE IT'S VERY, VERY HARD TO HURT MY FEELINGS. BUT I HAVE FOUND IN MY DEALINGS WITH JUDGE PATTERSON THAT THERE'S ALMOST AN ATMOSPHERE CREATED IN THE COURTROOM WHERE I KNOW THAT I AM JUST NOT GOING TO GET A FAIR SHAKE. I MEAN, I KNOW, I FEEL IT. I SEE IT IN THE LITTLE--HE MAKES A RULING AND HIS POSITION IS, HE SAYS, "THAT IS MY RULING." AND I SEE IT IN THE SMILES THAT HE WILL GIVE AFTER HE WILL RULE IN A CASE, YOU KNOW, IN OPPOSITION TO YOUR PARTICULAR POINT OF VIEW. IT'S JUST THAT--AND I THINK I TOLD HIM ON THE RECORD IN THIS CASE THAT THINGS WEREN'T GOING RIGHT, THEY DIDN'T LOOK RIGHT, AND THEY DIDN'T FEEL RIGHT. AND THE OTHER THING, AND THIS IS THE FINAL THING I'M GOING TO SAY IS, I MAKE AN ALLEGATION OF THE APPEARANCE OF EXPARTE COMMUNICATIONS. I THINK JUDGE PATTERSON IS PROBABLY SMART ENOUGH WHERE IT'S GOING TO BE VERY DIFFICULT TO FIND CLEAR AND CONVINCING PROOF. AND I DON'T EVEN KNOW WHAT THE STANDARD IS BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE. ALL I'M INTERESTED IN IS BEING TREATED FAIRLY. BUT ON ONE OCCASION EARLY IN THE HEARING, THE JUDGE MADE A--ASKED THE ADVERSARY, I THINK MADE A STATEMENT, "THERE ARE TWO THINGS THAT WE NEED TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT IN THIS ORDER." WHAT ARE THOSE TWO THINGS? WELL, NOBODY HAD EVER DISCUSSED ANY TWO THINGS, AT LEAST NOT IN MY PRESENCE. ANOTHER TIME THERE IS AN INDICATION IN THE TRANSCRIPT, THE JUDGE-- I THINK WE WENT TO THE LAST HEARING AND I SAID, "JUDGE, I'M CONFUSED AS TO WHY WE ARE HERE BECAUSE THE LAST TIME YOU ANNOUNCED THAT YOU WOULD ISSUE AN ORDER AND EVERYTHING WOULD HAVE BEEN DECIDED SAVING EXCEPT THE VALUE OF THE MARITAL HOME; THAT I COULD APPEAL THAT AND THEN BASED ON THE APPEAL THE COURT WOULD TAKE IT UP AND MAKE A DECISION ON THE VALUE OF THE MARITAL HOME." HIS RESPONSE WAS, "WELL, I THINK YOU AND MS. WISE AND I DISCUSSED THAT ON THE TELEPHONE." AND I REMINDED HIM THAT I HAD NO SUCH DISCUSSION, THAT I WASN'T PRIVY TO ANYTHING LIKE THAT. AND, ALSO, IN THE NEXT TO THE LAST HEARING THE JUDGE ANNOUNCED--AFTER HE ANNOUNCED THAT AND I WAS WAITING FOR THE ORDER TO COME DOWN AND THE ORDER CAME DOWN SETTING FOR ANOTHER HEARING FOR THE PURPOSE OF SETTING UP--TAKING TESTIMONY ON THE VALUE OF THE MARITAL RESIDENCE. NOW I DIDN'T PREPARE THE ORDER. I SUSPECT THAT THE JUDGE DIDN'T EITHER; SO, THERE MUST HAVE BEEN SOME CORRESPONDENCE GOING ON. I MEAN, THAT IS WHAT I CONCLUDED. AND I TOLD HIM THEN THAT IT DIDN'T LOOK RIGHT AND IT DIDN'T FEEL RIGHT, AND THAT IS THE POSITION I TAKE THIS AFTERNOON.
Q. WHAT WAS THE FINAL DISPOSITION OF THE RICHARDSON CASE THAT YOU INCLUDED IN THE TRANSCRIPT FOR?
A. I FILED AN APPEAL AND IT'S PENDING.
Q. THE APPEAL IS PENDING NOW?
A. YES, SIR.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY OTHER MEMBER HAVE QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU, MR. O'NEILL.
A. MR. CHAIRMAN, THANK YOU.

JUDGE PATTERSON: MR. CHAIRMAN, AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I HAVE NOTHING BUT THE HIGHEST RESPECT FOR MR. O'NEILL AND, AGAIN--WELL, I'M GOING TO RESPOND TO THIS. I'M TRYING TO RECALL IT AS BEST I CAN. I HAD A LOT OF BACK AND FORTH DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. O'NEILL BECAUSE I LIKE TO DO THAT IN THE COURTROOM AND I WANTED TO GET HIS THOUGHTS AND FEELINGS ABOUT THIS CASE. THIS WAS A CASE WHERE EVERYTHING WAS SETTLED TOTALLY, ABSOLUTELY, AND COMPLETELY IN 1984. THE CASE WAS OVER AND ENDED AND THERE WAS A FINAL ORDER THAT RECOGNIZED ALIMONY. IT SETTLED ALL THE PROPERTY DISPUTES. IT SETTLED THE CUSTODY. IT SETTLED THE PERSONAL PROPERTY. IT SETTLED EVERYTHING. AND I WAS HAVING A LITTLE STRUGGLE AND IN THE COURTROOM THESE MATTERS COME UP UNEXPECTEDLY. WE DON'T HAVE TIME TO REVIEW EVERY FILE IN EVERY CASE; AND I LIKE TO ENGAGE IN AN EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE ATTORNEYS AND GET THEIR FEELINGS, KIND OF LIKE IN AN APPELLATE COURT ACTION: WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THIS? WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THIS? AND I WAS KIND OF REASONING THROUGH THIS 1984 ORDER WHERE MR. TANENBAUM AND MR. KEVIN HOLMES HAD REPRESENTED THESE PEOPLE, HAD ENTERED INTO A DETAILED AGREEMENT AND SETTLEMENT WHICH HAD BEEN APPROVED BY JUDGE BRIDGES. THIS CASE WAS DECIDED AND OVER WITH. MS. WISE BROUGHT THE ACTION ON AN ORDER AND RULE AND MR. O'NEILL AND I DID AGREE THAT THE MOTHER WAS NOT A PARTY TO THE ACTION. BACK IN 1984 MR. HOLMES AND MR. TANENBAUM--YOU KNOW, THE LAW IN FAMILY COURT EVOLVED RATHER QUICKLY AND IT'S CHANGED BECAUSE OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION AND I WAS STRUGGLING WITH HOW TO CONCLUDE THIS CASE. THEY RECOGNIZED ALIMONY WAS PROPER. THE WIFE HAD A CHOICE. AND ACCORDING TO THE ORDER, THE MOTHER AND THE SON AGREED TO CONVEY THE HOUSE TO THE WIFE AND SHE HAS BEEN LIVING IN IT FOR SIX YEARS. THE ATTORNEYS AND THE PEOPLE JUST NEVER HAD GOTTEN AROUND TO GETTING THE DEED AND WINDING THIS CASE UP. FINALLY SIX YEARS LATER MS. WISE BROUGHT AN ACTION TO TRY TO GET THIS RESOLVED. THE MAN HAD RECOVERED FROM HIS CANCER, AND IS A LONGSHOREMAN WITH SUFFICIENT INCOME TO PAY MR. O'NEILL HIS FEE, I'M SURE. MR. O'NEILL IS A FINE GENTLEMAN. I HAVE NO ARGUMENTS. HE HAS BEEN RESPECTFUL TO ME AND I HOPE I HAVE BEEN TO HIM. AND I RESPECT HIS ABILITIES AS AN ATTORNEY. AND WHEN HE WALKS IN THE COURT, I KNOW HE HAS A MERITORIOUS CASE. I DID NOT BELIEVE THAT I COULD GO BACK IN AND RETRY THIS CASE WHICH HAD BEEN COMPLETELY AND ABSOLUTELY SETTLED IN '84 BY TWO FINE ATTORNEYS WHO STILL PRACTICE IN THE CHARLESTON BAR. I'M STUCK WITH THAT ORDER AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THAT ORDER; MY DECISION WAS THEY HAD AGREED ON ALIMONY AND IT WAS THE VALUE OF THAT HOUSE. SHE, MS. WISE, PRESENTED AN APPRAISER AND I RECONVENED IT TO GIVE MR. O'NEILL THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT AN APPRAISER SO I COULD DETERMINE WHAT THE ALIMONY WAS. I MADE THE LEGAL DECISION; I ENGAGED IN DEBATE WITH MR. O'NEILL AND MS. WISE, OR ATTEMPTED TO, TO HELP ME REASON THAT THING OUT; ISSUED MY ORDER. AND I THINK I RULED FROM THE BENCH IN ALL THESE MATTERS. IS THAT NOT TRUE, MR. O'NEILL?

MR. O'NEILL: EXCEPT FOR RESCHEDULING THE HEARING.

JUDGE PATTERSON: OKAY; I RULED FROM THE BENCH ON THE MERITS AND AFTER DISCUSSING IT FULLY WITH THE ATTORNEYS. MY RULINGS WERE RIGHT THERE IN THE COURTROOM AFTER HEARING ARGUMENTS FROM BOTH SIDES EXCEPT FOR RESCHEDULING THE HEARING. HE'S GOT IT ON APPEAL. IT'S A LEGITIMATE ISSUE FOR APPEAL FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THAT ORDER AND IT'S JUST UP TO THE APPELLATE COURT TO TELL ME WHETHER I WAS RIGHT OR WRONG. I HAVE BEEN REVERSED BEFORE AND I HAVE BEEN AFFIRMED. AND I HAVE THE HIGHEST RESPECT FOR MR. O'NEILL AND HE MAY PREVAIL IN THIS CASE AND HE IS AN EXCELLENT LAWYER AND HE DID A GOOD JOB IN THIS CASE. I HAVE NO QUARRELS WITH THAT AT ALL.

MR. BATES: NO QUESTIONS.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ANY MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE QUESTIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN: NO, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU. THAT CONCLUDES THE--

JUDGE PATTERSON: MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE JUST HAD SOME LAWYERS DRIVE DOWN FROM GREENVILLE JUST AS CHARACTER WITNESSES AND I HATE FOR THEM TO HAVE TO MAKE A TRIP AGAIN. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER YOU WANT TO---

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: I WONDER IF YOU WOULD CONSIDER SUBMITTING THEIR WHATEVER THEY MIGHT HAVE TO SAY BY AFFIDAVIT? DOES THAT OFFEND ANYONE?

JUDGE PATTERSON: MR. MULLINAX; MR. MARION PRACTICES WITH MR. CARTER AND JEFF SMITH AND THAT FIRM. MR. PAT PASCHAL DOES A GREAT DEAL OF DOMESTIC WORK AND PRACTICES BEFORE ME IN CIRCUIT COURT. REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WELL, IT'S LATE. WE ARE NOT GOING TO MAKE A DECISION TONIGHT. IN THIS CASE WE WILL, OF COURSE, GET THE TRANSCRIPTS. WE WILL HAVE FURTHER HEARINGS NEXT WEEK OR IN THE NEAR FUTURE ON AT LEAST MR. JOHNSON WHO HAS APPLIED FOR ANOTHER JUDGESHIP. IF YOU THINK THESE GENTLEMEN CAN BE HEARD IN A BRIEF PERIOD OF TIME, WE CAN HEAR FROM THEM, IF THAT BE THE WILL OF THE COMMITTEE, OR WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO RECEIVE THEIR COMMENTS BY AFFIDAVIT.

MR. NORFLEET: MR. CHAIRMAN, AGAIN, I'M NOT HERE ON BEHALF OF MR. BAILEY; I'M NOT HIS ATTORNEY AND I'M NOT HERE IN HIS STEAD; BUT I HAVE BEEN IN COMMUNICATION WITH HIM TODAY. AS YOU UNDERSTAND, HE HAD A CONFLICT IN FEDERAL COURT AND HE HAS ASKED ME TO AT LEAST CONVEY THE QUESTION OF WHETHER HE WILL BE PERMITTED TO TESTIFY AT A LATER TIME.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WE WILL---

MR. NORFLEET: OR AT LEAST TO CONVEY--I'M NOT ASKING YOU TO ANSWER MY QUESTION BUT HE DID ASK ME TO CONVEY TO Y'ALL THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO TESTIFY, THAT HE FEELS THAT IT'S VERY IMPORTANT AND THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SUPPLEMENT THE AFFIDAVIT THAT HE SUBMITTED TO YOU. THAT'S ALL.

JUDGE PATTERSON: MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH MR. BAILEY'S AFFIDAVIT. I HAVE KNOWN FOR MONTHS NOW THAT MR. BAILEY WAS GOING TO FILE THIS ACTION. THIS IS A PERSONAL CASE PRETTY MUCH WITH HIS. HE HAS NEVER TRIED ANY LITIGATED MATTERS IN FRONT OF ME AND THAT'S THE REASON MR. MCLAREN AND MR. LESTER IS HERE. THIS NOTICE WENT OUT ON NOVEMBER THE 14TH. I WOULD LIKE TO GET THIS MATTER BEHIND ME AND THERE IS A DEADLINE FOR ALL WITNESSES WHO ARE GOING TO TESTIFY AS OF DECEMBER THE 7TH AND MR. BAILEY FILED HIS AFFIDAVIT. I HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH MR. BAILEY. I JUST--ANY OTHER WITNESSES THAT WOULD WANT TO TESTIFY, I THINK SHOULD HAVE HAD TO HAVE MET THAT DEADLINE.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WELL, SIR, THE DEADLINE IS ESTABLISHED. MR. BAILEY WILL IN ALL LIKELIHOOD BE HEARD.

JUDGE PATTERSON: YES, SIR, THAT WILL BE FINE.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: BUT I'M NOT GOING TO OPEN THE DOOR FOR ANYTHING ELSE. IF SOME ISSUE THAT STRIKES THE COMMITTEE, THAT IT WANTS TO EXPLORE INTO, NOW WE HAVE THE---

JUDGE PATTERSON: YES, SIR, I UNDERSTAND.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ---PREROGATIVE ON OUR OWN INITIATIVE TO SEEK ANY WITNESSES. BUT UNTIL THE COMMITTEE DECIDES THAT, WE WILL LIMIT ANY FURTHER TESTIMONY TO MR. BAILEY. I DON'T WANT THESE GENTLEMEN TO HAVE TO MAKE ANOTHER TRIP. I DON'T MIND HEARING THEM BUT THE HOUR IS LATE. WE ARE ALL TIRED AND THIS HAS BEEN A LONG DAY AND WE AREN'T AS ABLE TO STAND LONG DAYS OF HEARINGS AS JUDGES AND SOME OF YOU TRIAL LAWYERS. AT LEAST I'M NOT. BUT IF YOU THINK YOU CAN HANDLE IT IN JUST A FEW MINUTES, WE WILL HEAR THEM; AND IF YOU CAN SUBMIT IT BY AFFIDAVIT, WE WILL DO IT THAT WAY. I WOULD LIKE TO GET IT CLOSED DOWN TONIGHT IF WE POSSIBLY CAN WITH THE EXCEPTION OF MR. BAILEY.

JUDGE PATTERSON: YES, SIR.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: PLEASE, IDENTIFY YOURSELF.

MR. MARION: MY NAME IS JEFFREY MARION AND I'M A LAWYER FROM GREENVILLE.

(JEFFREY MARION, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

MR. MARION: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, THE THREE OF US RECEIVED NOTIFICATION THIS MORNING THAT IT WAS APPARENT THERE WAS SOME OPPOSITION TO JUDGE PATTERSON. WE CAME DOWN HERE ON VERY SHORT NOTICE, I GUESS, TO GIVE THE SENTIMENT OF THE GREENVILLE BAR. THERE WAS A QUESTION ASKED OF SOME OF THE LAWYERS FROM CHARLESTON, WHAT WAS JUDGE PATTERSON'S REPUTATION? I DON'T KNOW WHAT IT WAS IN CHARLESTON. I DO KNOW THAT BEFORE THE GREENVILLE BAR THAT IT'S EXCELLENT. HE IS A COMPASSIONATE MAN AND THAT'S ONE THING I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE. MS. FABRI OR ONE OF THE PEOPLE FROM CHARLESTON SEEMED TO IMPLY THAT HE DIDN'T CARE ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED IN CUSTODY CASES; HE DIDN'T CARE ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED WHEN THE SUPPORT WASN'T PAID. THAT IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE IN MY EXPERIENCE. HE DOES CARE. HE IS A CARING MAN. THE IMPLICATION SEEMED TO BE THAT HE WAS STUPID, THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW THE MOST ELEMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW. THAT'S NOT TRUE. I THINK JUDGE PATTERSON IS PROBABLY RECOGNIZED BY MOST LAWYERS AS ONE OF THE MORE LEADERS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIELD OF EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION. MOST MAJOR CASES ARE HIS. HE HAS A GREAT INTELLECTUAL CURIOSITY. HE IS A FINE JUDGE IN FAMILY COURT. FRANKLY, I THINK THE ISSUES BEFORE THE FAMILY COURT QUITE OFTEN ARE MORE IMPORTANT THAN BEFORE THE CIRCUIT COURT AND HE HAS DEMONSTRATED AN ABILITY TO HANDLE THOSE DIFFICULT ISSUES AND I'M SATISFIED THAT HE CAN HANDLE THEM BEFORE THE CIRCUIT COURT. I SPEAK NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF BUT THE MEMBERS OF MY FIRM WHO WERE PRESENT AND ALL OF WHOM WANTED TO BE HERE, BUT I CAME AS A REPRESENTATIVE AND I AM GLAD TO DO TO SO, AND WE ALL SUPPORT JUDGE PATTERSON COMPLETELY. THANK YOU.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU.

MR. MULLINAX: MR. CHAIRMAN, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, MY NAME IS WALLY MULLINAX.

(WALLY MULLINAX, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

MR. MULLINAX: I HAVE BEEN PRACTICING IN GREENVILLE FOR ABOUT 10 YEARS NOW. MY PRIMARY EMPHASIS IS FAMILY LAW. I PRACTICE WITH HORTON, DRAWDY, WARD & JOHNSON IN GREENVILLE. I SPEAK ON BEHALF OF OUR LAW FIRM AND ON BEHALF OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BAR IN GREENVILLE. I HAVE SAT AND LISTENED TO WHAT THESE FOLKS HAVE HAD TO SAY TODAY AND TRIED TO MAKE A COUPLE OF NOTES. IT SEEMS THEY HAVE A PROBLEM WITH EXPARTE ORDERS ISSUED BY JUDGE PATTERSON. I CAN'T THINK OF AN INSTANCE IN THE 10 YEARS THAT I HAVE PRACTICED IN HIS COURT WHERE AN EXPARTE ORDER ON ANY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE WAS EVER ISSUED. IT SEEMS TO ME WHAT THEY ARE ARGUING ABOUT IS AN ORDER OF CONTINUANCE HERE, AN ORDER OF RESTORATION THERE. AT LEAST THE WAY WE DO IT IN GREENVILLE, IF YOU SEND DOWN A MOTION AND AN ORDER FOR A CONTINUANCE, IT'S EITHER GRANTED OR DENIED. THERE IS NOT A HEARING ON IT. WHETHER IT BE JUDGE PATTERSON, OR JUDGE WARD, OR JUDGE JOHNSON, THEY READ IT AND THEY EITHER SAY DENIED" OR THEY SAY "GRANTED" AND THEY GIVE YOU A HEARING DATE. AN ORDER RESTORING A CASE, AGAIN, IF YOU'VE GOT A DECENT REASON FOR RESTORING THE CASE, IT GETS RESTORED. IF YOU DON'T, YOU DON'T. I MEAN, THEY ARE THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE. HE WAS ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE FOR MANY, MANY MONTHS; IN FACT, TWO YEARS, I GUESS. JUDGE PATTERSON: EIGHT YEARS.

MR. MULLINAX: EIGHT YEARS. AND, YOU KNOW, YOU GO TO HIM AND HE DENIES THEM OR HE GRANTS THEM. IF ITS OVER SIX MONTHS, IT'S DENIED. THERE WASN'T REALLY A WHOLE LOT OF ARGUMENT TO IT. I THOUGHT THE REASON THAT THE COURT SENT JUDGE PATTERSON TO CHARLESTON WAS BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T KNOW HOW TO TRY A CASE IN SIX MONTHS; SO, THEY SENT HIM DOWN THERE TO TEACH THE ONES DOWN THERE WHAT HE HAD TAUGHT US, I GUESS FROM THE TIME I STARTED PRACTICING. THEY SAID HE IS RUDE TO ATTORNEYS AND I CAN'T POSSIBLY--THEY SAY THAT BUT THEN NONE OF THEM ACTUALLY GOT UP AND GAVE YOU ONE INSTANCE OF WHERE HE HAS BEEN RUDE TO THEM AND THEY ARE COMPLAINING ABOUT HIM. I CAN'T THINK OF ONE TIME WHEN HE HAS BEEN RUDE TO ANYBODY IN MY PRESENCE. HE HAS CERTAINLY NEVER BEEN RUDE TO ME. WHEN I FIRST STARTED PRACTICING HE WAS NEVER RUDE TO ME WHEN I DIDN'T KNOW WHAT I WAS DOING IN A COURTROOM. NOW HE WOULD GIVE ME SOME CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM FROM TIME TO TIME, WHICH I APPRECIATED; BUT AS FAR AS BEING RUDE, I CAN'T SEE WHERE HE HAS EVER BEEN RUDE TO LAWYERS OR LITIGANTS OR WITNESSES. I CAN THINK OF SOME OTHERS THAT HAVE, BUT CERTAINLY NOT JUDGE PATTERSON. THEY COMPLAINED THAT HE TALKS TO LITIGANTS. I CAN'T THINK OF ONE FAMILY COURT JUDGE IN 10 YEARS OF PRACTICE IN THE FAMILY COURTS THAT HASN'T HAD SOME COMMENT TO MAKE TO THE LITIGANTS AT SOME POINT OR ANOTHER, BUT ESPECIALLY IF THE LITIGANTS CAN'T AFFORD TO BE SEPARATED. AND IF THE JUDGE CAN'T TELL THEM THAT, THEN WHO CAN? THE LAWYER IS CERTAINLY NOT GOING TO DO THAT AND IF THAT MAKES HIM UNQUALIFIED TO SERVE ON THE CIRCUIT COURT BENCH, I GUESS WE'VE ALL GOT A PROBLEM. THEY SAY HE HAS NO LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND THEY ARGUE ABOUT JURISDICTION. AND I WILL BE REAL QUICK. I HAD ONE CASE WHERE THE MOTHER WAS HERE. THERE WERE TWO CHILDREN. THE HUSBAND HAD RUN OFF AND IN FOUR YEARS--SHE DOESN'T SEE THE KIDS FOR TWO YEARS. HE ENDS UP OUT IN LAS VEGAS. THERE'S AN ARGUMENT BECAUSE HE HAD RUN OFF WITH THE KIDS--EXCUSE ME--HE HAD RUN OFF WITH THE KIDS AND WE ARE TRYING TO FIND THEM--AS WHERE WE ARE GOING TO HAVE JURISDICTION, IF IT WAS GOING TO GO UP IN NEVADA; IF IT'S GOING TO GO UP HERE. HE READS MEMOS FROM BOTH SIDES AND DECIDES RIGHT OFF IMMEDIATELY. IT WASN'T ANY SITTING BACK TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHAT HE WAS GOING TO DO AND IT WAS EVENTUALLY THE LAW OF THE CASE IN THAT PARTICULAR CASE. THEY SAY HE IS NOT QUALIFIED IN CIVIL MATTERS; YET, WHILE HE IS DOWN IN CHARLESTON, THEY HAVE THE FIRST CASES TO CONSTRUE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE COASTAL MANAGEMENT ACT IN THIS STATE AND HE IS THE ONLY JUDGE DOWN THERE WHO WON'T RECUSE HIMSELF FROM HEARING THE CASES; AND, SO, THEY PULL HIM UP FROM FAMILY COURT TO HEAR THESE CASES IN NON-JURY CIRCUIT COURT. AND THESE FOLKS SAY OVER HERE THAT HE IS NOT QUALIFIED IN CIVIL MATTERS. I DON'T--IF THE PURPOSE OF THIS IS TO DETERMINE WHETHER HE IS QUALIFIED TO BE ON THE CIRCUIT COURT BENCH, I BELIEVE HE HAS PROBABLY HELD MORE CIRCUIT COURT THAN ANY FAMILY COURT JUDGE SITTING ON THE FAMILY COURT BENCH. AND HE IS DEFINITELY ONE OF THE MOST COMPASSIONATE FAMILY COURT JUDGES THAT YOU WILL EVER APPEAR IN FRONT OF. HE CERTAINLY DOESN'T RULE ON WHETHER HE LIKES THE LAWYER OR NOT. IN FACT, LOTS OF TIMES HE IS GOING TO RULE AGAINST YOU WHEN YOU THINK YOU'VE GOT A REASONABLE CASE BECAUSE HE STARTS LISTENING TO THESE FOLKS AND DECIDES THE CASE BASED ON WHAT HE FEELS IS RIGHT; NOT WHAT YOU OR THE OTHER SIDE FEELS IS RIGHT. THAT'S REALLY ALL I HAVE TO SAY, BUT I JUST WANTED TO COME AND SHOW OUR SUPPORT.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU:

(PAT PASCHAL, FIRST BEING DULY SWORN BY REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS, TESTIFIES AS FOLLOWS:)

MR. PASCHAL: MR. CHAIRMAN, MY NAME IS PAT PASCHAL AND I'M ALSO FROM GREENVILLE. I WAS ADMITTED TO THE BAR IN 1979. I WAS ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER THERE FOR TWO YEARS AND AS ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER APPEARED BEFORE JUDGE PATTERSON ON CRIMINAL MATTERS. I HAVE SINCE THEN APPEARED BEFORE HIM IN BOTH DOMESTIC COURT AND CIVIL MATTERS BEFORE IN CIRCUIT COURT, NON-JURY, WHICH HE HAS HELD MANY IN GREENVILLE. I WANT TO BE VERY BRIEF AND POINT OUT JUST A COUPLE OF CASES. I AM ALARMED THIS MORNING THAT SOMEONE WOULD ACCUSE JUDGE PATTERSON OF LACKING IN THE ABILITY TO BE IMPARTIAL AND TO BE FAIR. FOUR YEARS AGO I WAS APPOINTED IN A DEATH PENALTY CASE WITH A DEFENDANT THAT WAS CHARGED WITH THE MURDER OF A POLICE OFFICER IN GREENVILLE. IT WAS WITH A CO-DEFENDANT, ALSO. WE WERE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE THROUGH COMPLICATED NEGOTIATIONS; AND MY CLIENT NOT ONLY DID NOT HAVE TO FACE THE DEATH PENALTY, DID NOT HAVE TO FACE THE MURDER CHARGE EITHER. HE PLED GUILTY TO ARMED ROBBERY. AFTER THAT, A YEAR AFTER THAT HE FILED FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF. THIS PARTICULAR DEFENDANT HAD A GREAT DEAL OF CELEBRITY IN THE STATE AND THERE WAS ALL THE REASON IN THE WORLD--HE WAS A VERY UNPOPULAR PERSON. JUDGE PATTERSON WAS CONFRONTED WITH--IF EVER HE WAS CONFRONTED TO BE AN EXPARTE, TO BE UNFAIR OR LACK IMPARTIALITY, IT WOULD BE THAT CASE. I PERSONALLY WITNESSED THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, THE SOLICITOR'S OFFICE, AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE COMMUNITY AT SOME TIMES CLAIMING TO BE ON MY BEHALF ATTEMPTING TO EXPARTE HIM AND ATTEMPTING TO GET AN ATMOSPHERE OF THE "OLD BOY" NETWORK. HE WITHSTOOD EVERY EFFORT THAT WAS DONE IN THAT REGARD AND GAVE THIS PERSON, WHO BY EVERYONE'S ADMISSION WAS PROBABLY ONE OF THE MOST UNPOPULAR CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS IN THE COUNTY OF GREENVILLE, WHO BY HIS OWN ADMISSION WAS INVOLVED WITH THE ARMED ROBBERY AND THE MURDER OF A POLICE OFFICER, AND GAVE THIS MAN A FAIR TRIAL AND LISTENED TO WHAT HE SAID AND JUDGED HIS CREDIBILITY WITH EVERYONE ELSE'S THAT WE HAD. AND IT'S NOT ONLY IN THOSE CASES BUT IN THE CRIMINAL CASES, THAT AS A JUVENILE, I HAVE SEEN HIM TAKE THOSE TYPE OF STEPS TO MAKE SURE THERE WAS A FAIR TRIAL. I'VE ALSO COME IN FRONT OF HIM IN A NON-JURY WITH A COMPLICATED PARTNERSHIP CASE WITH A WIDOW WHO HAD SOME SOCIAL STANDING IN THE CITY OF GREENVILLE, WHO, I WAS AFRAID BECAUSE OF HER SOCIAL STANDING THAT MY CLIENTS WOULD NOT BE TREATED FAIRLY. HE GUARDED AGAINST THAT AND MADE SURE HE WAS IMPARTIAL. SUBSEQUENT TO THAT I WAS CONTACTED BY LAWYERS IN CHARLESTON ABOUT A POST CONVICTION RELIEF IN A DEATH PENALTY CASE BECAUSE OF MY INVOLVEMENT. I THINK I MENTIONED I WAS INVOLVED WITH SEVEN DEATH PENALTY CASES IN THE COUNTY OF GREENVILLE. THEY WERE GOING TO TRY TO GET OUT OF APPEARING IN FRONT OF JUDGE PATTERSON BECAUSE THEY WANTED TO KNOW IF HE WAS CAPABLE OF BEING IMPARTIAL AND THEY WANTED TO KNOW WHAT HE WAS PREDISPOSED TO DO. I SAID I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT HIS PREDISPOSITION IS OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM. I HAVE A FEELING THAT IF HE IS CONFRONTED WITH SENTENCING THAT HE IS GOING TO BE STERN. AFTER SOMEONE HAS BEEN GIVEN A FAIR TRIAL AND IS FOUND GUILTY, HE'S GOING TO BE VERY STERN IN THE SENTENCING BUT WHEN IT COMES TO GOING IN THAT COURTROOM AND BEING FAIR, THERE IS NO QUESTION IN MY MIND THAT YOU CANNOT HAVE A BETTER JUDGE IN THIS STATE THAT'S GOING TO BE FOR MORE FAIR AND MORE IMPARTIAL TO EACH ONE OF THE LITIGANTS, NO MATTER WHO THEY ARE AND NO MATTER WHAT THEIR POPULARITY IS. AND LET ME JUST ADD ONE OTHER THING. I HAVE NO SOCIAL, CHURCH, RELIGIOUS, BUSINESS, FRIENDSHIP OR OTHER ORGANIZATION OR OTHER CONNECTION WITH JUDGE PATTERSON; BUT AFTER HE RULES IN THE CASE, AND I MENTIONED TO MR. MULLINAX, YOU COULD NOT HAVE A MORE FAIR JUDGE. IF YOU HAVE GOT LAWYERS WHO ARE PREPARED AND ALL THEY WANT IS A FAIR TRIAL, THEY ARE GOING TO GET ONE FROM JUDGE PATTERSON. WHEN THE CALLS WENT OUT THIS MORNING, THEY CALLED THAT IN ON ME; THEY SAID YOU SAID THIS, NOW COME FORWARD AND SAY IT. AND THAT'S WHY I'M HERE BECAUSE I FEEL LIKE I HAVE A DUTY BECAUSE I DID SAY THAT. HE HAS BEEN CRITICIZED FOR THE ONE THING THAT I THINK IS HIS GREATEST VIRTUE AND THAT'S IMPARTIALITY; AND I THINK I WOULD HAVE SHIRKED MY DUTY AS A CITIZEN IF I HAD NOT ANSWERED THAT CALL AND COME DOWN HERE AND RELATED THIS TO YOU. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THANK YOU.

JUDGE PATTERSON: I JUST WANT TO THANK THEM FOR COMING. I DIDN'T ASK THEM TO COME. THEY JUST CAME ON THEIR OWN. I PERSONALLY DO NOT WANT TO RETRY MR. BAILEY'S CASE BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE. MR. MCLAREN IS HERE AND MR. LESTER IS HERE. THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM, LEE ROBINSON WILL HAVE TO BE HERE. THE OTHER ATTORNEY, MR. JEFFERDS WILL HAVE TO BE HERE. SERIOUS ALLEGATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE, ALLEGATIONS OF FALSE AFFIDAVITS AND A NUMBER OF THINGS. THAT CASE WAS SETTLED FRIDAY AFTERNOON COMPLETELY. JUDGE NESS PARTICIPATED IN THAT; HIS FIRM, JUSTICE NESS REPRESENTED MR. BAILEY. MR. MCLAREN AND MR. JEFFERDS REPRESENTED THE OTHER SIDE. MR. LESTER IS INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH THE CASE BECAUSE HE TRIED TO ARBITRATE IT AND BRING IT TO SETTLEMENT BECAUSE HE KNEW ALL THE PARTIES INVOLVED. THE CASE IS OVER AND NOTHING--ALL I DID WAS HAVE A TEMPORARY HEARING. JUDGE MCLEOD HAD HEARD THE FINAL CASE. I WOULD HOPE THAT THIS WOULD CONCLUDE THE HEARING AND HOPEFULLY WE WOULD NOT HAVE TO RETRY MR. BAILEY'S CASE AND GO INTO SOME OF THESE MATTERS. IT WOULD BE QUITE TOUCHY; AND IF HE WANTS TO APPEAR, I WILL BE HERE. MR. CHAIRMAN, I APPRECIATE YOUR CONSIDERATION; MY FRIENDS FROM GREENVILLE. AND THE
ONES FROM CHARLESTON, I HARBOR NO ILL FEELINGS TOWARD THOSE PEOPLE WHO HAVE COME AND SPOKEN TODAY ABOUT DECISIONS THAT I MADE IN THEIR CASES. I WOULD REFER YOU TO THE AFFIDAVIT OF MR. SAVAGE AND THE NICE LETTERS THAT I GOT THAT ARE IN THE FILE, PARTICULARLY THE ATTORNEYS THAT I PRACTICED WITH FOR SO MANY YEARS, THE FIRM OF LOVE, THORNTON, ARNOLD & THOMASON; BILL HAGOOD, THERON COCHRAN AND THOSE PEOPLE. OTHER THAN THAT, MR. CHAIRMAN, I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING ELSE TO OFFER. THANK YOU.

MR. ANDREWS: MR. CHAIRMAN, ONE THING WE DO HAVE ARE AFFIDAVITS THAT WERE BROUGHT IN WHILE WE WERE IN THE PROCESS FROM MR. J.D. TODD AND ALSO LEE ROBINSON AND I PASS THOSE UP FOR THE RECORD.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: WE WILL RECEIVE THOSE AFFIDAVITS. WE WILL BE IN RECESS. OBVIOUSLY WE HAVE ONE MORE SCREENING THAT WE MUST ACCOMPLISH, THAT BEING MR. MORDECAI JOHNSON. HE IS IN THE HOSPITAL TODAY AND I DON'T KNOW WHEN THAT WILL OCCUR. WE WILL TAKE NO VOTES ON ANY CANDIDATES TODAY. WE CERTAINLY WILL GET THE TRANSCRIPTS ON THOSE WHO HAVE OPPOSITION. ANYTHING ELSE FROM ANY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE?

REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN: ADJOURN.

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: THE COMMITTEE WILL BE ADJURED.

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: MR. CHAIRMAN, COULD WE HAVE A SHORT EXECUTIVE SESSION?

REPRESENTATIVE ROGERS: ALL RIGHT, WE WILL HAVE A TWO-MINUTE EXECUTIVE SESSION TO TALK ABOUT ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS.

(EXECUTIVE SESSION OFF THE RECORD AT 5:59 P.M.; THE EXECUTIVE SESSION WAS CONCLUDED AT 6:15 P.M.)

SENATOR MARTIN: LET THE RECORD SHOW WE ARE GOING TO SESSION 2 MINUTES EARLY BECAUSE THE FULL COMMITTEE IS PRESENT AND AS THE SENIOR SENATOR I'M ASSUMING THE CHAIR FOR THE PURPOSE OF AN ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING OF THE ELECTING OF THE PERMANENT CHAIRMAN; AND FOR THAT PURPOSE, I WILL OPEN UP THE FLOOR FOR NOMINATIONS OF CHAIRMAN OF THIS JUDICIAL SCREENING COMMITTEE.

SENATOR LOURIE: MR. CHAIRMAN.

SENATOR MARTIN: SENATOR LOURIE.

SENATOR LOURIE: I NOMINATE THE SENATOR FROM NEWBERRY TO SERVE AS CHAIRMAN.

SENATOR MARTIN: IS THERE A SECOND?

REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN: I SECOND IT.

SENATOR MARTIN: ARE THERE ANY FURTHER NOMINATIONS?

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: MR. CHAIRMAN, I MOVE THAT THE NOMINATIONS BE CLOSED AND THAT THE GENTLEMAN BE ELECTED BY ACCLAMATION.

SENATOR MARTIN: YOU HEARD THE MOTION; ALL IN FAVOR OF THE MOTION SAY AYE.

SENATOR MARTIN: THERE APPEARS TO BE A UNANIMOUS VOTE. THIS IS A DELIGHTFUL CHANGE FROM WHAT WE'VE HAD TO VOTE ON; SO, SENATOR FROM NEWBERRY, I WILL RELINQUISH THE CHAIR FOR YOU FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.

SENATOR POPE: THANK YOU, SIR. I THINK THE NEXT ITEM OF BUSINESS WILL BE TO ELECT A VICE CHAIRMAN; SO, I WILL OPEN THE FLOOR NOW FOR NOMINATIONS FOR VICE CHAIRMAN.

REPRESENTATIVE MARTIN: I NOMINATE LARRY GENTRY.

SENATOR POPE: ALL RIGHT, THE NOMINATION IS MR. GENTRY.

REPRESENTATIVE HODGES: SECOND.

SENATOR POPE: SECONDED BY MR. HODGES. ARE THERE ANY FURTHER NOMINATIONS?

SENATOR LOURIE: MR. CHAIRMAN, I MOVE THAT THE NOMINATIONS COME TO A CLOSE AND HE BE ELECTED BY ACCLAMATION.

SENATOR POPE: THE MOTION HAS BEEN MADE THAT MR. GENTRY BE ELECTED BY ACCLAMATION. ALL IN FAVOR SIGNIFY BY SAYING AYE.

SENATOR POPE: OPPOSED, NO.

SENATOR POPE: THE AYES HAVE IT.

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: THANK YOU.

SENATOR POPE: I CERTAINLY APPRECIATE YOUR VOTE OF CONFIDENCE FOR ME AND WE WILL PROCEED ON THE AGENDA. COUNSEL HAS POINTED OUT THAT WE DO HAVE GUIDELINES THAT WE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING FOR SOME TIME NOW; THEY HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED AND WE HAVE ADOPTED THEM PREVIOUSLY. I WOULD ENTERTAIN A MOTION AT THIS TIME TO ADOPT AS PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES THE SAME RULES WE HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING IN THE PAST WHICH ARE PRINTED IN THE BROCHURE OF THE COMMITTEE.

REPRESENTATIVE HENDRIX: I SO MOVE, MR. CHAIRMAN. SENATOR POPE: THE MOTION HAS BEEN MADE TO ADOPT THESE RULES. ALL IN FAVOR SIGNIFY BY SAYING AYE.

SENATOR POPE: OPPOSED, NO.

SENATOR POPE: THE PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES ARE NOW ADOPTED. AT THIS POINT WE WILL GO INTO EXECUTIVE SESSION; I WILL HAVE TO ASK EVERYONE TO PLEASE LEAVE SO WE CAN DISCUSS A COUPLE OF COMMITTEE MATTERS.

(EXECUTIVE SESSION OFF THE RECORD AT 2:04 P.M.; BACK ON THE RECORD AT 2:25 P.M.)

SENATOR POPE: AT THIS TIME WE WILL PROCEED WITH SCREENING. WE HAVE STILL PENDING BEFORE US THE SCREENING ON JUDGE LARRY PATTERSON. I WILL ASK COUNSEL TO ADVISE US OF THE STATUS OF THAT SCREENING AT THIS POINT.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN, AT OUR LAST HEARING ON DECEMBER 11TH WE HAD A SCREENING FOR JUDGE LARRY PATTERSON AND A NUMBER OF WITNESSES CAME FORWARD AND TESTIFIED AND WE WERE INFORMED THAT MR. JOEL BAILEY OF BEAUFORT ALSO WISHED TO TESTIFY; HOWEVER, HE WAS SCHEDULED TO BE IN FEDERAL COURT THAT DAY. I HAVE SINCE HAD COMMUNICATIONS WITH MR. BAILEY AND HE HAS INFORMED ME THAT IT IS HIS WISH THAT UNLESS OTHER ATTORNEYS THAT HE NAMED COULD BE SUBPOENAED THAT HE WOULD JUST WISH FOR HIS AFFIDAVIT THAT HE SUBMITTED TO THE COMMITTEE BE MADE PART OF THE RECORD. ALSO, DURING THAT TIME PERIOD WE RECEIVED AN AFFIDAVIT FROM JUDGE PATTERSON IN WHICH HE REPLIED TO ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN MR. BAILEY'S AFFIDAVIT AND WE HAVE BOTH OF THOSE AFFIDAVITS, OF JUDGE PATTERSON AND MR. BAILEY, AVAILABLE TO BE PUT ON THE RECORD AS PART OF HIS SCREENING HEARING.

SENATOR POPE: IS THERE A MOTION THAT WE DO INCLUDE THOSE TWO AFFIDAVITS IN THE RECORD?

SENATOR MCCONNELL: I SO MOVE.

SENATOR MARTIN: SECONDED.

SENATOR POPE: THE MOTION IS MADE AND SECONDED. ALL IN FAVOR SIGNIFY BY SAYING AYE.

SENATOR POPE: OPPOSED, NO.

SENATOR POPE: THE AYES HAVE IT. THOSE TWO AFFIDAVITS THAT COUNSEL JUST REFERRED TO WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE RECORD BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PROTESTANTS HERE AND THE CANDIDATE HIMSELF IS NOT HERE BECAUSE OF HIS MILITARY COMMITMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF. IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE IN REGARD TO THE PATTERSON SCREENING THAT ANYBODY WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT ON?

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
AFFIDAVIT
COUNTY OF BEAUFORT

Personally appeared before me JOEL D. BAILEY who, being
first duly sworn, does hereby state:

1. I am a resident and citizen of Beaufort County, South Carolina, and am currently forty-three (43) years old.

2. I am self-employed as an attorney, and have been licensed to practice law in the State of South Carolina since 1973. I am admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court, the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the United States Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, the South Carolina Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, as well as all inferior courts of this state.

3. I am a member of the South Carolina Bar, the Beaufort County Bar Association, the South Carolina Trial Lawyers Association (of which I am a past president), the American Bar Association, the National Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, and a sustaining member of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America.

4. I was appointed as one of the original members of the Local Rules Committee of the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina at the time of its creation, and have remained a committee member until the present time.

5. I have lectured at the University of South Carolina - Beaufort, and have appeared as a faculty member and/or speaker for continuing legal education seminars sponsored by the South Carolina Judiciary, South Carolina Bar, South Carolina Trial Lawyers Association, Southeastern Trial Lawyers Association, Midwestern Trial Lawyers Association, and Association of Trial Lawyers of America.

6. My practice is litigation-oriented, and is primarily concentrated in the Circuit Courts of South Carolina. During the nearly two decades in which I have practiced law in this state, I have handled hundreds of cases of varying magnitudes. I have appeared before trial judges in virtually every county of South Carolina, as well as in other states, and in Australia. I have observed judges who ranged from excellent to poor in terms of their qualifications. I have seldom, if ever, encountered a trial judge whom I considered less qualified for that position than Larry R. Patterson.

7. I have had an opportunity to personally observe Judge Patterson's performance as a judge, in that I have appeared before him as both an attorney and a private litigant. He has issued rulings both in my favor and against me. In each instance, he has demonstrated an inability to grasp even fundamental legal precepts, has consistently been dilatory in his rulings, and has shown favoritism which seems to have been based upon the identities of persons appearing before him.

8. On April 24, 1989, Judge Patterson was temporarily assigned to preside over certain non-jury matters in circuit court in Pickens County. I appeared before him on that date as counsel for the plaintiff in the case of Bowers v. Shedd, CA # 89-CP-39-136. The case arose out of a multi-vehicle automobile wreck which occurred on I-26 near Columbia. The plaintiff's motion for a change of venue based upon convenience of witnesses was heard by Judge Patterson, as well as plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint, plaintiff's motion to strike portions of defendant's answer and/or for partial summary judgment, plaintiff's motion to compel answers to interrogatories and requests for production, and defendant's motion to consolidate. It was apparent that Judge Patterson had not read nor was he familiar with the motions prior to the hearing. He was not sufficiently knowledgeable with the applicable basic legal principles to enable him to rule immediately on all the motions. He was only able to deal with the simplest ones, denying the defendant's motion to consolidate and granting my motion to amend. He deferred ruling on the other motions at that time.

9. On May 3, 1989, Judge Patterson wrote to me, stating that he was granting my motion for a change of venue, and directing me to prepare an order to that end. He did not mention the other motions then pending before him.

10. On May 11, 1989, I forwarded to Judge Patterson a proposed order regarding the change of venue, as well as proposed orders incorporating his prior rulings on the motions to amend and to consolidate.

11. On May 16, 1989, I received the executed order on the change of venue motion from Judge Patterson's secretary, together with unsigned orders dealing with the motions to amend and to consolidate. On May 18, 1989, I called Judge Patterson's secretary about the unsigned orders and was advised that the failure to sign them was an oversight. Per her request, I returned the unsigned orders to Judge Patterson for execution. These were ultimately signed by Judge Patterson on May 31, 1989, five weeks after his original ruling in Pickens.

12. By June 7, 1989, Judge Patterson had still not issued a ruling on the motion to strike and/or for partial summary judgment, nor on the motion to compel. That same day, Judge Patterson sent a letter to myself and opposing counsel, advising that he would not be ruling on the remaining motions and that, even though they had already been heard by him, the motions would have to be reargued in Columbia.

13. As a result of Judge Patterson's conduct, the case was delayed for several weeks and the litigants and their attorneys were required to incur additional costs and duplication of effort.

14. My appearance as an attorney before Judge Patterson gave me little warning of the abuse of judicial authority and improper conduct which became characteristic of his role in my personal domestic case, Bailey v. Bailey, CA# 89DR-10-3641.

15. My ex-wife and I separated in 1988, and were involved in litigation the following year. The case ultimately came before Judge Patterson in the Charleston County Family Court.

16. Although Judge Patterson had known one of my attorneys, Desa Ballard, for a number of years, she was confident that he would be fair and impartial in the matter. It soon became apparent that fairness and objectivity were not his primary considerations, and he repeatedly demonstrated hostility to me and my attorney in open court. The following paragraphs depict specific instances of judicial misconduct which have occurred during my litigation, and are illustrative of Judge Patterson's judicial temperament and conduct.

17. At the initial hearing before Judge Patterson on October 13, 1989, a serious act of misconduct on the part of counsel for my ex-wife was brought to the attention of Judge Patterson in the form of a motion for contempt. As part of his request for an award of temporary attorneys' fees, my ex-wife's counsel had presented perjured testimony, both oral and by way of affidavit, that he had not been paid a retainer fee. We then discovered that her counsel had been untruthful in this assertion, and presented proof in the form of a canceled check that he had, in fact, been paid a $5,000-00 retainer fee prior to his false representations to the court.

Instead of dealing directly with the act of blatant dishonesty on the part of the attorney, Judge Patterson sidestepped it at the hearing. He appeared hostile toward my counsel for raising the issue, stating that the case should be handled on a "higher plane". On December 6, 1989, Judge Patterson indicated in a telephone conference call with all counsel that, while he felt the statements of my ex-wife's counsel were not truthful, he did not feel compelled to deal with the issue as part of the matter before him. On December 18, 1989, he issued a written order in which he specifically declined to hold counsel in contempt for the false representation regarding his retainer fee.

Judge Patterson's failure to act regarding the perjured testimony of my ex-wife's attorney was tantamount to an official sanction of such conduct. His failure to properly handle the situation at that point gave a virtual green light to my ex-wife's attorneys to conduct the litigation as they wished. It is still on-going at this time, and they have asserted a claim for attorney fees exceeding $200,000 in a divorce action involving a total marital estate of approximately $500,000.
18. Judge Patterson's hostility toward my attorney, Desa A. Ballard, became increasingly apparent throughout the proceedings before him. He appointed as Guardian ad Litem for my children an attorney who previously ran for a circuit court judgeship, knowing that Ms. Ballard had opposed this person's candidacy and had supported her opponent. Ms. Ballard had contacted Judge Patterson's office to express her opposition to his choice of Guardian ad Litem within the time limit imposed by Judge Patterson for making such objections. However, she was informed that the appointment had already taken place. The Guardian ad Litem never established a rapport with my children, and they later requested a long-time friend of the family to take over her role. Judge Patterson denied this request because their choice of Guardian ad Litem had previously expressed the opinion that, from his experience, I was better suited than my ex-wife to have custody of the children.

As the litigation proceeded, Judge Patterson consistently ignored correspondence and requests for hearings sent by Ms. Ballard. He even delayed so long in scheduling a hearing to settle the record regarding a matter on appeal that the appeal was in jeopardy of being dismissed. When Ms. Ballard advised the Supreme Court that the delay in prosecuting the appeal was occasioned by Judge Patterson's failure to schedule a hearing settling the record, his treatment of her became even more hostile. My file contains numerous documents, including correspondence, which confirm the inexcusable refusal of Judge Patterson to even acknowledge correspondence by my counsel. His actions denied me effective representation of counsel during the course of this proceeding, as he choose to simply ignore my counsel's existence. The problem became so acute that Ms. Ballard recently determined that it was in my best interests for her not to make any further appearance in front of Judge Patterson in this matter, and it became necessary for me to obtain substitute counsel.

19. The highlight of Judge Patterson's bias became apparent on January 3, 1990. On that date, he held me in contempt of court and ordered me incarcerated until the date of my final hearing on January 22, 1990. He also ordered me to pay a fine of $500.00. Neither my attorneys nor I had received proper notice of the hearing on the contempt citation. The order which he determined that I violated had been issued on December 18, 1989, and served on my counsel while I was out of town with my children over Christmas. I saw it for the first time on January 2, 1990. The contempt citation was issued notwithstanding uncontroverted evidence that I had made a good faith effort to comply with the order upon learning of its existence the prior day.

Judge Patterson denied my counsel's request for an appeal bond, and then stated, "You have got thirty minutes and if you can work something out with them (referring to my ex-wife and her attorneys), that is fine. If you can't, I will write the order." The meaning of the phrase "work something out with them" soon became apparent, as my ex-wife's attorneys stated they would have Judge Patterson rescind the contempt citation if I agreed to dismiss all appeals then pending. I refused and Judge Patterson ordered me taken to the Charleston County Jail, where I remained until the following day when I was ordered released by South Carolina Supreme Court Justice Ernest Finney.

The contempt citation was appealed, and was pending before the Supreme Court when Judge Patterson initiated a conversation with one of my attorneys concerning settlement of the case. When he was advised that settlement was not possible without a vacation of the contempt citation, Judge Patterson indicated that there would be no vacation of the citation by him unless the entire case was settled. He took this position even though both parties joined in the request for vacation of the contempt citation. He refused to acknowledge my counsel's requests for a hearing to settle the record in order to proceed with the appeal on that issue, and delayed that hearing for several weeks until it was finally set under pressure from the Supreme Court. He did ultimately vacate the contempt citation, but only as part of an overall settlement of the case, thereby avoiding appellate review of his actions.

20. One of the greatest ethical considerations to surface during my litigation was the ever-present evidence of Judge Patterson's ex parte communications with my ex-wife and/or her attorneys. My attorney, Desa Ballard, complained about this conduct on several occasions, but to no avail. On one occasion, Judge Patterson met privately with my ex-wife and gave her documents to be filed against me in Beaufort County. On other occasions, he obviously had been in ex parte communications with her attorneys. When we attempted to get the attorneys' telephone records to substantiate such conduct, they obtained an order prohibiting us from doing so.

After I notified this Committee and other members of the General Assembly of my desire to present testimony in opposition to Judge Patterson's candidacy, he telephoned my attorney, David Taylor, and attempted to arrange a private meeting with me to "bury the hatchet". Mr. Taylor declined, and expressed concern over the initiation of an ex parte contact by the judge. Judge Patterson indicated that he did not view the communication as an ex parte one, and then indicated that the call could not be traced to him anyway, as he was calling from another judge's telephone.

21. Other egregious conduct by Judge Patterson included his rulings which prohibited me from discussing "this matter" with my children, interpreting the phrase to mean anything dealing with the action, including visitation schedules; attempting to bind parties with unrecorded telephone calls to the attorneys, erroneously maintaining that such calls constituted orders of the court; a general lack of an understanding of fundamental principles of law; and a failure to understand and apply evidentiary data supplied by expert witnesses, such as Neil Crossley, C.P.A.

22. The foregoing illustrate my reasons for feeling that Judge Patterson in not qualified to hold the office of circuit court judge in the state of South Carolina. The instances cited which were not personally observed to me are set forth as reported to me by my counsel.
Respectfully submitted,
JOEL D. BAILEY

Sworn to before me this
6th day of December, 1990.
Cheryl J. Owens
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR SOUTH CAROLINA
My Commission Expires: 8/31/98

JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE FOR JUDICIAL SCREENING

In the Matter of: LARRY R. PATTERSON, Candidate for the Circuit Court, Seat Number 3, of the 13th Circuit.

PERSONALLY APPEARED BEFORE ME, Larry R. Patterson, who being duly sworn, swears as follows:

1. My name is Larry R. Patterson. I am a candidate for the Circuit Court, Seat Number 3 in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit.

2. I am submitting this Affidavit in response to the Affidavit and filings of Joel D. Bailey. Mr. Bailey submitted an Affidavit dated December 6, 1990. He did not, however, personally appear or testify at my scheduled screening on December 11, 1990.

3. Although I would prefer to appear and testify in person to refute Mr. Bailey's allegations, I do not anticipate that I will be able to do so as I am a Colonel in the U.S. Army Reserves and I was activated on December 27, 1990. I expect to be deployed to Saudi Arabia in support of Operation Desert Shield in a matter of days. I was present and available to testify at my screening on December 11, 1990. I was specifically available to testify concerning Mr. Bailey's Affidavit and to receive any questions which may have arisen if he had chosen to appear and testify.

4. My association and contact with Mr. Bailey has been limited and infrequent. As I recall, appeared one time before me in the spring of 1989, when I presided over a non-jury term of Circuit Court in Pickens County. I also heard a small portion of his personal domestic case while I was sitting as Chief Administrative Family Court Judge in Charleston County. My primary involvement in Mr. Bailey's personal domestic case was to preside over a temporary hearing on October 13, 1989, and in a contempt hearing which resulted in an order issued on January 23, 1990. My total involvement lasted approximately three months (with the exception of limited proceedings resulting from Mr. Bailey's appeal from my January 23, 1990 Order in which I was requested to settle the record by the Supreme Court). The balance of Mr. Bailey's personal domestic case was heard by retired Family Court Judge William J. McLeod, who devoted three days to a final hearing on January 22, 23, 24, 1990, and two more days in the attorney fees phase of the case. I understand that there were 6 or 7 appeals filed by Mr. Bailey, but I was not involved in those appeals with the exception of settling the record in his appeal from my contempt Order.

5. After reviewing and considering Mr. Bailey's Affidavit in this matter, it is clear to me that Mr. Bailey is a disgruntled litigant. Family Court proceedings, particular those in which the complaining person is a party, are often highly emotionally charged events. Litigants frequently lose their overall perspective and sense of good judgment and reason. In Mr. Bailey's personal case, he attempted to recuse me, filing an Affidavit in support of his Motion to Recuse dated December 13, 1989. That Affidavit was signed by Mr. Bailey only seven days after I announced to all the lawyers in the Bailey case of my decision as to the pendente lite matters which were heard before me on October 13, 1989. My written Order was prepared and issued on December 18, 1989. The allegations made by Mr. Bailey on December 13, 1989, were either false or unfounded at that time, and those same allegations, which he is again repeating in his present Affidavit before this Committee dated December 6, 1990, are likewise materially false and/or unfounded.

6. As indicated above, my involvement in Mr. Bailey's divorce case has been limited. Although his divorce case spanned nearly two years, beginning in Beaufort County on January 25, 1989, and being concluded in Charleston County on December 6, 1990, my role, as Chief Administrative Family Court Judge in Charleston County, was limited to conducting the pendente lite hearing on October 13, 1989, and the contempt proceedings which resulted in my Order of January 18, 1990. The proceedings prior to October 13, 1989, were heard by Family Court Judge Berry L. Mobley, who recused himself on October 21, 1989, vacated his prior rulings, and transferred venue of the litigation to Charleston County, where I was sitting at the time as Chief Administrative Judge.

7. Mr. Bailey has asserted that I handled his personal case in a dilatory fashion. That is simply not accurate. Mr. Bailey's temporary hearing was held on October 13, 1989, in Charleston County. The Family Court Rules require that temporary hearings be heard and decided, except in exigent circumstances, upon Affidavits and Financial Declarations. Mr. Bailey and his counsel failed to present any Affidavits at the pendente lite hearing. Mrs. Bailey and her counsel presented extensive Affidavits at the pendente lite hearing. As an accommodation to Mr. Bailey and his counsel, I allowed them additional time to gather and submit Affidavits. Mr. Bailey and his counsel submitted numerous Affidavits throughout the balance of October of 1989, and continuing into November of 1989. I also interviewed the Bailey children in camera with the Guardian ad Litem. After reviewing the voluminous Affidavits filed on both sides of the case, and the numerous exhibits, my decision was delivered to all counsel by telephone conference initiated by me on December 6, 1989. Had Mr. Bailey complied with the Family Court Rules and been prepared to present his Affidavits at the pendente lite hearing on October 13, 1990, the Court's decision would have been made earlier.

8. I also believe that I acted promptly on the issue of contempt. Following the October 13, 1989, pendente lite hearing, Mr. Bailey failed and refused to pay any support to Mrs. Bailey or for the children when in Mrs. Bailey's custody, and failed and refused to pay the suit money that had been ordered paid. Mr. Bailey was $20,000.00 in arrears. An extensive contempt hearing was held on January 3, 1990, as a result of which I issued a Memorandum Order that date and followed with a detailed Order dated January 23, 1990. Mr. Bailey was found in contempt and jailed. Contrary to Mr. Bailey's Affidavit, the Supreme Court did not set aside or supersede my contempt Order, but rather allowed Mr. Bailey to be released from incarceration only after he posted a $20,000.00 bond securing and assuring his compliance with my Orders.

9. Mr. Bailey also asserts that I have been untimely in setting a hearing to settle the record on one of many of his appeals in the Family Court proceedings. His statements in that regard are not accurate. Upon receiving a written request from one of Mr. Bailey's attorneys requesting a hearing to settle the record, I did, by letter dated April 16, 1990, set that hearing to be held on Monday, May 14, 1990, at 2:00 P.M. in Charleston. We made every reasonable effort to accommodate the schedules of the lawyers (two and then three representing Mr. Bailey, two representing Mrs. Bailey, plus the Guardian ad Litem (also an attorney) and her attorney). The May 14, 1990, hearing was initially canceled at the request of one of Mr. Bailey's attorneys, Desa Ballard, on May 11, 1990, as she requested that all matters, including the Motion to Settle the Record, be continued pending the Supreme Court's disposition of Ms. Ballard's Petition for Writ of Prohibition in the Supreme Court. It was not necessary to thereafter actually settle the record (although a hearing was set for that purpose on August 6, 1990) as the main case was settled. I am not aware of any fact or circumstance that would justify Mr. Bailey's assertion that his appeal was in some way jeopardized by the proceedings in the lower Court.

10. Mr. Bailey has also asserted in his Affidavit that I have been hostile towards him and his attorneys and that I have shown favoritism. Those allegations are simply without basis.

11. After I announced my ruling in Mr. Bailey's case on the pendente lite issues on December 6, 1989, Mr. Bailey and his attorneys filed Motions to Recuse both me and the Guardian ad Litem, Lee Robinson, Esquire. Mr. Bailey alleged, among other things, that I had some type of close personal and professional relationship with Mrs. Bailey's attorneys, James T. McLaren, and Evander G. Jeffords. I have not and do not have any close personal relationship with Mr. McLaren or Mr. Jeffords, and have heard only a limited number of matters involving them as attorneys. My contact with each of them has been very limited. Mr. Bailey's allegations against Lee Robinson were similarly without basis. He asserted that Ms. Robinson should be recused because one of Mr. Bailey's attorneys, Desa Ballard, had "openly supported" Ms. Robinson's opposition for a judgeship. Ms. Robinson stated to the Court that she was not even aware of Ms. Ballard's involvement and even if she was it would have made no difference. Mr. Bailey sought to have Ms. Robinson replaced as Guardian ad Litem and to substitute his good friend, Ken Thornton, as Guardian ad Litem. I certainly did not feel it was appropriate for Mr. Thornton to be involved in the case in the capacity of an attorney or a Guardian ad Litem as he had and his wife had submitted Affidavits at the pendente lite hearing stage supporting Mr. Bailey in his request for custody.
12. It is clear, in retrospect, that Mr. Bailey and his counsel have attempted to deliberately provoke me. They have filed Motions in which they have accused both me and Mrs. Bailey's counsel with professionally improper conduct. In one Motion Mr. Bailey's counsel, Desa Ballard, accused the Court and counsel of communicating ex parte regarding the issuance of the Transcript of Judgment. That was not true as the lawyers on both sides had communicated with the Court only through letters, with copies to all involved counsel. Ms. Ballard's Motion was so unfounded that even Mr. Bailey and his other attorney, David Taylor, wrote a letter to me "disassociating" themselves from Ms. Ballard's accusations. A copy of that letter is attached.

13. In addition to attacking me and the Guardian ad Litem, Mr. Bailey also chose to attack Mrs. Bailey's attorneys. At the pendente lite hearing, which is intended only to be a summary proceeding to be dealt with on Affidavits and oral argument, they attempted to place before me issues involving a prior temporary hearing held before Judge Mobley long before I became involved in the case. Those issues involved whether or not an initial retainer paid by Mrs. Bailey's parents (rather than by Mrs. Bailey herself) should have been disclosed by Mr. Jeffords. Considering the seriousness of those allegations, and the fact that I did not preside over that hearing, and further considering the fact that Mr. Bailey was attempting to raise that issue in a temporary hearing, I did not feel it appropriate to grant the relief requested by Mr. Bailey. was not sanctioning (or condemning) what had been done, but rather dealt with the issues that I felt appropriate and proper for a pendente lite hearing. Mr. Bailey's assertion that my failure to handle that issue in the manner suggested by him caused a large amount of attorney fees to be incurred in the case is simply not true and is a gross exaggeration. If any conduct in the case caused the fees to be large, it was Mr. Bailey and his counsel. They contested virtually every issue and took positions contrary to good sense and common practice.

14. Mr. Bailey asserts that he was in some way not treated favorably in the contempt proceedings that came before me on January 3, 1990. The Orders that were issued by me in this case, as well as by the other Judges involved, are part of the record in this matter. My findings are detailed and fully supported. I was convinced, as I am today, that Mr. Bailey was a high income earner and that he had sufficient income and resources with which to pay the support and suit money that I ordered paid as a result of the October 13, 1990 hearing. At the time of the October 13, 1990 hearing Mr. Bailey had approximately $46,000.00 on deposit in banks. Although he was claiming a gross monthly income of only $4,614.00 on his Financial Declaration, his income had ranged between $133,000.00 and $237,000.00 in the three (3) years preceding his departure from home. Judge McLeod, who heard the matter on the merits, set the alimony at the same level ($2,500.00 per month), and the parties themselves ultimately settled the case at the same level of alimony ($2,500.00 per month). Mr. Bailey also agreed, when the case was ultimately settled, to pay attorney fees far in excess of that which I had originally ordered. During the time that Mr. Bailey was not paying support, he went on a skiing trip.

15. Mr. Bailey also complains of my refusal to vacate my contempt sanction. It is correct that I would not vacate that contempt sanction unless and until the whole case was settled and that I did so reluctantly. The contempt sanction was within my province and not within the province or power or authority of the parties to settle between them. Contempt is a sanction imposed by the Court, not the parties. I truly believed that Mr. Bailey was in contempt of my Pendente Lite Order and I sanctioned him accordingly. It is not my usual custom or method to later vacate contempt findings and I did so only after I was requested by all involved counsel and their clients and after the full case was settled.

16. Mr. Bailey also contends that I have in some way communicated on an ex parte basis with Mrs. Bailey or her attorneys. That is simply not true and is a complete falsehood. I have never spoken with Mrs. Bailey or her counsel on an ex parte basis. Mr. Bailey asserts that one of his attorneys, Desa Ballard, complained to me about ex parte communications. It is true that Ms. Ballard filed a Motion, without basis, stating that I had communicated on an ex parte basis with Mrs. Bailey and/or her attorneys, but it was that same Motion to which Mr. Bailey and his other counsel, David Taylor, wrote to me "disassociating" themselves from those allegations.

17. Mr. Bailey's assertion that I met privately with Mrs. Bailey and gave her documents to be filed is simply not accurate. After receiving communications from both counsel, with copies to both counsel, I issued a Transcript of Judgment and mailed it to Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. McLaren, for filing. At Mr. McLaren's direction, Mrs. Bailey was dispatched to hand-deliver the Transcripts of Judgment for filing in the Offices of the Clerk of Court for Common Pleas in Charleston County, the Family Court for Charleston County, and in the Court of Common Pleas for Beaufort County. Mr. McLaren also sent cover letters, which showed copies to all involved counsel, reflecting the transmittal of the Transcripts of Judgment for filing. When Mrs. Bailey was making necessary filing at the Family Court in Charleston, I saw her in the hallway, we politely said hello to one another, and that was the extent of our conversation. I did not discuss the Bailey case or any other matter with Mrs. Bailey.

18. Mr. Bailey also asserts or infers that I have in some way prohibited him from seeing the telephone records of Mrs. Bailey's attorneys. The record in the Family Court action reflects that Judge McLeod issued a Protective Order preventing Mr. Bailey from going on a fishing expedition with respect to the law firm records of McLaren & Lee in Columbia and the Hyman Law Firm in Florence. Judge McLeod ruled that such an inquiry would not be proper and that it would violate the confidences of the many clients represented by those firms. Contrary to Mr. Bailey's assertions, there have not been any ex parte communications between me or the lawyers representing Mrs. Bailey.

19. As to the allegation by Mr. Bailey that I have in some way had some private meeting with one of his attorneys, David Taylor, with respect to the letter that Mr. Bailey previously sent to all members of the General Assembly, which he did at or about the time that I was to hear one of the Bailey matters, I do not recall having any such discussion with Mr. Taylor. I do recall, however, that I have stated to each one of the lawyers involved in this case that they should make every effort to cease the hostilities and attempt to bring an amicable resolution to the Bailey case. That is not advice limited to the Bailey case, but represents my general philosophy that parties should make a reasonable attempt to settle their differences rather than litigating every issue.

20. Mr. Bailey also asserts that I have in some way acted improperly because I prohibited he and Mrs. Bailey, as well as counsel, from discussing the case with their children. It is true that I directed and ordered that Mr. Bailey, Mrs. Bailey and the attorneys not to discuss the case with the children. I did so because there were considerable concern that Mr. Bailey was attempting to brain-wash and turn the children against Mrs. Bailey. Some of that brain-washing was evidenced when I examined the children in camera with the Guardian ad Litem. I very much wanted to see to it that the children were removed from this controversy so that they were not damaged any further. I stand by my ruling. I believe that Mr. Bailey is disgruntled over the fact that his communication with the children became an issue in this case. On at least one occasion the eldest child was tape recorded at Mr. Bailey's law office while talking by telephone to the Guardian ad Litem. On another occasion, one of his attorneys spoke directly with the children and facilitated Mr. Bailey's efforts to have Ms. Robinson recused as Guardian ad Litem and replaced by Mr. Bailey's friend, Ken Thornton. On another occasion my orders were violated by Mr. Bailey and his counsel having the children evaluated by a psychologist (which Mr. Bailey had openly opposed in Court previously).

21. Mr. Bailey generally asserts that I am unfamiliar with the fundamental principles of law and that I failed to understand or appreciate the evidentiary data supplied by the witnesses. I have been a Family Court Judge for a number of years. I have handled cases far more involved and complex than the Bailey matter. I believe that my orders reflect a reasonable and comprehensive approach to the issues presented at the various hearings that I presided over in the Bailey matter. I believe that I have accurately enunciated and set forth the governing law and that I have applied that law appropriately and fairly to the facts presented at those hearings.

22. I hope that I have adequately addressed the main points raised by Mr. Bailey's Affidavit. Much of his Affidavit is conclusory and without any factual basis or specific allegations. As a result of my duty assignment and Mr. Bailey's failure to appear at the screening hearing on December 11, 1990, I did and will not have the opportunity to address the Committee in person concerning the Bailey matter. I hope that I have adequately addressed any concerns that the Committee may have in regard to this matter.

23. Mr. Bailey makes reference to a Motion matter that I heard in the Spring of 1989, while I was assigned to hear nonjury matters in the Circuit Court in Pickens County. I have a general but not specific recollection of the matters and events to which Mr. Bailey craves reference. I will attempt, however, to address his assertions to the best of my ability.

24. Unlike regular Circuit Court Judges, Family Court Judges who assigned to the Circuit Court do not have the benefit of a law clerk. We are generally assigned numerous Motion matters to hear, usually scheduled 20 minutes apart. The scheduling is done such that there is little if any time for study of the files prior to argument. The Court must rely upon cursory review of the file, oral arguments of counsel, and then must make rulings, which are generally made from the bench or at a later date after time is found to review the matter in more detail.

25. As I recall, Mr. Bailey represented the Plaintiff in a rather serious automobile wreck case. The situs of the wreck was near Columbia and he was therefore moving for a change of venue, which I granted. I also ruled on certain other perfunctory matters. I requested that Mr. Bailey prepare an Order, which he did.

26. When I received Mr. Bailey's Order, I signed the top Order, not realizing that there was a second Order in the materials that he forwarded to me. When my secretary brought that to my attention, I issued the second Order, but declined to rule on certain of the other matters. I felt that on the substantive issues it would be more appropriate that a resident Judge in the venue to which the case was being transferred (i. e, in Richland County) deal with those substantive matters as that was the place that the case would ultimately be tried and disposed of.

27. I feel that I dealt with the matters in the Pickens County case fairly and appropriately. I do not believe that Mr. Bailey's assertions are warranted, but rather are the product of a disgruntled litigant who is dissatisfied with the result in his own personal domestic case.

28. Being one of the trial Judges in a domestic case involving a lawyer litigant is probably one of the more difficult tasks which a Family Court Judge is called upon to perform. It is not a task that I take lightly, but at the same time I do not shirk or shun my responsibilities. I attempt in all cases, and particular those involving high profile lawyer litigants, to be even-handed and fair. It is important to the litigants and the system at large that both of those parties receive a fair and impartial determination of the issues that they are unable to resolve between themselves. I believe that I did so in all matters involving Mr. Bailey and his spouse, Wanda Bailey. I believe that Mr. Bailey's accusations are without basis.

29. The above statements are true and correct.

/s/ Larry R. Patterson

SWORN to and subscribed before me this 3 day of January, 1991.

/s/
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR SOUTH CAROLINA

My Commission Expires:3-1-95

SENATOR POPE: WE WILL PROCEED ON TO THE NEXT CANDIDATE, MR. MORDECAI JOHNSON. MR. JOHNSON, WILL YOU PLEASE COME AROUND; AND IN THE PAST WE HAVE GIVEN CANDIDATES THE OPTION OF EITHER STANDING AT THE PODIUM OR, IF YOU PREFER, TO SIT BY THE--OVER THERE WHERE THE COURT REPORTER CAN HEAR YOU.

MR. JOHNSON: I WILL STAND HERE, SIR.

SENATOR POPE: MR. JOHNSON, WOULD YOU PLEASE RAISE YOUR RIGHT HAND.

1. Mordecai C. Johnson
Home Address: Business Address:
Rte.1 Box 395 354-A North Dargan St.,

Effingham, SC 29541 P.O. Box 1804

Florence, SC 29503

2. He was born October 29, 1931, in Effingham.
Social Security Number: ***-**-*****

4. He married Navonia Allen on December 29, 1958. They have four children: Palmer E., age 27, (teacher); William A., age 26, (retail sales); Odishi N., age 25, (homemaker); Mordecai C., Jr., age 23, (soldier).

5. Military service: US Army - 1/52 till 12/53; Private; US53113549; Veteran (Korea); Honorable Discharge.

6. He attended Morris College in Sumter, 1946-48, transferring to Colored Normal I,A & M College, Orangeburg, 1948-51, A.B. Degree; Howard University, Washington D.C., 1956-59, LL.B. (J.D.); George Washington University, Washington, D.C., 1959-61, LL. M.

7. Significant activities in school: Choir, band and orchestra, including smaller ensembles during undergraduate years.

8. Continuing legal/judicial education:
Participated in various CLE Seminars and Sessions, usually exceeding requirements of the Bar; attended Judicial Orientation Session, of SC Court Administration at SC Criminal Justice Academy, Columbia, 1990.

9. Courses taught or lectures given: Recently taught semester course in Business Law at Francis Marion College. During the early 1970's he taught courses in Black History and Culture at USC, Shaw AFB Extension.

10. Published books or articles written: Numerous newspaper columns and articles over the past 20 years or so, appearing in Pee Dee Star, Pee Dee Times, Pee Dee Observer, Florence Morning News, Afro-American, Myrtle Beach Sun-News, Charlotte Observer and other publications.

12. Legal experience since graduation from law school:
1962-66 Office of General Counsel, US Depart. of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington -- education law, civil rights law.
1966-68 US Commission on Civil Rights -- civil rights law.
1968-now General practice -- concentrating largely on civil rights law through the early 1980's and more recently concentrating more heavily on Personal Injury, criminal defense, and other non-civil rights areas.

14. Frequency of appearances in court:
Federal - seldom
State - frequent

15. Percentage of litigation:
Civil: 60% Criminal: 40% Domestic: 10%

16. Percentage of cases in trial courts:
Jury: 75% Non-Jury: 25%

Sole counsel about 80% of the time, chief counsel or associate counsel about 10% of the time for each.

17. Five (5) of the most significant litigated matters in either trial or appellate court:

(a) State v. Ham, 256 S.C. 1, 180 SE 2d 628 (1971) two Justices dissenting, Reversed, 409 US 524, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed 2d 46 (1973), two Justices concurring in part and dissenting in part. This early drug case (Ham I), a marijuana case, involving an 11 point headnote, dealt with sufficiency of an arrest warrant, sufficiency of indictment, prejudicial publicity, rushing a defendant to trial, right to counsel, expert qualifications, statutory construction and other issues.
Significantly, they convinced two of five Justices of the S.C. Supreme Court, 15 years before Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), that the Defendant, a Black man, was denied a fair and impartial jury on racial grounds. Their views were upheld by all members of the U.S. Supreme Court.
(b) State v. Ham, 259 S.C. 118, 191 SE 2d 13 (1972), opinion by Chief Justice Moss, two Justices, Brailsford and Bussey, dissenting in two separate opinions. This early drug case (Ham II), a Librium case, involving a 16-point headnote, dealt with diverse issues, including the right to a speedy trial, sufficiency of indictment, statutory construction, sufficiency of evidence, pretrial publicity, voir dire of jurors, latitude of cross examination of witnesses, and comment by Court on evidence, raising questions under the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and related provisions of the Constitution of South Carolina.
Underlying litigation also involved novel questions of Federal law such as Federal removal, Federal Stay of State prosecution, prosecutorial misconduct, right to bail on State charges by Federal Court.
(c) Stanley v. Darlington County School District, et al., 424 F 2d 195, Reh. den, 424 F. 2d 198, Cert. den., 398 U.S. 909, 90 S.Ct. 1690, ___ L.Ed 2d ___ (1970), one of the earliest S.C. School desegregation cases, dating from the early 1960's, this decision required mid-term school desegregation, notwithstanding turmoil, resistance and disruption.

(d) Whittenberg v. School District of Greenville County, 424 F 2d 195, Reh. den, 424 F. 2d 197, Cert. den., 397 U.S. 1066, 90 S.Ct. 1499, ____ L.Ed 2d ____ (1970). This case, a companion to Stanley, also required mid-term desegregation. It involved a major School District (about 60,000 pupils), but, unlike Darlington County, the results were achieved peacefully.

(e) State v. Mannie Lee Law, 265 S.C. 111, 217 S.E. 2d 22 (1975) (Law I); Ibid, 270 S.C. 664, 224 SE 2d 302 (1978) (Law II).
Law I, was the most significant S.C. case on pretrial publicity and the right to a change of venue in more than 50 years. He persuaded the Court that the State and Federal Constitutional rights to an impartial jury should not be limited by the language of a statute and that the Court had the "common law power" to protect these rights.
On the merits in this murder case, (Law II), they raised 32 exceptions alleging reversible error, resulting in a 12-headnote, 12 page opinion. Some issues included insanity, right to counsel, drug induced competence, medication by State without notice to, knowledge of or consent of defense, prosecutorial misconduct, and constitutionality of death sentence.
In Law II, he plowed new legal grounds in the Supreme Court of SC which is only now being plowed in the US Supreme Court. In Law II, he argued that a psychotic inmate could not be forced to take medication to make him mentally competent to stand trial. It now appears that in Perry v. Louisiana, the US Supreme Court on yesterday ordered the Louisiana Supreme Court to reconsider its ruling that a psychotic inmate on death row could be forced to take medication to make him mentally competent to be executed. The State, "Court halts steps to Execution, Psychotic inmate in death row case," 11/14/90, p.2A.

18. Civil appeals:
(a) and (b) See Stanley and Whittenberg cases, supra, item 17.

(c) Kirven v. The Secretary of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, et al., 271 S.C. 194, 246 SE 2d 857 (1978)

(d) Backus v. Spears, 4th Cir., 1982, 677 F 2d 397.

(e) Simpkins v. Gressette, 4th Cir., 1980, 631 F 2d 287.

20. Judicial office: Appointed to the Municipal Court of Florence, appointed 1/8/90, sworn, 3/30/90. Criminal Jurisdiction under City Ordinances and, under State law, as a Magistrate, with contempt powers, involving fines and imprisonment up to $200 and 30 days. Jurisdiction includes preliminary hearings and bond proceedings in cases beyond the trial jurisdiction of the Municipal Court.

21. Five significant orders or opinions written:

(a) State v. Anthony Johnny Douglas, ORDER of 11/3/90 releasing Defendant on bond withstanding 5 day old teletyped request from New York that he be held; interpretation of Section 17-9-10, S.C. Code 1976, as amended.

(b) City v. Sharon Cooper, ORDER of 11/1/90 that Defendant who turned herself in to police on 1981 shoplifting warrant be released on Personal Recognizance without being booked through jail, violated. Rule, 11/5/90, Matter of Michelle to show cause why police captain should not be cited in contempt.

(c) City v. Michelle Shuler, ORDER, Sept. 1990, setting aside conviction and vacating sentence for denial of right to counsel.

(d) State v. , ORDER, ____________ 1990, finding no probable cause in drug case, then reversing himself after arguments, previously unheard, from prosecution.

(e) Most decisions in this Court are unwritten. Numerous of them, in addition to these specifically listed, have been precedent-setting. His decisions are almost never appealed.

22. Public office: Elected member of Florence City Council, 1977-81; previously appointed to membership and Vice Chairmanship of Board of Housing Appeals and Adjustments, City of Florence; Town Attorney, Sellers, S.C.

23. He has been an unsuccessful candidate for Florence City Council in 1970 and 1981; the SC Senate in 1972 and 1988; the SC House in 1972, 1982, and 1984. He was also an unsuccessful candidate for Mayor of Florence in 1983.

24. Occupation, business or profession other than the practice of law:
Public school teacher, 1951-52; Dorchester County School Board, 1954-56; Marlboro County School Board (holder of grade A teaching certificate, based on score on National Teacher Examinations); postal clerk, 1959-62, Washington, DC. Also worked at various times as a waiter, construction laborer, musician, domestic, farmer.

27. He is unaware of any financial arrangements or business relationships which constitute a conflict of interest. If one does occur, he would disqualify himself or otherwise deal with it based on the facts and the law then existing.

28. Arrested or charged: During the middle 1970's, he was indicted on charges of violating S.C. income tax laws. The charges were dismissed in 1976 following a preliminary hearing. During the late 1950's, he was convicted of loitering on a street in Florence. In 1980, he was charged with vagrancy, in violation of a Florence City Ordinance, but the prosecution did not go forward.

31. Sued: A Darlington County surgeon sued me for having filed a medical malpractice suit against him on behalf of clients, which we voluntarily nonsuited, i.e., a suit against his patient's attorneys. His suit was dismissed by the Circuit Court, which dismissal was affirmed on appeal. Moyd v. Johnson & Cain, Memorandum Op. #88-MO-021, SCCA, 3/9/88.

He ran, in 1981, for reelection to the Florence City Council, lost narrowly in the Democratic primary and his name was put forward as a petition candidate in the general election. The Chairman of the City and County Democratic parties sued him and obtained an Order enjoining him from offering or campaigning for the office and from having his name on the ballot. The Circuit Court's Order was upheld over his allegation of "numerous errors." Florence County Democratic Party, et al v. Johnson, 281 SC 218, 314 SE 2d 335 (1984).

As a Florence City Councilman, 1977-81, he, along with other members of the Council and the City as an entity, was sued a number of times.

33. His last physical was by Dr. Dewey N. Ervin of Florence. He is in good health, all things considered.

34. He was hospitalized for about a month in 1989, in McLeod Regional, Florence, on complaint of dizziness.

36. He had a heart attack in 1979 and his condition will require regular medical treatment for life. His physician is Harry S. Allen, Jr.

38. He discontinued drinking alcohol last year on advice of his cardiologist. He quit ingesting the drug nicotine when he quit smoking on his own during the 1970's.

39. Bar associations and professional organizations:
American Bar Association; SC Bar, Florence County Bar Association; Life Member, National Bar Association, elected member of House of Delegates, representing 12th Judicial Circuit of SC, 1989-present.

40. Civic, charitable, religious, educational, social and fraternal organizations:
Masonic Lodge, S.W., Consistory, Assistant K S & A Shrine; Savannah Grove Baptist Church, has served as Church Attorney, historian, Trustee, Choir Director and Sunday School teacher; NAACP, has served as State General Counsel.

41. --Listed in Marquis Who's Who in American Law which includes less than 3% of American lawyers; Who's Who In America.
--He points out that Justice Littlejohn (now Chief Justice, Ret.), with concurrence of Chief Justice Moss (now retired) and Justice (now Chief Justice, Ret.) Lewis, and without dissent, made a finding, on the public record forever, that a client of Mordecai C. Johnson, is "ably represented." State v. Ham, 256 S.C. at 9, 180 SE 2d 628. As far as he is aware, no other attorney in the history of our State has had his competence similarly vouched for by three Chief Justices, and concurred in by the remaining members of the Supreme Court.

42. Five letters of recommendation:

(a) Robert G. Phillips, Vice President

Citizens & Southern National Bank of SC

P.O. Box F-3, Florence, SC 29501

(b) John J. Powers, Jr.

Florence City Council, 1515 Heritage Lane

Florence, SC 29505

(c) Thomas C. Stanton, President

Francis Marion College, Box F7500

Florence, SC 29501-0056

(d) Andre' Lewis, President

Victory Savings Bank, 1545 Sumter St.

Columbia, SC 29202

(e) D. M. McEachin, Jr., Esquire

P.O. Box 4337, Florence, SC 29502-1337

Q. MR. JOHNSON, HAVE YOU HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK OVER THE SUMMARY OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE THAT YOU SUBMITTED
A. YES, SIR.
Q. HAVE YOU FOUND ANYTHING THAT WE NEED TO CLEAR UP OR CORRECT THAT WAS INCORRECT ON THE FACE OF THAT?
A. THE ONLY THING I FOUND, SIR, WAS A REFERENCE TO MY HAVING LOST MY DRIVER'S LICENSE AT SOME EARLIER POINT; AND I WROTE THE COMMITTEE A LETTER TO THE EFFECT THAT I HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY SUCH INCIDENT AND THAT I DID NOT RECEIVE A NOTICE OF ANY SUCH SUSPENSION AS IS REQUIRED BY SOUTH CAROLINA LAW.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR.
A. I ALSO ADDED THAT I HAVE A SON NAMED MORDECAI C. JOHNSON AND IT COULD REFER TO HIM; I DON'T KNOW.
Q. OKAY, THANK YOU VERY MUCH. YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR THE CIRCUIT COURT AT LARGE SEAT NUMBER 7 THAT WAS RECENTLY CREATED BY THE LEGISLATURE; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR, WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED--EXCUSE ME--IN CHECKING WITH THE LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT, BOTH FLORENCE COUNTY AND THE CITIES OR TOWNS OF FLORENCE AND EFFINGHAM; WE ALSO CHECKED WITH SLED, THEIR RECORDS SECTION CHECK; AND THE FBI WAS MAILED A FINGERPRINT CARD OF YOURS. WE CHECKED THE JUDGMENTS AND LAWSUITS IN THE RECORDS OF FLORENCE COUNTY, AS WELL AS WITH THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM HERE IN SOUTH CAROLINA. IN DOING THAT CHECK WE CAME ACROSS A FEW LAWSUITS IN WHICH YOU WERE A PARTY AND I WOULD JUST LIKE TO GO THROUGH THOSE---
A. YES, SIR.
Q. ---AND ALLOW YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN THOSE TO THE COMMITTEE. THERE WERE TWO FEDERAL COURT ACTIONS IN WHICH YOU WERE, I BELIEVE, A NAMED PLAINTIFF; ONE IN 1972, MORDECAI C. JOHNSON VERSUS GOVERNOR JOHN WEST, ET AL. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THAT CASE?
A. YES, SIR. I DON'T--I DID NOT RESEARCH THE RECORDS ON THAT BUT I WAS AT THE TIME VERY ACTIVE POLITICALLY. I WAS ACTIVE IN A PARTY THAT WAS A NEWLY CREATED PARTY AT THAT TIME CALLED THE UNITED CITIZENS PARTY; AND I THINK I'M CORRECT, I DID NOT CHECK THE RECORDS BUT I THINK I'M CORRECT THAT I WAS ONE OF A NUMBER OF PLAINTIFFS WHO SUED TO PLACE THE NAME OF OUR CANDIDATE ON THE BALLOT. I BELIEVE OUR CANDIDATE WAS RUNNING FOR GOVERNOR OR LT. GOVERNOR, MR. BROADWATER WHO IS AN ATTORNEY HERE IN FLORENCE AND SERVED IN THE LEGISLATURE AND A METHODIST MINISTER. AND I THINK I'M CORRECT THAT THAT WAS THE PURPOSE OF THAT LAWSUIT.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR, AND THERE WAS ANOTHER ONE IN 1974, MORDECAI C. JOHNSON, JR., EL AL VERSUS THE FLORENCE SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE.
A. YES, SIR. THAT WAS A LAWSUIT THAT I BROUGHT ON BEHALF OF MY CHILDREN. I WAS NOT A LITIGANT IN THAT CASE. I WAS A LAWYER FOR THE PLAINTIFFS BUT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE MY CHILDREN AND WE WERE SEEKING TO REQUIRE THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF FLORENCE OR FLORENCE SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER ONE TO PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION TO MY CHILDREN. I AM, FOR THE RECORD, A BLACK PERSON AND AT THAT TIME WE WERE IN THE MIDDLE OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION AND MY CHILDREN--THEY HAD A PLAN IN WHICH YOU COULD CHOOSE TO GO TO A WHITE SCHOOL IF YOU WERE BLACK; MY CHILDREN CHOSE THAT SCHOOL BUT WE HAD A PROBLEM GETTING TRANSPORTATION AND I HAD TO HAUL THEM BACK AND FORTH; SO, WE SUED THE SCHOOL DISTRICT IN ORDER TO FORCE THEM TO PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION. THE FEDERAL JUDGE DID REQUIRE THEM TO PROVIDE TRANSPORTATION FOR THE CHILDREN.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. AS FAR AS STATE COURT ACTIONS, IN 1981, I BELIEVE, DAWTRY VERSUS JOHNSON; THERE WAS A DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR $1,538.83. IN 1983 THERE WAS A DISMISSAL OF THAT CASE AND IT WAS PUT BACK ON THE ACTIVE ROSTER. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THAT ACTION?
A. AS I RECALL A DR. DAWTRY WHO PROVIDED SOME DENTAL SERVICES FOR MY DAUGHTER AND WE SETTLED THAT CASE. WE PAID HIM AN AMOUNT OF MONEY. THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN A DISMISSAL ON THAT CASE.
Q. YES, SIR, THERE WAS A DISMISSAL BUT THE RECORDS INDICATED THAT IT WAS PUT BACK ON THE ACTIVE ROSTER; BUT IT HAS SINCE BEEN SETTLED?
A. YES, SIR, THAT'S SETTLED.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. IN 1986 THERE WAS AN ENTRY FOR LANIER BUSINESS PRODUCTS, INC., VERSUS MORDECAI C. JOHNSON; I BELIEVE THERE WAS A SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT FOR $171 FILED, IS THAT CORRECT?
A. I DON'T HAVE--I DON'T REMEMBER THAT, BUT THAT COULD BE. YOU SAID THAT WAS '86 OR '76?
Q. 86.
A. '86; I'M SURE THAT HAS BEEN SETTLED IF THERE WAS ANY SUCH JUDGMENT.
Q. ALL RIGHT, AND ONE OTHER ONE--WELL, EXCUSE ME--TWO OTHER ONES: 1984, JOHNSON VERSUS FLORENCE COUNTY AND CITY DEMOCRATIC PARTIES. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION FILED ON THAT THAT BASICALLY, AND YOU TELL ME IF I GET THIS RIGHT--YOU WERE RESTRAINED FROM OFFERING OR CAMPAIGNING FOR A FLORENCE CITY COUNCIL SEAT IN A GENERAL ELECTION AFTER YOU HAD BEEN DEFEATED IN THE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY; IS THAT---
Q. THAT WAS A--WHAT IS THE NAME OF THAT CASE?
Q. JOHNSON VERSUS FLORENCE COUNTY AND CITY DEMOCRATIC PARTIES.
A. YES, SIR. IS THAT--IS THAT A SUPREME COURT CASE YOU ARE REFERRING TO OR---
Q. STATE SUPREME COURT, YES, SIR.
A. I THINK I'M CORRECT THAT THAT CASE AT LEAST BEGAN AS A DEMOCRATIC, CITY AND COUNTY DEMOCRATIC PARTY AGAINST JOHNSON; AND THAT WAS AN ACTION IN WHICH I HAD OFFERED FOR RE-ELECTION TO THE FLORENCE CITY COUNCIL. EXCUSE ME, I HAVE GOT A VERY BAD SINUS PROBLEM. I HAD OFFERED FOR REELECTION FOR THE FLORENCE CITY COUNCIL AND I LOST BY A VERY SMALL MARGIN IN THAT REELECTION. MY NAME WAS THEN PUT FORWARD AS A PETITION CANDIDATE. SOME OF MY PEOPLE COLLECTED THE REQUIRED NUMBER OF PETITIONS AND PLACED MY NAME ON THE BALLOT. THE CITY AND COUNTY DEMOCRATIC PARTY CHAIRMAN SUED ME SEEKING AN ORDER FROM THE COURT THAT MY NAME SHOULD NOT BE ON THAT BALLOT; AND THAT WAS HEARD BY JUDGE RALPH ANDERSON, WHO RULED IN FAVOR OF THE PARTY. WE APPEALED THAT, ALLEGING NUMEROUS ERRORS, TO THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT AND THE COURT RULED THAT JUDGE ANDERSON WAS CORRECT. SINCE THAT TIME THE--THEY SUED ON THE BASIS OF THE LOYALTY OATH PLEDGE AND SINCE THAT TIME THAT PLEDGE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY AMENDED.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR; IN 1988 THERE WAS ALSO A CASE MOYD VERSUS JOHNSON AND CAIN.
A. C-A-I-N, CAIN.
Q. YES, SIR. I BELIEVE YOU WERE SUED BY A DARLINGTON COUNTY SURGEON AFTER YOU HAD BEEN A PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL IN A MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTION, IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. AND THAT CASE WAS DISMISSED AGAINST YOU
A. YES, SIR. THAT WAS A CASE IN WHICH--NOW ALL OF THESE ARE MATTERS OF RECORD AND I AM GIVING YOU VERY, VERY BRIEF THUMBNAIL SKETCHES ON THEM. THAT WAS A CASE IN WHICH MR. CAIN AND I AS ATTORNEYS BROUGHT AN ACTION AGAINST THAT DOCTOR, ALLEGING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE. THE ACTION--AFTER WE GOT INTO THE CASE, WE DECIDED THAT WE COULD NOT SUSTAIN THE ACTION AND WE VOLUNTARILY DISMISSED IT AND THE DOCTOR THEN SUED, NOT HIS EX-PATIENT BUT SUED THE LAWYER OR LAWYERS, MR. CAIN AND ME, ALLEGING--MAKING VARIOUS ALLEGATIONS OF MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND OUTRAGE. THAT CASE WAS FIRST HEARD BY JUDGE WALLER, WHO RULED AGAINST US. THERE WAS NO LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA ON THAT QUESTION. THEN IT WAS HEARD BY JUDGE COTTINGHAM FROM BENNETTSVILLE AFTER THE COURT HAD RULED THAT A LAWYER COULD NOT BE SUED FOR TAKING ACTION ON BEHALF OF HIS CLIENT IF HE TOOK IT ON A GOOD FAITH ACTION. THAT CASE WENT TO THE COURT OF APPEALS WHICH AGREED WITH JUDGE COTTINGHAM AND IT WAS NEVER HEARD BY THE SUPREME COURT ON CERTIORARI. THEY ISSUED A MEMORANDUM OPINION AND THAT OPINION IS NOT REPORTED BUT THAT IS THE SUM AND SUBSTANCE OF WHAT THAT CASE WAS ABOUT. AND I WOULD BE HAPPY TO PROVIDE YOU WITH THAT OPINION, IF YOU WANT.
Q. I BELIEVE THAT'S SATISFACTORY. ALSO, AS YOU JUST NOTED, YOU SAID THAT ON THE DRIVER'S LICENSE CHECK WITH THE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT THAT YOU NEVER WERE AWARE THAT YOUR LICENSE HAD BEEN SUSPENDED OR RECEIVED ANY NOTICE OF THAT?
A. I HAVE BEEN DRIVING A CAR FOR 40 YEARS; I DON'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THAT.
Q. IS YOUR ADDRESS ROUTE 1, BOX 395; EFFINGHAM, SOUTH CAROLINA?
A. YES, SIR.
Q. DOES YOUR SON RESIDE THERE, TOO?
A. HE DID AT THAT TIME, SIR.
Q. IN 1987?
A. YES, SIR. I HAVE CHECKED--I HAVE ASKED HIM ABOUT IT. HE IS IN SAUDI ARABIA, TOO. BUT HE TELLS ME THAT HE DOESN'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THAT EITHER; SO, I JUST HAVE NO EXPLANATION ABOUT THAT.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR.
A. THE LAW, AS YOU KNOW, COUNSELOR, REQUIRES THAT THE DRIVER BE SENT A NOTICE OF SUSPENSION.
Q. YES, SIR.
A. AND I CAN SAY TO YOU HERE THAT I HAVE NEVER RECEIVED, I HAVE NO RECOLLECTION OF RECEIVING ANY NOTICE; AND MY SON TELLS ME HE HAS NO RECOLLECTION OF RECEIVING ANY SUCH NOTICE.
Q. AS FAR AS FINANCIAL INFORMATION, YOU SUBMITTED A STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST AS WELL AS A FINANCIAL NET WORTH STATEMENT AND BOTH OF THOSE APPEAR TO BE SATISFACTORY WITH NO CONFLICTS APPEARING, OR CONFLICTING INTEREST OR OBLIGATIONS. ON YOUR CREDIT REPORT IT WAS NOTED THAT THERE WAS AN UNPAID LIEN TO THE FLORENCE GENERAL HOSPITAL THAT APPEARED ON THAT REPORT; AND THERE HAD ALSO BEEN THREE OTHER LIENS BUT THOSE THREE OTHER LIENS HAD BEEN RELEASED. ARE YOU FAMILIAR WITH OR AWARE OF THE FLORENCE HOSPITAL LIEN?
A. NO, SIR.
Q. NO, SIR?
A. AS FAR AS I AM AWARE, I MEAN, I DON'T OWE FLORENCE GENERAL HOSPITAL ANY MONEY. I MAY HAVE AT SOME POINT, BUT I CERTAINLY DON'T OWE NO SUCH DEBT AT THIS TIME.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR. IN REGARD TO YOUR HEALTH YOU NOTED THAT YOU SUFFERED A HEART ATTACK IN 1979; IN 1989 THAT YOU WERE HOSPITALIZED FOR DIZZINESS; AND YOU ALSO MISSED THE HEARING OF DECEMBER 11TH BECAUSE YOU WERE HOSPITALIZED ON THAT DATE. WHAT IS THE STATUS OF YOUR HEALTH AT THIS--
A. I WAS DISCHARGED, I BELIEVE, ON THE DATE THAT THIS COMMITTEE WAS HAVING ITS HEARING. I AM, OF COURSE, A HEART PATIENT AND A HEART PATIENT IS ALWAYS A HEART PATIENT. YOU ARE ALWAYS UNDER THE CARE OF A PHYSICIAN. THE RESTRICTIONS ON ME WERE WITH RESPECT TO MY DIET, THAT I SHOULD WATCH MY SALT AND MY CHOLESTEROL; THAT I SHOULD NOT DO ANY HEAVY LIFTING; AND THAT I SHOULD DO AN EXERCISE REGIMEN AND TAKE MY MEDICINE.
Q. ALL RIGHT, SIR, THANK YOU. AS FAR AS EXPERIENCE, YOU NOTED THAT 75 PERCENT OF YOUR TRIAL WORK HAS BEEN BEFORE A JURY AND THAT THE BASIC BREAKDOWN OF YOUR EXPERIENCE IS 60 PERCENT CIVIL, 40 PERCENT--AND THAT ADDS UP TO 110 PERCENT--AND 10 PERCENT FAMILY. EITHER YOUR MATH WAS BAD OR MY MATH WAS BAD.
A. IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN 30, I SUPPOSE.
Q. AND YOU HAVE SERVED AS A MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE, ALSO; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR, I AM STILL SERVING.
Q. IS THAT FOR FLORENCE OR FOR EFFINGHAM?
A. FOR FLORENCE. THE LAW DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT YOU RESIDE IN THE CITY TO BE THE CITY JUDGE AND I DO NOT RESIDE IN THE CITY. I WAS ELECTED ON JANUARY 8TH, 1990, AND TOOK OFFICE ON MARCH THE 30TH, I BELIEVE, OR 31ST IN 1990, AND I'M STILL SERVING. OUR TERM WAS ORIGINALLY TO EXPIRE ON DECEMBER 31ST BUT HAS BEEN EXTENDED UNTIL JANUARY THE 28TH AT WHICH TIME THE CITY WILL REDUCE FROM THREE JUDGES TO TWO JUDGES.
Q. ALL RIGHT, MR. JOHNSON, I BELIEVE THIS IS THE FIRST TIME YOU HAVE BEEN SCREENED FOR A JUDICIAL POSITION STATEWIDE; IS THAT CORRECT?
A. YES, SIR, THAT'S CORRECT, SIR.
Q. THERE HAVE BEEN NO COMPLAINTS FILED IN REGARD TO YOUR CANDIDACY, NOR HAVE THERE BEEN ANY STATEMENTS RECEIVED, NOR HAVE ANY WITNESSES CONTACTED THIS COMMITTEE IN REGARD TO TESTIFYING AND I DON'T BELIEVE THERE ARE ANY WITNESSES HERE TO TESTIFY.

MR. BATES: MR. CHAIRMAN, I WOULD TURN IT BACK OVER TO YOU TO SEE IF ANY OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OF MR. JOHNSON.

SENATOR POPE: THANK YOU, COUNSEL. DOES ANYONE ELSE HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OF CANDIDATE MR. JOHNSON?

SENATOR POPE: ALL RIGHT, MR. JOHNSON, IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE---

REPRESENTATIVE GENTRY: MR. CHAIRMAN, EXCUSE ME.

SENATOR POPE: MR. GENTRY.

Q. MR. JOHNSON, I BELIEVE, DID YOU HAVE A HEART ATTACK IN 1989? OR 1979?
A. IN 1979; I HAD A HEART ATTACK IN 1979. AS FAR AS I KNOW, I DID NOT HAVE A HEART ATTACK EITHER IN 1989 OR IN 1990 BUT I DID GO BACK BECAUSE OF PERSISTENT CHEST PAINS. THE DOCTORS--YOU CAN HAVE CHEST PAINS FROM A VARIETY OF THINGS, I GATHER; BUT HEART PATIENTS ARE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS THAT IF YOU HAVE PERSISTENT CHEST PAINS THAT YOU TAKE YOUR MEDICATION AND THAT YOU SHOULD GET TO A DOCTOR OR GET TO A HOSPITAL IN A REASONABLE TIME, AND THAT'S WHAT I DID.
Q. YES, SIR. HAVE YOU HAD ANY OPERATIONS?
A. YOU MEAN--NO, SIR, I HAVE NOT. YOU MEAN SURGERY, OPEN HEART SURGERY?
Q. OR BYPASS OR ANYTHING?
A. NO, SIR, I HAVE NOT HAD THAT OPERATION. HE DID NOT RECOMMEND THAT. HE DIDN'T THINK THAT MY SITUATION WOULD JUSTIFY THAT.
Q. YOU TAKE MEDICATION FOR YOUR CONDITION?
A. YES, SIR.

SENATOR POPE: ANYONE ELSE GOT A QUESTION OF THE CANDIDATE.

SENATOR POPE: MR. JOHNSON, THANK YOU. IS THERE ANYTHING ELSE YOU WOULD LIKE TO ADD?
A. NO, SIR. THIS IS THE BRIEFEST HEARING I HAVE HAD IN MY LIFE.

SENATOR POPE: WELL, THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR BEING WITH US.
A. THANK YOU, GENTLEMEN, SO MUCH FOR HEARING ME.

SENATOR POPE: YES, SIR.
A. I WILL JUST ASK YOU ONE QUESTION: SHOULD I--AM I FREE TO GO OR SHOULD I WAIT HERE?

SENATOR POPE: IT'S YOUR CHOICE, BUT YOU ARE FREE TO GO. WE WON'T REQUIRE YOUR PRESENCE ANY FURTHER. IF YOU WOULD LIKE TO STAY FOR SOME REASON, THAT WOULD BE FINE BUT YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED.
A. ALL RIGHT, SIR.

SENATOR POPE: THANK YOU, SIR.

(EXECUTIVE SESSION OFF THE RECORD AT 4:45 P.M.; EXECUTIVE SESSION BACK ON THE RECORD AT 5:05 P.M.)

SENATOR POPE: WE ARE CALLING THE MEETING BACK FROM EXECUTIVE SESSION AND THE COMMITTEE ON MOTION OF THE SENATOR FROM CHARLESTON WILL MEET AGAIN AT 11:00 O'CLOCK TUESDAY MORNING AND WE WILL RESUME THIS MATTER. THE MEETING IS ADJOURNED.

(WHEREUPON, THE HEARING WAS ADJOURNED AT 5:06 P.M.)

The Judicial Screening Committee has reviewed and investigated the qualifications of the following candidates and makes certain findings of facts. Rep. Hodges did not participate in the screening of any of the candidates except for Mordecai Johnson and thus did not cast a vote in regard to qualification of any other candidate.

The following judges and active retired judges were unanimously found by the committee to be qualified to continue to serve:

The Hon. Alexander M. Sanders, Jr., Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals;
The Hon. Jasper M. Cureton, Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals;
The Hon. Ralph King Anderson, Circuit Court At-Large Seat #1;

The Hon. William T. Howell, Circuit Court At-Large Seat #2;

The Hon. M. Duane Shuler, Circuit Court At-Large Seat #3;
The Hon. Frank P. McGowan, Jr., Circuit Court At-Large Seat #4;

The Hon. James B. Stephen, Circuit Court At-Large Seat #5;

The Hon. James E. Lockemy, Circuit Court At-Large Seat #6;

The Hon. Walter J. Bristow, active retired Circuit Court Judge;

The Hon. James M. Morris, active retired Circuit Court Judge;
The Hon. William J. McLeod, active retired Family Court Judge, sitting as a special judge in the Circuit and Family Courts;
Costa M. Pleicones, candidate for Seat #3, Fifth Judicial Circuit;
The Hon. Louis E. Condon, candidate for Seat #3, Ninth Judicial Circuit;
Vic Rawl, candidate for Seat #3, Ninth Judicial Circuit;
Ernest Hamilton, candidate for Seat #3, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit;
The Hon. Willie T. Smith, candidate for Seat #3, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit;
The Hon. Jackson Gregory, candidate for Seat #2, Fourteenth Judicial Circuit;
The Hon. John L. Breeden, Jr., candidate for Seat #2, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit;
The Hon. David H. Maring, candidate for Seat #2, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit;
The Hon. H. Dean Hall, candidate for Circuit Court At-Large Seat #7;
Mordecai C. Johnson, candidate for Circuit Court At-Large Seat #7;
Clyde N. Davis, Jr., candidate for Circuit Court At-Large Seat #8;
The Hon. Paul Short, Jr., candidate for Circuit Court At-Large Seat #8;
Wheeler Tillman, candidate for Circuit Court At-Large Seat #8;
The Hon. Mark Westbrook, candidate for Circuit Court At-Large Seat #8;
Lee Alford, candidate for Circuit Court At-Large Seat #9;
Thomas C. Dillard, candidate for Circuit Court At-Large Seat #9;
Vinton D. Lide, candidate for Circuit Court At-Large Seat #9;
Henry McKellar, candidate for Circuit Court At-Large Seat #9;
George O'Kelley, candidate for Circuit Court At-Large Seat #9
The Hon. Joseph A. Wilson, candidate for Circuit Court At-Large Seat #10.

In the Screening of the Hon. S. Norwood Gasque, retired Family Court Judge, Mr. Bunyan W. Anderson testified that Judge Gasque mishandled a divorce action in which Mr. Anderson was a party. Specifically, he charged that Judge Gasque made an ex parte communication with his ex-wife's attorney, made a threat of contempt, refused to allow a hearing to settle the record to be recorded, and made errors in orders issued in the case. Eugene Rogers, Esq., attorney for Mrs. Anderson in the divorce case, also testified. Mr. Rogers told the committee that there had been no illegal or unethical conduct on his or Judge Gasque's part in the case, that there had been several appeals in the case as well as other review of the case, and that at no time was there any finding or holding that Judge Gasque had acted improperly in his judicial capacity.

Upon review of the cumulative evidence presented to the committee in regard to the screening of Judge S. Norwood Gasque the Judicial Screening Committee unanimously, with the exception of Chairman Rogers who recused himself on the basis of having previously represented Mr. Anderson in unrelated matters, finds him qualified to serve at the direction of the Chief Justice as an active retired Family Court judge.

Witnesses also testified during the screening of the Hon. Frank Eppes, active retired Circuit Court judge. Dr. Robert Morrow, D.D.S., Mr. Mark Owen, Ms. Ginger Owen, and Mr. Jim Grego testified that they believed Judge Eppes to be unqualified to serve on the bench. D.J. Stratos, Esq., Randolph Murdaugh, Jr., Esq., and Joseph P. Mizzell, Jr., Esq., Solicitor of the First Circuit, testified on the judge's behalf.

The testimony of Dr. Morrow, Mr. Owen, and Ms. Owen related to the sentencing of a man who pled guilty to the criminal sexual assault of the Owen's five year old child. Judge Eppes gave the defendant a suspended sentence, ordering restitution. Eppes later told Mr. Owen, in the presence of some members of the jury venire which included Dr. Morrow, that Owen could have killed the defendant for his act because no jury would convict the father of the molested child. Mr. Grego testified that Judge Eppes was too lenient in his sentencing practices and lacked professionalism in his conduct. Mr. Grego submitted to the committee a booklet with newspaper articles relating to Judge Eppes, affidavits by the above-mentioned witnesses and others, and sentencing statistics compiled by members of Citizens Against Violent Crime (CAVE) from Charleston County during a term of court in which Judge Eppes was presiding.

The attorneys testifying on behalf of Judge Eppes told the committee of their observations of and experiences with the judge over several decades and praised him for his even-handedness and judicial abilities and temperament.

Upon review of the cumulative evidence submitted, the committee voted 7-1 in favor of finding Judge Frank Eppes qualified to continue to serve as an active retired Circuit Court judge at the Chief Justice's direction. Those voting favorably were Senators J. Martin, Lourie, and Pope, and Representatives Rogers, McEachin, Gentry, and D. Martin. Voting to find the judge unqualified was Senator McConnell.

Senator McConnell, in his dissent of the vote of qualification, stated his specific reasons for his vote as follows:

I based my vote on Judge Eppes on the handling of the sentencing in the sexual assault case and the testimony of the witnesses, including Judge Eppes' explanation of the circumstances. Frankly, I was dismayed that he would make remarks directed negatively toward one of the parents in his explanation for why he did not require a person who was pleading guilty of sexual assault to serve some time behind bars. That had nothing to do with the issue of guilt and the adequacy of the sentence. I was also impressed by the observation of C.A.V.E. which summarized their analysis of Judge Eppes' sentencing performance on the bench. In the matter of Judge Eppes, we are dealing with a retired judge who is being called back to the bench on occasions. There is not an opportunity for legislators other than in this vote to vote yes or no on Judge Eppes' reelection as we would do with sitting judges. If such were the case, I would vote no. Because this is my only opportunity to cast my vote, I must, judging his qualifications, vote no.

The majority resolved that it was unfair to allow an individual case to be the basis for judging qualification. The majority noted that Judge Eppes is responsible for sentencing a higher percentage of inmates currently incarcerated in the state prison system than any other judge and that Judge Eppes was endorsed for qualification by a resolution of the state's solicitors.

In the screening of the Hon. Larry Patterson, candidate for Seat #3, Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, several persons testified or offered affidavits in opposition to and in support of Judge Patterson's qualification.

Testifying in opposition to Judge Patterson were Charleston attorneys Michael Wood, Daniel Norfleet, Margaret Fabri, and Anthony O'Neill. Attorney Joel Bailey of Beaufort submitted an affidavit for the record, but was unable to attend the hearing because of a conflicting trial date in federal court. These witnesses testified that while Judge Patterson served as Administrative Judge for the Family Court in Charleston County, he made ex parte communications with opposing counsel, made inappropriate comments to litigants and attorneys from the bench, made inconsistent rulings, and lacked the judgment and intellect necessary to be a capable jurist.

Testifying favorably for Judge Patterson were former Chief Justice Julius Ness, attorneys Mark Andrews, Dan David, and John Bradley of Charleston, and attorneys Jeffrey Marion, Wally Mullinax, and Pat Paschal of Greenville. These witnesses addressed some of the specific allegations heard against Judge Patterson as well as made general statements of praise and approval. An affidavit responding to the allegations made in Mr. Bailey's affidavit was submitted by Judge Patterson as well as several affidavits from other members of the bar.

It is the finding of the Committee that the unfavorable testimony regarding Judge Patterson was the result of personality conflicts between the Judge and those witnesses or frustration by disgruntled litigants and counsel disappointed with the outcome of proceedings they appeared in before Judge Patterson. Upon review of the cumulative evidence presented to the Committee in regard to the screening of Judge Larry Patterson the Judicial Screening Committee unanimously finds him qualified as a candidate for the Circuit Court.

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Sen. Thomas H. Pope, III, Chairman
/s/ Rep. Larry E. Gentry, Vice Chairman
/s/ Sen. John A. Martin
/s/ Sen. Isadore E. Lourie
/s/ Sen. Glenn F. McConnell
/s/ Rep. Daniel E. Martin, Sr.
/s/ Rep. B.L. Hendricks
/s/ Rep. James H. Hodges

(On motion of Senator POPE, with unanimous consent, ordered printed in the Journal.)

The following Bill having been read the second time was passed and ordered to a third reading:

S. 574 -- Senators McGill and Hinds: A BILL TO AMEND ARTICLE 12, CHAPTER 11, TITLE 50, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO PROTECTION OF GAME, BY ADDING SECTION 50-11-2415, SO AS TO PERMIT RUBBER PADDED STEEL FOOT-HOLD TRAPS TO BE USED IN GAME ZONE 9 TO CAPTURE FOX.

(By prior motion of Senator McGill, with unanimous consent)

By prior motion of Senator WILLIAMS, the Senate agreed that when the Senate adjourned on Friday, that it stand adjourned to meet on Tuesday, February 5, 1991, at 12:00 Noon.

At 11:16 A.M., on motion of Senator GIESE, the Senate adjourned to meet next Tuesday, February 5, 1991, at 12:00 Noon.

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