H 4311 Session 113 (1999-2000)
H 4311 General Bill, By Sandifer and Emory
Similar(S 951)
A BILL TO AMEND SECTIONS 36-9-301 AND 36-9-312, BOTH AS AMENDED, CODE OF LAWS
OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BOTH RELATING TO ESTABLISHING PRIORITY OF A PURCHASE
MONEY SECURITY INTEREST IN COLLATERAL OTHER THAN INVENTORY, SO AS TO INCREASE
THE "GRACE PERIOD" FOR FILING FROM TEN DAYS TO TWENTY DAYS.
12/01/99 House Prefiled
12/01/99 House Referred to Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry
01/11/00 House Introduced and read first time HJ-416
01/11/00 House Referred to Committee on Labor, Commerce and
Industry HJ-416
02/09/00 House Committee report: Favorable Labor, Commerce and
Industry HJ-4
02/15/00 House Requests for debate-Rep(s). Knotts, Trotter,
Fleming, Easterday, Seithel, Dantzler, Frye,
Sandifer, Huggins, Hinson and Whatley HJ-34
02/22/00 House Read second time HJ-30
02/22/00 House Roll call Yeas-79 Nays-0 HJ-31
02/23/00 House Read third time and sent to Senate HJ-16
02/24/00 Senate Introduced and read first time SJ-5
02/24/00 Senate Referred to Committee on Judiciary SJ-5
05/24/00 Senate Committee report: Favorable with amendment
Judiciary SJ-15
Indicates Matter Stricken
Indicates New Matter
COMMITTEE REPORT
May 24, 2000
H. 4311
Introduced by Reps. Sandifer and Emory
S. Printed 5/24/00--S. [ORDERED NOT TO BE PRINTED]
Read the first time February 24, 2000.
THE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
To whom was referred a Bill (H. 4311), to amend Sections 36-9-301 and 36-9-312, both as amended, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, both relating to establishing priority of a purchase money security interest in collateral, etc., respectfully
REPORT:
That they have duly and carefully considered the same, and recommend that the same do pass with amendment:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking all after the enacting words and inserting:
/ SECTION 1. COPYRIGHT (c) 2000 BY THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COPYRIGHT (c) 2000 SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE. The South Carolina Reporters' Comments contained in Articles 2A, 8, and 9 of Title 36, may not be reproduced in whole or in part in any form or for inclusion in any material which is offered for sale without the express written permission of the Clerk of the South Carolina Senate.
SECTION 2. Title 36 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
"CHAPTER 2A
Commercial Code - Leases
________
Introduction
Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, along with Conforming Amendments to Articles 1 and 9, is presented, upon the recommendation of the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, by the National Conference for Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute. It represents a major development in commercial law, addressing a type of business transaction, the leasing of personal property, that has long existed. Under present law, transactions of this type are governed partly by common law principles relating to personal property, partly by principles relating to real estate leases, and partly by reference to Articles 2 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, dealing with Sales and Secured Transactions respectively. The legal rules and concepts derived from these sources imperfectly fit a transaction that involves personal property rather than realty, and a lease rather than either a sale or a security interest as such. A statute directly addressing the personal property lease is therefore appropriate.
Such a statute has become especially appropriate with the exponential expansion of the number and scale of personal property lease transactions. Article 2A will apply to transactions involving billions of dollars annually. It will apply to consumer's rental of automobiles or do-it-yourself equipment, on the one hand, and to leases of such items as commercial aircraft (to the extent not preempted by federal law) and industrial machinery, on the other. The text recognizes the differences between consumer and business leasing, while resting upon concepts that apply generally to any personal property lease transactions.
The final product represents an important undertaking of the Conference and the Institute. It has proceeded, following recommendations by the Conference's Study Committee in 1981, through preparation and review by the Conference's Drafting Committee first of a proposed free-standing Uniform Personal Property Leasing Act, which was approved by the Conference, and later of Article 2A, which proceeded through the Permanent Editorial Board, the Executive Committee of the Conference, the Conference, and the Council of the Institute and the Annual Meeting of the members of the Institute. Carrying the text through these several stages has required coordination of somewhat different procedures, and continued patience and mutual forbearance. At the same time, the text has been subjected to analysis and criticism from many points of view and thereby steadily improved.
The resulting product borrows from both Articles 2 and 9. These existing Articles of the Uniform Commercial Code have certain imperfections revealed by the long experience since their adoption. Article 2A cannot overcome those imperfections but seeks to minimize their significance as applied to leases. More fundamentally, there is important conceptual dissonance between Article 2 and Article 9. The formulation of Article 2A takes Articles 2 and 9 as they are for the time being and hence has required careful adjustment to this dissonance.
Part 1
General Provisions
Section 36-2A-101. Short title.
This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Commercial Code - Leases.
Official Comment
Rationale for Codification: There are several reasons for codifying the law with respect to leases of goods. An analysis of the case law as it applies to leases of goods suggests at least three significant issues to be resolved by codification. First, what is a lease? It is necessary to define lease to determine whether a transaction creates a lease or a security interest disguised as a lease. If the transaction creates a security interest disguised as a lease, the lessor will be required to file a financing statement or take other action to perfect its interest in the goods against third parties. There is no such requirement with respect to leases. Yet the distinction between a lease and a security interest disguised as a lease is not clear. Second, will the lessor be deemed to have made warranties to the lessee? If the transaction is a sale the express and implied warranties of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code apply. However, the warranty law with respect to leases is uncertain. Third, what remedies are available to the lessor upon the lessee's default? If the transaction is a security interest disguised as a lease, the answer is stated in Part 5 of the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9). There is no clear answer with respect to leases.
There are reasons to codify the law with respect to leases of goods in addition to those suggested by a review of the reported cases. The answer to this important question should not be limited to the issues raised in these cases. Is it not also proper to determine the remedies available to the lessee upon the lessor's default? It is, but that issue is not reached through a review of the reported cases. This is only one of the many issues presented in structuring, negotiating and documenting a lease of goods.
Statutory Analogue: After it was decided to proceed with the codification project, the drafting committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws looked for a statutory analogue, gradually narrowing the focus to the Article on Sales (Article 2) and the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9). A review of the literature with respect to the sale of goods reveals that Article 2 is predicated upon certain assumptions: Parties to the sales transaction frequently are without counsel; the agreement of the parties often is oral or evidenced by scant writings; obligations between the parties are bilateral; applicable law is influenced by the need to preserve freedom of contract. A review of the literature with respect to personal property security law reveals that Article 9 is predicated upon very different assumptions: Parties to a secured transaction regularly are represented by counsel; the agreement of the parties frequently is reduced to a writing, extensive in scope; the obligations between the parties are essentially unilateral; and applicable law seriously limits freedom of contract.
The lease is closer in spirit and form to the sale of goods than to the creation of a security interest. While parties to a lease are sometimes represented by counsel and their agreement is often reduced to a writing, the obligations of the parties are bilateral and the common law of leasing is dominated by the need to preserve freedom of contract. Thus the drafting committee concluded that Article 2 was the appropriate statutory analogue.
Issues: The drafting committee then identified and resolved several issues critical to codification:
Scope: The scope of the Article was limited to leases (Section 2A-102). There was no need to include leases intended as security, i.e., security interests disguised as leases, as they are adequately treated in Article 9. Further, even if leases intended as security were included, the need to preserve the distinction would remain, as policy suggests treatment significantly different from that accorded leases.
Definition of Lease: Lease was defined to exclude leases intended as security (Section 2A-103(1)(j)). Given the litigation to date a revised definition of security interest was suggested for inclusion in the Act. (Section 1-201(37)). This revision sharpens the distinction between leases and security interests disguised as leases.
Filing: The lessor was not required to file a financing statement against the lessee or take any other action to protect the lessor's interest in the goods (Section 2A-301). The refined definition of security interest will more clearly signal the need to file to potential lessors of goods. Those lessors who are concerned will file a protective financing statement (Section 9-408).
Warranties: All of the express and implied warranties of the Article on Sales (Article 2) were included (Sections 2A-210 through 2A-216), revised to reflect differences in lease transactions. The lease of goods is sufficiently similar to the sale of goods to justify this decision. Further, many courts have reached the same decision.
Certificate of Title Laws: Many leasing transactions involve goods subject to certificate of title statutes. To avoid conflict with those statutes, this Article is subject to them (Section 2A-104(1)(a)).
Consumer Leases: Many leasing transactions involve parties subject to consumer protection statutes or decisions. To avoid conflict with those laws this Article is subject to them to the extent provided in Section 2A-104(1)(c) and (2). Further, certain consumer protections have been incorporated in the Article.
Finance Leases: Certain leasing transactions substitute the supplier of the goods for the lessor as the party responsible to the lessee with respect to warranties and the like. The definition of finance lease (Section 2A-103(1)(g)) was developed to describe these transactions. Various sections of the Article implement the substitution of the supplier for the lessor, including Sections 2A-209 and 2A-407. No attempt was made to fashion a special rule where the finance lessor is an affiliate of the supplier of goods; this is to be developed by the courts, case by case.
Sale and Leaseback: Sale and leaseback transactions are becoming increasingly common. A number of state statutes treat transactions where possession is retained by the seller as fraudulent per se or prima facie fraudulent. That position is not in accord with modern practice and thus is changed by the Article "if the buyer bought for value and in good faith" (Section 2A-308(3)).
Remedies: The Article has not only provided for lessor's remedies upon default by the lessee (Sections 2A-523 through 2A-531), but also for lessee's remedies upon default by the lessor (Sections 2A-508 through 2A-522). This is a significant departure from Article 9, which provides remedies only for the secured party upon default by the debtor. This difference is compelled by the bilateral nature of the obligations between the parties to a lease.
Damages: Many leasing transactions are predicated on the parties' ability to stipulate an appropriate measure of damages in the event of default. The rule with respect to sales of goods (Section 2-718) is not sufficiently flexible to accommodate this practice. Consistent with the common law emphasis upon freedom to contract, the Article has created a revised rule that allows greater flexibility with respect to leases of goods (Section 2A-504(1)).
History: This Article is a revision of the Uniform Personal Property Leasing Act, which was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August, 1985. However, it was believed that the subject matter of the Uniform Personal Property Leasing Act would be better treated as an Article of this Act. Thus, although the Conference promulgated the Uniform Personal Property Leasing Act as a Uniform Law, activity was held in abeyance to allow time to restate the Uniform Personal Property Leasing Act as Article 2A.
In August, 1986 the Conference approved and recommended this Article (including conforming amendments to Article 1 and Article 9) for promulgation as an amendment to this Act. In December, 1986 the Council of the American Law Institute approved and recommended this Article (including conforming amendments to Article 1 and Article 9), with Official Comments, for promulgation as an amendment to this Act. In March, 1987 the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code approved and recommended this Article (including conforming amendments to Article 1 and Article 9), with Official Comments, for promulgation as an amendment to this Act. In May, 1987 the American Law Institute approved and recommended this Article (including conforming amendments to Article 1 and Article 9), with Official Comments, for promulgation as an amendment to this Act. In August, 1987 the Conference confirmed its approval of the final text of this Article.
Upon its initial promulgation, Article 2A was rapidly enacted in several states, was introduced in a number of other states, and underwent bar association, law revision commission and legislative study in still further states. In that process debate emerged, principally sparked by the study of Article 2A by the California Bar Association, California's non-uniform amendments to Article 2A, and Articles appearing in a symposium on Article 2A published after its promulgation in the Alabama Law Review. The debate chiefly centered on whether Article 2A had struck the proper balance or was clear enough concerning the ability of a lessor to grant a security interest in its leasehold interest and in the residual, priority between a secured party and the lessee, and the lessor's remedy structure under Article 2A.
This debate over issues on which reasonable minds could and did differ began to affect the enactment effort for Article 2A in a deleterious manner. Consequently, the Standby Committee for Article 2A, composed predominantly of the former members of the drafting committee, reviewed the legislative actions and studies in the various states, and opened a dialogue with the principal proponents of the non-uniform amendments. Negotiations were conducted in conjunction with, and were facilitated by, a study of the uniform Article and the non-uniform Amendments by the New York Law Revision Commission. Ultimately, a consensus was reached, which has been approved by the membership of the Conference, the Permanent Editorial Board, and the Council of the Institute. Rapid and uniform enactment of Article 2A is expected as a result of the completed amendments. The Article 2A experience reaffirms the essential viability of the procedures of the Conference and the Institute for creating and updating uniform state law in the commercial law area.
Relationship of Article 2A to Other Articles: The Article on Sales provided a useful point of reference for codifying the law of leases. Many of the provisions of that Article were carried over, changed to reflect differences in style, leasing terminology or leasing practices. Thus, the Official Comments to those sections of Article 2 whose provisions were carried over are incorporated by reference in Article 2A, as well; further, any case law interpreting those provisions should be viewed as persuasive but not binding on a court when deciding a similar issue with respect to leases. Any change in the sequence that has been made when carrying over a provision from Article 2 should be viewed as a matter of style, not substance. This is not to suggest that in other instances Article 2A did not also incorporate substantially revised provisions of Article 2, Article 9 or otherwise where the revision was driven by a concern over the substance; but for the lack of a mandate, the drafting committee might well have made the same or a similar change in the statutory analogue. Those sections in Article 2A include Sections 2A-104, 2A-105, 2A-106, 2A-108(2) and (4), 2A-109(2), 2A-208, 2A-214(2) and (3)(a), 2A-216, 2A-303, 2A-306, 2A-503, 2A-504(3)(b), 2A-506(2), and 2A-515. For lack of relevance or significance not all of the provisions of Article 2 were incorporated in Article 2A.
This codification was greatly influenced by the fundamental tenet of the common law as it has developed with respect to leases of goods: freedom of the parties to contract. Note that, like all other Articles of this Act, the principles of construction and interpretation contained in Article 1 are applicable throughout Article 2A (Section 2A-103(4)). These principles include the ability of the parties to vary the effect of the provisions of Article 2A, subject to certain limitations including those that relate to the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care (Section 1-102(3)). Consistent with those principles no negative inference is to be drawn by the episodic use of the phrase "unless otherwise agreed" in certain provisions of Article 2A. Section 1-102(4). Indeed, the contrary is true, as the general rule in the Act, including this Article, is that the effect of the Act's provisions may be varied by agreement. Section 1-102(3). This conclusion follows even where the statutory analogue contains the phrase and the correlative provision in Article 2A does not.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
The South Carolina enactment of Article 2A is the result of careful study by the South Carolina Law Institute at the behest of the Senate Judiciary Committee. South Carolina has adopted the uniform version of Article 2A, thus preserving the advantages of uniform commercial laws. The fundamental effects of adding Article 2A to the South Carolina Uniform Commercial Code are to extend the provisions of Article 2 governing sales of goods to analogous leasing transactions, to bring lease contracts within the scope of the general provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, and to bring South Carolina law back into conformity with the law of our sister states.
Section 36-2A-102. Scope.
This chapter applies to any transaction, regardless of form, that creates a lease.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 9-102(1). Throughout this Article, unless otherwise stated, references to "Section" are to other sections of this Act.
Changes: Substantially revised.
Purposes: This Article governs transactions as diverse as the lease of a hand tool to an individual for a few hours and the leveraged lease of a complex line of industrial equipment to a multi-national organization for a number of years.
To achieve that end it was necessary to provide that this Article applies to any transaction, regardless of form, that creates a lease. Since lease is defined as a transfer of an interest in goods (Section 2A-103(1)(j)) and goods is defined to include fixtures (Section 2A-103(1)(h)), application is limited to the extent the transaction relates to goods, including fixtures. Further, since the definition of lease does not include a sale (Section 2-106(1)) or retention or creation of a security interest (Section 1-201(37)), application is further limited; sales and security interests are governed by other Articles of this Act.
Finally, in recognition of the diversity of the transactions to be governed, the sophistication of many of the parties to these transactions, and the common law tradition as it applies to the bailment for hire or lease, freedom of contract has been preserved. DeKoven, Proceedings After Default by the Lessee Under a True Lease of Equipment, in 1C P. Coogan, W. Hogan, D. Vagts, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 29B.02[2] (1986). Thus, despite the extensive regulatory scheme established by this Article, the parties to a lease will be able to create private rules to govern their transaction. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-102(3). However, there are special rules in this Article governing consumer leases, as well as other state and federal statutes, that may further limit freedom of contract with respect to consumer leases.
A court may apply this Article by analogy to any transaction, regardless of form, that creates a lease of personal property other than goods, taking into account the expressed intentions of the parties to the transaction and any differences between a lease of goods and a lease of other property. Such application has precedent as the provisions of the Article on Sales (Article 2) have been applied by analogy to leases of goods. E.g., Hawkland, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on Equipment Leasing, 1972 Ill. L.F. 446; Murray, Under the Spreading Analogy of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 Fordham L. Rev. 447 (1971). Whether such application would be appropriate for other bailments of personal property, gratuitous or for hire, should be determined by the facts of each case. See Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 92 Wash. 2d 40, 46-48, 593 P.2d 1308, 1312 (1979).
Further, parties to a transaction creating a lease of personal property other than goods, or a bailment of personal property may provide by agreement that this Article applies. Upholding the parties' choice is consistent with the spirit of this Article.
Cross References: Sections 1-102(3), 1-201(37), Article 2, esp. Section 2-106(1), and Sections 2A-103(1)(h), 2A-103(1)(j) and 2A-103(4).
Definitional Cross Reference:
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
The South Carolina Supreme Court has declined to apply the provisions of Article 2 to all personal property leases by analogy. D&D Leasing Co. v. Gentry, 298 S.C. 342, 380 S.E.2d 823 (1989). Instead, South Carolina courts have analyzed the characteristics of a "lease" to determine if it was a true lease, governed by the common law prior to the enactment of Article 2A, or if that contract was in essence a sale, though in the form of a lease, properly governed by Article 2 and the general provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. See Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Way, 263 S.C. 101, 208 S.E.2d 31 (1974) (option to purchase leased equipment at the end of the lease upon payment of "relatively nominal" additional consideration, where the "true and real consideration for the sale of the goods" was the rental payments, rendered the "lease" a sale of goods governed by Article 2), and D&D Leasing Co. v. Gentry, supra (lease without any option to purchase the leased goods is a "true lease" and not subject to Article 2). Cf. Jones Leasing, Inc. v. Gene Phillips & Assoc., 282 S.C. 327, 318 S.E.2d 31 (Ct. App. 1984) (holding two automobile TRAC leases to be subject to Article 2 because "the lessee could at some point purchase the goods.").
No reported decisions of the South Carolina courts, however, analyze the distinction between a lease and a security interest disguised as a lease. This distinction is often not readily apparent. Revised Section 1-201(37) provides that whether a lease creates a security interest will depend on the economic realities of the transaction, particularly the economic life test. The distinction is important because if the lease is a security interest, the secured party (lessor) must comply with the filing and perfection requirements under Article 9 in order to maintain priority of interest in the subject property - and even then may have only a security interest and not ownership of the goods.
Section 36-2A-103. Definitions and index of definitions.
(1) In this chapter unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) 'Buyer in ordinary course of business' means a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest or leasehold interest of a third party in the goods, buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker. 'Buying' may be for cash or by exchange of other property or on secured or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or documents of title under a pre-existing contract for sale but does not include a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.
(b) 'Cancellation' occurs when either party puts an end to the lease contract for default by the other party.
(c) 'Commercial unit' means such a unit of goods as by commercial usage is a single whole for purposes of lease and division of which materially impairs its character or value on the market or in use. A commercial unit may be a single chapter, as a machine, or a set of chapters, as a suite of furniture or a line of machinery, or a quantity, as a gross or carload, or any other unit treated in use or in the relevant market as a single whole.
(d) 'Conforming' goods or performance under a lease contract means goods or performance that are in accordance with the obligations under the lease contract.
(e) 'Consumer lease' means a lease that a lessor regularly engaged in the business of leasing or selling makes to a lessee who is an individual and who takes under the lease primarily for a personal, family, or household purpose, if the total payments to be made under the lease contract, excluding payments for options to renew or buy, do not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars.
(f) 'Fault' means wrongful act, omission, breach, or default.
(g) 'Finance lease' means a lease with respect to which:
( i) the lessor does not select, manufacture, or supply the goods;
( ii) the lessor acquires the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods in connection with the lease; and
(iii) one of the following occurs:
(A) the lessee receives a copy of the contract by which the lessor acquired the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods before signing the lease contract;
(B) the lessee's approval of the contract by which the lessor acquired the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods is a condition to effectiveness of the lease contract;
(C) the lessee, before signing the lease contract, receives an accurate and complete statement designating the promises and warranties, and any disclaimers of warranties, limitations or modifications of remedies, or liquidated damages, including those of a third party, such as the manufacturer of the goods, provided to the lessor by the person supplying the goods in connection with or as part of the contract by which the lessor acquired the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods; or
(D) if the lease is not a consumer lease, the lessor, before the lessee signs the lease contract, informs the lessee in writing (i) of the identity of the person supplying the goods to the lessor, unless the lessee has selected that person and directed the lessor to acquire the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods from that person, (ii) that the lessee is entitled under this chapter to the promises and warranties, including those of any third party, provided to the lessor by the person supplying the goods in connection with or as part of the contract by which the lessor acquired the goods or the right to possession and use of the goods, and (iii) that the lessee may communicate with the person supplying the goods to the lessor and receive an accurate and complete statement of those promises and warranties, including any disclaimers and limitations of them or of remedies.
(h) 'Goods' means all things that are movable at the time of identification to the lease contract, or are fixtures (Section 36-2A-309), but the term does not include money, documents, instruments, accounts, chattel paper, general intangibles, or minerals or the like, including oil and gas, before extraction. The term also includes the unborn young of animals.
(i) 'Installment lease contract' means a lease contract that authorizes or requires the delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately accepted, even though the lease contract contains a clause 'each delivery is a separate lease' or its equivalent.
(j) 'Lease' means a transfer of the right to possession and use of goods for a term in return for consideration, but a sale, including a sale on approval or a sale or return, or retention or creation of a security interest is not a lease. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term includes a sublease.
(k) 'Lease agreement' means the bargain, with respect to the lease, of the lessor and the lessee in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance as provided in this chapter. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term includes a sublease agreement.
(l) 'Lease contract' means the total legal obligation that results from the lease agreement as affected by this chapter and any other applicable rules of law. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term includes a sublease contract.
(m) 'Leasehold interest' means the interest of the lessor or the lessee under a lease contract.
(n) 'Lessee' means a person who acquires the right to possession and use of goods under a lease. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term includes a sublessee.
(o) 'Lessee in ordinary course of business' means a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the lease to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest or leasehold interest of a third party in the goods leases in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling or leasing goods of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker. 'Leasing' may be for cash or by exchange of other property or on secured or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or documents of title under a pre-existing lease contract but does not include a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.
(p) 'Lessor' means a person who transfers the right to possession and use of goods under a lease. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term includes a sublessor.
(q) 'Lessor's residual interest' means the lessor's interest in the goods after expiration, termination, or cancellation of the lease contract.
(r) 'Lien' means a charge against or interest in goods to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, but the term does not include a security interest.
(s) 'Lot' means a parcel or a single article that is the subject matter of a separate lease or delivery, whether or not it is sufficient to perform the lease contract.
(t) 'Merchant lessee' means a lessee that is a merchant with respect to goods of the kind subject to the lease.
(u) 'Present value' means the amount as of a date certain of one or more sums payable in the future, discounted to the date certain. The discount is determined by the interest rate specified by the parties if the rate was not manifestly unreasonable at the time the transaction was entered into; otherwise, the discount is determined by a commercially reasonable rate that takes into account the facts and circumstances of each case at the time the transaction was entered into.
(v) 'Purchase' includes taking by sale, lease, mortgage, security interest, pledge, gift, or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in goods.
(w) 'Sublease' means a lease of goods the right to possession and use of which was acquired by the lessor as a lessee under an existing lease.
(x) 'Supplier' means a person from whom a lessor buys or leases goods to be leased under a finance lease.
(y) 'Supply contract' means a contract under which a lessor buys or leases goods to be leased.
(z) 'Termination' occurs when either party pursuant to a power created by agreement or law puts an end to the lease contract otherwise than for default.
(2) Other definitions applying to this chapter and the sections in which they appear are:
Accessions. Section 36-2A-310(1).
Construction mortgage. Section 36-2A-309(1)(d).
Encumbrance. Section 36-2A-309(1)(e).
Fixtures. Section 36-2A-309(1)(a).
Fixture filing. Section 36-2A-309(1)(b).
Purchase money lease. Section 36-2A-309(1)(c).
(3) The following definitions in other chapters apply to this chapter:
Account. Section 36-9-106.
Between merchants. Section 36-2-104(3).
Buyer. Section 36-2-103(1)(a).
Chattel paper. Section 36-9-105(1)(b).
Consumer goods. Section 36-9-109(1).
Document. Section 36-9-105(1)(f).
Entrusting. Section 36-2-403(3).
General intangibles. Section 36-9-106.
Good faith. Section 36-2-103(1)(b).
Instrument. Section 36-9-105(1)(i).
Merchant. Section 36-2-104(1).
Mortgage. Section 36-9-105(1)(j).
Pursuant to commitment. Section 36-9-105(1)(k).
Receipt. Section 36-2-103(1)(c).
Sale. Section 36-2-106(1).
Sale on approval. Section 36-2-326.
Sale or return. Section 36-2-326.
Seller. Section 36-2-103(1)(d).
(4) In addition, Chapter 1 contains general definitions and principles of construction and interpretation applicable throughout this chapter.
Official Comment
(a) "Buyer in ordinary course of business". Section 1-201(9).
(b) "Cancellation". Section 2-106(4). The effect of a cancellation is provided in Section 2A-505(1).
(c) "Commercial unit". Section 2-105(6).
(d) "Conforming". Section 2-106(2).
(e) "Consumer lease". New. This Article includes a subset of rules that applies only to consumer leases. Sections 2A-106, 2A-108(2), 2A-108(4), 2A-109(2), 2A-221, 2A-309, 2A-406, 2A-407, 2A-504(3)(b), and 2A-516(3)(b).
For a transaction to qualify as a consumer lease it must first qualify as a lease. Section 2A-103(1)(j). Note that this Article regulates the transactional elements of a lease, including a consumer lease; consumer protection statutes, present and future, and existing consumer protection decisions are unaffected by this Article. Section 2A-104(1)(c) and (2). Of course, Article 2A as state law also is subject to federal consumer protection law.
This definition is modeled after the definition of consumer lease in the Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1667 (1982), and in the Unif. Consumer Credit Code Section 1.301(14), 7A U.L.A. 43 (1974). However, this definition of consumer lease differs from its models in several respects: the lessor can be a person regularly engaged either in the business of leasing or of selling goods, the lease need not be for a term exceeding four months, a lease primarily for an agricultural purpose is not covered, and whether there should be a limitation by dollar amount and its amount is left up to the individual states.
This definition focuses on the parties as well as the transaction. If a lease is within this definition, the lessor must be regularly engaged in the business of leasing or selling, and the lessee must be an individual not an organization; note that a lease to two or more individuals having a common interest through marriage or the like is not excluded as a lease to an organization under Section 1-201(28). The lessee must take the interest primarily for a personal, family or household purpose. If required by the enacting state, total payments under the lease contract, excluding payments for options to renew or buy, cannot exceed the figure designated.
(f) "Fault". Section 1-201(16).
(g) "Finance Lease". New. This Article includes a subset of rules that applies only to finance leases. Sections 2A-209, 2A-211(2), 2A-212(1), 2A-213, 2A-219(1), 2A-220(1)(a), 2A-221, 2A-405(c), 2A-407, 2A-516(2) and 2A-517(1)(a) and (2).
For a transaction to qualify as a finance lease it must first qualify as a lease. Section 2A-103(1)(j). Unless the lessor is comfortable that the transaction will qualify as a finance lease, the lease agreement should include provisions giving the lessor the benefits created by the subset of rules applicable to the transaction that qualifies as a finance lease under this Article.
A finance lease is the product of a three party transaction. The supplier manufactures or supplies the goods pursuant to the lessee's specification, perhaps even pursuant to a purchase order, sales agreement or lease agreement between the supplier and the lessee. After the prospective finance lease is negotiated, a purchase order, sales agreement, or lease agreement is entered into by the lessor (as buyer or prime lessee) or an existing order, agreement or lease is assigned by the lessee to the lessor, and the lessor and the lessee then enter into a lease or sublease of the goods. Due to the limited function usually performed by the lessor, the lessee looks almost entirely to the supplier for representations, covenants and warranties. If a manufacturer's warranty carries through, the lessee may also look to that. Yet, this definition does not restrict the lessor's function solely to the supply of funds; if the lessor undertakes or performs other functions, express warranties, covenants and the common law will protect the lessee.
This definition focuses on the transaction, not the status of the parties; to avoid confusion it is important to note that in other contexts, e.g., tax and accounting, the term finance lease has been used to connote different types of lease transactions, including leases that are disguised secured transactions. M. Rice, Equipment Financing, 62-71 (1981). A lessor who is a merchant with respect to goods of the kind subject to the lease may be a lessor under a finance lease. Many leases that are leases back to the seller of goods (Section 2A-308(3)) will be finance leases. This conclusion is easily demonstrated by a hypothetical. Assume that B has bought goods from C pursuant to a sales contract. After delivery to and acceptance of the goods by B, B negotiates to sell the goods to A and simultaneously to lease the goods back from A, on terms and conditions that, we assume, will qualify the transaction as a lease. Section 2A-103(1)(j). In documenting the sale and lease back, B assigns the original sales contract between B, as buyer, and C, as seller, to A. A review of these facts leads to the conclusion that the lease from A to B qualifies as a finance lease, as all three conditions of the definition are satisfied. Subparagraph (i) is satisfied as A, the lessor, had nothing to do with the selection, manufacture, or supply of the equipment. Subparagraph (ii) is satisfied as A, the lessor, bought the equipment at the same time that A leased the equipment to B, which certainly is in connection with the lease. Finally, subparagraph (iii) (A) is satisfied as A entered into the sales contract with B at the same time that A leased the equipment back to B. B, the lessee, will have received a copy of the sales contract in a timely fashion.
Subsection (i) requires the lessor to remain outside the selection, manufacture and supply of the goods; that is the rationale for releasing the lessor from most of its traditional liability. The lessor is not prohibited from possession, maintenance or operation of the goods, as policy does not require such prohibition. To insure the lessee's reliance on the supplier, and not on the lessor, subsection (ii) requires that the goods (where the lessor is the buyer of the goods) or that the right to possession and use of the goods (where the lessor is the prime lessee and the sublessor of the goods) be acquired in connection with the lease (or sublease) to qualify as a finance lease. The scope of the phrase "in connection with" is to be developed by the courts, case by case. Finally, as the lessee generally relies almost entirely upon the supplier for representations and covenants, and upon the supplier or a manufacturer, or both, for warranties with respect to the goods, subsection (iii) requires that one of the following occur: (A) the lessee receive a copy of the supply contract before signing the lease contract; (B) the lessee's approval of the supply contract is a condition to the effectiveness of the lease contract; (C) the lessee receive a statement describing the promises and warranties and any limitations relevant to the lessee before signing the lease contract; or (D) before signing the lease contract and except in a consumer lease, the lessee receive a writing identifying the supplier (unless the supplier was selected and required by the lessee) and the rights of the lessee under Section 2A-209, and advising the lessee a statement of promises and warranties is available from the supplier. Thus, even where oral supply orders or computer placed supply orders are compelled by custom and usage the transaction may still qualify as a finance lease if the lessee approves the supply contract before the lease contract is effective and such approval was a condition to the effectiveness of the lease contract. Moreover, where the lessor does not want the lessee to see the entire supply contract, including price information, the lessee may be provided with a separate statement of the terms of the supply contract relevant to the lessee; promises between the supplier and the lessor that do not affect the lessee need not be included. The statement can be a restatement of those terms or a copy of portions of the supply contract with the relevant terms clearly designated. Any implied warranties need not be designated, but a disclaimer or modification of remedy must be designated. A copy of any manufacturer's warranty is sufficient if that is the warranty provided. However, a copy of any Regulation M disclosure given pursuant to 12 C.F.R. Section 213.4(g) concerning warranties in itself is not sufficient since those disclosures need only briefly identify express warranties and need not include any disclaimer of warranty.
If a transaction does not qualify as a finance lease, the parties may achieve the same result by agreement; no negative implications are to be drawn if the transaction does not qualify. Further, absent the application of special rules (fraud, duress, and the like), a lease that qualifies as a finance lease and is assigned by the lessor or the lessee to a third party does not lose its status as a finance lease under this Article. Finally, this Article creates no special rule where the lessor is an affiliate of the supplier; whether the transaction qualifies as a finance lease will be determined by the facts of each case.
(h) "Goods". Section 9-105(1)(h). See Section 2A-103(3) for reference to the definition of "Account", "Chattel paper", "Document", "General intangibles" and "Instrument". See Section 2A-217 for determination of the time and manner of identification.
(i) "Installment lease contract". Section 2-612(1).
(j) "Lease". New. There are several reasons to codify the law with respect to leases of goods. An analysis of the case law as it applies to leases of goods suggests at least several significant issues to be resolved by codification. First and foremost is the definition of a lease. It is necessary to define lease to determine whether a transaction creates a lease or a security interest disguised as a lease. If the transaction creates a security interest disguised as a lease, the transaction will be governed by the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9) and the lessor will be required to file a financing statement or take other action to perfect its interest in the goods against third parties. There is no such requirement with respect to leases under the common law and, except with respect to leases of fixtures (Section 2A-309), this Article imposes no such requirement. Yet the distinction between a lease and a security interest disguised as a lease is not clear from the case law at the time of the promulgation of this Article. DeKoven, Leases of Equipment: Puritan Leasing Company v. August, A Dangerous Decision, 12 U.S.F. L. Rev. 257 (1978).
At common law a lease of personal property is a bailment for hire. While there are several definitions of bailment for hire, all require a thing to be let and a price for the letting. Thus, in modern terms and as provided in this definition, a lease is created when the lessee agrees to furnish consideration for the right to the possession and use of goods over a specified period of time. Mooney, Personal Property Leasing: A Challenge, 36 Bus. Law. 1605, 1607 (1981). Further, a lease is neither a sale (Section 2-106(1)) nor a retention or creation of a security interest (Section 1-201(37)). Due to extensive litigation to distinguish true leases from security interests, an amendment to Section 1-201(37) has been promulgated with this Article to create a sharper distinction.
This section as well as Section 1-201(37) must be examined to determine whether the transaction in question creates a lease or a security interest. The following hypotheticals indicate the perimeters of the issue. Assume that A has purchased a number of copying machines, new, for $1,000 each; the machines have an estimated useful economic life of three years. A advertises that the machines are available to rent for a minimum of one month and that the monthly rental is $100.00. A intends to enter into leases where A provides all maintenance, without charge to the lessee. Further, the lessee will rent the machine, month to month, with no obligation to renew. At the end of the lease term the lessee will be obligated to return the machine to A's place of business. This transaction qualifies as a lease under the first half of the definition, for the transaction includes a transfer by A to a prospective lessee of possession and use of the machine for a stated term, month to month. The machines are goods (Section 2A-103(1)(h)). The lessee is obligated to pay consideration in return, $100.00 for each month of the term.
However, the second half of the definition provides that a sale or a security interest is not a lease. Since there is no passing of title, there is no sale. Sections 2A-103(3) and 2-106(1). Under pre-Act security law this transaction would have created a bailment for hire or a true lease and not a conditional sale. Da Rocha v. Macomber, 330 Mass. 611, 614-15, 116 N.E.2d 139, 142 (1953). Under Section 1-201(37), as amended with the promulgation of this Article, the same result would follow. While the lessee is obligated to pay rent for the one month term of the lease, one of the other four conditions of the second paragraph of Section 1-201(37) must be met and none is. The term of the lease is one month and the economic life of the machine is 36 months; thus, subparagraph (a) of Section 1-201(37) is not now satisfied. Considering the amount of the monthly rent, absent economic duress or coercion, the lessee is not bound either to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods or to become the owner. If the lessee did lease the machine for 36 months, the lessee would have paid the lessor $3,600 for a machine that could have been purchased for $1,000; thus, subparagraph (b) of Section 1-201(37) is not satisfied. Finally, there are no options; thus, subparagraphs (c) and (d) of Section 1-201(37) are not satisfied. This transaction creates a lease, not a security interest. However, with each renewal of the lease the facts and circumstances at the time of each renewal must be examined to determine if that conclusion remains accurate, as it is possible that a transaction that first creates a lease, later creates a security interest.
Assume that the facts are changed and that A requires each lessee to lease the goods for 36 months, with no right to terminate. Under pre-Act security law this transaction would have created a conditional sale, and not a bailment for hire or true lease. Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U.S. 664, 672-73 (1876). Under this subsection, and Section 1-201(37), as amended with the inclusion of this Article in the Act, the same result would follow. The lessee's obligation for the term is not subject to termination by the lessee and the term is equal to the economic life of the machine.
Between these extremes there are many transactions that can be created. Some of the transactions have not been properly categorized by the courts in applying the 1978 and earlier Official Texts of Section 1-201(37). This subsection, together with Section 1-201(37), as amended with the promulgation of this Article, draws a brighter line, which should create a clearer signal to the professional lessor and lessee.
(k) "Lease agreement". This definition is derived from the first sentence of Section 1-201(3). Because the definition of lease is broad enough to cover future transfers, lease agreement includes an agreement contemplating a current or subsequent transfer. Thus it was not necessary to make an express reference to an agreement for the future lease of goods (Section 2-106(1)). This concept is also incorporated in the definition of lease contract. Note that the definition of lease does not include transactions in ordinary building materials that are incorporated into an improvement on land. Section 2A-309(2).
The provisions of this Article, if applicable, determine whether a lease agreement has legal consequences; otherwise the law of bailments and other applicable law determine the same. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-103.
(l) "Lease contract". This definition is derived from the definition of contract in Section 1-201(11). Note that a lease contract may be for the future lease of goods, since this notion is included in the definition of lease.
(m) "Leasehold interest". New.
(n) "Lessee". New.
(o) "Lessee in ordinary course of business". Section 1-201(9).
(p) "Lessor". New.
(q) "Lessor's residual interest". New.
(r) "Lien". New. This term is used in Section 2A-307
(Priority of Liens Arising by Attachment or Levy on, Security Interests in, and Other Claims to Goods).
(s) "Lot". Section 2-105(5).
(t) "Merchant lessee". New. This term is used in Section 2A-511 (Merchant Lessee's Duties as to Rightfully Rejected Goods). A person may satisfy the requirement of dealing in goods of the kind subject to the lease as lessor, lessee, seller, or buyer.
(u) "Present value". New. Authorities agree that present value should be used to determine fairly the damages payable by the lessor or the lessee on default. E.g., Taylor v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 170 Ga. App. 322, 316 S.E.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1984). Present value is defined to mean an amount that represents the discounted value as of a date certain of one or more sums payable in the future. This is a function of the economic principle that a dollar today is more valuable to the holder than a dollar payable in two years. While there is no question as to the principle, reasonable people would differ as to the rate of discount to apply in determining the value of that future dollar today. To minimize litigation, this Article allows the parties to specify the discount or interest rate, if the rate was not manifestly unreasonable at the time the transaction was entered into. In all other cases, the interest rate will be a commercially reasonable rate that takes into account the facts and circumstances of each case, as of the time the transaction was entered into.
(v) "Purchase". Section 1-201(32). This definition omits the reference to lien contained in the definition of purchase in Article 1 (Section 1-201(32)). This should not be construed to exclude consensual liens from the definition of purchase in this Article; the exclusion was mandated by the scope of the definition of lien in Section 2A-103(1)(r). Further, the definition of purchaser in this Article adds a reference to lease; as purchase is defined in Section 1-201(32) to include any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property, this addition is not substantive.
(w) "Sublease". New.
(x) "Supplier". New.
(y) "Supply contract". New.
(z) "Termination". Section 2-106(3). The effect of a termination is provided in Section 2A-505(2).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Significant changes in South Carolina law are effected by the definitions of "Consumer lease" and "Finance lease" and the provisions throughout Article 2A relating to those terms, as is discussed generally in the Official Comment. The indexed $25,000.00 upper limit used in the definition of Consumer Lease is the same as that for consumer credit sales, Section 37-2-104(1)(e), and consumer leases, Section 37-2-106(1)(b), under the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code and is subject to the same indexing process, under Section 37-1-109, so that the upper limits will always be the same under all three definitions.
The definition of "Lease" is significant in determining the scope of application of Article 2A and Articles 2 and 9, as discussed in the South Carolina Reporter's Comment to the preceding section, 2A-102, and the Official Comment to this section.
"Present value" is a newly-defined concept relating to the calculation of damages; the definition permits the parties to specify a reasonable interest or discount rate to be used in calculating present value.
The other definitions are in accord with previous Uniform Commercial Code definitions that have been a part of South Carolina law.
Section 36-2A-104. Leases subject to other law.
(1) A lease, although subject to this chapter, is also subject to any applicable:
(a) certificate of title statute of this State;
(b) certificate of title statute of another jurisdiction (Section 36-2A-105); or
(c) consumer protection statute of this State, or final consumer protection decision of a court of this State existing on the effective date of this chapter.
(2) In case of conflict between this chapter, other than Sections 36-2A-105, 36-2A-304(3), and 36-2A-305(3), and a statute or decision referred to in subsection (1), the statute or decision controls.
(3) Failure to comply with an applicable law has only the effect specified therein.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Sections 9-203(4) and 9-302(3)(b) and (c).
Changes: Substantially revised.
Purposes: 1. This Article creates a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of transactions that create leases. Section 2A-102. Thus, the Article supersedes all prior legislation dealing with leases, except to the extent set forth in this Section.
2. Subsection (1) states the general rule that a lease, although governed by the scheme of this Article, also may be governed by certain other applicable laws. This may occur in the case of a consumer lease. Section 2A-103(1)(e). Those laws may be state statutes existing prior to enactment of Article 2A or passed afterward. In this case, it is desirable for this Article to specify which statute controls. Or the law may be a pre-existing consumer protection decision. This Article preserves such decisions. Or the law may be a statute of the United States. Such a law controls without any statement in this Article under applicable principles of preemption.
An illustration of a statute of the United States that governs consumer leases is the Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. Sections 1667-1667(e) (1982) and its implementing regulation, Regulation M, 12 C.F.R. Section 213 (1986); the statute mandates disclosures of certain lease terms, delimits the liability of a lessee in leasing personal property, and regulates the advertising of lease terms. An illustration of a state statute that governs consumer leases and which if adopted in the enacting state prevails over this Article is the Unif. Consumer Credit Code, which includes many provisions similar to those of the Consumer Leasing Act, e.g, Unif. Consumer Credit Code Sections 3.202, 3.209, 3.401, 7A U.L.A. 108-09, 115, 125 (1974), as well as provisions in addition to those of the Consumer Leasing Act, e.g., Unif. Consumer Credit Code Sections 5.109-.111, 7A U.L.A. 171-76 (1974) (the right to cure a default). Such statutes may define consumer lease so as to govern transactions within and without the definition of consumer lease under this Article.
3. Under subsection (2), subject to certain limited exclusions, in case of conflict a statute or a decision described in subsection (1) prevails over this Article. For example, a provision like Unif. Consumer Credit Code Section 5.112, 7A U.L.A. 176 (1974), limiting self-help repossession, prevails over Section 2A-525(3). A consumer protection decision rendered after the effective date of this Article may supplement its provisions. For example, in relation to Article 9 a court might conclude that an acceleration clause may not be enforced against an individual debtor after late payments have been accepted unless a prior notice of default is given. To the extent the decision establishes a general principle applicable to transactions other than secured transactions, it may supplement Section 2A-502.
4. Consumer protection in lease transactions is primarily left to other law. However, several provisions of this Article do contain special rules that may not be varied by agreement in the case of a consumer lease. E.g., Sections 2A-106, 2A-108, and 2A-109(2). Were that not so, the ability of the parties to govern their relationship by agreement together with the position of the lessor in a consumer lease too often could result in a one-sided lease agreement.
5. In construing this provision the reference to statute should be deemed to include applicable regulations. A consumer protection decision is "final" on the effective date of this Article if it is not subject to appeal on that date or, if subject to appeal, is not later reversed on appeal. Of course, such a decision can be overruled by a later decision or superseded by a later statute.
Cross References: Sections 2A-103(1)(e), 2A-106, 2A-108, 2A-109(2) and 2A-525(3).
Definitional Cross Reference:
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
South Carolina's Consumer Protection Code, Title 37 of the South Carolina Code, contains many provisions that regulate consumer leases. Numerous sections of Article 2A will be affected by the rule of Subsection (2) that in such conflicts, the consumer protection laws control: Sections 2A-106, -107, -108, -109, -303, -305, -502.
Section 36-2A-105. Territorial application of chapter to goods covered by certificate of title.
Subject to the provisions of Sections 36-2A-304(3) and 36-2A-305(3), with respect to goods covered by a certificate of title issued under a statute of this State or of another jurisdiction, compliance and the effect of compliance or noncompliance with a certificate of title statute are governed by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction issuing the certificate until the earlier of (a) surrender of the certificate, or (b) four months after the goods are removed from that jurisdiction and thereafter until a new certificate of title is issued by another jurisdiction.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 9-103(2)(a) and (b).
Changes: Substantially revised. The provisions of the last sentence of Section 9-103(2)(b) have not been incorporated as it is superfluous in this context. The provisions of Section 9-103(2)(d) have not been incorporated because the problems dealt with are adequately addressed by this section and Sections 2A-304(3) and 305(3).
Purposes: The new certificate referred to in (b) must be permanent, not temporary. Generally, the lessor or creditor whose interest is indicated on the most recently issued certificate of title will prevail over interests indicated on certificates issued previously by other jurisdictions. This provision reflects a policy that it is reasonable to require holders of interests in goods covered by a certificate of title to police the goods or risk losing their interests when a new certificate of title is issued by another jurisdiction.
Cross References: Sections 2A-304(3), 2A-305(3), 9-103(2)(b) and 9-103(2)(d).
Definitional Cross Reference:
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This provision is new in South Carolina law.
Section 36-2A-106. Limitation on power of parties to consumer lease to choose applicable law and judicial forum.
(1) If the law chosen by the parties to a consumer lease is that of a jurisdiction other than a jurisdiction in which the lessee resides at the time the lease agreement becomes enforceable or within thirty days thereafter or in which the goods are to be used, the choice is not enforceable.
(2) If the judicial forum chosen by the parties to a consumer lease is a forum that would not otherwise have jurisdiction over the lessee, the choice is not enforceable.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Unif. Consumer Credit Code Section 1.201(8), 7A U.L.A. 36 (1974).
Changes: Substantially revised.
Purposes: There is a real danger that a lessor may induce a consumer lessee to agree that the applicable law will be a jurisdiction that has little effective consumer protection, or to agree that the applicable forum will be a forum that is inconvenient for the lessee in the event of litigation. As a result, this section invalidates these choice of law or forum clauses, except where the law chosen is that of the state of the consumer's residence or where the goods will be kept, or the forum chosen is one that otherwise would have jurisdiction over the lessee.
Subsection (1) limits potentially abusive choice of law clauses in consumer leases. The 30-day rule in subsection (1) was suggested by Section 9-103(1)(c). This section has no effect on choice of law clauses in leases that are not consumer leases. Such clauses would be governed by other law.
Subsection (2) prevents enforcement of potentially abusive jurisdictional consent clauses in consumer leases. By using the term judicial forum, this section does not limit selection of a nonjudicial forum, such as arbitration. This section has no effect on choice of forum clauses in leases that are not consumer leases; such clauses are, as a matter of current law, "prima facie valid". The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972). Such clauses would be governed by other law, including the Model Choice of Forum Act (1968).
Cross Reference: Section 9-103(1)(c).
Definitional Cross References:
"Consumer lease". Section 2A-103(1)(e).
"Lease agreement". Section 2A-103(1)(k).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section is generally in accord with South Carolina consumer protection statutes, although paragraph 1 departs somewhat from the ordinary South Carolina rule governing contractual choice of laws. See Section 37-1-201(10), requiring South Carolina law to be applied in disputes over consumer credit transactions. To the extent that this section, like any other provision of Article 2A, is found to conflict with any South Carolina consumer protection statute, the consumer law controls. Section 2A-104(2).
In non-consumer transactions, choice of law clauses are generally upheld as prima facie valid, as the Official Comment notes. The Fourth Circuit upheld a choice of law clause governing a lease agreement for cattle in Hoffman v. National Equipment Rental, Ltd., 643 F.2d 987 (4th Cir. 1981). In that case the lessees were experienced cattle farmers, so the lease could not be characterized as a consumer transaction. Presumably, this section would have no effect on the holding of Hoffman. Where no provision in the agreement specifies the applicable law, South Carolina applies the "place of making" rule. See Pennsylvania Thresherman & F.M. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Owens, 238 F.2d 549 (4th Cir. 1986), where the Fourth Circuit applied South Carolina law in interpreting an insurance contract entered into in South Carolina.
Forum-selection clauses are also presumptively valid. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (holding that, in spite of historical reluctance, federal courts should treat forum-selection clauses as prima facie valid), and Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (holding that the rule of The Bremen was subject only to the narrowest of exceptions and that the prima facie validity of forum-selection clauses would govern a form contract passenger ticket); International Software Systems v. Amplicon, Inc., 77 F.3d 112 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the rule of The Bremen applied to validate a forum-selection clause in a commercial lease).
Fundamental principles of freedom of contract and economic efficiency demanding that courts enforce choice-of-law and jurisdiction and venue clauses in finance leases and other commercial leases are balanced in consumer leases by the policies underlying consumer protection legislation. Under this section, choice-of-law and jurisdiction and venue clauses in commercial leases, including finance leases, should continue to be upheld and enforced by South Carolina courts, whereas in consumer leases their validity and enforcement will be limited.
Section 36-2A-107. Waiver or renunciation of claim or right after default.
Any claim or right arising out of an alleged default or breach of warranty may be discharged in whole or in part without consideration by a written waiver or renunciation signed and delivered by the aggrieved party.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 1-107.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology. This clause is used throughout the Official Comments to this Article to indicate the scope of change in the provisions of the Uniform Statutory Source included in the section; these changes range from one extreme, e.g., a significant difference in practice (a warranty as to merchantability is not implied in a finance lease (Section 2A-212)) to the other extreme, e.g., a modest difference in style or terminology (the transaction governed is a lease not a sale (Section 2A-103)).
Cross References: Sections 2A-103 and 2A-212.
Definitional Cross References:
"Aggrieved party". Section 1-201(2).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Signed". Section 1-201(39).
"Written". Section 1-201(46).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Although this section eliminates the consideration requirement from waivers after default on a lease agreement, the parties to the agreement are still obligated to act in good faith as required in Section 36-1-203. Additionally, oral waivers are subject to both the Statute of Frauds provisions contained in Section 2A-201 and the provisions regarding modification of written agreements contained in Section 2A-208. See also the statutory source, as enacted in South Carolina (Section 36-1-107), and its Official Comment.
Additionally, the effect of this section on waivers under Consumer Leases is limited by Section 37-1-107 which makes any waiver of consumer rights under Title 37 of the South Carolina Code void.
Section 36-2A-108. Unconscionability.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds a lease contract or any clause of a lease contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the lease contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the lease contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) With respect to a consumer lease, if the court as a matter of law finds that a lease contract or any clause of a lease contract has been induced by unconscionable conduct or that unconscionable conduct has occurred in the collection of a claim arising from a lease contract, the court may grant appropriate relief.
(3) Before making a finding of unconscionability under subsection (1) or (2), the court, on its own motion or that of a party, shall afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to the setting, purpose, and effect of the lease contract or clause, or of the conduct.
(4) In an action in which the lessee claims unconscionability with respect to a consumer lease:
(a) If the court finds unconscionability under subsection (1) or (2), the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to the lessee.
(b) If the court does not find unconscionability and the lessee claiming unconscionability has brought or maintained an action he knew to be groundless, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to the party against whom the claim is made.
(c) In determining attorney's fees, the amount of the recovery on behalf of the claimant under subsections (1) and (2) is not controlling.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-302 and Unif. Consumer Credit Code Section 5.108, 7A U.L.A. 167-69 (1974).
Changes: Subsection (1) is taken almost verbatim from the provisions of Section 2-302(1). Subsection (2) is suggested by the provisions of Unif. Consumer Credit Code Section 5.108(1), (2), 7A U.L.A. 167 (1974). Subsection (3), taken from the provisions of Section 2-302(2), has been expanded to cover unconscionable conduct. Unif. Consumer Credit Code Section 5.108(3), 7A U.L.A. 167 (1974). The provision for the award of attorney's fees to consumers, subsection (4), covers unconscionability under subsection (1) as well as (2). Subsection (4) is modeled on the provisions of Unif. Consumer Credit Code Section 5.108(6), 7A U.L.A. 169 (1974).
Purposes: Subsections (1) and (3) of this section apply the concept of unconscionability reflected in the provisions of Section 2-302 to leases. See Dillman & Assocs. v. Capitol Leasing Co., 110 Ill. App. 3d 335, 342, 442 N.E.2d 311, 316 (App. Ct. 1982). Subsection (3) omits the adjective "commercial" found in subsection 2-302(2) because subsection (3) is concerned with all leases and the relevant standard of conduct is determined by the context.
The balance of the section is modeled on the provisions of Unif. Consumer Credit Code Section 5.108, 7A U.L.A. 167-69 (1974). Thus subsection (2) recognizes that a consumer lease or a clause in a consumer lease may not itself be unconscionable but that the agreement would never have been entered into if unconscionable means had not been employed to induce the consumer to agree. To make a statement to induce the consumer to lease the goods, in the expectation of invoking an integration clause in the lease to exclude the statement's admissibility in a subsequent dispute, may be unconscionable. Subsection (2) also provides a consumer remedy for unconscionable conduct, such as using or threatening to use force or violence, in the collection of a claim arising from a lease contract. These provisions are not exclusive. The remedies of this section are in addition to remedies otherwise available for the same conduct under other law, for example, an action in tort for abusive debt collection or under another statute of this State for such conduct. The reference to appropriate relief in subsection (2) is intended to foster liberal administration of this remedy. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-106(1).
Subsection (4) authorizes an award of reasonable attorney's fees if the court finds unconscionability with respect to a consumer lease under subsections (1) or (2). Provision is also made for recovery by the party against whom the claim was made if the court does not find unconscionability and does find that the consumer knew the action to be groundless. Further, subsection (4)(b) is independent of, and thus will not override, a term in the lease agreement that provides for the payment of attorney's fees.
Cross References: Sections 1-106(1), 2-302 and 2A-103(4).
Definitional Cross References:
"Action". Section 1-201(1).
"Consumer lease". Section 2A-103(1)(e).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
South Carolina courts of equity have long demonstrated their willingness to employ the concept of unconscionability in refusing to decree specific performance of contracts found to be unconscionable, either in whole or in part. See, e.g., Marthinson v. McCutchen, 84 S.C. 256, 66 S.E. 120 (1909); Anthony v. Eve, 109 S.C. 255, 95 S.E. 513 (1917), both to the effect that the court will not order specific performance of a contract that is not found to be "fair, just and reasonable."
Courts of law in South Carolina have reached similar results, despite the traditionally-held view that a court of law will not interfere with the parties' freedom of contract. See Philadelphia Storage Battery Co. v. Mutual Tire Stores, 161 S.C. 487, 159 S.E. 825 (1931) and Gaines W. Harrison & Sons, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 180 F.Supp. 243 (1960) (despite a broad provision concerning the parties' right to terminate the contract, a cause of action will lie against one who exercises that right "against equity and good conscience"). In striking or modifying objectionable terms of a contract, courts in this and other jurisdictions frequently use the common law concepts of duress, fraud, misrepresentation, and undue influence. See 1 Corbin, Contracts, Section 128 (1950) ("There is sufficient flexibility in the concepts of fraud, duress, misrepresentation, and undue influence...to enable the courts to avoid enforcement of unconscionable provisions in long printed standardized contacts.")
A contract for lease which is not in itself unconscionable at the time the contract is made but which has an unconscionable effect at some later date, perhaps due to a change in market conditions, is not covered by this section. However, the common law concepts of impossibility and impracticability of performance would still apply to those situations.
Previously, lease contracts in South Carolina which were claimed by one party to be unconscionable were analyzed under Section 36-2-302 if the lease contract was found to have the characteristics of a sale of goods by inclusion of an option to purchase. In Jones Leasing, Inc. v. Gene Phillips & Assocs., 282 S.C. 327, 318 S.E.2d 31 (App. 1984), the Court of Appeals held that the trial judge properly found that the automobile lease contracts in question were not unconscionable under Section 36-2-302 where the provisions were not so oppressive, unreasonable, or one-sided as to have been unconscionable at the time the contracts were made. The court further noted that even if some of the provisions were unconscionable, the remaining provisions were still enforceable. In the alternative, the court stated that it could strike or modify those unconscionable provisions, or limit their effect so as to avoid an unconscionable result.
The requirement of Paragraph (4)(b) that the court "shall" award attorney's fees against a consumer lessee who knowingly brought a groundless action claiming unconscionability is inconsistent with Section 37-5-108(6), which provides that in such circumstances the court "may" award fees. Under Section 2A-104(2) the permissive language of Section 37-5-108(6) controls.
Section 36-2A-109. Option to accelerate at will.
(1) A term providing that one party or his successor in interest may accelerate payment or performance or require collateral or additional collateral 'at will' or 'when he deems himself insecure' or in words of similar import must be construed to mean that he has power to do so only if he in good faith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired.
(2) With respect to a consumer lease, the burden of establishing good faith under subsection (1) is on the party who exercised the power; otherwise the burden of establishing lack of good faith is on the party against whom the power has been exercised.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 1-208 and Unif. Consumer Credit Code Section 5.109(2), 7A U.L.A. 171 (1974).
Purposes: Subsection (1) reflects modest changes in style to the provisions of the first sentence of Section 1-208.
Subsection (2), however, reflects a significant change in the provisions of the second sentence of Section 1-208 by creating a new rule with respect to a consumer lease. A lease provision allowing acceleration at the will of the lessor or when the lessor deems itself insecure is of critical importance to the lessee. In a consumer lease it is a provision that is not usually agreed to by the parties but is usually mandated by the lessor. Therefore, where its invocation depends not on specific criteria but on the discretion of the lessor, its use should be regulated to prevent abuse. Subsection (1) imposes a duty of good faith upon its exercise. Subsection (2) shifts the burden of establishing good faith to the lessor in the case of a consumer lease, but not otherwise.
Cross Reference: Section 1-208.
Definitional Cross References:
"Burden of establishing". Section 1-201(8).
"Consumer lease". Section 2A-103(1)(e).
"Good faith". Sections 1-201(19) and 2-103(1)(b).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Term". Section 1-201(42).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Subsection (1) expands the basic rule in South Carolina, as enunciated in Section 36-1-208, to cover leases. The new rule of subsection (2), which applies only to consumer leases, is in general accord with the purpose and policy of South Carolina's consumer protection statutes. However the Consumer Protection Code provides in Section 37-5-109 that the only permissible events of default are failure to make a payment as required and significant impairment of the prospect of payment, performance, or the realization of collateral; other occurrences may not be treated as defaults. Additionally, Sections 37-5-110 & -111 require the creditor to give the consumer debtor (consumer lessee) notice of right to cure. Section 2A-104(2) provides that the limitations of the Consumer Protection Code prevail over inconsistent provisions in Article 2A.
Even prior to the enactment of Section 36-1-208, South Carolina adhered to a similar rule. See Cook v C.I.T. Corporation, 191 S.C. 440, 4 S.E.2d 801 (1939), holding that a clause in a mortgage permitting the mortgagee to repossess when the mortgagee feels insecure confers a right which must be exercised in good faith and only in circumstances where the mortgagee has a reasonable apprehension of danger.
Part 2
Formation and Construction of Lease Contract
Section 36-2A-201. Statute of frauds.
(1) A lease contract is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless:
(a) the total payments to be made under the lease contract, excluding payments for options to renew or buy, are less than one thousand dollars; or
(b) there is a writing, signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by that party's authorized agent, sufficient to indicate that a lease contract has been made between the parties and to describe the goods leased and the lease term.
(2) Any description of leased goods or of the lease term is sufficient and satisfies subsection (1)(b), whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described.
(3) A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon, but the lease contract is not enforceable under subsection (1)(b) beyond the lease term and the quantity of goods shown in the writing.
(4) A lease contract that does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1), but which is valid in other respects, is enforceable:
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured or obtained for the lessee and are not suitable for lease or sale to others in the ordinary course of the lessor's business, and the lessor, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances that reasonably indicate that the goods are for the lessee, has made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement;
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in that party's pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a lease contract was made, but the lease contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or
(c) with respect to goods that have been received and accepted by the lessee.
(5) The lease term under a lease contract referred to in subsection (4) is:
(a) the term so specified if there is a writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by that party's authorized agent specifying the lease term;
(b) the term so admitted if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in that party's pleading, testimony, or otherwise in court a lease term; or
(c) a reasonable lease term.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Sections 2-201, 9-203(1) and 9-110.
Changes: This section is modeled on Section 2-201, with changes to reflect the differences between a lease contract and a contract for the sale of goods. In particular, subsection (1)(b) adds a requirement that the writing "describe the goods leased and the lease term", borrowing that concept, with revisions, from the provisions of Section 9-203(1)(a). Subsection (2), relying on the statutory analogue in Section 9-110, sets forth the minimum criterion for satisfying that requirement.
Purposes: The changes in this section conform the provisions of Section 2-201 to custom and usage in lease transactions. Section 2-201(2), stating a special rule between merchants, was not included in this section as the number of such transactions involving leases, as opposed to sales, was thought to be modest. Subsection (4) creates no exception for transactions where payment has been made and accepted. This represents a departure from the analogue, Section 2-201(3)(c). The rationale for the departure is grounded in the distinction between sales and leases. Unlike a buyer in a sales transaction, the lessee does not tender payment in full for goods delivered, but only payment of rent for one or more months. It was decided that, as a matter of policy, this act of payment is not a sufficient substitute for the required memorandum. Subsection (5) was needed to establish the criteria for supplying the lease term if it is omitted, as the lease contract may still be enforceable under subsection (4).
Cross References: Sections 2-201, 9-110 and 9-203(1)(a).
Definitional Cross References:
"Action". Section 1-201(1).
"Agreed". Section 1-201(3).
"Buying". Section 2A-103(1)(a).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Notice". Section 1-201(25).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Sale". Section 2-106(1).
"Signed". Section 1-201(39).
"Term". Section 1-201(42).
"Writing". Section 1-201(46).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This provision is based on the Article 2 Statute of Frauds, S.C. Code Section 36-2-201, which modified South Carolina's pre-UCC Statute of Frauds. That statute exempted future goods. See Noland Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 301 F.2d 43, 48 (4th Cir. 1962) (Statute does not apply to goods which "are to be made, or something is to be done, to put them in condition to be delivered") (quoting Wallace v. Dowling, 68 S.E. 571, 572-73 (S.C. 1910)). The previous statute also required strict compliance with the traditional rule that all material terms must be specified in the writing. See Boozer v. Teague, 27 S.C. 348 (1887). See also Speed v. Speed, 213 S.C. 401, 49 S.E.2d 588 (1948) (writing must clearly identify the contracting parties, the subject matter of the sale, and the consideration exchanged); Pitts v. Edwards, 141 S.C. 126, 139 S.E. 219 (1927) (memorandum of sale of cotton did not satisfy the statute because it omitted the grade of cotton to be sold, referring only to a telephone conversation on the subject); Rigby v. Gaymon, 95 S.C. 489, 79 S.E. 518 (1913) (writing insufficient to satisfy statute because no price term shown). As with Section 36-2-201, the writing had to be signed by the party to be charged or his agent. See A.M. Law & Co. v. Cleveland, 172 S.C. 200, 173 S.E. 638 (1934). The previous statute also recognized the exception found in Section 36-2-201(3)(b), that a contract admitted by a party in his testimony satisfied the statute's requirements. See Walker v. Preacher, 188 S.C. 431, 199 S.E. 675 (1938).
Meeting the requirements of this section does not, in and of itself, prove the terms of a contract, but merely eliminates the use of the statute of frauds as an affirmative defense to the contract's enforceability. See Hinson-Barr, Inc. v. Pinckard, 356 S.E.2d 115 (S.C. 1987).
Courts in some other states have continued to recognize exceptions to the statute of frauds -- in particular, the theory of promissory estoppel. However, in South Carolina, promissory estoppel is not available to circumvent the Article 2 statute of frauds. See McDabco, Inc. v. Chet Adams Co., 548 F. Supp. 456 (D.S.C. 1982). The interpretation of this Article 2A Statute of Frauds should be consistent with the interpretation of its Article 2 source.
Section 36-2A-202. Final written expression: parol or extrinsic evidence.
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented:
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade or by course of performance; and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-202.
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreement". Section 1-201(3).
"Course of dealing". Section 1-205.
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Term". Section 1-201(42).
"Usage of trade". Section 1-205.
"Writing". Section 1-201(46).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section makes no changes in current South Carolina law, but merely extends the parol evidence rule contained in Article 2 to leases. As Dean Robert W. Foster demonstrated in his thorough analysis of the South Carolina cases in his Reporter's Comments to Section 36-2-202 (the Article 2 parol evidence rule, upon which this section is modeled), these statutory versions are consistent with the pre-code South Carolina common law parol evidence rule.
The increased use of electronic and other modern communications places a greater emphasis on speed in the contracting process. When a lease is transmitted electronically, the burden falls on the sender (usually the lessor) to communicate the terms of the entire agreement in a way such that a reasonable lessee would be on notice of additional terms and conditions of the lease if these terms are to form a part of the final agreement of the parties. If the lessor fails to take steps notifying a reasonable lessee of the presence of additional terms, that failure will ordinarily bar introduction of prior or contemporaneous agreements containing those terms, unless they are supported by a course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance. The terms of the lease agreement will be those transmitted and thus found in the writing adopted by the parties as the final expression of their agreement.
Section 36-2A-203. Seals inoperative.
The affixing of a seal to a writing evidencing a lease contract or an offer to enter into a lease contract does not render the writing a sealed instrument and the law with respect to sealed instruments does not apply to the lease contract or offer.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-203.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Definitional Cross References:
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Writing". Section 1-201(46).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
The South Carolina enactment of the Article 2 source for this section, Section 36-2-203, made little practical change in then-existing law. As noted in Dean Robert W. Foster's Reporter's Comments to that section, contracts under seal were given a twenty-year statute of limitations, while contracts not under seal were given a six-year statute of limitations. However, Section 2-725 set a uniform statute of limitations of six years for all transactions governed by Article 2. Additionally, Dean Foster noted that contracts under seal had fallen out of use. Article 2A handles these matters analogously: Section 2A-506 provides a four-year statute of limitations for all agreements within the scope of Article 2A. Therefore, as with the Article 2 source, this section will have little effect on South Carolina law.
This provision does not affect the use of corporate and other seals in authenticating signatures. See, e.g., Sections 33-3-102(2) and 33-1-200(g).
Section 36-2A-204. Formation in general.
(1) A lease contract may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a lease contract.
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a lease contract may be found although the moment of its making is undetermined.
(3) Although one or more terms are left open, a lease contract does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a lease contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-204.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreement". Section 1-201(3).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Remedy". Section 1-201(34).
"Term". Section 1-201(42).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
The provisions of this section generally follow both pre-UCC South Carolina common law and the Article 2 provision on which this section is based (Section 36-2-204 on formation of contracts for the sale of goods).
Shealy v. Fowler, 182 S.C. 81, 188 S.E. 499 (1936) held that conduct of the parties which recognizes the existence of a contract was sufficient to show acceptance of an offer. Dowling v. Charleston & W.C. Ry. Co., 105 S.C. 475, 81 S.E. 313 (1912), stated that "the law implies a contract between persons where the ordinary course of dealings between them, considered in light of all circumstances, reasonably warrants the inference that they mutually intended to contract."
However, early South Carolina common law was considerably stricter than the UCC about the definiteness of terms required for enforceability. See McLaurin v. Hamer, 165 S.C. 411, 164 S.E. 2 (1931) ("material terms cannot be left for future settlement").
Article 2A lacks the "gap-filler" provisions found in Article 2 (see, e.g., Section 36-2-305 (open price terms); 36-2-306 (output and requirements contracts); 36-2-307 (mode of delivery); 36-2-308 (place of delivery); 36-2-309 (time for performance)).
Section 36-2A-205. Firm offers.
An offer by a merchant to lease goods to or from another person in a signed writing that by its terms gives assurance it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time stated or, if no time is stated, for a reasonable time, but in no event may the period of irrevocability exceed three months. Any term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be separately signed by the offeror.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-205.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Definitional Cross References:
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Merchant". Section 2-104(1).
"Person". Section 1-201(30).
"Reasonable time". Section 1-204(1) and (2).
"Signed". Section 1-201(39).
"Term". Section 1-201(42).
"Writing". Section 1-201(46).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section maintains the general position on firm offers found in the statutory source provision, Section 36-2-205. Pre-UCC South Carolina common law held that only an offer supported by additional consideration bound the offeror for the stated period. See Moneyweight Scale Co. v. Gordon Mercantile Co., 102 S.C. 419, 86 S.E. 1060 (1915); Connor v. Renneker, 25 S.C. 514 (1886).
Section 36-2A-206. Offer and acceptance in formation of lease contract.
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances, an offer to make a lease contract must be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable in the circumstances.
(2) If beginning a requested performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance, an offeror who is not notified of acceptance within a reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-206(1)(a) and (2).
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Definitional Cross References:
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Notifies". Section 1-201(26).
"Reasonable time". Section 1-204(1) and (2).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section, which applies the provisions of the statutory source (Section 36-2-206) to leases, is consistent with the general South Carolina common law on acceptance of offers to contract. See, e.g., In re Morgan v. Honeycutt, 277 S.C. 150, 283 S.E.2d 444 (1981) ("conduct which manifests assent to the offeror is acceptance"); Fender & Latham, Inc. v. First Union National Bank of South Carolina, 316 S.C. 48, 446 S.E.2d 448 (Ct. App. 1994) (where there was no enforceable contract between the parties because Fender & Latham did not comply with the unambiguous express conditions required by the offer.); Rowland v. Pruitt, 123 S.C. 244, 116 S.E. 456 (1922) (holding that the mailing of a letter which accepted an order for goods finalized the formation of a contract at the time the letter was mailed).
The provisions of subsection (2) do not necessarily change the common law of South Carolina but they do impose a time limitation on the offeree's choice between acceptance and rejection of the offer. See Section 36-2-206(2) and South Carolina Reporter's Comments; H.A. Sack Co. v. Forest Beach Public Service District, 272 S.C. 256, 250 S.E.2d 340 (1978) (where the offeror was allowed to revoke his offer due to the offeree's untimely notification of acceptance). This case also states that "silence ordinarily does not constitute an acceptance," and would, thus, not be a reasonable medium of acceptance under subsection (1). Id. at ---, 341.
This section deletes a provision from the source provision, Section 36-2-206, which allows a seller to treat an order to buy goods for prompt delivery as an invitation to accept by either return promise or by shipment. Leases of goods are rarely, if ever, formed by shipment of the goods; therefore, that provision was omitted in Article 2A. William H. Lawrence and John H. Minan, Law of Personal Property Leasing, 3.02(3)(b)(iii) at 3-9 (1993).
Section 36-2A-207. Course of performance or practical construction.
(1) If a lease contract involves repeated occasions for performance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is relevant to determine the meaning of the lease agreement.
(2) The express terms of a lease agreement and any course of performance, as well as any course of dealing and usage of trade, must be construed whenever reasonable as consistent with each other. If that construction is unreasonable, express terms control course of performance, course of performance controls both course of dealing and usage of trade, and course of dealing controls usage of trade.
(3) Subject to the provisions of Section 36-2A-208 on modification and waiver, course of performance is relevant to show a waiver or modification of any term inconsistent with the course of performance.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Sections 2-208 and 1-205(4).
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology, except that subsection (2) was further revised to make the subsection parallel the provisions of Section 1-205(4) by adding that course of dealing controls usage of trade.
Purposes: The section should be read in conjunction with Section 2A-208. In particular, although a specific term may control over course of performance as a matter of lease construction under subsection (2), subsection (3) allows the same course of dealing to show a waiver or modification, if Section 2A-208 is satisfied.
Cross References: Sections 1-205(4), 2-208 and 2A-208.
Definitional Cross References:
"Course of dealing". Section 1-205.
"Knowledge". Section 1-201(25).
"Lease agreement". Section 2A-103(1)(k).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Term". Section 1-201(42).
"Usage of trade". Section 1-205.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section makes no change in existing South Carolina law. See Sections 36-2-208 and 36-1-205(4) and their South Carolina Reporter's Comments. These statutory analogues are also generally consistent with pre-UCC South Carolina common law. See, e.g., Coates & Sons v. Early, 46 S.C. 220, 24 S.E. 305 (1896); Kentucky Wagon Mfg. Co. v. People's Supply Co., 77 S.C. 92, 57 S.E. 676 (1905); Autrey v. Bell, 114 S.C. 370, 103 S.E. 749 (1920). On the relevance of course of dealings between the parties, see Carter v. American Fruit Growers, Inc., 130 S.C. 280, 125 S.E. 641 (1924). Course of dealing and usage of trade are subordinate to the unambiguous express terms of the agreement. Fairly v. Wappoo Mills, 44 S.C. 227, 22 S.E. 108 (1894).
Section 36-2A-208. Modification, rescission and waiver.
(1) An agreement modifying a lease contract needs no consideration to be binding.
(2) A signed lease agreement that excludes modification or rescission except by a signed writing may not be modified or rescinded otherwise, but, such a requirement on a form supplied by a merchant must be separately signed by the other party, except as between merchants.
(3) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (2), it may operate as a waiver.
(4) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion of a lease contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notification received by the other party that strict performance will be required of any term waived, unless the retraction would be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance on the waiver.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-209.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology, except that the provisions of subsection 2-209(3) were omitted.
Purposes: Section 2-209(3) provides that "the requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article (Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within its provisions." This provision was not incorporated as it is unfair to allow an oral modification to make the entire lease contract unenforceable, e.g. if the modification takes it a few dollars over the dollar limit. At the same time, the problem could not be solved by providing that the lease contract would still be enforceable in its pre-modification state (if it then satisfied the statute of frauds) since in some cases that might be worse than no enforcement at all. Resolution of the issue is left to the courts based on the facts of each case.
Cross References: Sections 2-201 and 2-209.
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreement". Section 1-201(3).
"Between merchants". Section 2-104(3).
"Lease agreement". Section 2A-103(1)(k).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Merchant". Section 2-104(1).
"Notification". Section 1-201(26).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Signed". Section 1-201(39).
"Term". Section 1-201(42).
"Writing". Section 1-201(46).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Traditional common law required new consideration for an enforceable modification of a contract. The pre-existing duty rule barred the enforcement of a modification which increased the obligations of one party without a corresponding change in the duties of the other, in the absence of any additional consideration. See Rabon v. State Finance Corp., 283 S.C. 183, 26 S.E.2d 501 (1943); T.H. Colcock & Co. v. Louisville C.&C. Ry. Co., 1 Strob 329 (1847). Article 2A follows the lead of the source provision in Article 2 by abrogating this rule as it applies to lease contracts. The purpose of the abrogation is stated in the Official Comment to Section 36-2-309: "This section seeks to protect and make effective all necessary and desirable modifications of...contracts without regard to the technicalities which at present hamper such adjustments." The Code's general requirement of good faith applies to the modification of lease contracts as it does to sales contracts in order to prevent abuses of this relaxation of the common law rule. See Section 36-2-209, Cmt.2 and the South Carolina Reporter's Comments; see also William H. Lawrence and John H. Minan, Law of Personal Property Leasing, 3.04(2) at 3-15 (1993).
Subsection (2) changes the general common law rule permitting oral modification of a written contract, when supported by additional consideration, even where the contract explicitly states that modification may be effected only in writing. See South Carolina National Bank v. Silks, 367 S.E.2d 421 (S.C. App. 1988) and Fass v. South Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 105 S.C. 107, 89 S.E. 558 (1916). Subsection (2) allows the parties to a lease contract to require that modifications or rescissions be in writing.
Subsection (3) provides that even though an attempted modification or rescission fails to meet the requirements of subsection (2), the attempt could nevertheless operate as a waiver. To illustrate the interplay between these two provisions, assume that the contract contains a clause that prohibits oral modifications but the lessee nevertheless requests an oral modification of the rental price terms and subsequently behaves in accordance with this modification. If the lessor does not object but accepts payment on the new terms, the lessee might successfully argue waiver of the contract's written requirement, even though the modification, standing alone, would be unenforceable. This subsection is consistent with Florence Printing Co. v. Parnell, 178 S.C. 119, 182 S.E. 313 (1934), holding that where a party relied upon an oral extension of time, the contractual deadline had been waived and the party insisting upon it was estopped.
Subsection (4) mirrors its statutory analogue, Section 36-2-209(5). Although there are no South Carolina cases on point, this is the rule of the Restatement, Second, of Contracts Section 84(2) (1981).
Section 36-2A-209. Lessee under finance lease as beneficiary of supply contract.
(1) The benefit of a supplier's promises to the lessor under the supply contract and of all warranties, whether express or implied, including those of any third party provided in connection with or as part of the supply contract, extends to the lessee to the extent of the lessee's leasehold interest under a finance lease related to the supply contract, but is subject to the terms of the warranty and of the supply contract and all defenses or claims arising therefrom.
(2) The extension of the benefit of a supplier's promises and of warranties to the lessee (Section 36-2A-209(1)) does not:
(i) modify the rights and obligations of the parties to the supply contract, whether arising from it or otherwise; or
(ii) impose any duty or liability under the supply contract on the lessee.
(3) Any modification or rescission of the supply contract by the supplier and the lessor is effective between the supplier and the lessee unless, before the modification or rescission, the supplier has received notice that the lessee has entered into a finance lease related to the supply contract. If the modification or rescission is effective between the supplier and the lessee, the lessor is deemed to have assumed, in addition to the obligations of the lessor to the lessee under the lease contract, promises of the supplier to the lessor and warranties that were so modified or rescinded as they existed and were available to the lessee before modification or rescission.
(4) In addition to the extension of the benefit of the supplier's promises and of warranties to the lessee under subsection (1), the lessee retains all rights that the lessee may have against the supplier which arise from an agreement between the lessee and the supplier or under other law.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: None.
Changes: This section is modeled on Section 9-318, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 302-315 (1981), and leasing practices. See Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 625 F.2d 1291, 1296-97 (5th Cir. 1980).
Purposes: 1. The function performed by the lessor in a finance lease is extremely limited. Section 2A-103(1)(g). The lessee looks to the supplier of the goods for warranties and the like or, in some cases as to warranties, to the manufacturer if a warranty made by that person is passed on. That expectation is reflected in subsection (1), which is self-executing. As a matter of policy, the operation of this provision may not be excluded, modified or limited; however, an exclusion, modification, or limitation of any term of the supply contract or warranty, including any with respect to rights and remedies, and any defense or claim such as a statute of limitations, effective against the lessor as the acquiring party under the supply contract, is also effective against the lessee as the beneficiary designated under this provision. For example, the supplier is not precluded from excluding or modifying an express or implied warranty under a supply contract. Sections 2-312(2) and 2-316, or Section 2A-214. Further, the supplier is not precluded from limiting the rights and remedies of the lessor and from liquidating damages. Sections 2-718 and 2-719 or Sections 2A-503 and 2A-504. If the supply contract excludes or modifies warranties, limits remedies , or liquidates damages with respect to the lessor, such provisions are enforceable against the lessee as beneficiary. Thus, only selective discrimination against the beneficiaries designated under this section is precluded, i.e., exclusion of the supplier's liability to the lessee with respect to warranties made to the lessor. This section does not affect the development of other law with respect to products liability.
2. Enforcement of this benefit is by action. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-106(2).
3. The benefit extended by these provisions is not without a price, as this Article also provides in the case of a finance lease that is not a consumer lease that the lessee's promises to the lessor under the lease contract become irrevocable and independent upon the lessee's acceptance of the goods. Section 2A-407.
4. Subsection (2) limits the effect of subsection (1) on the supplier and the lessor by preserving, notwithstanding the transfer of the benefits of the supply contract to the lessee, all of the supplier's and the lessor's rights and obligations with respect to each other and others; it further absolves the lessee of any duties with respect to the supply contract that might have been inferred from the extension of the benefits thereof.
5. Subsections (2) and (3) also deal with difficult issues related to modification or rescission of the supply contract. Subsection (2) states a rule that determines the impact of the statutory extension of benefit contained in subsection (1) upon the relationship of the parties to the supply contract and, in a limited respect, upon the lessee. This statutory extension of benefit, like that contained in Sections 2A-216 and 2-318, is not a modification of the supply contract by the parties. Thus, subsection (3) states the rules that apply to a modification or rescission of the supply contract by the parties. Subsection (3) provides that a modification or rescission is not effective between the supplier and the lessee if, before the modification or rescission occurs, the supplier received notice that the lessee has entered into the finance lease. On the other hand, if the modification or rescission is effective, then to the extent of the modification or rescission of the benefit or warranty, the lessor by statutory dictate assumes an obligation to provide to the lessee that which the lessee would otherwise lose. For example, assume a reduction in an express warranty from four years to one year. No prejudice to the lessee may occur if the goods perform as agreed. If, however, there is a breach of the express warranty after one year and before four years pass, the lessor is liable. A remedy for any prejudice to the lessee because of the bifurcation of the lessee's recourse resulting from the action of the supplier and the lessor is left to resolution by the courts based on the facts of each case.
6. Subsection (4) makes it clear that the rights granted to the lessee by this section do not displace any rights the lessee otherwise may have against the supplier.
Cross References: Sections 2A-103(1)(g), 2A-407 and 9-318.
Definitional Cross References:
"Action". Section 1-201(1).
"Finance lease". Section 2A-103(1)(g).
"Leasehold interest". Section 2A-103(1)(m).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Notice". Section 1-201(25).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Supplier". Section 2A-103(1)(x).
"Supply contract". Section 2A-103(1)(y).
"Term". Section 1-201(42).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section, although dealing with a type of transaction that has not been the subject of specific provisions in South Carolina law, makes no essential changes in the results that would have been reached under the common law and Section 36-9-318, which codified the common law rights of an assignee when defenses have arisen or modification has occurred between the parties to the underlying contract. This section recognizes that a lessee under a finance lease is the intended beneficiary of the supplier's promises and all warranties to the lessor, but that the lessee has no obligations under the supply contract. In drawing on both Section 36-9-318 and the provisions of Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 302-315 (1981), this section seemingly incorporates two separate theories for purposes of overcoming the lack of privity: the Article 9 provision on assignment and the Restatement provisions on the third party beneficiary theory. See Note, Finance Lease, Hell or High Water Clause, and Third Party Beneficiary Theory in Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 318 (1992), suggesting that this section relies primarily on third party beneficiary theory under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, rather than the assignment theory under Section 9-318. This section follows the common law rule, and rejects the inconsistent provision in Section 36-9-318(2) that makes any good faith, commercially reasonable modification effective against a non-consenting assignee. Once the supplier has been notified that the finance lease has been entered into, modification of the supply contract by the lessor and supplier does not affect the rights of the non-consenting lessee; the effect is that of a self-executing assignment of warranties. Prior to that notification to the supplier, the lessee's rights against the supplier may be modified by agreement of the supplier and lessor, but the lessor assumes the obligations from which the supplier has been released.
Section 36-2A-210. Express warranties.
(1) Express warranties by the lessor are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the lessor to the lessee which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods will conform to the affirmation or promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods will conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model that is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods will conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the lessor use formal words, such as 'warrant' or 'guarantee,' or that the lessor have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the lessor's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-313.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Purposes: All of the express and implied warranties of the Article on Sales (Article 2) are included in this Article, revised to reflect the differences between a sale of goods and a lease of goods. Sections 2A-210 through 2A-216. The lease of goods is sufficiently similar to the sale of goods to justify this decision. Hawkland, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on Equipment Leasing, 1972 Ill. L.F. 446, 459 -60. Many state and federal courts have reached the same conclusion.
Value of the goods, as used in subsection (2), includes rental value.
Cross References: Article 2, esp. Section 2-313, and Sections 2A-210 through 2A-216.
Definitional Cross References:
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section makes no change in existing South Carolina law. See generally C. Ray Miles Construction Co. v. Weaver, 296 S.C. 466, 373 S.E.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1988), in which the court held that the common law warranties that applied to leases of personal property were the implied warranties of quality and of fitness for a purpose known to the lessor, as well as any express warranties included by the lessor and lessee in the lease contract.
Section 36-2A-211. Warranties against interference and against infringement; lessee's obligation against infringement.
(1) There is in a lease contract a warranty that for the lease term no person holds a claim to or interest in the goods that arose from an act or omission of the lessor, other than a claim by way of infringement or the like, which will interfere with the lessee's enjoyment of its leasehold interest.
(2) Except in a finance lease there is in a lease contract by a lessor who is a merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind a warranty that the goods are delivered free of the rightful claim of any person by way of infringement or the like.
(3) A lessee who furnishes specifications to a lessor or a supplier shall hold the lessor and the supplier harmless against any claim by way of infringement or the like that arises out of compliance with the specifications.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-312.
Changes: This section is modeled on the provisions of Section 2-312, with modifications to reflect the limited interest transferred by a lease contract and the total interest transferred by a sale. Section 2-312(2), which is omitted here, is incorporated in Section 2A-214. The warranty of quiet possession was abolished with respect to sales of goods. Section 2-312 Official Comment 1. Section 2A-211(1) reinstates the warranty of quiet possession with respect to leases. Inherent in the nature of the limited interest transferred by the lease - the right to possession and use of the goods - is the need of the lessee for protection greater than that afforded to the buyer. Since the scope of the protection is limited to claims or interests that arose from acts or omissions of the lessor, the lessor will be in position to evaluate the potential cost, certainly a far better position than that enjoyed by the lessee. Further, to the extent the market will allow, the lessor can attempt to pass on the anticipated additional cost to the lessee in the guise of higher rent.
Purposes: General language was chosen for subsection (1) that expresses the essence of the lessee's expectation: with an exception for infringement and the like, no person holding a claim or interest that arose from an act or omission of the lessor will be able to interfere with the lessee's use and enjoyment of the goods for the lease term. Subsection (2), like other similar provisions in later sections, excludes the finance lessor from extending this warranty; with few exceptions (Sections 2A-210 and 2A-211(1)), the lessee under a finance lease is to look to the supplier for warranties and the like or, in some cases as to warranties, to the manufacturer if a warranty made by that person is passed on. Subsections (2) and (3) are derived from Section 2-312(3). These subsections, as well as the analogue, should be construed so that applicable principles of law and equity supplement their provisions. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-103.
Cross References: Sections 2-312, 2-312(1), 2-312(2), 2-312 Official Comment 1, 2A-210, 2A-211(1) and 2A-214.
Definitional Cross References:
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Finance lease". Section 2A-103(1)(g).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Leasehold interest". Section 2A-103(1)(m).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Merchant". Section 2-104(1).
"Person". Section 1-201(30).
"Supplier". Section 2A-103(1)(x).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section is similar to Section 36-2-312 except that it provides for an implied warranty of quiet possession in a lease of personal property instead of the warranty of title that is created by a sale. It is uncertain whether the warranty of quiet possession previously applied to leases in South Carolina, although the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 36-2-312, in South Carolina eliminated it as a separate warranty in sales of goods.
Section 36-2A-212. Implied warranty of merchantability.
(1) Except in a finance lease, a warranty that the goods will be merchantable is implied in a lease contract if the lessor is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must at least:
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the description in the lease agreement;
(b) in the case of fungible goods, be of fair average quality within the description;
(c) be fit for the ordinary purposes for which goods of that type are used;
(d) run, within the variation permitted by the lease agreement, of even kind, quality, and quantity within each unit and among all units involved;
(e) be adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the lease agreement may require; and
(f) conform to any promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label.
(3) Other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or usage of trade.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-314.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology. E.g., Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr., Inc., 97 Idaho 216, 225, 541 P.2d 1184, 1193 (1975) (implied warranty of merchantability (Article 2) extends to lease transactions).
Definitional Cross References:
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Course of dealing". Section 1-205.
"Finance lease". Section 2A-103(1)(g).
"Fungible". Section 1-201(17).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease agreement". Section 2A-103(1)(k).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Merchant". Section 2-104(1).
"Usage of trade". Section 1-205.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section makes no substantive changes in South Carolina law. For an excellent discussion on the history of the implied warranties of "quality" or "soundness" (the "common law precursor to the implied warranty of merchantability provided by the Uniform Commercial Code") and "fitness for a purpose known to the lessor" in South Carolina and their application to personal property leases, see C. Ray Miles Construction Co. v. Weaver, 296 S.C. 466, 373 S.E.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1988).
Although implied warranties have most frequently been found in contracts for sale, at least one early case specifically recognized the applicability of these warranties to contracts for the lease of personal property. See Colcock v. Goode, 14 S.C.L. (3 McCord) 513 (1826). For an earlier discussion of the common law warranty of soundness, see Timrod v. Shoolbred, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 324 (1793) ("This warranty extends to all faults, known and unknown to the seller; and although, in general, it principally relates to title and qualifications, and not to longevity, yet, in some cases, it ought to be construed to extend to the latter." Id. at 326 (emphasis in original)).
The issue of the merchantability of the leased goods is a question properly determinable by the trier of fact. Seaside Resorts, Inc. v. Club Car, Inc., 308 S.C. 47, 416 S.E.2d 655 (Ct. App. 1992). Where the ordinary and intended purpose of the product is also the particular purpose for which the product is leased, the warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose "merge and are cumulative, such that a plaintiff may proceed upon either theory." Soaper v. Hope Industries, Inc., 309 S.C. 438, 424 S.E.2d 493 (1992).
Section 36-2A-213. Implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose.
Except in a finance lease, if the lessor at the time the lease contract is made has reason to know of any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the lessee is relying on the lessor's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is in the lease contract an implied warranty that the goods will be fit for that purpose.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-315.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology. E.g., All-States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, 879, 538 P.2d 1177, 1183 (1975) (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose (Article 2) extends to lease transactions).
Definitional Cross References:
"Finance lease". Section 2A-103(1)(g).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Knows". Section 1-201(25).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
The common law of South Carolina has long implied in a contract of sale a warranty of fitness for a purpose known to the vendor. See Walker, Evans & Cogswell Co. v. Ayer, 80 S.C. 292, 61 S.E. 557 (1908). Subsequent cases fleshed out this warranty. See Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Coclin, 161 S.C. 40, ___ 159 S.E. 461, 463 (1931) ("In the absence of an express warranty or a nonwarranty clause, the law will imply a warranty that the article sold is fit and suitable for the purpose for which it is bought and for which a sound price is paid.") See also Reliance Varnish Co. v. Mullins Lumber Co., 213 S.C. 84, 97, 48 S.E.2d 653, 659 (1948) ("There was an implied warranty that the materials sold were reasonably adapted to the purpose for which they were, with the knowledge of the (seller), purchased by (the buyer)."). Where the particular purpose for which the product is leased is also the ordinary purpose for the product, the warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a particular purpose "merge and are cumulative, such that a plaintiff may proceed upon either theory." Soaper v. Hope Industries, Inc.,309 S.C. 438, 424 S.E.2d 493 (1992).
Section 36-2A-214. Exclusion or modification of warranties.
(1) If the agreement creates an express warranty, words disclaiming it are inoperative.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it, the language must mention 'merchantability', be in writing, and be conspicuous. Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness, the exclusion must be in writing and be conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it is in writing, is conspicuous, and states, for example, 'There is no warranty that the goods will be fit for a particular purpose'.
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2), but subject to subsection (4),
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by specific language that in common understanding calls the lessee's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty, if in writing and conspicuous;
(b) if the lessee before entering into the lease contract has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as desired or has refused to examine the goods, there is no implied warranty with regard to defects that an examination should in the circumstances have revealed; and
(c) an implied warranty may also be excluded or modified by course of dealing, course of performance, or usage of trade.
(4) To exclude or modify a warranty against interference or against infringement (Section 2A-211) or any part of it, the language must be specific, be in writing, and be conspicuous, unless the circumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade, give the lessee reason to know that the goods are being leased subject to a claim or interest of any person.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Sections 2-316 and 2-312(2).
Changes: Subsection (2) requires that a disclaimer of the warranty of merchantability be conspicuous and in writing as is the case for a disclaimer of the warranty of fitness; this is contrary to the rule stated in Section 2-316(2) with respect to the disclaimer of the warranty of merchantability. This section also provides that to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability, fitness or against interference or infringement the language must be in writing and conspicuous. There are, however, exceptions to the rule. E.g., course of dealing, course of performance, or usage of trade may exclude or modify an implied warranty. Section 2A-214(3)(c). The analogue of Section 2-312(2) has been moved to subsection (4) of this section for a more unified treatment of disclaimers; there is no policy with respect to leases of goods that would justify continuing certain distinctions found in the Article on Sales (Article 2) regarding the treatment of the disclaimer of various warranties. Compare Sections 2-312(2) and 2-316(2). Finally, the example of a disclaimer of the implied warranty of fitness stated in subsection (2) differs from the analogue stated in Section 2-316(2); this example should promote a better understanding of the effect of the disclaimer.
Purposes: These changes were made to reflect leasing practices. E.g., FMC Finance Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 1980) (disclaimer of implied warranty under lease transactions must be conspicuous and in writing). The omission of the provisions of Section 2-316(4) was not substantive. Sections 2A-503 and 2A-504.
Cross References:
Article 2, esp. Sections 2-312(2) and 2-316, and Sections 2A-503 and 2A-504.
Definitional Cross References:
"Conspicuous". Section 1-201(10).
"Course of dealing". Section 1-205.
"Fault". Section 2A-103(1)(f).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Knows". Section 1-201(25).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Person". Section 1-201(30).
"Usage of trade". Section 1-205.
"Writing". Section 1-201(46).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section is not a uniform enactment of the official version of 2A-214, but instead was modified to parallel the non-uniform variations of S.C. Code Ann. Section 36-2-316. The language of the official version of 2A-214(1) is substantially similar to the language of the official (1962) version of its statutory analogue, UCC Section 2-316(1). However, upon adoption in South Carolina that language was modified to use the language of the 1954 draft of the UCC: "If the agreement creates an express warranty words disclaiming it are inoperative." S.C. Code Ann. Section 36-2-316(1). Subsection (1) of this provision contains identical language, conforming South Carolina's enactment of Article 2A to its version of Article 2.
Similarly, subsection (3)(a) of the official version differs from its analogue as adopted in South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. Section 36-2-316(3)(a), which does not contain the specific references to "as is" or "with all faults" that are found in UCC Section 2-316(3)(a). These references have similarly been deleted from the South Carolina enactment of Section 36-2A-214(3)(a).
The remaining subsections of 2A-214 make little change in South Carolina law but merely group together the various provisions of Sections 2-316 and 2-312(2), and extend those provisions to lease agreements.
Section 36-2A-215. Cumulation and conflict of warranties express or implied.
Warranties, whether express or implied, must be construed as consistent with each other and as cumulative, but if that construction is unreasonable, the intention of the parties determines which warranty is dominant. In ascertaining that intention the following rules apply:
(a) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent sample or model or general language of description.
(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent general language of description.
(c) Express warranties displace inconsistent implied warranties other than an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-317.
Definitional Cross Reference:
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Although there are no reported South Carolina cases on cumulation and conflict of express and implied warranties in leases of personal property, this section, like its statutory source, Section 36-2-317, is in accord with the approach of South Carolina courts when confronted with such issues generally and thus this section appears to make no change in South Carolina law, but merely extends the provisions of Section 36-2-317 to lease transactions. See generally South Carolina Reporter's Comments to S.C. Code Ann. Section 36-2-317.
36-2A-216. Third-party beneficiaries of express and implied warranties.
A warranty to or for the benefit of a lessee under this chapter, whether express or implied, extends to any natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. This section does not displace principles of law and equity that extend a warranty to or for the benefit of a lessee to other persons. The operation of this section may not be excluded, modified, or limited, but an exclusion, modification, or limitation of the warranty, including any with respect to rights and remedies, effective against the lessee is also effective against the beneficiary designated under this section.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-318.
Changes: The provisions of Section 2-318 have been included in this section, modified in two respects: first, to reflect leasing practice, including the special practices of the lessor under a finance lease; second, to reflect and thus codify elements of the Official Comment to Section 2-318 with respect to the effect of disclaimers and limitations of remedies against third parties.
Purposes: This section is based on later additions to Section 2-318 and is more favorable to the injured person.
The last sentence does not preclude the lessor from excluding or modifying an express or implied warranty under a lease. Section 2A-214. Further, that sentence does not preclude the lessor from limiting the rights and remedies of the lessee and from liquidating damages. Sections 2A-503 and 2A-504. If the lease excludes or modifies warranties, limits remedies for breach, or liquidates damages with respect to the lessee, such provisions are enforceable against the beneficiaries designated under this section. However, this last sentence forbids selective discrimination against the beneficiaries designated under this section, i.e., exclusion of the lessor's liability to the beneficiaries with respect to warranties made by the lessor to the lessee.
Other law, including the Article on Sales (Article 2), may apply in determining the extent to which a warranty to or for the benefit of the lessor extends to the lessee and third parties. This is in part a function of whether the lessor has bought or leased the goods.
This Article does not purport to change the development of the relationship of the common law, with respect to products liability, including strict liability in tort (as restated in Restatement (Second) of Torts, 402A (1965)), to the provisions of this Act. Compare Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Maryland, 418 A.2d 968 (Del. 1980) and Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973) with Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
Cross References: Article 2, esp. Section 2-318, and Sections 2A-214, 2A-503 and 2A-504.
Definitional Cross References:
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Person". Section 1-201(30).
"Remedy". Section 1-201(34).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws provided three alternative versions of this section, as had been done for the analogous provision in Article 2, Section 2-318. In enacting the Uniform Commercial Code, the South Carolina General Assembly chose the middle ground, Alternative B, for Section 36-2-318 but modified it to provide liability for injury to property of a natural person in addition to personal injury. Subsequently, in JKT Co. v. Hardwick, 274 S.C. 413, 265 S.E.2d 510 (1980), the Supreme Court held that the statutory protection of natural persons in Section 36-2-318 did not inhibit the developing case law abolishing the requirement of privity in South Carolina:
South Carolina is in the vanguard in permitting a plaintiff to recover economic loss from a seller with whom he did not deal and who made no express warranties to him. . . . We can perceive no valid reason why we should erect an artificial line distinguishing between consumer plaintiffs and corporate plaintiffs on the issue of privity. It would be patently unfair to allow a manufacturer of a defective product to escape liability via privity when the plaintiff is an individual, so it is unfair to disallow recovery when a corporation brings suit. There is no justifiable reason why an innocent corporate consumer should be denied recovery when a manufacturer places an defective article into commerce. The same rule should apply to corporate transactions as to consumer purchases.
This section adopts Alternative C of the Official Text, because that version most closely parallels South Carolina sales law after JKT Company. Thus South Carolina sales and lease law provide similar rights for third parties injured by sold or leased goods. In addition, if the goods were leased under a finance lease, the third person who has been injured, in person or property, may be able to claim under the supplier's warranties using Section 36-2-318 rather than Section 36-2A-216.
Section 36-2A-217. Identification.
Identification of goods as goods to which a lease contract refers may be made at any time and in any manner explicitly agreed to by the parties. In the absence of explicit agreement, identification occurs:
(a) when the lease contract is made if it is for goods that are existing and identified;
(b) when the goods are shipped, marked, or otherwise designated by the lessor as goods to which the lease contract refers, if the lease contract is for goods that are not existing and identified; or
(c) when the young are conceived, if the lease contract is for a lease of unborn young of animals.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-501.
Changes: This section, together with Section 2A-218, is derived from the provisions of Section 2-501, with changes to reflect lease terminology; however, this section omits as irrelevant to leasing practice the treatment of special property.
Purposes: With respect to subsection (b) there is a certain amount of ambiguity in the reference to when goods are designated, e.g., when the lessor is both selling and leasing goods to the same lessee/buyer and has marked goods for delivery but has not distinguished between those related to the lease contract and those related to the sales contract. As in Section 2-501(1)(b), this issue has been left to be resolved by the courts, case by case.
Cross References: Sections 2-501 and 2A-218.
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreement". Section 1-201(3).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section makes no change in existing South Carolina law, but merely adapts the analogous rule in Article 2 to lease transactions within the scope of this Article.
Section 36-2A-218. Insurance and proceeds.
(1) A lessee obtains an insurable interest when existing goods are identified to the lease contract even though the goods identified are nonconforming and the lessee has an option to reject them.
(2) If a lessee has an insurable interest only by reason of the lessor's identification of the goods, the lessor, until default or insolvency or notification to the lessee that identification is final, may substitute other goods for those identified.
(3) Notwithstanding a lessee's insurable interest under subsections (1) and (2), the lessor retains an insurable interest until an option to buy has been exercised by the lessee and risk of loss has passed to the lessee.
(4) Nothing in this section impairs any insurable interest recognized under any other statute or rule of law.
(5) The parties by agreement may determine that one or more parties have an obligation to obtain and pay for insurance covering the goods and by agreement may determine the beneficiary of the proceeds of the insurance.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-501.
Changes: This section, together with Section 2A-217, is derived from the provisions of Section 2-501, with changes and additions to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Purposes: Subsection (2) states a rule allowing substitution of goods by the lessor under certain circumstances, until default or insolvency of the lessor, or until notification to the lessee that identification is final. Subsection (3) states a rule regarding the lessor's insurable interest that, by virtue of the difference between a sale and a lease, necessarily is different from the rule stated in Section 2-501(2) regarding the seller's insurable interest. For this purpose the option to buy shall be deemed to have been exercised by the lessee when the resulting sale is closed, not when the lessee gives notice to the lessor. Further, subsection (5) is new and reflects the common practice of shifting the responsibility and cost of insuring the goods between the parties to the lease transaction.
Cross References: Sections 2-501, 2-501(2) and 2A-217.
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreement". Section 1-201(3).
"Buying". Section 2A-103(1)(a).
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Insolvent". Section 1-201(23).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Notification". Section 1-201(26).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Although there are no South Carolina cases directly on point, this section closely tracks the language of its statutory analogue and should make no significant change in South Carolina law. Subsection (5), however, has no statutory source; it is new to the UCC. As the Official Comment to this section indicates, its rule is seen by the drafters of this Article as a mere codification of currently existing transactional practice.
Similar results were reached at common law before the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. With respect to subsection (1), see John Frazer & Co. v. Hilliard, 2 Strob 309 (1848). With respect to subsection (3) (the retention by the lessor of an insurable interest), see Geiger v. Ashley, 185 S.C. 71, 193 S.E. 192 (1937), where a mortgagee was held to retain an insurable interest in the property which was separate from the mortgagor's insurable interest.
Section 36-2A-219. Risk of loss.
(1) Except in the case of a finance lease, risk of loss is retained by the lessor and does not pass to the lessee. In the case of a finance lease, risk of loss passes to the lessee.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this chapter on the effect of default on risk of loss (Section 36-2A-220), if risk of loss is to pass to the lessee and the time of passage is not stated, the following rules apply:
(a) If the lease contract requires or authorizes the goods to be shipped by carrier
( i) and it does not require delivery at a particular destination, the risk of loss passes to the lessee when the goods are duly delivered to the carrier; but
(ii) if it does require delivery at a particular destination and the goods are there duly tendered while in the possession of the carrier, the risk of loss passes to the lessee when the goods are there duly so tendered as to enable the lessee to take delivery.
(b) If the goods are held by a bailee to be delivered without being moved, the risk of loss passes to the lessee on acknowledgment by the bailee of the lessee's right to possession of the goods.
(c) In any case not within subsection (a) or (b), the risk of loss passes to the lessee on the lessee's receipt of the goods if the lessor, or, in the case of a finance lease, the supplier, is a merchant; otherwise the risk passes to the lessee on tender of delivery.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-509(1) through (3).
Changes: Subsection (1) is new. The introduction to subsection (2) is new, but subparagraph (a) incorporates the provisions of Section 2-509(1); subparagraph (b) incorporates the provisions of Section 2-509(2) only in part, reflecting current practice in lease transactions.
Purposes: Subsection (1) states rules related to retention or passage of risk of loss consistent with current practice in lease transactions. The provisions of subsection (4) of Section 2-509 are not incorporated as they are not necessary. This section does not deal with responsibility for loss caused by the wrongful act of either the lessor or the lessee.
Cross References: Sections 2-509(1), 2-509(2) and 2-509(4).
Definitional Cross References:
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Finance lease". Section 2A-103(1)(g).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Merchant". Section 2-104(1).
"Receipt". Section 2-103(1)(c).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Supplier". Section 2A-103(1)(x).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
There are no South Carolina cases on point. This section adapts and extends the rule of the statutory source, Section 36-2-509, to lease transactions.
Section 36-2A-220. Effect of default on risk of loss.
(1) Where risk of loss is to pass to the lessee and the time of passage is not stated:
(a) If a tender or delivery of goods so fails to conform to the lease contract as to give a right of rejection, the risk of their loss remains with the lessor, or, in the case of a finance lease, the supplier, until cure or acceptance.
(b) If the lessee rightfully revokes acceptance, he may treat the risk of loss as having remained with the lessor from the beginning to the extent of any deficiency in his effective insurance coverage.
(2) Whether or not risk of loss is to pass to the lessee, if the lessee as to conforming goods already identified to a lease contract repudiates or is otherwise in default under the lease contract, the lessor, or, in the case of a finance lease, the supplier, to the extent of any deficiency in his effective insurance coverage may treat the risk of loss as resting on the lessee for a commercially reasonable time.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-510.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology. The rule in Section (1)(b) does not allow the lessee under a finance lease to treat the risk of loss as having remained with the supplier from the beginning. This is appropriate given the limited circumstances under which the lessee under a finance lease is allowed to revoke acceptance. Section 2A-517 and Section 2A-516 Official Comment.
Definitional Cross References:
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Finance lease". Section 2A-103(1)(g).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l). "Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Reasonable time". Section 1-204(1) and (2).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Supplier". Section 2A-103(1)(x).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
There are no South Carolina cases dealing with the effect of default by a party to a lease transaction on the allocation of the risk of loss. This section merely extends the rule of the statutory source, Section 36-2-510, to lease transactions.
Section 36-2A-221: Casualty to identified goods.
If a lease contract requires goods identified when the lease contract is made, and the goods suffer casualty without fault of the lessee, the lessor or the supplier before delivery, or the goods suffer casualty before risk of loss passes to the lessee pursuant to the lease agreement or Section 36-2A-219, then:
(a) if the loss is total, the lease contract is avoided; and
(b) if the loss is partial or the goods have so deteriorated as to no longer conform to the lease contract, the lessee may nevertheless demand inspection and at his option either treat the lease contract as avoided or, except in a finance lease that is not a consumer lease, accept the goods with due allowance from the rent payable for the balance of the lease term for the deterioration or the deficiency in quantity but without further right against the lessor.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-613.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Purposes: Due to the vagaries of determining the amount of due allowance (Section 2-613(b)), no attempt was made in subsection (b) to treat a problem unique to lease contracts and installment sales contracts: determining how to recapture the allowance, e.g., application to the first or last rent payments or allocation, pro rata, to all rent payments.
Cross References: Section 2-613.
Definitional Cross References:
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Consumer lease". Section 2A-103(1)(e).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Fault". Section 2A-103(1)(f).
"Finance lease". Section 2A-103(1)(g).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease agreement". Section 2A-103(1)(k).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Supplier". Section 2A-103(1)(x).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section extends the rule of Section 36-2-613 to lease transactions. The determination of due allowance is likely to require case-by-case analysis, as suggested by the Official Comment to this section.
Part 3
Effect of Lease Contract
Section 36-2A-301. Enforceability of lease contract.
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a lease contract is effective and enforceable according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the goods, and against creditors of the parties.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 9-201.
Changes: The first sentence of Section 9-201 was incorporated, modified to reflect leasing terminology. The second sentence of Section 9-201 was eliminated as not relevant to leasing practices.
Purposes: 1. This section establishes a general rule regarding the validity and enforceability of a lease contract. The lease contract is effective and enforceable between the parties and against third parties. Exceptions to this general rule arise where there is a specific rule to the contrary in this Article. Enforceability is, thus, dependent upon the lease contract meeting the requirements of the Statute of Frauds provisions of Section 2A-201. Enforceability is also a function of the lease contract conforming to the principles of construction and interpretation contained in the Article on General Provisions (Article 1). Section 2A-103(4).
2. The effectiveness or enforceability of the lease contract is not dependent upon the lease contract or any financing statement or the like being filed or recorded; however, the priority of the interest of a lessor of fixtures with respect to the interests of certain third parties in such fixtures is subject to the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9). Section 2A-309. Prior to the adoption of this Article filing or recording was not required with respect to leases, only leases intended as security. The definition of security interest, as amended concurrently with the adoption of this Article, more clearly delineates leases and leases intended as security and thus signals the need to file. Section 1-201(37). Those lessors who are concerned about whether the transaction creates a lease or a security interest will continue to file a protective financing statement. Section 9-408. Coogan, Leasing and the Uniform Commercial Code, in Equipment Leasing-Leveraged Leasing 681, 744-46 (2d ed. 1980).
Cross References: Article 1, especially Section 1-201(37), and Sections 2-104(1), 2A-103(1)(j), 2A-103(1)(l), 2A-103(1)(n), 2A-103(1)(o) and 2A-103(1)(w), 2A-103(3), 2A-103(4), 2A-201, 2A-301 through 2A-303, 2A-303(2), 2A-303(5), 2A-304 through 2A-307, 2A-307(1), 2A-307(2)(a), 2A-308 through 2A-311, 2A-508, 2A-511(4), 2A-523, Article 9, especially Sections 9-201 and 9-408.
Definitional Cross References:
"Creditor". Section 1-201(12).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Purchaser". Section 1-201(33).
"Term". Section 1-201(42).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Section 2A-301 is patterned after South Carolina Code Section 36-9-201, dealing with the effectiveness of a security interest. Unlike security interests under Article 9, however, leases are not subject to any filing or perfection requirements under Article 2A. (The filing requirement under South Carolina Code Section 27-23-80, that leases of personal property had to be filed of record to be valid against subsequent creditors, was repealed when the 1988 amendments to the UCC were enacted. Act 494 of 1988.) A lease that also creates a security interest under Article 9 is subject to the filing requirements of that Article. South Carolina Code Section 36-9-408 allows a lessor to file a financing statement for the lease without the fact of filing being considered in determining whether the lease creates a security interest under Article 9.
Section 36-2A-302. Title to and possession of goods.
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, each provision of this chapter applies whether the lessor or a third party has title to the goods, and whether the lessor, the lessee, or a third party has possession of the goods, notwithstanding any statute or rule of law that possession or the absence of possession is fraudulent.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 9-202.
Changes: Section 9-202 was modified to reflect leasing terminology and to clarify the law of leases with respect to fraudulent conveyances or transfers.
Purposes: The separation of ownership and possession of goods between the lessor and the lessee (or a third party) has created problems under certain fraudulent conveyance statutes. See, e.g., In re Ludlum Enters., 510 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1975); Suburbia Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Bel-Air Conditioning Co., 385 So. 2d 1151 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). This section provides, among other things, that separation of ownership and possession per se does not affect the enforceability of the lease contract. Sections 2A-301 and 2A-308.
Cross References: Sections 2A-301, 2A-308 and 9-202.
Definitional Cross References:
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
With adoption of South Carolina Code Ann. Section 36-9-202, the statutory analogue to this section, South Carolina put to rest a long controversy about who holds title in a sale transaction when a chattel mortgage is given. The early decisions in South Carolina held that the mortgagee acquired legal title upon execution of the mortgage, prior to any default, enabling the mortgagee to maintain an action for recovery against a purchaser of the mortgaged property, while the later decisions indicated that title passed to the mortgagee only when the condition was breached. Compare Levi v. Legg & Bell, 23 S.C. 282 (1855), with Martin v. Jenkins, 51 S.C. 42, 27 S.E. 947 (1897). In addition, the mortgagee had a right to possession unless circumstances indicated that such was not the intention of the parties. Hill v. Winnsboro Granite Corp., 112 SC 243, 99 S.E. 836 (1919).
Just as Section 36-9-202 made the location of title as between the secured party and the debtor irrelevant to parties' rights in secured transactions, so this section makes the location of title (so long as it is not with the lessee) and the location of possession irrelevant to the enforceability of a lease. Possession or the absence of possession is not of itself determinative of fraud. In some instances, this treatment may modify the result otherwise directed under South Carolina's adoption of the Statute of Elizabeth, contained in Section 27-23-10.
Section 2A-308 specifically governs the rights of creditors of lessors who have retained possession after leasing the goods and the rights of creditors of lessees who have retained possession after selling the goods to a lessor in a sale-leaseback transaction.
Section 36-2A-303. Alienability of party's interest under lease contract or of lessor's residual interest in goods; delegation of performance; transfer of rights.
(1) As used in this section, 'creation of a security interest' includes the sale of a lease contract that is subject to Article 9, Secured Transactions, by reason of Section 36-9-102(1)(b).
(2) Except as provided in subsections (3) and (4), a provision in a lease agreement which (i) prohibits the voluntary or involuntary transfer, including a transfer by sale, sublease, creation, or enforcement of a security interest, or attachment, levy, or other judicial process, of an interest of a party under the lease contract or of the lessor's residual interest in the goods, or (ii) makes such a transfer an event of default, gives rise to the rights and remedies provided in subsection (5), but a transfer that is prohibited or is an event of default under the lease agreement is otherwise effective.
(3) A provision in a lease agreement which (i) prohibits the creation or enforcement of a security interest in an interest of a party under the lease contract or in the lessor's residual interest in the goods, or (ii) makes such a transfer an event of default, is not enforceable unless, and then only to the extent that, there is an actual transfer by the lessee of the lessee's right of possession or use of the goods in violation of the provision or an actual delegation of a material performance of either party to the lease contract in violation of the provision. Neither the granting nor the enforcement of a security interest in (i) the lessor's interest under the lease contract or (ii) the lessor's residual interest in the goods is a transfer that materially impairs the prospect of obtaining return performance by, materially changes the duty of, or materially increases the burden or risk imposed on, the lessee within the purview of subsection (5) unless, and then only to the extent that, there is an actual delegation of a material performance of the lessor.
(4) A provision in a lease agreement which (i) prohibits a transfer of a right to damages for default with respect to the whole lease contract or of a right to payment arising out of the transferor's due performance of the transferor's entire obligation, or (ii) makes such a transfer an event of default, is not enforceable, and such a transfer is not a transfer that materially impairs the prospect of obtaining return performance by, materially changes the duty of, or materially increases the burden or risk imposed on, the other party to the lease contract within the purview of subsection (5).
(5) Subject to subsections (3) and (4):
(a) if a transfer is made which is made an event of default under a lease agreement, the party to the lease contract not making the transfer, unless that party waives the default or otherwise agrees, has the rights and remedies described in Section 36-2A-501(2);
(b) if paragraph (a) is not applicable and if a transfer is made that is prohibited under a lease agreement or materially impairs the prospect of obtaining return performance by, materially changes the duty of, or materially increases the burden or risk imposed on, the other party to the lease contract, unless the party not making the transfer agrees at any time to the transfer in the lease contract or otherwise, then, except as limited by contract, (i) the transferor is liable to the party not making the transfer for damages caused by the transfer to the extent that the damages could not reasonably be prevented by the party not making the transfer and (ii) a court having jurisdiction may grant other appropriate relief, including cancellation of the lease contract or an injunction against the transfer.
(6) A transfer of 'the lease' or of 'all my rights under the lease', or a transfer in similar general terms, is a transfer of rights and, unless the language or the circumstances, as in a transfer for security, indicate the contrary, the transfer is a delegation of duties by the transferor to the transferee. Acceptance by the transferee constitutes a promise by the transferee to perform those duties. The promise is enforceable by either the transferor or the other party to the lease contract.
(7) Unless otherwise agreed by the lessor and the lessee, a delegation of performance does not relieve the transferor as against the other party of any duty to perform or of any liability for default.
(8) In a consumer lease, to prohibit the transfer of an interest of a party under the lease contract or to make a transfer an event of default, the language must be specific, by a writing, and conspicuous.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Sections 2-210 and 9-311.
Changes: The provisions of Sections 2-210 and 9-311 were incorporated in this section, with substantial modifications to reflect leasing terminology and practice and to harmonize the principles of the respective provisions, i.e. limitations on delegation of performance on the one hand and alienability of rights on the other. In addition, unlike Section 2-210 which deals only with voluntary transfers, this section deals with involuntary as well as voluntary transfers. Moreover, the principle of Section 9-318(4) denying effectiveness to contractual terms prohibiting assignments of receivables due and to become due also is implemented.
Purposes: 1. Subsection (2) states a rule, consistent with Section 9-311, that voluntary and involuntary transfers of an interest of a party under the lease contract or of the lessor's residual interest, including by way of the creation or enforcement of a security interest, are effective, notwithstanding a provision in the lease agreement prohibiting the transfer or making the transfer an event of default. Although the transfers are effective, the provision in the lease agreement is nevertheless enforceable, but only as provided in subsection (5). Under subsection (5) the prejudiced party is limited to the remedies on "default under the lease contract" in this Article and, except as limited by this Article, as provided in the lease agreement, if the transfer has been made an event of default. Section 2A-501(2). Usually, there will be a specific provision to this effect or a general provision making a breach of a covenant an event of default. In those cases where the transfer is prohibited, but not made an event of default, the prejudiced party may recover damages; or, if the damage remedy would be ineffective adequately to protect that party, the court can order cancellation of the lease contract or enjoin the transfer. This rule that such provisions generally are enforceable is subject to subsections (3) and (4), which make such provisions unenforceable in certain instances.
2. The first such instance is described in subsection (3). A provision in a lease agreement which prohibits the creation or enforcement of a security interest, including sales of lease contracts subject to Article 9 (Sections 9-102(1)(b) and 9-104(f)), or makes it an event of default is generally not enforceable, reflecting the policy of Section 9-318(4). However, that policy gives way to the doctrine stated in Section 2-210(2), which gives one party to a contract the right to protect itself against an actual delegation (but not just a provision under which delegation might later occur) of a material performance by the other party. Accordingly, such a provision in a lease agreement is enforceable when the transfer delegates a material performance. Generally, as expressly provided in subsection (6), a transfer for security is not a delegation of duties. However, inasmuch as the creation of a security interest includes the sale of a lease contract, if there are then unperformed duties on the part of the lessor/seller, there could be a delegation of duties in the sale, and, if such a delegation actually takes place and is of a material performance, a provision in a lease agreement prohibiting it or making it an event of default would be enforceable, giving rise to the rights and remedies stated in subsection (5). The statute does not define "material." The parties may set standards to determine its meaning. The term is intended to exclude delegations of matters such as accounting to a professional accountant and the performance of, as opposed to the responsibility for, maintenance duties to a person in the maintenance service industry.
3. For similar reasons, the lessor is entitled to protect its residual interest in the goods by prohibiting anyone but the lessee from possessing or using them. Accordingly, under subsection (3) if there is an actual transfer by the lessee of its right of possession or use of the goods in violation of a provision in the lease agreement, such a provision likewise is enforceable, giving rise to the rights and remedies stated in subsection (5). A transfer of the lessee's right of possession or use of the goods resulting from the enforcement of a security interest granted by the lessee in its leasehold interest is a "transfer by the lessee" under this subsection.
4. Finally, subsection (3) protects against a claim that the creation or enforcement of a security interest in the lessor's interest under the lease contract or in the residual interest is a transfer that materially impairs the prospect of obtaining return performance by, materially changes the duty of, or materially increases the burden or risk imposed on the lessee so as to give rise to the rights and remedies stated in subsection (5), unless the transfer involves an actual delegation of a material performance of the lessor.
5. While it is not likely that a transfer by the lessor of its right to payment under the lease contract would impair at a future time the ability of the lessee to obtain the performance due the lessee under the lease contract from the lessor, if under the circumstances reasonable grounds for insecurity as to receiving that performance arise, the lessee may employ the provision of this Article for demanding adequate assurance of due performance and has the remedy provided in that circumstance. Section 2A-401.
6. Sections 9-206 and 9-318(1) through (3) also are relevant. Section 9-206 sanctions an agreement by a lessee not to assert certain types of claims or defenses against the lessor's assignee. Section 9-318(1) through (3) deal with, among other things, the other party's rights against the assignee where Section 9-206(1) does not apply. Since the definition of contract under Section 1-201(11) includes a lease agreement, the definition of account debtor under Section 9-105(1)(a) includes a lessee of goods. As a result, Section 9-206 applies to lease agreements, and there is no need to restate those sections in this Article. The reference to "defenses or claims arising out of a sale" in Section 9-318(1) should be interpreted broadly to include defenses or claims arising out of a lease inasmuch as that section codifies the common law rule with respect to contracts, including lease contracts.
7. Subsection (4) is based upon Section 2-210(2) and Section 9-318(4). It makes unenforceable a prohibition against transfers of certain rights to payment or a provision making the transfer an event of default. It also provides that such transfers do not materially impair the prospect of obtaining return performance by, materially change the duty of, or materially increase the burden or risk imposed on, the other party to the lease contract so as to give rise to the rights and remedies stated in subsection (5). Accordingly, a transfer of a right to payment cannot be prohibited or made an event of default, or be one that materially impairs performance, changes duties or increases risk, if the right is already due or will become due without further performance being required by the party to receive payment. Thus, a lessor can transfer the right to future payments under the lease contract, including by way of a grant of a security interest, and the transfer will not give rise to the rights and remedies stated in subsection (5) if the lessor has no remaining performance under the lease contract. The mere fact that the lessor is obligated to allow the lessee to remain in possession and to use the goods as long as the lessee is not in default does not mean that there is "remaining performance" on the part of the lessor. Likewise, the fact that the lessor has potential liability under a "non-operating" lease contract for breaches of warranty does not mean that there is "remaining performance." In contrast, the lessor would have "remaining performance" under a lease contract requiring the lessor to regularly maintain and service the goods or to provide "upgrades" of the equipment on a periodic basis in order to avoid obsolescence. The basic distinction is between a mere potential duty to respond which is not "remaining performance," and an affirmative duty to render stipulated performance. Although the distinction may be difficult to draw in some cases, it is instructive to focus on the difference between "operating" and "non-operating" leases as generally understood in the marketplace. Even if there is "remaining performance" under a lease contract, a transfer for security of a right to payment that is made an event of default or that is in violation of a prohibition against transfer does not give rise to the rights and remedies under subsection (5) if it does not constitute an actual delegation of a material performance under subsection (3).
8. The application of either the rule of subsection (3) or the rule of subsection (4) to the grant by the lessor of a security interest in the lessor's right to future payment under the lease contract may produce the same result. Both subsections generally protect security transfers by the lessor in particular because the creation by the lessor of a security interest or the enforcement of that interest generally will not prejudice the lessee's rights if it does not result in a delegation of the lessor's duties. To the contrary, the receipt of loan proceeds or relief from the enforcement of an antecedent debt normally should enhance the lessor's ability to perform its duties under the lease contract. Nevertheless, there are circumstances where relief might be justified. For example, if ownership of the goods is transferred pursuant to enforcement of a security interest to a party whose ownership would prevent the lessee from continuing to possess the goods, relief might be warranted. See 49 U.S.C. Section 1401(a) and (b) which places limitations on the operation of aircraft in the United States based on the citizenship or corporate qualification of the registrant.
9. Relief on the ground of material prejudice when the lease agreement does not prohibit the transfer or make it an event of default should be afforded only in extreme circumstances, considering the fact that the party asserting material prejudice did not insist upon a provision in the lease agreement that would protect against such a transfer.
10. Subsection (5) implements the rule of subsection (2). Subsection (2) provides that, even though a transfer is effective, a provision in the lease agreement prohibiting it or making it an event of default may be enforceable as provided in subsection (5). See Brummond v. First National Bank of Clovis, 656 P.2d 884, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1311 (N. Mex. 1983), stating the analogous rule for Section 9-311. If the transfer prohibited by the lease agreement is made an event of default, then, under subsection 5(a), unless the default is waived or there is an agreement otherwise, the aggrieved party has the rights and remedies referred to in Section 2A-501(2), viz. those in this Article and, except as limited in the Article, those provided in the lease agreement. In the unlikely circumstance that the lease agreement prohibits the transfer without making a violation of the prohibition an event of default or, even if there is no prohibition against the transfer, and the transfer is one that materially impairs performance, changes duties, or increases risk (for example, a sublease or assignment to a party using the goods improperly or for an illegal purpose), then subsection 5(b) is applicable. In that circumstance, unless the party aggrieved by the transfer has otherwise agreed in the lease contract, such as by assenting to a particular transfer or to transfers in general, or agrees in some other manner, the aggrieved party has the right to recover damages from the transferor and a court may, in appropriate circumstances, grant other relief, such as cancellation of the lease contract or an injunction against the transfer.
11. If a transfer gives rise to the rights and remedies provided in subsection (5), the transferee as an alternative may propose, and the other party may accept, adequate cure or compensation for past defaults and adequate assurance of future due performance under the lease contract. Subsection (5) does not preclude any other relief that may be available to a party to the lease contract aggrieved by a transfer subject to an enforceable prohibition, such as an action for interference with contractual relations.
12. Subsection (8) requires that a provision in a consumer lease prohibiting a transfer, or making it an event of default, must be specific, written and conspicuous. See Section 1-201(10). This assists in protecting a consumer lessee against surprise assertions of default.
13. Subsection (6) is taken almost verbatim from the provisions of Section 2-210(4). The subsection states a rule of construction that distinguishes a commercial assignment, which substitutes the assignee for the assignor as to rights and duties, and an assignment for security or financing assignment, which substitutes the assignee for the assignor only as to rights. Note that the assignment for security or financing assignment is a subset of all security interests. Security interest is defined to include "any interest of a buyer of ... chattel paper". Section 1-201(37). Chattel paper is defined to include a lease. Section 9-105(1)(b). Thus, a buyer of leases is the holder of a security interest in the leases. That conclusion should not influence this issue, as the policy is quite different. Whether a buyer of leases is the holder of a commercial assignment, or an assignment for security or financing assignment should be determined by the language of the assignment or the circumstances of the assignment.
Cross References: Sections 1-201(11), 1-201(37), 2-210, 2A-401, 9-102(1)(b), 9-104(f), 9-105(1)(a), 9-206, and 9-318.
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreed" and "Agreement". Section 1-201(3).
"Conspicuous". Section 1-201(10).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Lessor's residual interest". Section 2A-103(1)(q).
"Notice". Section 1-201(25).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Person". Section 1-201(30).
"Reasonable time". Section 1-204(1) and (2).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Term". Section 1-201(42).
"Writing". Section 1-201(46).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This provision (Subsection (2)) extends to leases the principle of South Carolina Code Ann. Section 36-9-311, that in all security transactions the debtor has an interest which can be conveyed or reached by creditors, regardless of attempted restriction in the security agreement. Under Subsection (2), voluntary or involuntary transfers of interests under a lease may be effective, notwithstanding a provision in the lease that makes them an event of default.
Subsection (4), which is based on Section 36-9-210(2) and Section 36-9-318(4), invalidates restrictions against transfers of certain rights to payment. In South Carolina, the common law rule was developed in the case law of sales, recognizing the validity of these assignments. See Troublefield v. Heyward 111 S.C. 293, 97 S.E. 767 (1919).
Subsection (6) is almost exactly the same as its analogue, Section 36-9-210. The adoption of Section 36-9-210 in South Carolina merely codified the common law.
The provisions of this section on default are subject to the limitations of South Carolina Code Section 37-5-109 regulating default in consumer credit transactions, including consumer leases. To the extent of any conflict, Section 2A-104 provides that the consumer protection provisions of Title 37 prevail.
Section 36-2A-304. Subsequent lease of goods by lessor.
(1) Subject to Section 36-2A-303, a subsequent lessee from a lessor of goods under an existing lease contract obtains, to the extent of the leasehold interest transferred, the leasehold interest in the goods that the lessor had or had power to transfer, and except as provided in subsection (2) and Section 36-2A-527(4), takes subject to the existing lease contract. A lessor with voidable title has power to transfer a good leasehold interest to a good faith subsequent lessee for value, but only to the extent set forth in the preceding sentence. If goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase, the lessor has that power even though:
(a) the lessor's transferor was deceived as to the identity of the lessor;
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored;
(c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a 'cash sale'; or
(d) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law.
(2) A subsequent lessee in the ordinary course of business from a lessor who is a merchant dealing in goods of that kind to whom the goods were entrusted by the existing lessee of that lessor before the interest of the subsequent lessee became enforceable against that lessor obtains, to the extent of the leasehold interest transferred, all of that lessor's and the existing lessee's rights to the goods, and takes free of the existing lease contract.
(3) A subsequent lessee from the lessor of goods that are subject to an existing lease contract and are covered by a certificate of title issued under a statute of this State or of another jurisdiction takes no greater rights than those provided both by this section and by the certificate of title statute.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-403.
Changes: While Section 2-403 was used as a model for this section, the provisions of Section 2-403 were significantly revised to reflect leasing practices and to integrate this Article with certificate of title statutes.
Purposes: 1. This section must be read in conjunction with, as it is subject to, the provisions of Section 2A-303, which govern voluntary and involuntary transfers of rights and duties under a lease contract, including the lessor's residual interest in the goods.
2. This section must also be read in conjunction with Section 2-403. This section and Section 2A-305 are derived from Section 2-403, which states a unified policy on good faith purchases of goods. Given the scope of the definition of purchaser (Section 1-201(33)), a person who bought goods to lease as well as a person who bought goods subject to an existing lease from a lessor will take pursuant to Section 2-403. Further, a person who leases such goods from the person who bought them should also be protected under Section 2-403, first because the lessee's rights are derivative and second because the definition of purchaser should be interpreted to include one who takes by lease; no negative implication should be drawn from the inclusion of lease in the definition of purchase in this Article. Section 2A-103(1)(v).
3. There are hypotheticals that relate to an entrustee's unauthorized lease of entrusted goods to a third party that are outside the provisions of Sections 2-403, 2A-304 and 2A-305. Consider a sale of goods by M, a merchant, to B, a buyer. After paying for the goods B allows M to retain possession of the goods as B is short of storage. Before B calls for the goods M leases the goods to L, a lessee. This transaction is not governed by Section 2-403(2) as L is not a buyer in the ordinary course of business. Section 1-201(9). Further, this transaction is not governed by Section 2A-304(2) as B is not an existing lessee. Finally, this transaction is not governed by Section 2A-305(2) as B is not M's lessor. Section 2A-307(2) resolves the potential dispute between B, M and L. By virtue of B's entrustment of the goods to M and M's lease of the goods to L, B has a cause of action against M under the common law. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-103. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts Sections 222A-243. Thus, B is a creditor of M. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-201(12). Section 2A-307(2) provides that B, as M's creditor, takes subject to M's lease to L. Thus, if L does not default under the lease, L's enjoyment and possession of the goods should be undisturbed. However, B is not without recourse. B's action should result in a judgment against M providing, among other things, a turnover of all proceeds arising from M's lease to L, as well as a transfer of all of M's right, title and interest as lessor under M's lease to L, including M's residual interest in the goods. Section 2A-103(1)(q).
4. Subsection (1) states a rule with respect to the leasehold interest obtained by a subsequent lessee from a lessor of goods under an existing lease contract. The interest will include such leasehold interest as the lessor has in the goods as well as the leasehold interest that the lessor had the power to transfer. Thus, the subsequent lessee obtains unimpaired all rights acquired under the law of agency, apparent agency, ownership or other estoppel, whether based upon statutory provisions or upon case law principles. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-103. In general, the subsequent lessee takes subject to the existing lease contract, including the existing lessee's rights thereunder. Furthermore, the subsequent lease contract is, of course, limited by its own terms, and the subsequent lessee takes only to the extent of the leasehold interest transferred thereunder.
5. Subsection (1) further provides that a lessor with voidable title has power to transfer a good leasehold interest to a good faith subsequent lessee for value. In addition, subsections (1)(a) through (d) provide specifically for the protection of the good faith subsequent lessee for value in a number of specific situations which have been troublesome under prior law.
6. The position of an existing lessee who entrusts leased goods to its lessor is not distinguishable from the position of other entrusters. Thus, subsection (2) provides that the subsequent lessee in the ordinary course of business takes free of the existing lease contract between the lessor entrustee and the lessee entruster, if the lessor is a merchant dealing in goods of that kind. Further, the subsequent lessee obtains all of the lessor entrustee's and the lessee entruster's rights to the goods, but only to the extent of the leasehold interest transferred by the lessor entrustee. Thus, the lessor entrustee retains the residual interest in the goods. Section 2A-103(1)(q). However, entrustment by the existing lessee must have occurred before the interest of the subsequent lessee became enforceable against the lessor. Entrusting is defined in Section 2-403(3) and that definition applies here. Section 2A-103(3).
7. Subsection (3) states a rule with respect to a transfer of goods from a lessor to a subsequent lessee where the goods are subject to an existing lease and covered by a certificate of title. The subsequent lessee's rights are no greater than those provided by this section and the applicable certificate of title statute, including any applicable case law construing such statute. Where the relationship between the certificate of title statute and Section 2-403, the statutory analogue to this section, has been construed by a court, that construction is incorporated here. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-102(1) and (2). The better rule is that the certificate of title statutes are in harmony with Section 2-403 and thus would be in harmony with this section. E.g., Atwood Chevrolet-Olds v. Aberdeen Mun. School Dist., 431 So.2d 926, 928 (Miss. 1983); Godfrey v. Gilsdorf, 476 P.2d 3, 6, 86 Nev. 714, 718 (1970); Martin v. Nager, 192 N.J. Super. 189, 197-98, 469 A.2d 519, 523 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1983). Where the certificate of title statute is silent on this issue of transfer, this section will control.
Cross References: Sections 1-102, 1-103, 1-201(33), 2-403, 2A-103(1)(v), 2A-103(3), 2A-103(4), 2A-303 and 2A-305.
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreed". Section 1-201(3).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Entrusting". Section 2-403(3).
"Good faith". Sections 1-201(19) and 2-103(1)(b).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Leasehold interest". Section 2A-103(1)(m).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessee in the ordinary course of business". Section 2A-103(1)(o).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Merchant". Section 2-104(1).
"Purchase". Section 2A-103(1)(v).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This provision is substantially similar to its statutory analogue, South Carolina Code Ann. Section 36-2-403, which deals with the rights of good faith purchasers to acquire an interest in goods greater than their transferors had.
Subsection (1) basically codifies the common law principle that a lessee acquires all of the interest of his lessor. In addition, South Carolina courts recognize the common law concept of a "voidable title," which is utilized in Subsection (1); a voidable title, unlike a void title, ripens into an indefeasible title in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value. See Marvin v. Connelly, 272 S.C. 562, 252 S.E.2d 568 (1979).
In general, the common law analysis turns upon whether the original owner assented to the transfer. For example, if the goods were stolen from the original owner, a thief could not pass title even to a bona fide purchaser for value. See Sun Ins. Office v. Foil, 187 S.C. 183, 197 S.E. 683 (1938). If, on the other hand, the owner intended to transfer ownership, but transferred voidable title which was passed to the good faith purchaser for value, the owner's claim to the goods would be cut off.
Subsection (2) is also substantially similar to its analogue. Subsection (2) governs the position of an existing lessee who entrusts the leased goods to its lessor. Subsection (2) is consistent with the South Carolina common law position. See Russell Willis, Inc. v. Page, 213 S.C. 156, 48 S.E.2d 627 (1948) (sale of goods).
Section 36-2A-305. Sale or sublease of goods by lessee.
(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 36-2A-303, a buyer or sublessee from the lessee of goods under an existing lease contract obtains, to the extent of the interest transferred, the leasehold interest in the goods that the lessee had or had power to transfer, and except as provided in subsection (2) and Section 36-2A-511(4), takes subject to the existing lease contract. A lessee with a voidable leasehold interest has power to transfer a good leasehold interest to a good faith buyer for value or a good faith sublessee for value, but only to the extent set forth in the preceding sentence. When goods have been delivered under a transaction of lease the lessee has that power even though:
(a) the lessor was deceived as to the identity of the lessee;
(b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored; or
(c) the delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law.
(2) A buyer in the ordinary course of business or a sublessee in the ordinary course of business from a lessee who is a merchant dealing in goods of that kind to whom the goods were entrusted by the lessor obtains, to the extent of the interest transferred, all of the lessor's and lessee's rights to the goods, and takes free of the existing lease contract.
(3) A buyer or sublessee from the lessee of goods that are subject to an existing lease contract and are covered by a certificate of title issued under a statute of this State or of another jurisdiction takes no greater rights than those provided both by this section and by the certificate of title statute.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-403.
Changes: While Section 2-403 was used as a model for this section, the provisions of Section 2-403 were significantly revised to reflect leasing practice and to integrate this Article with certificate of title statutes.
Purposes: This section, a companion to Section 2A-304, states the rule with respect to the leasehold interest obtained by a buyer or sublessee from a lessee of goods under an existing lease contract. Cf. Section 2A-304 Official Comment. Note that this provision is consistent with existing case law, which prohibits the bailee's transfer of title to a good faith purchaser for value under Section 2-403(1). Rohweder v. Aberdeen Product. Credit Ass'n, 765 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1985).
Subsection (2) is also consistent with existing case law. American Standard Credit, Inc. v. National Cement Co., 643 F.2d 248, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1981); but cf. Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. TLW Computer Indus., 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1052, 1057-58 (D. Mass. 1983). Unlike Section 2A-304(2), this subsection does not contain any requirement with respect to the time that the goods were entrusted to the merchant. In Section 2A-304(2) the competition is between two customers of the merchant lessor; the time of entrusting was added as a criterion to create additional protection to the customer who was first in time: the existing lessee. In subsection (2) the equities between the competing interests were viewed as balanced.
There appears to be some overlap between Section 2-403(2) and Section 2A-305(2) with respect to a buyer in the ordinary course of business. However, an examination of this Article's definition of buyer in the ordinary course of business (Section 2A-103(1)(a)) makes clear that this reference was necessary to treat entrusting in the context of a lease.
Subsection (3) states a rule of construction with respect to a transfer of goods from a lessee to a buyer or sublessee, where the goods are subject to an existing lease and covered by a certificate of title. Cf. Section 2A-304 Official Comment.
Cross References: Sections 2-403, 2A-103(1)(a), 2A-304 and 2A-305(2).
Definitional Cross References:
"Buyer". Section 2-103(1)(a).
"Buyer in the ordinary course of business". Section 2A-103(1)(a).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Entrusting". Section 2-403(3).
"Good faith". Sections 1-201(19) and 2-103(1)(b).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Leasehold interest". Section 2A-103(1)(m).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessee in the ordinary course of business". Section 2A-103(1)(o).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Merchant". Section 2-104(1).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Sale". Section 2-106(1).
"Sublease". Section 2A-103(1)(w).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This provision for the subsequent sale or sublease of goods by a lessee closely parallels the provision in Section 2A-304 regarding subsequent sale or sublease of goods by a lessor. In short, this provision provides that the buyer or sublessee obtains, to the extent transferred, the lessee's leasehold interest in the goods.
Subleases of motor vehicles are specifically regulated by Chapter 13 of Title 37. Although that Chapter is located in the Consumer Protection Code, the transactions it regulates are not only those with consumers. Nonetheless, the provisions of Chapter 13 should prevail over anything inconsistent in this section, under Section 2A-104(2).
Section 36-2A-306. Priority of certain liens arising by operation of law.
If a person in the ordinary course of his business furnishes services or materials with respect to goods subject to a lease contract, a lien upon those goods in the possession of that person given by statute or rule of law for those materials or services takes priority over any interest of the lessor or lessee under the lease contract or this chapter unless the lien is created by statute and the statute provides otherwise or unless the lien is created by rule of law and it provides otherwise.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 9-310.
Changes: The approach reflected in the provisions of Section 9-310 was included, but revised to conform to leasing terminology and to expand the exception to the special priority granted to protected liens to cover liens created by rule of law as well as those created by statute.
Purposes: This section should be interpreted to allow a qualified lessor or a qualified lessee to be the competing lienholder if the statute or rule of law so provides. The reference to statute includes applicable regulations and cases; these sources must be reviewed in resolving a priority dispute under this section.
Cross Reference: Section 9-310.
Definitional Cross References:
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease Contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Lien". Section 2A-103(1)(r).
"Person". Section 1-201(30).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section covers all forms of non consensual liens, such as the common mechanics lien. The exception was logically expanded beyond coverage in the statutory analogue, found at South Carolina Code Ann. Section 36-9-310, to encompass liens created by rule of law when the rule of law does not permit this special priority.
This section reverses the priority found in Nesbitt Auto Co. v. Whitlock, 113 S.C. 519, 101 S.E. 822 (1920), which held that under the recording act a prior recorded purchase money mortgage had priority over a lien of a repairman.
Section 36-2A-307. Priority of liens arising by attachment or levy on, security interests in, and other claims to goods.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-2A-306, a creditor of a lessee takes subject to the lease contract.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (3) and (4) and in Sections 36-2A-306 and 36-2A-308, a creditor of a lessor takes subject to the lease contract unless:
(a) the creditor holds a lien that attached to the goods before the lease contract became enforceable,
(b) the creditor holds a security interest in the goods and the lessee did not give value and receive delivery of the goods without knowledge of the security interest; or
(c) the creditor holds a security interest in the goods which was perfected (Section 36-9-303) before the lease contract became enforceable.
(3) A lessee in the ordinary course of business takes the leasehold interest free of a security interest in the goods created by the lessor even though the security interest is perfected (Section 36-9-303) and the lessee knows of its existence.
(4) A lessee other than a lessee in the ordinary course of business takes the leasehold interest free of a security interest to the extent that it secures future advances made after the secured party acquires knowledge of the lease or more than forty-five days after the lease contract becomes enforceable, whichever first occurs, unless the future advances are made pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the lease and before the expiration of the forty-five-day period.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: None for subsection (1). Subsection (2) is derived from Section 9-301, and subsections (3) and (4) are derived from Section 9-307(1) and (3), respectively.
Changes: The provisions of Sections 9-301 and 9-307(1) and (3) were incorporated, and modified to reflect leasing terminology and the basic concepts reflected in this Article.
Purposes: 1. Subsection (1) states a general rule of priority that a creditor of the lessee takes subject to the lease contract. The term lessee (Section 2A-103(1)(n)) includes sublessee. Therefore, this subsection not only covers disputes between the prime lessor and a creditor of the prime lessee but also disputes between the prime lessor, or the sublessor, and a creditor of the sublessee. Section 2A-301 Official Comment 3(g). Further, by using the term creditor (Section 1-201(12)), this subsection will cover disputes with a general creditor, a secured creditor, a lien creditor and any representative of creditors. Section 2A-103(4).
2. Subsection (2) states a general rule of priority that a creditor of a lessor takes subject to the lease contract. Note the discussion above with regard to the scope of these rules. Section 2A-301 Official Comment 3(g). Thus, the section will not only cover disputes between the prime lessee and a creditor of the prime lessor but also disputes between the prime lessee, or the sublessee, and a creditor of the sublessor.
3. To take priority over the lease contract, and the interests derived therefrom, the creditor must come within one of three exceptions stated within the rule. First, subsection (2)(a) provides that where the creditor holds a lien (Section 2A-103(1)(r)) that attached before the lease contract became enforceable (Section 2A-301), the creditor does not take subject to the lease. Second, subsection (2)(b) provides that when the creditor holds a security interest (Section 1-201(37)) , whether or not perfected, the creditor has priority over a lessee who did not give value (Section 1-201(44)) and receive delivery of the goods without knowledge (Section 1-201(25)) of the security interest. As to other lessees, under subsection (2)(c) a secured creditor holding a perfected security interest before the time the lease contract became enforceable (Section 2A-301) does not take subject to the lease. With respect to this provision, the lessee in these circumstances is treated like a buyer so that perfection of a purchase money security interest does not relate back (Section 9-301).
4. The rules of this section operate in favor of whichever party to the lease contract may enforce it, even if one party perhaps may not, e.g., under Section 2A-201(1)(b).
5. The rules stated in subsections (2)(b) and (c), and the rule in subsection (3), are best understood by reviewing a hypothetical. Assume that a merchant engaged in the business of selling and leasing musical instruments obtained possession of a truck load of musical instruments on deferred payment terms from a supplier of musical instruments on January 6. To secure payment of such credit the merchant granted the supplier a security interest in the instruments; the security interest was perfected by filing on January 15. The merchant, as lessor, entered into a lease to an individual of one of the musical instruments supplied by the supplier; the lease became enforceable on January 10. Under subsection (2)(b) the lessee will prevail (assuming the lessee qualifies thereunder) unless subsection (c) provides otherwise. Under the rule stated in subsection (2)(c) a priority dispute between the supplier, as the lessor's secured creditor, and the lessee would be determined by ascertaining on January 10 (the day the lease became enforceable) the validity and perfected status of the security interest in the musical instrument and the enforceability of the lease contract by the lessee. Nothing more appearing, under the rule stated in subsection (2)(c), the supplier's security interest in the musical instrument would not have priority over the lease contract. Moreover, subsection (2) states that its rules are subject to the rules of subsections (3) and (4). Under this hypothetical the lessee should qualify as a "lessee in the ordinary course of business". Section 2A-103(1)(o). Subsection (3) also makes clear that the lessee in the ordinary course of business will win even if he or she knows of the existence of the supplier's security interest.
6. Subsections (3) and (4), which are modeled on the provisions of Section 9-307(1) and (3), respectively, state two exceptions to the priority rule stated in subsection (2) with respect to a creditor who holds a security interest. The lessee in the ordinary course of business will be treated in the same fashion as the buyer in the ordinary course of business, given a priority dispute with a secured creditor over goods subject to a lease contract.
Cross References: Sections 1-201(12), 1-201(25), 1-201(37), 1-201(44), 2A-103(1)(n), 2A-103(1)(o), 2A-103(1)(r), 2A-103(4), 2A-201(1)(b), 2A-301 Official Comment 3(g), Article 9, especially Sections 9-301, 9-307(1) and 9-307(3).
Definitional Cross References:
"Creditor". Section 1-201(12).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Knowledge" and "Knows". Section 1-201(25).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Leasehold interest". Section 2A-103(1)(m).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessee in the ordinary course of business". Section 2A-103(1)(o).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Lien". Section 2A-103(1)(r).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Pursuant to commitment". Section 2A-103(3).
"Security interest". Section 1-201(37).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section is a compilation of the concepts codified in Sections 36-9-301 and 36-9-307. Subsection (3) is substantially similar to its analogue, Section 36-9-307. This provision is patterned after the Article 9 exception that makes even a perfected secured party subordinate to the buyer in the ordinary course of business. For South Carolina cases regarding this provision in the sales context , see Clanton Auto Sales v. Young, 239 S.C. 250, 122 S.E.2d 640 (1961) and Russell Willis, Inc. v. Page, 213 S.C. 156, 48 S.E.2d 627 (1948). Under subsection (3) a lessee in the ordinary course of business takes the leasehold interest free of any security interest the lessor has created in the goods, even if the lessee knows of that interest.
With regard to a lease not in the ordinary course of business, subsection (4) provides a limited exception to the general rule of subsections (1) & (2) that the lessee is not subject to subsequent encumbrances by the lessor. Under subsection (4) until the secured party learns of the lease or the lease has been enforceable for 45 days, future advances or a commitment to make future advances burden the lessee's interest. Once the secured party learns of the lease or 45 days have passed, the leasehold interest takes priority over further voluntary advances. This provision parallels the official text of UCC Section 9-307(3). However, South Carolina Code Section 36-9-307(3) is completely different, protecting the secured creditor rather than the subsequent purchaser. See the South Carolina Reporter's Notes to Section 36-9-307 explaining the policy decision that was made in 1988 to reject the uniform language. In South Carolina a lessee has greater protection under this provision than does a purchaser under Section 36-9-307.
Section 36-2A-308. Special rights of creditors.
(1) A creditor of a lessor in possession of goods subject to a lease contract may treat the lease contract as void if as against the creditor retention of possession by the lessor is fraudulent under any statute or rule of law, but retention of possession in good faith and current course of trade by the lessor for a commercially reasonable time after the lease contract becomes enforceable is not fraudulent.
(2) Nothing in this chapter impairs the rights of creditors of a lessor if the lease contract (a) becomes enforceable, not in current course of trade but in satisfaction of or as security for a pre-existing claim for money, security, or the like, and (b) is made under circumstances which under any statute or rule of law apart from this chapter would constitute the transaction a fraudulent transfer or voidable preference.
(3) A creditor of a seller may treat a sale or an identification of goods to a contract for sale as void if as against the creditor retention of possession by the seller is fraudulent under any statute or rule of law, but retention of possession of the goods pursuant to a lease contract entered into by the seller as lessee and the buyer as lessor in connection with the sale or identification of the goods is not fraudulent if the buyer bought for value and in good faith.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-402(2) and (3)(b).
Changes: Rephrased and new material added to conform to leasing terminology and practice.
Purposes: Subsection (1) states a general rule of avoidance where the lessor has retained possession of goods if such retention is fraudulent under any statute or rule of law. However, the subsection creates an exception under certain circumstances for retention of possession of goods for a commercially reasonable time after the lease contract becomes enforceable.
Subsection (2) also preserves the possibility of an attack on the lease by creditors of the lessor if the lease was made in satisfaction of or as security for a pre-existing claim, and would constitute a fraudulent transfer or voidable preference under other law.
Finally, subsection (3) states a new rule with respect to sale-leaseback transactions, i.e., transactions where the seller sells goods to a buyer but possession of the goods is retained by the seller pursuant to a lease contract between the buyer as lessor and the seller as lessee. Notwithstanding any statute or rule of law that would treat such retention as fraud, whether per se, prima facie, or otherwise, the retention is not fraudulent if the buyer bought for value (Section 1-201(44)) and in good faith (Sections 1-201(19) and 2-103(1)(b)). Section 2A-103(3) and (4). This provision overrides Section 2-402(2) to the extent it would otherwise apply to a sale-leaseback transaction.
Cross References: Sections 1-201(19), 1-201(44), 2-402(2) and 2A-103(4).
Definitional Cross References:
"Buyer". Section 2-103(1)(a).
"Contract". Section 1-201(11).
"Creditor". Section 1-201(12).
"Good faith". Sections 1-201(19) and 2-103(1)(b).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Money". Section 1-201(24).
"Reasonable time". Section 1-204(1) and (2).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Sale". Section 2-106(1).
"Seller". Section 2-103(1)(d).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Subsections (1) and (2) of 2A-308 are substantially similar to their statutory analogue, Section 36-2-402 of the South Carolina Code.
Subsection (1) is a modified version of Section 36-2-402(2), which recognizes that different states have developed different presumptions of fraud from the retention of possession by the seller of goods. Under South Carolina common law, retention of possession by the seller creates a presumption of fraud which can be rebutted by showing that it was for a bona fide purpose. Smith v. Henry, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 118, 122 (1831).
Subsection (2) is also similar to its statutory analogue, Section 36-2-402(3). In the context of sales, Section 36-2-402(3) made clear that the rights of a seller's creditors to set aside a sale based on voidable preferences or fraudulent conveyances were not disturbed by the adoption of Article 2. The Article 2A provision extends this rule to the leasing context.
Subsection (3) expressly eliminates the presumption of fraud in a bona fide sale-leaseback where the sale is for value, although the seller/lessee retains possession of the goods. In such transactions, this provision will prevail over any contrary interpretation of the Statute of Elizabeth, contained in Section 27-23-10. This is true even though leases are no longer required to be filed of record to be valid against subsequent creditors. See Section 9(a)(1) of Act 494 of 1988, repealing South Carolina Code Section 27-23-80. However, lessors may continue to file "precautionary" UCC financing statements, expressly authorized by Section 36-9-408. See Official Comment 2 to Section 36-2A-301.
Section 36-2A-309. Lessor's and lessee's rights when goods become fixtures.
(1) In this section:
(a) goods are 'fixtures' when they become so related to particular real estate that an interest in them arises under real estate law;
(b) a 'fixture filing' is the filing, in the office where a mortgage on the real estate would be filed or recorded, of a financing statement covering goods that are or are to become fixtures and conforming to the requirements of Section 36-9-402(5);
(c) a lease is a 'purchase money lease' unless the lessee has possession or use of the goods or the right to possession or use of the goods before the lease agreement is enforceable;
(d) a mortgage is a 'construction mortgage' to the extent it secures an obligation incurred for the construction of an improvement on land including the acquisition cost of the land, if the recorded writing so indicates; and
(e) 'encumbrance' includes real estate mortgages and other liens on real estate and all other rights in real estate that are not ownership interests.
(2) Under this chapter a lease may be of goods that are fixtures or may continue in goods that become fixtures, but no lease exists under this chapter of ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on land.
(3) This chapter does not prevent creation of a lease of fixtures pursuant to real estate law.
(4) The perfected interest of a lessor of fixtures has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate if:
(a) ease is a purchase money lease, the conflicting interest of the encumbrancer or owner arises before the goods become fixtures, the interest of the lessor is perfected by a fixture filing before the goods become fixtures or within ten days thereafter, and the lessee has an interest of record in the real estate or is in possession of the real estate; or
(b) the interest of the lessor is perfected by a fixture filing before the interest of the encumbrancer or owner is of record, the lessor's interest has priority over any conflicting interest of a predecessor in title of the encumbrancer or owner, and the lessee has an interest of record in the real estate or is in possession of the real estate.
(5) The interest of a lessor of fixtures, whether or not perfected, has priority over the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate if:
(a) the fixtures are readily removable factory or office machines, readily removable equipment that is not primarily used or leased for use in the operation of the real estate, or readily removable replacements of domestic appliances that are goods subject to a consumer lease, and before the goods become fixtures the lease contract is enforceable; or
(b) the conflicting interest is a lien on the real estate obtained by legal or equitable proceedings after the lease contract is enforceable; or
(c) the encumbrancer or owner has consented in writing to the lease or has disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures; or
(d) the lessee has a right to remove the goods as against the encumbrancer or owner. If the lessee's right to remove terminates, the priority of the interest of the lessor continues for a reasonable time.
(6) Notwithstanding subsection (4)(a) but otherwise subject to subsections (4) and (5), the interest of a lessor of fixtures, including the lessor's residual interest, is subordinate to the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer of the real estate under a construction mortgage recorded before the goods become fixtures if the goods become fixtures before the completion of the construction. To the extent given to refinance a construction mortgage, the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer of the real estate under a mortgage has this priority to the same extent as the encumbrancer of the real estate under the construction mortgage.
(7) In cases not within the preceding subsections, priority between the interest of a lessor of fixtures, including the lessor's residual interest, and the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate who is not the lessee is determined by the priority rules governing conflicting interests in real estate.
(8) If the interest of a lessor of fixtures, including the lessor's residual interest, has priority over all conflicting interests of all owners and encumbrancers of the real estate, the lessor or the lessee may (i) on default, expiration, termination, or cancellation of the lease agreement but subject to the lease agreement and this chapter, or (ii) if necessary to enforce other rights and remedies of the lessor or lessee under this chapter, remove the goods from the real estate, free and clear of all conflicting interests of all owners and encumbrancers of the real estate, but the lessor or lessee must reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of the real estate who is not the lessee and who has not otherwise agreed for the cost of repair of any physical injury, but not for any diminution in value of the real estate caused by the absence of the goods removed or by any necessity of replacing them. A person entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission to remove until the party seeking removal gives adequate security for the performance of this obligation.
(9) Even though the lease agreement does not create a security interest, the interest of a lessor of fixtures, including the lessor's residual interest, is perfected by filing a financing statement as a fixture filing for leased goods that are or are to become fixtures in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Chapter on Secured Transactions (Chapter 9).
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 9-313.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing terminology and to add new material.
Purposes: 1. While Section 9-313 provided a model for this section, certain provisions were substantially revised.
2. Section 2A-309(1)(c), which is new, defines purchase money lease to exclude leases where the lessee had possession or use of the goods or the right thereof before the lease agreement became enforceable. This term is used in subsection (4)(a) as one of the conditions that must be satisfied to obtain priority over the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate.
3. Section 2A-309(4), which states one of several priority rules found in this section, deletes reference to office machines and the like (Section 9-313(4)(c)) as well as certain liens (Section 9-313(4)(d)). However, these items are included in subsection (5), another priority rule that is more permissive than the rule found in subsection (4) as it applies whether or not the interest of the lessor is perfected. In addition, subsection (5)(a) expands the scope of the provisions of Section 9-313(4)(c) to include readily removable equipment not primarily used or leased for use in the operation of real estate; the qualifier is intended to exclude from the expanded rule equipment integral to the operation of real estate, e.g., heating and air conditioning equipment.
4. The rule stated in subsection (7) is more liberal than the rule stated in Section 9-313(7) in that issues of priority not otherwise resolved in this subsection are left for resolution by the priority rules governing conflicting interests in real estate, as opposed to the Section 9-313(7) automatic subordination of the security interest in fixtures. Note that, for the purpose of this section, where the interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate is paramount to the interest of the lessor, the latter term includes the residual interest of the lessor.
5. The rule stated in subsection (8) is more liberal than the rule stated in Section 9-313(8) in that the right of removal is extended to both the lessor and the lessee and the occasion for removal includes expiration, termination or cancellation of the lease agreement, and enforcement of rights and remedies under this Article, as well as default. The new language also provides that upon removal the goods are free and clear of conflicting interests of owners and encumbrancers of the real estate.
6. Finally, subsection (9) provides a mechanism for the lessor of fixtures to perfect its interest by filing a financing statement under the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9), even though the lease agreement does not create a security interest. Section 1-201(37). The relevant provisions of Article 9 must be interpreted permissively to give effect to this mechanism as it implicitly expands the scope of Article 9 so that its filing provisions apply to transactions that create a lease of fixtures, even though the lease agreement does not create a security interest. This mechanism is similar to that provided in Section 2-326(3)(c) for the seller of goods on consignment, even though the consignment is not "intended as security". Section 1-201(37). Given the lack of litigation with respect to the mechanism created for consignment sales, this new mechanism should prove effective.
Cross References: Sections 1-201(37), 2A-309(1)(c), 2A-309(4), Article 9, especially Sections 9-313, 9-313(4)(c), 9-313(4)(d), 9-313(7), 9-313(8) and 9-408.
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreed". Section 1-201(3).
"Cancellation". Section 2A-103(1)(b).
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Consumer lease". Section 2A-103(1)(e).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease agreement". Section 2A-103(1)(k).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Lien". Section 2A-103(1)(r).
"Mortgage". Section 9-105(1)(j).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Person". Section 1-201(30).
"Reasonable time". Section 1-204(1) and (2).
"Remedy". Section 1-201(34).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Security interest". Section 1-201(37).
"Termination". Section 2A-103(1)(z).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
"Writing". Section 1-201(46).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Section 2A-309 governs the rights of both lessors and lessees when goods become fixtures. Article 2A recognizes the traditional definition of fixtures, which recognizes the definition most widely used in real estate law.
In order to achieve priority over competing realty interests, lessors are required by Subsection (9) to make a fixture filing. The fixture filing must recite that it is to be filed in the real estate records and include a description of the real estate.
Subsection (4)(b) governs the dilemma when competing claims in goods that constitute fixtures arise between lessors and encumbrancers or owners of the real property to which the fixtures are attached. Article 2A follows the traditional rule: first in time, first in right. Subsection 4(a), however, provides an exception in the case of a purchase money interest. The exception allows a lessor who enters into a purchase money lease to attain priority over the competing real estate interests even if the lessor makes a fixture filing after the real estate claimant has filed. The lessor, however, must take advantage of the grace period by making the fixture filing before the goods have been fixtures for ten days. Under Subsection (7), the lessor who does not make a proper filing will lose to a competing interest of an owner or encumbrancer of real estate. There are several exceptions to this rule, all of which are found within Subsection (5). In general, although these provisions are substantially similar to their sister Article 9 provision, they are broader.
Section 36-2A-310. Lessor's and lessee's rights when goods become accessions.
(1) Goods are 'accessions' when they are installed in or affixed to other goods.
(2) The interest of a lessor or a lessee under a lease contract entered into before the goods became accessions is superior to all interests in the whole except as stated in subsection (4).
(3) The interest of a lessor or a lessee under a lease contract entered into at the time or after the goods became accessions is superior to all subsequently acquired interests in the whole except as stated in subsection (4) but is subordinate to interests in the whole existing at the time the lease contract was made unless the holders of such interests in the whole have in writing consented to the lease or disclaimed an interest in the goods as part of the whole.
(4) The interest of a lessor or a lessee under a lease contract described in subsection (2) or (3) is subordinate to the interest of
(a) a buyer in the ordinary course of business or a lessee in the ordinary course of business of any interest in the whole acquired after the goods became accessions; or
(b) a creditor with a security interest in the whole perfected before the lease contract was made to the extent that the creditor makes subsequent advances without knowledge of the lease contract.
(5) When under subsections (2) or (3) and (4) a lessor or a lessee of accessions holds an interest that is superior to all interests in the whole, the lessor or the lessee may (a) on default, expiration, termination, or cancellation of the lease contract by the other party but subject to the provisions of the lease contract and this chapter, or (b) if necessary to enforce his other rights and remedies under this chapter, remove the goods from the whole, free and clear of all interests in the whole, but he must reimburse any holder of an interest in the whole who is not the lessee and who has not otherwise agreed for the cost of repair of any physical injury but not for any diminution in value of the whole caused by the absence of the goods removed or by any necessity for replacing them. A person entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission to remove until the party seeking removal gives adequate security for the performance of this obligation.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 9-314.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing terminology and to add new material.
Purposes: Subsections (1) and (2) restate the provisions of subsection (1) of Section 9-314 to clarify the definition of accession and to add leasing terminology to the priority rule that applies when the lease is entered into before the goods become accessions.
Subsection (3) restates the provisions of subsection (2) of Section 9-314 to add leasing terminology to the priority rule that applies when the lease is entered into on or after the goods become accessions. Unlike the rule with respect to security interests, the lease is merely subordinate, not invalid.
Subsection (4) creates two exceptions to the priority rules stated in subsections (2) and (3). Subsection (4) deletes the special priority rule found in the provisions of Section 9-314(3)(b) as the interests of the lessor and lessee are entitled to greater protection.
Finally, subsection (5) is modeled on the provisions of Section 9-314(4) with respect to removal of accessions, restated to reflect the parallel changes in Section 2A-309(8).
Neither this section nor Section 9-314 governs where the accession to the goods is not subject to the interest of a lessor or a lessee under a lease contract and is not subject to the interest of a secured party under a security agreement. This issue is to be resolved by the courts, case by case.
Cross References: Sections 2A-309(8), 9-314(1), 9-314(2), 9-314(3)(b), 9-314(4).
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreed". Section 1-201(3).
"Buyer in the ordinary course of business". Section 2A-103(1)(a).
"Cancellation". Section 2A-103(1)(b).
"Creditor". Section 1-201(12).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Holder". Section 1-201(20).
"Knowledge". Section 1-201(25).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessee in the ordinary course of business". Section 2A-103(1)(o).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Person". Section 1-201(30).
"Remedy". Section 1-201(34).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Security interest". Section 1-201(37).
"Termination". Section 2A-103(1)(z).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
"Writing". Section 1-201(46).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Subsections (1) and (2) of this provision reflect the provisions of its statutory analogue, Section 36-9-314 of the South Carolina Code. Section 2A-310 defines "accession" and states the priority rule that applies when a lease is entered into before the goods became accessions, just as its sister provision does. A typical fact situation that arises in sales is described in Goodrich Silvertown v. Rogers, 189 S.C. 91, 200 S.E. 91 (1938), which involved a priority contest between a recorded chattel mortgage on a car and a subsequent conditional sale vendor of tires placed on the car. The South Carolina Supreme Court held for the holder of the security interest in the tires. This result was undisturbed by the adoption of Section 36-9-314(1). Under Section 2A-310 the same result would obtain for accessions of leased goods.
With regard to the rights of a creditor under this section, it is important to note that South Carolina Code Section 36-9-301(2) provides that a purchase money security interest perfected by filing within ten days of transfer of possession relates back to the time of possession and takes priority over lien creditor rights arising between delivery and filing.
Section 36-2A-311. Priority subject to subordination.
Nothing in this chapter prevents subordination by agreement by any person entitled to priority.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 9-316.
Purposes: The several preceding sections deal with questions of priority. This section is inserted to make it entirely clear that a person entitled to priority may effectively agree to subordinate the claim. Only the person entitled to priority may make such an agreement: the rights of such a person cannot be adversely affected by an agreement to which that person is not a party.
Cross References: Sections 1-102 and 2A-304 through 2A-310.
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreement". Section 1-201(3).
"Person". Section 1-201(30).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section mirrors its analogue, Section 36-9-316, and makes clear that persons who are entitled to priority may subordinate their claims.
Part 4
Performance of Lease Contract:
Repudiated, Substituted and Excused
Section 36-2A-401. Insecurity: adequate assurance of performance.
(1) A lease contract imposes an obligation on each party that the other's expectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired.
(2) If reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to the performance of either party, the insecure party may demand in writing adequate assurance of due performance. Until the insecure party receives that assurance, if commercially reasonable the insecure party may suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed return.
(3) A repudiation of the lease contract occurs if assurance of due performance adequate under the circumstances of the particular case is not provided to the insecure party within a reasonable time, not to exceed thirty days after receipt of a demand by the other party.
(4) Between merchants, the reasonableness of grounds for insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance offered must be determined according to commercial standards.
(5) Acceptance of any nonconforming delivery or payment does not prejudice the aggrieved party's right to demand adequate assurance of future performance.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-609.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology. Note that in the analogue to subsection (3) (Section 2-609(4)), the adjective "justified" modifies demand. The adjective was deleted here as unnecessary, implying no substantive change.
Definitional Cross References:
"Aggrieved party". Section 1-201(2).
"Agreed". Section 1-201(3).
"Between merchants". Section 2-104(3).
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Reasonable time". Section 1-204(1) and (2).
"Receipt". Section 2-103(1)(c).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Writing". Section 1-201(46).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section is virtually the same as its analogue, Section 36-2-609 of the South Carolina Code, which modified the common law by expanding the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation. Under the common law, a party had no right to request reassurance, and any request could be ignored with impunity. McCloskey v. Minweld Steel Co., 220 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1955). T&S Brass and Bronze Works, Inc. v. Pic-Air, Inc., 790 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1986) provides a good example of insecurity under South Carolina law. That case involved an installment sale. Because forty percent of the goods in the first installment were defective, the buyer demanded assurance that the goods in the remaining installments would meet the contractual specifications. The court held the seller's failure to provide the requested assurance of quality to be a repudiation. This section provides the same result in a lease.
Section 36-2A-402. Anticipatory repudiation.
If either party repudiates a lease contract with respect to a performance not yet due under the lease contract, the loss of which performance will substantially impair the value of the lease contract to the other, the aggrieved party may:
(a) for a commercially reasonable time, await retraction of repudiation and performance by the repudiating party;
(b) make demand pursuant to Section 36-2A-401 and await assurance of future performance adequate under the circumstances of the particular case; or
(c) resort to any right or remedy upon default under the lease contract or this chapter, even though the aggrieved party has notified the repudiating party that the aggrieved party would await the repudiating party's performance and assurance and has urged retraction. In addition, whether or not the aggrieved party is pursuing one of the foregoing remedies, the aggrieved party may suspend performance or, if the aggrieved party is the lessor, proceed in accordance with the provisions of this chapter on the lessor's right to identify goods to the lease contract notwithstanding default or to salvage unfinished goods (Section 36-2A-524).
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-610.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Definitional Cross References:
"Aggrieved party". Section 1-201(2).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Notifies". Section 1-201(26).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Reasonable time". Section 1-204(1) and (2).
"Remedy". Section 1-201(34).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section merely codifies the common law of anticipatory repudiation. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts, Section 8.22 (2nd ed. 1990).
Section 36-2A-403. Retraction of anticipatory repudiation.
(1) Until the repudiating party's next performance is due, the repudiating party can retract the repudiation unless, since the repudiation, the aggrieved party has canceled the lease contract or materially changed the aggrieved party's position or otherwise indicated that the aggrieved party considers the repudiation final.
(2) Retraction may be by any method that clearly indicates to the aggrieved party that the repudiating party intends to perform under the lease contract and includes any assurance demanded under Section 36-2A-401.
(3) Retraction reinstates a repudiating party's rights under a lease contract with due excuse and allowance to the aggrieved party for any delay occasioned by the repudiation.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-611.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology. Note that in the analogue to subsection (2) (Section 2-611(2)) the adjective "justifiably" modifies demanded. The adjective was deleted here (as it was in Section 2A-401) as unnecessary, implying no substantive change.
Definitional Cross References:
"Aggrieved party". Section 1-201(2).
"Cancellation". Section 2A-103(1)(b).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Section 2A-403 restates the common law rules on retraction of a repudiation. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts, Section 8.22 (2nd ed. 1990).
Section 36-2A-404. Substituted performance.
(1) If without fault of the lessee, the lessor and the supplier, the agreed berthing, loading, or unloading facilities fail or the agreed type of carrier becomes unavailable or the agreed manner of delivery otherwise becomes commercially impracticable, but a commercially reasonable substitute is available, the substitute performance must be tendered and accepted.
(2) If the agreed means or manner of payment fails because of domestic or foreign governmental regulation:
(a) the lessor may withhold or stop delivery or cause the supplier to withhold or stop delivery unless the lessee provides a means or manner of payment that is commercially a substantial equivalent; and
(b) if delivery has already been taken, payment by the means or in the manner provided by the regulation discharges the lessee's obligation unless the regulation is discriminatory, oppressive, or predatory.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-614.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreed". Section 1-201(3).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Fault". Section 2A-103(1)(f).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Supplier". Section 2A-103(1)(x).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Section 2A-404 is designed to save a transaction where failure or impracticability arise in regard to matters such as shipping, carriage, or manner of payment. There are no South Carolina cases on point. This section adopts the rule of Section 36-2-614 to leasing transactions.
Section 36-2A-405. Excused performance.
Subject to Section 36-2A-404 on substituted performance, the following rules apply:
(a) Delay in delivery or nondelivery in whole or in part by a lessor or a supplier who complies with subsections (b) and (c) is not a default under the lease contract if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the lease contract was made or by compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic governmental regulation or order, whether or not the regulation or order later proves to be invalid.
(b) If the causes mentioned in subsection (a) affect only part of the lessor's or the supplier's capacity to perform, he shall allocate production and deliveries among his customers but at his option may include regular customers not then under contract for sale or lease as well as his own requirements for further manufacture. He may so allocate in any manner that is fair and reasonable.
(c) The lessor seasonably shall notify the lessee and in the case of a finance lease the supplier seasonably shall notify the lessor and the lessee, if known, that there will be delay or nondelivery and, if allocation is required under subsection (b), of the estimated quota thus made available for the lessee.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-615.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreed". Section 1-201(3).
"Contract". Section 1-201(11).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Finance lease". Section 2A-103(1)(g).
"Good faith". Sections 1-201(19) and 2-103(1)(b).
"Knows". Section 1-201(25).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Notifies". Section 1-201(26).
"Sale". Section 2-106(1).
"Seasonably". Section 1-204(3).
"Supplier". Section 2A-103(1)(x).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section expands the rule of Section 36-2-615 to the law of leases; however, although this marks the express adoption of impracticability in place of the traditional common law of impossibility, it is doubtful that this makes any change in the current common law of contracts. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts, Section 9.6 (2nd ed. 1990).
South Carolina law appears unchanged by this section, even though those decisions use the term "impossibility" as opposed to impracticability due to hardship or added expense. See, e.g., Hammassopoulo v. Hammassopoulo, 134 S.C. 54, 131 S.E. 319 (1925).
Section 405(b) requires that any allocation of goods under this section due to a shortage caused by force majeure be done in a fair, reasonable, non-discriminatory manner.
The occurrence of generally accepted business risks does not excuse performance under this rule. The comments to Section 36-2-615 illustrate what type of events give rise to the excuse.
Section 36-2A-406. Procedure on excused performance.
(1) If the lessee receives notification of a material or indefinite delay or an allocation justified under Section 36-2A-405, the lessee may by written notification to the lessor as to any goods involved, and with respect to all of the goods if under an installment lease contract the value of the whole lease contract is substantially impaired (Section 36-2A-510):
(a) terminate the lease contract (Section 36-2A-505(2)); or
(b) except in a finance lease that is not a consumer lease, modify the lease contract by accepting the available quota in substitution, with due allowance from the rent payable for the balance of the lease term for the deficiency but without further right against the lessor.
(2) If, after receipt of a notification from the lessor under Section 36-2A-405, the lessee fails so to modify the lease agreement within a reasonable time not exceeding thirty days, the lease contract lapses with respect to any deliveries affected.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-616(1) and (2).
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology. Note that subsection 1(a) allows the lessee under a lease, including a finance lease, the right to terminate the lease for excused performance (Sections 2A-404 and 2A-405). However, subsection 1(b), which allows the lessee the right to modify the lease for excused performance, excludes a finance lease that is not a consumer lease. This exclusion is compelled by the same policy that led to codification of provisions with respect to irrevocable promises. Section 2A-407.
Definitional Cross References:
"Consumer lease". Section 2A-103(1)(e).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Finance lease". Section 2A-103(1)(g).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Installment lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(i).
"Lease agreement". Section 2A-103(1)(k).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Notice". Section 1-201(25).
"Reasonable time". Section 1-204(1) and (2).
"Receipt". Section 2-103(1)(c).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Termination". Section 2A-103(1)(z).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
"Written". Section 1-201(46).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Section 2A-406 expands the law of Section 36-2-616 to the leasing context. Section 36-2-616 codified the common law doctrine that a buyer had the option of either terminating a sales contract or modifying it if he received notification from the seller of a material delay or allocation.
The 30-day provision in subsection (2) puts an outer limit on a "reasonable time." Such limits are commonplace throughout the Uniform Commercial Code. See Section 36-2-616 cmt. 5. The lessee only has such a reasonable time to accept the proposed modification before the lease lapses.
Section 36-2A-407. Irrevocable promises: finance leases.
(1) In the case of a finance lease that is not a consumer lease the lessee's promises under the lease contract become irrevocable and independent upon the lessee's acceptance of the goods.
(2) A promise that has become irrevocable and independent under subsection (1):
(a) is effective and enforceable between the parties, and by or against third parties including assignees of the parties; and
(b) is not subject to cancellation, termination, modification, repudiation, excuse, or substitution without the consent of the party to whom the promise runs.
(3) This section does not affect the validity under any other law of a covenant in any lease contract making the lessee's promises irrevocable and independent upon the lessee's acceptance of the goods.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: None.
Purposes: 1. This section extends the benefits of the classic "hell or high water" clause to a finance lease that is not a consumer lease. This section is self-executing; no special provision need be added to the contract. This section makes covenants in a finance lease irrevocable and independent due to the function of the finance lessor in a three party relationship: the lessee is looking to the supplier to perform the essential covenants and warranties. Section 2A-209. Thus, upon the lessee's acceptance of the goods the lessee's promises to the lessor under the lease contract become irrevocable and independent. The provisions of this section remain subject to the obligation of good faith (Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-203), and the lessee's revocation of acceptance (Section 2A-517).
2. The section requires the lessee to perform even if the lessor's performance after the lessee's acceptance is not in accordance with the lease contract; the lessee may, however, have and pursue a cause of action against the lessor, e.g., breach of certain limited warranties (Sections 2A-210 and 2A-211(1)). This is appropriate because the benefit of the supplier's promises and warranties to the lessor under the supply contract and, in some cases, the warranty of a manufacturer who is not the supplier, is extended to the lessee under the finance lease. Section 2A-209. Despite this balance, this section excludes a finance lease that is a consumer lease. That a consumer be obligated to pay notwithstanding defective goods or the like is a principle that is not tenable under case law (Unico v. Owen, 50 N.J. 101, 232 A.2d 405 (1967)), state statute (Unif. Consumer Credit Code Section 3.403-.405, 7A U.L.A. 126-31 (1974), or federal statute (15 U.S.C. Section 1666i (1982)).
3. The relationship of the three parties to a transaction that qualifies as a finance lease is best demonstrated by a hypothetical. A, the potential lessor, has been contacted by B, the potential lessee, to discuss the lease of an expensive line of equipment that B has recently placed an order for with C, the manufacturer of such goods. The negotiation is completed and A, as lessor, and B, as lessee, sign a lease of the line of equipment for a 60-month term. B, as buyer, assigns the purchase order with C to A. If this transaction creates a lease (Section 2A-103(1)(j)), this transaction should qualify as a finance lease. Section 2A-103(1)(g).
4. The line of equipment is delivered by C to B's place of business. After installation by C and testing by B, B accepts the goods by signing a certificate of delivery and acceptance, a copy of which is sent by B to A and C. One year later the line of equipment malfunctions and B falls behind in its manufacturing schedule.
5. Under this Article, because the lease is a finance lease, no warranty of fitness or merchantability is extended by A to B. Sections 2A-212(1) and 2A-213. Absent an express provision in the lease agreement, application of Section 2A-210 or Section 2A-211(1), or application of the principles of law and equity, including the law with respect to fraud, duress, or the like (Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-103), B has no claim against A. B's obligation to pay rent to A continues as the obligation became irrevocable and independent when B accepted the line of equipment (Section 2A-407(1)). B has no right of set-off with respect to any part of the rent still due under the lease. Section 2A-508(6). However, B may have another remedy. Despite the lack of privity between B and C (the purchase order with C having been assigned by B to A), B may have a claim against C. Section 2A-209(1).
6. This section does not address whether a "hell or high water" clause, i.e., a clause that is to the effect of this section, is enforceable if included in a finance lease that is a consumer lease or a lease that is not a finance lease. That issue will continue to be determined by the facts of each case and other law which this section does not affect. Sections 2A-104, 2A-103(4), 9-206 and 9-318. However, with respect to finance leases that are not consumer leases courts have enforced "hell or high water" clauses. In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., 21 Bankr. 993, 1006 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
7. Subsection (2) further provides that a promise that has become irrevocable and independent under subsection (1) is enforceable not only between the parties but also against third parties. Thus, the finance lease can be transferred or assigned without disturbing enforceability. Further, subsection (2) also provides that the promise cannot, among other things, be canceled or terminated without the consent of the lessor.
Cross References: Sections 1-103, 1-203, 2A-103(1)(g), 2A-103(1)(j), 2A-103(4), 2A-104, 2A-209, 2A-209(1), 2A-210, 2A-211(1), 2A-212(1), 2A-213, 2A-517(1)(b), 9-206 and 9-318.
Definitional Cross References:
"Cancellation". Section 2A-103(1)(b).
"Consumer lease". Section 2A-103(1)(e).
"Finance lease". Section 2A-103(1)(g).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Termination". Section 2A-103(1)(z).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This provision is new to the Uniform Commercial Code: Article 2 has no corresponding section. It is a codification of the "hell or high water" clause commonly included in finances leases to protect their assignability, essentially creating a status similar to a holder in due course. The lessee must continue to make payments under the lease after accepting the goods, regardless of subsequent events. The finance lessee's rights lie against the supplier. See Section 2A-209(1).
Part 5
Default
A. In General
Section 36-2A-501. Default: procedure.
(1) Whether the lessor or the lessee is in default under a lease contract is determined by the lease agreement and this chapter.
(2) If the lessor or the lessee is in default under the lease contract, the party seeking enforcement has rights and remedies as provided in this chapter and, except as limited by this chapter, as provided in the lease agreement.
(3) If the lessor or the lessee is in default under the lease contract, the party seeking enforcement may reduce the party's claim to judgment, or otherwise enforce the lease contract by self-help or any available judicial procedure or nonjudicial procedure, including administrative proceeding, arbitration, or the like, in accordance with this chapter.
(4) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-1-106(1) or this chapter or the lease agreement, the rights and remedies referred to in subsections (2) and (3) are cumulative.
(5) If the lease agreement covers both real property and goods, the party seeking enforcement may proceed under this Part as to the goods, or under other applicable law as to both the real property and the goods in accordance with that party's rights and remedies in respect of the real property, in which case this Part does not apply.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 9-501.
Changes: Substantially revised.
Purposes: 1. Subsection (1) is new and represents a departure from the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9) as the subsection makes clear that whether a party to the lease agreement is in default is determined by this Article as well as the agreement. Sections 2A-508 and 2A-523. It further departs from Article 9 in recognizing the potential default of either party, a function of the bilateral nature of the obligations between the parties to the lease contract.
2. Subsection (2) is a version of the first sentence of Section 9-501(1), revised to reflect leasing terminology.
3. Subsection (3), an expansive version of the second sentence of Section 9-501(1), lists the procedures that may be followed by the party seeking enforcement; in effect, the scope of the procedures listed in subsection (3) is consistent with the scope of the procedures available to the foreclosing secured party.
4. Subsection (4) establishes that the parties' rights and remedies are cumulative. DeKoven, Leases of Equipment: Puritan Leasing Company v. August, A Dangerous Decision, 12 U.S.F. L. Rev. 257, 276-80 (1978). Cumulation, and largely unrestricted selection, of remedies is allowed in furtherance of the general policy of the Commercial Code, stated in Section 1-106, that remedies be liberally administered to put the aggrieved party in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed. Therefore, cumulation of, or selection among, remedies is available to the extent necessary to put the aggrieved party in as good a position as it would have been in had there been full performance. However, cumulation of, or selection among, remedies is not available to the extent that the cumulation or selection would put the aggrieved party in a better position than it would have been in had there been full performance by the other party.
5. Section 9-501(3), which, among other things, states that certain rules, to the extent they give rights to the debtor and impose duties on the secured party, may not be waived or varied, was not incorporated in this Article. Given the significance of freedom of contract in the development of the common law as it applies to bailments for hire and the lessee's lack of an equity of redemption, there was no reason to impose that restraint.
Cross References: Sections 1-106, 2A-508, 2A-523, Article 9, especially Sections 9-501(1) and 9-501(3).
Definitional Cross References:
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease agreement". Section 2A-103(1)(k).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Remedy". Section 1-201(34).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Though there is no South Carolina lease law on this point, prior South Carolina allows cumulative remedies. Both contract law and Article 2 attempt to put the aggrieved party in as good of position as he would have been had the contract been fulfilled. There is nothing in South Carolina law to indicate that we would not follow Puritan Leasing v. August, 16 Cal. 3d 451, 128 Cal. Rptr. 175, 546 P.2d 679 (1975) (referred to in the Official Comment). South Carolina permits the aggrieved party to exercise different remedies for different types of property, even where all of the collateral is personalty. Stokes v Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 130 S.C. 521, 126 S.E. 649 (1924). Unlike the Article 2 provision, this section specifically provides for self-help.
Section 36-2A-502. Notice after default.
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter or the lease agreement, the lessor or lessee in default under the lease contract is not entitled to notice of default or notice of enforcement from the other party to the lease agreement.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: None.
Purposes: This section makes clear that absent agreement to the contrary or provision in this Article to the contrary, e.g., Section 2A-516(3)(a), the party in default is not entitled to notice of default or enforcement. While a review of Part 5 of Article 9 leads to the same conclusion with respect to giving notice of default to the debtor, it is never stated. Although Article 9 requires notice of disposition and strict foreclosure, the different scheme of lessors' and lessees' rights and remedies developed under the common law, and codified by this Article, generally does not require notice of enforcement; furthermore, such notice is not mandated by due process requirements. However, certain sections of this Article do require notice. E.g., Section 2A-517(4).
Cross References: Sections 2A-516(3)(a), 2A-517(4), and Article 9, esp. Part 5.
Definitional Cross References:
"Lease agreement". Section 2A-103(1)(k).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Notice". Section 1-201(25).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Although there is no South Carolina lease law on point, there is nothing to indicate that South Carolina would require notice of default or enforcement except where required by other sections of Article 2A or by Title 37 for consumer leases. The notice requirement of Section 37-5-110, of course, takes precedence over the provisions of Article 2A. Section 2A-104(2).
Section 36-2A-503. Modification or impairment of rights and remedies.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the lease agreement may include rights and remedies for default in addition to or in substitution for those provided in this chapter and may limit or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this chapter.
(2) Resort to a remedy provided under this chapter or in the lease agreement is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive. If circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose, or provision for an exclusive remedy is unconscionable, a remedy may be had as provided in this chapter.
(3) Consequential damages may be liquidated under Section 36-2A-504, or may otherwise be limited, altered, or excluded unless the limitation, alteration, or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation, alteration, or exclusion of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation, alteration, or exclusion of damages where the loss is commercial is not prima facie unconscionable.
(4) Rights and remedies on default by the lessor or the lessee with respect to any obligation or promise collateral or ancillary to the lease contract are not impaired by this chapter.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Sections 2-719 and 2-701.
Changes: Rewritten to reflect lease terminology and to clarify the relationship between this section and Section 2A-504.
Purposes: 1. A significant purpose of this Part is to provide rights and remedies for those parties to a lease who fail to provide them by agreement or whose rights and remedies fail of their essential purpose or are unenforceable. However, it is important to note that this implies no restriction on freedom to contract. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-102(3). Thus, subsection (1), a revised version of the provisions of Section 2-719(1), allows the parties to the lease agreement freedom to provide for rights and remedies in addition to or in substitution for those provided in this Article and to alter or limit the measure of damages recoverable under this Article. Except to the extent otherwise provided in this Article (e.g., Sections 2A-105, 106 and 108(1) and (2)), this Part shall be construed neither to restrict the parties' ability to provide for rights and remedies or to limit or alter the measure of damages by agreement, nor to imply disapproval of rights and remedy schemes other than those set forth in this Part.
2. Subsection (2) makes explicit with respect to this Article what is implicit in Section 2-719 with respect to the Article on Sales (Article 2): if an exclusive remedy is held to be unconscionable, remedies under this Article are available. Section 2-719 Official Comment 1.
3. Subsection (3), a revision of Section 2-719(3), makes clear that consequential damages may also be liquidated. Section 2A-504(1).
4. Subsection (4) is a revision of the provisions of Section 2-701. This subsection leaves the treatment of default with respect to obligations or promises collateral or ancillary to the lease contract to other law. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-103. An example of such an obligation would be that of the lessor to the secured creditor which has provided the funds to leverage the lessor's lease transaction; an example of such a promise would be that of the lessee, as seller, to the lessor, as buyer, in a sale-leaseback transaction.
Cross References: Sections 1-102(3), 1-103, Article 2, especially Sections 2-701, 2-719, 2-719(1), 2-719(3), 2-719 Official Comment 1, and Sections 2A-103(4), 2A-105, 2A-106, 2A-108(1), 2A-108(2), and 2A-504.
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreed". Section 1-201(3).
"Consumer goods". Section 9-109(1).
"Lease agreement". Section 2A-103(1)(k).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Person". Section 1-201(30).
"Remedy". Section 1-201(34).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section helps ensure that the parties will have adequate remedies for breach of a lease. Though there is no South Carolina lease law on point, prior South Carolina law indicates a policy decision to avoid unfair limitations of liability. See Deiter v. Frick Co., 169 S.C. 480, 169 S.E. 297 (1932) (where the contract term limiting seller's liability to furnishing duplicate parts did not save the seller from consequential damages).
Section 36-2A-504. Liquidation of damages.
(1) Damages payable by either party for default, or any other act or omission, including indemnity for loss or diminution of anticipated tax benefits or loss or damage to lessor's residual interest, may be liquidated in the lease agreement but only at an amount or by a formula that is reasonable in light of the then anticipated harm caused by the default or other act or omission.
(2) If the lease agreement provides for liquidation of damages, and such provision does not comply with subsection (1), or such provision is an exclusive or limited remedy that circumstances cause to fail of its essential purpose, a remedy may be had as provided in this chapter.
(3) If the lessor justifiably withholds or stops delivery of goods because of the lessee's default or insolvency (Section 36-2A-525 or 36-2A-526), the lessee is entitled to restitution of any amount by which the sum of his payments exceeds:
(a) the amount to which the lessor is entitled by virtue of terms liquidating the lessor's damages in accordance with subsection (1); or
(b) in the absence of those terms, twenty percent of the then present value of the total rent the lessee was obligated to pay for the balance of the lease term, or, in the case of a consumer lease, the lesser of such amount or five hundred dollars.
(4) A lessee's right to restitution under subsection (3) is subject to offset to the extent the lessor establishes:
(a) a right to recover damages under the provisions of this chapter other than subsection (1); and
(b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the lessee directly or indirectly by reason of the lease contract.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Sections 2-718(1), (2), (3) and 2-719(2).
Changes: Substantially rewritten.
Purposes: Many leasing transactions are predicated on the parties' ability to agree to an appropriate amount of damages or formula for damages in the event of default or other act or omission. The rule with respect to sales of goods (Section 2-718) may not be sufficiently flexible to accommodate this practice. Thus, consistent with the common law emphasis upon freedom to contract with respect to bailments for hire, this section has created a revised rule that allows greater flexibility with respect to leases of goods.
Subsection (1), a significantly modified version of the provisions of Section 2-718(1), provides for liquidation of damages in the lease agreement at an amount or by a formula. Section 2-718(1) does not by its express terms include liquidation by a formula; this change was compelled by modern leasing practice. Subsection (1), in a further expansion of Section 2-718(1), provides for liquidation of damages for default as well as any other act or omission.
A liquidated damages formula that is common in leasing practice provides that the sum of lease payments past due, accelerated future lease payments, and the lessor's estimated residual interest, less the net proceeds of disposition (whether by sale or re-lease) of the leased goods is the lessor's damages. Tax indemnities, costs, interest and attorney's fees are also added to determine the lessor's damages. Another common liquidated damages formula utilizes a periodic depreciation allocation as a credit to the aforesaid amount in mitigation of a lessor's damages. A third formula provides for a fixed number of periodic payments as a means of liquidating damages. Stipulated loss or stipulated damage schedules are also common. Whether these formulae are enforceable will be determined in the context of each case by applying a standard of reasonableness in light of the harm anticipated when the formula was agreed to. Whether the inclusion of these formulae will affect the classification of the transaction as a lease or a security interest is to be determined by the facts of each case. Section 1-201(37). E.g., In re Noack, 44 Bankr. 172, 174-75 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984).
This section does not incorporate two other tests that under sales law determine enforceability of liquidated damages, i.e., difficulties of proof of loss and inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. The ability to liquidate damages is critical to modern leasing practice; given the parties' freedom to contract at common law, the policy behind retaining these two additional requirements here was thought to be outweighed. Further, given the expansion of subsection (1) to enable the parties to liquidate the amount payable with respect to an indemnity for loss or diminution of anticipated tax benefits resulted in another change: the last sentence of Section 2-718(1), providing that a term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty, was also not incorporated. The impact of local, state and federal tax laws on a leasing transaction can result in an amount payable with respect to the tax indemnity many times greater than the original purchase price of the goods. By deleting the reference to unreasonably large liquidated damages the parties are free to negotiate a formula, restrained by the rule of reasonableness in this section. These changes should invite the parties to liquidate damages. Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 Yale L.J. 199, 278 (1963).
Subsection (2), a revised version of Section 2-719(2), provides that if the liquidated damages provision is not enforceable or fails of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Article.
Subsection (3)(b) of this section differs from subsection (2)(b) of Section 2-718; in the absence of a valid liquidated damages amount or formula the lessor is permitted to retain 20 percent of the present value of the total rent payable under the lease. The alternative limitation of $500 contained in Section 2-718 is deleted as unrealistically low with respect to a lease other than a consumer lease.
Cross References: Sections 1-201(37), 2-718, 2-718(1), 2-718(2)(b) and 2-719(2).
Definitional Cross References:
"Consumer lease". Section 2A-103(1)(e).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Insolvent". Section 1-201(23).
"Lease agreement". Section 2A-103(1)(k).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Lessor's residual interest". Section 2A-103(1)(q).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Present value". Section 2A-103(1)(u).
"Remedy". Section 1-201(34).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Term". Section 1-201(42).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
The general rule of subsection (1) is in accord with the basic common law treatment of liquidated damages. Though there is no South Carolina lease law on point, the common law rule is indicated by the courts' refusal to enforce an agreement when the amount stated exceeds any reasonable expectation of compensation, and is, thus, penal in nature. See 3 Williston, Sales, Section 599L (rev. ed. 1948). In William & Co. v. Vance & Moseley, 9 S.C. 344 (1877), a clause in a contract for the sale of cotton calling for liquidated damages of $2.00 per bale was held to be valid liquidated damages. However, the court held in Murray & Co. v. Ouzts, 117 S.C. 388, 109 S.E. 122 (1921), that a clause in the contract calling for reimbursement of all expenses and 20 per cent of the purchase price to be paid in the event of breach was a penalty and unenforceable. These decisions hinged on the correlation between the amount called for in the liquidated damages clause and the actual damages sustained, rather than on the amount of damages that could have been reasonably expected at the time the contract was made.
Section 36-2A-505. Cancellation and termination and effect of cancellation, termination, rescission, or fraud on rights and remedies.
(1) On cancellation of the lease contract, all obligations that are still executory on both sides are discharged, but any right based on prior default or performance survives, and the canceling party also retains any remedy for default of the whole lease contract or any unperformed balance.
(2) On termination of the lease contract, all obligations that are still executory on both sides are discharged but any right based on prior default or performance survives.
(3) Unless the contrary intention clearly appears, expressions of 'cancellation', 'rescission', or the like of the lease contract may not be construed as a renunciation or discharge of any claim in damages for an antecedent default.
(4) Rights and remedies for material misrepresentation or fraud include all rights and remedies available under this chapter for default.
(5) Neither rescission nor a claim for rescission of the lease contract nor rejection or return of the goods may bar or be deemed inconsistent with a claim for damages or other right or remedy.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Sections 2-106(3) and (4), 2-720 and 2-721.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Definitional Cross References:
"Cancellation". Section 2A-103(1)(b).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Remedy". Section 1-201(34).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Termination". Section 2A-103(1)(z).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Though there is no South Carolina lease law on point, prior South Carolina law was changed by Article 2 which preserves the usual remedies for breach, unless it is clearly the parties' intent to waive them. This section follows its Article 2 analogue and also makes it clear that remedies for a fraudulent breach are as liberal as for a non-fraudulent breach. See Aaron v. Hampton Motors, Inc., 240 S.C. 26, 124 S.E.2d 585 (1962); Culbreath v. Investor's Syndicate, 203 S.C. 213, 26 S.E.2d 809 (1943).
Section 36-2A-506. Statute of limitations.
(1) An action for default under a lease contract, including breach of warranty or indemnity, must be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued. By the original lease contract the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year.
(2) A cause of action for default accrues when the act or omission on which the default or breach of warranty is based is or should have been discovered by the aggrieved party, or when the default occurs, whichever is later. A cause of action for indemnity accrues when the act or omission on which the claim for indemnity is based is or should have been discovered by the indemnified party, whichever is later.
(3) If an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same default or breach of warranty or indemnity, the other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action that have accrued before this chapter becomes effective.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-725.
Changes: Substantially rewritten.
Purposes: Subsection (1) does not incorporate the limitation found in Section 2-725(1) prohibiting the parties from extending the period of limitation. Breach of warranty and indemnity claims often arise in a lease transaction; with the passage of time such claims often diminish or are eliminated. To encourage the parties to commence litigation under these circumstances makes little sense.
Subsection (2) states two rules for determining when a cause of action accrues. With respect to default, the rule of Section 2-725(2) is not incorporated in favor of a more liberal rule of the later of the date when the default occurs or when the act or omission on which it is based is or should have been discovered. With respect to indemnity, a similarly liberal rule is adopted.
Cross References: Sections 2-725(1) and 2-725(2).
Definitional Cross References:
"Action". Section 1-201(1).
"Aggrieved party". Section 1-201(2).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Remedy". Section 1-201(34).
"Termination". Section 2A-103(1)(z).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Although there is no South Carolina lease law on point, this Article takes lease contracts out of the generally applicable statute of limitations for contract actions, as Article 2 does for sales. See Atlas Food Systems and Services, Inc. v. Crane National Vendors Div. of Unidynamics Corp., 319 S.C. 556, 462 S.E.2d 858 (1995) (holding that a sale of goods is governed by the six-year Article 2 statute of frauds, Section 36-2-725, not the general three-year statute of frauds in Section 15-3-530).
Like Article 2, this section contains a provision permitting the parties to reduce this period should they desire.
South Carolina provides a six-year statute of frauds for sales of goods rather than the four-year uniform provision found in both Article 2 and Article 2A of the UCC. This provision enacts the official language of the UCC provision and thus provides a four-year statute of limitations for leases rather than the six years provided for sales in South Carolina.
Section 36-2A-507. Proof of market rent: time and place.
(1) Damages based on market rent (Section 36-2A-519 or 36-2A-528) are determined according to the rent for the use of the goods concerned for a lease term identical to the remaining lease term of the original lease agreement and prevailing at the times specified in Sections 36-2A-519 and 36-2A-528.
(2) If evidence of rent for the use of the goods concerned for a lease term identical to the remaining lease term of the original lease agreement and prevailing at the times or places described in this chapter is not readily available, the rent prevailing within any reasonable time before or after the time described or at any other place or for a different lease term which in commercial judgment or under usage of trade would serve as a reasonable substitute for the one described may be used, making any proper allowance for the difference, including the cost of transporting the goods to or from the other place.
(3) Evidence of a relevant rent prevailing at a time or place or for a lease term other than the one described in this chapter offered by one party is not admissible unless and until he has given the other party notice the court finds sufficient to prevent unfair surprise.
(4) If the prevailing rent or value of any goods regularly leased in any established market is in issue, reports in official publications or trade journals or in newspapers or periodicals of general circulation published as the reports of that market are admissible in evidence. The circumstances of the preparation of the report may be shown to affect its weight but not its admissibility.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Sections 2-723 and 2-724.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology. Sections 2A-519 and 2A-528 specify the times as of which market rent is to be determined.
Definitional Cross References:
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease agreement". Section 2A-103(1)(k).
"Notice". Section 1-201(25).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Reasonable time". Section 1-204(1) and (2).
"Usage of trade". Section 1-205.
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Although there is no South Carolina lease law on point, prior South Carolina law seems to be consistent with this section. See Union Bleaching & Finishing Co. v. Barker Fuel Co., 124 S.C. 458, 117 S.E. 735 (1923) (in buyer's action for seller's failure to deliver coal, market price at most available markets was a proper basis for damages because there was no market price available at time and place where contract called for delivery); Clinton Oil & Mfg. Co. v. Carpenter, 113 S.C. 10, 101 S.E. 47 (1919) (market price was measured at nearest market place to point of delivery plus cost of shipment to delivery point).
B. Default by Lessor
Section 36-2A-508. Lessee's remedies.
(1) If a lessor fails to deliver the goods in conformity to the lease contract (Section 36-2A-509) or repudiates the lease contract (Section 36-2A-402), or a lessee rightfully rejects the goods (Section 36-2A-509) or justifiably revokes acceptance of the goods (Section 36-2A-517), then with respect to any goods involved, and with respect to all of the goods if under an installment lease contract the value of the whole lease contract is substantially impaired (Section 36-2A-510), the lessor is in default under the lease contract and the lessee may:
(a) cancel the lease contract (Section 36-2A-505(1));
(b) recover so much of the rent and security as has been paid and is just under the circumstances;
(c) cover and recover damages as to all goods affected whether or not they have been identified to the lease contract (Sections 36-2A-518 and 36-2A-520), or recover damages for nondelivery (Sections 36-2A-519 and 36-2A-520);
(d) exercise any other rights or pursue any other remedies provided in the lease contract.
(2) If a lessor fails to deliver the goods in conformity to the lease contract or repudiates the lease contract, the lessee may also:
(a) if the goods have been identified, recover them (Section 36-2A-522); or
(b) in a proper case, obtain specific performance or replevy the goods (Section 36-2A-521).
(3) If a lessor is otherwise in default under a lease contract, the lessee may exercise the rights and pursue the remedies provided in the lease contract, which may include a right to cancel the lease, and in Section 36-2A-519(3).
(4) If a lessor has breached a warranty, whether express or implied, the lessee may recover damages (Section 36-2A-519(4)).
(5) On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of acceptance, a lessee has a security interest in goods in the lessee's possession or control for any rent and security that has been paid and any expenses reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, transportation, and care and custody and may hold those goods and dispose of them in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner, subject to Section 36-2A-527(5).
(6) Subject to the provisions of Section 36-2A-407, a lessee, on notifying the lessor of the lessee's intention to do so, may deduct all or any part of the damages resulting from any default under the lease contract from any part of the rent still due under the same lease contract.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Sections 2-711 and 2-717.
Changes: Substantially rewritten.
Purposes: 1. This section is an index to Sections 2A-509 through 522 which set out the lessee's rights and remedies after the lessor's default. The lessor and the lessee can agree to modify the rights and remedies available under this Article; they can, among other things, provide that for defaults other than those specified in subsection (1) the lessee can exercise the rights and remedies referred to in subsection (1); and they can create a new scheme of rights and remedies triggered by the occurrence of the default. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-102(3).
2. Subsection (1), a substantially rewritten version of the provisions of Section 2-711(1), lists three cumulative remedies of the lessee where the lessor has failed to deliver conforming goods or has repudiated the contract, or the lessee has rightfully rejected or justifiably revoked. Sections 2A-501(2) and (4). Subsection (1) also allows the lessee to exercise any contractual remedy. This Article rejects any general doctrine of election of remedy. To determine if one remedy bars another in a particular case is a function of whether the lessee has been put in as good a position as if the lessor had fully performed the lease agreement. Use of multiple remedies is barred only if the effect is to put the lessee in a better position than it would have been in had the lessor fully performed under the lease. Sections 2A-103(4), 2A-501(4), and 1-106(1). Subsection (1)(b), in recognition that no bright line can be created that would operate fairly in all installment lease cases and in recognition of the fact that a lessee may be able to cancel the lease (revoke acceptance of the goods) after the goods have been in use for some period of time, does not require that all lease payments made by the lessee under the lease be returned upon cancellation. Rather, only such portion as is just of the rent and security payments made may be recovered. If a defect in the goods is discovered immediately upon tender to the lessee and the goods are rejected immediately, then the lessee should recover all payments made. If, however, for example, a 36-month equipment lease is terminated in the 12th month because the lessor has materially breached the contract by failing to perform its maintenance obligations, it may be just to return only a small part or none of the rental payments already made.
3. Subsection (2), a version of the provisions of Section 2-711(2) revised to reflect leasing terminology, lists two alternative remedies for the recovery of the goods by the lessee; however, each of these remedies is cumulative with respect to those listed in subsection (1).
4. Subsection (3) is new. It covers defaults which do not deprive the lessee of the goods and which are not so serious as to justify rejection or revocation of acceptance under subsection (1). It also covers defaults for which the lessee could have rejected or revoked acceptance of the goods but elects not to do so and retains the goods. In either case, a lessee which retains the goods is entitled to recover damages as stated in Section 2A-519(3). That measure of damages is "the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the lessor's default as determined in any manner that is reasonable together with incidental and consequential damages, less expenses saved in consequence of the lessor's breach."
5. Subsection (1)(d) and subsection (3) recognize that the lease agreement may provide rights and remedies in addition to or different from those which Article 2A provides. In particular, subsection (3) provides that the lease agreement may give the remedy of cancellation of the lease for defaults by the lessor that would not otherwise be material defaults which would justify cancellation under subsection (1). If there is a right to cancel, there is, of course, a right to reject or revoke acceptance of the goods.
6. Subsection (4) is new and merely adds to the completeness of the index by including a reference to the lessee's recovery of damages upon the lessor's breach of warranty; such breach may not rise to the level of a default by the lessor justifying revocation of acceptance. If the lessee properly rejects or revokes acceptance of the goods because of a breach of warranty, the rights and remedies are those provided in subsection (1) rather than those in Section 2A-519(4).
7. Subsection (5), a revised version of the provisions of Section 2-711(3), recognizes, on rightful rejection or justifiable revocation, the lessee's security interest in goods in its possession and control. Section 9-113, which recognized security interests arising under the Article on Sales (Article 2), was amended with the adoption of this Article to reflect the security interests arising under this Article. Pursuant to Section 2A-511(4), a purchaser who purchases goods from the lessee in good faith takes free of any rights of the lessor, or in the case of a finance lease the supplier. Such goods, however, must have been rightfully rejected and disposed of pursuant to Section 2A-511 or 2A-512. However, Section 2A-517(5) provides that the lessee will have the same rights and duties with respect to goods where acceptance has been revoked as with respect to goods rejected. Thus, Section 2A-511(4) will apply to the lessee's disposition of such goods.
8. Pursuant to Section 2A-527(5), the lessee must account to the lessor for the excess proceeds of such disposition, after satisfaction of the claim secured by the lessee's security interest.
9. Subsection (6), a slightly revised version of the provisions of Section 2-717, sanctions a right of set-off by the lessee, subject to the rule of Section 2A-407 with respect to irrevocable promises in a finance lease that is not a consumer lease, and further subject to an enforceable "hell or high water" clause in the lease agreement. Section 2A-407 Official Comment. No attempt is made to state how the set-off should occur; this is to be determined by the facts of each case.
10. There is no special treatment of the finance lease in this section. Absent supplemental principles of law and equity to the contrary, in the case of most finance leases, following the lessee's acceptance of the goods the lessee will have no rights or remedies against the lessor, because the lessor's obligations to the lessee are minimal. Sections 2A-210 and 2A-211(1). Since the lessee will look to the supplier for performance, this is appropriate. Section 2A-209.
Cross References: Sections 1-102(3), 1-103, 1-106(1), Article 2, especially Sections 2-711, 2-717 and Sections 2A-103(4), 2A-209, 2A-210, 2A-211(1), 2A-407, 2A-501(2), 2A-501(4), 2A-509 through 2A-522, 2A-511(3), 2A-517(5), 2A-527(5) and Section 9-113.
Definitional Cross References:
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Good faith". Sections 1-201(19) and 2-103(1)(b).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Installment lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(i).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Notifies". Section 1-201(26).
"Receipt". Section 2-103(1)(c).
"Remedy". Section 1-201(34).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Security interest". Section 1-201(37).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Section 2A-508 is an index of remedies treated in greater detail in following sections. This index of remedies goes beyond its Article 2 analogue in three basic respects: 1. It recognizes the availability of remedies to cover cases in which the lessee accepts and retains the goods and either the breach by the lessor is not sufficient to justify rejection or revocation or the lessee nevertheless elects to retain the goods; the available remedies are any included in the lease agreement and damages measured by the loss that would follow in the ordinary course of events from the lessor's default; 2. It specifically acknowledges that a lessee can recover damages if a lessor has breached an express or implied warranty; and 3. It entitles an aggrieved lessee to set off damages resulting from any default of the lessor against rent still due under the contract. William H. Lawrence and John H. Minan, Law of Personal Property Leasing, 15.01[2][a] (1993).
Section 36-2A-509. Lessee's rights on improper delivery; rightful rejection.
(1) Subject to the provisions of Section 36-2A-510 on default in installment lease contracts, if the goods or the tender or delivery fail in any respect to conform to the lease contract, the lessee may reject or accept the goods or accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest of the goods.
(2) Rejection of goods is ineffective unless it is within a reasonable time after tender or delivery of the goods and the lessee seasonably notifies the lessor.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Sections 2-601 and 2-602(1).
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Definitional Cross References:
"Commercial unit". Section 2A-103(1)(c).
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Installment lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(i).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Notifies". Section 1-201(26).
"Reasonable time". Section 1-204(1) and (2).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Seasonably". Section 1-204(3).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
There is no South Carolina lease law on point. After a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods has passed, unless a timely rejection is made, the goods are deemed accepted. This is in accord with the common law in South Carolina. Porter Bros., Inc. v. Smith, 284 S.C. 292, 325 S.E.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1985); Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Coclin, 161 S.C. 40, 159 S.E. 461 (1931). Notice of rejection of goods by a buyer must be in writing under Section 36-2-602. American Fast Print, Ltd. v. Design Prints of Hickory, 288 S.C. 46, 339 S.E.2d 516 (Ct. App. 1986). However, lesses face no such requirement.
Section 36-2A-510. Installment lease contracts: rejection and default.
(1) Under an installment lease contract a lessee may reject any delivery that is nonconforming if the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of that delivery and cannot be cured or the nonconformity is a defect in the required documents; but if the nonconformity does not fall within subsection (2) and the lessor or the supplier gives adequate assurance of its cure, the lessee must accept that delivery.
(2) Whenever nonconformity or default with respect to one or more deliveries substantially impairs the value of the installment lease contract as a whole there is a default with respect to the whole. But, the aggrieved party reinstates the installment lease contract as a whole if the aggrieved party accepts a nonconforming delivery without seasonably notifying of cancellation or brings an action with respect only to past deliveries or demands performance as to future deliveries.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-612.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Definitional Cross References:
"Action". Section 1-201(1)
"Aggrieved party". Section 1-201(2).
"Cancellation". Section 2A-103(1)(b).
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Installment lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(i).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Notifies". Section 1-201(26).
"Seasonably". Section 1-204(3).
"Supplier". Section 2A-103(1)(x).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Although there is no South Carolina lease law on point, South Carolina law uses a substantial performance test in installment contract cases based on the difficulty of perfect tender of each of multiple deliveries. See South Carolina Reporter's Comments to Section 36-2-612.
Section 36-2A-511. Merchant lessee's duties as to rightfully rejected goods.
(1) Subject to any security interest of a lessee (Section 36-2A-508(5)), if a lessor or a supplier has no agent or place of business at the market of rejection, a merchant lessee, after rejection of goods in his possession or control, shall follow any reasonable instructions received from the lessor or the supplier with respect to the goods. In the absence of those instructions, a merchant lessee shall make reasonable efforts to sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of the goods for the lessor's account if they threaten to decline in value speedily. Instructions are not reasonable if on demand indemnity for expenses is not forthcoming.
(2) If a merchant lessee (subsection (1)) or any other lessee (Section 36-2A-512) disposes of goods, he is entitled to reimbursement either from the lessor or the supplier or out of the proceeds for reasonable expenses of caring for and disposing of the goods and, if the expenses include no disposition commission, to such commission as is usual in the trade, or if there is none, to a reasonable sum not exceeding ten percent of the gross proceeds.
(3) In complying with this section or Section 36-2A-512, the lessee is held only to good faith. Good faith conduct hereunder is neither acceptance or conversion nor the basis of an action for damages.
(4) A purchaser who purchases in good faith from a lessee pursuant to this section or Section 36-2A-512 takes the goods free of any rights of the lessor and the supplier even though the lessee fails to comply with one or more of the requirements of this chapter.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Sections 2-603 and 2-706(5).
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology. This section, by its terms, applies to merchants as well as others. Thus, in construing the section it is important to note that under this Act the term good faith is defined differently for merchants (Section 2-103(1)(b)) than for others (Section 1-201(19)). Section 2A-103(3) and (4).
Definitional Cross References:
"Action". Section 1-201(1).
"Good faith". Sections 1-201(19) and 2-103(1)(b).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Merchant lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(t).
"Purchaser". Section 1-201(33).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Security interest". Section 1-201(37).
"Supplier". Section 2A-103(1)(x).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Although there are no South Carolina lease or sales cases on point, like the statutory analogue (Section 36-2-706(5)), subsection (4) modifies the majority view at common law which favored the original buyer. By protecting a later purchaser even against the lessor or supplier, the sale will be more attractive, increasing the resale price and decreasing the damages the lessor or supplier will have to pay. See South Carolina Reporter's Comments to Section 36-2-706.
Section 36-2A-512. Lessee's duties as to rightfully rejected goods.
(1) Except as otherwise provided with respect to goods that threaten to decline in value speedily (Section 36-2A-511) and subject to any security interest of a lessee (Section 36-2A-508(5)):
(a) the lessee, after rejection of goods in the lessee's possession, shall hold them with reasonable care at the lessor's or the supplier's disposition for a reasonable time after the lessee's seasonable notification of rejection;
(b) if the lessor or the supplier gives no instructions within a reasonable time after notification of rejection, the lessee may store the rejected goods for the lessor's or the supplier's account or ship them to the lessor or the supplier or dispose of them for the lessor's or the supplier's account with reimbursement in the manner provided in Section 36-2A-511; but
(c) the lessee has no further obligations with regard to goods rightfully rejected.
(2) Action by the lessee pursuant to subsection (1) is not acceptance or conversion.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Sections 2-602(2)(b) and (c) and 2-604.
Changes: Substantially rewritten.
Purposes: The introduction to subsection (1) references goods that threaten to decline in value speedily and not perishables, the reference in Section 2-604, the statutory analogue. This is a change in style, not substance, as the first phrase includes the second. Subparagraphs (a) and (c) are revised versions of the provisions of Section 2-602(2)(b) and (c). Subparagraph (a) states the rule with respect to the lessee's treatment of goods in its possession following rejection; subparagraph (b) states the rule regarding such goods if the lessor or supplier then fails to give instructions to the lessee. If the lessee performs in a fashion consistent with subparagraphs (a) and (b), subparagraph (c) exonerates the lessee.
Cross References: Sections 2-602(2)(b), 2-602(2)(c) and 2-604.
Definitional Cross References:
"Action". Section 1-201(1).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Notification". Section 1-201(26).
"Reasonable time". Section 1-204(1) and (2).
"Seasonably". Section 1-204(3).
"Security interest". Section 1-201(37).
"Supplier". Section 2A-103(1)(x).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
There is no South Carolina lease law on point; however, like the statutory analogue, Section 2-602(2), this provision codifies the common law rule that an effective rejection of non-conforming goods by the lessee requires affirmative action and timely notice to the lessor. See the Official Comment to Section 36-2-602. Otherwise the lessee is deemed to have accepted the goods.
Subsection (b), like its statutory analogue, Section 2-604, protects the lessee's right to reject the goods by permitting the lessee to deal with the goods as he sees fit when no instruction is forthcoming from the lessor after rejection.
Section 36-2A-513. Cure by lessor of improper tender or delivery; replacement.
(1) If any tender or delivery by the lessor or the supplier is rejected because nonconforming and the time for performance has not yet expired, the lessor or the supplier may seasonably notify the lessee of the lessor's or the supplier's intention to cure and may then make a conforming delivery within the time provided in the lease contract.
(2) If the lessee rejects a nonconforming tender that the lessor or the supplier had reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without money allowance, the lessor or the supplier may have a further reasonable time to substitute a conforming tender if he seasonably notifies the lessee.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-508.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Definitional Cross References:
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Money". Section 1-201(24).
"Notifies". Section 1-201(26).
"Reasonable time". Section 1-204(1) and (2).
"Seasonably". Section 1-204(3).
"Supplier". Section 2A-103(1)(x).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
There is no South Carolina lease law on point. However, this section is similar to the statutory analogue, Section 36-2-508, which the South Carolina Reporter's Comments noted was "probably not a change of existing common law since delivery of non-conforming goods is probably not an anticipatory breach if coupled with notice of intention to perform fully within the contract time. See, Rest., Contracts, Section 319 (1932)." See also Rest. 2d, Contracts, Section 256 (1981).
Section 36-2A-514. Waiver of lessee's objections.
(1) In rejecting goods, a lessee's failure to state a particular defect that is ascertainable by reasonable inspection precludes the lessee from relying on the defect to justify rejection or to establish default:
(a) if, stated seasonably, the lessor or the supplier could have cured it (Section 36-2A-513); or
(b) between merchants if the lessor or the supplier after rejection has made a request in writing for a full and final written statement of all defects on which the lessee proposes to rely.
(2) A lessee's failure to reserve rights when paying rent or other consideration against documents precludes recovery of the payment for defects apparent on the face of the documents.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-605.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Purposes: The principles applicable to the commercial practice of payment against documents (subsection 2) are explained in Official Comment 4 to Section 2-605, the statutory analogue to this section.
Cross Reference: Section 2-605 Official Comment 4.
Definitional Cross References:
"Between merchants". Section 2-104(3).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Seasonably". Section 1-204(3).
"Supplier". Section 2A-103(1)(x).
"Writing". Section 1-201(46).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
There is no South Carolina lease law on point. However, like the statutory analogue, this section is intended to prevent sophisticated merchants from misleading lessors by failing to state any defects. Likewise, it is intended to prevent unsophisticated lessees from waiving their right to reject by not stating all the defects.
Section 36-2A-515. Acceptance of goods.
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs after the lessee has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods and
(a) the lessee signifies or acts with respect to the goods in a manner that signifies to the lessor or the supplier that the goods are conforming or that the lessee will take or retain them in spite of their nonconformity; or
(b) the lessee fails to make an effective rejection of the goods (Section 36-2A-509(2)).
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that entire unit.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-606.
Changes: The provisions of Section 2-606(1)(a) were substantially rewritten to provide that the lessee's conduct may signify acceptance. Further, the provisions of Section 2-606(1)(c) were not incorporated as irrelevant given the lessee's possession and use of the leased goods.
Cross References: Sections 2-606(1)(a) and 2-606(1)(c).
Definitional Cross References:
"Commercial unit". Section 2A-103(1)(c).
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Supplier". Section 2A-103(1)(x).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
A reasonable opportunity to inspect goods is in accord with South Carolina case law on sales. See Southern Coal Co. v. Rice, 122 S.C. 484, 115 S.E. 815 (1922); Building Supply Co. v. Jones, 87 S.C. 426, 69 S.E. 881 (1911). However, the lease contract may stipulate what constitutes a reasonable time. Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Dean, 256 S.C. 99, 180 S.E.2d 892 (1971) (where revocation of acceptance 30-45 days later not allowed because the lease stated the time for inspection and notification to the lessor was 48 hours.)
Subsection (2) expresses the same policy as found under Section 36-2-601(c) and Section 36-2-606(2) that require acceptance of an entire commercial unit of goods so that there will not be an undue impairment of the value of rejected goods.
Section 36-2A-516. Effect of acceptance of goods; notice of default; burden of establishing default after acceptance; notice of claim or litigation to person answerable over.
(1) A lessee must pay rent for any goods accepted in accordance with the lease contract, with due allowance for goods rightfully rejected or not delivered.
(2) A lessee's acceptance of goods precludes rejection of the goods accepted. In the case of a finance lease, if made with knowledge of a nonconformity, acceptance cannot be revoked because of it. In any other case, if made with knowledge of a nonconformity, acceptance cannot be revoked because of it unless the acceptance was on the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity would be seasonably cured. Acceptance does not of itself impair any other remedy provided by this chapter or the lease agreement for nonconformity.
(3) If a tender has been accepted:
(a) within a reasonable time after the lessee discovers or should have discovered any default, the lessee shall notify the lessor and the supplier, if any, or be barred from any remedy against the party not notified;
(b) except in the case of a consumer lease, within a reasonable time after the lessee receives notice of litigation for infringement or the like (Section 36-2A-211) the lessee shall notify the lessor or be barred from any remedy over for liability established by the litigation; and
(c) the burden is on the lessee to establish any default.
(4) If a lessee is sued for breach of a warranty or other obligation for which a lessor or a supplier is answerable over the following apply:
(a) The lessee may give the lessor or the supplier, or both, written notice of the litigation. If the notice states that the person notified may come in and defend and that if the person notified does not do so that person will be bound in any action against that person by the lessee by any determination of fact common to the two litigations, then unless the person notified after seasonable receipt of the notice does come in and defend that person is so bound.
(b) The lessor or the supplier may demand in writing that the lessee turn over control of the litigation including settlement if the claim is one for infringement or the like (Section 36-2A-211) or else be barred from any remedy over. If the demand states that the lessor or the supplier agrees to bear all expense and to satisfy any adverse judgment, then unless the lessee after seasonable receipt of the demand does turn over control the lessee is so barred.
(5) Subsections (3) and (4) apply to any obligation of a lessee to hold the lessor or the supplier harmless against infringement or the like (Section 36-2A-211).
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-607.
Changes: Substantially revised.
Purposes: 1. Subsection (2) creates a special rule for finance leases, precluding revocation if acceptance is made with knowledge of nonconformity with respect to the lease agreement, as opposed to the supply agreement; this is not inequitable as the lessee has a direct claim against the supplier. Section 2A-209(1). Revocation of acceptance of a finance lease is permitted if the lessee's acceptance was without discovery of the nonconformity (with respect to the lease agreement, not the supply agreement) and was reasonably induced by the lessor's assurances. Section 2A-517(1)(b). Absent exclusion or modification, the lessor under a finance lease makes certain warranties to the lessee. Sections 2A-210 and 2A-211(1). Revocation of acceptance is not prohibited even after the lessee's promise has become irrevocable and independent. Section 2A-407 Official Comment. Where the finance lease creates a security interest, the rule may be to the contrary. General Elec. Credit Corp. of Tennessee v. Ger-Beck Mach. Co., 806 F.2d 1207 (3rd Cir. 1986).
2. Subsection (3)(a) requires the lessee to give notice of default, within a reasonable time after the lessee discovered or should have discovered the default. In a finance lease, notice may be given either to the supplier, the lessor, or both, but remedy is barred against the party not notified. In a finance lease, the lessor is usually not liable for defects in the goods and the essential notice is to the supplier. While notice to the finance lessor will often not give any additional rights to the lessee, it would be good practice to give the notice since the finance lessor has an interest in the goods. Subsection (3)(a) does not use the term finance lease, but the definition of supplier is a person from whom a lessor buys or leases goods to be leased under a finance lease. Section 2A-103(1)(x). Therefore, there can be a "supplier" only in a finance lease. Subsection (4) applies similar notice rules as to lessors and suppliers if a lessee is sued for a breach of warranty or other obligation for which a lessor or supplier is answerable over.
3. Subsection (3)(b) requires the lessee to give the lessor notice of litigation for infringement or the like. There is an exception created in the case of a consumer lease. While such an exception was considered for a finance lease, it was not created because it was not necessary - the lessor in a finance lease does not give a warranty against infringement. Section 2A-211(2). Even though not required under subsection (3)(b), the lessee who takes under a finance lease should consider giving notice of litigation for infringement or the like to the supplier, because the lessee obtains the benefit of the suppliers' promises subject to the suppliers' defenses or claims. Sections 2A-209(1) and 2-607(3)(b).
Cross References: Sections 2-607(3)(b), 2A-103(1)(x), 2A-209(1), 2A-210, 2A-211(1), 2A-211(2), 2A-407 Official Comment and 2A-517(1)(b).
Definitional Cross References:
"Action". Section 1-201(1).
"Agreement". Section 1-201(3).
"Burden of establishing". Section 1-201(8).
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Consumer lease". Section 2A-103(1)(e).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Discover". Section 1-201(25).
"Finance lease". Section 2A-103(1)(g).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Knowledge". Section 1-201(25).
"Lease agreement". Section 2A-103(1)(k).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Notice". Section 1-201(25).
"Notifies". Section 1-201(26).
"Person". Section 1-201(30).
"Reasonable time". Section 1-204(1) and (2).
"Receipt". Section 2-103(1)(c).
"Remedy". Section 1-201(34).
"Seasonably". Section 1-204(3).
"Supplier". Section 2A-103(1)(x).
"Written". Section 1-201(46).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Subsection (1) is in accord with South Carolina lease law. In Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Stevens, Stevens & Thomas, P.A., 287 S.C. 338, 338 S.E.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1985), the lessee was held liable for rent despite his attempted revocation of acceptance of the non-conforming goods, 34 months after acceptance. The lessor was not required to accept lessee's tender and was allowed to accelerate the contract.
Subsection (2) reflects the contractual provisions of finance leases, which are given effect under the South Carolina common law. See Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Stevens, Stevens & Thomas, P.A., 287 S.C. 338, 338 S.E.2d 343 (Ct. App. 1985). Although rejection of defective goods was not allowed in Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Dean, 256 S.C. 99, 180 S.E.2d 892 (1971), because notice came too late under the express terms of the contract, it appears that the rejection or revocation of acceptance would have been allowed had it been timely, thus producing the same result as under this section and Section 2A-517.
While revocation of acceptance is available only in limited circumstances (see Section 2A-517), acceptance does not bar the lessee from other available remedies, provided notice is given to the appropriate party. A lessee who fails to provide the required notification is barred from recovering from the party not notified. Subsection 3(b) codifies the common law notice requirement as did the statutory analogue. See Richmond Pressed Metal Works v. Haley, 157 S.C. 426, 154 S.E. 412 (1930) (failure to make a complaint within a reasonable time after opportunity for inspection); L.D. Powell Co. v. Levy, 136 S.C. 387, 134 S.E. 415 (1926) (retention of law books for four years without objection). What is a reasonable time for notice is a question of fact. Simmons v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 279 S.C. 26, 302 S.E.2d 17 (1983).
Subsection 3(b) provides an exception for consumer leases, defined in Section 2A-103(1)(e), and subsection 3(c) codifies the usual rule that the moving party has the burden of proof.
Section 36-2A-517. Revocation of acceptance of goods.
(1) A lessee may revoke acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to the lessee if the lessee has accepted it:
(a) except in the case of a finance lease, on the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of the nonconformity if the lessee's acceptance was reasonably induced either by the lessor's assurances or, except in the case of a finance lease, by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance.
(2) Except in the case of a finance lease that is not a consumer lease, a lessee may revoke acceptance of a lot or commercial unit if the lessor defaults under the lease contract and the default substantially impairs the value of that lot or commercial unit to the lessee.
(3) If the lease agreement so provides, the lessee may revoke acceptance of a lot or commercial unit because of other defaults by the lessor.
(4) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the lessee discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by the nonconformity. Revocation is not effective until the lessee notifies the lessor.
(5) A lessee who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if the lessee had rejected them.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-608.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology. Note that in the case of a finance lease the lessee retains a limited right to revoke acceptance. Sections 2A-517(1)(b) and 2A-516 Official Comment. New subsections (2) and (3) added.
Purposes: 1. The section states the situations under which the lessee may return the goods to the lessor and cancel the lease. Subsection (2) recognizes that the lessor may have continuing obligations under the lease and that a default as to those obligations may be sufficiently material to justify revocation of acceptance of the leased items and cancellation of the lease by the lessee. For example, a failure by the lessor to fulfill its obligation to maintain leased equipment or to supply other goods which are necessary for the operation of the leased equipment may justify revocation of acceptance and cancellation of the lease.
2. Subsection (3) specifically provides that the lease agreement may provide that the lessee can revoke acceptance for defaults by the lessor which in the absence of such an agreement might not be considered sufficiently serious to justify revocation. That is, the parties are free to contract on the question of what defaults are so material that the lessee can cancel the lease.
Cross Reference: Section 2A-516 Official Comment.
Definitional Cross References:
"Commercial unit". Section 2A-103(1)(c).
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Discover". Section 1-201(25).
"Finance lease". Section 2A-103(1)(g).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Lot". Section 2A-103(1)(s).
"Notifies". Section 1-201(26).
"Reasonable time". Section 1-204(1) and (2).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Seasonably". Section 1-204(3).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section essentially tracks the rule in Article 2.
Substantial impairment is a question of fact. Burris v. Lake Wylie Marina, Inc., 285 S.C. 614, 330 S.E.2d 559 (Ct. App. 1985).
Subsection (4) does not change the existing lease law in South Carolina. See Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Dean, 256 S.C. 99, 180 S.E.2d 892 (1971) (where revocation of acceptance 30-45 days after delivery was impermissible under lease requiring inspection and notification to the lessor within 48 hours).
Section 36-2A-518. Cover; substitute goods.
(1) After a default by a lessor under the lease contract of the type described in Section 36-2A-508(1), or, if agreed, after other default by the lessor, the lessee may cover by making any purchase or lease of or contract to purchase or lease goods in substitution for those due from the lessor.
(2) Except as otherwise provided with respect to damages liquidated in the lease agreement (Section 36-2A-504) or otherwise determined pursuant to agreement of the parties (Sections 36-1-102(3) and 36-2A-503), if a lessee's cover is by a lease agreement substantially similar to the original lease agreement and the new lease agreement is made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner, the lessee may recover from the lessor as damages (i) the present value, as of the date of the commencement of the term of the new lease agreement, of the rent under the new lease agreement applicable to that period of the new lease term which is comparable to the then remaining term of the original lease agreement minus the present value as of the same date of the total rent for the then remaining lease term of the original lease agreement, and (ii) any incidental or consequential damages, less expenses saved in consequence of the lessor's default.
(3) If a lessee's cover is by lease agreement that for any reason does not qualify for treatment under subsection (2), or is by purchase or otherwise, the lessee may recover from the lessor as if the lessee had elected not to cover and Section 36-2A-519 governs.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-712.
Changes: Substantially revised.
Purposes: 1. Subsection (1) allows the lessee to take action to fix its damages after default by the lessor. Such action may consist of the lease of goods. The decision to cover is a function of commercial judgment, not a statutory mandate replete with sanctions for failure to comply. Cf. Section 9-507.
2. Subsection (2) states a rule for determining the amount of lessee's damages provided that there is no agreement to the contrary. The lessee's damages will be established using the new lease agreement as a measure if the following three criteria are met: (i) the lessee's cover is by lease agreement, (ii) the lease agreement is substantially similar to the original lease agreement, and (iii) such cover was effected in good faith, and in a commercially reasonable manner. Thus, the lessee will be entitled to recover from the lessor the present value, as of the date of commencement of the term of the new lease agreement, of the rent under the new lease agreement applicable to that period which is comparable to the then remaining term of the original lease agreement less the present value of the rent reserved for the remaining term under the original lease, together with incidental or consequential damages less expenses saved in consequence of the lessor's default. Consequential damages may include loss suffered by the lessee because of deprivation of the use of the goods during the period between the default and the acquisition of the goods under the new lease agreement. If the lessee's cover does not satisfy the criteria of subsection (2), Section 2A-519 governs.
3. Two of the three criteria to be met by the lessee are familiar, but the concept of the new lease agreement being substantially similar to the original lease agreement is not. Given the many variables facing a party who intends to lease goods and the rapidity of change in the market place, the policy decision was made not to draft with specificity. It was thought unwise to seek to establish certainty at the cost of fairness. Thus, the decision of whether the new lease agreement is substantially similar to the original will be determined case by case.
4. While the section does not draw a bright line, it is possible to describe some of the factors that should be considered in finding that a new lease agreement is substantially similar to the original. First, the goods subject to the new lease agreement should be examined. For example, in a lease of computer equipment the new lease might be for more modern equipment. However, it may be that at the time of the lessor's breach it was not possible to obtain the same type of goods in the market place. Because the lessee's remedy under Section 2A-519 is intended to place the lessee in essentially the same position as if he had covered, if goods similar to those to have been delivered under the original lease are not available, then the computer equipment in this hypothetical should qualify as a commercially reasonable substitute. See Section 2-712(1).
5. Second, the various elements of the new lease agreement should also be examined. Those elements include the presence or absence of options to purchase or release; the lessor's representations, warranties and covenants to the lessee, as well as those to be provided by the lessee to the lessor; and the services, if any, to be provided by the lessor or by the lessee. All of these factors allocate cost and risk between the lessor and the lessee and thus affect the amount of rent to be paid. If the differences between the original lease and the new lease can be easily valued, it would be appropriate for a court to adjust the difference in rental to take account of the difference between the two leases, find that the new lease is substantially similar to the old lease, and award cover damages under this section. If, for example, the new lease requires the lessor to insure the goods in the hands of the lessee, while the original lease required the lessee to insure, the usual cost of such insurance could be deducted from the rent due under the new lease before determining the difference in rental between the two leases.
6. Having examined the goods and the agreement, the test to be applied is whether, in light of these comparisons, the new lease agreement is substantially similar to the original lease agreement. These findings should not be made with scientific precision, as they are a function of economics, nor should they be made independently with respect to the goods and each element of the agreement, as it is important that a sense of commercial judgment pervade the finding. To establish the new lease as a proper measure of damage under subsection (2), these factors, taken as a whole, must result in a finding that the new lease agreement is substantially similar to the original.
7. A new lease can be substantially similar to the original lease even though its term extends beyond the remaining term of the original lease, so long as both (a) the lease terms are commercially comparable (e.g., it is highly unlikely that a one-month rental and a five-year lease would reflect similar commercial realities), and (b) the court can fairly apportion a part of the rental payments under the new lease to that part of the term of the new lease which is comparable to the remaining lease term under the original lease. Also, the lease term of the new lease may be comparable to the term of the original lease even though the beginning and ending dates of the two leases are not the same. For example, a two-month lease of agricultural equipment for the months of August and September may be comparable to a two-month lease running from the 15th of August to the 15th of October if in the particular location two-month leases beginning on August 15th are basically interchangeable with two-month leases beginning August 1st. Similarly, the term of a one-year truck lease beginning on the 15th of January may be comparable to the term of a one-year truck lease beginning January 2d. If the lease terms are found to be comparable, the court may base cover damages on the entire difference between the costs under the two leases.
Cross References: Sections 2-712(1), 2A-519 and 9-507.
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreement". Section 1-201(3).
"Contract". Section 1-201(11).
"Good faith". Sections 1-201(19) and 2-103(1)(b).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease agreement". Section 2A-103(1)(k).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(l)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Present value". Section 2A-103(1)(u).
"Purchase". Section 2A-103(1)(v).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section resolves the common law conflict as to whether the buyer has a duty to cover by following the position of the Article 2 analogue that cover is optional. See the South Carolina Reporter's Comments to Section 36-2-712. Unless a lessee covers, he cannot measure monetary damages based on a qualifying cover transaction. See William H. Lawrence and John H. Minan, Law of Personal Property Leasing, 15.02[3] (1993). For damages in the absence of cover, see Section 2A-519.
Section 36-2A-519. Lessee's damages for nondelivery, repudiation, default, and breach of warranty in regard to accepted goods.
(1) Except as otherwise provided with respect to damages liquidated in the lease agreement (Section 36-2A-504) or otherwise determined pursuant to agreement of the parties ( Sections 36-1-102(3) and 36-2A-503), if a lessee elects not to cover or a lessee elects to cover and the cover is by lease agreement that for any reason does not qualify for treatment under Section 36-2A-518(2), or is by purchase or otherwise, the measure of damages for nondelivery or repudiation by the lessor or for rejection or revocation of acceptance by the lessee is the present value, as of the date of the default, of the then market rent minus the present value as of the same date of the original rent, computed for the remaining lease term of the original lease agreement, together with incidental and consequential damages, less expenses saved in consequence of the lessor's default.
(2) Market rent is to be determined as of the place for tender or, in cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of acceptance, as of the place of arrival.
(3) Except as otherwise agreed, if the lessee has accepted goods and given notification (Section 36-2A-516(3)), the measure of damages for nonconforming tender or delivery or other default by a lessor is the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the lessor's default as determined in any manner that is reasonable together with incidental and consequential damages, less expenses saved in consequence of the lessor's default.
(4) Except as otherwise agreed, the measure of damages for breach of warranty is the present value at the time and place of acceptance of the difference between the value of the use of the goods accepted and the value if they had been as warranted for the lease term, unless special circumstances show proximate damages of a different amount, together with incidental and consequential damages, less expenses saved in consequence of the lessor's default or breach of warranty.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Sections 2-713 and 2-714.
Changes: Substantially revised.
Purposes: 1. Subsection (1), a revised version of the provisions of Section 2-713(1), states the basic rule governing the measure of lessee's damages for non-delivery or repudiation by the lessor or for rightful rejection or revocation of acceptance by the lessee. This measure will apply, absent agreement to the contrary, if the lessee does not cover or if the cover does not qualify under Section 2A-518. There is no sanction for cover that does not qualify.
2. The measure of damage is the present value, as of the date of default, of the market rent for the remaining term of the lease less the present value of the original rent for the remaining term of the lease, plus incidental and consequential damages less expenses saved in consequence of the default. Note that the reference in Section 2A-519(1) is to the date of default not to the date of an event of default. An event of default under a lease agreement becomes a default under a lease agreement only after the expiration of any relevant period of grace and compliance with any notice requirements under this Article and the lease agreement. American Bar Foundation, Commentaries on Indentures, Section 5-1, at 216-217 (1971). Section 2A-501(1). This conclusion is also a function of whether, as a matter of fact or law, the event of default has been waived, suspended or cured. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-103.
3. Subsection (2), a revised version of the provisions of Section 2-713(2), states the rule with respect to determining market rent.
4. Subsection (3), a revised version of the provisions of Section 2-714(1) and (3), states the measure of damages where goods have been accepted and acceptance is not revoked. The subsection applies both to defaults which occur at the inception of the lease and to defaults which occur subsequently, such as failure to comply with an obligation to maintain the leased goods. The measure in essence is the loss, in the ordinary course of events, flowing from the default.
5. Subsection (4), a revised version of the provisions of Section 2-714(2), states the measure of damages for breach of warranty. The measure in essence is the present value of the difference between the value of the goods accepted and of the goods if they had been as warranted.
6. Subsections (1), (3) and (4) specifically state that the parties may by contract vary the damages rules stated in those subsections.
Cross References: Sections 2-713(1), 2-713(2), 2-714 and Section 2A-518.
Definitional Cross References:
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease agreement". Section 2A-103(1)(k).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Notification". Section 1-201(26).
"Present value". Section 2A-103(1)(u).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
There is no South Carolina lease law on point; however, this section is consistent with its statutory analogue, Section 36-2-713(1). This formula attempts to protect the lessee's benefit of the bargain if the lessee has not covered.
This section departs from its statutory analogue, Section 36-2-713(2), in designating the location of the marketplace for determining the differential. Values are ascertained at the time and place of acceptance. See William H. Lawrence and John H. Minan, Law of Personal Property Leasing, 15.02[9][c] (1993).
Section 36-2A-520. Lessee's incidental and consequential damages.
(1) Incidental damages resulting from a lessor's default include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation, and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected or goods the acceptance of which is justifiably revoked, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with effecting cover, and any other reasonable expense incident to the default.
(2) Consequential damages resulting from a lessor's default include:
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the lessor at the time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-715.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing terminology and practices.
Purposes: Subsection (1), a revised version of the provisions of Section 2-715(1), lists some examples of incidental damages resulting from a lessor's default; the list is not exhaustive. Subsection (1) makes clear that it applies not only to rightful rejection, but also to justifiable revocation.
Subsection (2), a revised version of the provisions of Section 2-715(2), lists some examples of consequential damages resulting from a lessor's default; the list is not exhaustive.
Cross References: Section 2-715.
Definitional Cross References:
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Knows". Section 1-201(25).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Person". Section 1-201(30).
"Receipt". Section 2-103(1)(c).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
There is no South Carolina lease law on point; however, the statutory analogue merely codified the common law. See the South Carolina Reporter's Comments to Section 36-2-715.
Section 36-2A-521. Lessee's right to specific performance or replevin.
(1) Specific performance may be decreed if the goods are unique or in other proper circumstances.
(2) A decree for specific performance may include any terms and conditions as to payment of the rent, damages, or other relief that the court deems just.
(3) A lessee has a right of replevin, detinue, sequestration, claim and delivery, or the like for goods identified to the lease contract if after reasonable effort the lessee is unable to effect cover for those goods or the circumstances reasonably indicate that the effort will be unavailing.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-716.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology, and to expand the reference to the right of replevin in subsection (3) to include other similar rights of the lessee.
Definitional Cross References:
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Term". Section 1-201(42).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Although there is no South Carolina lease law on point, South Carolina courts have been reluctant to decree specific performance, granting it only when the legal remedy is inadequate. See the South Carolina Reporter's Comments to Section 36-2-716. Replevin, a right for the qualifying lessee, is more narrowly applied than specific performance. This section gives a right of replevin only when the goods have been identified to the contract and cover is impossible.
Section 36-2A-522. Lessee's right to goods on lessor's insolvency.
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and even though the goods have not been shipped, a lessee who has paid a part or all of the rent and security for goods identified to a lease contract (Section 36-2A-217) on making and keeping good a tender of any unpaid portion of the rent and security due under the lease contract may recover the goods identified from the lessor if the lessor becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first installment of rent and security.
(2) A lessee acquires the right to recover goods identified to a lease contract only if they conform to the lease contract.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-502.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Definitional Cross References:
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Insolvent". Section 1-201(23).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Receipt". Section 2-103(1)(c).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Although there is no South Carolina lease law on point, this section is similar to South Carolina sales law. See Section 36-3-502.
Subsection (1) sets forth factors that could constitute an example of a "proper circumstance" under Section 2A-521, entitling the lessee to specific performance.
Subsection (2) is designed to prevent the lessee from taking advantage of the lessor's erroneously identifying to the contract goods of greater value than those called for by the contract, to the detriment of the lessor's other creditors.
C. Default by Lessee
Section 36-2A-523. Lessor's remedies.
(1) If a lessee wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance of goods or fails to make a payment when due or repudiates with respect to a part or the whole, then, with respect to any goods involved, and with respect to all of the goods if under an installment lease contract the value of the whole lease contract is substantially impaired (Section 36-2A-510), the lessee is in default under the lease contract and the lessor may:
(a) cancel the lease contract (Section 36-2A-505(1));
(b) proceed respecting goods not identified to the lease contract (Section 36-2A-524);
(c) withhold delivery of the goods and take possession of goods previously delivered (Section 36-2A-525);
(d) stop delivery of the goods by any bailee (Section 36-2A-526);
(e) dispose of the goods and recover damages (Section 36-2A-527), or retain the goods and recover damages (Section 36-2A-528), or in a proper case recover rent (Section 36-2A-529);
(f) exercise any other rights or pursue any other remedies provided in the lease contract.
(2) If a lessor does not fully exercise a right or obtain a remedy to which the lessor is entitled under subsection (1), the lessor may recover the loss resulting in the ordinary course of events from the lessee's default as determined in any reasonable manner, together with incidental damages, less expenses saved in consequence of the lessee's default.
(3) If a lessee is otherwise in default under a lease contract, the lessor may exercise the rights and pursue the remedies provided in the lease contract , which may include a right to cancel the lease. In addition, unless otherwise provided in the lease contract:
(a) if the default substantially impairs the value of the lease contract to the lessor, the lessor may exercise the rights and pursue the remedies provided in subsections (1) or (2); or
(b) if the default does not substantially impair the value of the lease contract to the lessor, the lessor may recover as provided in subsection (2).
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-703.
Changes: Substantially revised.
Purposes: 1. Subsection (1) is an index to Sections 2A-524 through 2A-531 and states that the remedies provided in those sections are available for the defaults referred to in subsection (1): wrongful rejection or revocation of acceptance, failure to make a payment when due, or repudiation. In addition, remedies provided in the lease contract are available. Subsection (2) sets out a remedy if the lessor does not pursue to completion a right or actually obtain a remedy available under subsection (1), and subsection (3) sets out statutory remedies for defaults not specifically referred to in subsection (1). Subsection (3) provides that, if any default by the lessee other than those specifically referred to in subsection (1) is material, the lessor can exercise the remedies provided in subsection (1) or (2); otherwise the available remedy is as provided in subsection (3). A lessor who has brought an action seeking or has nonjudicially pursued one or more of the remedies available under subsection (1) may amend so as to claim or may nonjudicially pursue a remedy under subsection (2) unless the right or remedy first chosen has been pursued to an extent actually inconsistent with the new course of action. The intent of the provision is to reject the doctrine of election of remedies and to permit an alteration of course by the lessor unless such alteration would actually have an effect on the lessee that would be unreasonable under the circumstances. Further, the lessor may pursue remedies under both subsections (1) and (2) unless doing so would put the lessor in a better position than it would have been in had the lessee fully performed.
2. The lessor and the lessee can agree to modify the rights and remedies available under the Article; they can, among other things, provide that for defaults other than those specified in subsection (1) the lessor can exercise the rights and remedies referred to in subsection (1), whether or not the default would otherwise be held to substantially impair the value of the lease contract to the lessor; they can also create a new scheme of rights and remedies triggered by the occurrence of the default. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-102(3).
3. Subsection (1), a substantially rewritten version of Section 2-703, lists various cumulative remedies of the lessor where the lessee wrongfully rejects or revokes acceptance, fails to make a payment when due, or repudiates. Section 2A-501(2) and (4). The subsection also allows the lessor to exercise any contractual remedy.
4. This Article rejects any general doctrine of election of remedy. Whether, in a particular case, one remedy bars another, is a function of whether lessor has been put in as good a position as if the lessee had fully performed the lease contract. Multiple remedies are barred only if the effect is to put the lessor in a better position than it would have been in had the lessee fully performed under the lease. Sections 2A-103(4), 2A-501(4), and 1-106(1).
5. Hypothetical: To better understand the application of subparagraphs (a) through (e), it is useful to review a hypothetical. Assume that A is a merchant in the business of selling and leasing new bicycles of various types. B is about to engage in the business of subleasing bicycles to summer residents of and visitors to an island resort. A, as lessor, has agreed to lease 60 bicycles to B. While there is one master lease, deliveries and terms are staggered. 20 bicycles are to be delivered by A to B's island location on June 1; the term of the lease of these bicycles is four months. 20 bicycles are to be delivered by A to B's island location on July 1; the term of the lease of these bicycles is three months. Finally, 20 bicycles are to be delivered by A to B's island location on August 1; the term of the lease of these bicycles is two months. B is obligated to pay rent to A on the 15th day of each month during the term for the lease. Rent is $50 per month, per bicycle. B has no option to purchase or release and must return the bicycles to A at the end of the term, in good condition, reasonable wear and tear excepted. Since the retail price of each bicycle is $400 and bicycles used in the retail rental business have a useful economic life of 36 months, this transaction creates a lease. Sections 2A-103(1)(j) and 1-201(37).
6. A's current inventory of bicycles is not large. Thus, upon signing the lease with B in February, A agreed to purchase 60 new bicycles from A's principal manufacturer, with special instructions to drop ship the bicycles to B's island location in accordance with the delivery schedule set forth in the lease.
7. The first shipment of 20 bicycles was received by B on May 21. B inspected the bicycles, accepted the same as conforming to the lease and signed a receipt of delivery and acceptance. However, due to poor weather that summer, business was terrible and B was unable to pay the rent due on June 15. Pursuant to the lease A sent B notice of default and proceeded to enforce his rights and remedies against B.
8. A's counsel first advised A that under Section 2A-510(2) and the terms of the lease B's failure to pay was a default with respect to the whole. Thus, to minimize A's continued exposure, A was advised to take possession of the bicycles. If A had possession of the goods A could refuse to deliver. Section 2A-525(1). However, the facts here are different. With respect to the bicycles in B's possession, A has the right to take possession of the bicycles, without breach of the peace. Section 2A-525(2). If B refuses to allow A access to the bicycles, A can proceed by action, including replevin or injunctive relief.
9. With respect to the 40 bicycles that have not been delivered, this Article provides various alternatives. First, assume that 20 of the remaining 40 bicycles have been manufactured and delivered by the manufacturer to a carrier for shipment to B. Given the size of the shipment, the carrier was using a small truck for the delivery and the truck had not yet reached the island ferry when the manufacturer (at the request of A) instructed the carrier to divert the shipment to A's place of business. A's right to stop delivery is recognized under these circumstances. Section 2A-526(1). Second, assume that the 20 remaining bicycles were in the process of manufacture when B defaulted. A retains the right (as between A as lessor and B as lessee) to exercise reasonable commercial judgment whether to complete manufacture or to dispose of the unfinished goods for scrap. Since A is not the manufacturer and A has a binding contract to buy the bicycles, A elected to allow the manufacturer to complete the manufacture of the bicycles, but instructed the manufacturer to deliver the completed bicycles to A's place of business. Section 2A-524(2).
10. Thus, so far A has elected to exercise the remedies referred to in subparagraphs (b) through (d) in subsection (1). None of these remedies bars any of the others because A's election and enforcement merely resulted in A's possession of the bicycles. Had B performed A would have recovered possession of the bicycles. Thus A is in the process of obtaining the benefit of his bargain. Note that A could exercise any other rights or pursue any other remedies provided in the lease contract (Section 2A-523(1)(f)), or elect to recover his loss due to the lessee's default under Section 2A-523(2).
11. A's counsel next would determine what action, if any, should be taken with respect to the goods. As stated in subparagraph (e) and as discussed fully in Section 2A-527(1) the lessor may, but has no obligation to, dispose of the goods by a substantially similar lease (indeed, the lessor has no obligation whatsoever to dispose of the goods at all) and recover damages based on that action, but lessor will not be able to recover damages which put it in a better position than performance would have done, nor will it be able to recover damages for losses which it could have reasonably avoided. In this case, since A is in the business of leasing and selling bicycles, A will probably inventory the 60 bicycles for its retail trade.
12. A's counsel then will determine which of the various means of ascertaining A's damages against B are available. Subparagraph (e) catalogues each relevant section. First, under Section 2A-527(2) the amount of A's claim is computed by comparing the original lease between A and B with any subsequent lease of the bicycles but only if the subsequent lease is substantially similar to the original lease contract. While the section does not define this term, the Official Comment does establish some parameters. If, however, A elects to lease the bicycles to his retail trade, it is unlikely that the resulting lease will be substantially similar to the original, as leases to retail customers are considerably different from leases to wholesale customers like B. If, however, the leases were substantially similar, the damage claim is for accrued and unpaid rent to the beginning of the new lease, plus the present value as of the same date, of the rent reserved under the original lease for the balance of its term less the present value as of the same date of the rent reserved under the replacement lease for a term comparable to the balance of the term of the original lease, together with incidental damages less expenses saved in consequence of the lessee's default.
13. If the new lease is not substantially similar or if A elects to sell the bicycles or to hold the bicycles, damages are computed under Section 2A-528 or 2A-529.
14. If A elects to pursue his claim under Section 2A-528(1) the damage rule is the same as that stated in Section 2A-527(2) except that damages are measured from default if the lessee never took possession of the goods or from the time when the lessor did or could have regained possession and that the standard of comparison is not the rent reserved under a substantially similar lease entered into by the lessor but a market rent, as defined in Section 2A-507. Further, if the facts of this hypothetical were more elaborate A may be able to establish that the measure of damage under subsection (1) is inadequate to put him in the same position that B's performance would have, in which case A can claim the present value of his lost profits.
15. Yet another alternative for computing A's damage claim against B which will be available in some situations is recovery of the present value, as of entry of judgment, of the rent for the then remaining lease term under Section 2A-529. However, this formulation is not available if the goods have been repossessed or tendered back to A. For the 20 bicycles repossessed and the remaining 40 bicycles, A will be able to recover the present value of the rent only if A is unable to dispose of them, or circumstances indicate the effort will be unavailing. If A has prevailed in an action for the rent, at any time up to collection of a judgment by A against B, A might dispose of the bicycles. In such case A's claim for damages against B is governed by Section 2A-527 or 2A-528. Section 2A-529(3). The resulting recalculation of claim should reduce the amount recoverable by A against B and the lessor is required to cause an appropriate credit to be entered against the earlier judgment. However, the nature of the post-judgment proceedings to resolve this issue, and the sanctions for a failure to comply, if any, will be determined by other law.
16. Finally, if the lease agreement had so provided pursuant to subparagraph (f), A's claim against B would not be determined under any of these statutory formulae, but pursuant to a liquidated damages clause. Section 2A-504(1).
17. These various methods of computing A's damage claim against B are alternatives subject to Section 2A-501(4). However, the pursuit of any one of these alternatives is not a bar to, nor has it been barred by, A's earlier action to obtain possession of the 60 bicycles. These formulae, which vary as a function of an overt or implied mitigation of damage theory, focus on allowing A a recovery of the benefit of his bargain with B. Had B performed, A would have received the rent as well as the return of the 60 bicycles at the end of the term.
18. Finally, A's counsel should also advise A of his right to cancel the lease contract under subparagraph (a). Section 2A-505(1). Cancellation will discharge all existing obligations but preserve A's rights and remedies.
19. Subsection (2) recognizes that a lessor who is entitled to exercise the rights or to obtain a remedy granted by subsection (1) may choose not to do so. In such cases, the lessor can recover damages as provided in subsection (2). For example, for non-payment of rent, the lessor may decide not to take possession of the goods and cancel the lease, but rather to merely sue for the unpaid rent as it comes due plus lost interest or other damages "determined in any reasonable manner." Subsection (2) also negates any loss of alternative rights and remedies by reason of having invoked or commenced the exercise or pursuit of any one or more rights or remedies.
20. Subsection (3) allows the lessor access to a remedy scheme provided in this Article as well as that contained in the lease contract if the lessee is in default for reasons other than those stated in subsection (1). Note that the reference to this Article includes supplementary principles of law and equity, e.g., fraud, misrepresentation and duress. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-103.
21. There is no special treatment of the finance lease in this section. Absent supplementary principles of law to the contrary, in most cases the supplier will have no rights or remedies against the defaulting lessee. Section 2A-209(2)(ii). Given that the supplier will look to the lessor for payment, this is appropriate. However, there is a specific exception to this rule with respect to the right to identify goods to the lease contract. Section 2A-524(2). The parties are free to create a different result in a particular case. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-102(3).
Cross References: Sections 1-102(3), 1-103, 1-106(1), 1-201(37), 2-703, 2A-103(1)(j), 2A-103(4), 2A-209(2)(ii), 2A-501(4), 2A-504(1), 2A-505(1), 2A-507, 2A-510(2), 2A-524 through 2A-531, 2A-524(2), 2A-525(1), 2A-525(2), 2A-526(1), 2A-527(1), 2A-527(2), 2A-528(1) and 2A-529(3).
Definitional Cross References:
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Installment lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(i).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Remedy". Section 1-201(34).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
There is no South Carolina lease law on point. This section expands its statutory analogue to protect the lessor when the lessee failed to pay or breached a provision of the lease constituting a default.
Article 2A allows cumulative remedies. However an aggrieved party is not entitled to double recovery; that is prevented by the doctrine of election of remedies, under which the plaintiff must choose among the available relief. A defendant may invoke the doctrine at any stage of the case. Inman v. Imperial Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 303 S.C. 10, 397 S.E.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1990) (allowing the defendant to require the plaintiff to make an election, even though the defendant had not invoked the doctrine until the third appeal). The trial court may also require election on its own motion. Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 279 S.C. 336, 306 S.E.2d 616 (1983). In Nichols the Supreme Court held that if the jury returns a verdict for plaintiff on multiple causes of action for the same damages, the verdict must be reformed so plaintiff only recovers once for the actual damages proven.
Section 36-2A-524. Lessor's right to identify goods to lease contract.
(1) After default by the lessee under the lease contract of the type described in Section 36-2A-523(1) or Section 36-2A-523(3)(a) or, if agreed, after other default by the lessee, the lessor may:
(a) identify to the lease contract conforming goods not already identified if at the time the lessor learned of the default they were in the lessor's or the supplier's possession or control; and
(b) dispose of goods (Section 36-2A-527(1)) that demonstrably have been intended for the particular lease contract even though those goods are unfinished.
(2) If the goods are unfinished, in the exercise of reasonable commercial judgment for the purposes of avoiding loss and of effective realization, an aggrieved lessor or the supplier may either complete manufacture and wholly identify the goods to the lease contract or cease manufacture and lease, sell, or otherwise dispose of the goods for scrap or salvage value or proceed in any other reasonable manner.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-704.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Purposes: The remedies provided by this section are available to the lessor (i) if there has been a default by the lessee which falls within Section 2A-523(1) or 2A-523(3)(a), or (ii) if there has been any other default for which the lease contract gives the lessor the remedies provided by this section. Under "(ii)", the lease contract may give the lessor the remedies of identification and disposition provided by this section in various ways. For example, a lease provision might specifically refer to the remedies of identification and disposition, or it might refer to this section by number (i.e., 2A-524), or it might do so by a more general reference such as "all rights and remedies provided by Article 2A for default by the lessee."
Definitional Cross References:
"Aggrieved party". Section 1-201(2).
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Learn". Section 1-201(25).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Supplier". Section 2A-103(1)(x).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Identification is necessary to establish the lessor's rights to sell or again lease the goods or to recover the price following a default by the lessee. The lessor must show performance of the contract on his part, by tender of delivery or at least an appropriation of the goods to the contract. See Smythe v. Goode, 121 S.C. 270, 113 S.E. 690 (1922).
Like the statutory analogue, subsection (2) imposes a standard of commercially reasonable judgment upon the lessor or supplier in deciding whether to complete the goods. This prevents the lessor from claims of failure to mitigate damages in a close case in which hindsight indicates it might have been better to complete the goods although it was commercially reasonable not to.
Section 36-2A-525. Lessor's right to possession of goods.
(1) If a lessor discovers the lessee to be insolvent, the lessor may refuse to deliver the goods.
(2) After a default by the lessee under the lease contract of the type described in Section 36-2A-523(1) or 36-2A-523(3)(a) or, if agreed, after other default by the lessee, the lessor has the right to take possession of the goods. If the lease contract so provides, the lessor may require the lessee to assemble the goods and make them available to the lessor at a place to be designated by the lessor which is reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal, the lessor may render unusable any goods employed in trade or business, and may dispose of goods on the lessee's premises (Section 36-2A-527).
(3) The lessor may proceed under subsection (2) without judicial process if it can be done without breach of the peace or the lessor may proceed by action.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Sections 2-702(1) and 9-503.
Changes: Substantially revised.
Purposes: 1. Subsection (1), a revised version of the provisions of Section 2-702(1), allows the lessor to refuse to deliver goods if the lessee is insolvent. Note that the provisions of Section 2-702(2), granting the unpaid seller certain rights of reclamation, were not incorporated in this section. Subsection (2) made this unnecessary.
2. Subsection (2), a revised version of the provisions of Section 9-503, allows the lessor, on a Section 2A-523(1) or 2A-523(3)(a) default by the lessee, the right to take possession of or reclaim the goods. Also, the lessor can contract for the right to take possession of the goods for other defaults by the lessee. Therefore, since the lessee's insolvency is an event of default in a standard lease agreement, subsection (2) is the functional equivalent of Section 2-702(2). Further, subsection (2) sanctions the classic crate and delivery clause obligating the lessee to assemble the goods and to make them available to the lessor. Finally, the lessor may leave the goods in place, render them unusable (if they are goods employed in trade or business), and dispose of them on the lessee's premises.
3. Subsection (3), a revised version of the provisions of Section 9-503, allows the lessor to proceed under subsection (2) without judicial process, absent breach of the peace, or by action. Sections 2A-501(3), 2A-103(4) and 1-201(1). In the appropriate case action includes injunctive relief. Clark Equip. Co. v. Armstrong Equip. Co., 431 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971). This Section, as well as a number of other Sections in this Part, are included in the Article to codify the lessor's common law right to protect the lessor's reversionary interest in the goods. Section 2A-103(1)(q). These Sections are intended to supplement and not displace principles of law and equity with respect to the protection of such interest. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-103. Such principles apply in many instances, e.g., loss or damage to goods if risk of loss passes to the lessee, failure of the lessee to return goods to the lessor in the condition stipulated in the lease, and refusal of the lessee to return goods to the lessor after termination or cancellation of the lease. See also Section 2A-532.
Cross References: Sections 1-106(2), 2-702(1), 2-702(2), 2A-103(4), 2A-501(3), 2A-532 and 9-503.
Definitional Cross References:
"Action". Section 1-201(1).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Discover". Section 1-201(25).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Insolvent". Section 1-201(23).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Although there is no South Carolina lease law on point, this section incorporates the Article 9 right of self help without prior judicial proceedings. The common law also provided for self help without judicial proceedings, provided it could be accomplished peaceably and without breach of the peace. Castell v. Stephenson Finance Co., 244 S.C. 45, 135 S.E.2d 311 (1964); Johnson Cotton Co. v. Cannon, 242 S.C. 42, 129 S.E.2d 750 (1963). "Breach of the peace" is defined in Lyda v. Cooper, 169 S.C. 451, 169 S.E. 236 (1933); see also Jordan v. Citizens and Southern Nat. Bank of S.C., 278 S.C. 449, 298 S.E.2d 213 (1982) (breach of the peace during the getaway rather than the seizure).
Although challenged on constitutional grounds in many jurisdictions, this right has been upheld. See 30 Bus. Law. 893 (1975). The plaintiffs in many of these challenges were attempting to hold the state liable in Section 1983 actions. See generally McDuffy v. Worthmore Furniture, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 257 (E.D. Va. 1974)
Section 36-2A-526. Lessor's stoppage of delivery in transit or otherwise.
(1) A lessor may stop delivery of goods in the possession of a carrier or other bailee if the lessor discovers the lessee to be insolvent and may stop delivery of carload, truckload, planeload, or larger shipments of express or freight if the lessee repudiates or fails to make a payment due before delivery, whether for rent, security or otherwise under the lease contract, or for any other reason the lessor has a right to withhold or take possession of the goods.
(2) In pursuing its remedies under subsection (1), the lessor may stop delivery until
(a) receipt of the goods by the lessee;
(b) acknowledgment to the lessee by any bailee of the goods, except a carrier, that the bailee holds the goods for the lessee; or
(c) such an acknowledgment to the lessee by a carrier via reshipment or as warehouseman.
(3) (a) To stop delivery, a lessor shall so notify as to enable the bailee by reasonable diligence to prevent delivery of the goods.
(b) After notification, the bailee shall hold and deliver the goods according to the directions of the lessor, but the lessor is liable to the bailee for any ensuing charges or damages.
(c) A carrier who has issued a nonnegotiable bill of lading is not obliged to obey a notification to stop received from a person other than the consignor.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-705.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Definitional Cross References:
"Bill of lading". Section 1-201(6).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Discover". Section 1-201(25).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Insolvent". Section 1-201(23).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Notifies" and "Notification". Section 1-201(26).
"Person". Section 1-201(30).
"Receipt". Section 2-103(1)(c).
"Remedy". Section 1-201(34).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Although there is no South Carolina lease law on point, the common law recognizes the right of an unpaid seller, upon discovery of the buyer's insolvency, to stop the delivery of goods which are in transit. Monaghan Mills v. Gilbreath Mfg. Co., 96 S.C. 195, 80 S.E. 194 (1913). Article 2 expanded the common law and allowed stoppage when the goods were in the hands of other bailees. See South Carolina Reporter's Comments to Section 36-2-705. This section expands this later rule to leases.
Subsection (2) codifies the common law rule that the right of stoppage terminates upon receipt of the goods. See John Frazier & Co. v. Hilliard, 2 Strob 309 (1848). Once the goods are in the control of the lessee, the lessor may no longer stop delivery, but must exercise his right to take possession from the defaulting lessee.
Section 36-2A-527. Lessor's rights to dispose of goods.
(1) After a default by a lessee under the lease contract of the type described in Section 36-2A-523(1) or 36-2A-523(3)(a) or after the lessor refuses to deliver or takes possession of goods (Section 36-2A-525 or 36-2A-526), or, if agreed, after other default by a lessee, the lessor may dispose of the goods concerned or the undelivered balance thereof by lease, sale, or otherwise.
(2) Except as otherwise provided with respect to damages liquidated in the lease agreement (Section 36-2A-504) or otherwise determined pursuant to agreement of the parties (Sections 36-1-102(3) and 36-2A-503), if the disposition is by lease agreement substantially similar to the original lease agreement and the new lease agreement is made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner, the lessor may recover from the lessee as damages (i) accrued and unpaid rent as of the date of the commencement of the term of the new lease agreement, (ii) the present value, as of the same date, of the total rent for the then remaining lease term of the original lease agreement minus the present value, as of the same date, of the rent under the new lease agreement applicable to that period of the new lease term which is comparable to the then remaining term of the original lease agreement, and (iii) any incidental damages allowed under Section 36-2A-530, less expenses saved in consequence of the lessee's default.
(3) If the lessor's disposition is by lease agreement that for any reason does not qualify for treatment under subsection (2), or is by sale or otherwise, the lessor may recover from the lessee as if the lessor had elected not to dispose of the goods and Section 36-2A-528 governs.
(4) A subsequent buyer or lessee who buys or leases from the lessor in good faith for value as a result of a disposition under this section takes the goods free of the original lease contract and any rights of the original lessee even though the lessor fails to comply with one or more of the requirements of this chapter.
(5) The lessor is not accountable to the lessee for any profit made on any disposition. A lessee who has rightfully rejected or justifiably revoked acceptance shall account to the lessor for any excess over the amount of the lessee's security interest (Section 36-2A-508(5)).
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-706(1), (5) and (6).
Changes: Substantially revised.
Purposes: 1. Subsection (1), a revised version of the first sentence of subsection 2-706(1), allows the lessor the right to dispose of goods after a statutory or other material default by the lessee (even if the goods remain in the lessee's possession - Section 2A-525(2)), after the lessor refuses to deliver or takes possession of the goods, or, if agreed, after other contractual default. The lessor's decision to exercise this right is a function of a commercial judgment, not a statutory mandate replete with sanctions for failure to comply. Cf. Section 9-507. As the owner of the goods, in the case of a lessor, or as the prime lessee of the goods, in the case of a sublessor, compulsory disposition of the goods is inconsistent with the nature of the interest held by the lessor or the sublessor and is not necessary because the interest held by the lessee or the sublessee is not protected by a right of redemption under the common law or this Article. Subsection 2A-527(5).
2. The rule for determining the measure of damages recoverable by the lessor against the lessee is a function of several variables. If the lessor has elected to effect disposition under subsection (1) and such disposition is by lease that qualifies under subsection (2), the measure of damages set forth in subsection (2) will apply, absent agreement to the contrary. Sections 2A-504, 2A-103(4) and 1-102(3).
3. The lessor's damages will be established using the new lease agreement as a measure if the following three criteria are satisfied: (i) the lessor disposed of the goods by lease, (ii) the lease agreement is substantially similar to the original lease agreement, and (iii) such disposition was in good faith, and in a commercially reasonable manner. Thus, the lessor will be entitled to recover from the lessee the accrued and unpaid rent as of the date of commencement of the term of the new lease, and the present value, as of the same date , of the rent under the original lease for the then remaining term less the present value as of the same date of the rent under the new lease agreement applicable to the period of the new lease comparable to the remaining term under the original lease, together with incidental damages less expenses saved in consequence of the lessee's default. If the lessor's disposition does not satisfy the criteria of subsection (2), the lessor may calculate its claim against the lessee pursuant to Section 2A-528. Section 2A-523(1)(e).
4. Two of the three criteria to be met by the lessor are familiar, but the concept of the new lease agreement that is substantially similar to the original lease agreement is not. Given the many variables facing a party who intends to lease goods and the rapidity of change in the market place, the policy decision was made not to draft with specificity. It was thought unwise to seek to establish certainty at the cost of fairness. The decision of whether the new lease agreement is substantially similar to the original will be determined case by case.
5. While the section does not draw a bright line, it is possible to describe some of the factors that should be considered in a finding that a new lease agreement is substantially similar to the original. The various elements of the new lease agreement should be examined. Those elements include the options to purchase or release; the lessor's representations, warranties and covenants to the lessee as well as those to be provided by the lessee to the lessor; and the services, if any, to be provided by the lessor or by the lessee. All of these factors allocate cost and risk between the lessor and the lessee and thus affect the amount of rent to be paid. These findings should not be made with scientific precision, as they are a function of economics, nor should they be made independently, as it is important that a sense of commercial judgment pervade the finding. See Section 2A-507(2). To establish the new lease as a proper measure of damage under subsection (2), these various factors, taken as a whole, must result in a finding that the new lease agreement is substantially similar to the original. If the differences between the original lease and the new lease can be easily valued, it would be appropriate for a court to find that the new lease is substantially similar to the old lease, adjust the difference in the rent between the two leases to take account of the differences, and award damages under this section. If, for example, the new lease requires the lessor to insure the goods in the hands of the lessee, while the original lease required the lessee to insure, the usual cost of such insurance could be deducted from rent due under the new lease before the difference in rental between the two leases is determined.
6. The following hypothetical illustrates the difficulty of providing a bright line. Assume that A buys a jumbo tractor for $1 million and then leases the tractor to B for a term of 36 months. The tractor is delivered to and is accepted by B on May 1. On June 1 B fails to pay the monthly rent to A. B returns the tractor to A, who immediately releases the tractor to C for a term identical to the term remaining under the lease between A and B. All terms and conditions under the lease between A and C are identical to those under the original lease between A and B, except that C does not provide any property damage or other insurance coverage, and B agreed to provide complete coverage. Coverage is expensive and difficult to obtain. It is a question of fact whether it is so difficult to adjust the recovery to take account of the difference between the two leases as to insurance that the second lease is not substantially similar to the original.
7. A new lease can be substantially similar to the original lease even though its term extends beyond the remaining term of the original lease, so long as both (a) the lease terms are commercially comparable (e.g., it is highly unlikely that a one-month rental and a five-year lease would reflect similar realities), and (b) the court can fairly apportion a part of the rental payments under the new lease to that part of the term of the new lease which is comparable to the remaining lease term under the original lease. Also, the lease term of the new lease may be comparable to the remaining term of the original lease even though the beginning and ending dates of the two leases are not the same. For example, a two-month lease of agricultural equipment for the months of August and September may be comparable to a two-month lease running from the 15th of August to the 15th of October if in the particular location two-month leases beginning on August 15th are basically interchangeable with two-month leases beginning August 1st. Similarly, the term of a one-year truck lease beginning on the 15th of January may be comparable to the term of a one-year truck lease beginning January 2d. If the lease terms are found to be comparable, the court may base cover damages on the entire difference between the costs under the two leases.
8. Subsection (3), which is new, provides that if the lessor's disposition is by lease that does not qualify under subsection (2), or is by sale or otherwise, Section 2A-528 governs.
9. Subsection (4), a revised version of subsection 2-706(5), applies to protect a subsequent buyer or lessee who buys or leases from the lessor in good faith and for value, pursuant to a disposition under this section. Note that by its terms, the rule in subsection 2A-304(1), which provides that the subsequent lessee takes subject to the original lease contract, is controlled by the rule stated in this subsection.
10. Subsection (5), a revised version of subsection 2-706(6), provides that the lessor is not accountable to the lessee for any profit made by the lessor on a disposition. This rule follows from the fundamental premise of the bailment for hire that the lessee under a lease of goods has no equity of redemption to protect.
Cross References: Sections 1-102(3), 2-706(1), 2-706(5), 2-706(6), 2A-103(4), 2A-304(1), 2A-504, 2A-507(2), 2A-523(1)(e), 2A-525(2), 2A-527(5), 2A-528 and 9-507.
Definitional Cross References:
"Buyer" and "Buying". Section 2-103(1)(a).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Good faith". Sections 1-201(19) and 2-103(1)(b).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Present value". Section 2A-103(1)(u).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Sale". Section 2-106(1).
"Security interest". Section 1-201(37).
"Value". Section 1-201(44).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
There is no South Carolina lease law on point. This section permits a lessor to choose between disposing of goods or using them without any subsequent disposal.
Section 36-2A-528. Lessor's damages for nonacceptance, failure to pay, repudiation, or other default.
(1) Except as otherwise provided with respect to damages liquidated in the lease agreement (Section 36-2A-504) or otherwise determined pursuant to agreement of the parties (Sections 36-1-102(3) and 36-2A-503), if a lessor elects to retain the goods or a lessor elects to dispose of the goods and the disposition is by lease agreement that for any reason does not qualify for treatment under Section 36-2A-527(2), or is by sale or otherwise, the lessor may recover from the lessee as damages for a default of the type described in Section 36-2A-523(1) or 36-2A-523(3)(a), or, if agreed, for other default of the lessee, (i) accrued and unpaid rent as of the date of default if the lessee has never taken possession of the goods, or, if the lessee has taken possession of the goods, as of the date the lessor repossesses the goods or an earlier date on which the lessee makes a tender of the goods to the lessor, (ii) the present value as of the date determined under clause (i) of the total rent for the then remaining lease term of the original lease agreement minus the present value as of the same date of the market rent at the place where the goods are located computed for the same lease term, and (iii) any incidental damages allowed under Section 36-2A-530, less expenses saved in consequence of the lessee's default.
(2) If the measure of damages provided in subsection (1) is inadequate to put a lessor in as good a position as performance would have, the measure of damages is the present value of the profit, including reasonable overhead, the lessor would have made from full performance by the lessee, together with any incidental damages allowed under Section 36-2A-530, due allowance for costs reasonably incurred and due credit for payments or proceeds of disposition.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-708.
Changes: Substantially revised.
Purposes: 1. Subsection (1), a substantially revised version of Section 2-708(1), states the basic rule governing the measure of lessor's damages for a default described in Section 2A-523(1) or (3)(a), and, if agreed, for a contractual default. This measure will apply if the lessor elects to retain the goods (whether undelivered, returned by the lessee, or repossessed by the lessor after acceptance and default by the lessee) or if the lessor's disposition does not qualify under subsection 2A-527(2). Section 2A-527(3). Note that under some of these conditions, the lessor may recover damages from the lessee pursuant to the rule set forth in Section 2A-529. There is no sanction for disposition that does not qualify under subsection 2A-527(2). Application of the rule set forth in this section is subject to agreement to the contrary. Sections 2A-504, 2A-103(4) and 1-102(3).
2. If the lessee has never taken possession of the goods, the measure of damage is the accrued and unpaid rent as of the date of default together with the present value, as of the date of default, of the original rent for the remaining term of the lease less the present value as of the same date of market rent, and incidental damages, less expenses saved in consequence of the default. Note that the reference in Section 2A-528(1)(i) and (ii) is to the date of default not to the date of an event of default. An event of default under a lease agreement becomes a default under a lease agreement only after the expiration of any relevant period of grace and compliance with any notice requirements under this Article and the lease agreement. American Bar Foundation, Commentaries on Indentures, Section 5-1, at 216-217 (1971). Section 2A-501(1). This conclusion is also a function of whether, as a matter of fact or law, the event of default has been waived, suspended or cured. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-103. If the lessee has taken possession of the goods, the measure of damages is the accrued and unpaid rent as of the earlier of the time the lessor repossesses the goods or the time the lessee tenders the goods to the lessor plus the difference between the present value, as of the same time, of the rent under the lease for the remaining lease term and the present value, as of the same time, of the market rent.
3. Market rent will be computed pursuant to Section 2A-507.
4. Subsection (2), a somewhat revised version of the provisions of subsection 2-708(2), states a measure of damages which applies if the measure of damages in subsection (1) is inadequate to put the lessor in as good a position as performance would have. The measure of damage is the lessor's profit, including overhead, together with incidental damages, with allowance for costs reasonably incurred and credit for payments or proceeds of disposition. In determining the amount of due credit with respect to proceeds of disposition a proper value should be attributed to the lessor's residual interest in the goods. Sections 2A-103(1)(q) and 2A-507(4).
5. In calculating profit, a court should include any expected appreciation of the goods, e.g. the foal of a leased brood mare. Because this subsection is intended to give the lessor the benefit of the bargain, a court should consider any reasonable benefit or profit expected by the lessor from the performance of the lease agreement. See Honeywell, Inc. v. Lithonia Lighting, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 406, 413 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Locks v. Wade, 36 N.J. Super. 128, 131, 114 A.2d 875, 877 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955). Further, in calculating profit the concept of present value must be given effect. Taylor v. Commercial Credit Equip. Corp., 170 Ga. App. 322, 316 S.E.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1984). See generally Section 2A-103(1)(u).
Cross References: Sections 1-102(3), 2-708, 2A-103(1)(u), 2A-402, 2A-504, 2A-507, 2A-527(2) and 2A-529.
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreement". Section 1-201(3).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease agreement". Section 2A-103(1)(k).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Present value". Section 2A-103(1)(u).
"Sale". Section 2-106(1).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
In Mid-Continent Refrigerator Co. v. Dean, 256 S.C. 99, 180 S.E.2d 892 (1971), the court apparently awarded damages to the plaintiff-lessor based on the monthly rental from default until the date the lessor accepted return of the refrigerator. The result under Article 2A would have been calculated pursuant to subsection (1), which specifies that the date on which the lessee tendered the refrigerator to the lessor would have been the date from which the damages were calculated, rather than the date on which the lessor accepted the returned refrigerator. However, under this section the lessor Mid-Continent would have been entitled to receive incidental damages in addition to the excess of the contractually-specified rent over the market rent.
It is important to note that Mid-Continent apparently involved a lease unlike those in common usage today. Modern leases usually provide contractual acceleration of future rent or otherwise liquidate the lessor's damages; such provisions are permitted under Article 2A. D&D Leasing Co. of S.C. v. Lipson, 305 S.C. 540, 409 S.E.2d 794 (Ct. App. 1991), involved such a contractual acceleration clause which the court enforced, noting that it created no windfall for the lessor, since the lessee received credit for the price received on the lessor's sale of the goods. The result under Article 2A could require discounting the accelerated rents to present value, rather than simply summing them as was done in D&D Leasing. See Section 36-2A-504 (imposing a reasonableness test for liquidated damages provisions) and Official Comment (u) ("Present Value") to Section 36-2A-103.
Consistent with the statutory analogue, in the absence of contractual damage provisions, Article 2A includes measures of damages for the protection of the lessor's benefit of the bargain based on market rent. Were the lessor able to sell or relet the goods, the lessor would have two transactions instead of one, had the breaching lessee performed. If the calculation under subsection (1) is inadequate in this circumstance to place the lessor in the same position as performance of the original lease, subsection (2) allows the lessor to recover lost profit.
Section 36-2A-529. Lessor's action for the rent.
(1) After default by the lessee under the lease contract of the type described in Section 36-2A-523(1) or 36-2A-523(3)(a) or, if agreed, after other default by the lessee, if the lessor complies with subsection (2), the lessor may recover from the lessee as damages:
(a) for goods accepted by the lessee and not repossessed by or tendered to the lessor, and for conforming goods lost or damaged within a commercially reasonable time after risk of loss passes to the lessee (Section 36-2A-219), (i) accrued and unpaid rent as of the date of entry of judgment in favor of the lessor, (ii) the present value as of the same date of the rent for the then remaining lease term of the lease agreement, and (iii) any incidental damages allowed under Section 36-2A-530, less expenses saved in consequence of the lessee's default; and
(b) for goods identified to the lease contract if the lessor is unable after reasonable effort to dispose of them at a reasonable price or the circumstances reasonably indicate that effort will be unavailing, (i) accrued and unpaid rent as of the date of entry of judgment in favor of the lessor, (ii) the present value as of the same date of the rent for the then remaining lease term of the lease agreement, and (iii) any incidental damages allowed under Section 36-2A-530, less expenses saved in consequence of the lessee's default.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3), the lessor shall hold for the lessee for the remaining lease term of the lease agreement any goods that have been identified to the lease contract and are in the lessor's control.
(3) The lessor may dispose of the goods at any time before collection of the judgment for damages obtained pursuant to subsection (1). If the disposition is before the end of the remaining lease term of the lease agreement, the lessor's recovery against the lessee for damages is governed by Section 36-2A-527 or Section 36-2A-528, and the lessor will cause an appropriate credit to be provided against a judgment for damages to the extent that the amount of the judgment exceeds the recovery available pursuant to Section 36-2A-527 or 36-2A-528.
(4) Payment of the judgment for damages obtained pursuant to subsection (1) entitles the lessee to the use and possession of the goods not then disposed of for the remaining lease term of and in accordance with the lease agreement.
(5) After default by the lessee under the lease contract of the type described in Section 36-2A-523(1) or Section 36-2A-523(3)(a) or, if agreed, after other default by the lessee, a lessor who is held not entitled to rent under this section must nevertheless be awarded damages for nonacceptance under Section 36-2A-527 or Section 36-2A-528.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-709.
Changes: Substantially revised.
Purposes: 1. Absent a lease contract provision to the contrary, an action for the full unpaid rent (discounted to present value as of the time of entry of judgment as to rent due after that time) is available as to goods not lost or damaged only if the lessee retains possession of the goods or the lessor is or apparently will be unable to dispose of them at a reasonable price after reasonable effort. There is no general right in a lessor to recover the full rent from the lessee upon holding the goods for the lessee. If the lessee tenders goods back to the lessor, and the lessor refuses to accept the tender, the lessor will be limited to the damages it would have suffered had it taken back the goods. The rule in Article 2 that the seller can recover the price of accepted goods is rejected here. In a lease, the lessor always has a residual interest in the goods which the lessor usually realizes upon at the end of a lease term by either sale or a new lease. Therefore, it is not a substantial imposition on the lessor to require it to take back and dispose of the goods if the lessee chooses to tender them back before the end of the lease term: the lessor will merely do earlier what it would have done anyway, sell or relet the goods. Further, the lessee will frequently encounter substantial difficulties if the lessee attempts to sublet the goods for the remainder of the lease term. In contrast to the buyer who owns the entire interest in goods and can easily dispose of them, the lessee is selling only the right to use the goods under the terms of the lease and the sublessee must assume a relationship with the lessor. In that situation, it is usually more efficient to eliminate the original lessee as a middleman by allowing the lessee to return the goods to the lessor who can then redispose of them.
2. In some situations even where possession of the goods is reacquired, a lessor will be able to recover as damages the present value of the full rent due, not under this section, but under 2A-528(2) which allows a lost profit recovery if necessary to put the lessor in the position it would have been in had the lessee performed. Following is an example of such a case. A is a lessor of construction equipment and maintains a substantial inventory. B leases from A a backhoe for a period of two weeks at a rental of $1,000. After three days, B returns the backhoe and refuses to pay the rent. A has five backhoes in inventory, including the one returned by B. During the next 11 days after the return by B of the backhoe, A rents no more than three backhoes at any one time and, therefore, always has two on hand. If B had kept the backhoe for the full rental period, A would have earned the full rental on that backhoe, plus the rental on the other backhoes it actually did rent during that period. Getting this backhoe back before the end of the lease term did not enable A to make any leases it would not otherwise have made. The only way to put A in the position it would have been in had the lessee fully performed is to give the lessor the full rentals. A realized no savings at all because the backhoe was returned early and might even have incurred additional expense if it was paying for parking space for equipment in inventory. A has no obligation to relet the backhoe for the benefit of B rather than leasing that backhoe or any other in inventory for its own benefit. Further, it is probably not reasonable to expect A to dispose of the backhoe by sale when it is returned in an effort to reduce damages suffered by B. Ordinarily, the loss of a two-week rental would not require A to reduce the size of its backhoe inventory. Whether A would similarly be entitled to full rentals as lost profit in a one-year lease of a backhoe is a question of fact: in any event the lessor, subject to mitigation of damages rules, is entitled to be put in as good a position as it would have been had the lessee fully performed the lease contract.
3. Under subsection (2) a lessor who is able and elects to sue for the rent due under a lease must hold goods not lost or damaged for the lessee. Subsection (3) creates an exception to the subsection (2) requirement. If the lessor disposes of those goods prior to collection of the judgment (whether as a matter of law or agreement), the lessor's recovery is governed by the measure of damages in Section 2A-527 if the disposition is by lease that is substantially similar to the original lease, or otherwise by the measure of damages in Section 2A-528. Section 2A-523 Official Comment.
4. Subsection (4), which is new, further reinforces the requisites of Subsection (2). In the event the judgment for damages obtained by the lessor against the lessee pursuant to subsection (1) is satisfied, the lessee regains the right to use and possession of the remaining goods for the balance of the original lease term; a partial satisfaction of the judgment creates no right in the lessee to use and possession of the goods.
5. The relationship between subsections (2) and (4) is important to understand. Subsection (2) requires the lessor to hold for the lessee identified goods in the lessor's possession. Absent agreement to the contrary, whether in the lease or otherwise, under most circumstances the requirement that the lessor hold the goods for the lessee for the term will mean that the lessor is not allowed to use them. Sections 2A-103(4) and 1-203. Further, the lessor's use of the goods could be viewed as a disposition of the goods that would bar the lessor from recovery under this section, remitting the lessor to the two preceding sections for a determination of the lessor's claim for damages against the lessee.
6. Subsection (5), the analogue of subsection 2-709(3), further reinforces the thrust of subsection (3) by stating that a lessor who is held not entitled to rent under this section has not elected a remedy; the lessor must be awarded damages under Sections 2A-527 and 2A-528. This is a function of two significant policies of this Article - that resort to a remedy is optional, unless expressly agreed to be exclusive (Section 2A-503(2)) and that rights and remedies provided in this Article generally are cumulative. (Section 2A-501(2) and (4)).
Cross References: Sections 1-203, 2-709, 2-709(3), 2A-103(4), 2A-501(2), 2A-501(4), 2A-503(2), 2A-504, 2A-523(1)(e), 2A-525(2), 2A-527, 2A-528 and 2A-529(2).
Definitional Cross References:
"Action". Section 1-201(1).
"Conforming". Section 2A-103(1)(d).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Lease agreement". Section 2A-103(1)(k).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Present value". Section 2A-103(1)(u).
"Reasonable time". Section 1-204(1) and (2).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Subsection (1)(a) provides the calculation for accelerated rentals for goods accepted by the lessee. If the identified goods are destroyed after the risk of loss passes to the lessee, the lessee is liable to the lessor for the rent. In Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Stevens, Stevens & Thomas, P.A., 287 S.C. 338, 338 S.E.2d 343 (Ct.App. 1985), the lessee was held liable to the finance lessor for accelerated rentals. (The supplier of the copier was held liable to the lessee on the counterclaim.) Like the analogue, this section is in accord with South Carolina case law.
Subsection (1)(b) tracks earlier law by requiring the lessor to mitigate damages, where practical, before recovery will be allowed for accelerated rentals.
Section 36-2A-530. Lessor's incidental damages.
Incidental damages to an aggrieved lessor include any commercially reasonable charges, expenses, or commissions incurred in stopping delivery, in the transportation, care and custody of goods after the lessee's default, in connection with return or disposition of the goods, or otherwise resulting from the default.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-710.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Definitional Cross References:
"Aggrieved party". Section 1-201(2).
"Delivery". Section 1-201(14).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Incidental damages would include such expenses as resale, storage, and notice charges. See Smoothing Iron Heater Co. v. Blakely, 94 S.C. 224, 77 S.E. 945 (1913) (seller's damages include storage and insurance cost); Woods v. Cramer, 34 S.C. 508, 13 S.E. 660 (1891) (seller recovered storage and resale expenses).
Consistent with the approach in the statutory analogue, Article 2A does not include a reference to allowable consequential damages for an aggrieved lessor.
Section 36-2A-531. Standing to sue third parties for injury to goods.
(1) If a third party so deals with goods that have been identified to a lease contract as to cause actionable injury to a party to the lease contract (a) the lessor has a right of action against the third party, and (b) the lessee also has a right of action against the third party if the lessee:
( i) has a security interest in the goods;
( ii) has an insurable interest in the goods; or
(iii) bears the risk of loss under the lease contract or has since the injury assumed that risk as against the lessor and the goods have been converted or destroyed.
(2) If at the time of the injury the party plaintiff did not bear the risk of loss as against the other party to the lease contract and there is no arrangement between them for disposition of the recovery, his suit or settlement, subject to his own interest, is as a fiduciary for the other party to the lease contract.
(3) Either party with the consent of the other may sue for the benefit of whom it may concern.
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 2-722.
Changes: Revised to reflect leasing practices and terminology.
Definitional Cross References:
"Action". Section 1-201(1).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease contract". Section 2A-103(1)(l).
"Lessee". Section 2A-103(1)(n).
"Lessor". Section 2A-103(1)(p).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Security interest". Section 1-201(37).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
There is no South Carolina lease law on point. This section extends the sales provision, Section 36-2-722, to leases.
Section 36-2A-532. Lessor's rights to residual interest.
In addition to any other recovery permitted by this chapter or other law, the lessor may recover from the lessee an amount that will fully compensate the lessor for any loss of or damage to the lessor's residual interest in the goods caused by the default of the lessee."
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: None.
Purposes: This section recognizes the right of the lessor to recover under this Article (as well as under other law) from the lessee for failure to comply with the lease obligations as to the condition of leased goods when returned to the lessor, for failure to return the goods at the end of the lease, or for any other default which causes loss or injury to the lessor's residual interest in the goods.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Unlike a seller, a lessor retains a residual interest in the leased goods, which can be harmed by the actions of the lessee. In order to protect the residual interest, Article 2A adds this additional right of recovery. There are no South Carolina cases on point.
SECTION 3. Section 36-1-105 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 221 of 1996, is further amended to read:
"Section 36-1-105. Territorial application of the title; parties' power to choose applicable law.
(1) Except as provided in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this State and also to another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this State or of another state or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing an agreement this title applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this State.
(2) Where one of the following provisions of this title specifies the applicable law, that provision governs and a contrary agreement is effective only to the extent permitted by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) so specified:
Rights of seller's creditors against sold goods.
Section 36-2-402.
Applicability of the Chapter on Leases.
Sections 36-2A-105 and 36-2A-106.
Applicability of the Chapter on Bank Deposits and Collections.
Section 36-4-102.
Bulk transfers subject to the Chapter on Bulk Transfers.
Section 36-6-102.
Applicability of the Chapter on Investment Securities.
Section 36-8-106.
Perfection provisions of the Chapter on Secured Transactions.
Section 36-9-103.
Governing law in the Chapter on Funds Transfers.
Section 36-4A-507."
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 1-105, 1978 Official Text of the Act.
Changes: Subsection (2) is amended to reference two sections of the Article on Leases (Article 2A), which is being promulgated at the same time as this amendment.
SECTION 4. Section 36-1-201(37) of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 494 of 1988, is further amended to read:
"(37) 'Security interest' means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. The retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer (Section 36-2-401) is limited in effect to a reservation of a 'security interest'. The term also includes any interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper which is subject to Chapter 9. The special property interest of a buyer of goods on identification of the those goods to a contract for sale under Section 36-2-401 is not a 'security interest', but a buyer also may also acquire a 'security interest' by complying with Chapter 9. Unless a lease or consignment is intended as security, reservation of title under a lease or consignment is not a 'security interest', but a consignment is in any event is subject to the provisions on consignment sales (Section 36-2-326). Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become the owner of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended for security.
(A) Whether a transaction creates a lease or security interest is determined by the facts of each case; however, a transaction creates a security interest if the consideration the lessee is to pay the lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods is an obligation for the term of the lease not subject to termination by the lessee, and
(1) the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the remaining economic life of the goods,
(2) the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods or is bound to become the owner of the goods,
(3) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods for no additional consideration or nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement, or
(4) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no additional consideration or nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement.
(B) A transaction does not create a security interest merely because it provides that
(1) the present value of the consideration the lessee is obligated to pay the lessor for the right to possession and use of the goods is substantially equal to or is greater than the fair market value of the goods at the time the lease is entered into,
(2) the lessee assumes risk of loss of the goods, or agrees to pay taxes, insurance, filing, recording, or registration fees, or service or maintenance costs with respect to the goods,
(3) the lessee has an option to renew the lease or to become the owner of the goods,
(4) the lessee has an option to renew the lease for a fixed rent that is equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market rent for the use of the goods for the term of the renewal at the time the option is to be performed, or
(5) the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for a fixed price that is equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market value of the goods at the time the option is to be performed.
For Purposes of this subsection (37):
Additional consideration is not nominal if (i) when the option to renew the lease is granted to the lessee the rent is stated to be the fair market rent for the use of the goods for the term of the renewal determined at the time the option is to be performed, or (ii) when the option to become the owner of the goods is granted to the lessee the price is stated to be the fair market value of the goods determined at the time the option is to be performed. Additional consideration is nominal if it is less than the lessee's reasonably predictable cost of performing under the lease agreement if the option is not exercised;
'Reasonably predictable' and 'remaining economic life of the goods' are to be determined with reference to the facts and circumstances at the time the transaction is entered into; and
'Present value' means the amount as of a date certain of one or more sums payable in the future, discounted to the date certain. The discount is determined by the interest rate specified by the parties if the rate is not manifestly unreasonable at the time the transaction is entered into; otherwise, the discount is determined by a commercially reasonable rate that takes into account the facts and circumstances of each case at the time the transaction was entered into."
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 1-201(37), 1978 Official Text of the Act.
Changes: Substantially revised.
Purposes: This amendment to Section 1-201(37) is being promulgated at the same time that the Article on Leases (Article 2A) is being promulgated as an amendment to this Act.
One of the reasons it was decided to codify the law with respect to leases was to resolve an issue that has created considerable confusion in the courts: what is a lease? The confusion exists, in part, due to the last two sentences of the definition of security interest in the 1978 Official Text of the Act. Section 1-201(37). The confusion is compounded by the rather considerable change in the federal, state and local tax laws and accounting rules as they relate to leases of goods. The answer is important because the definition of lease determines not only the rights and remedies of the parties to the lease but also those of third parties. If a transaction creates a lease and not a security interest, the lessee's interest in the goods is limited to its leasehold estate; the residual interest in the goods belongs to the lessor. This has significant implications to the lessee's creditors. "On common law theory, the lessor, since he has not parted with title, is entitled to full protection against the lessee's creditors and trustee in bankruptcy...." 1 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property Section 3.6, at 76 (l965).
Under pre-Act chattel security law there was generally no requirement that the lessor file the lease, a financing statement, or the like, to enforce the lease agreement against the lessee or any third party; the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9) did not change the common law in that respect. Coogan, Leasing and the Uniform Commercial Code, in Equipment Leasing - Leveraged Leasing 681, 700 n.25, 729 n.80 (2d ed. 1980). The Article on Leases (Article 2A) has not changed the law in that respect, except for leases of fixtures. Section 2A-309. An examination of the common law will not provide an adequate answer to the question of what is a lease. The definition of security interest in Section 1-201(37) of the 1978 Official Text of the Act provides that the Article on Secured Transactions (Article 9) governs security interests disguised as leases, i.e., leases intended as security; however, the definition is vague and outmoded.
Lease is defined in Article 2A as a transfer of the right to possession and use of goods for a term, in return for consideration. Section 2A-103(1)(j). The definition continues by stating that the retention or creation of a security interest is not a lease. Thus, the task of sharpening the line between true leases and security interests disguised as leases continues to be a function of this section.
The first paragraph of this definition is a revised version of the first five sentences of the 1978 Official Text of Section 1-201(37). The changes are modest in that they make a style change in the fourth sentence and delete the reference to lease in the fifth sentence. The balance of this definition is new, although it preserves elements of the last two sentences of the prior definition. The focus of the changes was to draw a sharper line between leases and security interests disguised as leases to create greater certainty in commercial transactions.
Prior to this amendment, Section 1-201(37) provided that whether a lease was intended as security (i.e., a security interest disguised as a lease) was to be determined from the facts of each case; however, (a) the inclusion of an option to purchase did not itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the terms of the lease the lessee would become, or had the option to become, the owner of the property for no additional consideration, or for a nominal consideration, did make the lease one intended for security.
Reference to the intent of the parties to create a lease or security interest has led to unfortunate results. In discovering intent, courts have relied upon factors that were thought to be more consistent with sales or loans than leases. Most of these criteria, however, are as applicable to true leases as to security interests. Examples include the typical net lease provisions, a purported lessor's lack of storage facilities or its character as a financing party rather than a dealer in goods. Accordingly, amended Section 1-201(37) deletes all reference to the parties' intent.
The second paragraph of the new definition is taken from Section 1(2) of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act (act withdrawn 1943), modified to reflect current leasing practice. Thus, reference to the case law prior to this Act will provide a useful source of precedent. Gilmore, Security Law, Formalism and Article 9, 47 Neb. L. Rev. 659, 671 (1968). Whether a transaction creates a lease or a security interest continues to be determined by the facts of each case. The second paragraph further provides that a transaction creates a security interest if the lessee has an obligation to continue paying consideration for the term of the lease, if the obligation is not terminable by the lessee (thus correcting early statutory gloss, e.g. In re Royer's Bakery, Inc., 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 342 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1963)) and if one of four additional tests is met. The first of these four tests, subparagraph (a), is that the original lease term is equal to or greater than the remaining economic life of the goods. The second of these tests, subparagraph (b), is that the lessee is either bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods or to become the owner of the goods. In re Gehrke Enters., 1 Bankr. 647, 651-52 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1979). The third of these tests, subparagraph (c), is whether the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods for no additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration, which is defined later in this section. In re Celeryvale Transp., 44 Bankr. 1007, 1014-15 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1984). The fourth of these tests, subparagraph (d), is whether the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration. All of these tests focus on economics, not the intent of the parties. In re Berge, 32 Bankr. 370, 371-73 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983).
The focus on economics is reinforced by the next paragraph, which is new. It states that a transaction does not create a security interest merely because the transaction has certain characteristics listed therein. Subparagraph (a) has no statutory derivative; it states that a full payout lease does not per se create a security interest. Rushton v. Shea, 419 F. Supp. 1349, 1365 (D. Del. 1976). Subparagraph (b) provides the same regarding the provisions of the typical net lease. Compare All-States Leasing Co. v. Ochs, 42 Or. App. 319, 600 P.2d 899 (Ct. App. 1979) with In re Tillery, 571 F.2d 1361 (5th Cir. 1978). Subparagraph (c) restates and expands the provisions of former Section 1-201(37) to make clear that the option can be to buy or renew. Subparagraphs (d) and (e) treat fixed price options and provide that fair market value must be determined at the time the transaction is entered into. Compare Arnold Mach. Co. v. Balls, 624 P.2d 678 (Utah 1981) with Aoki v. Shepherd Mach. Co., 665 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1982).
The relationship of the second paragraph of this subsection to the third paragraph of this subsection deserves to be explored. The fixed price purchase option provides a useful example. A fixed price purchase option in a lease does not of itself create a security interest. This is particularly true if the fixed price is equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market value of the goods at the time the option is to be performed. A security interest is created only if the option price is nominal and the conditions stated in the introduction to the second paragraph of this subsection are met. There is a set of purchase options whose fixed price is less than fair market value but greater than nominal that must be determined on the facts of each case to ascertain whether the transaction in which the option is included creates a lease or a security interest.
It was possible to provide for various other permutations and combinations with respect to options to purchase and renew. For example, this section could have stated a rule to govern the facts of In re Marhoefer Packing Co., 674 F.2d 1139 (7th Cir. 1982). This was not done because it would unnecessarily complicate the definition. Further development of this rule is left to the courts.
The fourth paragraph provides definitions and rules of construction.
SECTION 5. Section 36-9-113 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 494 of 1988, is further amended to read:
"Section 36-9-113. Security interests arising under chapter on sales or under chapter on leases.
A security interest arising solely under the Chapter on Sales (Chapter 2) or the Chapter on Leases (Chapter 2A) is subject to the provisions of this chapter except that to the extent that and so long as the debtor does not have or does not lawfully obtain possession of the goods
(a) no security agreement is necessary to make the security interest enforceable; and
(b) no filing is required to perfect the security interest; and
(c) the rights of the secured party on default by the debtor are governed (i) by the Chapter on Sales (Chapter 2) in the case of a security interest arising solely under such Chapter or (ii) by the Chapter on Leases (Chapter 2A) in the case of a security interest arising solely under such Chapter."
Official Comment
Uniform Statutory Source: Section 9-113, 1978 Official Text of the Act.
Changes: This section is amended to include security interests arising under the Article on Leases (Article 2A), which is being promulgated at the same time as this amendment. Section 2A-508(5). After the effective date of the amendment to this section all references in the Act to Section 9-113 will be deemed to refer to this section, as amended. E.g., Sections 9-203(1) and 9-302(1)(f).
Cross Reference: Article 2A, esp. Section 2A-508(5).
Definitional Cross References:
"Agreement". Section 1-201(3).
"Goods". Section 2A-103(1)(h).
"Lease". Section 2A-103(1)(j).
"Party". Section 1-201(29).
"Rights". Section 1-201(36).
"Sale". Section 2-106(1).
"Security interest". Section 1-201(37).
SECTION 6. Introduction: South Carolina Reporter's Introductory Comment to the 2000 Revision of Article 8
The 2000 Revision of Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code makes significant changes in Article 8's framework for analyzing rights in investment securities. These changes are not tweaks; Article 8 has been altogether repealed, and a new statute substituted. This Comment describes briefly the reasons these changes were made, and their effects.
The fundamental reasons for the changes are to provide uniformity in the securities industry and to provide a more accurate description of the realities of the securities markets, both today and as they may develop in the foreseeable future. Secondary reasons for the changes are to enhance the value-adding factors of liquidity and certainty in securities transactions.
In this day of increasingly cross-border markets, uniformity is also a value-adding factor. Toward this end, every state in the United States is expected to adopt revised Article 8 on or before July 1, 2001. The United States Treasury has, by regulation, adopted revised Article 8 as governing all security interests in Treasury securities, whether or not a relevant state has done so.
Revised Article 8 provides a more accurate description of the securities industry than did its predecessor. The 1978 uniform amendments to Article 8 reflected a perceived need to de-emphasize the role of paper certificates. This perception was on the mark, but the solution adopted by the 1978 amendments -- certificateless securities -- never caught on in the marketplace. Instead, the market, on its own, developed a system of electronic book entry based on very large physical certificates held by clearing corporations. The 2000 Revision recognizes this "indirect holding system" and establishes a uniform structure for it, found in Part 5 of Article 8. It is described further below.
Effects of the 2000 Revision are described in detail in the Official and South Carolina Reporter's Comments accompanying each Section of Article 8. These effects should not be troublesome or even noticeable to investors or bankers, with the exception of the treatment of creation and perfection of security interests in investment securities, discussed briefly below. The structure of the direct holding system established by former Article 8 has been retained, although in simplified form. The newly-described indirect holding system (discussed below) is intended to formalize a pattern of securities holding that is already established practice in South Carolina and nationally. No significant South Carolina judicial opinions are overturned. Accordingly, few, if any, changes should be required in the operations of those who deal in investment securities. Indeed, revised Article 8 should be a better fit than was its predecessor with the way operations are conducted in the securities business, and should clarify many questions left unanswered by prior law.
The 2000 Revision will have a noticeable impact in secured transactions. The Revision moves the statutory material relating to the creation and perfection of security interests in investment securities back into Article 9, although certain key concepts, such as the newly-invented concept of "control," are defined in Article 8 (see Section [8-106]). Those interested in changes in secured transactions should refer to Article 9 for a detailed description. For present purposes, suffice it to say that, as to investment securities, the changes are more in the nature of clarification than alteration. Security interests in securities held without certificates are dealt with by analogies to those represented by certificates, a system one observer has called the "virtual certificate."
The scope of Article 8 following the 2000 Revision is broader than that of prior law. Former Article 8 applied to interests of a type commonly dealt in on securities exchanges or markets (see Section 38-8-102 (repealed)). This left somewhat in limbo the law governing non-traded securities, such as shares in closely-held corporations. The 2000 Revision extends the ambit of Article 8 expressly to include shares of stock in close corporations, rights in securities accounts ("securities entitlements;" see Section [8-102](a)(9)), and "financial assets," a new term describing a broad range of assets not normally thought of as securities but held in a securities account (see Section [8-102](a)(9)).
Like its predecessor statute, the design of the 2000 Revision is to enhance liquidity by creating a structure de-emphasizing the use of certificates in securities transactions. Unlike its predecessor (which invented the concept of certificateless securities in the belief that this was the wave of the future), the 2000 revision adopts the marketplace's own solution, by recognizing, and applying a uniform structure to, the "indirect holding system."
The indirect holding system describes the practice of using clearing corporations to hold large blocks of securities, represented by "jumbo" certificates. The clearing corporations are the holders of record. The members of the clearing corporations, such as brokerage houses, own undifferentiated rights to these securities; that is to say, they do not hold certificates nor do they "own" particular securities. What they do own is rights to a percentage of the fungible whole held by the clearing corporation. When the members' customers "buy" securities and put them in their accounts with the members, they do not buy particular securities but, in their turn, rights in their broker's rights in the holdings of the clearing corporation. These rights are known in the statute by the defined term, "securities entitlement" (see Section [8-102(a)(17)]. Each day, all trades are cleared up the line, by netting accounts through electronic book entry. In the indirect system, physical handling of certificates is virtually eliminated. Compared to a system based on certificates, transaction cost is minimized and speed maximized, enhancing liquidity.
The vast majority of publicly-traded securities are held through the indirect holding system as a matter of practice and agreement within the industry. The 2000 Revision establishes, for the first time, a set of comprehensive rules providing a uniform structure for this system and defining the relevant rights and duties. The Revision is designed, not to mandate system structure, but to formalize and make uniform a set of rules describing present industry practice while providing flexibility to accommodate future changes in market practice.
The new rules describing the indirect holding system are largely found in Part 5 of Article 8. They supplant a pastiche of common law rules and agreed practices. They borrow, with modifications, a number of well-understood concepts, such as shelter, and purchaser for value.
Part 1 of Article 8 consists largely of definitions and basic concepts. Parts 2, 3 and 4 describe the direct holding system, that is, the set of rights and duties created when investors hold securities directly from the issuer. Under the direct holding system, the investor is the holder of record, to whom the issuer's duties (such as delivery of notifications and distributions) are directly owed. The direct holding system is not fundamentally changed from prior law, but it is simplified and many questions arising under prior law are clarified. The concept of certificateless securities is de-emphasized, and the concept of information statements is deleted as a statutory concept.
Article 8 is technical. Further, the 2000 Revision relies on many terms of art invented solely for use in this statute. Those using this statute are strongly encouraged to read the introductory materials and the Official Comments.
The South Carolina Reporter's Comments do not attempt to explain the substance of the statute; the Official Comments do that. The South Carolina comments have two purposes. The first is to describe changes in South Carolina law caused by adoption of the Revision, including changes in Article 8 itself. The second would be to describe any variations in South Carolina's Revision from the Official Text, were there any. However, as the South Carolina task force which reviewed the Official Text found in the Revision no conflict with existing South Carolina law or public policy, and because of the strong value in uniformity in Article 8, the task force recommended no changes from the Official Text. Indeed, virtually no changes have been enacted by any adopting State.
The 2000 Revision is a project of the South Carolina Law Institute. The Law Institute's Article 8 Task Force was composed of Elaine Fowler, Chair; Morris Ellison, Esquire; and Julia Carrier, the Task Force's research assistant. Thanks goes to all those associated with the Task Force, to the staff of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for their support, and to the hard-working staff of the Senate Judiciary Committee, other legislative staffers in the Senate and House, and Legislative Counsel, which ultimately made possible the adoption of the 2000 Revision.
Martin C. McWilliams, Jr.
Reporter
Prefatory Note
The present version of Article 8 is the product of a major revision made necessary by the fact that the prior version of Article 8 did not adequately deal with the system of securities holding through securities intermediaries that has developed in the past few decades. Although the prior version of Article 8 did contain some provisions dealing with securities holding through securities intermediaries, these were engrafted onto a structure designed for securities practices of earlier times. The resulting legal uncertainties adversely affected all participants. The revision is intended to eliminate these uncertainties by providing a modern legal structure for current securities holding practices.
I. EVOLUTION OF SECURITIES HOLDING SYSTEMS
A. The Traditional Securities Holding System
The original version of Article 8, drafted in the 1940s and 1950s, was based on the assumption that possession and delivery of physical certificates are the key elements in the securities holding system. Ownership of securities was traditionally evidenced by possession of the certificates, and changes were accomplished by delivery of the certificates.
Transfer of securities in the traditional certificate-based system was a complicated, labor-intensive process. Each time securities were traded, the physical certificates had to be delivered from the seller to the buyer, and in the case of registered securities the certificates had to be surrendered to the issuer or its transfer agent for registration of transfer. As is well known, the mechanical problems of processing the paperwork for securities transfers reached crisis proportions in the late 1960s, leading to calls for the elimination of the physical certificate and development of modern electronic systems for recording ownership of securities and transfers of ownership. That was the focus of the revision effort that led to the promulgation of the 1978 amendments to Article 8 concerning uncertificated securities.
B. The Uncertificated Securities System Envisioned by the 1978 Amendments
In 1978, amendments to Article 8 were approved to establish the commercial law rules that were thought necessary to permit the evolution of a system in which issuers would no longer issue certificates. The Drafting Committee that produced the 1978 amendments was given a fairly limited charge. It was to draft the revisions that would be needed for uncertificated securities, but otherwise leave the Article 8 rules unchanged. Accordingly, the 1978 amendments primarily took the form of adding parallel provisions dealing with uncertificated securities to the existing rules of Article 8 on certificated securities.
The system of securities holding contemplated by the 1978 amendments differed from the traditional system only in that ownership of securities would not be evidenced by physical certificates. It was contemplated that changes in ownership would continue to be reflected by changes in the records of the issuer. The main difference would be that instead of surrendering an indorsed certificate for registration of transfer, an instruction would be sent to the issuer directing it to register the transfer. Although a system of the sort contemplated by the 1978 amendments may well develop in the coming decades, this has not yet happened for most categories of securities. Mutual funds shares have long been issued in uncertificated form, but virtually all other forms of publicly traded corporate securities are still issued in certificated form. Individual investors who wish to be recorded as registered owners on the issuers' books still obtain and hold physical certificates. The certificates representing the largest portion of the shares of publicly traded companies, however, are not held by the beneficial owners, but by clearing corporations. Settlement of securities trading occurs not by delivery of certificates or by registration of transfer on the records of the issuers or their transfer agents, but by computer entries in the records of clearing corporations and securities intermediaries. That is quite different from the system envisioned by the 1978 amendments.
C. Evolution of the Indirect Holding System
At the time of the "paperwork crunch" in the late 1960s, the trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange that so seriously strained the capacities of the clearance and settlement system was in the range of 10 million shares per day. Today, the system can easily handle trading volume on routine days of hundreds of millions of shares. This processing capacity could have been achieved only by the application of modern electronic information processing systems. Yet the legal rules under which the system operates are not the uncertificated securities provisions of Article 8. To understand why this is so, one must delve at least a bit deeper into the operations of the current system.
If one examines the shareholder records of large corporations whose shares are publicly traded on the exchanges or in the over the counter market, one would find that one entity -- Cede & Co. -- is listed as the shareholder of record of somewhere in the range of sixty to eighty per cent of the outstanding shares of all publicly traded companies. Cede & Co. is the nominee name used by The Depository Trust Company ("DTC"), a limited purpose trust company organized under New York law for the purpose of acting as a depository to hold securities for the benefit of its participants, some 600 or so broker-dealers and banks. Essentially all of the trading in publicly held companies is executed through the broker-dealers who are participants in DTC, and the great bulk of public securities -- the sixty to eighty per cent figure noted above -- are held by these broker-dealers and banks on behalf of their customers. If all of these broker-dealers and banks held physical certificates, then as trades were executed each day it would be necessary to deliver the certificates back and forth among these broker-dealers and banks. By handing all of their securities over to a common depository all of these deliveries can be eliminated. Transfers can be accomplished by adjustments to the participants' DTC accounts.
Although the use of a common depository eliminates the needs for physical deliveries, an enormous number of entries would still have to be made on DTC's books if each transaction between its participants were recorded one by one on DTC's books. Any two major broker-dealers may have executed numerous trades with each other in a given security on a single day. Significant processing efficiency has been achieved by netting all of the transactions among the participants that occur each day, so that entries need be made on the depository's books only for the net changes in the positions of each participant at the end of each day. This clearance and netting function might well be performed by the securities exchanges or by the same institution that acts as the depository, as is the case in many other securities markets around the world. In the United States, however, this clearance and netting function is carried out by a separate corporation, National Securities Clearing Corporation ("NSCC"). All that needs to be done to settle each day's trading is for NSCC to compute the net receive and deliver obligations and to instruct DTC to make the corresponding adjustments in the participants' accounts.
The broker-dealers and banks who are participants in the DTC-NSCC system in turn provide analogous clearance and settlement functions to their own customers. If Customer A buys 100 shares of XYZ Co. through Broker, and Customer B sells 100 shares of XYZ Co. through the same Broker, the trade can be settled by entries on Broker's books. Neither DTC's books showing Broker's total position in XYZ Co., nor XYZ Co.'s books showing DTC's total position in XYZ Co., need be changed to reflect the settlement of this trade. One can readily appreciate the significance of the settlement function performed at this level if one considers that a single major bank may be acting as securities custodian for hundreds or thousands of mutual funds, pension funds, and other institutional investors. On any given day, the customers of that bank may have entered into an enormous number of trades, yet it is possible that relatively little of this trading activity will result in any net change in the custodian bank's positions on the books of DTC.
Settlement of market trading in most of the major U.S. securities markets is now effected primarily through some form of netted clearance and depository system. Virtually all publicly traded corporate equity securities, corporate debt securities, and municipal debt securities are now eligible for deposit in the DTC system. Recently, DTC has implemented a similar depository settlement system for the commercial paper market, and could, but for limitations in present Article 8, handle other forms of short-term money market securities such as bankers' acceptances. For trading in mortgage-backed securities, such as Ginnie Mae's, a similar depository settlement system has been developed by Participants Trust Company. For trading in U.S. Treasury securities, a somewhat analogous book-entry system is operated under Treasury rules by the Federal Reserve System.
D. Need for Different Legal Rules for the Direct and Indirect Holding Systems
Both the traditional paper-based system, and the uncertificated system contemplated by the 1978 amendments, can be described as "direct" securities holding systems; that is, the beneficial owners of securities have a direct relationship with the issuer of the securities. For securities in bearer form, whoever has possession of the certificate thereby has a direct claim against the issuer. For registered securities, the registered owner, whether of certificated or uncertificated securities, has a direct relationship with the issuer by virtue of being recorded as the owner on the records maintained by the issuer or its transfer agent.
By contrast, the DTC depository system for corporate equity and debt securities can be described as an "indirect holding" system, that is, the issuer's records do not show the identity of all of the beneficial owners. Instead, a large portion of the outstanding securities of any given issue are recorded on the issuer's records as belonging to a depository. The depository's records in turn show the identity of the banks or brokers who are its members, and the records of those securities intermediaries show the identity of their customers.
Even after the 1978 amendments, the rules of Article 8 did not deal effectively with the indirect holding system. The rules of the 1978 version of Article 8 were based on the assumption that changes in ownership of securities would still be effected either by delivery of physical certificates or by registration of transfer on the books of the issuer. Yet in the indirect holding system, settlement of the vast majority of securities trades does not involve either of these events. For most, if not all, of the securities held through DTC, physical certificates representing DTC's total position do exist. These "jumbo certificates," however, are never delivered from person to person. Just as nothing ever happens to these certificates, virtually nothing happens to the official registry of stockholders maintained by the issuers or their transfer agents to reflect the great bulk of the changes in ownership of shares that occur each day.
The principal mechanism through which securities trades are settled today is not delivery of certificates or registration of transfers on the issuer's books, but netted settlement arrangements and accounting entries on the books of a multi-tiered pyramid of securities intermediaries. Herein is the basic problem. Virtually all of the rules of the prior version of Article 8 specifying how changes in ownership of securities are effected, and what happens if something goes awry in the process, were keyed to the concepts of a transfer of physical certificates or registration of transfers on the books of the issuers, yet that is not how changes in ownership are actually reflected in the modern securities holding system.
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF REVISED ARTICLE 8
A. Drafting Approach-- Neutrality Principle
One of the objectives of the revision of Article 8 is to devise a structure of commercial law rules for investment securities that will be sufficiently flexible to respond to changes in practice over the next few decades. If it were possible to predict with confidence how the securities holding and trading system would develop, one could produce a statute designed specifically for the system envisioned. Recent experience, however, shows the danger of that approach. The 1978 amendments to Article 8 were based on the assumption that the solution to the problems that plagued the paper-based securities trading system of the 1960s would be the development of uncertificated securities. Instead, the solution thus far has been the development of the indirect holding system.
If one thought that the indirect holding system would come to dominate securities holding, one might draft Article 8 rules designed primarily for the indirect holding system, giving limited attention to the traditional direct holding system of security certificates or any uncertificated version of a direct holding system that might develop in the future. It is, however, by no means clear whether the long-term evolution will be toward decreased or increased use of direct holdings. At present, investors in most equity securities can either hold their securities through brokers or request that certificates be issued in their own name. For the immediate future it seems likely that that situation will continue. One can imagine many plausible scenarios for future evolution. Direct holding might become less and less common as investors become more familiar and comfortable with book-entry systems and/or as market or regulatory pressures develop that discourage direct holding. One might note, for example, that major brokerage firms are beginning to impose fees for having certificates issued and that some observers have suggested that acceleration of the cycle for settlement of securities trades might be facilitated by discouraging customers from obtaining certificates. On the other hand, other observers feel that it is important for investors to retain the option of holding securities in certificated form, or at least in some form that gives them a direct relationship with the issuer and does not require them to hold through brokers or other securities intermediaries. Some groups within the securities industry are beginning to work on development of uncertificated systems that would preserve this option.
Revised Article 8 takes a neutral position on the evolution of securities holding practices. The revision was based on the assumption that the path of development will be determined by market and regulatory forces and that the Article 8 rules should not seek to influence that development in any specific direction. Although various drafting approaches were considered, it became apparent early in the revision process that the differences between the direct holding system and the indirect holding system are sufficiently significant that it is best to treat them as separate systems requiring different legal concepts. Accordingly, while the rules of the prior version of Article 8 have, in large measure, been retained for the direct holding system, a new Part 5 has been added, setting out the commercial law rules for the indirect securities holding system. The principle of neutrality does carry some implications for the design of specific Article 8 rules. At the very least, the Article 8 rules for all securities holding systems should be sufficiently clear and predictable that uncertainty about the governing law does not itself operate as a constraint on market developments. In addition, an effort has been made to identify and eliminate any Article 8 rules that might act as impediments to any of the foreseeable paths of development.
B. Direct Holding System
With respect to securities held directly, Revised Article 8 retains the basic conceptual structure and rules of present law. Part 2, which is largely unchanged from former law, deals with certain aspects of the obligations of issuers. The primary purpose of the rules of Part 2 is to apply to investment securities the principles of negotiable instruments law that preclude the issuers of negotiable instruments from asserting defenses against subsequent purchasers. Part 3 deals with transfer for securities held directly. One of its principal purposes is to apply to investment securities the principles of negotiable instruments law that protect purchasers of negotiable instruments against adverse claims. Part 4 deals with the process of registration of transfer by the issuer or transfer agent.
Although the basic concepts of the direct holding system rules have been retained, there are significant changes in terminology, organization, and statement of the rules. Some of the major changes are as follows:
Simplification of Part 3. The addition of the new Part 5 on the indirect holding system makes unnecessary the rather elaborate provisions of former law, such as those in Section 8-313, that sought to fit the indirect holding system into the conceptual structure of the direct holding system. Thus, Part 3 of Revised Article 8 is, in many respects, more similar to the original version of Article 8 than to the 1978 version.
Protected purchaser. The prior version of Article 8 used the term "bona fide purchaser" to refer to those purchasers who took free from adverse claims, and it used the phrase "good faith" in stating the requirements for such status. In order to promote clarity, Revised Article 8 states the rules that protect purchasers against adverse claims without using the phrase "good faith" and uses the new term "protected purchaser" to refer to purchasers in the direct holding system who are protected against adverse claims. See Sections 8-105 and 8-303.
Certificated versus uncertificated securities. The rules of the 1978 version of Article 8 concerning uncertificated securities have been simplified considerably. The 1978 version added provisions on uncertificated securities parallel to the provisions of the original version of Article 8 dealing with securities represented by certificates. Thus, virtually every section had one set of rules on "certificated securities" and another on "uncertificated securities." The constant juxtaposition of "certificated securities" and "uncertificated securities" has probably led readers to overemphasize the differences. Revised Article 8 has a unitary definition of "security" in Section 8-102(a)(15) which refers to the underlying intangible interest or obligation. In Revised Article 8, the difference between certificated and uncertificated is treated not as an inherent attribute of the security but as a difference in the means by which ownership is evidenced. The terms "certificated" and "uncertificated" security are used in those sections where it is important to distinguish between these two means of evidencing ownership. Revised Article 8 also deletes the provisions of the 1978 version concerning "transaction statements" and "registered pledges." These changes are explained in the Revision Notes 3, 4, and 5, below.
Scope of Parts 2, 3, and 4. The rules of Parts 2, 3, and 4 deal only with the rights of persons who hold securities directly. In typical securities holding arrangements in the modern depository system, only the clearing corporation would be a direct holder of the securities. Thus, while the rules of Parts 2, 3, and 4 would apply to the relationship between the issuer and the clearing corporation, they have no application to relationships below the clearing corporation level. Under Revised Article 8, a person who holds a security through a broker or securities custodian has a security entitlement governed by the Part 5 rules but is not the direct holder of the security. Thus, the rules of Revised Section 8-303 on the rights of "protected purchasers," which are the analog of the bona fide purchaser rules of former Article 8, do not apply to persons who hold securities through brokers or securities custodians. Instead, Part 5 contains its own rules to protect investors in the indirect holding system against adverse claims. See Revised Section 8-502.
C. Indirect Holding System
Although the Revised Article 8 provisions for the indirect holding system are somewhat complex, the basic approach taken can be summarized rather briefly. Revised Article 8 abandons the attempt to describe all of the complex relationships in the indirect holding system using the simple concepts of the traditional direct holding system. Instead, new rules specifically designed for the indirect holding system are added as Part 5 of Article 8. In a nutshell, the approach is to describe the core of the package of rights of a person who holds a security through a securities intermediary and then give that package of rights a name.
The starting point of Revised Article 8's treatment of the indirect holding system is the concept of "security entitlement." The term is defined in Section 8-102(a)(17) as "the rights and property interest of an entitlement holder with respect to a financial asset specified in Part 5." Like many legal concepts, however, the meaning of "security entitlement" is to be found less in any specific definition than in the matrix of rules that use the term. In a sense, then, the entirety of Part 5 is the definition of "security entitlement" because the Part 5 rules specify the rights and property interest that comprise a security entitlement.
Part 5 begins by specifying, in Section 8-501, when an entitlement holder acquires a security entitlement. The basic rule is very simple. A person acquires a security entitlement when the securities intermediary credits the financial asset to the person's account. The remaining sections of Part 5 specify the content of the security entitlement concept. Section 8-504 provides that a securities intermediary must maintain a sufficient quantity of financial assets to satisfy the claims of all of its entitlement holders. Section 8-503 provides that these financial assets are held by the intermediary for the entitlement holders, are not the property of the securities intermediary, and are not subject to claims of the intermediary's general creditors. Thus, a security entitlement is itself a form of property interest not merely an in personam claim against the intermediary. The concept of a security entitlement does, however, include a package of in personam rights against the intermediary. Other Part 5 rules identify the core of this package of rights, subject to specification by agreement and regulatory law. See Sections 8-505 through 8-509.
To illustrate the basic features of the new rules, consider a simple example of two investors, John and Mary, each of whom owns 1000 shares of Acme, Inc., a publicly traded company. John has a certificate representing his 1000 shares and is registered on the books maintained by Acme's transfer agent as the holder of record of those 1000 shares. Accordingly, he has a direct claim against the issuer, he receives dividends and distributions directly from the issuer, and he receives proxies directly from the issuer for purposes of voting his shares. Mary has chosen to hold her securities through her broker. She does not have a certificate and is not registered on Acme's stock books as a holder of record. She enjoys the economic and corporate benefits of ownership but does so through her broker and any other intermediaries in the chain back to the issuer. John's interest in Acme common stock would be described under Revised Article 8 as a direct interest in a "security." Thus, if John grants a security interest in his investment position, the collateral would be described as a "security." Mary's interest in Acme common stock would be described under Revised Article 8 as a "security entitlement." Thus, if Mary grants a security interest in her investment position, the collateral would be described as a "security entitlement."
For many purposes, there is no need to differentiate among the various ways that an investor might hold securities. For example, for purposes of financial accounting, John and Mary would each be described as the owner of 1000 shares of Acme common stock. For those purposes it is irrelevant that John is the registered owner and has physical possession of a certificate, while Mary holds her position through an intermediary. Revised Article 8 recognizes this point in Section 8-104 which provides that acquiring a security entitlement and acquiring a security certificate are different ways of acquiring an interest in the underlying security.
D. Security Interests
Along with the revision of Article 8, significant changes have been made in the rules concerning security interests in securities. The revision returns to the pre-1978 structure in which the rules on security interests in investment securities are set out in Article 9, rather than in Article 8. The changes in Article 9 are, in part, conforming changes to adapt Article 9 to the new concept of a security entitlement. The Article 9 changes, however, go beyond that to establish a simplified structure for the creation and perfection of security interests in investment securities, whether held directly or indirectly. In order to avoid disruption of the current numbering sequence of Article 9, the new rules on security interests in investment securities are primarily set out in a new Section 9-115.
The Revised Article 9 rules continue the long-established principle that a security interest in a security represented by a certificate can be perfected by a possessory pledge. The revised rules, however, do not require that all security interests in investment securities be implemented by procedures based on the conceptual structure of the common law pledge. Under the revised Article 9 rules, a security interest in securities can be created pursuant to Section 9-203 in the same fashion as a security interest in any other form of property, that is, by agreement between the debtor and secured party. There is no requirement of a "transfer," "delivery," or any similar action, physical or metaphysical, for the creation of an effective security interest. A security interest in securities is, of course, a form of property interest, but the only requirements for creation of this form of property interest are those set out in Section 9-203.
The perfection methods for security interests in investment securities are set out in Revised Section 9-115(4). The basic rule is that a security interest may be perfected by "control." The concept of control, defined in Section 8-106, plays an important role in both Article 8 and Article 9. In general, obtaining control means taking the steps necessary to place the lender in a position where it can have the collateral sold off without the further cooperation of the debtor. Thus, for certificated securities, a lender obtains control by taking possession of the certificate with any necessary indorsement. For securities held through a securities intermediary, the lender can obtain control in two ways. First, the lender obtains control if it becomes the entitlement holder; that is, has the securities positions transferred to an account in its own name. Second, the lender obtains control if the securities intermediary agrees to act on instructions from the secured party to dispose of the positions, even though the debtor remains the entitlement holder. Such an arrangement suffices to give the lender control even though the debtor retains the right to trade and exercise other ordinary rights of an entitlement holder.
Except where the debtor is itself a securities firm, filing of an ordinary Article 9 financing statement is also a permissible alternative method of perfection. However, filing with respect to investment property does not assure the lender the same protections as for other forms of collateral, since the priority rules provide that a secured party who obtains control has priority over a secured party who does not obtain control.
The details of the new rules on security interests, as applied both to the retail level and to arrangements for secured financing of securities dealers, are explained in the Official Comments to Section 9-115.
III. SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 8
A. Terminology
To understand the scope and application of the rules of Revised Article 8, and the related security interest rules of Article 9, it is necessary to understand some of the key defined terms:
Security, defined in Section 8-102(a)(15), has essentially the same meaning as under the prior version of Article 8. The difference in Revised Article 8 is that the definition of security does not determine the coverage of all of Article 8. Although the direct holding system rules in Parts 2, 3, and 4 apply only to securities, the indirect holding system rules of Part 5 apply to the broader category of "financial assets."
Financial asset, defined in Section 8-103(a)(9), is the term used to describe the forms of property to which the indirect holding system rules of Part 5 apply. The term includes not only "securities," but also other interests, obligations, or property that are held through securities accounts. The best illustration of the broader scope of the term financial asset is the treatment of money market instruments, discussed below.
Security entitlement, defined in Section 8-103(a)(17), is the term used to describe the property interest of a person who holds a security or other financial asset through a securities intermediary.
Securities intermediary, defined in Section 8-103(a)(14), is the term used for those who hold securities for others in the indirect holding system. It covers clearing corporations, banks acting as securities custodians, and brokers holding securities for their customers.
Entitlement holder, defined in Section 8-103(a)(7), is the term used for those who hold securities through intermediaries.
Securities account, defined in Section 8-501(a), describes the form of arrangement between a securities intermediary and an entitlement holder that gives rise to a security entitlement. As explained below, the definition of securities account plays a key role in setting the scope of the indirect holding system rules of Part 5.
Investment property, defined in Section 9-115(1)(f), determines the application of the new Article 9 rules for secured transactions. In addition to securities and security entitlements, the Article 9 term "investment property" is defined to include "securities account" in order to simplify the drafting of the Article 9 rules that permit debtors to grant security interests either in specific security entitlements or in an entire securities account. The other difference between the coverage of the Article 8 and Article 9 terms is that commodity futures contracts are excluded from Article 8, but are included within the Article 9 definition of "investment property." Thus, the new Article 9 rules apply to security interests in commodity futures positions as well as security interests in securities positions.
B. Notes on Scope of Article 8
Article 8 is in no sense a comprehensive codification of the law governing securities or transactions in securities. Although Article 8 deals with some aspects of the rights of securities holders against issuers, most of that relationship is governed not by Article 8, but by corporation, securities, and contract law. Although Article 8 deals with some aspects of the rights and duties of parties who transfer securities, it is not a codification of the law of contracts for the purchase or sale of securities. (The prior version of Article 8 did include a few miscellaneous rules on contracts for the sale of securities, but these have not been included in Revised Article 8). Although the new indirect holding system rules of Part 5 deal with some aspects of the relationship between brokers or other securities professionals and their customers, Article 8 is still not in any sense a comprehensive code of the law governing the relationship between broker-dealers or other securities intermediaries and their customers. Most of the law governing that relationship is the common law of contract and agency, supplemented or supplanted by regulatory law.
The distinction between the aspects of the broker-customer relationship that are and are not dealt with in this Article may be illuminated by considering the differing roles of the broker in a typical securities transaction, in which the broker acts as agent for the customer. When a customer directs a broker to buy or sell securities for the customer, and the broker executes that trade on a securities exchange or in the over the counter market, the broker is entering into a contract for the purchase or sale of the securities as agent of the customer. The rules of the exchange, practices of the market, or regulatory law will specify when and how that contract is to be performed. For example, today the terms of the standard contract for trades in most corporate securities require the seller to deliver the securities, and the buyer to pay for them, five business days after the date that the contract was made, although the SEC has recently promulgated a rule that will accelerate the cycle to require settlement in three business days. In the common speech of the industry, the transaction in which the broker enters into a contract for the purchase or sale of the securities is referred to as executing the trade, and the transaction in which the securities are delivered and paid for is referred to as settlement. Thus, the current settlement cycle is known as T+5, that is, settlement is required on the fifth business day after the date of the trade, and the new SEC rule will change it to T+3. One must be careful in moving from the jargon of the securities industry to the jargon of the legal profession. For most practical economic purposes, the trade date is the date that counts, because that is the time at which the price is set, the risk of price changes shifts, and the parties become bound to perform. For purposes of precise legal analysis, however, the securities phrase "trade" or "execute a trade" means enter into a contract for the purchase or sale of the securities. The transfer of property interests occurs not at the time the contract is made but at the time it is performed, that is, at settlement.
The distinction between trade and settlement is important in understanding the scope of Article 8. Article 8 deals with the settlement phase of securities transactions. It deals with the mechanisms by which interests in securities are transferred, and the rights and duties of those who are involved in the transfer process. It does not deal with the process of entering into contracts for the transfer of securities or regulate the rights and duties of those involved in the contracting process. To use securities parlance, Article 8 deals not with the trade, but with settlement of the trade. Indeed, Article 8 does not even deal with all aspects of settlement. In a netted clearance and settlement system such as the NSCC-DTC system, individual trades are not settled one-by-one by corresponding entries on the books of any depository. Rather, settlement of the individual trades occurs through the clearing arrangements, in accordance with the rules and agreements that govern those arrangements.
In the rules dealing with the indirect holding system, one must be particularly careful to bear in mind the distinction between trade and settlement. Under Revised Article 8, the property interest of a person who holds securities through an intermediary is described as a "security entitlement," which is defined in Revised Section 8-102(a)(17) as the package of rights and property interest of an entitlement holder specified in Part 5. Saying that the security entitlement is a package of rights against the broker does not mean that all of the customer's rights against the broker are part of the security entitlement and hence part of the subject matter of Article 8. The distinction between trade and settlement remains fundamental. The rules of this Article on the indirect holding system deal with brokers and other intermediaries as media through which investors hold their financial assets. Brokers are also media through which investors buy and sell their financial assets, but that aspect of their role is not the subject of this Article.
The principal goal of the Article 8 revision project is to provide a satisfactory framework for analysis of the indirect holding system. The technique used in Revised Article 8 is to acknowledge explicitly that the relationship between a securities intermediary and its entitlement holders is sui generis, and to state the applicable commercial law rules directly, rather than by inference from a categorization of the relationship based on legal concepts of a different era. One of the consequences of this drafting technique is that in order to provide content to the concept of security entitlement it becomes necessary to identify the core of the package of rights that make up a security entitlement. Sections 8-504 through 8-508 cover such basic matters as the duty of the securities intermediary to maintain a sufficient quantity of securities to satisfy all of its entitlement holders, the duty of the securities intermediary to pass through to entitlement holder the economic and corporate law rights of ownership of the security, and the duty of the securities intermediary to comply with authorized entitlement orders originated by the entitlement holder. These sections are best thought of as definitional; that is, a relationship which does not include these rights is not the kind of relationship that Revised Article 8 deals with. Because these sections take the form of statements of the duties of an intermediary toward its entitlement holders, one must be careful to avoid a distorted perspective on what Revised Article 8 is and is not designed to do. Revised Article 8 is not, and should not be, a comprehensive body of private law governing the relationship between brokers and their customers, nor a body of regulatory law to police against improper conduct by brokers or other intermediaries. Many, if not most, aspects of the relationship between brokers and customers are governed by the common law of contract and agency, supplemented or supplanted by federal and state regulatory law. Revised Article 8 does not take the place of this body of private and regulatory law. If there are gaps in the regulatory law, they should be dealt with as such; Article 8 is not the place to address them. Article 8 deals with how interests in securities are evidenced and how they are transferred. By way of a rough analogy, one might think of Article 8 as playing the role for the securities markets that real estate recording acts play for the real estate markets. Real estate recording acts do not regulate the conduct of parties to real estate transactions; Article 8 does not regulate the conduct of parties to securities transactions.
C. Application of Revised Articles 8 and 9 to Common Investments and Investment Arrangements
It may aid understanding to sketch briefly the treatment under Revised Articles 8 and 9 of a variety of relatively common products and arrangements.
1. Publicly traded stocks and bonds
"Security" is defined in Revised Section 8-102(a)(15) in substantially the same terms as in the prior version of Article 8. It covers the ordinary publicly traded investment securities, such as corporate stocks and bonds. Parts 2, 3, and 4 govern the interests of persons who hold securities directly, and Part 5 governs the interest of those who hold securities indirectly.
Ordinary publicly traded securities provide a good illustration of the relationship between the direct and indirect holding system rules. The distinction between the direct and indirect holding systems is not an attribute of the securities themselves but of the way in which a particular person holds the securities. Thus, whether one looks to the direct holding system rules of Parts 2, 3, and 4 or the indirect holding system rules of Part 5 will depend on the level in the securities holding system being analyzed.
Consider, for example, corporate stock which is held through a depository, such as DTC. The clearing corporation, or its nominee, is the registered owner of all of the securities it holds on behalf of all of its participants. Thus the rules of Parts 2, 3, and 4 of Revised Article 8 apply to the relationship between the issuer and the clearing corporation. If, as is typically the case today, the securities are still represented by certificates, the clearing corporation will be the holder of the security certificate or certificates representing its total holdings. So far as Article 8 is concerned, the relationship between the issuer and the clearing corporation is no different from the relationship between the issuer and any other registered owner.
The relationship between the clearing corporation and its participants is governed by the indirect holding system rules of Part 5. At that level, the clearing corporation is the securities intermediary and the participant is the entitlement holder. If the participant is itself a securities intermediary, such as a broker holding for its customers or a bank acting as a securities custodian, the Part 5 rules apply to its relationship to its own customers. At that level the broker or bank custodian is the securities intermediary and the customer is the entitlement holder. Note that the broker or bank custodian is both an entitlement holder and a securities intermediary -- but is so with respect to different security entitlements. For purposes of Article 8 analysis, the customer's security entitlement against the broker or bank custodian is a different item of property from the security entitlement of the broker or bank custodian against the clearing corporation.
For investors who hold their securities directly, it makes no difference that some other investors hold their interests indirectly. Many investors today choose to hold their securities directly, becoming the registered owners on the books of the issuer and obtaining certificates registered in their names. For such investors, the addition of the new indirect holding system rules to Article 8 is entirely irrelevant. They will continue to deal directly with the issuers, or their transfer agents, under essentially the same rules as in the prior version of Article 8.
The securities holding options available to investors in a particular form of security may depend on the terms of the security. For example, direct holding is frequently not available for new issues of state and local government bonds. At one time, state and local government bonds were commonly issued in bearer form. Today, however, new issues of state and local government bonds must be in registered form and most are issued in what is known as "book-entry only" form; that is, the issuer specifies that the only person it will directly register as the registered owner is a clearing corporation. Thus, one of the inherent terms of the security is that investors can hold only in the indirect holding system.
2. Treasury securities.
U.S. government securities fall within the definition of security in Article 8 and therefore are governed by Article 8 in the same fashion as any other publicly held debt security, except insofar as Article 8 is preempted by applicable federal law or regulation.
New Treasury securities are no longer issued in certificated form; they can be held only through the book-entry systems established by the Treasury and Federal Reserve Banks. The Treasury offers a book-entry system, known as "Treasury Direct" which enables individual investors to have their positions recorded directly on the books of a Federal Reserve Bank, in a fashion somewhat similar to the uncertificated direct holding system contemplated by the 1978 version of Article 8. The governing law for the Treasury Direct system, however, is set out in the applicable Treasury regulations. The Treasury Direct system is not designed for active trading.
The great bulk of Treasury securities are held not through the Treasury Direct system but through a multi-tiered indirect holding system. The Federal Reserve Banks, acting as fiscal agent for the Treasury, maintain records of the holdings of member banks of the Federal Reserve System, and those banks in turn maintain records showing the extent to which they are holding for themselves or their own customers, including government securities dealers, institutional investors, or smaller banks who in turn may act as custodians for investors. The indirect holding system for Treasury securities was established under federal regulations promulgated in the 1970s. In the 1980s, Treasury released the proposed TRADES regulations that would have established a more comprehensive body of federal commercial law for the Treasury holding system. During the Article 8 revision process, Treasury withdrew these regulations, anticipating that once Revised Article 8 is enacted, it will be possible to base the law for the Treasury system on the new Article 8 rules.
3. Broker-customer relationships
Whether the relationship between a broker and its customer is governed by the Article 8 Part 5 rules depends on the nature of the services that the broker performs for the customer.
Some investors use brokers only to purchase and sell securities. These customers take delivery of certificates representing the securities they purchase and hold them in their own names. When they wish to sell, they deliver the certificates to the brokers. The Article 8 Part 5 rules would not affect such customers, because the Part 5 rules deal with arrangements in which investors hold securities through securities intermediaries. The transaction between the customer and broker might be the traditional agency arrangement in which the broker buys or sells on behalf of the customer as agent for an undisclosed principal, or it might be a dealer transaction in which the "broker" as principal buys from or sells to the customer. In either case, if the customer takes delivery and holds the securities directly, she will become the "purchaser" of a "security" whose interest therein is governed by the rules of Parts 2, 3, and 4 of Article 8. If the customer meets the other requirements of Section 8-303(a), the customer who takes delivery can qualify as a "protected purchaser" who takes free from any adverse claims under Section 8-303(b). The broker's role in such transactions is primarily governed by non-Article 8 law. There are only a few provisions of Article 8 that affect the relationship between the customer and broker in such cases. See Sections 8-108 (broker makes to the customer the warranties of a transferor) and 8-115 (broker not liable in conversion if customer was acting wrongfully against a third party in selling securities).
Many investors use brokers not only to purchase and sell securities, but also as the custodians through whom they hold their securities. The indirect holding system rules of Part 5 apply to the custodial aspect of this relationship. If a customer purchases a security through a broker and directs the broker to hold the security in an account for the customer, the customer will never become a "purchaser" of a "security" whose interest therein is governed by the rules of Parts 2, 3, and 4 of Article 8. Accordingly, the customer does not become a "protected purchaser" under Section 8-303. Rather, the customer becomes an "entitlement holder" who has a "security entitlement" to the security against the broker as "securities intermediary." See Section 8-501. It would make no sense to say that the customer in such a case takes an interest in the security free from all other claims, since the nature of the relationship is that the customer has an interest in common with other customers who hold positions in the same security through the same broker. Section 8-502, however, does protect an entitlement holder against adverse claims, in the sense that once the entitlement holder has acquired the package of rights that comprise a security entitlement no one else can take that package of rights away by arguing that the transaction that resulted in the customer's acquisition of the security entitlement was the traceable product of a transfer or transaction that was wrongful as against the claimant.
4. Bank deposit accounts; brokerage asset management accounts
An ordinary bank deposit account would not fall within the definition of "security" in Section 8-102(a)(15), so the rules of Parts 2, 3, and 4 of Article 8 do not apply to deposit accounts. Nor would the relationship between a bank and its depositors be governed by the rules of Part 5 of Article 8. The Part 5 rules apply to "security entitlements." Section 8-501(b) provides that a person has a security entitlement when a securities intermediary credits a financial asset to the person's "securities account." "Securities account" is defined in Section 8-501(a) as "an account to which a financial asset is or may be credited in accordance with an agreement under which the person maintaining the account undertakes to treat the person for whom the account is maintained as entitled to exercise the rights that comprise the financial asset." The definition of securities account plays a key role in setting the scope of Part 5 of Article 8. A person has a security entitlement governed by Part 5 only if the relationship in question falls within the definition of "securities account." The definition of securities account in Section 8-501(a) excludes deposit accounts from the Part 5 rules of Article 8. One of the basic elements of the relationship between a securities intermediary and an entitlement holder is that the securities intermediary has the duty to hold exactly the quantity of securities that it carries for the account of its customers. See Section 8-504. The assets that a securities intermediary holds for its entitlement holder are not assets that the securities intermediary can use in its own proprietary business. See Section 8-503. A deposit account is an entirely different arrangement. A bank is not required to hold in its vaults or in deposit accounts with other banks a sum of money equal to the claims of all of its depositors. Banks are permitted to use depositors' funds in their ordinary lending business; indeed, that is a primary function of banks. A deposit account, unlike a securities account, is simply a debtor-creditor relationship. Thus a bank or other financial institution maintaining deposit accounts is not covered by Part 5 of Article 8.
Today, it is common for brokers to maintain securities accounts for their customers which include arrangements for the customers to hold liquid "cash" assets in the form of money market mutual fund shares. Insofar as the broker is holding money market mutual fund shares for its customer, the customer has a security entitlement to the money market mutual fund shares. It is also common for brokers to offer their customers an arrangement in which the customer has access to those liquid assets via a deposit account with a bank, whereby shares of the money market fund are redeemed to cover checks drawn on the account. Article 8 applies only to the securities account; the linked bank account remains an account covered by other law. Thus the rights and duties of the customer and the bank are governed not by Article 8, but by the relevant payment system law, such as Article 4 or Article 4A.
5. Trusts
The indirect holding system rules of Part 5 of Article 8 are not intended to govern all relationships in which one person holds securities "on behalf of" another. Rather, the Part 5 rules come into play only if the relationship in question falls within the definition of securities account in Section 8-501(a). The definition of securities account serves the important function of ensuring that ordinary trust arrangements are not inadvertently swept into Part 5 of Article 8. Suppose that Bank serves as trustee of a trust for the benefit of Beneficiary. The corpus of the trust is invested in securities and other financial assets. Although Bank is, in some senses, holding securities for Beneficiary, the arrangement would not fall within the definition of securities account. Bank, as trustee, has not undertaken to treat Beneficiary as entitled to exercise all of the rights that comprise the portfolio securities. For instance, although Beneficiary receives the economic benefit of the portfolio securities, Beneficiary does not have the right to direct dispositions of individual trust assets or to exercise voting or other corporate law rights with respect to the individual securities. Thus Bank's obligations to Beneficiary as trustee are governed by ordinary trust law, not by Part 5 of Article 8. Of course, if Bank, as trustee, holds the securities through an intermediary, Part 5 of Revised Article 8 would govern the relationship between Bank, as entitlement holder, and the intermediary through which Bank holds the securities. It is also possible that a different department of Bank acts as the intermediary through which Bank, as trustee, holds the securities. Bank, qua securities custodian, might be holding securities for a large number of customers, including Bank's own trust department. Insofar as Bank may be regarded as acting in different capacities, Part 5 of Article 8 may be relevant to the relationship between the two sides of Bank's business. However, the relationship between Bank as trustee and the beneficiaries of the trust would remain governed by trust law, not Article 8.
6. Mutual fund shares
Shares of mutual funds are Article 8 securities, whether the fund is organized as a corporation, business trust, or other form of entity. See Sections 8-102(a)(15) and 8-103(b). Mutual funds commonly do not issue certificates. Thus, mutual fund shares are typically uncertificated securities under Article 8.
Although a mutual fund is, in a colloquial sense, holding the portfolio securities on behalf of the fund's shareholders, the indirect holding system rules of Part 5 do not apply to the relationship between the fund and its shareholders. The Part 5 rules apply to "security entitlements." Section 8-501(e) provides that issuance of a security is not establishment of a security entitlement. Thus, because mutual funds shares do fit within the Article 8 definition of security, the relationship between the fund and its shareholders is automatically excluded from the Part 5 rules.
Of course, a person might hold shares in a mutual fund through a brokerage account. Because mutual fund shares are securities, they automatically fall within the broader term "financial asset," so the Part 5 indirect holding system rules apply to mutual fund shares that are held through securities accounts. That is, a person who holds mutual fund shares through a brokerage account could have a security entitlement to the mutual fund shares, just as the person would have a security entitlement to any other security carried in the brokerage account.
7. Stock of closely held corporations
Ordinary corporate stock falls within the Article 8 definition of security, whether or not it is publicly traded. See Sections 8-102(a)(15) and 8-103(a). There is nothing in the new indirect holding system rules of Article 8 that would preclude their application to shares of companies that are not publicly traded. The indirect holding system rules, however, would come into play only if the shares were in fact held through a securities account with a securities intermediary. Since that is typically not the case with respect to shares of closely held corporations, transactions involving those shares will continue to be governed by the traditional rules, as amended, that are set out in Parts 2, 3, and 4 of Article 8, and the corresponding provisions of Article 9. The simplification of the Article 8 rules on uncertificated securities may, however, make the alternative of dispensing with certificates more attractive for closely held corporations.
8. Partnership interests and limited liability company shares
Interests in partnerships or shares of limited liability companies are not Article 8 securities unless they are in fact dealt in or traded on securities exchanges or in securities markets. See Section 8-103(c). The issuers, however, may if they wish explicitly "opt-in" by specifying that the interests or shares are securities governed by Article 8. Even though interests in partnerships or shares of limited liability companies do not generally fall within the category of "security" in Article 8, they would fall within the broader term "financial asset." Accordingly, if such interests are held through a securities account with a securities intermediary, the indirect holding system rules of Part 5 apply, and the interest of a person who holds them through such an account is a security entitlement.
9. Bankers' acceptances, commercial paper, and other money market instruments.
Money market instruments, such as commercial paper, bankers' acceptances, and certificates of deposit, are good examples of a form of property that may fall within the definition of "financial asset," even though they may not fall within the definition of "security." Section 8-103(d) provides that a writing that meets the definition of security certificate under Section 8-102(a)(15) is governed by Article 8, even though it also fits within the definition of "negotiable instrument" in Article 3.
Some forms of short term money market instruments may meet the requirements of an Article 8 security, while others may not. For example, the Article 8 definition of security requires that the obligation be in registered or bearer form. Bankers' acceptances are typically payable "to order," and thus do not qualify as Article 8 securities. Thus, the obligations of the immediate parties to a bankers' acceptance are governed by Article 3, rather than Article 8. That is an entirely appropriate classification, even for those bankers' acceptance that are handled as investment media in the securities markets, because Article 8, unlike Article 3, does not contain rules specifying the standardized obligations of parties to instruments. For example, the Article 3 rules on the obligations of acceptors and drawers of drafts are necessary to specify the obligations represented by bankers' acceptances, but Article 8 contains no provisions dealing with these issues.
Immobilization through a depository system is, however, just as important for money market instruments as for traditional securities. Under the prior version of Article 8, the rules on the depository system, set out in Section 8-320, applied only to Article 8 securities. Although some forms of money market instruments could be fitted within the language of the Article 8 definition of "security," this is not true for bankers' acceptances. Accordingly, it was not thought feasible to make bankers' acceptances eligible for deposit in clearing corporations under the prior version of Article 8. Revised Article 8 solves this problem by separating the coverage of the Part 5 rules from the definition of security. Even though a bankers' acceptance or other money market instrument is an Article 3 negotiable instrument rather than an Article 8 security, it would still fall within the definition of financial asset in Section 8-102(a)(9). Accordingly, if the instrument is held through a clearing corporation or other securities intermediary, the rules of Part 5 of Article 8 apply.
10. Repurchase agreement transactions
Repurchase agreements are an important form of transaction in the securities business, particularly in connection with government securities. Repos and reverse repos can be used for a variety of purposes. The one that is of particular concern for purposes of commercial law rules is the use of repurchase agreements as a form of financing transaction for government securities dealers. Government securities dealers typically obtain intra-day financing from their clearing banks, and then at the end of the trading day seek overnight financing from other sources to repay that day's advances from the clearing bank. Repos are the principal source of this financing. The dealer ("repo seller") sells securities to the financing source ("repo buyer") for cash, and at the same time agrees to repurchase the same or like securities the following day, or at some other brief interval. The sources of the financing include a variety of entities seeking short term investments for surplus cash, such as pension funds, business corporations, money market funds, and banks. The pricing may be computed in various ways, but in essence the price at which the dealer agrees to repurchase the securities exceeds the price paid to the dealer by an amount equivalent to interest on the funds.
The transfer of the securities from a securities dealer as repo seller to a provider of funds as repo buyer can be effected in a variety of ways. The repo buyer might be willing to allow the repo seller to keep the securities "in its hands," relying on the dealer's representation that it will hold them on behalf of the repo buyer. In the jargon of the trade, these are known as "hold-in-custody repos" or "HIC repos." At the other extreme, the repo buyer might insist that the dealer "hand over" the securities so that in the event that the dealer fails and is unable to perform its obligation to repurchase them, the repo buyer will have the securities "in its hands." The jargon for these is "delivered-out repos." A wide variety of arrangements between these two extremes might be devised, in which the securities are "handed over" to a third party with powers concerning their disposition allocated between the repo seller and repo buyer in a variety of ways.
Specification of the rights of repo buyers is complicated by the fact that the transfer of the interest in securities from the repo seller to the repo buyer might be characterized as an outright sale or as the creation of a security interest. Article 8 does not attempt to specify any categorical rules on that issue.
Article 8 sets out rules on the rights of parties who have implemented securities transactions in certain ways. It does not, however, deal with the legal characterization of the transactions that are implemented through the Article 8 mechanisms. Rather, the Article 8 rules apply without regard to the characterization of transactions for other purposes. For example, the Article 8 rules for the direct holding system provide that a person who takes delivery of a duly indorsed security certificate for value and without notice of adverse claims takes free from any adverse claims. That rule applies without regard to the character of the transaction in which the security certificate was delivered. It applies both to delivery upon original issue and to delivery upon transfer. It applies to transfers in settlement of sales and to transfers in pledge. Similarly, the Article 8 indirect holding system rules, such as the adverse claim cut-off rules in Sections 8-502 and 8-510, apply to the transactions that fall within their terms, whether those transactions were sales, secured transactions, or something else.
Repos involve transfers of interests in securities. The Article 8 rules apply to transfers of securities in repos, just as they apply to transfers of securities in any other form of transaction. The transfer of the interest in securities from the repo seller to the repo buyer might be characterized as an outright sale or as the creation of a security interest. Article 8 does not determine that question. The rules of Revised Article 8 have, however, been drafted to minimize the possibility that disputes over the characterization of the transfer in a repo would affect substantive questions that are governed by Article 8. See, e.g., Section 8-510 and Comment 4 thereto.
11. Securities lending transactions
In a typical securities lending transaction, the owner of securities lends them to another person who needs the securities to satisfy a delivery obligation. For example, when a customer of a broker sells a security short, the broker executes an ordinary trade as seller and so must deliver the securities at settlement. The customer is "short" against the broker because the customer has an open obligation to deliver the securities to the broker, which the customer hopes to be able to satisfy by buying in the securities at a lower price. If the short seller's broker does not have the securities in its own inventory, the broker will borrow them from someone else. The securities lender delivers the securities to the borrowing broker, and the borrowing broker becomes contractually obligated to redeliver a like quantity of the same security. Securities borrowers are required to provide collateral, usually government securities, to assure performance of their redelivery obligation.
The securities lender does not retain any property interest in the securities that are delivered to the borrower. The transaction is an outright transfer in which the borrower obtains full title. The whole point of securities lending is that the borrower needs the securities to transfer them to someone else. It would make no sense to say that the lender retains any property interest in the securities it has lent. Accordingly, even if the securities borrower defaults on its redelivery obligation, the securities lender has no property interest in the original securities that could be asserted against any person to whom the securities borrower may have transferred them. One need not look to adverse claim cut-off rules to reach that result; the securities lender never had an adverse claim. The securities borrower's default is no different from any other breach of contract. The securities lender's protection is its right to foreclose on the collateral given to secure the borrower's redelivery obligation. Perhaps the best way to understand securities lending is to note that the word "loan" in securities lending transactions is used in the sense it carries in loans of money, as distinguished from loans of specific identifiable chattels. Someone who lends money does not retain any property interest in the money that is handed over to the borrower. To use civil law terminology, securities lending is mutuum, rather than commodatum. See Story on Bailments, '' 6 and 47.
12. Traded stock options
Stock options issued and cleared through the Options Clearing Corporation ("OCC") are a good example of a form of investment vehicle that is treated as a financial asset to which the Part 5 rules apply, but not as an Article 8 security to which Parts 2, 3, and 4 apply. OCC carries on its books the options positions of the brokerage firms which are clearing members of OCC. The clearing members in turn carry on their books the options positions of their customers. The arrangements are structurally similar to the securities depository system. In the options structure, however, there is no issuer separate from the clearing corporation. The financial assets held through the system are standardized contracts entitling the holder to purchase or sell a certain security at a set price. Rather than being an interest in or obligation of a separate issuer, an option is a contractual right against the counter-party. In order to assure performance of the options, OCC interposes itself as counter-party to each options trade. The rules of Parts 2, 3, and 4 of this Article, however, do not well describe the obligations and rights of OCC. On the other hand, the rules of Part 5, and the related Article 9 rules on security interests and priorities, do provide a workable legal framework for the commercial law analysis of the rights of the participants in the options market. Accordingly, publicly traded securities options are included within the definition of "financial asset," but not "security." See Section 8-103(e). Thus, although OCC would not be an issuer of a security for purposes of this Article, it would be a clearing corporation, against whom its clearing members have security entitlements to the options positions. Similarly, the clearing members' customers have security entitlements against the clearing members. Traded stock options are also a good illustration of the point that the classification issues under Article 8 are very different from classification under other law, such as the federal securities laws. See Section 8-102(d). Stock options are treated as securities for purposes of federal securities laws, but not for purposes of Article 8.
13. Commodity futures
Section 8-103(f) provides that a "commodity contract" is not a security or a financial asset. Section 9-115 defines commodity contract to include commodity futures contracts, commodity options, and options on commodity futures contracts that are traded on or subject to the rules of a board of trade that has been designated as a contract market for that contract pursuant to the federal commodities laws. Thus, commodity contracts themselves are not Article 8 securities to which the rules of Parts 2, 3, and 4 apply, nor is the relationship between a customer and a commodity futures commission merchant governed by the Part 5 rules of Article 8. Commodity contracts, however, are included within the Article 9 definition of "investment property." Thus security interests in commodity positions are governed by essentially the same set of rules as security interests in security entitlements.
14. "Whatever else they have or may devise."
The classification question posed by the above-captioned category of investment products and arrangements is among the most difficult -- and important -- issue raised by the Article 8 revision process. Rapid innovation is perhaps the only constant characteristic of the securities and financial markets. The rules of Revised Article 8 are intended to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate new developments.
A common mechanism by which new financial instruments are devised is that a financial institution that holds some security, financial instrument, or pool thereof, creates interests in that asset or pool which are sold to others. It is not possible to answer in the abstract the question of how such interests are treated under Article 8, because the variety of such products is limited only by human imagination and current regulatory structures. At this general level, however, one can note that there are at least three possible treatments under Article 8 of the relationship between the institution which creates the interests and the persons who hold them. (Again, it must be borne in mind that the Article 8 classification issue may be different from the classification question posed by federal securities law or other regulation.) First, creation of the new interests in the underlying assets may constitute issuance of a new Article 8 security. In that case the relationship between the institution that created the interest and the persons who hold them is not governed by the Part 5 rules, but by the rules of Parts 2, 3, and 4. See Section 8-501(e). That, for example, is the structure of issuance of mutual fund shares. Second, the relationship between the entity creating the interests and those holding them may fit within the Part 5 rules, so that the persons are treating as having security entitlements against the institution with respect to the underlying assets. That, for example, is the structure used for stock options. Third, it may be that the creation of the new interests in the underlying assets does not constitute issuance of a new Article 8 security, nor does the relationship between the entity creating the interests and those holding them fit within the Part 5 rules. In that case, the relationship is governed by other law, as in the case of ordinary trusts.
The first of these three possibilities -- that the creation of the new interest is issuance of a new security for Article 8 purposes -- is a fairly common pattern. For example, an American depositary receipt facility does not maintain securities accounts but issues securities called ADRs in respect of foreign securities deposited in such facility. Similarly, custodians of government securities which issue receipts, certificates, or the like representing direct interests in those securities (sometimes interests split between principal and income) do not maintain securities accounts but issue securities representing those interests. Trusts holding assets, in a variety of structured and securitized transactions, which issue certificates or the like representing "pass-through" or undivided beneficial interests in the trust assets, do not maintain securities accounts but issue securities representing those interests.
In analyzing these classification questions, courts should take care to avoid mechanical jurisprudence based solely upon exegesis of the wording of definitions in Article 8. The result of classification questions is that different sets of rules come into play. In order to decide the classification question it is necessary to understand fully the commercial setting and consider which set of rules best fits the transaction. Rather than letting the choice of rules turn on interpretation of the words of the definitions, the interpretation of the words of the definitions should turn on the suitability of the application of the substantive rules.
IV. CHANGES FROM PRIOR (1978) VERSION OF ARTICLE 8
A. Table of Disposition of Sections in Prior Version
Article 8 (1978) Revised Articles 8 and 9
8-101 8-101
8-102(1)(a) 8-102(a)(4) & (15)
8-102(1)(b) 8-102(a)(15) & (18)
8-102(1)(c) 8-102(a)(15)
8-102(1)(d) 8-102(a)(13)
8-102(1)(e) 8-102(a)(2)
8-102(2) 8-202(b)(1)
8-102(3) 8-102(a)(5)
8-102(4) omitted, see Revision Note 1
8-102(5) 8-102(b)
8-102(6) 8-102(c)
8-103 8-209
8-104 8-210
8-105(1) omitted, see Revision Note 8
8-105(2) omitted, see Revision Note 4
8-105(3) 8-114
8-106 8-110
8-107 omitted, see Revision Note 8
8-108 omitted, see Revision Note 5
8-201 8-201
8-202 8-202; transaction statement provisions
omitted, see Revision Note 4
8-203 8-203
8-204 8-204; transaction statement provisions
omitted, see Revision Note 4
8-205 8-205; transaction statement provisions
omitted, see Revision Note 4
8-206 8-206; transaction statement provisions
omitted, see Revision Note 4
8-207 8-207; registered pledge provisions
omitted, see Revision Note 5
8-208 8-208; transaction statement provisions
omitted, see Revision Note 4
8-301 8-302(a) & (b)
8-302(1) 8-303(a)
8-302(2) 8-102(a)(1)
8-302(3) 8-303(b)
8-302(4) 8-302(c)
8-303 8-102(a)(3)
8-304(1) 8-105(d)
8-304(2) omitted, see Revision Note 4
8-304(3) 8-105(b)
8-305 8-105(c)
8-306(1) 8-108(f)
8-306(2) 8-108(a)
8-306(3) 8-108(g)
8-306(4) 8-108(h)
8-306(5) 8-108(e)
8-306(6) 8-306(h)
8-306(7) 8-108(b), 8-306(h)
8-306(8) omitted, see Revision Note 5
8-306(9) 8-108(c)
8-306(10) 8-108(i)
8-307 8-304(d)
8-308(1) 8-102(a)(11), 8-107
8-308(2) 8-304(a)
8-308(3) 8-304(b)
8-308(4) 8-102(a)(12)
8-308(5) 8-107 & 8-305(a)
8-308(6) 8-107
8-308(7) 8-107
8-308(8) 8-107
8-308(9) 8-304(f) & 8-305(b)
8-308(10) 8-107
8-308(11) 8-107
8-309 8-304(c)
8-310 8-304(e)
8-311(a) omitted, see 8-106(b)(2), 8-301(b)(1), 8-303
8-311(b) 8-404
8-312 8-306
8-313(1)(a) omitted, see Revision Note 2;
see also 8-301(a)(1) & (2)
8-313(1)(b) omitted, see Revision Note 2;
see also 8-301(b)(1) & (2)
8-313(1)(c) omitted, see Revision Note 2;
see also 8-301(a)(3)
8-313(1)(d) omitted, see Revision Note 2;
see also 8-501(b)
8-313(1)(e) omitted, see Revision Note 2;
see also 8-301(a)(2)
8-313(1)(f) omitted, see Revision Note 2;
see also 8-301(b)(2)
8-313(1)(g) omitted, see Revision Notes 1 & 2;
see also 8-501(b), 8-111
8-313(1)(h)-(j) omitted, see Revision Note 2;
see also 9-115 & 9-203
8-313(2) omitted, see Revision Note 2;
see also 8-503
8-313(3) omitted, see Revision Note 2
8-313(4) 8-102(a)(14)
8-314 omitted, see Revision Note 8
8-315 omitted, see Revision Note 8
8-316 8-307
8-317 8-112
8-318 8-115
8-319 omitted, see 8-113 and Revision Note 7
8-320 omitted, see Revision Note 1
8-321 omitted, see 9-115, 9-203
8-401 8-401
8-402 8-402, see Revision Note 6
8-403 8-403, see Revision Note 6
8-404 8-404
8-405(1) 8-406
8-405(2) 8-405(a)
8-405(3) 8-405(b)
8-406 8-407
8-407 omitted, see Revision Note 8
8-408 omitted, see Revision Note 4
B. Revision Notes
1. Provisions of former Article 8 on clearing corporations
The keystone of the treatment of the indirect holding system in the prior version of Article 8 was the special provision on clearing corporations in Section 8-320. Section 8-320 was added to Article 8 in 1962, at the very end of the process that culminated in promulgation and enactment of the original version of the Code. The key concepts of the original version of Article 8 were "bona fide purchaser" and "delivery." Under Section 8-302 (1962) one could qualify as a "bona fide purchaser" only if one had taken delivery of a security, and Section 8-313 (1962) specified what counted as a delivery.
Section 8-320 was added to take account of the development of the system in which trades can be settled by netted book-entry movements at a depository without physical deliveries of certificates. Rather than reworking the basic concepts, however, Section 8-320 brought the depository system within Article 8 by definitional fiat. Subsection (a) of Section 8-320 (1962) stated that a transfer or pledge could be effected by entries on the books of a central depository, and subsection (b) stated that such an entry "has the effect of a delivery of a security in bearer form or duly indorsed in blank." In 1978, Section 8-320 was revised to conform it to the general substitution of the concept of "transfer" for "delivery," but the basic structure remained the same. Under the 1978 version of Article 8, the only book-entry transfers that qualified the transferee for bona fide purchaser rights were those made on the books of a clearing corporation. See Sections 8-302(1)(c), 8-313(1)(g), and 8-320. Thus, for practical purposes, the indirect holding system rules of the prior version of Article 8 required that the securities be held by a clearing corporation in accordance with the central depository rules of Section 8-320.
Some of the definitional provisions concerning clearing corporation in the prior version of Article 8 seem to have conflated the commercial law rules on the effect of book-entry transactions with issues about the regulation of entities that are acting as clearing corporations. For example, the Section 8-320 rules that gave effect to book-entry transfers applied only if the security was "in the custody of the clearing corporation, another clearing corporation, [or] a custodian bank." "Custodian bank" was defined in Section 8-102(4) as "a bank or trust company that is supervised and examined by state or federal authority having supervision over banks and is acting as custodian for a clearing corporation." Although this was probably inadvertent, these definitional provisions have operated as an obstacle to the development of clearing arrangements for global trading, since they effectively precluded clearing corporations from using foreign banks as custodians.
Revised Article 8 is based on the view that Article 8 is not the proper place for regulatory decisions about whether certain sorts of financial institutions should or should not be permitted to engage in a particular aspect of the securities business, such as acting as a clearing corporation, or how they should be permitted to conduct that business. Rather, Article 8 should deal only with the commercial law questions of what duties and rights flow from doing business as a clearing corporation, leaving it to other regulatory law to decide which entities should be permitted to act as clearing corporations, and to regulate their activities. Federal securities laws now establish a detailed regulatory structure for clearing corporations; there is no need for Article 8 to duplicate parts of that structure. Revised Article 8 deletes all provision of the prior version which had the effect of specifying how clearing corporations should conduct their operations. For example, Revised Article 8 deletes the definition of "custodian bank," which operated in the prior version only as a regulatory restriction on how clearing corporations could hold securities.
In general, the structure of Revised Article 8 is such that there is relatively little need for special provisions on clearing corporations. Book-entry transactions effected through clearing corporations are treated under the same rules in Part 5 as book-entry transactions effected through any other securities intermediary. Accordingly, Revised Article 8 has no direct analog of the special provisions in Section 8-320 on transfers on the books of clearing corporations.
2. Former Section 8-313 -- "Transfer."
Section 8-313 of the 1978 version of Article was extremely complicated, because it attempted to cover many different issues. The following account of the evolution of Section 8-313 may assist in understanding why a different approach is taken in Revised Article 8. This explanation is, however, intended not as an actual account of historical events, but as a conceptual reconstruction, devised from the perspective of, and with the benefit of, hindsight.
The original objective of Article 8 was to ensure that certificates representing investment securities would be "negotiable" in the sense that purchasers would be protected by the bona fide purchaser rules. The requirements for bona fide purchaser status were that the purchaser had to (i) take delivery of the security and (ii) give value in good faith and without notice of adverse claims. Section 8-313 specified what counted as a "delivery," and Section 8-302 specified the other requirements.
The 1978 amendments added provisions on uncertificated securities, but the basic organizational pattern was retained. Section 8-302 continued to state the requirements of value, good faith, and lack of notice for good faith purchase, and Section 8-313 stated the mechanism by which the purchase had to be implemented. Delivery as defined in the original version of Section 8-313 had a meaning similar to the concept known in colloquial securities jargon as "good delivery"; that is, physical delivery with any necessary indorsement. Although the word "delivery" has now come to be used in securities parlance in a broader sense than physical delivery, when the provisions for uncertificated securities were added it was thought preferable to use another word. Thus, the word "transfer" was substituted for "delivery" in Section 8-313.
The 1978 amendments also moved the rules governing security interests in securities from Article 9 to Article 8, though the basic conceptual structure of the common law of pledge was retained. Since a pledge required a delivery, and since the term transfer had been substituted for delivery, the 1978 amendments provided that in order to create a security interest there must be a "transfer," in the defined Article 8 sense, from the debtor to the secured party. Accordingly, provisions had to be added to Section 8-313 so that any of the steps that should suffice to create a perfected security interest would be deemed to constitute a "transfer" within the meaning of Section 8-313. Thus, the Section 8-313 rules on "transfer," which had in the previous version dealt only with what counted as a delivery that qualified one for bona fide purchaser status, became the statutory locus for all of the rules on creation and perfection of security interests in securities. Accordingly the rather elaborate rules of subsections (1)(h), (1)(i), and (1)(j) were added.
Having expanded Section 8-313 to the point that it served as the rule specifying the formal requirements for transfer of all significant forms of interests in securities, it must have seemed only logical to take the next step and make the Section 8-313 rules the exclusive means of transferring interests in securities. Thus, while the prior version had stated that "Delivery to a purchaser occurs when ...", the 1978 version stated that "Transfer of a security or a limited interest (including a security interest) therein to a purchaser occurs only ... ." Having taken that step, however, it then became necessary to ensure that anyone who should be regarded as having an interest in a security would be covered by some provision of Section 8-313. Thus, the provisions of subsection (1)(d)(ii) and (iii) were added to make it possible to say that the customers of a securities intermediary who hold interests in securities held by the intermediary in fungible bulk received "transfers."
Section 8-313(1)(d) was the key provision in the 1978 version dealing with the indirect holding system at the level below securities depositories. It operated in essentially the same fashion as Section 8-320; that is, it stated that when a broker or bank holding securities in fungible bulk makes entries on its books identifying a quantity of the fungible bulk as belonging to the customer, that action is treated as a "transfer" -- in the special Section 8-313 sense -- of an interest in the security from the intermediary to the customer.
Revised Article 8 has no direct analog of the 1978 version of Section 8-313. The rules on secured transactions have been returned to Article 9, so subsections of Section 8-313 (1978) dealing with security interests are deleted from Article 8. Insofar as portions of Section 8-313 (1978) were designed to specify the formal requirements for transferees to qualify for protection against adverse claims, their place is taken by Revised Section 8-301, which defines "delivery," in a fashion somewhat akin to the pre-1978 version of Section 8-313. The descendant of the provisions of Section 8-313 (1978) dealing with the indirect holding system is Revised Section 8-501 which specifies when a person acquires a security entitlement. Section 8-501, however, is based on a different analysis of the transaction in which a customer acquires a position in the indirect holding system. The transaction is not described as a "transfer" of an interest in some portion of a fungible bulk of securities held by the securities intermediary but as the creation of a security entitlement. Accordingly, just as Revised Article 8 has no direct analog of the Section 8-320 rules on clearing corporation transfers, it has no direct analog of the Section 8-313(1) rules on "transfers" of interests in securities held in fungible bulk.
3. Uncertificated securities provisions
Given the way that securities holding practices have evolved, the sharp distinction that the 1978 version of Article 8 drew between certificated securities and uncertificated securities has become somewhat misleading. Since many provisions of the 1978 version had separate subsections dealing first with certificated securities and then with uncertificated securities, and since people intuitively realize that the volume of trading in the modern securities markets could not possibly be handled by pushing around certificates, it was only natural for a reader of the statute to conclude that the uncertificated securities provisions of Article 8 were the basis of the book-entry system. That, however, is not the case. Although physical delivery of certificates plays little role in the settlement system, most publicly traded securities are still, in legal theory, certificated securities. To use clearance and settlement jargon, the book-entry securities holding system has used "immobilization" rather than "dematerialization."
The important legal and practical difference is between the direct holding system, in which the beneficial owners have a direct relationship with the issuer, and the indirect holding system, in which securities are held through tiers of securities intermediaries. Accordingly, in Revised Article 8 the contrast between certificated securities and uncertificated securities has been minimized or eliminated as much as possible in stating the substantive provisions.
4. Transaction statements
Although the 1978 provisions on uncertificated securities contemplated a system in which there would be no definitive certificates as reifications of the underlying interests or obligations, the 1978 amendments did not really dispense with all requirements of paper evidence of securities holding. The 1978 amendments required issuers of uncertificated securities to send paper "transaction statements" upon registration of transfer. Section 8-408 regulated the content and format of these transaction statements in considerable detail. The statements had to be in writing, include specific information, and contain a conspicuous legend stating that "This statement is merely a record of the rights of the addressee as of the time of its issuance. Delivery of this statement, of itself, confers no rights on the recipient. This statement is neither a negotiable instrument nor a security." Issuers were required to send statements when any transfer was registered (known as "initial transaction statements") and also were required to send periodic statements at least annually and also upon any security holder's reasonable request. Fees were regulated to some extent, in that Section 8-408(8) specified that if periodic statements were sent at least quarterly, the issuer could charge for statements requested by security holders at other times.
The detailed specification of reporting requirements for issuers of uncertificated securities was quite different from the treatment of securities intermediaries. Though the prior version of Article 8 did require non-clearing corporation securities intermediaries to send confirmations of transfers -- a requirement deleted in Revised Article 8 -- it did not regulate their content or format. Article 8 has never imposed periodic reporting requirements on securities intermediaries. Thus, reporting requirements for the indirect holding system were left to agreements and regulatory authorities, while reporting requirements for a book-entry direct holding system were imposed by statute.
Securities holding systems based on transaction statements of the sort contemplated by the 1978 amendments have not yet evolved to any major extent -- indeed, the statutory specification of the details of the information system may itself have acted as an impediment to the evolution of a book-entry direct system. Accordingly, Revised Article 8 drops the statutory requirements concerning transaction statements. The record keeping and reporting obligations of issuers of uncertificated securities would be left to agreement and other law, as is the case today for securities intermediaries.
In the 1978 version, the Part 2 rules concerning transfer restrictions, issuers' defenses, and the like were based on the assumption that transaction statements would be used in a fashion analogous to traditional security certificates. For example, Sections 8-202 and 8-204 specified that the terms of a security, or any restrictions on transfer imposed by the issuer, had to be noted on the transaction statement. Revised Article 8 deletes all such references to transaction statements. The terms of securities, or of restrictions of transfer, would be governed by whatever law or agreement specifies these matters, just as is the case for various other forms of business entities, such as partnerships, that have never issued certificates representing interests. Other Part 2 rules, such as Sections 8-205, 8-206, and 8-208, attempted to state rules on forgery and related matters for transactions statements. Since Revised Article 8 does not specify the format for information systems for uncertificated securities, there is no point in attempting to state rules on the consequences of wrongful information transmission in the particular format of written statements authenticated by signatures.
5. Deletion of provisions on registered pledges
The 1978 version of Article 8 also added detailed provisions concerning "registered pledges" of uncertificated securities. Revised Article 8 adopts a new system of rules for security interests in securities, for both the direct and indirect holding systems that make it unnecessary to have special statutory provisions for registered pledges of uncertificated securities.
The reason that the 1978 version of Article 8 created this concept was that if the only means of creating security interests was the pledge, it seemed necessary to provide some substitute for the pledge in the absence of a certificate. The point of the registered pledge was, presumably, that it permitted a debtor to grant a perfected security interest in securities, yet still keep the securities in the debtor's own name for purposes of dividends, voting, and the like. The concept of registered pledge has, however, been thought troublesome by many legal commentators and securities industry participants. For example, in Massachusetts where many mutual funds have their headquarters, a non-uniform amendment was enacted to permit the issuer of an uncertificated security to refuse to register a pledge and instead issue a certificate to the owner that the owner could then pledge by ordinary means.
Under the 1978 version of Article 8, if an issuer chose to issue securities in uncertificated form, it was also required by statute to offer a registered pledge program. Revised Articles 8 and 9 take a different approach. All of the provisions dealing with registered pledges have been deleted. This does not mean, however, that issuers cannot offer such a service. The control rules of Revised Section 8-106 and the related priority provisions in Article 9 establish a structure that permits issuers to develop systems akin to the registered pledge device, without mandating that they do so, or legislating the details of the system. In essence, the registered pledge or control device amounts to a record keeping service. A debtor can always transfer securities to its lender. In a registered pledge or control agreement arrangement, the issuer keeps track of which securities the secured party holds for its own account outright, and which securities it holds in pledge from its debtors.
Under the rules of Revised Articles 8 and 9, the registered pledge issue can easily be left to resolution by the market. The concept of control is defined in such fashion that if an issuer or securities intermediary wishes to offer a service akin to the registered pledge device it can do so. The issuer or securities intermediary would offer to enter into agreements with the debtor and secured party under which it would hold the securities for the account of the debtor, but subject to instructions from the secured party. The secured party would thereby obtain control assuring perfection and priority of its lien.
Even if such arrangements are not offered by issuers, persons who hold uncertificated securities will have several options for using them as collateral for secured loans. Under the new rules, filing is a permissible method of perfection, for debtors other than securities firms. A secured party who relies on filing is, of course, exposed to the risk that the debtor will double finance and grant a later secured lender a security interest under circumstances that give that lender control and hence priority. If the lender is unwilling to run that risk, the debtor can transfer the securities outright to the lender on the books of the issuer, though between the parties the debtor would be the owner and the lender only a secured party. That, of course, requires that the debtor trust the secured party not to dispose of the collateral wrongfully, and the debtor may also need to make arrangements with the secured party to exercise benefits of ownership such as voting and receiving distributions.
It may well be that both lenders and borrowers would prefer to have some arrangement, such as the registered pledge device of current law, that permits the debtor to remain as the registered owner entitled to vote and receive dividends but gives the lender exclusive power to order their disposition. The approach taken in this revision is that if there is a genuine demand for such arrangements, it can be met by the market. The difficulty with the approach of present Article 8 is that it mandates that any issuer that wishes to issue securities in uncertificated form must also offer this record keeping service. That obligation may well have acted as a disincentive to the development of uncertificated securities. Thus, the deletion of the mandated registered pledge provisions is consistent with the principle of neutrality toward the evolution of securities holding practices.
6. Former Section 8-403 -- Issuer's Duty as to Adverse Claims
Section 8-403 of the prior version of Article 8 dealt with the obligations of issuers to adverse claimants. The starting point of American law on issuers' liability in such circumstances is the old case of Lowry v. Commercial & Farmers' Bank, 15 F. Cas. 1040 (C.C.D. Md. 1848) (No. 8551), under which issuers could be held liable for registering a transfer at the direction of a registered owner who was acting wrongfully as against a third person in making the transfer. The Lowry principle imposed onerous liability on issuers, particularly in the case of transfers by fiduciaries, such as executors and trustees. To protect against risk of such liability, issuers developed the practice of requiring extensive documentation for fiduciary stock transfers to assure themselves that the fiduciaries were acting rightfully. As a result, fiduciary stock transfers were cumbersome and time consuming.
In the present century, American law has gradually moved away from the Lowry principle. Statutes such as the Uniform Fiduciaries Act, the Model Fiduciary Stock Transfer Act, and the Uniform Act for the Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers sought to avoid the delays in stock transfers that could result from issuers' demands for documentation by limiting the issuer's responsibility for transfers in breach of the registered owner's duty to others. Although these statutes provided that issuers had no duty of inquiry to determine whether a fiduciary was acting rightfully, they all provided that an issuer could be liable if the issuer acted with notice of third party claims.
The prior version of Article 8 followed the same approach as the various fiduciary transfer statutes. Issuers were not required to seek out information from which they could determine whether a fiduciary was acting properly, but they were liable if they registered a transfer with notice that the fiduciary was acting improperly. Former Section 8-308(11) said that the failure of a fiduciary to comply with a controlling instrument or failure to obtain a court approval required under local law did not render the indorsement or instruction unauthorized. However, if a fiduciary was in fact acting improperly, then the beneficiary would be treated as an adverse claimant. See Section 8-302(2) (1978) and Comment 4. Former Section 8-403 specified that if written notice of an adverse claim had been sent to the issuer, the issuer "shall inquire into the adverse claim" before registering a transfer on the indorsement or instruction of the registered owner. The issuer could "discharge any duty of inquiry by any reasonable means," including by notifying the adverse claimant that the transfer would be registered unless the adverse claimant obtained a court order or gave an indemnity bond.
Revised Article 8 rejects the Lowry principle altogether. It provides that an issuer is not liable for wrongful registration if it acts on an effective indorsement or instruction, even though the issuer may have notice of adverse claims, so long as the issuer has not been served with legal process and is not acting in collusion with the wrongdoer in registering the transfer. See Revised Section 8-404 and Comments thereto. The provisions of prior Section 8-403 specifying that issuers had a duty to investigate adverse claims of which they had notice are deleted.
Revised Article 8 also deletes the provisions set out in Section 8-403(3) of prior law specifying that issuers did not have a duty to inquire into the rightfulness of transfers by fiduciaries. The omission of the rules formerly in Section 8-403(3) does not, of course, mean that issuers would be liable for acting on the instruction of fiduciaries in the circumstances covered by former Section 8-403(3). Former Section 8-403(3) assumed that issuers would be liable if they registered a transfer with notice of an adverse claim. Former Section 8-403(3) was necessary only to negate any inference that knowledge that a transfer was initiated by a fiduciary might give constructive notice of adverse claims. Under Section 8-404 of Revised Article 8, mere notice of adverse claims does not impose duties on the issuer. Accordingly the provisions included in former Section 8-403(3) are unnecessary.
Although the prior version of Article 8 included provisions similar or identical to those set out in the Uniform Act for the Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers and similar statutes, most states retained these statutes at the time the Uniform Commercial Code was adopted. These statutes are based on a premise different from Revised Article 8. The fiduciary simplification acts are predicated on the assumption that an issuer would be liable to an adverse claimant if the issuer had notice. These statutes seek only to preclude any inference that issuers have such notice when they register transfers on the instructions of a fiduciary. Revised Article 8 is based on the view that a third party should not be able to interfere with the relationship between an issuer and its registered shareholders unless the claimant obtains legal process. Since notice of an adverse claim does not impose duties on an issuer under Revised Article 8, the Uniform Act for the Simplification of Fiduciary Security Transfers, or similar statutes, should be repealed upon enactment of Revised Article 8.
7. Former Section 8-319 -- Statute of Frauds
Revised Article 8 deletes the special statute of frauds provision for securities contracts that was set out in former Section 8-319. See Revised Section 8-113. Most of the litigation involving the statute of frauds rule of the prior version of Article 8 involved informal transactions, rather than transactions on the organized securities markets. Typical cases were those in which an employee or former employee of a small enterprise sued to enforce an alleged promise that he or she would receive an equity interest in the business. The usual commercial policies relating to writings in contracts for the sale of personal property are at most tangentially implicated in such cases. There was a rather large and complex body of case law dealing with the applicability of Section 8-319 to cases of this sort. It seems doubtful that the cost of litigating these issues was warranted by whatever protections the statute of frauds offered against fraudulent claims.
Subsection (c) of former Section 8-319 provided that the statute of frauds bar did not apply if a written confirmation was sent and the recipient did not seasonably send an objection. That provision, however, presumably would not have had the effect of binding a broker's customer to the terms of a trade for which confirmation had been sent though the customer had not objected within 10 days. In the first place, the relationship between a broker and customer is ordinarily that of agent and principal; thus the broker is not seeking to enforce a contract for sale of a security, but to bind its principal for action taken by the broker as agent. Former Section 8-319 did not by its terms apply to the agency relationship. Moreover, even if former Section 8-319(c) applied, it is doubtful that it, of its own force, had the effect of precluding the customer from disputing whether there was a contract or what the terms of the contract were. Former Section 8-319(c) only removed the statute of frauds as a bar to enforcement; it did not say that there was a contract or that the confirmation had the effect of excluding other evidence of its terms. Thus, deletion of former Section 8-319 does not change the law one way or the other on whether a customer who fails to object to a written confirmation is precluded from denying the trade described in the confirmation, because that issue was never governed by former Section 8-319(c).
8. Miscellaneous
Prior Section 8-105. Revised Article 8 deletes the statement found in Section 8-105(1) of the prior version that certificated securities "are negotiable instruments." This provision was added very late in the drafting process of the original Uniform Commercial Code. Apparently the thought was that it might be useful in dealing with potential transition problems arising out of the fact that bonds were then treated as negotiable instruments under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law. During that era, many other statutes, such as those specifying permissible categories of investments for regulated entities, might have used such phrases as "negotiable securities" or "negotiable instruments." Section 8-105 seems to have been included in the original version of Article 8 to avoid unfortunate interpretations of those other statutes once securities were moved from the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law to UCC Article 8. Whether or not Section 8-105 was necessary at that time, it has surely outlived its purpose. The statement that securities "are negotiable instruments" is very confusing. As used in the Uniform Commercial Code, the term "negotiable instrument" means an instrument that is governed by Article 3; yet Article 8 securities are not governed by Article 3. Courts have occasionally cited Section 8-105(1) of prior law for the proposition that the rules that are generally thought of as characteristic of negotiability, such as the rule that bona fide purchasers take free from adverse claims, apply to certificated securities. Section 8-105(1), however, is unnecessary for that purpose, since the relevant rules are set out in specific provisions of Article 8.
Prior Sections 8-107 and 8-314. Article 8 has never been, and should not be, a comprehensive codification of the law of contracts for the purchase and sale of securities. The prior version of Article 8 did contain, however, a number of provisions dealing with miscellaneous aspects of the law of contracts as applied to contracts for the sale of securities. Section 8-107 dealt with one remedy for breach, and Section 8-314 dealt with certain aspects of performance. Revised Article 8 deletes these on the theory that inclusion of a few sections on issues of contract law is likely to cause more harm than good since inferences might be drawn from the failure to cover related issues. The deletion of these sections is not, however, intended as a rejection of the rules of contract law and interpretation that they expressed.
Prior Section 8-315. It is not entirely clear what the function of Section 8-315 of prior law was. The section specified that the owner of a security could recover it from a person to whom it had been transferred, if the transferee did not qualify as a bona fide purchaser. It seems to have been intended only to recognize that securities, like any other form of personal property, are governed by the general principle of property law that an owner can recover property from a person to whom it has been transferred under circumstances that did not cut off the owner's claim. Although many other Articles of the UCC deal with cut-off rules, Article 8 was the only one that included an affirmative statement of the rights of an owner to recover her property. It seems wiser to adopt the same approach as in Articles 2, 3, 7, and 9, and leave this point to other law. Accordingly, Section 8-315 is deleted in Revised Article 8, without, of course, implying rejection of the nearly self-evident rule that it sought to express.
Prior Section 8-407. This section, entitled "Exchangeability of Securities," seemed to say that holders of securities had the right to cause issuers to convert them back and forth from certificated to uncertificated form. The provision, however, applied only if the issuer "regularly maintains a system for issuing the class of securities involved under which both certificated and uncertificated securities are regularly issued to the category of owners, which includes the person in whose name the new security is to be registered." The provision seems unnecessary, since it applied only if the issuer decided that it should. The matter can be covered by agreement or corporate charter or by-laws.
V. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
On behalf of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute, the Drafting Committee and the Reporter acknowledge with deep appreciation the dedicated and helpful assistance of a great many individuals and organizations. Among the large number of individuals who participated in the development of Revised Article 8, special mention should be made of a few whose contributions were extraordinary.
Preceding the preparation of Revised Article 8, the topic was carefully studied by the Advisory Committee on Settlement of Market Transactions of the American Bar Association Section of Business Law, under the chairmanship of Robert Haydock, Jr., of Boston, MA. Martin Aronstein, of Philadelphia, PA, reporter for the 1977 revision of Article 8, served on the Haydock Committee and continued to advise the Drafting Committee. Robert C. Mendelson, New York, NY, who also served on the Haydock Committee, is chair of the Market Transactions Advisory Committee set up by the Securities and Exchange Commission; Bob Mendelson's considerable contribution to the preparation of Revised Article 8 was most important. Other members of the Haydock Committee had continuing roles either as members of the Drafting Committee or as sources of valuable advice to that committee.
The revision of Article 8 is the culmination of a successful federal-state collaboration among the American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, sponsors of the Uniform Commercial Code, and representatives of the United States Department of the Treasury, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Reserve System, and other federal bodies. The product reflects the assistance of many people, and particularly of Jonathan Kallman and Ari Burstein on behalf of the SEC, Calvin Ninomiya, Cynthia E. Reese, and Virginia S. Rutledge of Treasury, Lawranne Stewart of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Debra W. Cook and MarySue Fisher of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and George Wilder and Carla Behnfeldt of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
Representatives of organizations in the securities and banking industry and their counsel gave generously of their time and knowledge. Special mention should be made of Norman R. Nelson, New York Clearing House, R. May Lee, Public Securities Association, Robert J. Woldow and Karen Saperstein, National Securities Clearing Corporation, Leopold S. Rassnick, Participants Trust Company, Robert Wittie and Patricia Louie, Investment Company Institute, Thomas A. Williams, Richard B. Nesson and Carl Urist, Depository Trust Company, Dennis A. Dutterer, Board of Trade Clearing Corporation, Evalyn Lipton Fishbein, State Street Bank and Trust Company, Robert P. DeGregorie, Chemical Bank, Gail M. Inaba, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, Anthony J. Leitner, Goldman, Sachs & Company, Robert M. MacAllister, The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., Kevin J. Moynihan, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., Lois J. Radisch, J.P. Morgan & Co., James J. Volpe, First Chicago Trust Company of New York, and Richard E. Smith, Securities Transfer Association.
Many lawyers and law professors contributed to the work of the Drafting Committee. Special appreciation is due to Sandra M. Rocks, New York, NY, who participated on behalf of the ABA UCC Investment Securities Subcommittee and ABA Task Force on TRADES Regulations. Others who participated included Steven Harris and James R. McDaniel, Chicago, IL, Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Madison, WI, David M. Huggins and Bradley Y. Smith, New York, NY, David J. Schraa, Brussels, Belgium, and Randall D. Guynn, London, England. The Reporter and Drafting Committee also received assistance from the dedicated work of lawyers, not themselves experts in securities law, who reviewed and commented upon drafts and participated in the revision process through meetings of the Members Consultative Group of the American Law Institute and at various national, state, and local bar association programs.
SECTION 7. Chapter 8, Title 36 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"CHAPTER 8
Investment Securities
Part I
General Provisions
Section 36-8-101. Short title
This chapter may be cited as Uniform Commercial Code--Investment Securities.
Section 36-8-102. Definitions
(a) In this chapter:
(1) 'Adverse claim' means a claim that a claimant has a property interest in a financial asset and that it is a violation of the rights of the claimant for another person to hold, transfer, or deal with the financial asset.
(2) 'Bearer form,' as applied to a certificated security, means a form in which the security is payable to the bearer of the security certificate according to its terms but not by reason of an indorsement.
(3) 'Broker' means a person defined as a broker or dealer under the federal securities laws, but without excluding a bank acting in that capacity.
(4) 'Certificated security' means a security that is represented by a certificate.
(5) 'Clearing corporation' means:
(i) a person that is registered as a 'clearing agency' under the federal securities laws;
(ii) a federal reserve bank; or
(iii) any other person that provides clearance or settlement services with respect to financial assets that would require it to register as a clearing agency under the federal securities laws but for an exclusion or exemption from the registration requirement, if its activities as a clearing corporation, including promulgation of rules, are subject to regulation by a federal or state governmental authority.
(6) 'Communicate' means to:
(i) send a signed writing; or
(ii) transmit information by any mechanism agreed upon by the persons transmitting and receiving the information.
(7) 'Entitlement holder' means a person identified in the records of a securities intermediary as the person having a security entitlement against the securities intermediary. If a person acquires a security entitlement by virtue of Section 36-8-501(b)(2) or (3), that person is the entitlement holder.
(8) 'Entitlement order' means a notification communicated to a securities intermediary directing transfer or redemption of a financial asset to which the entitlement holder has a security entitlement.
(9) 'Financial asset,' except as otherwise provided in Section 36-8-103, means:
(i) a security;
(ii) an obligation of a person or a share, participation, or other interest in a person or in property or an enterprise of a person, which is, or is of a type, dealt in or traded on financial markets, or which is recognized in any area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment; or
(iii) any property that is held by a securities intermediary for another person in a securities account if the securities intermediary has expressly agreed with the other person that the property is to be treated as a financial asset under this chapter.
As context requires, the term means either the interest itself or the means by which a person's claim to it is evidenced, including a certificated or uncertificated security, a security certificate, or a security entitlement.
(10) 'Good faith,' for purposes of the obligation of good faith in the performance or enforcement of contracts or duties within this chapter, means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.
(11) 'Indorsement' means a signature that alone or accompanied by other words is made on a security certificate in registered form or on a separate document for the purpose of assigning, transferring, or redeeming the security or granting a power to assign, transfer, or redeem it.
(12) 'Instruction' means a notification communicated to the issuer of an uncertificated security which directs that the transfer of the security be registered or that the security be redeemed.
(13) 'Registered form,' as applied to a certificated security, means a form in which:
(i) the security certificate specifies a person entitled to the security; and
(ii) a transfer of the security may be registered upon books maintained for that purpose by or on behalf of the issuer, or the security certificate so states.
(14) 'Securities intermediary' means:
(i) a clearing corporation; or
(ii) a person, including a bank or broker, that in the ordinary course of its business maintains securities accounts for others and is acting in that capacity.
(15) 'Security,' except as otherwise provided in Section 36-8-103, means an obligation of an issuer or a share, participation, or other interest in an issuer or in property or an enterprise of an issuer:
(i) which is represented by a security certificate in bearer or registered form, or the transfer of which may be registered upon books maintained for that purpose by or on behalf of the issuer;
(ii) which is one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible into a class or series of shares, participations, interests, or obligations; and
(iii) which:
(A) is, or is of a type, dealt in or traded on securities exchanges or securities markets; or
(B) is a medium for investment and by its terms expressly provides that it is a security governed by this chapter.
(16) 'Security certificate' means a certificate representing a security.
(17) 'Security entitlement' means the rights and property interest of an entitlement holder with respect to a financial asset specified in Part 5.
(18) 'Uncertificated security' means a security that is not represented by a certificate.
(b) Other definitions applying to this chapter and the sections in which they appear are:
Appropriate person Section 36-8-107
Control Section 36-8-106
Delivery Section 36-8-301
Investment company security Section 36-8-103
Issuer Section 36-8-201
Overissue Section 36-8-210
Protected purchaser Section 36-8-303
Securities account Section 36-8-501
(c) In addition, Chapter 1 contains general definitions and principles of construction and interpretation applicable throughout this chapter.
(d) The characterization of a person, business, or transaction for purposes of this chapter does not determine the characterization of the person, business, or transaction for purposes of any other law, regulation, or rule.
Official Comment
1. "Adverse claim." The definition of the term "adverse claim" has two components. First, the term refers only to property interests. Second, the term means not merely that a person has a property interest in a financial asset but that it is a violation of the claimant's property interest for the other person to hold or transfer the security or other financial asset.
The term adverse claim is not, of course, limited to ownership rights, but extends to other property interests established by other law. A security interest, for example, would be an adverse claim with respect to a transferee from the debtor since any effort by the secured party to enforce the security interest against the property would be an interference with the transferee's interest.
The definition of adverse claim in the prior version of Article 8 might have been read to suggest that any wrongful action concerning a security, even a simple breach of contract, gave rise to an adverse claim. Insofar as such cases as Fallon v. Wall Street Clearing Corp., 586 N.Y.S.2d 953, 182 A.D.2d 245, (1992) and Pentech Intl. v. Wall St. Clearing Co., 983 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1993), were based on that view, they are rejected by the new definition which explicitly limits the term adverse claim to property interests. Suppose, for example, that A contracts to sell or deliver securities to B, but fails to do so and instead sells or pledges the securities to C. B, the promisee, has an action against A for breach of contract, but absent unusual circumstances the action for breach would not give rise to a property interest in the securities. Accordingly, B does not have an adverse claim. An adverse claim might, however, be based upon principles of equitable remedies that give rise to property claims. It would, for example, cover a right established by other law to rescind a transaction in which securities were transferred. Suppose, for example, that A holds securities and is induced by B's fraud to transfer them to B. Under the law of contract or restitution, A may have a right to rescind the transfer, which gives A a property claim to the securities. If so, A has an adverse claim to the securities in B's hands. By contrast, if B had committed no fraud, but had merely committed a breach of contract in connection with the transfer from A to B, A may have only a right to damages for breach, not a right to rescind. In that case, A would not have an adverse claim to the securities in B's hands.
2. "Bearer form." The definition of "bearer form" has remained substantially unchanged since the early drafts of the original version of Article 8. The requirement that the certificate be payable to bearer by its terms rather than by an indorsement has the effect of preventing instruments governed by other law, such as chattel paper or Article 3 negotiable instruments, from being inadvertently swept into the Article 8 definition of security merely by virtue of blank indorsements. Although the other elements of the definition of security in Section 8-102(a)(14) probably suffice for that purpose in any event, the language used in the prior version of Article 8 has been retained.
3. "Broker." Broker is defined by reference to the definitions of broker and dealer in the federal securities laws. The only difference is that banks, which are excluded from the federal securities law definition, are included in the Article 8 definition when they perform functions that would bring them within the federal securities law definition if it did not have the clause excluding banks. The definition covers both those who act as agents ("brokers" in securities parlance) and those who act as principals ("dealers" in securities parlance). Since the definition refers to persons "defined" as brokers or dealers under the federal securities law, rather than to persons required to "register" as brokers or dealers under the federal securities law, it covers not only registered brokers and dealers but also those exempt from the registration requirement, such as purely intrastate brokers. The only substantive rules that turn on the defined term broker are one provision of the section on warranties, Section 8-108(i), and the special perfection rule in Article 9 for security interests granted by brokers, Section 9-115(4)(c).
4. "Certificated security." The term "certificated security" means a security that is represented by a security certificate.
5. "Clearing corporation." The definition of clearing corporation limits its application to entities that are subject to a rigorous regulatory framework. Accordingly, the definition includes only federal reserve banks, persons who are registered as "clearing agencies" under the federal securities laws (which impose a comprehensive system of regulation of the activities and rules of clearing agencies), and other entities subject to a comparable system of regulatory oversight.
6. "Communicate." The term "communicate" assures that the Article 8 rules will be sufficiently flexible to adapt to changes in information technology. Sending a signed writing always suffices as a communication, but the parties can agree that a different means of transmitting information is to be used. Agreement is defined in Section 1-201(3) as "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance." Thus, use of an information transmission method might be found to be authorized by agreement, even though the parties have not explicitly so specified in a formal agreement. The term communicate is used in Sections 8-102(a)(7) (definition of entitlement order), 8-102(a)(11) (definition of instruction), and 8-403 (demand that issuer not register transfer).
7. "Entitlement holder." This term designates those who hold financial assets through intermediaries in the indirect holding system. Because many of the rules of Part 5 impose duties on securities intermediaries in favor of entitlement holders, the definition of entitlement holder is, in most cases, limited to the person specifically designated as such on the records of the intermediary. The last sentence of the definition covers the relatively unusual cases where a person may acquire a security entitlement under Section 8-501 even though the person may not be specifically designated as an entitlement holder on the records of the securities intermediary.
A person may have an interest in a security entitlement, and may even have the right to give entitlement orders to the securities intermediary with respect to it, even though the person is not the entitlement holder. For example, a person who holds securities through a securities account in its own name may have given discretionary trading authority to another person, such as an investment adviser. Similarly, the control provisions in Section 8-106 and the related provisions in Article 9 are designed to facilitate transactions in which a person who holds securities through a securities account uses them as collateral in an arrangement where the securities intermediary has agreed that if the secured party so directs the intermediary will dispose of the positions. In such arrangements, the debtor remains the entitlement holder but has agreed that the secured party can initiate entitlement orders. Moreover, an entitlement holder may be acting for another person as a nominee, agent, trustee, or in another capacity. Unless the entitlement holder is itself acting as a securities intermediary for the other person, in which case the other person would be an entitlement holder with respect to the securities entitlement, the relationship between an entitlement holder, and another person for whose benefit the entitlement holder holds a securities entitlement is governed by other law.
8. "Entitlement order." This term is defined as a notification communicated to a securities intermediary directing transfer or redemption of the financial asset to which an entitlement holder has a security entitlement. The term is used in the rules for the indirect holding system in a fashion analogous to the use of the terms "indorsement" and "instruction" in the rules for the direct holding system. If a person directly holds a certificated security in registered form and wishes to transfer it, the means of transfer is an indorsement. If a person directly holds an uncertificated security and wishes to transfer it, the means of transfer is an instruction. If a person holds a security entitlement, the means of disposition is an entitlement order. An entitlement order includes a direction under Section 8-508 to the securities intermediary to transfer a financial asset to the account of the entitlement holder at another financial intermediary or to cause the financial asset to be transferred to the entitlement holder in the direct holding system (e.g., the delivery of a securities certificate registered in the name of the former entitlement holder). As noted in Comment 7, an entitlement order need not be initiated by the entitlement holder in order to be effective, so long as the entitlement holder has authorized the other party to initiate entitlement orders. See Section 8-107(b).
9. "Financial asset." The definition of "financial asset," in conjunction with the definition of "securities account" in Section 8-501, sets the scope of the indirect holding system rules of Part 5 of Revised Article 8. The Part 5 rules apply not only to securities held through intermediaries, but also to other financial assets held through intermediaries. The term financial asset is defined to include not only securities but also a broader category of obligations, shares, participations, and interests.
Having separate definitions of security and financial asset makes it possible to separate the question of the proper scope of the traditional Article 8 rules from the question of the proper scope of the new indirect holding system rules. Some forms of financial assets should be covered by the indirect holding system rules of Part 5, but not by the rules of Parts 2, 3, and 4. The term financial asset is used to cover such property. Because the term security entitlement is defined in terms of financial assets rather than securities, the rules concerning security entitlements set out in Part 5 of Article 8 and in Revised Article 9 apply to the broader class of financial assets.
The fact that something does or could fall within the definition of financial asset does not, without more, trigger Article 8 coverage. The indirect holding system rules of Revised Article 8 apply only if the financial asset is in fact held in a securities account, so that the interest of the person who holds the financial asset through the securities account is a security entitlement. Thus, questions of the scope of the indirect holding system rules cannot be framed as "Is such-and-such a 'financial asset' under Article 8?" Rather, one must analyze whether the relationship between an institution and a person on whose behalf the institution holds an asset falls within the scope of the term securities account as defined in Section 8-501. That question turns in large measure on whether it makes sense to apply the Part 5 rules to the relationship.
The term financial asset is used to refer both to the underlying asset and the particular means by which ownership of that asset is evidenced. Thus, with respect to a certificated security, the term financial asset may, as context requires, refer either to the interest or obligation of the issuer or to the security certificate representing that interest or obligation. Similarly, if a person holds a security or other financial asset through a securities account, the term financial asset may, as context requires, refer either to the underlying asset or to the person's security entitlement.
10. "Good faith." Good faith is defined in Article 8 for purposes of the application to Article 8 of Section 1-203, which provides that "Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." The sole function of the good faith definition in Revised Article 8 is to give content to the Section 1-203 obligation as it applies to contracts and duties that are governed by Article 8. The standard is one of "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." The reference to commercial standards makes clear that assessments of conduct are to be made in light of the commercial setting. The substantive rules of Article 8 have been drafted to take account of the commercial circumstances of the securities holding and processing system. For example, Section 8-115 provides that a securities intermediary acting on an effective entitlement order, or a broker or other agent acting as a conduit in a securities transaction, is not liable to an adverse claimant, unless the claimant obtained legal process or the intermediary acted in collusion with the wrongdoer. This, and other similar provisions, see Sections 8-404 and 8-503(e), do not depend on notice of adverse claims, because it would impair rather than advance the interest of investors in having a sound and efficient securities clearance and settlement system to require intermediaries to investigate the propriety of the transactions they are processing. The good faith obligation does not supplant the standards of conduct established in provisions of this kind.
In Revised Article 8, the definition of good faith is not germane to the question whether a purchaser takes free from adverse claims. The rules on such questions as whether a purchaser who takes in suspicious circumstances is disqualified from protected purchaser status are treated not as an aspect of good faith but directly in the rules of Section 8-105 on notice of adverse claims.
11. "Indorsement" is defined as a signature made on a security certificate or separate document for purposes of transferring or redeeming the security. The definition is adapted from the language of Section 8-308(1) of the prior version and from the definition of indorsement in the Negotiable Instruments Article, see Section 3-204(a). The definition of indorsement does not include the requirement that the signature be made by an appropriate person or be authorized. Those questions are treated in the separate substantive provision on whether the indorsement is effective, rather than in the definition of indorsement. See Section 8-107.
12. "Instruction" is defined as a notification communicated to the issuer of an uncertificated security directing that transfer be registered or that the security be redeemed. Instructions are the analog for uncertificated securities of indorsements of certificated securities.
13. "Registered form." The definition of "registered form" is substantially the same as in the prior version of Article 8. Like the definition of bearer form, it serves primarily to distinguish Article 8 securities from instruments governed by other law, such as Article 3.
14. "Securities intermediary." A "securities intermediary" is a person that in the ordinary course of its business maintains securities accounts for others and is acting in that capacity. The most common examples of securities intermediaries would be clearing corporations holding securities for their participants, banks acting as securities custodians, and brokers holding securities on behalf of their customers. Clearing corporations are listed separately as a category of securities intermediary in subparagraph (i) even though in most circumstances they would fall within the general definition in subparagraph (ii). The reason is to simplify the analysis of arrangements such as the NSCC-DTC system in which NSCC performs the comparison, clearance, and netting function, while DTC acts as the depository. Because NSCC is a registered clearing agency under the federal securities laws, it is a clearing corporation and hence a securities intermediary under Article 8, regardless of whether it is at any particular time or in any particular aspect of its operations holding securities on behalf of its participants.
The terms securities intermediary and broker have different meanings. Broker means a person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities, as agent for others or as principal. Securities intermediary means a person maintaining securities accounts for others. A stockbroker, in the colloquial sense, may or may not be acting as a securities intermediary.
The definition of securities intermediary includes the requirement that the person in question is "acting in the capacity" of maintaining securities accounts for others. This is to take account of the fact that a particular entity, such as a bank, may act in many different capacities in securities transactions. A bank may act as a transfer agent for issuers, as a securities custodian for institutional investors and private investors, as a dealer in government securities, as a lender taking securities as collateral, and as a provider of general payment and collection services that might be used in connection with securities transactions. A bank that maintains securities accounts for its customers would be a securities intermediary with respect to those accounts; but if it takes a pledge of securities from a borrower to secure a loan, it is not thereby acting as a securities intermediary with respect to the pledged securities, since it holds them for its own account rather than for a customer. In other circumstances, those two functions might be combined. For example, if the bank is a government securities dealer it may maintain securities accounts for customers and also provide the customers with margin credit to purchase or carry the securities, in much the same way that brokers provide margin loans to their customers.
15. "Security." The definition of "security" has three components. First, there is the subparagraph (i) test that the interest or obligation be fully transferable, in the sense that the issuer either maintains transfer books or the obligation or interest is represented by a certificate in bearer or registered form. Second, there is the subparagraph (ii) test that the interest or obligation be divisible, that is, one of a class or series, as distinguished from individual obligations of the sort governed by ordinary contract law or by Article 3. Third, there is the subparagraph (iii) functional test, which generally turns on whether the interest or obligation is, or is of a type, dealt in or traded on securities markets or securities exchanges. There is, however, an "opt-in" provision in subparagraph (iii) which permits the issuer of any interest or obligation that is "a medium of investment" to specify that it is a security governed by Article 8.
The divisibility test of subparagraph (ii) applies to the security -- that is, the underlying intangible interest -- not the means by which that interest is evidenced. Thus, securities issued in book-entry only form meet the divisibility test because the underlying intangible interest is divisible via the mechanism of the indirect holding system. This is so even though the clearing corporation is the only eligible direct holder of the security.
The third component, the functional test in subparagraph (iii), provides flexibility while ensuring that the Article 8 rules do not apply to interests or obligations in circumstances so unconnected with the securities markets that parties are unlikely to have thought of the possibility that Article 8 might apply. Subparagraph (iii)(A) covers interests or obligations that either are dealt in or traded on securities exchanges or securities markets, or are of a type dealt in or traded on securities exchanges or securities markets. The "is dealt in or traded on" phrase eliminates problems in the characterization of new forms of securities which are to be traded in the markets, even though no similar type has previously been dealt in or traded in the markets. Subparagraph (iii)(B) covers the broader category of media for investment, but it applies only if the terms of the interest or obligation specify that it is an Article 8 security. This opt-in provision allows for deliberate expansion of the scope of Article 8.
Section 8-103 contains additional rules on the treatment of particular interests as securities or financial assets.
16. "Security certificate." The term "security" refers to the underlying asset, e.g., 1000 shares of common stock of Acme, Inc. The term "security certificate" refers to the paper certificates that have traditionally been used to embody the underlying intangible interest.
17. "Security entitlement" means the rights and property interest of a person who holds securities or other financial assets through a securities intermediary. A security entitlement is both a package of personal rights against the securities intermediary and an interest in the property held by the securities intermediary. A security entitlement is not, however, a specific property interest in any financial asset held by the securities intermediary or by the clearing corporation through which the securities intermediary holds the financial asset. See Sections 8-104(c) and 8-503. The formal definition of security entitlement set out in subsection (a)(17) of this section is a cross-reference to the rules of Part 5. In a sense, then, the entirety of Part 5 is the definition of security entitlement. The Part 5 rules specify the rights and property interest that comprise a security entitlement.
18. "Uncertificated security." The term "uncertificated security" means a security that is not represented by a security certificate. For uncertificated securities, there is no need to draw any distinction between the underlying asset and the means by which a direct holder's interest in that asset is evidenced. Compare "certificated security" and "security certificate."
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This section includes definitions applicable to Article 8 which represent, in many cases, substantial new law when compared to former Section 36-8-102. The provisions of this Section are identical to those of the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-102.
"Adverse claim." Prior law defined this term at Section 36-8-302(2) as including "a claim that a transfer was or would be wrongful or that a particular adverse person is the owner of or has an interest in the security." South Carolina law is changed by narrowing the definition to apply solely to property interests; for example, a breach of contract between a securities intermediary (see Section [8-102(a)(14)]) and its customer ("entitlement holder" -- see Section [8-102(a)(7)]) not involving a property interest in securities might give the customer a cause of action against the intermediary for contract damages, but would not constitute an adverse claim in the securities as against one to whom the intermediary sold the securities. See Official Comment 1 to the present Section. This change is made in the interest of certainty and finality in securities transactions.
When a person has notice of an adverse claim is controlled by rules set out at Section [8-105].
"Bearer form." Prior law defined this term at Section 8-102(1)(e). The wording changes are not intended to make any substantive change from prior law.
"Broker." Prior law defined this term at Section 36-8-303 to be a person in buying and selling securities as a business. The present Section changes South Carolina law by incorporating by reference the federal securities-law definition, minus the latter's carve out for banks. See Official Comment 3 to the present Section. A broker is a type of securities intermediary. See the definition of that term at Section [8-102(a)(14)].
"Certificated security." Prior law defined this term at Section 36-8-102 (c) as part of the general definition of "security." The present Section refers to a separate definition of "security" which is a substantial change in South Carolina law. See Section [8-102(a)(15)] and the Official and South Carolina Reporter's Comments thereto. See also Section [8-102(a)(16)], defining "securities certificate."
"Clearing corporation." Prior law defined this term at Section 36-8-102(3) as, essentially, a corporation registered as a clearing corporation under the federal securities laws or one performing similar functions but exempt from such registration. The present definition is differently worded but to similar effect. The definition is no longer limited to enterprises organized as corporations. A clearing corporation is a type of securities intermediary; see the definition of that term at Section [8-102(a)(14)].
"Communicate." This term was not defined or used in prior Article 8, and has not been a term of art in South Carolina law. It is employed in Article 8 as descriptive of means of notification (in the sense of an intention to change a legal relation) without limiting such means to traditional methods of transmittal. For references to its appearances in the Act, see the Official Comment to this Section.
"Entitlement holder." This term is new and conceptually significant in the context of the indirect holding system described in Part 5 of Article 8. It describes, in effect, a customer of a securities intermediary, such as a broker or clearing corporation, as having rights against the intermediary relating to certain financial assets (defined at Section [8-102(a)(9)]) held in a securities account (defined in Section [8-501]). Such rights are principally described in Part 5 of Article 8.
As used in Article 8 the term reflects the market reality that most "owners" of securities own not the security, but a derivative interest, or bundle of rights, in a fungible mass of securities legally owned by another. More than one layer of entitlement holders may exist between the legal owner of securities and the ultimate entitlement holder. Recognition of such derivative ownership is the core idea of the indirect holding system described in Part 5.
While an entitlement holder is a type of beneficial owner, the term does not, of itself, contemplate a fiduciary relationship between the entitlement holder and either the holder's securities intermediary or the ultimate legal owner. See the definition of "securities intermediary" at Section [8-102(14)].
"Entitlement order." This term is new.
"Financial asset." This term is new. Its underlying concept is that all interests, obligations or property held through securities accounts (defined in Section [8-501]) fall within the scope of Part 5 of Article 8, whether or not they are securities. Securities (defined at Section [8-102(a)(15)]) in the direct holding system are controlled by Parts 2, 3 and 4 of Article 8. Securities in the indirect holding system are financial assets, as are interests, obligations and property which are not securities but are held in securities accounts -- that is to say, in the indirect holding system. The indirect holding system, and financial assets, are controlled by Part 5 of Article 8, which is largely new. Rules for making these distinctions are found at Section [8-103].
"Good faith." This term was not defined in the previous version of Article 8. As the Official Comment to this Section observes, it is defined here to give content in the context of Article 8 to the requirement of good faith established by Section 36-1-203. This definition supplants the general definition of "good faith" found in Section 36-1-201(19) ("honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned"). As the Official Comment explains, a significant intention of this modification is to remove the issue of "suspicion" of adverse claims from good-faith analysis, in the interest of efficiency and finality in securities transactions. Adverse claims are addressed directly in Section [8-105].
"Indorsement." This term was defined similarly in prior law at Section 36-8-308(1). See Section [8-107] concerning effectiveness of indorsements.
"Instruction." This term was defined in prior law at Section 36-8-308(4). The new definition is similar in intent, reflecting, as the Official Comment to this section explains, the uncertificated securities' analog to endorsement. It differs from prior law in (i) reflecting the elimination of the concept of registration of interests in uncertificated securities, and (ii) use of the new concept embodied in the term "communicate." See Section [8-102(a)(6)].
"Registered form." Prior law defined this term at Section 8-102(1)(d). The wording changes are not intended to make any substantive change from prior law.
"Securities intermediary." This term is new. It is extensively discussed in the Official Comment to this Section. It is designed to reflect the market reality that most "owners" of securities do not own the securities, but own a derivative interest, or bundle of rights, in an undivided fungible mass of securities held by a legal owner. The term is meant to be broadly employed to include persons maintaining securities accounts for others in the indirect holding system described in Part 5 of Article 8.
"Security." This term was defined in prior law at Section 36-8-102(1). No substantive changes in the meaning of "security" are intended. In particular, the term, as before, is intended to serve the purposes of Article 8; it is not coextensive with the meaning of "security" for purposes of securities regulation, and is not meant to be applied in that context. See Section [8-102(d)].
In a significant change from former law, the definition no longer establishes the scope of Article 8. Parts 2, 3 and 4 of Article 8 continue to relate only to securities, but part 5, much of which is new, applies to all "financial assets" as defined at Section [8-102(a)(9)]. In addition to the definition of "security" in this Section and the accompanying Official Comment, see Section [8-103].
Limited liability company memberships and ownership interests in partnerships and limited partnerships are not securities under this definition, unless they are dealt in or traded as securities or a securities intermediary has agreed to treat them as securities. Whether or not such interests are securities, they are financial assets if held in a securities account (defined at Section [8-102(a)(9)]. See Section [8-103]. Again, this treatment is not meant to be taken into account for purposes of the securities regulation laws. See Section [8-102(d)].
"Security certificate." This term was included in prior law at Section 36-8-102(1). As under former law, it refers to an instrument which is the physical manifestation of a security. The term "security" appearing by itself refers to the intangible interest defined at Section [8-102(a)(15)] only, and does not contemplate a certificate.
"Security entitlement." This term is new. It is descriptive of that bundle of contract rights and property interests owned by a particular entitlement holder (defined at Section [8-102(a)(7)]) in a particular financial asset (defined at Section [8-102(a)(9)]) held through a securities intermediary (defined at Section [8-102(a)(14)]).
"Uncertificated security." This term was included in prior law at Section 36-8-102(1). As under prior law, the term incorporates "security," now defined at Section [8-102(a)(15)], and the concept of "certificate," now changed to "security certificate," defined at Section [8-102(a)(16)]. No substantive change was intended in the meaning of "uncertificated security," although present law deals with uncertificated securities quite differently than did prior law.
Definitional Cross References
"Agreement" Section 1-201(3)
"Bank" Section 1-201(4)
"Person" Section 1-201(30)
"Send" Section 1-201(38)
"Signed" Section 1-201(39)
"Writing" Section 1-201(46)
Section 36-8-103. Rules for determining whether certain obligations and interests are securities or financial assets
(a) A share or similar equity interest issued by a corporation, business trust, joint stock company, or similar entity is a security.
(b) An 'investment company security' is a security. 'Investment company security' means a share or similar equity interest issued by an entity that is registered as an investment company under the federal investment company laws, an interest in a unit investment trust that is so registered, or a face-amount certificate issued by a face-amount certificate company that is so registered. Investment company security does not include an insurance policy or endowment policy or annuity contract issued by an insurance company.
(c) An interest in a partnership or limited liability company is not a security unless it is dealt in or traded on securities exchanges or in securities markets, its terms expressly provide that it is a security governed by this chapter, or it is an investment company security. However, an interest in a partnership or limited liability company is a financial asset if it is held in a securities account.
(d) A writing that is a security certificate is governed by this chapter and not by Chapter 3, even though it also meets the requirements of that chapter. However, a negotiable instrument governed by Chapter 3 is a financial asset if it is held in a securities account.
(e) An option or similar obligation issued by a clearing corporation to its participants is not a security, but is a financial asset.
(f) A commodity contract, as defined in Section 36-9-102(a)(15), is not a security or a financial asset.
Official Comment
1. This section contains rules that supplement the definitions of "financial asset" and "security" in Section 8-102. The Section 8-102 definitions are worded in general terms, because they must be sufficiently comprehensive and flexible to cover the wide variety of investment products that now exist or may develop. The rules in this section are intended to foreclose interpretive issues concerning the application of the general definitions to several specific investment products. No implication is made about the application of the Section 8-102 definitions to investment products not covered by this section.
2. Subsection (a) establishes an unconditional rule that ordinary corporate stock is a security. That is so whether or not the particular issue is dealt in or traded on securities exchanges or in securities markets. Thus, shares of closely held corporations are Article 8 securities.
3. Subsection (b) establishes that the Article 8 term "security" includes the various forms of the investment vehicles offered to the public by investment companies registered as such under the federal Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended. This clarification is prompted principally by the fact that the typical transaction in shares of open-end investment companies is an issuance or redemption, rather than a transfer of shares from one person to another as is the case with ordinary corporate stock. For similar reasons, the definitions of indorsement, instruction, and entitlement order in Section 8-102 refer to "redemptions" as well as "transfers," to ensure that the Article 8 rules on such matters as signature guaranties, Section 8-306, assurances, Sections 8-402 and 8-507, and effectiveness, Section 8-107, apply to directions to redeem mutual fund shares. The exclusion of insurance products is needed because some insurance company separate accounts are registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, but these are not traded under the usual Article 8 mechanics.
4. Subsection (c) is designed to foreclose interpretive questions that might otherwise be raised by the application of the "of a type" language of Section 8-102(a)(15)(iii) to partnership interests. Subsection (c) establishes the general rule that partnership interests or shares of limited liability companies are not Article 8 securities unless they are in fact dealt in or traded on securities exchanges or in securities markets. The issuer, however, may explicitly "opt-in" by specifying that the interests or shares are securities governed by Article 8. Partnership interests or shares of limited liability companies are included in the broader term "financial asset." Thus, if they are held through a securities account, the indirect holding system rules of Part 5 apply, and the interest of a person who holds them through such an account is a security entitlement.
5. Subsection (d) deals with the line between Article 3 negotiable instruments and Article 8 investment securities. It continues the rule of the prior version of Article 8 that a writing that meets the Article 8 definition is covered by Article 8 rather than Article 3, even though it also meets the definition of negotiable instrument. However, subsection (d) provides that an Article 3 negotiable instrument is a "financial asset" so that the indirect holding system rules apply if the instrument is held through a securities intermediary. This facilitates making items such as money market instruments eligible for deposit in clearing corporations.
6. Subsection (e) is included to clarify the treatment of investment products such as traded stock options, which are treated as financial assets but not securities. Thus, the indirect holding system rules of Part 5 apply, but the direct holding system rules of Parts 2, 3, and 4 do not.
7. Subsection (f) excludes commodity contracts from all of Article 8. However, the Article 9 rules on security interests in investment property do apply to security interests in commodity positions. See Section 9-115 and Comment 8 thereto. "Commodity contract" is defined in Section 9-115.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section clarifies the meaning of "security" with respect to certain interests. It had no counterpart in prior law. The provisions of this Section are identical to those of the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-103. The matters addressed in prior Section 36-8-103 are now addressed in Section [8-209].
Under this Section shares of stock are always securities, as are investment company securities. Limited liability company memberships and partnership ownership interests are not securities unless dealt in or traded as such, or unless the issuer "opts in" to Article 8 pursuant to Section [8-103(c)]. Traded stock options are not securities but are financial assets. Commodities futures contracts are neither securities nor financial assets, by operation of Section [8-103(f)], and thus lie outside Article 8.
Securities held directly are not financial assets and are subject to Parts 2, 3 and 4 of Article 8. Securities in the indirect holding system are financial assets, and subject to Part 5. Non-securities in the indirect holding system are financial assets. Non-securities held otherwise than in a securities account are not governed by Article 8. Clearly, then, investment media classification as securities or financial assets or neither is key to their consequent governance under Parts 2, 3 and 4, or Part 5, or none at all. In the scope note which precedes the Official Text of Article 8, the UCC Reporter cautions courts against "mechanical jurisprudence" in such classification. Rather, according to the Reporter, "the interpretation of the words of the definitions should turn on the suitability of the application of the substantive rules" to the particular investment medium.
Definitional Cross References
"Clearing corporation" Section 8-102(a)(5)
"Commodity contract" Section 9-115
"Financial asset" Section 8-102(a)(9)
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
Section 36-8-104. Acquisition of security or financial asset or interest therein
(a) A person acquires a security or an interest therein, under this chapter, if:
(1) the person is a purchaser to whom a security is delivered pursuant to Section 36-8-301; or
(2) the person acquires a security entitlement to the security pursuant to Section 36-8-501.
(b) A person acquires a financial asset, other than a security, or an interest therein, under this chapter, if the person acquires a security entitlement to the financial asset.
(c) A person who acquires a security entitlement to a security or other financial asset has the rights specified in Part 5, but is a purchaser of any security, security entitlement, or other financial asset held by the securities intermediary only to the extent provided in Section 36-8-503.
(d) Unless the context shows that a different meaning is intended, a person who is required by other law, regulation, rule, or agreement to transfer, deliver, present, surrender, exchange, or otherwise put in the possession of another person a security or financial asset satisfies that requirement by causing the other person to acquire an interest in the security or financial asset pursuant to subsection (a) or (b).
Official Comment
1. This section lists the ways in which interests in securities and other financial assets are acquired under Article 8. In that sense, it describes the scope of Article 8. Subsection (a) describes the two ways that a person may acquire a security or interest therein under this Article: (1) by delivery (Section 8-301), and (2) by acquiring a security entitlement. Each of these methods is described in detail in the relevant substantive provisions of this Article. Part 3, beginning with the definition of "delivery" in Section 8-301, describes how interests in securities are acquired in the direct holding system. Part 5, beginning with the rules of Section 8-501 on how security entitlements are acquired, describes how interests in securities are acquired in the indirect holding system.
Subsection (b) specifies how a person may acquire an interest under Article 8 in a financial asset other than a security. This Article deals with financial assets other than securities only insofar as they are held in the indirect holding system. For example, a bankers' acceptance falls within the definition of "financial asset," so if it is held through a securities account the entitlement holder's right to it is a security entitlement governed by Part 5. The bankers' acceptance itself, however, is a negotiable instrument governed by Article 3, not by Article 8. Thus, the provisions of Parts 2, 3, and 4 of this Article that deal with the rights of direct holders of securities are not applicable. Article 3, not Article 8, specifies how one acquires a direct interest in a bankers' acceptance. If a bankers' acceptance is delivered to a clearing corporation to be held for the account of the clearing corporation's participants, the clearing corporation becomes the holder of the bankers' acceptance under the Article 3 rules specifying how negotiable instruments are transferred. The rights of the clearing corporation's participants, however, are governed by Part 5 of this Article.
2. The distinction in usage in Article 8 between the term "security" (and its correlatives "security certificate" and "uncertificated security") on the one hand, and "security entitlement" on the other, corresponds to the distinction between the direct and indirect holding systems. For example, with respect to certificated securities that can be held either directly or through intermediaries, obtaining possession of a security certificate and acquiring a security entitlement are both means of holding the underlying security. For many other purposes, there is no need to draw a distinction between the means of holding. For purposes of commercial law analysis, however, the form of holding may make a difference. Where an item of property can be held in different ways, the rules on how one deals with it, including how one transfers it or how one grants a security interest in it, differ depending on the form of holding.
Although a security entitlement is means of holding the underlying security or other financial asset, a person who has a security entitlement does not have any direct claim to a specific asset in the possession of the securities intermediary. Subsection (c) provides explicitly that a person who acquires a security entitlement is a "purchaser" of any security, security entitlement, or other financial asset held by the securities intermediary only in the sense that under Section 8-503 a security entitlement is treated as a sui generis form of property interest.
3. Subsection (d) is designed to ensure that parties will retain their expected legal rights and duties under Revised Article 8. One of the major changes made by the revision is that the rules for the indirect holding system are stated in terms of the "security entitlements" held by investors, rather than speaking of them as holding direct interests in securities. Subsection (d) is designed as a translation rule to eliminate problems of co-ordination of terminology, and facilitate the continued use of systems for the efficient handling of securities and financial assets through securities intermediaries and clearing corporations. The efficiencies of a securities intermediary or clearing corporation are, in part, dependent on the ability to transfer securities credited to securities accounts in the intermediary or clearing corporation to the account of an issuer, its agent, or other person by book entry in a manner that permits exchanges, redemptions, conversions, and other transactions (which may be governed by pre-existing or new agreements, constitutional documents, or other instruments) to occur and to avoid the need to withdraw from immobilization in an intermediary or clearing corporation physical securities in order to deliver them for such purposes. Existing corporate charters, indentures and like documents may require the "presentation," "surrender," "delivery," or "transfer" of securities or security certificates for purposes of exchange, redemption, conversion or other reason. Likewise, documents may use a wide variety of terminology to describe, in the context for example of a tender or exchange offer, the means of putting the offeror or the issuer or its agent in possession of the security. Subsection (d) takes the place of provisions of prior law which could be used to reach the legal conclusion that book-entry transfers are equivalent to physical delivery to the person to whose account the book entry is credited.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section had no counterpart in prior versions of Article 8. The provisions of this Section are identical to those of the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-104. The matters addressed by prior Section 36-8-104 are now addressed in Section [8-210].
This Section establishes the structure of Article 8. It uses Article 8's special terminology to describe how a person acquires a security, a financial asset, or an interest in either. In so doing, it draws together many threads, effectively defining the pattern of Article 8 and its core distinction between the direct holding system described in Parts 2, 3 and 4 and the indirect holding system described in Part 5. How a person makes an investment controls the Parts of Article 8 that govern the investment. Thus, acquiring a security pursuant to Section [8-104(a)(1)] implicates the direct holding system. Acquiring an interest in a security through a securities intermediary pursuant to Section [8-104(a)(2)] implicates the indirect holding system. Acquisition of an interest in a non-security through a securities intermediary implicates the indirect holding system, pursuant to Section [8-104(b)]. A non-security which is acquired directly falls outside Article 8.
With respect to financial assets in the indirect holding system, Subsection (c) broadens the general law pertaining to "purchasers" to that described in Section 8-503. That Section provides in effect that entitlement holders -- investors who hold investments through the indirect holding system -- do not have claims against transferees from their securities intermediaries except in unusual circumstances, although they may have a contract action against their financial intermediary.
Subsection (c) changes substantially the prior law of adverse claims, including prior limits on the "holder in due course" concept. It is intended to facilitate transactions, thereby encouraging liquidity and finality in securities transactions. This Subsection should be read together with the definition of "adverse claim" and its Official Comment at Section [8-102(a)(1)], and with Section [8-105] and its Official Comment.
Definitional Cross References
"Delivery" Section 8-301
"Financial asset" Section 8-102(a)(9)
"Person" Section 1-201(30)
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Security entitlement" Section 8-102(a)(17)
Section 36-8-105. Notice of adverse claim
(a) A person has notice of an adverse claim if:
(1) the person knows of the adverse claim;
(2) the person is aware of facts sufficient to indicate that there is a significant probability that the adverse claim exists and deliberately avoids information that would establish the existence of the adverse claim; or
(3) the person has a duty, imposed by statute or regulation, to investigate whether an adverse claim exists, and the investigation so required would establish the existence of the adverse claim.
(b) Having knowledge that a financial asset or interest therein is or has been transferred by a representative imposes no duty of inquiry into the rightfulness of a transaction and is not notice of an adverse claim. However, a person who knows that a representative has transferred a financial asset or interest therein in a transaction that is, or whose proceeds are being used, for the individual benefit of the representative or otherwise in breach of duty has notice of an adverse claim.
(c) An act or event that creates a right to immediate performance of the principal obligation represented by a security certificate or sets a date on or after which the certificate is to be presented or surrendered for redemption or exchange does not itself constitute notice of an adverse claim except in the case of a transfer more than:
(1) one year after a date set for presentment or surrender for redemption or exchange; or
(2) six months after a date set for payment of money against presentation or surrender of the certificate, if money was available for payment on that date.
(d) A purchaser of a certificated security has notice of an adverse claim if the security certificate:
(1) whether in bearer or registered form, has been indorsed 'for collection' or 'for surrender' or for some other purpose not involving transfer; or
(2) is in bearer form and has on it an unambiguous statement that it is the property of a person other than the transferor, but the mere writing of a name on the certificate is not such a statement.
(e) Filing of a financing statement under Chapter 9 is not notice of an adverse claim to a financial asset.
Official Comment
1. The rules specifying whether adverse claims can be asserted against persons who acquire securities or security entitlements, Sections 8-303, 8-502, and 8-510, provide that one is protected against an adverse claim only if one takes without notice of the claim. This section defines notice of an adverse claim.
The general Article 1 definition of "notice" in Section 1-201(25) -- which provides that a person has notice of a fact if "from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know that it exists" -- does not apply to the interpretation of "notice of adverse claims." The Section 1-201(25) definition of "notice" does, however, apply to usages of that term and its cognates in Article 8 in contexts other than notice of adverse claims.
2. This section must be interpreted in light of the definition of "adverse claim" in Section 8-102(a)(1). "Adverse claim" does not include all circumstances in which a third party has a property interest in securities, but only those situations where a security is transferred in violation of the claimant's property interest. Therefore, awareness that someone other than the transferor has a property interest is not notice of an adverse claim. The transferee must be aware that the transfer violates the other party's property interest. If A holds securities in which B has some form of property interest, and A transfers the securities to C, C may know that B has an interest, but infer that A is acting in accordance with A's obligations to B. The mere fact that C knew that B had a property interest does not mean that C had notice of an adverse claim. Whether C had notice of an adverse claim depends on whether C had sufficient awareness that A was acting in violation of B's property rights. The rule in subsection (b) is a particularization of this general principle.
3. Paragraph (a)(1) provides that a person has notice of an adverse claim if the person has knowledge of the adverse claim. Knowledge is defined in Section 1-201(25) as actual knowledge.
4. Paragraph (a)(2) provides that a person has notice of an adverse claim if the person is aware of a significant probability that an adverse claim exists and deliberately avoids information that might establish the existence of the adverse claim. This is intended to codify the "willful blindness" test that has been applied in such cases. See May v. Chapman, 16 M. & W. 355, 153 Eng. Rep. 1225 (1847); Goodman v. Simonds, 61 U.S. 343 (1857).
The first prong of the willful blindness test of paragraph (a)(2) turns on whether the person is aware facts sufficient to indicate that there is a significant probability that an adverse claim exists. The "awareness" aspect necessarily turns on the actor's state of mind. Whether facts known to a person make the person aware of a "significant probability" that an adverse claim exists turns on facts about the world and the conclusions that would be drawn from those facts, taking account of the experience and position of the person in question. A particular set of facts might indicate a significant probability of an adverse claim to a professional with considerable experience in the usual methods and procedures by which securities transactions are conducted, even though the same facts would not indicate a significant probability of an adverse claim to a non-professional.
The second prong of the willful blindness test of paragraph (a)(2) turns on whether the person "deliberately avoids information" that would establish the existence of the adverse claim. The test is the character of the person's response to the information the person has. The question is whether the person deliberately failed to seek further information because of concern that suspicions would be confirmed.
Application of the "deliberate avoidance" test to a transaction by an organization focuses on the knowledge and the actions of the individual or individuals conducting the transaction on behalf of the organization. Thus, an organization that purchases a security is not willfully blind to an adverse claim unless the officers or agents who conducted that purchase transaction are willfully blind to the adverse claim. Under the two prongs of the willful blindness test, the individual or individuals conducting a transaction must know of facts indicating a substantial probability that the adverse claim exists and deliberately fail to seek further information that might confirm or refute the indication. For this purpose, information known to individuals within an organization who are not conducting or aware of a transaction, but not forwarded to the individuals conducting the transaction, is not pertinent in determining whether the individuals conducting the transaction had knowledge of a substantial probability of the existence of the adverse claim. Cf. Section 1-201(27). An organization may also "deliberately avoid information" if it acts to preclude or inhibit transmission of pertinent information to those individuals responsible for the conduct of purchase transactions.
5. Paragraph (a)(3) provides that a person has notice of an adverse claim if the person would have learned of the adverse claim by conducting an investigation that is required by other statute or regulation. This rule applies only if there is some other statute or regulation that explicitly requires persons dealing with securities to conduct some investigation. The federal securities laws require that brokers and banks, in certain specified circumstances, check with a stolen securities registry to determine whether securities offered for sale or pledge have been reported as stolen. If securities that were listed as stolen in the registry are taken by an institution that failed to comply with requirement to check the registry, the institution would be held to have notice of the fact that they were stolen under paragraph (a)(3). Accordingly, the institution could not qualify as a protected purchaser under Section 8-303. The same result has been reached under the prior version of Article 8. See First Nat'l Bank of Cicero v. Lewco Securities, 860 F.2d 1407 (7th Cir. 1988).
6. Subsection (b) provides explicitly for some situations involving purchase from one described or identifiable as a representative. Knowledge of the existence of the representative relation is not enough in itself to constitute "notice of an adverse claim" that would disqualify the purchaser from protected purchaser status. A purchaser may take a security on the inference that the representative is acting properly. Knowledge that a security is being transferred to an individual account of the representative or that the proceeds of the transaction will be paid into that account is not sufficient to constitute "notice of an adverse claim," but knowledge that the proceeds will be applied to the personal indebtedness of the representative is. See State Bank of Binghamton v. Bache, 162 Misc. 128, 293 N.Y.S. 667 (1937).
7. Subsection (c) specifies whether a purchaser of a "stale" security is charged with notice of adverse claims, and therefore disqualified from protected purchaser status under Section 8-303. The fact of "staleness" is viewed as notice of certain defects after the lapse of stated periods, but the maturity of the security does not operate automatically to affect holders' rights. The periods of time here stated are shorter than those appearing in the provisions of this Article on staleness as notice of defects or defenses of an issuer (Section 8-203) since a purchaser who takes a security after funds or other securities are available for its redemption has more reason to suspect claims of ownership than issuer's defenses. An owner will normally turn in a security rather than transfer it at such a time. Of itself, a default never constitutes notice of a possible adverse claim. To provide otherwise would not tend to drive defaulted securities home and would serve only to disrupt current financial markets where many defaulted securities are actively traded. Unpaid or overdue coupons attached to a bond do not bring it within the operation of this subsection, though they may be relevant under the general test of notice of adverse claims in subsection (a).
8. Subsection (d) provides the owner of a certificated security with a means of protection while a security certificate is being sent in for redemption or exchange. The owner may endorse it "for collection" or "for surrender," and this constitutes notice of the owner's claims, under subsection (d).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
Notice of adverse claims was addressed in prior law at Sections 36-8-304 and -305. The Uniform Commercial Code's general rules for charging parties with notice are found at Section 36-1-201(25). The latter is superseded and Section 36-8-304 and -305 are altered and supplemented by the provisions of this Section, which are identical to those of the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-105.
Prior Section 36-8-105(1), with its description of investment securities as "negotiable instruments," has been deleted by the 2000 Revision, with the intention of discarding that description to avoid the confusing impression that investment securities were governed by UCC Article 3.
Prior Section 36-8-105(2), with its reference to "transaction statements," has also been omitted. The 2000 Revision deletes all references to transaction statements (written notifications to holders of uncertificated securities of their rights), a major change from prior law. The record keeping and reporting obligations of issuers of uncertificated securities are left to agreement and other applicable law, such as the securities regulation laws.
The matters addressed in prior Section 36-8-105(3) are now addressed at Section [8-114].
The familiar rules formerly found at Section 36-8-304(1) are now found at Section [8-105(d)]. No change is intended in these rules.
Former Section 36-8-304(2) has been omitted, as have many of the special rules applying to uncertificated securities.
The content of former Section 36-8-304(2) is now found at Section [8-105(b)], translated into the lexicon of the revision.
The content of former Section 36-8-305, "Staleness as notice of adverse claims," is basically unchanged, and is now found at Section 8-105(c).
In the direct holding system, notice of adverse claims is central to the Article 8 concept of "protected purchaser," defined at Section 8-303(a). A protected purchaser acquires its interest free of any adverse claim. One result can be that a protected purchaser acquires greater rights than possessed by the transferor. This result overrules the shelter principle in particular cases. Often given as an example is that a protected purchaser of a security from a thief takes free of the rightful owner's claim.
Notice of adverse claims applies similarly in the indirect holding system in connection with the protection of interests of entitlement holders (see Section [8-502]) and persons who are not entitlement holders but have a property interest in a security entitlement derived from an entitlement holder. Secured lenders would be an example (see Section [8-510(a) and (b)]). Securities intermediaries transferring financial assets pursuant to effective entitlement orders are protected from adverse claimants even if they have notice of adverse claims. See Section [8-115].
Definitional Cross References
"Adverse claim" Section 8-102(a)(1)
"Bearer form" Section 8-102(a)(2)
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Financial asset" Section 8-102(a)(9)
"Knowledge" Section 1-201(25)
"Person" Section 1-201(30)
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Registered form" Section 8-102(a)(13)
"Representative" Section 1-201(35)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
Section 36-8-106. Control
(a) A purchaser has 'control' of a certificated security in bearer form if the certificated security is delivered to the purchaser.
(b) A purchaser has 'control' of a certificated security in registered form if the certificated security is delivered to the purchaser, and:
(1) the certificate is indorsed to the purchaser or in blank by an effective indorsement; or
(2) the certificate is registered in the name of the purchaser, upon original issue or registration of transfer by the issuer.
(c) A purchaser has 'control' of an uncertificated security if:
(1) the uncertificated security is delivered to the purchaser; or
(2) the issuer has agreed that it will comply with instructions originated by the purchaser without further consent by the registered owner.
(d) A purchaser has 'control' of a security entitlement if:
(1) the purchaser becomes the entitlement holder;
(2) the securities intermediary has agreed that it will comply with entitlement orders originated by the purchaser without further consent by the entitlement holder; or
(3) another person has control of the security entitlement on behalf of the purchaser or, having previously acquired control of the security entitlement, acknowledges that it has control on behalf of the purchaser.
(e) If an interest in a security entitlement is granted by the entitlement holder to the entitlement holder's own securities intermediary, the securities intermediary has control.
(f) A purchaser who has satisfied the requirements of subsection (c) or (d) has control, even if the registered owner in the case of subsection (c) or the entitlement holder in the case of subsection (d) retains the right to make substitutions for the uncertificated security or security entitlement, to originate instructions or entitlement orders to the issuer or securities intermediary, or otherwise to deal with the uncertificated security or security entitlement.
(g) An issuer or a securities intermediary may not enter into an agreement of the kind described in subsection (c)(2) or (d)(2) without the consent of the registered owner or entitlement holder, but an issuer or a securities intermediary is not required to enter into such an agreement even though the registered owner or entitlement holder so directs. An issuer or securities intermediary that has entered into such an agreement is not required to confirm the existence of the agreement to another party unless requested to do so by the registered owner or entitlement holder.
Official Comment
1. 1. The concept of "control" plays a key role in various provisions dealing with the rights of purchasers, including secured parties. See Sections 8-303 (protected purchasers); 8-503(e) (purchasers from securities intermediaries); 8-510 (purchasers of security entitlements from entitlement holders); 9-314 (perfection of security interests); 9-328 (priorities among conflicting security interests).
Obtaining "control" means that the purchaser has taken whatever steps are necessary, given the manner in which the securities are held, to place itself in a position where it can have the securities sold, without further action by the owner.
2. Subsection (a) provides that a purchaser obtains "control" with respect to a certificated security in bearer form by taking "delivery," as defined in Section 8-301. Subsection (b) provides that a purchaser obtains "control" with respect to a certificated security in registered form by taking "delivery," as defined in Section 8-301, provided that the security certificate has been indorsed to the purchaser or in blank. Section 8-301 provides that delivery of a certificated security occurs when the purchaser obtains possession of the security certificate, or when an agent for the purchaser (other than a securities intermediary) either acquires possession or acknowledges that the agent holds for the purchaser.
3. Subsection (c) specifies the means by which a purchaser can obtain control over uncertificated securities which the transferor holds directly. Two mechanisms are possible.
Under subsection (c)(1), securities can be "delivered" to a purchaser. Section 8-301(b) provides that "delivery" of an uncertificated security occurs when the purchaser becomes the registered holder. So far as the issuer is concerned, the purchaser would then be entitled to exercise all rights of ownership. See Section 8-207. As between the parties to a purchase transaction, however, the rights of the purchaser are determined by their contract. Cf. Section 9-202. Arrangements covered by this paragraph are analogous to arrangements in which bearer certificates are delivered to a secured party -- so far as the issuer or any other parties are concerned, the secured party appears to be the outright owner, although it is in fact holding as collateral property that belongs to the debtor.
Under subsection (c)(2), a purchaser has control if the issuer has agreed to act on the instructions of the purchaser, even though the owner remains listed as the registered owner. The issuer, of course, would be acting wrongfully against the registered owner if it entered into such an agreement without the consent of the registered owner. Subsection (g) makes this point explicit. The subsection (c)(2) provision makes it possible for issuers to offer a service akin to the registered pledge device of the 1978 version of Article 8, without mandating that all issuers offer that service.
4. Subsection (d) specifies the means by which a purchaser can obtain control of a security entitlement. Three mechanisms are possible, analogous to those provided in subsection (c) for uncertificated securities. Under subsection (d)(1), a purchaser has control if it is the entitlement holder. This subsection would apply whether the purchaser holds through the same intermediary that the debtor used, or has the securities position transferred to its own intermediary.
Subsection (d)(2) provides that a purchaser has control if the securities intermediary has agreed to act on entitlement orders originated by the purchaser if no further consent by the entitlement holder is required. Under subsection (d)(2), control may be achieved even though the original entitlement holder remains as the entitlement holder. Finally, a purchaser may obtain control under subsection (d)(3) if another person has control and the person acknowledges that it has control on the purchaser's behalf. Control under subsection (d)(3) parallels the delivery of certificated securities and uncertificated securities under Section 8-301. Of course, the acknowledging person cannot be the debtor.
This section specifies only the minimum requirements that such an arrangement must meet to confer "control"; the details of the arrangement can be specified by agreement. The arrangement might cover all of the positions in a particular account or subaccount, or only specified positions. There is no requirement that the control party's right to give entitlement orders be exclusive. The arrangement might provide that only the control party can give entitlement orders, or that either the entitlement holder or the control party can give entitlement orders. See subsection (f).
The following examples illustrate the application of subsection (d):
Example 1. Debtor grants Alpha Bank a security interest in a security entitlement that includes 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock that Debtor holds through an account with Able & Co. Alpha Bank also has an account with Able. Debtor instructs Able to transfer the shares to Alpha, and Able does so by crediting the shares to Alpha's account. Alpha has control of the 1000 shares under subsection (d)(1). Although Debtor may have become the beneficial owner of the new securities entitlement, as between Debtor and Alpha, Able has agreed to act on Alpha's entitlement orders because, as between Able and Alpha, Alpha has become the entitlement holder. See Section 8-506.
Example 2. Debtor grants Alpha Bank a security interest in a security entitlement that includes 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock that Debtor holds through an account with Able & Co. Alpha does not have an account with Able. Alpha uses Beta as its securities custodian. Debtor instructs Able to transfer the shares to Beta, for the account of Alpha, and Able does so. Alpha has control of the 1000 shares under subsection (d)(1). As in Example 1, although Debtor may have become the beneficial owner of the new securities entitlement, as between Debtor and Alpha, Beta has agreed to act on Alpha's entitlement orders because, as between Beta and Alpha, Alpha has become the entitlement holder.
Example 3. Debtor grants Alpha Bank a security interest in a security entitlement that includes 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock that Debtor holds through an account with Able & Co. Debtor, Able, and Alpha enter into an agreement under which Debtor will continue to receive dividends and distributions, and will continue to have the right to direct dispositions, but Alpha also has the right to direct dispositions. Alpha has control of the 1000 shares under subsection (d)(2).
Example 4. Able & Co., a securities dealer, grants Alpha Bank a security interest in a security entitlement that includes 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock that Able holds through an account with Clearing Corporation. Able causes Clearing Corporation to transfer the shares into Alpha's account at Clearing Corporation. As in Example 1, Alpha has control of the 1000 shares under subsection (d)(1).
Example 5. Able & Co., a securities dealer, grants Alpha Bank a security interest in a security entitlement that includes 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock that Able holds through an account with Clearing Corporation. Alpha does not have an account with Clearing Corporation. It holds its securities through Beta Bank, which does have an account with Clearing Corporation. Able causes Clearing Corporation to transfer the shares into Beta's account at Clearing Corporation. Beta credits the position to Alpha's account with Beta. As in Example 2, Alpha has control of the 1000 shares under subsection (d)(1).
Example 6. Able & Co. a securities dealer, grants Alpha Bank a security interest in a security entitlement that includes 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock that Able holds through an account with Clearing Corporation. Able causes Clearing Corporation to transfer the shares into a pledge account, pursuant to an agreement under which Able will continue to receive dividends, distributions, and the like, but Alpha has the right to direct dispositions. As in Example 3, Alpha has control of the 1000 shares under subsection (d)(2).
Example 7. Able & Co. a securities dealer, grants Alpha Bank a security interest in a security entitlement that includes 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock that Able holds through an account with Clearing Corporation. Able, Alpha, and Clearing Corporation enter into an agreement under which Clearing Corporation will act on instructions from Alpha with respect to the XYZ Co. stock carried in Able's account, but Able will continue to receive dividends, distributions, and the like, and will also have the right to direct dispositions. As in Example 3, Alpha has control of the 1000 shares under subsection (d)(2).
Example 8. Able & Co. a securities dealer, holds a wide range of securities through its account at Clearing Corporation. Able enters into an arrangement with Alpha Bank pursuant to which Alpha provides financing to Able secured by securities identified as the collateral on lists provided by Able to Alpha on a daily or other periodic basis. Able, Alpha, and Clearing Corporation enter into an agreement under which Clearing Corporation agrees that if at any time Alpha directs Clearing Corporation to do so, Clearing Corporation will transfer any securities from Able's account at Alpha's instructions. Because Clearing Corporation has agreed to act on Alpha's instructions with respect to any securities carried in Able's account, at the moment that Alpha's security interest attaches to securities listed by Able, Alpha obtains control of those securities under subsection (d)(2). There is no requirement that Clearing Corporation be informed of which securities Able has pledged to Alpha.
Example 9. Debtor grants Alpha Bank a security interest in a security entitlement that includes 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock that Debtor holds through an account with Able & Co. Beta Bank agrees with Alpha to act as Alpha's collateral agent with respect to the security entitlement. Debtor, Able, and Beta enter into an agreement under which Debtor will continue to receive dividends and distributions, and will continue to have the right to direct dispositions, but Beta also has the right to direct dispositions. Because Able has agreed that it will comply with entitlement orders originated by Beta without further consent by Debtor. Beta has control of the security entitlement (see Example 3). Because Beta has control on behalf of Alpha, Alpha also has control under subsection (d)(3). It is not necessary for Able to enter into an agreement directly with Alpha or for Able to be aware of Beta's agency relationship with Alpha.
5. For a purchaser to have "control" under subsection (c)(2) or (d)(2), it is essential that the issuer or securities intermediary, as the case may be, actually be a party to the agreement. If a debtor gives a secured party a power of attorney authorizing the secured party to act in the name of the debtor, but the issuer or securities intermediary does not specifically agree to this arrangement, the secured party does not have "control" within the meaning of subsection (c)(2) or (d)(2) because the issuer or securities intermediary is not a party to the agreement. The secured party does not have control under subsection (c)(1) or (d)(1) because, although the power of attorney might give the secured party authority to act on the debtor's behalf as an agent, the secured party has not actually become the registered owner or entitlement holder.
6. Subsection (e) provides that if an interest in a security entitlement is granted by an entitlement holder to the securities intermediary through which the security entitlement is maintained, the securities intermediary has control. A common transaction covered by this provision is a margin loan from a broker to its customer.
7. The term "control" is used in a particular defined sense. The requirements for obtaining control are set out in this section. The concept is not to be interpreted by reference to similar concepts in other bodies of law. In particular, the requirements for "possession" derived from the common law of pledge are not to be used as a basis for interpreting subsection (c)(2) or (d)(2). Those provisions are designed to supplant the concepts of "constructive possession" and the like. A principal purpose of the "control" concept is to eliminate the uncertainty and confusion that results from attempting to apply common law possession concepts to modern securities holding practices.
The key to the control concept is that the purchaser has the ability to have the securities sold or transferred without further action by the transferor. There is no requirement that the powers held by the purchaser be exclusive. For example, in a secured lending arrangement, if the secured party wishes, it can allow the debtor to retain the right to make substitutions to direct the disposition of the uncertificated security or security entitlement, or otherwise to give instructions or entitlement orders. (As explained in Section 8-102, Comment 8, an entitlement order includes a direction under Section 8-508 to the securities intermediary to transfer a financial asset to the account of the entitlement holder at another financial intermediary or to cause the financial asset to be transferred to the entitlement holder in the direct holding system (e.g., by delivery of a securities certificate registered in the name of the former entitlement holder).) Subsection (f) is included to make clear the general point stated in subsections (c) and (d) that the test of control is whether the purchaser has obtained the requisite power, not whether the debtor has retained other powers. There is no implication that retention by the debtor of powers other than those mentioned in subsection (f) is inconsistent with the purchaser having control. Nor is there a requirement that the purchaser's powers be unconditional, provided that further consent of the entitlement holder is not a condition.
Example 10. Debtor grants to Alpha Bank and to Beta Bank a security interest in a security entitlement that includes 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock that Debtor holds through an account with Able & Co. By agreement among the parties, Alpha's security interest is senior and Beta's is junior. Able agrees to act on the entitlement orders of either Alpha or Beta. Alpha and Beta each has control under subsection (d)(2). Moreover, Beta has control notwithstanding a term of Able's agreement to the effect that Able's obligation to act on Beta's entitlement orders is conditioned on the Alpha's consent. The crucial distinction is that Able's agreement to act on Beta's entitlement orders is not conditioned on Debtor's further consent.
Example 11. Debtor grants to Alpha Bank a security interest in a security entitlement that includes 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock that Debtor holds thought an account with Able & Co. Able agrees to act on the entitlement orders of Alpha, but Alpha's right to give entitlement orders to the securities intermediary is conditioned on the Debtor's default. Alternatively, Alpha's right to give entitlement orders is conditioned upon Alpha's statement to Able that Debtor is in default. Because Able's agreement to act on Beta's entitlement orders is not conditioned on Debtor's further consent, Alpha has control of the securities entitlement under either alternative.
In many situations, it will be better practice for both the securities intermediary and the purchaser to insist that any conditions relating in any way to the entitlement holder be effective only as between the purchaser and the entitlement holder. That practice would avoid the risk that the securities intermediary could be caught between conflicting assertions of the entitlement holder and the purchaser as to whether the conditions in fact have been met. Nonetheless, the existence of unfulfilled conditions effective against the intermediary would not preclude the purchaser from having control.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section had no counterpart in prior law. Its provisions are identical to those of the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-106. The matters addressed in prior Section 36-8-106 are now addressed at Section [8-110].
As indicated in the Official Comment, "control" is a key concept in Article 8, acting as an essential component of such concepts as "protected purchaser" and playing a central role in the perfection of security interests. A person with "control" has done all that is necessary to be in a position to make a disposition of a security or security entitlement without further action of the transferor. For example, a secured party has acquired control of a security when it is able to liquidate the security without action of the debtor. The requirements to achieve control vary according to the investment interest, as described in this Section. All such requirements proceed by analogy to possession of a bearer certificate; indeed, the concept of "control" is simply a set of analogues to such possession, each analogue conveying analogous powers.
As indicated in Official Comment 7 to this Section, control is to be used in the sense defined here, and subsumes other usages and other similar concepts, such as common-law "possession."
Definitional Cross References
"Bearer form" Section 8-102(a)(2)
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Delivery" Section 8-301
"Effective" Section 8-107
"Entitlement holder" Section 8-102(a)(7)
"Entitlement order" Section 8-102(a)(8)
"Indorsement" Section 8-102(a)(11)
"Instruction" Section 8-102(a)(12)
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Registered form" Section 8-102(a)(13)
"Securities intermediary" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Security entitlement" Section 8-102(a)(17)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
Section 36-8-107. Whether indorsement, instruction, or entitlement order is effective
(a) 'Appropriate person' means:
(1) with respect to an indorsement, the person specified by a security certificate or by an effective special indorsement to be entitled to the security;
(2) with respect to an instruction, the registered owner of an uncertificated security;
(3) with respect to an entitlement order, the entitlement holder;
(4) if the person designated in item (1), (2), or (3) is deceased, the designated person's successor taking under other law or the designated person's personal representative acting for the estate of the decedent; or
(5) if the person designated in item (1), (2), or (3) lacks capacity, the designated person's guardian, conservator, or other similar representative who has power under other law to transfer the security or financial asset.
(b) An indorsement, instruction, or entitlement order is effective if:
(1) it is made by the appropriate person;
(2) it is made by a person who has power under the law of agency to transfer the security or financial asset on behalf of the appropriate person, including, in the case of an instruction or entitlement order, a person who has control under Section 36-8-106(c)(2) or (d)(2); or
(3) the appropriate person has ratified it or is otherwise precluded from asserting its ineffectiveness.
(c) An indorsement, instruction, or entitlement order made by a representative is effective even if:
(1) the representative has failed to comply with a controlling instrument or with the law of the State having jurisdiction of the representative relationship, including any law requiring the representative to obtain court approval of the transaction; or
(2) the representative's action in making the indorsement, instruction, or entitlement order or using the proceeds of the transaction is otherwise a breach of duty.
(d) If a security is registered in the name of or specially indorsed to a person described as a representative, or if a securities account is maintained in the name of a person described as a representative, an indorsement, instruction, or entitlement order made by the person is effective even though the person is no longer serving in the described capacity.
(e) Effectiveness of an indorsement, instruction, or entitlement order is determined as of the date the indorsement, instruction, or entitlement order is made, and an indorsement, instruction, or entitlement order does not become ineffective by reason of any later change of circumstances.
Official Comment
1. This section defines two concepts, "appropriate person" and "effective." Effectiveness is a broader concept than appropriate person. For example, if a security or securities account is registered in the name of Mary Roe, Mary Roe is the "appropriate person," but an indorsement, instruction, or entitlement order made by John Doe is "effective" if, under agency or other law, Mary Roe is precluded from denying Doe's authority. Treating these two concepts separately facilitates statement of the rules of Article 8 that state the legal effect of an indorsement, instruction, or entitlement order. For example, a securities intermediary is protected against liability if it acts on an effective entitlement order, but has a duty to comply with an entitlement order only if it is originated by an appropriate person. See Sections 8-115 and 8-507.
One important application of the "effectiveness" concept is in the direct holding system rules on the rights of purchasers. A purchaser of a certificated security in registered form can qualify as a protected purchaser who takes free from adverse claims under Section 8-303 only if the purchaser obtains "control." Section 8-106 provides that a purchaser of a certificated security in registered form obtains control if there has been an "effective" indorsement.
2. Subsection (a) provides that the term "appropriate person" covers two categories: (1) the person who is actually designated as the person entitled to the security or security entitlement, and (2) the successor or legal representative of that person if that person has died or otherwise lacks capacity. Other law determines who has power to transfer a security on behalf of a person who lacks capacity. For example, if securities are registered in the name of more than one person and one of the designated persons dies, whether the survivor is the appropriate person depends on the form of tenancy. If the two were registered joint tenants with right of survivorship, the survivor would have that power under other law and thus would be the "appropriate person." If securities are registered in the name of an individual and the individual dies, the law of decedents' estates determines who has power to transfer the decedent's securities. That would ordinarily be the executor or administrator, but if a "small estate statute" permits a widow to transfer a decedent's securities without administration proceedings, she would be the appropriate person. If the registration of a security or a securities account contains a designation of a death beneficiary under the Uniform Transfer on Death Security Registration Act or comparable legislation, the designated beneficiary would, under that law, have power to transfer upon the person's death and so would be the appropriate person. Article 8 does not contain a list of such representatives, because any list is likely to become outdated by developments in other law.
3. Subsection (b) sets out the general rule that an indorsement, instruction, or entitlement order is effective if it is made by the appropriate person or by a person who has power to transfer under agency law or if the appropriate person is precluded from denying its effectiveness. The control rules in Section 8-106 provide for arrangements where a person who holds securities through a securities intermediary, or holds uncertificated securities directly, enters into a control agreement giving the secured party the right to initiate entitlement orders of instructions. Paragraph 2 of subsection (b) states explicitly that an entitlement order or instruction initiated by a person who has obtained such a control agreement is "effective."
Subsections (c), (d), and (e) supplement the general rule of subsection (b) on effectiveness. The term "representative," used in subsections (c) and (d), is defined in Section 1-201(35).
4. Subsection (c) provides that an indorsement, instruction, or entitlement order made by a representative is effective even though the representative's action is a violation of duties. The following example illustrates this subsection:
Example 1. Certificated securities are registered in the name of John Doe. Doe dies and Mary Roe is appointed executor. Roe indorses the security certificate and transfers it to a purchaser in a transaction that is a violation of her duties as executor.
Roe's indorsement is effective, because Roe is the appropriate person under subsection (a)(4). This is so even though Roe's transfer violated her obligations as executor. The policies of free transferability of securities that underlie Article 8 dictate that neither a purchaser to whom Roe transfers the securities nor the issuer who registers transfer should be required to investigate the terms of the will to determine whether Roe is acting properly. Although Roe's indorsement is effective under this section, her breach of duty may be such that her beneficiary has an adverse claim to the securities that Roe transferred. The question whether that adverse claim can be asserted against purchasers is governed not by this section but by Section 8-303. Under Section 8-404, the issuer has no duties to an adverse claimant unless the claimant obtains legal process enjoining the issuer from registering transfer.
5. Subsection (d) deals with cases where a security or a securities account is registered in the name of a person specifically designated as a representative. The following example illustrates this subsection:
Example 2. Certificated securities are registered in the name of "John Jones, trustee of the Smith Family Trust." John Jones is removed as trustee and Martha Moe is appointed successor trustee. The securities, however, are not reregistered, but remain registered in the name of "John Jones, trustee of the Smith Family Trust." Jones indorses the security certificate and transfers it to a purchaser.
Subsection (d) provides that an indorsement by John Jones as trustee is effective even though Jones is no longer serving in that capacity. Since the securities were registered in the name of "John Jones, trustee of the Smith Family Trust," a purchaser, or the issuer when called upon to register transfer, should be entitled to assume without further inquiry that Jones has the power to act as trustee for the Smith Family Trust.
Note that subsection (d) does not apply to a case where the security or securities account is registered in the name of principal rather than the representative as such. The following example illustrates this point:
Example 3. Certificated securities are registered in the name of John Doe. John Doe dies and Mary Roe is appointed executor. The securities are not reregistered in the name of Mary Roe as executor. Later, Mary Roe is removed as executor and Martha Moe is appointed as her successor. After being removed, Mary Roe indorses the security certificate that is registered in the name of John Doe and transfers it to a purchaser.
Mary Roe's indorsement is not made effective by subsection (d), because the securities were not registered in the name of Mary Roe as representative. A purchaser or the issuer registering transfer should be required to determine whether Roe has power to act for John Doe. Purchasers and issuers can protect themselves in such cases by requiring signature guaranties. See Section 8-306.
6. Subsection (e) provides that the effectiveness of an indorsement, instruction, or entitlement order is determined as of the date it is made. The following example illustrates this subsection:
Example 4. Certificated securities are registered in the name of John Doe. John Doe dies and Mary Roe is appointed executor. Mary Roe indorses the security certificate that is registered in the name of John Doe and transfers it to a purchaser. After the indorsement and transfer, but before the security certificate is presented to the issuer for registration of transfer, Mary Roe is removed as executor and Martha Moe is appointed as her successor.
Mary Roe's indorsement is effective, because at the time Roe indorsed she was the appropriate person under subsection (a)(4). Her later removal as executor does not render the indorsement ineffective. Accordingly, the issuer would not be liable for registering the transfer. See Section 8-404.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section includes much of the content of prior Section 36-8-308. Its provisions are identical to those of the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-107.
Prior Section 36-8-107, concerning a remedy for breach of contract, has been deleted to avoid any inferences which might be drawn from the presence in Article 8 of certain contract rules and the absence of others. The deletion of the subject matter of prior Section 36-8-107 is not intended as a rejection of the rules therein expressed.
Prior law addressed endorsements and instructions at Section 36-8-308. The matters dealt with by that Section are now found in this Section and in Sections [8-102(a)(11)] (definition of "indorsement"), [8-102(a)(12)] (definition of "instruction"), [8-304(a), (b) and (f)] (types of indorsement and effects), and [8-305(a) and (b)] (effect of instructions). This Section includes the content of former Sections 36-8-308(1), (5), (6), (7), (8), (10) and (11). The principal function of this Section is to describe the ramifications of "appropriate person" and "effective." These concepts are central in determining when one dealing with a security holder or entitlement owner is required to act on instructions and when third parties are entitled to rely on instructions.
Subsection (a), which defines "appropriate person," is largely unchanged from prior law, except for the introduction of the concept of the "entitlement holder," which, in combination with the concept of "control," subsumes the former references to registered pledgees. See Official Comment 3 to this Section.
Subsection (b) does not change prior law, although the reference to the common law of agency, implicit in prior law, is codified here.
Subsections (c) through (e) are similar to prior law, although they effectively clarify the protection of issuers and intermediaries from liability in reliance on appropriate persons. (Note that "representative" as used in these subsections is broadly defined at Section 36-1-201(35) as any person empowered to act for another). This protection reflects the policy of revised Article 8 to enhance liquidity and finality in securities transactions.
Definitional Cross References
"Entitlement order" Section 8-102(a)(8)
"Financial asset" Section 8-102(a)(9)
"Indorsement" Section 8-102(a)(11)
"Instruction" Section 8-102(a)(12)
"Representative" Section 1-201(35)
"Securities account" Section 8-501
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
"Security entitlement" Section 8-102(a)(17)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
Section 36-8-108. Warranties in direct holding
(a) A person who transfers a certificated security to a purchaser for value warrants to the purchaser, and an indorser, if the transfer is by indorsement, warrants to any subsequent purchaser, that:
(1) the certificate is genuine and has not been materially altered;
(2) the transferor or indorser does not know of any fact that might impair the validity of the security;
(3) there is no adverse claim to the security;
(4) the transfer does not violate any restriction on transfer;
(5) if the transfer is by indorsement, the indorsement is made by an appropriate person, or if the indorsement is by an agent, the agent has actual authority to act on behalf of the appropriate person; and
(6) the transfer is otherwise effective and rightful.
(b) A person who originates an instruction for registration of transfer of an uncertificated security to a purchaser for value warrants to the purchaser that:
(1) the instruction is made by an appropriate person, or if the instruction is by an agent, the agent has actual authority to act on behalf of the appropriate person;
(2) the security is valid;
(3) there is no adverse claim to the security; and
(4) at the time the instruction is presented to the issuer:
(i) the purchaser will be entitled to the registration of transfer;
(ii) the transfer will be registered by the issuer free from all liens, security interests, restrictions, and claims other than those specified in the instruction;
(iii) the transfer will not violate any restriction on transfer; and
(iv) the requested transfer will otherwise be effective and rightful.
(c) A person who transfers an uncertificated security to a purchaser for value and does not originate an instruction in connection with the transfer warrants that:
(1) the uncertificated security is valid;
(2) there is no adverse claim to the security;
(3) the transfer does not violate any restriction on transfer; and
(4) the transfer is otherwise effective and rightful.
(d) A person who indorses a security certificate warrants to the issuer that:
(1) there is no adverse claim to the security; and
(2) the indorsement is effective.
(e) A person who originates an instruction for registration of transfer of an uncertificated security warrants to the issuer that:
(1) the instruction is effective; and
(2) at the time the instruction is presented to the issuer the purchaser will be entitled to the registration of transfer.
(f) A person who presents a certificated security for registration of transfer or for payment or exchange warrants to the issuer that the person is entitled to the registration, payment, or exchange, but a purchaser for value and without notice of adverse claims to whom transfer is registered warrants only that the person has no knowledge of any unauthorized signature in a necessary indorsement.
(g) If a person acts as agent of another in delivering a certificated security to a purchaser, the identity of the principal was known to the person to whom the certificate was delivered, and the certificate delivered by the agent was received by the agent from the principal or received by the agent from another person at the direction of the principal, the person delivering the security certificate warrants only that the delivering person has authority to act for the principal and does not know of any adverse claim to the certificated security.
(h) A secured party who redelivers a security certificate received, or after payment and on order of the debtor delivers the security certificate to another person, makes only the warranties of an agent under subsection (g).
(i) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g), a broker acting for a customer makes to the issuer and a purchaser the warranties provided in subsections (a) through (f). A broker that delivers a security certificate to its customer, or causes its customer to be registered as the owner of an uncertificated security, makes to the customer the warranties provided in subsection (a) or (b), and has the rights and privileges of a purchaser under this section. The warranties of and in favor of the broker acting as an agent are in addition to applicable warranties given by and in favor of the customer.
Official Comment
1. Subsections (a), (b), and (c) deal with warranties by security transferors to purchasers. Subsections (d) and (e) deal with warranties by security transferors to issuers. Subsection (f) deals with presentment warranties.
2. Subsection (a) specifies the warranties made by a person who transfers a certificated security to a purchaser for value. Paragraphs (3), (4), and (5) make explicit several key points that are implicit in the general warranty of paragraph (6) that the transfer is effective and rightful. Subsection (b) sets forth the warranties made to a purchaser for value by one who originates an instruction. These warranties are quite similar to those made by one transferring a certificated security, subsection (a), the principal difference being the absolute warranty of validity. If upon receipt of the instruction the issuer should dispute the validity of the security, the burden of proving validity is upon the transferor. Subsection (c) provides for the limited circumstances in which an uncertificated security could be transferred without an instruction, see Section 8-301(b)(2). Subsections (d) and (e) give the issuer the benefit of the warranties of an indorser or originator on those matters not within the issuer's knowledge.
3. Subsection (f) limits the warranties made by a purchaser for value without notice whose presentation of a security certificate is defective in some way but to whom the issuer does register transfer. The effect is to deny the issuer a remedy against such a person unless at the time of presentment the person had knowledge of an unauthorized signature in a necessary indorsement. The issuer can protect itself by refusing to make the transfer or, if it registers the transfer before it discovers the defect, by pursuing its remedy against a signature guarantor.
4. Subsection (g) eliminates all substantive warranties in the relatively unusual case of a delivery of certificated security by an agent of a disclosed principal where the agent delivers the exact certificate that it received from or for the principal. Subsection (h) limits the warranties given by a secured party who redelivers a certificate. Subsection (i) specifies the warranties of brokers in the more common scenarios.
5. Under Section 1-102(3) the warranty provisions apply "unless otherwise agreed" and the parties may enter into express agreements to allocate the risks of possible defects. Usual estoppel principles apply with respect to transfers of both certificated and uncertificated securities whenever the purchaser has knowledge of the defect, and these warranties will not be breached in such a case.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section includes much of the content of prior Section 36-8-306. Its provisions are identical to those of the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-108.
Former Section 36-8-108 addressed registered pledges of uncertificated securities. Such pledges have been deleted as a mandatory provision of Article 8. Issuers of uncertificated securities could offer such a service as a matter of agreement. Otherwise, under the rules of the 2000 Revision pledges of uncertificated securities can be perfected by filing, by substitution of the lender as the registered holder, or through the control principle. Generally speaking, secured transaction matters are moved to Article 9 by the 2000 Revision.
This Section and Section [8-109] divide warranties into two categories: warranties in the direct holding system, found in this Section, and warranties in the indirect holding system, found in Section [8-109]. This Section in turn addresses warranties as to certificated securities in subsection (a) and as to uncertificated securities in subsection (b). The balance of this Section addresses warranties as to investments moving between the two holding systems.
The warranties addressed by this Section draw their meanings largely from defined terms. For example, "adverse claim," a key concept in this Section, is defined differently than in former law. See Section [8-102(a)(1)].
Former Section 36-8-306(8), concerning pledges, has been omitted from the present Section. As noted above, material relating to secured transactions has been transferred to Article 9 by the 2000 revision.
Definitional Cross References
"Adverse claim" Section 8-102(a)(1)
"Appropriate person" Section 8-107
"Broker" Section 8-102(a)(3)
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Indorsement" Section 8-102(a)(11)
"Instruction" Section 8-102(a)(12)
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Person" Section 1-201(30)
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Secured party" Section 9-105(1)(m)
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
"Value" Sections 1-201(44) & 8-116
Section 36-8-109. Warranties in indirect holding.
(a) A person who originates an entitlement order to a securities intermediary warrants to the securities intermediary that:
(1) the entitlement order is made by an appropriate person, or if the entitlement order is by an agent, the agent has actual authority to act on behalf of the appropriate person; and
(2) there is no adverse claim to the security entitlement.
(b) A person who delivers a security certificate to a securities intermediary for credit to a securities account or originates an instruction with respect to an uncertificated security directing that the uncertificated security be credited to a securities account makes to the securities intermediary the warranties specified in Section 36-8-108(a) or (b).
(c) If a securities intermediary delivers a security certificate to its entitlement holder or causes its entitlement holder to be registered as the owner of an uncertificated security, the securities intermediary makes to the entitlement holder the warranties specified in Section 36-8-108(a) or (b).
Official Comment
1. Subsection (a) provides that a person who originates an entitlement order warrants to the securities intermediary that the order is authorized, and warrants the absence of adverse claims. Subsection (b) specifies the warranties that are given when a person who holds securities directly has the holding converted into indirect form. A person who delivers a certificate to a securities intermediary or originates an instruction for an uncertificated security gives to the securities intermediary the transfer warranties under Section 8-108. If the securities intermediary in turn delivers the certificate to a higher level securities intermediary, it gives the same warranties.
2. Subsection (c) states the warranties that a securities intermediary gives when a customer who has been holding securities in an account with the securities intermediary requests that certificates be delivered or that uncertificated securities be registered in the customer's name. The warranties are the same as those that brokers make with respect to securities that the brokers sell to or buy on behalf of the customers. See Section 8-108(i).
3. As with the Section 8-108 warranties, the warranties specified in this section may be modified by agreement under Section 1-102(3).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section is entirely new, in the sense that it addresses the indirect holding system, a concept which is new in the 2000 revision. Its provisions are identical to those of the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-109.
Again, this Section can be understood only in terms of its defined terms. Of basic significance are the concepts of "securities intermediary" (generally speaking, one through whom a person holds an interest in securities; see Section [8-102(a)(14)]) and "securities entitlement" (generally speaking, an interest in securities held through another; see Section [8-103(a)(17)]). These concepts define the indirect holding system, in which an investor does not hold securities, but holds rights against (ultimately) the legal owner of a fungible mass of securities.
Definitional Cross References
"Adverse claim" Section 8-102(a)(1)
"Appropriate person" Section 8-107
"Entitlement holder" Section 8-102(a)(7)
"Entitlement order" Section 8-102(a)(8)
"Instruction" Section 8-102(a)(12)
"Person" Section 1-201(30)
"Securities account" Section 8-501
"Securities intermediary" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
Section 36-8-110. Applicability; choice of law.
(a) The local law of the issuer's jurisdiction, as specified in subsection (d), governs:
(1) the validity of a security;
(2) the rights and duties of the issuer with respect to registration of transfer;
(3) the effectiveness of registration of transfer by the issuer;
(4) whether the issuer owes any duties to an adverse claimant to a security; and
(5) whether an adverse claim can be asserted against a person to whom transfer of a certificated or uncertificated security is registered or a person who obtains control of an uncertificated security.
(b) The local law of the securities intermediary's jurisdiction, as specified in subsection (e), governs:
(1) acquisition of a security entitlement from the securities intermediary;
(2) the rights and duties of the securities intermediary and entitlement holder arising out of a security entitlement;
(3) whether the securities intermediary owes any duties to an adverse claimant to a security entitlement; and
(4) whether an adverse claim can be asserted against a person who acquires a security entitlement from the securities intermediary or a person who purchases a security entitlement or interest therein from an entitlement holder.
(c) The local law of the jurisdiction in which a security certificate is located at the time of delivery governs whether an adverse claim can be asserted against a person to whom the security certificate is delivered.
(d) 'Issuer's jurisdiction' means the jurisdiction under which the issuer of the security is organized or, if permitted by the law of that jurisdiction, the law of another jurisdiction specified by the issuer. An issuer organized under the law of this State may specify the law of another jurisdiction as the law governing the matters specified in subsection (a)(2) through (5).
(e) The following rules determine a 'securities intermediary's jurisdiction' for purposes of this section:
(1) If an agreement between the securities intermediary and its entitlement holder governing the securities account expressly provides that a particular jurisdiction is the securities intermediary's jurisdiction for purposes of this part, this article, or this chapter, that jurisdiction is the securities intermediary's jurisdiction.
(2) If item (1) does not apply and an agreement between the securities intermediary and its entitlement holder governing the securities account expressly provides that the agreement is governed by the law of a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is the securities intermediary's jurisdiction.
(3) If neither item (1) nor item (2) applies and an agreement between the securities intermediary and its entitlement holder governing the securities account expressly provides that the securities account is maintained at an office in a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is the securities intermediary's jurisdiction.
(4) If none of the preceding items applies, the securities intermediary's jurisdiction is the jurisdiction in which the office identified in an account statement as the office serving the entitlement holder's account is located.
(5) If none of the preceding items applies, the securities intermediary's jurisdiction is the jurisdiction in which the chief executive office of the securities intermediary is located.
(f) A securities intermediary's jurisdiction is not determined by the physical location of certificates representing financial assets, or by the jurisdiction in which is organized the issuer of the financial asset with respect to which an entitlement holder has a security entitlement, or by the location of facilities for data processing or other record keeping concerning the account.
Official Comment
1. This section deals with applicability and choice of law issues concerning Article 8. The distinction between the direct and indirect holding systems plays a significant role in determining the governing law. An investor in the direct holding system is registered on the books of the issuer and/or has possession of a security certificate. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of incorporation of the issuer or location of the certificate determine the applicable law. By contrast, an investor in the indirect holding system has a security entitlement, which is a bundle of rights against the securities intermediary with respect to a security, rather than a direct interest in the underlying security. Accordingly, in the rules for the indirect holding system, the jurisdiction of incorporation of the issuer of the underlying security or the location of any certificates that might be held by the intermediary or a higher tier intermediary, do not determine the applicable law.
The phrase "local law" refers to the law of a jurisdiction other than its conflict of laws rules. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws ' 4.
2. Subsection (a) provides that the law of an issuer's jurisdiction governs certain issues where the substantive rules of Article 8 determine the issuer's rights and duties. Paragraph (1) of subsection (a) provides that the law of the issuer's jurisdiction governs the validity of the security. This ensures that a single body of law will govern the questions addressed in Part 2 of Article 8, concerning the circumstances in which an issuer can and cannot assert invalidity as a defense against purchasers. Similarly, paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) of subsection (a) ensure that the issuer will be able to look to a single body of law on the questions addressed in Part 4 of Article 8, concerning the issuer's duties and liabilities with respect to registration of transfer.
Paragraph (5) of subsection (a) applies the law of an issuer's jurisdiction to the question whether an adverse claim can be asserted against a purchaser to whom transfer has been registered, or who has obtained control over an uncertificated security. Although this issue deals with the rights of persons other than the issuer, the law of the issuer's jurisdiction applies because the purchasers to whom the provision applies are those whose protection against adverse claims depends on the fact that their interests have been recorded on the books of the issuer.
The principal policy reflected in the choice of law rules in subsection (a) is that an issuer and others should be able to look to a single body of law on the matters specified in subsection (a), rather than having to look to the law of all of the different jurisdictions in which security holders may reside. The choice of law policies reflected in this subsection do not require that the body of law governing all of the matters specified in subsection (a) be that of the jurisdiction in which the issuer is incorporated. Thus, subsection (d) provides that the term "issuer's jurisdiction" means the jurisdiction in which the issuer is organized, or, if permitted by that law, the law of another jurisdiction selected by the issuer. Subsection (d) also provides that issuers organized under the law of a State which adopts this Article may make such a selection, except as to the validity issue specified in paragraph (1). The question whether an issuer can assert the defense of invalidity may implicate significant policies of the issuer's jurisdiction of incorporation. See, e.g., Section 8-202 and Comments thereto.
Although subsection (a) provides that the issuer's rights and duties concerning registration of transfer are governed by the law of the issuer's jurisdiction, other matters related to registration of transfer, such as appointment of a guardian for a registered owner or the existence of agency relationships, might be governed by another jurisdiction's law. Neither this section nor Section 1-105 deals with what law governs the appointment of the administrator or executor; that question is determined under generally applicable choice of law rules.
3. Subsection (b) provides that the law of the securities intermediary's jurisdiction governs the issues concerning the indirect holding system that are dealt with in Article 8. Paragraphs (1) and (2) cover the matters dealt with in the Article 8 rules defining the concept of security entitlement and specifying the duties of securities intermediaries. Paragraph (3) provides that the law of the security intermediary's jurisdiction determines whether the intermediary owes any duties to an adverse claimant. Paragraph (4) provides that the law of the security intermediary's jurisdiction determines whether adverse claims can be asserted against entitlement holders and others.
Subsection (e) determines what is a "securities intermediary's jurisdiction." The policy of subsection (b) is to ensure that a securities intermediary and all of its entitlement holders can look to a single, readily-identifiable body of law to determine their rights and duties. Accordingly, subsection (e) sets out a sequential series of tests to facilitate identification of that body of law. Paragraph (1) of subsection (e) permits specification of the securities intermediary's jurisdiction by agreement. In the absence of such a specification, the law chosen by the parties to govern the securities account determines the securities intermediary's jurisdiction. See paragraph (2). Because the policy of this section is to enable parties to determine, in advance and with certainty, what law will apply to transactions governed by this Article, the validation of the parties' selection of governing law by agreement is not conditioned upon a determination that the jurisdiction whose law is chosen bear a "reasonable relation" to the transaction. See Section 4A-507; compare Section 1-105(1). That is also true with respect to the similar provisions in subsection (d) of this section and in Section 9-305. The remaining paragraphs in subsection (e) contain additional default rules for determining the securities intermediary's jurisdiction.
Subsection (f) makes explicit a point that is implicit in the Article 8 description of a security entitlement as a bundle of rights against the intermediary with respect to a security or other financial asset, rather than as a direct interest in the underlying security or other financial asset. The governing law for relationships in the indirect holding system is not determined by such matters as the jurisdiction of incorporation of the issuer of the securities held through the intermediary, or the location of any physical certificates held by the intermediary or a higher tier intermediary.
4. Subsection (c) provides a choice of law rule for adverse claim issues that may arise in connection with delivery of security certificates in the direct holding system. It applies the law of the place of delivery. If a certificated security issued by an Idaho corporation is sold, and the sale is settled by physical delivery of the certificate from Seller to Buyer in New York, under subsection (c), New York law determines whether Buyer takes free from adverse claims. The domicile of Seller, Buyer, and any adverse claimant is irrelevant.
5. The following examples illustrate how a court in a jurisdiction which has enacted this section would determine the governing law:
Example 1. John Doe, a resident of Kansas, maintains a securities account with Able & Co. Able is incorporated in Delaware. Its chief executive offices are located in Illinois. The office where Doe transacts business with Able is located in Missouri. The agreement between Doe and Able specifies that Illinois law is the securities intermediary's (Able's) jurisdiction. Through the account, Doe holds securities of a Colorado corporation, which Able holds through Clearing Corporation. The rules of Clearing Corporation provide that the rights and duties of Clearing Corporation and its participants are governed by New York law. Subsection (a) specifies that a controversy concerning the rights and duties as between the issuer and Clearing Corporation is governed by Colorado law. Subsections (b) and (e) specify that a controversy concerning the rights and duties as between the Clearing Corporation and Able is governed by New York law, and that a controversy concerning the rights and duties as between Able and Doe is governed by Illinois law.
Example 2. Same facts as to Doe and Able as in Example 1. Through the account, Doe holds securities of a Senegalese corporation, which Able holds through Clearing Corporation. Clearing Corporation's operations are located in Belgium, and its rules and agreements with its participants provide that they are governed by Belgian law. Clearing Corporation holds the securities through a custodial account at the Paris branch office of Global Bank, which is organized under English law. The agreement between Clearing Corporation and Global Bank provides that it is governed by French law. Subsection (a) specifies that a controversy concerning the rights and duties as between the issuer and Global Bank is governed by Senegalese law. Subsections (b) and (e) specify that a controversy concerning the rights and duties as between Global Bank and Clearing Corporation is governed by French law, that a controversy concerning the rights and duties as between Clearing Corporation and Able is governed by Belgian law, and that a controversy concerning the rights and duties as between Able and Doe is governed by Illinois law.
6. To the extent that this section does not specify the governing law, general choice of law rules apply. For example, suppose that in either of the examples in the preceding Comment, Doe enters into an agreement with Roe, also a resident of Kansas, in which Doe agrees to transfer all of his interests in the securities held through Able to Roe. Article 8 does not deal with whether such an agreement is enforceable or whether it gives Roe some interest in Doe's security entitlement. This section specifies what jurisdiction's law governs the issues that are dealt with in Article 8. Article 8, however, does specify that securities intermediaries have only limited duties with respect to adverse claims. See Section 8-115. Subsection (b)(3) of this section provides that Illinois law governs whether Able owes any duties to an adverse claimant. Thus, if Illinois has adopted Revised Article 8, Section 8-115 as enacted in Illinois determines whether Roe has any rights against Able.
7. The choice of law provisions concerning security interests in securities and security entitlements are set out in Section 9-305.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, which is largely new, replaces former Section 36-8-106. Its provisions are identical to those of the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-110.
This Section works major changes from prior law. Its acceptance is a major step toward uniformity in Article 8 matters, as its employment will tend to refer all litigants to the same substantive law.
Generally speaking, the UCC permits parties to choose governing law by agreement, so long as the choice is reasonably related to the subject matter of the transaction. See Section 36-1-105(1). For purposes of Article 8 this Section establishes default rules (variable by agreement) and certain mandatory rules, not variable by agreement. Analogous rules relating to creation and perfection of security interests are found in Article 9.
Prior law dealt with the interests of all holders in terms of the location of the underlying security. Accordingly, choice-of-law rules focussed on the location of the certificate, in both the direct and indirect holding systems. Under such a system, the fortuity of the location of a clearing company manifested an effect on governing law out of proportion to the realities of the rights involved and the parties' expectations. The present Section retains location as an important element of choice of law for securities in the direct holding system, but, in the indirect holding system, establishes as the key element as to each securities entitlement the jurisdiction of the securities intermediary creating the entitlement.
Clarification and uniformity of result in choice-of-law rules was a primary objective of the 2000 Revision. This Section is intended to be construed in favor of uniformity of result to enhance predictability of result and consequent confidence and liquidity in a global securities industry.
Definitional Cross References
"Adverse claim" Section 8-102(a)(1)
"Agreement" Section 1-201(3)
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Entitlement holder" Section 8-102(a)(7)
"Financial asset" Section 8-102(a)(9)
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Person" Section 1-201(30)
"Purchase" Section 1-201(32)
"Securities intermediary" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
"Security entitlement" Section 8-102(a)(17)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
Section 36-8-111. Clearing corporation rules.
A rule adopted by a clearing corporation governing rights and obligations among the clearing corporation and its participants in the clearing corporation is effective even if the rule conflicts with this chapter and affects another party who does not consent to the rule.
Official Comment
1. The experience of the past few decades shows that securities holding and settlement practices may develop rapidly, and in unforeseeable directions. Accordingly, it is desirable that the rules of Article 8 be adaptable both to ensure that commercial law can conform to changing practices and to ensure that commercial law does not operate as an obstacle to developments in securities practice. Even if practices were unchanging, it would not be possible in a general statute to specify in detail the rules needed to provide certainty in the operations of the clearance and settlement system.
The provisions of this Article and Article 1 on the effect of agreements provide considerable flexibility in the specification of the details of the rights and obligations of participants in the securities holding system by agreement. See Sections 8-504 through 8-509, and Section 1-102(3) and (4). Given the magnitude of the exposures involved in securities transactions, however, it may not be possible for the parties in developing practices to rely solely on private agreements, particularly with respect to matters that might affect others, such as creditors. For example, in order to be fully effective, rules of clearing corporations on the finality or reversibility of securities settlements must not only bind the participants in the clearing corporation but also be effective against their creditors. Section 8-111 provides that clearing corporation rules are effective even if they indirectly affect third parties, such as creditors of a participant. This provision does not, however, permit rules to be adopted that would govern the rights and obligations of third parties other than as a consequence of rules that specify the rights and obligations of the clearing corporation and its participants.
2. The definition of clearing corporation in Section 8-102 covers only federal reserve banks, entities registered as clearing agencies under the federal securities laws, and others subject to comparable regulation. The rules of registered clearing agencies are subject to regulatory oversight under the federal securities laws.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section is new. Its closest analogue under prior law was Section 36-8-320, which imposed certain rules on operations of clearing corporations. This Section's provisions are identical to those of the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-111.
This Section reflects the policy of neutrality underlying much of the 2000 Revision; that is, that Article 8 is not an appropriate location for regulatory decisions. This Section is designed to answer questions concerning rights and duties flowing from doing business as a clearing corporation. Other, regulatory law, such as the law of securities regulation, answers such questions as who may act as a clearing corporation and how their operations are to be regulated. Accordingly, all material regulating clearing corporations has been removed from Article 8.
Definitional Cross Reference
"Clearing corporation" Section 8-102(a)(5)
Section 36-8-112. Creditor's legal process.
(a) The interest of a debtor in a certificated security may be reached by a creditor only by actual seizure of the security certificate by the officer making the attachment or levy, except as otherwise provided in subsection (d). However, a certificated security for which the certificate has been surrendered to the issuer may be reached by a creditor by legal process upon the issuer.
(b) The interest of a debtor in an uncertificated security may be reached by a creditor only by legal process upon the issuer at its chief executive office in the United States, except as otherwise provided in subsection (d).
(c) The interest of a debtor in a security entitlement may be reached by a creditor only by legal process upon the securities intermediary with whom the debtor's securities account is maintained, except as otherwise provided in subsection (d).
(d) The interest of a debtor in a certificated security for which the certificate is in the possession of a secured party, or in an uncertificated security registered in the name of a secured party, or a security entitlement maintained in the name of a secured party, may be reached by a creditor by legal process upon the secured party.
(e) A creditor whose debtor is the owner of a certificated security, uncertificated security, or security entitlement is entitled to aid from a court of competent jurisdiction, by injunction or otherwise, in reaching the certificated security, uncertificated security, or security entitlement or in satisfying the claim by means allowed at law or in equity in regard to property that cannot readily be reached by other legal process.
Official Comment
1. In dealing with certificated securities the instrument itself is the vital thing, and therefore a valid levy cannot be made unless all possibility of the certificate's wrongfully finding its way into a transferee's hands has been removed. This can be accomplished only when the certificate is in the possession of a public officer, the issuer, or an independent third party. A debtor who has been enjoined can still transfer the security in contempt of court. See Overlock v. Jerome-Portland Copper Mining Co., 29 Ariz. 560, 243 P. 400 (1926). Therefore, although injunctive relief is provided in subsection (e) so that creditors may use this method to gain control of the certificated security, the security certificate itself must be reached to constitute a proper levy whenever the debtor has possession.
2. Subsection (b) provides that when the security is uncertificated and registered in the debtor's name, the debtor's interest can be reached only by legal process upon the issuer. The most logical place to serve the issuer would be the place where the transfer records are maintained, but that location might be difficult to identify, especially when the separate elements of a computer network might be situated in different places. The chief executive office is selected as the appropriate place by analogy to Section 9-103(3)(d). See Comment 5(c) to that section. This section indicates only how attachment is to be made, not when it is legally justified. For that reason there is no conflict between this section and Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
3. Subsection (c) provides that a security entitlement can be reached only by legal process upon the debtor's security intermediary. Process is effective only if directed to the debtor's own security intermediary. If Debtor holds securities through Broker, and Broker in turn holds through Clearing Corporation, Debtor's property interest is a security entitlement against Broker. Accordingly, Debtor's creditor cannot reach Debtor's interest by legal process directed to the Clearing Corporation. See also Section 8-115.
4. Subsection (d) provides that when a certificated security, an uncertificated security, or a security entitlement is controlled by a secured party, the debtor's interest can be reached by legal process upon the secured party. This section does not attempt to provide for rights as between the creditor and the secured party, as, for example, whether or when the secured party must liquidate the security.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section replaces prior Section 36-8-317. Its provisions are identical to those of the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-112.
This Section does not substantively change the rules of prior Section 36-8-317, but reformulates the wording to take account of the indirect holding system. Section [8-112(a)], stating the basic rule relating to certificated securities, is not substantively changed from prior Section 36-8-317 except that the rule is now limited to securities in the direct holding system. Additionally, the former reference to legal process upon the issuer is no longer limited to the issuer's "chief executive office." Where good service may be had is left to other law.
Subsection (b) restates the same rule in terms of uncertificated securities, retaining the former limitation on good service to the issuer's chief executive office. Prior law made this section effective only where the uncertificated security was registered in the debtor's name. The present section applies its rule to any interest of a debtor in an uncertificated security.
Subsection (c) states the rule for securities entitlements; that is, the indirect holding system. This subsection replaces former subsection 36-8-317(4), altering the vocabulary to that of the 2000 Revision.
Subsection (d) relates to debtors' interests created by other law, particularly Article 9 (see Section 36-9-201). It represents no substantive change from former subsection 36-8-317(3).
Subsection (e) is not substantively changed from prior Section 36-9-317(6).
The subject matter of prior Section 36-8-317(5) has been transferred to Article 9.
Definitional Cross References
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Secured party" Section 9-105(1)(m)
"Securities intermediary" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
"Security entitlement" Section 8-102(a)(17)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
Section 36-8-113. Statute of frauds inapplicable.
A contract or modification of a contract for the sale or purchase of a security is enforceable whether or not there is a writing signed or record authenticated by a party against whom enforcement is sought, even if the contract or modification is not capable of performance within one year of its making.
Official Comment
This section provides that the statute of frauds does not apply to contracts for the sale of securities, reversing prior law which had a special statute of frauds in Section 8-319 (1978). With the increasing use of electronic means of communication, the statute of frauds is unsuited to the realities of the securities business. For securities transactions, whatever benefits a statute of frauds may play in filtering out fraudulent claims are outweighed by the obstacles it places in the development of modern commercial practices in the securities business.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section replaces prior Section 36-8-319, former Article 8's special statute of frauds. This Section's provisions are identical to those of the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-113.
While the Official Comment refers only to the elimination of Section 36-8-319, the general wording of this Section shows an intention to remove any requirement of a writing from transactions governed by Article 8. The concluding phrase of this Section explicitly makes inapplicable the general statute of frauds found at Section 32-3-10(5). A conforming change to Section 36-1-206 explicitly removes securities and security agreements from the general UCC statute of frauds. The policy underlying these changes is succinctly set out in the Official Comment.
Definitional Cross References
"Action" Section 1-201(1)
"Contract" Section 1-201(11)
"Writing" Section 1-201(46)
Section 36-8-114. Evidentiary rules concerning certificated securities.
The following rules apply in an action on a certificated security against the issuer:
(1) Unless specifically denied in the pleadings, each signature on a security certificate or in a necessary indorsement is admitted.
(2) If the effectiveness of a signature is put in issue, the burden of establishing effectiveness is on the party claiming under the signature, but the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized.
(3) If signatures on a security certificate are admitted or established, production of the certificate entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes a defense or a defect going to the validity of the security.
(4) If it is shown that a defense or defect exists, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the plaintiff or some person under whom the plaintiff claims is a person against whom the defense or defect cannot be asserted.
Official Comment
This section adapts the rules of negotiable instruments law concerning procedure in actions on instruments, see Section 3-308, to actions on certificated securities governed by this Article. An "action on a security" includes any action or proceeding brought against the issuer to enforce a right or interest that is part of the security, such as an action to collect principal or interest or a dividend, or to establish a right to vote or to receive a new security under an exchange offer or plan of reorganization. This section applies only to certificated securities; actions on uncertificated securities are governed by general evidentiary principles.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section replaces prior Section 36-8-105(3). This Section's provisions are identical to those of the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-114.
This Section makes no substantive change from prior law, except that prior subsection 36-8-105(3)(d), relating to transaction statements, is omitted. (The uncertificated security transaction statement has been omitted as a mandatory concept from the 2000 Revision.)
Definitional Cross References
"Action" Section 1-201(1)
"Burden of establishing" Section 1-201(8)
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Indorsement" Section 8-102(a)(11)
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Presumed" Section 1-201(31)
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
Section 36-8-115. Securities intermediary and others not liable to adverse claimant.
A securities intermediary that has transferred a financial asset pursuant to an effective entitlement order, or a broker or other agent or bailee that has dealt with a financial asset at the direction of its customer or principal, is not liable to a person having an adverse claim to the financial asset, unless the securities intermediary, or broker or other agent or bailee:
(1) took the action after it had been served with an injunction, restraining order, or other legal process enjoining it from doing so, issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, and had a reasonable opportunity to act on the injunction, restraining order, or other legal process; or
(2) acted in collusion with the wrongdoer in violating the rights of the adverse claimant; or
(3) in the case of a security certificate that has been stolen, acted with notice of the adverse claim.
Official Comment
1. Other provisions of Article 8 protect certain purchasers against adverse claims, both for the direct holding system and the indirect holding system. See Sections 8-303 and 8-502. This section deals with the related question of the possible liability of a person who acted as the "conduit" for a securities transaction. It covers both securities intermediaries -- the "conduits" in the indirect holding system -- and brokers or other agents or bailees -- the "conduits" in the direct holding system. The following examples illustrate its operation:
Example 1. John Doe is a customer of the brokerage firm of Able & Co. Doe delivers to Able a certificate for 100 shares of XYZ Co. common stock, registered in Doe's name and properly indorsed, and asks the firm to sell it for him. Able does so. Later, John Doe's spouse Mary Doe brings an action against Able asserting that Able's action was wrongful against her because the XYZ Co. stock was marital property in which she had an interest, and John Doe was acting wrongfully against her in transferring the securities.
Example 2. Mary Roe is a customer of the brokerage firm of Baker & Co. and holds her securities through a securities account with Baker. Roe instructs Baker to sell 100 shares of XYZ Co. common stock that she carried in her account. Baker does so. Later, Mary Roe's spouse John Roe brings an action against Baker asserting that Baker's action was wrongful against him because the XYZ Co. stock was marital property in which he had an interest, and Mary Roe was acting wrongfully against him in transferring the securities.
Under common law conversion principles, Mary Doe might be able to assert that Able & Co. is liable to her in Example 1 for exercising dominion over property inconsistent with her rights in it. On that or some similar theory John Roe might assert that Baker is liable to him in Example 2. Section 8-115 protects both Able and Baker from liability.
2. The policy of this section is similar to that of many other rules of law that protect agents and bailees from liability as innocent converters. If a thief steals property and ships it by mail, express service, or carrier, to another person, the recipient of the property does not obtain good title, even though the recipient may have given value to the thief and had no notice or knowledge that the property was stolen. Accordingly, the true owner can recover the property from the recipient or obtain damages in a conversion or similar action. An action against the postal service, express company, or carrier presents entirely different policy considerations. Accordingly, general tort law protects agents or bailees who act on the instructions of their principals or bailors. See Restatement (Second) of Torts ' 235. See also UCC Section 7-404.
3. Except as provided in paragraph 3, this section applies even though the securities intermediary, or the broker or other agent or bailee, had notice or knowledge that another person asserts a claim to the securities. Consider the following examples:
Example 3. Same facts as in Example 1, except that before John Doe brought the XYZ Co. security certificate to Able for sale, Mary Doe telephoned or wrote to the firm asserting that she had an interest in all of John Doe's securities and demanding that they not trade for him.
Example 4. Same facts as in Example 2, except that before Mary Roe gave an entitlement order to Baker to sell the XYZ Co. securities from her account, John Roe telephoned or wrote to the firm asserting that he had an interest in all of Mary Roe's securities and demanding that they not trade for her.
Section 8-115 protects Able and Baker from liability. The protections of Section 8-115 do not depend on the presence or absence of notice of adverse claims. It is essential to the securities settlement system that brokers and securities intermediaries be able to act promptly on the directions of their customers. Even though a firm has notice that someone asserts a claim to a customer's securities or security entitlements, the firm should not be placed in the position of having to make a legal judgment about the validity of the claim at the risk of liability either to its customer or to the third party for guessing wrong. Under this section, the broker or securities intermediary is privileged to act on the instructions of its customer or entitlement holder, unless it has been served with a restraining order or other legal process enjoining it from doing so. This is already the law in many jurisdictions. For example a section of the New York Banking Law provides that banks need not recognize any adverse claim to funds or securities on deposit with them unless they have been served with legal process. N.Y. Banking Law ' 134. Other sections of the UCC embody a similar policy. See Sections 3-602, 5-114(2)(b).
Paragraph (1) of this section refers only to a court order enjoining the securities intermediary or the broker or other agent or bailee from acting at the instructions of the customer. It does not apply to cases where the adverse claimant tells the intermediary or broker that the customer has been enjoined, or shows the intermediary or broker a copy of a court order binding the customer.
Paragraph (3) takes a different approach in one limited class of cases, those where a customer sells stolen certificated securities through a securities firm. Here the policies that lead to protection of securities firms against assertions of other sorts of claims must be weighed against the desirability of having securities firms guard against the disposition of stolen securities. Accordingly, paragraph (3) denies protection to a broker, custodian, or other agent or bailee who receives a stolen security certificate from its customer, if the broker, custodian, or other agent or bailee had notice of adverse claims. The circumstances that give notice of adverse claims are specified in Section 8-105. The result is that brokers, custodians, and other agents and bailees face the same liability for selling stolen certificated securities that purchasers face for buying them.
4. As applied to securities intermediaries, this section embodies one of the fundamental principles of the Article 8 indirect holding system rules -- that a securities intermediary owes duties only to its own entitlement holders. The following examples illustrate the operation of this section in the multi-tiered indirect holding system:
Example 5. Able & Co., a broker-dealer, holds 50,000 shares of XYZ Co. stock in its account at Clearing Corporation. Able acquired the XYZ shares from another firm, Baker & Co., in a transaction that Baker contends was tainted by fraud, giving Baker a right to rescind the transaction and recover the XYZ shares from Able. Baker sends notice to Clearing Corporation stating that Baker has a claim to the 50,000 shares of XYZ Co. in Able's account. Able then initiates an entitlement order directing Clearing Corporation to transfer the 50,000 shares of XYZ Co. to another firm in settlement of a trade. Under Section 8-115, Clearing Corporation is privileged to comply with Able's entitlement order, without fear of liability to Baker. This is so even though Clearing Corporation has notice of Baker's claim, unless Baker obtains a court order enjoining Clearing Corporation from acting on Able's entitlement order.
Example 6. Able & Co., a broker-dealer, holds 50,000 shares of XYZ Co. stock in its account at Clearing Corporation. Able initiates an entitlement order directing Clearing Corporation to transfer the 50,000 shares of XYZ Co. to another firm in settlement of a trade. That trade was made by Able for its own account, and the proceeds were devoted to its own use. Able becomes insolvent, and it is discovered that Able has a shortfall in the shares of XYZ Co. stock that it should have been carrying for its customers. Able's customers bring an action against Clearing Corporation asserting that Clearing Corporation acted wrongfully in transferring the XYZ shares on Able's order because those were shares that should have been held by Able for its customers. Under Section 8-115, Clearing Corporation is not liable to Able's customers, because Clearing Corporation acted on an effective entitlement order of its own entitlement holder, Able. Clearing Corporation's protection against liability does not depend on the presence or absence of notice or knowledge of the claim by Clearing Corporation.
5. If the conduct of a securities intermediary or a broker or other agent or bailee rises to a level of complicity in the wrongdoing of its customer or principal, the policies that favor protection against liability do not apply. Accordingly, paragraph (2) provides that the protections of this section do not apply if the securities intermediary or broker or other agent or bailee acted in collusion with the customer or principal in violating the rights of another person. The collusion test is intended to adopt a standard akin to the tort rules that determine whether a person is liable as an aider or abettor for the tortious conduct of a third party. See Restatement (Second) of Torts ' 876.
Knowledge that the action of the customer is wrongful is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the collusion test. The aspect of the role of securities intermediaries and brokers that Article 8 deals with is the clerical or ministerial role of implementing and recording the securities transactions that their customers conduct. Faithful performance of this role consists of following the instructions of the customer. It is not the role of the record-keeper to police whether the transactions recorded are appropriate, so mere awareness that the customer may be acting wrongfully does not itself constitute collusion. That, of course, does not insulate an intermediary or broker from responsibility in egregious cases where its action goes beyond the ordinary standards of the business of implementing and recording transactions, and reaches a level of affirmative misconduct in assisting the customer in the commission of a wrong.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section replaces prior Section 36-8-318. This Section is identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-114.
Former Section 36-8-318 protected an "agent or bailee" transferring securities in good faith pursuant the principal's instructions from a conversion action although the principal had no right to give the instructions. This protection is continued in the present Section. Words are added to clarify that the protection extends to "securities intermediaries" and "financial assets" within the meaning of the 2000 Revision. The concept of good faith is replaced by three specific sets of circumstances, described in subsections (a), (b) and (c), under which the protection will not apply.
Definitional Cross References
"Broker" Section 8-102(a)(3)
"Effective" Section 8-107
"Entitlement order" Section 8-102(a)(8)
"Financial asset" Section 8-102(a)(9)
"Securities intermediary" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
Section 36-8-116. Securities intermediary as purchaser for value.
A securities intermediary that receives a financial asset and establishes a security entitlement to the financial asset in favor of an entitlement holder is a purchaser for value of the financial asset. A securities intermediary that acquires a security entitlement to a financial asset from another securities intermediary acquires the security entitlement for value if the securities intermediary acquiring the security entitlement establishes a security entitlement to the financial asset in favor of an entitlement holder.
Official Comment
1. This section is intended to make explicit two points that, while implicit in other provisions, are of sufficient importance to the operation of the indirect holding system that they warrant explicit statement. First, it makes clear that a securities intermediary that receives a financial asset and establishes a security entitlement in respect thereof in favor of an entitlement holder is a "purchaser" of the financial asset that the securities intermediary received. Second, it makes clear that by establishing a security entitlement in favor of an entitlement holder a securities intermediary gives value for any corresponding financial asset that the securities intermediary receives or acquires from another party, whether the intermediary holds directly or indirectly.
In many cases a securities intermediary that receives a financial asset will also be transferring value to the person from whom the financial asset was received. That, however, is not always the case. Payment may occur through a different system than settlement of the securities side of the transaction, or the securities might be transferred without a corresponding payment, as when a person moves an account from one securities intermediary to another. Even though the securities intermediary does not give value to the transferor, it does give value by incurring obligations to its own entitlement holder. Although the general definition of value in Section 1-201(44)(d) should be interpreted to cover the point, this section is included to make this point explicit.
2. The following examples illustrate the effect of this section:
Example 1. Buyer buys 1000 shares of XYZ Co. common stock through Buyer's broker Able & Co. to be held in Buyer's securities account. In settlement of the trade, the selling broker delivers to Able a security certificate in street name, indorsed in blank, for 1000 shares XYZ Co. stock, which Able holds in its vault. Able credits Buyer's account for securities in that amount. Section 8-116 specifies that Able is a purchaser of the XYZ Co. stock certificate, and gave value for it. Thus, Able can obtain the benefit of Section 8-303, which protects purchasers for value, if it satisfies the other requirements of that section.
Example 2. Buyer buys 1000 shares XYZ Co. common stock through Buyer's broker Able & Co. to be held in Buyer's securities account. The trade is settled by crediting 1000 shares XYZ Co. stock to Able's account at Clearing Corporation. Able credits Buyer's account for securities in that amount. When Clearing Corporation credits Able's account, Able acquires a security entitlement under Section 8-501. Section 8-116 specifies that Able acquired this security entitlement for value. Thus, Able can obtain the benefit of Section 8-502, which protects persons who acquire security entitlements for value, if it satisfies the other requirements of that section.
Example 3. Thief steals a certificated bearer bond from Owner. Thief sends the certificate to his broker Able & Co. to be held in his securities account, and Able credits Thief's account for the bond. Section 8-116 specifies that Able is a purchaser of the bond and gave value for it. Thus, Able can obtain the benefit of Section 8-303, which protects purchasers for value, if it satisfies the other requirements of that section.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section is new. It is identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-114.
This section establishes conditions under which securities intermediaries are accorded "purchaser for value" status. This status is generally similar to the concepts of "bona fide purchaser for value" and "holder in due course." Such status brings securities intermediaries either partly or all the way into the ambit of several important statutory concepts, e.g., Sections [8-108 and -109] (warranties), [8-202] (validity of issuance of securities), [8-302 and -303] (purchasers and protected purchasers) and [8-502] (security entitlement acquired for value and without notice).
Definitional Cross References
"Financial asset" Section 8-102(a)(9)
"Securities intermediary" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Security entitlement" Section 8-102(a)(17)
"Entitlement holder" Section 8-102(a)(7)
Part 2
Issue And Issuer
Section 36-8-201. Issuer.
(a) With respect to an obligation on or a defense to a security, an 'issuer' includes a person that:
(1) places or authorizes the placing of its name on a security certificate, other than as authenticating trustee, registrar, transfer agent, or the like, to evidence a share, participation, or other interest in its property or in an enterprise, or to evidence its duty to perform an obligation represented by the certificate;
(2) creates a share, participation, or other interest in its property or in an enterprise, or undertakes an obligation, that is an uncertificated security;
(3) directly or indirectly creates a fractional interest in its rights or property, if the fractional interest is represented by a security certificate; or
(4) becomes responsible for, or in place of, another person described as an issuer in this section.
(b) With respect to an obligation on or defense to a security, a guarantor is an issuer to the extent of its guaranty, whether or not its obligation is noted on a security certificate.
(c) With respect to a registration of a transfer, issuer means a person on whose behalf transfer books are maintained.
Official Comment
1. The definition of "issuer" in this section functions primarily to describe the persons whose defenses may be cut off under the rules in Part 2. In large measure it simply tracks the language of the definition of security in Section 8-102(a)(15).
2. Subsection (b) distinguishes the obligations of a guarantor as issuer from those of the principal obligor. However, it does not exempt the guarantor from the impact of subsection (d) of Section 8-202. Whether or not the obligation of the guarantor is noted on the security is immaterial. Typically, guarantors are parent corporations, or stand in some similar relationship to the principal obligor. If that relationship existed at the time the security was originally issued the guaranty would probably have been noted on the security. However, if the relationship arose afterward, e.g., through a purchase of stock or properties, or through merger or consolidation, probably the notation would not have been made. Nonetheless, the holder of the security is entitled to the benefit of the obligation of the guarantor.
3. Subsection (c) narrows the definition of "issuer" for purposes of Part 4 of this Article (registration of transfer). It is supplemented by Section 8-407.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-201, is changed in minor ways from prior Section 36-8-201. The minor rewording is not intended to change the substance of the Section. The deletion of the reference to "statements" in prior Section 36-8-201(2) reflects the deletion from the 2000 Revision of mandated delivery of transaction and periodic statements formerly required by Section 36-8-408 (deleted).
This Section's definition of "issuer" is expanded for certain purposes by Section [8-407].
Definitional Cross References
"Person" Section 1-201(30)
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
Section 36-8-202. Issuer's responsibility and defenses; notice of defect or defense.
(a) Even against a purchaser for value and without notice, the terms of a certificated security include terms stated on the certificate and terms made part of the security by reference on the certificate to another instrument, indenture, or document or to a constitution, statute, ordinance, rule, regulation, order, or the like, to the extent the terms referred to do not conflict with terms stated on the certificate. A reference under this subsection does not of itself charge a purchaser for value with notice of a defect going to the validity of the security, even if the certificate expressly states that a person accepting it admits notice. The terms of an uncertificated security include those stated in any instrument, indenture, or document or in a constitution, statute, ordinance, rule, regulation, order, or the like, pursuant to which the security is issued.
(b) The following rules apply if an issuer asserts that a security is not valid:
(1) A security other than one issued by a government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, even though issued with a defect going to its validity, is valid in the hands of a purchaser for value and without notice of the particular defect unless the defect involves a violation of a constitutional provision. In that case, the security is valid in the hands of a purchaser for value and without notice of the defect, other than one who takes by original issue.
(2) Item (1) applies to an issuer that is a government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality only if there has been substantial compliance with the legal requirements governing the issue or the issuer has received a substantial consideration for the issue as a whole or for the particular security and a stated purpose of the issue is one for which the issuer has power to borrow money or issue the security.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-8-205, lack of genuineness of a certificated security is a complete defense, even against a purchaser for value and without notice.
(d) All other defenses of the issuer of a security, including nondelivery and conditional delivery of a certificated security, are ineffective against a purchaser for value who has taken the certificated security without notice of the particular defense.
(e) This section does not affect the right of a party to cancel a contract for a security 'when, as and if issued' or 'when distributed' in the event of a material change in the character of the security that is the subject of the contract or in the plan or arrangement pursuant to which the security is to be issued or distributed.
(f) If a security is held by a securities intermediary against whom an entitlement holder has a security entitlement with respect to the security, the issuer may not assert any defense that the issuer could not assert if the entitlement holder held the security directly.
Official Comment
1. In this Article the rights of the purchaser for value without notice are divided into two aspects, those against the issuer, and those against other claimants to the security. Part 2 of this Article, and especially this section, deal with rights against the issuer.
Subsection (a) states, in accordance with the prevailing case law, the right of the issuer (who prepares the text of the security) to include terms incorporated by adequate reference to an extrinsic source, so long as the terms so incorporated do not conflict with the stated terms. Thus, the standard practice of referring in a bond or debenture to the trust indenture under which it is issued without spelling out its necessarily complex and lengthy provisions is approved. Every stock certificate refers in some manner to the charter or articles of incorporation of the issuer. At least where there is more than one class of stock authorized applicable corporation codes specifically require a statement or summary as to preferences, voting powers and the like. References to constitutions, statutes, ordinances, rules, regulations or orders are not so common, except in the obligations of governments or governmental agencies or units; but where appropriate they fit into the rule here stated.
Courts have generally held that an issuer is estopped from denying representations made in the text of a security. Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co. v. Leeds, 21 Del.Ch. 279, 186 A. 913 (1936). Nor is a defect in form or the invalidity of a security normally available to the issuer as a defense. Bonini v. Family Theatre Corporation, 327 Pa. 273, 194 A. 498 (1937); First National Bank of Fairbanks v. Alaska Airmotive, 119 F.2d 267 (C.C.A.Alaska 1941).
2. The rule in subsection (a) requiring that the terms of a security be noted or referred to on the certificate is based on practices and expectations in the direct holding system for certificated securities. This rule does not express a general rule or policy that the terms of a security are effective only if they are communicated to beneficial owners in some particular fashion. Rather, subsection (a) is based on the principle that a purchaser who does obtain a certificate is entitled to assume that the terms of the security have been noted or referred to on the certificate. That policy does not come into play in a securities holding system in which purchasers do not take delivery of certificates.
The provisions of subsection (a) concerning notation of terms on security certificates are necessary only because paper certificates play such an important role for certificated securities that a purchaser should be protected against assertion of any defenses or rights that are not noted on the certificate. No similar problem exists with respect to uncertificated securities. The last sentence of subsection (a) is, strictly speaking, unnecessary, since it only recognizes the fact that the terms of an uncertificated security are determined by whatever other law or agreement governs the security. It is included only to preclude any inference that uncertificated securities are subject to any requirement analogous to the requirement of notation of terms on security certificates.
The rule of subsection (a) applies to the indirect holding system only in the sense that if a certificated security has been delivered to the clearing corporation or other securities intermediary, the terms of the security should be noted or referred to on the certificate. If the security is uncertificated, that principle does not apply even at the issuer-clearing corporation level. The beneficial owners who hold securities through the clearing corporation are bound by the terms of the security, even though they do not actually see the certificate. Since entitlement holders in an indirect holding system have not taken delivery of certificates, the policy of subsection (a) does not apply.
3. The penultimate sentence of subsection (a) and all of subsection (b) embody the concept that it is the duty of the issuer, not of the purchaser, to make sure that the security complies with the law governing its issue. The penultimate sentence of subsection (a) makes clear that the issuer cannot, by incorporating a reference to a statute or other document, charge the purchaser with notice of the security's invalidity. Subsection (b) gives to a purchaser for value without notice of the defect the right to enforce the security against the issuer despite the presence of a defect that otherwise would render the security invalid. There are three circumstances in which a purchaser does not gain such rights: first, if the defect involves a violation of constitutional provisions, these rights accrue only to a subsequent purchaser, that is, one who takes other than by original issue. This Article leaves to the law of each particular State the rights of a purchaser on original issue of a security with a constitutional defect. No negative implication is intended by the explicit grant of rights to a subsequent purchaser.
Second, governmental issuers are distinguished in subsection (b) from other issuers as a matter of public policy, and additional safeguards are imposed before governmental issues are validated. Governmental issuers are estopped from asserting defenses only if there has been substantial compliance with the legal requirements governing the issue or if substantial consideration has been received and a stated purpose of the issue is one for which the issuer has power to borrow money or issue the security. The purpose of the substantial compliance requirement is to make certain that a mere technicality as, e.g., in the manner of publishing election notices, shall not be a ground for depriving an innocent purchaser of rights in the security. The policy is here adopted of such cases as Tommie v. City of Gadsden, 229 Ala. 521, 158 So. 763 (1935), in which minor discrepancies in the form of the election ballot used were overlooked and the bonds were declared valid since there had been substantial compliance with the statute.
A long and well established line of federal cases recognizes the principle of estoppel in favor of purchasers for value without notices where municipalities issue bonds containing recitals of compliance with governing constitutional and statutory provisions, made by the municipal authorities entrusted with determining such compliance. Chaffee County v. Potter, 142 U.S. 355 (1892); Oregon v. Jennings, 119 U.S. 74 (1886); Gunnison County Commissioners v. Rollins, 173 U.S. 255 (1898). This rule has been qualified, however, by requiring that the municipality have power to issue the security. Anthony v. County of Jasper, 101 U.S. 693 (1879); Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U.S. 260 (1876). This section follows the case law trend, simplifying the rule by setting up two conditions for an estoppel against a governmental issuer: (1) substantial consideration given, and (2) power in the issuer to borrow money or issue the security for the stated purpose. As a practical matter the problem of policing governmental issuers has been alleviated by the present practice of requiring legal opinions as to the validity of the issue. The bulk of the case law on this point is nearly 100 years old and it may be assumed that the question now seldom arises.
Section 8-210, regarding overissue, provides the third exception to the rule that an innocent purchase for value takes a valid security despite the presence of a defect that would otherwise give rise to invalidity. See that section and its Comment for further explanation.
4. Subsection (e) is included to make clear that this section does not affect the presently recognized right of either party to a "when, as and if" or "when distributed" contract to cancel the contract on substantial change.
5. Subsection (f) has been added because the introduction of the security entitlement concept requires some adaptation of the Part 2 rules, particularly those that distinguish between purchasers who take by original issue and subsequent purchasers. The basic concept of Part 2 is to apply to investment securities the principle of negotiable instruments law that an obligor is precluded from asserting most defenses against purchasers for value without notice. Section 8-202 describes in some detail which defenses issuers can raise against purchasers for value and subsequent purchasers for value. Because these rules were drafted with the direct holding system in mind, some interpretive problems might be presented in applying them to the indirect holding. For example, if a municipality issues a bond in book-entry only form, the only direct "purchaser" of that bond would be the clearing corporation. The policy of precluding the issuer from asserting defenses is, however, equally applicable. Subsection (f) is designed to ensure that the defense preclusion rules developed for the direct holding system will also apply to the indirect holding system.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-202, is substantially similar to prior Section 36-8-202.
Subsection (a) continues the rule of prior law, changed only with respect to sources of terms reflecting responsibilities and defenses for issuers of uncertificated securities. In that respect, the reference to transaction statements in prior subsection (1)(b) has been deleted (reflecting the general deletion from the 2000 Revision of mandatory transaction statements) and replaced by the final sentence of subsection (a). Unlike prior law, which identified only the initial transaction statement as a source of terms, subsection (a) now permits a variety of sources, including an initial transaction statement if a security is issued pursuant to such a document.
Subsections (b)(1) and (2) continue the rules of former subsection (2), using the vocabulary of the 2000 Revision and deleting references to initial transaction statements.
Subsections (c), (d) and (e) continue the rules of former subsections (3), (4) and (5), respectively, with no substantive change.
Subsection (f) is new, taking account of the new concepts of "securities intermediary" and "entitlement holder," found in Part 5 relating to the indirect holding system. This subsection prevents issuers from asserting against entitlement holders defenses under this Section which it could not assert against a direct holder.
Definitional Cross References
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Notice" Section 1-201(25)
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
"Value" Sections 1-201(44) & 8-116
Section 36-8-203. Staleness as notice of defect or defense.
After an act or event, other than a call that has been revoked, creating a right to immediate performance of the principal obligation represented by a certificated security or setting a date on or after which the security is to be presented or surrendered for redemption or exchange, a purchaser is charged with notice of any defect in its issue or defense of the issuer, if the act or event:
(1) requires the payment of money, the delivery of a certificated security, the registration of transfer of an uncertificated security, or any of them on presentation or surrender of the security certificate, the money or security is available on the date set for payment or exchange, and the purchaser takes the security more than one year after that date; or
(2) is not covered by item (1) and the purchaser takes the security more than two years after the date set for surrender or presentation or the date on which performance became due.
Official Comment
1. The problem of matured or called securities is here dealt with in terms of the effect of such events in giving notice of the issuer's defenses and not in terms of "negotiability". The substance of this section applies only to certificated securities because certificates may be transferred to a purchaser by delivery after the security has matured, been called, or become redeemable or exchangeable. It is contemplated that uncertificated securities which have matured or been called will merely be canceled on the books of the issuer and the proceeds sent to the registered owner. Uncertificated securities which have become redeemable or exchangeable, at the option of the owner, may be transferred to a purchaser, but the transfer is effectuated only by registration of transfer, thus necessitating communication with the issuer. If defects or defenses in such securities exist, the issuer will necessarily have the opportunity to bring them to the attention of the purchaser.
2. The fact that a security certificate is in circulation long after it has been called for redemption or exchange must give rise to the question in a purchaser's mind as to why it has not been surrendered. After the lapse of a reasonable period of time a purchaser can no longer claim "no reason to know" of any defects or irregularities in its issue. Where funds are available for the redemption the security certificate is normally turned in more promptly and a shorter time is set as the "reasonable period" than is set where funds are not available.
Defaulted certificated securities may be traded on financial markets in the same manner as unmatured and undefaulted instruments and a purchaser might not be placed upon notice of irregularity by the mere fact of default. An issuer, however, should at some point be placed in a position to determine definitely its liability on an invalid or improper issue, and for this purpose a security under this section becomes "stale" two years after the default. A different rule applies when the question is notice not of issuer's defenses but of claims of ownership. Section 8-105 and Comment.
3. Nothing in this section is designed to extend the life of preferred stocks called for redemption as "shares of stock" beyond the redemption date. After such a call, the security represents only a right to the funds set aside for redemption.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-203, is substantially similar to prior Section 36-8-203. The exception formerly appearing in subsection (2) is now incorporated in the first sentence of the introductory paragraph. No substantive change is intended.
Definitional Cross References
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Notice" Section 1-201(25)
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
Section 36-8-204. Effect of issuer's restriction on transfer.
A restriction on transfer of a security imposed by the issuer, even if otherwise lawful, is ineffective against a person without knowledge of the restriction unless:
(1) the security is certificated and the restriction is noted conspicuously on the security certificate; or
(2) the security is uncertificated and the registered owner has been notified of the restriction.
Official Comment
1. Restrictions on transfer of securities are imposed by issuers in a variety of circumstances and for a variety of purposes, such as to retain control of a close corporation or to ensure compliance with federal securities laws. Other law determines whether such restrictions are permissible. This section deals only with the consequences of failure to note the restriction on a security certificate.
This section imposes no bar to enforcement of a restriction on transfer against a person who has actual knowledge of it.
2. A restriction on transfer of a certificated security is ineffective against a person without knowledge of the restriction unless the restriction is noted conspicuously on the certificate. The word "noted" is used to make clear that the restriction need not be set forth in full text. Refusal by an issuer to register a transfer on the basis of an unnoted restriction would be a violation of the issuer's duty to register under Section 8-401.
3. The policy of this section is the same as in Section 8-202. A purchaser who takes delivery of a certificated security is entitled to rely on the terms stated on the certificate. That policy obviously does not apply to uncertificated securities. For uncertificated securities, this section requires only that the registered owner has been notified of the restriction. Suppose, for example, that A is the registered owner of an uncertificated security, and that the issuer has notified A of a restriction on transfer. A agrees to sell the security to B, in violation of the restriction. A completes a written instruction directing the issuer to register transfer to B, and B pays A for the security at the time A delivers the instruction to B. A does not inform B of the restriction, and B does not otherwise have notice or knowledge of it at the time B pays and receives the instruction. B presents the instruction to the issuer, but the issuer refuses to register the transfer on the grounds that it would violate the restriction. The issuer has complied with this section, because it did notify the registered owner A of the restriction. The issuer's refusal to register transfer is not wrongful. B has an action against A for breach of transfer warranty, see Section 8-108(b)(4)(iii). B's mistake was treating an uncertificated security transaction in the fashion appropriate only for a certificated security. The mechanism for transfer of uncertificated securities is registration of transfer on the books of the issuer; handing over an instruction only initiates the process. The purchaser should make arrangements to ensure that the price is not paid until it knows that the issuer has or will register transfer.
4. In the indirect holding system, investors neither take physical delivery of security certificates nor have uncertificated securities registered in their names. So long as the requirements of this section have been satisfied at the level of the relationship between the issuer and the securities intermediary that is a direct holder, this section does not preclude the issuer from enforcing a restriction on transfer. See Section 8-202(a) and Comment 2 thereto.
5. This section deals only with restrictions imposed by the issuer. Restrictions imposed by statute are not affected. See Quiner v. Marblehead Social Co., 10 Mass. 476 (1813); Madison Bank v. Price, 79 Kan. 289, 100 P. 280 (1909); Healey v. Steele Center Creamery Ass'n, 115 Minn. 451, 133 N.W. 69 (1911). Nor does it deal with private agreements between stockholders containing restrictive covenants as to the sale of the security.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-204, is substantially similar to prior Section 36-8-204. The references in prior law to "initial transaction statements" appearing have been deleted, consonant with the general deletion of transaction statements as a mandatory concept in Article 8. As a result, restrictions on transfer of uncertificated securities may be noticed by any means of notification under the statute, not only through transaction statements, as under prior law.
This Section applies to restrictions imposed by issuers only. Restrictions resulting from statute, regulation or contract are not affected. In that respect, see Section 33-6-270, the Business Corporation Act's provision governing restrictions on transfer. An issuer's restriction on transfer must comply with this Section and with Section 33-6-270.
This Section generally subjects issuers' restrictions to "knowledge," defined at Section 36-1-201(25) as "actual knowledge." Section 33-6-270(b) also uses the word "knowledge," which is not defined in the Business Corporation Act. The Official Comment to the Section appears to require actual knowledge, however ("If a transferee knows of the restriction he is bound by it ...").
In the absence of knowledge, subsection (a) requires that issuers' restrictions be "noted conspicuously on the security certificate." Section 33-6-270(b) is to similar effect. "Noted" is not defined in either statute. Official Comment 2 to this Section observes that "note" is used to avoid any inference that the restriction must be set forth in full. While not as explicit, the Official Comment to Section 33-6-270 should be read to the same effect.
"Conspicuous" for purposes of this Section is defined at Section 36-1-201(10), and for purposes of Section 33-6-270 at Section 33-1-400(5). The wording of the two definitions is sufficiently similar that, in the context of Article 8, the UCC definition should be construed identically to the Business Corporation Act definition.
Subsection (b) imputes to holders of uncertificated securities restrictions of which they have been "notified." "Notice" is defined at Section 36-1-201(25) to include actual knowledge, receipt of notification or to have reason to know. In light of the deletion of mandatory initial transaction statements, notification in this context relates to Section 33-8-202(a), which provides that the terms of an uncertificated security "include those stated . . . in any document . . . pursuant to which the security is issued." The reference in Section 33-6-270(b) to information statements, if not corrected, should be read similarly, as should the other references to statements relating to uncertificated securities in Section 33-6-260 and the Official and South Carolina comments to Sections 33-6-260 and -270, if such references have not been corrected.
Definitional Cross References
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Conspicuous" Section 1-201(10)
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Knowledge" Section 1-201(25)
"Notify" Section 1-201(25)
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
Section 36-8-205. Effect of unauthorized signature on security certificate.
An unauthorized signature placed on a security certificate before or in the course of issue is ineffective, but the signature is effective in favor of a purchaser for value of the certificated security if the purchaser is without notice of the lack of authority and the signing has been done by:
(1) an authenticating trustee, registrar, transfer agent, or other person entrusted by the issuer with the signing of the security certificate or of similar security certificates, or the immediate preparation for signing of any of them; or
(2) an employee of the issuer, or of any of the persons listed in item (1), entrusted with responsible handling of the security certificate.
Official Comment
1. The problem of forged or unauthorized signatures may arise where an employee of the issuer, transfer agent, or registrar has access to securities which the employee is required to prepare for issue by affixing the corporate seal or by adding a signature necessary for issue. This section is based upon the issuer's duty to avoid the negligent entrusting of securities to such persons. Issuers have long been held responsible for signatures placed upon securities by parties whom they have held out to the public as authorized to prepare such securities. See Fifth Avenue Bank of New York v. The Forty-Second & Grand Street Ferry Railroad Co., 137 N.Y. 231, 33 N.E. 378, 19 L.R.A. 331, 33 Am.St.Rep. 712 (1893); Jarvis v. Manhattan Beach Co., 148 N.Y. 652, 43 N.E. 68, 31 L.R.A. 776, 51 Am.St.Rep. 727 (1896). The "apparent authority" concept of some of the case-law, however, is here extended and this section expressly rejects the technical distinction, made by courts reluctant to recognize forged signatures, between cases where forgers sign signatures they are authorized to sign under proper circumstances and those in which they sign signatures they are never authorized to sign. Citizens' & Southern National Bank v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 50 Ga.App. 681, 179 S.E. 278 (1935). Normally the purchaser is not in a position to determine which signature a forger, entrusted with the preparation of securities, has "apparent authority" to sign. The issuer, on the other hand, can protect itself against such fraud by the careful selection and bonding of agents and employees, or by action over against transfer agents and registrars who in turn may bond their personnel.
2. The issuer cannot be held liable for the honesty of employees not entrusted, directly or indirectly, with the signing, preparation, or responsible handling of similar securities and whose possible commission of forgery it has no reason to anticipate. The result in such cases as Hudson Trust Co. v. American Linseed Co., 232 N.Y. 350, 134 N.E. 178 (1922), and Dollar Savings Fund & Trust Co. v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 213 Pa. 307, 62 A. 916, 5 Ann.Cas. 248 (1906) is here adopted.
3. This section is not concerned with forged or unauthorized indorsements, but only with unauthorized signatures of issuers, transfer agents, etc., placed upon security certificates during the course of their issue. The protection here stated is available to all purchasers for value without notice and not merely to subsequent purchasers.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-205, is substantially similar to prior Section 36-8-205. The reference in prior law to transfer statements has been deleted, reflecting the general deletion of transfer statements as a mandatory concept under the 2000 Revision. No other substantive change from prior law is intended. This Section is based on the perception that the issuer is in the best position to control signatures on its behalf, and therefore should bear signature risk.
A "signature" for purposes of this Section is "any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing." Section 36-1-201(39).
Definitional Cross References
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Notice" Section 1-201(25)
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Unauthorized signature" Section 1-201(43)
Section 36-8-206. Completion or alteration of security certificate.
(a) If a security certificate contains the signatures necessary to its issue or transfer but is incomplete in any other respect:
(1) any person may complete it by filling in the blanks as authorized; and
(2) even if the blanks are incorrectly filled in, the security certificate as completed is enforceable by a purchaser who took it for value and without notice of the incorrectness.
(b) A complete security certificate that has been improperly altered, even if fraudulently, remains enforceable, but only according to its original terms.
Official Comment
1. The problem of forged or unauthorized signatures necessary for the issue or transfer of a security is not involved here, and a person in possession of a blank certificate is not, by this section, given authority to fill in blanks with such signatures. Completion of blanks left in a transfer instruction is dealt with elsewhere (Section 8-305(a)).
2. Blanks left upon issue of a security certificate are the only ones dealt with here, and a purchaser for value without notice is protected. A purchaser is not in a good position to determine whether blanks were completed by the issuer or by some person not authorized to complete them. On the other hand the issuer can protect itself by not placing its signature on the writing until the blanks are completed or, if it does sign before all blanks are completed, by carefully selecting the agents and employees to whom it entrusts the writing after authentication. With respect to a security certificate that is completed by the issuer but later is altered, the issuer has done everything it can to protect the purchaser and thus is not charged with the terms as altered. However, it is charged according to the original terms, since it is not thereby prejudiced. If the completion or alteration is obviously irregular, the purchaser may not qualify as a purchaser who took without notice under this section.
3. Only the purchaser who physically takes the certificate is directly protected. However, a transferee may receive protection indirectly through Section 8-302(a).
4. The protection granted a purchaser for value without notice under this section is modified to the extent that an overissue may result where an incorrect amount is inserted into a blank (Section 8-210).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-206, is identical in all substantive respects to prior Section 36-8-206(1) and (2). Prior subsections (3) and (4), relating to transfer statements, have been deleted, reflecting the general deletion of transfer statements as a mandatory concept under the 2000 Revision. No other substantive change from prior law is intended.
This Section continues the policy that the issuer is in the best position to control incomplete certificates, and is therefore allocated the associated risk versus a purchaser for value without notice. As to altered certificates, alterations are deemed not within the issuer's control, so that allocation of risk to the issuer is inappropriate.
A "signature" for purposes of this Section is "any symbol executed or adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing." Section 36-1-201(39).
Definitional Cross References
"Notice" Section 1-201(25)
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
"Unauthorized signature" Section 1-201(43)
"Value" Sections 1-201(44) & 8-116
Section 36-8-207. Rights and duties of issuer with respect to registered owners.
(a) Before due presentment for registration of transfer of a certificated security in registered form or of an instruction requesting registration of transfer of an uncertificated security, the issuer or indenture trustee may treat the registered owner as the person exclusively entitled to vote, receive notifications, and otherwise exercise all the rights and powers of an owner.
(b) This chapter does not affect the liability of the registered owner of a security for a call, assessment, or the like.
Official Comment
1. Subsection (a) states the issuer's right to treat the registered owner of a security as the person entitled to exercise all the rights of an owner. This right of the issuer is limited by the provisions of Part 4 of this article. Once there has been due presentation for registration of transfer, the issuer has a duty to register ownership in the name of the transferee. Section 8-401. Thus its right to treat the old registered owner as exclusively entitled to the rights of ownership must cease.
The issuer may under this section make distributions of money or securities to the registered owners of securities without requiring further proof of ownership, provided that such distributions are distributable to the owners of all securities of the same issue and the terms of the security do not require surrender of a security certificate as a condition of payment or exchange. Any such distribution shall constitute a defense against a claim for the same distribution by a person, even if that person is in possession of the security certificate and is a protected purchaser of the security. See PEB Commentary No. 4, dated March 10, 1990.
2. Subsection (a) is permissive and does not require that the issuer deal exclusively with the registered owner. It is free to require proof of ownership before paying out dividends or the like if it chooses to. Barbato v. Breeze Corporation, 128 N.J.L. 309, 26 A.2d 53 (1942).
3. This section does not operate to determine who is finally entitled to exercise voting and other rights or to receive payments and distributions. The parties are still free to incorporate their own arrangements as to these matters in seller-purchaser agreements which may be definitive as between them.
4. No change in existing state laws as to the liability of registered owners for calls and assessments is here intended; nor is anything in this section designed to estop record holders from denying ownership when assessments are levied if they are otherwise entitled to do so under state law. See State ex rel. Squire v. Murfey, Blosson & Co., 131 Ohio St. 289, 2 N.E.2d 866 (1936); Willing v. Delaplaine, 23 F.Supp. 579 (1937).
5. No interference is intended with the common practice of closing the transfer books or taking a record date for dividend, voting, and other purposes, as provided for in by-laws, charters, and statutes.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-207, is unchanged in all substantive respects from prior Section 36-8-207(1) and (7). No change in the law from those subsections is intended.
The subject matter of prior subsection (2), relating to uncertificated securities, have been moved to Part 5 of Article 8. Prior subsections (3) through (7), relating to registered pledges of uncertificated securities, have been deleted. Deletion of registered pledges as a mandatory concept does not mean that issuers could not offer a similar service which, in conjunction with the control concept, could constitute perfection of a security interest. Development of such a system is left to agreement and to the market.
Definitional Cross References
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Instruction" Section 8-102(a)(12)
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Registered form" Section 8-102(a)(13)
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
Section 36-8-208. Effect of signature of authenticating trustee, registrar, or transfer agent.
(a) A person signing a security certificate as authenticating trustee, registrar, transfer agent, or the like, warrants to a purchaser for value of the certificated security, if the purchaser is without notice of a particular defect, that:
(1) the certificate is genuine;
(2) the person's own participation in the issue of the security is within the person's capacity and within the scope of the authority received by the person from the issuer; and
(3) the person has reasonable grounds to believe that the certificated security is in the form and within the amount the issuer is authorized to issue.
(b) Unless otherwise agreed, a person signing under subsection (a) does not assume responsibility for the validity of the security in other respects.
Official Comment
1. The warranties here stated express the current understanding and prevailing case law as to the effect of the signatures of authenticating trustees, transfer agents, and registrars. See Jarvis v. Manhattan Beach Co., 148 N.Y. 652, 43 N.E. 68, 31 L.R.A. 776, 51 Am.St.Rep. 727 (1896). Although it has generally been regarded as the particular obligation of the transfer agent to determine whether securities are in proper form as provided by the by-laws and Articles of Incorporation, neither a registrar nor an authenticating trustee should properly place a signature upon a certificate without determining whether it is at least regular on its face. The obligations of these parties in this respect have therefore been made explicit in terms of due care. See Feldmeier v. Mortgage Securities, Inc., 34 Cal.App.2d 201, 93 P.2d 593 (1939).
2. Those cases which hold that an authenticating trustee is not liable for any defect in the mortgage or property which secures the bond or for any fraudulent misrepresentations made by the issuer are not here affected since these matters do not involve the genuineness or proper form of the security. Ainsa v. Mercantile Trust Co., 174 Cal. 504, 163 P. 898 (1917); Tschetinian v. City Trust Co., 186 N.Y. 432, 79 N.E. 401 (1906); Davidge v. Guardian Trust Co. of New York, 203 N.Y. 331, 96 N.E. 751 (1911).
3. The charter or an applicable statute may affect the capacity of a bank or other corporation undertaking to act as an authenticating trustee, registrar, or transfer agent. See, for example, the Federal Reserve Act (U.S.C.A., Title 12, Banks and Banking, Section 248) under which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank is authorized to grant special permits to National Banks permitting them to act as trustees. Such corporations are therefore held to certify as to their legal capacity to act as well as to their authority.
4. Authenticating trustees, registrars, and transfer agents have normally been held liable for an issue in excess of the authorized amount. Jarvis v. Manhattan Beach Co., supra; Mullen v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 108 Me. 498, 81 A. 948 (1911). In imposing upon these parties a duty of due care with respect to the amount they are authorized to help issue, this section does not necessarily validate the security, but merely holds persons responsible for the excess issue liable in damages for any loss suffered by the purchaser.
5. Aside from questions of genuineness and excess issue, these parties are not held to certify as to the validity of the security unless they specifically undertake to do so. The case law which has recognized a unique responsibility on the transfer agent's part to testify as to the validity of any security which it countersigns is rejected.
6. This provision does not prevent a transfer agent or issuer from agreeing with a registrar of stock to protect the registrar in respect of the genuineness and proper form of a security certificate signed by the issuer or the transfer agent or both. Nor does it interfere with proper indemnity arrangements between the issuer and trustees, transfer agents, registrars, and the like.
7. An unauthorized signature is a signature for purposes of this section if and only if it is made effective by Section 8-205.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-208, is unchanged from prior Section 36-8-208 in all substantive respects except for the elimination of the concept of transaction statements, which have been deleted as a statutory concept by the 2000 Revision. This Section now applies only to signatures on certificates. The effect of signatures on a document resembling a transaction statement would be a matter of contract.
Definitional Cross References
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Genuine" Section 1-201(18)
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Notice" Section 1-201(25)
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
"Value" Sections 1-201(44) & 8-116
Section 36-8-209. Issuer's lien.
A lien in favor of an issuer upon a certificated security is valid against a purchaser only if the right of the issuer to the lien is noted conspicuously on the security certificate.
Official Comment
This section is similar to Sections 8-202 and 8-204 which require that the terms of a certificated security and any restriction on transfer imposed by the issuer be noted on the security certificate. This section differs from those two sections in that the purchaser's knowledge of the issuer's claim is irrelevant. "Noted" makes clear that the text of the lien provisions need not be set forth in full. However, this would not override a provision of an applicable corporation code requiring statement in haec verba. This section does not apply to uncertificated securities. It applies to the indirect holding system in the same fashion as Sections 8-202 and 8-204, see Comment 2 to Section 8-202.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-209, is unchanged in all substantive respects from prior Section 36-8-103, except for the deletion of references to uncertificated securities. Otherwise, no substantive change is intended by this Section.
Definitional Cross References
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
Section 36-8-210. Overissue.
(a) In this section, 'overissue' means the issue of securities in excess of the amount the issuer has corporate power to issue, but an overissue does not occur if appropriate action has cured the overissue.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) and (d), the provisions of this chapter which validate a security or compel its issue or reissue do not apply to the extent that validation, issue, or reissue would result in overissue.
(c) If an identical security not constituting an overissue is reasonably available for purchase, a person entitled to issue or validation may compel the issuer to purchase the security and deliver it if certificated or register its transfer if uncertificated, against surrender of any security certificate the person holds.
(d) If a security is not reasonably available for purchase, a person entitled to issue or validation may recover from the issuer the price the person or the last purchaser for value paid for it with interest from the date of the person's demand.
Official Comment
1. Deeply embedded in corporation law is the conception that "corporate power" to issue securities stems from the statute, either general or special, under which the corporation is organized. Corporation codes universally require that the charter or articles of incorporation state, at least as to capital shares, maximum limits in terms of number of shares or total dollar capital. Historically, special incorporation statutes are similarly drawn and sometimes similarly limit the face amount of authorized debt securities. The theory is that issue of securities in excess of the authorized amounts is prohibited. See, for example, McWilliams v. Geddes & Moss Undertaking Co., 169 So. 894 (1936, La.); Crawford v. Twin City Oil Co., 216 Ala. 216, 113 So. 61 (1927); New York and New Haven R.R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N.Y. 30 (1865). This conception persists despite modern corporation codes under which, by action of directors and stockholders, additional shares can be authorized by charter amendment and thereafter issued. This section does not give a person entitled to validation, issue, or reissue of a security, the right to compel amendment of the charter to authorize additional shares. Therefore, in a case where issue of an additional security would require charter amendment, the plaintiff is limited to the two alternate remedies set forth in subsections (c) and (d). The last clause of subsection (a), which is added in Revised Article 8, does, however, recognize that under modern conditions, overissue may be a relatively minor technical problem that can be cured by appropriate action under governing corporate law.
2. Where an identical security is reasonably available for purchase, whether because traded on an organized market, or because one or more security owners may be willing to sell at a not unreasonable price, the issuer, although unable to issue additional shares, will be able to purchase them and may be compelled to follow that procedure. West v. Tintic Standard Mining Co., 71 Utah 158, 263 P. 490 (1928).
3. The right to recover damages from an issuer who has permitted an overissue to occur is well settled. New York and New Haven R.R. Co. v. Schuyler, 34 N.Y. 30 (1865). The measure of such damages, however, has been open to question, some courts basing them upon the value of stock at the time registration is refused; some upon the value at the time of trial; and some upon the highest value between the time of refusal and the time of trial. Allen v. South Boston Railroad, 150 Mass. 200, 22 N.E. 917, 5 L.R.A. 716, 15 Am.St.Rep. 185 (1889); Commercial Bank v. Kortright, 22 Wend. (N.Y.) 348 (1839). The purchase price of the security to the last purchaser who gave value for it is here adopted as being the fairest means of reducing the possibility of speculation by the purchaser. Interest may be recovered as the best available measure of compensation for delay.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-210, is unchanged in substance from prior Section 36-8-104, except for (1) the reordering and stylistic rewriting of the material and (2) addition of the last phrase of present subsection (a) permitting cure. Otherwise, no substantive change is intended by this Section.
Definitional Cross References
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
Part 3
Transfer Of Certificated and
Uncertificated Securities
Section 36-8-301. Delivery.
(a) Delivery of a certificated security to a purchaser occurs when:
(1) the purchaser acquires possession of the security certificate;
(2) another person, other than a securities intermediary, either acquires possession of the security certificate on behalf of the purchaser or, having previously acquired possession of the certificate, acknowledges that it holds for the purchaser; or
(3) a securities intermediary acting on behalf of the purchaser acquires possession of the security certificate, only if the certificate is in registered form and is (i) registered in the name of the purchaser, (ii) payable to the order of the purchaser, or (iii) specially indorsed to the purchaser by an effective indorsement and has not been indorsed to the securities intermediary or in blank.
(b) Delivery of an uncertificated security to a purchaser occurs when:
(1) the issuer registers the purchaser as the registered owner, upon original issue or registration of transfer; or
(2) another person, other than a securities intermediary, either becomes the registered owner of the uncertificated security on behalf of the purchaser or, having previously become the registered owner, acknowledges that it holds for the purchaser.
Official Comment
1. This section specifies the requirements for "delivery" of securities. Delivery is used in Article 8 to describe the formal steps necessary for a purchaser to acquire a direct interest in a security under this Article. The concept of delivery refers to the implementation of a transaction, not the legal categorization of the transaction which is consummated by delivery. Issuance and transfer are different kinds of transaction, though both may be implemented by delivery. Sale and pledge are different kinds of transfers, but both may be implemented by delivery.
2. Subsection (a) defines delivery with respect to certificated securities. Paragraph (1) deals with simple cases where purchasers themselves acquire physical possession of certificates. Paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (a) specify the circumstances in which delivery to a purchaser can occur although the certificate is in the possession of a person other than the purchaser. Paragraph (2) contains the general rule that a purchaser can take delivery through another person, so long as the other person is actually acting on behalf of the purchaser or acknowledges that it is holding on behalf of the purchaser. Paragraph (2) does not apply to acquisition of possession by a securities intermediary, because a person who holds securities through a securities account acquires a security entitlement, rather than having a direct interest. See Section 8-501. Subsection (a)(3) specifies the limited circumstances in which delivery of security certificates to a securities intermediary is treated as a delivery to the customer. Note that delivery is a method of perfecting a security interest in a certificated security. See Section 9-313(a), (e).
3. Subsection (b) defines delivery with respect to uncertificated securities. Use of the term "delivery" with respect to uncertificated securities, does, at least on first hearing, seem a bit solecistic. The word "delivery" is, however, routinely used in the securities business in a broader sense than manual tradition. For example, settlement by entries on the books of a clearing corporation is commonly called "delivery," as in the expression "delivery versus payment." The diction of this section has the advantage of using the same term for uncertificated securities as for certificated securities, for which delivery is conventional usage. Paragraph (1) of subsection (b) provides that delivery occurs when the purchaser becomes the registered owner of an uncertificated security, either upon original issue or registration of transfer. Paragraph (2) provides for delivery of an uncertificated security through a third person, in a fashion analogous to subsection (a)(2).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-301, represents substantial change from prior law. It replaces subject matter found in former Section 36-8-313(1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(e) and (1)(f). Changes are described briefly below. The matters addressed by former Section 36-8-301 is now found at Section [8-302(a) and (b)].
Prior law used "transfer" to refer to delivery of uncertificated securities (and interests therein, including security interests). See the Official and South Carolina comments to Section [8-313]. The 2000 Revision eliminates "transfer" as a statutory term in this respect. "Delivery," as explained by this Section, is the term used to refer to conveyance of interests in certificated and uncertificated securities. In connection with security entitlements (securities held in the indirect holding system), see Article 5, and particularly Section [8-501(b)].
Prior law at Section 36-8-313 dealt with creation of security interests as a form of delivery or transfer. Matters relating to security interests have been moved to Article 9. This Section continues, with clarification, the basic rules of former law that delivery of a certificated security is based on possession of the certificate by a purchaser or purchaser's agent, and that delivery of an uncertificated security is based upon registration by the issuer of the purchaser or the purchaser's agent.
Subsection (b) recognizes the distinction between the holder of an uncertificated security and its registered owner, protecting the latter in case of the holder's insolvency.
Definitional Cross References
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Effective" Section 8-107
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Registered form" Section 8-102(a)(13)
"Securities intermediary" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
"Special indorsement" Section 8-304(a)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
Section 36-8-302. Rights of purchaser.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c), a purchaser of a certificated or uncertificated security acquires all rights in the security that the transferor had or had power to transfer.
(b) A purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased.
(c) A purchaser of a certificated security who as a previous holder had notice of an adverse claim does not improve its position by taking from a protected purchaser.
Official Comment
1. Subsection (a) provides that a purchaser of a certificated or uncertificated security acquires all rights that the transferor had or had power to transfer. This statement of the familiar "shelter" principle is qualified by the exceptions that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires only that interest, subsection (b), and that a person who does not qualify as a protected purchaser cannot improve its position by taking from a subsequent protected purchaser, subsection (c).
2. Although this section provides that a purchaser acquires a property interest in a certificated or uncertificated security, it does not state that a person can acquire an interest in a security only by purchase. Article 8 also is not a comprehensive codification of all of the law governing the creation or transfer of interests in securities by purchase. For example, the grant of a security interest is a transfer of a property interest, but the formal steps necessary to effectuate such a transfer are governed by Article 9 not by Article 8. Under the Article 9 rules, a security interest in a certificated or uncertificated security can be created by execution of a security agreement under Section 9-203 and can be perfected by filing. A transfer of an Article 9 security interest can be implemented by an Article 8 delivery, but need not be.
Similarly, Article 8 does not determine whether a property interest in certificated or uncertificated security is acquired under other law, such as the law of gifts, trusts, or equitable remedies. Nor does Article 8 deal with transfers by operation of law. For example, transfers from decedent to administrator, from ward to guardian, and from bankrupt to trustee in bankruptcy are governed by other law as to both the time they occur and the substance of the transfer. The Article 8 rules do, however, determine whether the issuer is obligated to recognize the rights that a third party, such as a transferee, may acquire under other law. See Sections 8-207, 8-401, and 8-404.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-302, continues basic shelter rules from prior law. Subsections (a) and (b) replace subject matter found in former Section 36-8-301 and subsection (c) replaces subject matter formerly found in Section 36-8-302(4), deleting the reference to security interests (matters relating to security interests have been moved to Article 9).
Subject matter addressed by former Sections 36-8-302(1) and (3) is now found at Section [8-303(a) and (b)], and subject matter addressed by former Section 36-8-302(b) is now found at Section [8-102(a)(1)].
Definitional Cross References
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Notice of adverse claim" Section 8-105
"Protected purchaser" Section 8-303
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
"Delivery" Section 8-301
Section 36-8-303. Protected purchaser.
(a) 'Protected purchaser' means a purchaser of a certificated or uncertificated security, or of an interest therein, who:
(1) gives value;
(2) does not have notice of any adverse claim to the security; and
(3) obtains control of the certificated or uncertificated security.
(b) In addition to acquiring the rights of a purchaser, a protected purchaser also acquires its interest in the security free of any adverse claim.
Official Comment
1. Subsection (a) lists the requirements that a purchaser must meet to qualify as a "protected purchaser." Subsection (b) provides that a protected purchaser takes its interest free from adverse claims. "Purchaser" is defined broadly in Section 1-201. A secured party as well as an outright buyer can qualify as a protected purchaser. Also, "purchase" includes taking by issue, so a person to whom a security is originally issued can qualify as a protected purchaser.
2. To qualify as a protected purchaser, a purchaser must give value, take without notice of any adverse claim, and obtain control. Value is used in the broad sense defined in Section 1-201(44). See also Section 8-116 (securities intermediary as purchaser for value). Adverse claim is defined in Section 8-102(a)(1). Section 8-105 specifies whether a purchaser has notice of an adverse claim. Control is defined in Section 8-106. To qualify as a protected purchaser there must be a time at which all of the requirements are satisfied. Thus if a purchaser obtains notice of an adverse claim before giving value or satisfying the requirements for control, the purchaser cannot be a protected purchaser. See also Section 8-304(d).
The requirement that a protected purchaser obtain control expresses the point that to qualify for the adverse claim cut-off rule a purchaser must take through a transaction that is implemented by the appropriate mechanism. By contrast, the rules in Part 2 provide that any purchaser for value of a security without notice of a defense may take free of the issuer's defense based on that defense. See Section 8-202.
3. The requirements for control differ depending on the form of the security. For securities represented by bearer certificates, a purchaser obtains control by delivery. See Sections 8-106(a) and 8-301(a). For securities represented by certificates in registered form, the requirements for control are: (1) delivery as defined in Section 8-301(b), plus (2) either an effective indorsement or registration of transfer by the issuer. See Section 8-106(b). Thus, a person who takes through a forged indorsement does not qualify as a protected purchaser by virtue of the delivery alone. If, however, the purchaser presents the certificate to the issuer for registration of transfer, and the issuer registers transfer over the forged indorsement, the purchaser can qualify as a protected purchaser of the new certificate. If the issuer registers transfer on a forged indorsement, the true owner will be able to recover from the issuer for wrongful registration, see Section 8-404, unless the owner's delay in notifying the issuer of a loss or theft of the certificate results in preclusion under Section 8-406.
For uncertificated securities, a purchaser can obtain control either by delivery, see Sections 8-106(c)(1) and 8-301(b), or by obtaining an agreement pursuant to which the issuer agrees to act on instructions from the purchaser without further consent from the registered owner, see Section 8-106(c)(2). The control agreement device of Section 8-106(c)(2) takes the place of the "registered pledge" concept of the 1978 version of Article 8. A secured lender who obtains a control agreement under Section 8-106(c)(2) can qualify as a protected purchaser of an uncertificated security.
4. This section states directly the rules determining whether one takes free from adverse claims without using the phrase "good faith." Whether a person who takes under suspicious circumstances is disqualified is determined by the rules of Section 8-105 on notice of adverse claims. The term "protected purchaser," which replaces the term "bona fide purchaser" used in the prior version of Article 8, is derived from the term "protected holder" used in the Convention on International Bills and Notes prepared by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL").
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-303, replaces concepts formerly found in Sections 36-8-302(1) and (3). The subject matter of former Section 36-8-303 is now found at Section [8-102(a)(1)].
This Section replaces the "bona fide purchaser" concept of prior law with "protected purchaser." Protected purchaser is a key concept in revised Article 8. Subsection (b) provides that a protected purchaser "acquires its interest in the security free of any adverse claim." This means that the obverse of the shelter principle -- that a transferee cannot acquire more than the rights of the transferor -- does not always operate under Article 8. A frequently cited example is that one qualifying as a protected purchaser, buying from a thief, takes free of the claim of the rightful owner.
The requirement of "good faith" found in former Section 36-8-302 is deleted from this Section. Its function is now performed by Section [8-105] relating to adverse claims. That Section is more explicit, and narrower, than the former good-faith standard.
Applying the shelter principle of Section [8-302(a)], a purchaser from a protected purchaser takes free of adverse claims (subject to the limitation of Section [8-302(c)]), regardless of whether the purchase qualifies as a protected purchaser.
The policies underlying the rights of protected purchasers are clarity and finality in securities transactions, contributing to the confidence of purchasers and consequent liquidity of the securities markets.
Definitional Cross References
"Adverse claim" Section 8-102(a)(1)
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Control" Section 8-106
"Notice of adverse claim" Section 8-105
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
"Value" Sections 1-201(44) & 8-116
Section 36-8-304. Indorsement.
(a) An indorsement may be in blank or special. An indorsement in blank includes an indorsement to bearer. A special indorsement specifies to whom a security is to be transferred or who has power to transfer it. A holder may convert a blank indorsement to a special indorsement.
(b) An indorsement purporting to be only of part of a security certificate representing units intended by the issuer to be separately transferable is effective to the extent of the indorsement.
(c) An indorsement, whether special or in blank, does not constitute a transfer until delivery of the certificate on which it appears or, if the indorsement is on a separate document, until delivery of both the document and the certificate.
(d) If a security certificate in registered form has been delivered to a purchaser without a necessary indorsement, the purchaser may become a protected purchaser only when the indorsement is supplied. However, against a transferor, a transfer is complete upon delivery and the purchaser has a specifically enforceable right to have any necessary indorsement supplied.
(e) An indorsement of a security certificate in bearer form may give notice of an adverse claim to the certificate, but it does not otherwise affect a right to registration that the holder possesses.
(f) Unless otherwise agreed, a person making an indorsement assumes only the obligations provided in Section 36-8-108 and not an obligation that the security will be honored by the issuer.
Official Comment
1. By virtue of the definition of indorsement in Section 8-102 and the rules of this section, the simplified method of indorsing certificated securities previously set forth in the Uniform Stock Transfer Act is continued. Although more than one special indorsement on a given security certificate is possible, the desire for dividends or interest, as the case may be, should operate to bring the certificate home for registration of transfer within a reasonable period of time. The usual form of assignment which appears on the back of a stock certificate or in a separate "power" may be filled up either in the form of an assignment, a power of attorney to transfer, or both. If it is not filled up at all but merely signed, the indorsement is in blank. If filled up either as an assignment or as a power of attorney to transfer, the indorsement is special.
2. Subsection (b) recognizes the validity of a "partial" indorsement, e.g., as to fifty shares of the one hundred represented by a single certificate. The rights of a transferee under a partial indorsement to the status of a protected purchaser are left to the case law.
3. Subsection (c) deals with the effect of an indorsement without delivery. There must be a voluntary parting with control in order to effect a valid transfer of a certificated security as between the parties. Levey v. Nason, 279 Mass. 268, 181 N.E. 193 (1932), and National Surety Co. v. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, 237 App.Div. 485, 261 N.Y.S. 605 (1933). The provision in Section 10 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act that an attempted transfer without delivery amounts to a promise to transfer is omitted. Even under that Act the effect of such a promise was left to the applicable law of contracts, and this Article by making no reference to such situations intends to achieve a similar result. With respect to delivery there is no counterpart to subsection (d) on right to compel indorsement, such as is envisaged in Johnson v. Johnson, 300 Mass. 24, 13 N.E.2d 788 (1938), where the transferee under a written assignment was given the right to compel a transfer of the certificate.
4. Subsection (d) deals with the effect of delivery without indorsement. As between the parties the transfer is made complete upon delivery, but the transferee cannot become a protected purchaser until indorsement is made. The indorsement does not operate retroactively, and notice may intervene between delivery and indorsement so as to prevent the transferee from becoming a protected purchaser. Although a purchaser taking without a necessary indorsement may be subject to claims of ownership, any issuer's defense of which the purchaser had no notice at the time of delivery will be cut off, since the provisions of this Article protect all purchasers for value without notice (Section 8-202).
The transferee's right to compel an indorsement where a security certificate has been delivered with intent to transfer is recognized in the case law. See Coats v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co., 170 La. 871, 129 So. 513 (1930). A proper indorsement is one of the requisites of transfer which a purchaser of a certificated security has a right to obtain (Section 8-307). A purchaser may not only compel an indorsement under that section but may also recover for any reasonable expense incurred by the transferor's failure to respond to the demand for an indorsement.
5. Subsection (e) deals with the significance of an indorsement on a security certificate in bearer form. The concept of indorsement applies only to registered securities. A purported indorsement of bearer paper is normally of no effect. An indorsement "for collection," "for surrender" or the like, charges a purchaser with notice of adverse claims (Section 8-105(d)) but does not operate beyond this to interfere with any right the holder may otherwise possess to have the security registered.
6. Subsection (f) makes clear that the indorser of a security certificate does not warrant that the issuer will honor the underlying obligation. In view of the nature of investment securities and the circumstances under which they are normally transferred, a transferor cannot be held to warrant as to the issuer's actions. As a transferor the indorser, of course, remains liable for breach of the warranties set forth in this Article (Section 8-108).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-304, includes concepts formerly found in Sections 36-8-307, 36-8-308(2) and (3), 36-8-309 and 36-8-310. The subject matter of former Section 36-8-304(1) is now found at Section [8-105(d)], and that of former Section 36-8-304(3) at Section [8-105(b)]. Former Section 36-8-304(2) has been omitted along with all other references to transaction statements.
Subsection (a) is essentially definitional. It continues without substantive change the rules of former Section 36-8-308(2).
Subsection (b) continues without substantive change the rule of former Section 36-8-308(3).
Subsection (c) continues without substantive change the rule for former Section 36-8-309.
Subsection (d) continues the rule of former Section 36-8-307, substituting the concept of "protected purchaser" for that of "bona fide purchaser." Concerning the effect of this change, see Section [8-303] and its Official and South Carolina Reporter's comments.
Subsection (e) continues without substantive change the rule of former Section 36-8-310.
Subsection (f) continues the rule of former Section 36-8-308(9) that an indorser's obligations are limited. Under prior law these obligations were described at Section 36-8-306. They are now found at Section [8-108]. For a comparison see the South Carolina Reporter's Comment to Section [8-108].
Definitional Cross References
"Bearer form" Section 8-102(a)(2)
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Indorsement" Section 8-102(a)(11)
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Registered form" Section 8-102(a)(13)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
Section 36-8-305. Instruction.
(a) If an instruction has been originated by an appropriate person but is incomplete in any other respect, any person may complete it as authorized and the issuer may rely on it as completed, even though it has been completed incorrectly.
(b) Unless otherwise agreed, a person initiating an instruction assumes only the obligations imposed by Section 36-8-108 and not an obligation that the security will be honored by the issuer.
Official Comment
1. The term instruction is defined in Section 8-102(a)(12) as a notification communicated to the issuer of an uncertificated security directing that transfer be registered. Section 8-107 specifies who may initiate an effective instruction.
Functionally, presentation of an instruction is quite similar to the presentation of an indorsed certificate for reregistration. Note that instruction is defined in terms of "communicate," see Section 8-102(a)(6). Thus, the instruction may be in the form of a writing signed by the registered owner or in any other form agreed upon by the issuer and the registered owner. Allowing nonwritten forms of instructions will permit the development and employment of means of transmitting instructions electronically.
When a person who originates an instruction leaves a blank and the blank later is completed, subsection (a) gives the issuer the same rights it would have had against the originating person had that person completed the blank. This is true regardless of whether the person completing the instruction had authority to complete it. Compare Section 8-206 and its Comment, dealing with blanks left upon issue.
2. Subsection (b) makes clear that the originator of an instruction, like the indorser of a security certificate, does not warrant that the issuer will honor the underlying obligation, but does make warranties as a transferor under Section 8-108.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-305, incorporates concepts formerly found in Sections 36-8-308(5) and 36-8-308(9). The subject matter of former Section 36-8-305 is now found at Section [8-105(c)].
Subsection (a) is not substantively changed from former Section 36-8-308(5) except that the definition of "instruction originated by an appropriate person" which introduced that subsection is now derived from Sections [8-102(a)(12)] ("instruction") and [8-107] ("appropriate person").
Subsection (b) continues the rule of former Section 36-8-308(9) that an indorser's obligations are limited. Under prior law these obligations were described at Section 36-8-306. They are now found at Section [8-108]. For a comparison see the South Carolina Reporter's Comment to Section [8-108].
Definitional Cross References
"Appropriate person" Section 8-107
"Instruction" Section 8-102(a)(12)
"Issuer" Section 8-201
Section 36-8-306. Effect of guaranteeing signature, indorsement, or instruction.
(a) A person who guarantees a signature of an indorser of a security certificate warrants that at the time of signing:
(1) the signature was genuine;
(2) the signer was an appropriate person to indorse, or if the signature is by an agent, the agent had actual authority to act on behalf of the appropriate person; and
(3) the signer had legal capacity to sign.
(b) A person who guarantees a signature of the originator of an instruction warrants that at the time of signing:
(1) the signature was genuine;
(2) the signer was an appropriate person to originate the instruction, or if the signature is by an agent, the agent had actual authority to act on behalf of the appropriate person, if the person specified in the instruction as the registered owner was, in fact, the registered owner, as to which fact the signature guarantor does not make a warranty; and
(3) the signer had legal capacity to sign.
(c) A person who specially guarantees the signature of an originator of an instruction makes the warranties of a signature guarantor under subsection (b) and also warrants that at the time the instruction is presented to the issuer:
(1) the person specified in the instruction as the registered owner of the uncertificated security will be the registered owner; and
(2) the transfer of the uncertificated security requested in the instruction will be registered by the issuer free from all liens, security interests, restrictions, and claims other than those specified in the instruction.
(d) A guarantor under subsections (a) and (b) or a special guarantor under subsection (c) does not otherwise warrant the rightfulness of the transfer.
(e) A person who guarantees an indorsement of a security certificate makes the warranties of a signature guarantor under subsection (a) and also warrants the rightfulness of the transfer in all respects.
(f) A person who guarantees an instruction requesting the transfer of an uncertificated security makes the warranties of a special signature guarantor under subsection (c) and also warrants the rightfulness of the transfer in all respects.
(g) An issuer may not require a special guaranty of signature, a guaranty of indorsement, or a guaranty of instruction as a condition to registration of transfer.
(h) The warranties under this section are made to a person taking or dealing with the security in reliance on the guaranty, and the guarantor is liable to the person for loss resulting from their breach. An indorser or originator of an instruction whose signature, indorsement, or instruction has been guaranteed is liable to a guarantor for any loss suffered by the guarantor as a result of breach of the warranties of the guarantor.
Official Comment
1. Subsection (a) provides that a guarantor of the signature of the indorser of a security certificate warrants that the signature is genuine, that the signer is an appropriate person or has actual authority to indorse on behalf of the appropriate person, and that the signer has legal capacity. Subsection (b) provides similar, though not identical, warranties for the guarantor of a signature of the originator of an instruction for transfer of an uncertificated security.
Appropriate person is defined in Section 8-107(a) to include a successor or person who has power under other law to act for a person who is deceased or lacks capacity. Thus if a certificate registered in the name of Mary Roe is indorsed by Jane Doe as executor of Mary Roe, a guarantor of the signature of Jane Doe warrants that she has power to act as executor.
Although the definition of appropriate person in Section 8-107(a) does not itself include an agent, an indorsement by an agent is effective under Section 8-107(b) if the agent has authority to act for the appropriate person. Accordingly, this section provides an explicit warranty of authority for agents.
2. The rationale of the principle that a signature guarantor warrants the authority of the signer, rather than simply the genuineness of the signature, was explained in the leading case of Jennie Clarkson Home for Children v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 182 N.Y. 47, 74 N.E. 571, 70 A.L.R. 787 (1905), which dealt with a guaranty of the signature of a person indorsing on behalf of a corporation. "If stock is held by an individual who is executing a power of attorney for its transfer, the member of the exchange who signs as a witness thereto guaranties not only the genuineness of the signature affixed to the power of attorney, but that the person signing is the individual in whose name the stock stands. With reference to stock standing in the name of a corporation, which can only sign a power of attorney through its authorized officers or agents, a different situation is presented. If the witnessing of the signature of the corporation is only that of the signature of a person who signs for the corporation, then the guaranty is of no value, and there is nothing to protect purchasers or the companies who are called upon to issue new stock in the place of that transferred from the frauds of persons who have signed the names of corporations without authority. If such is the only effect of the guaranty, purchasers and transfer agents must first go to the corporation in whose name the stock stands and ascertain whether the individual who signed the power of attorney had authority to so do. This will require time, and in many cases will necessitate the postponement of the completion of the purchase by the payment of the money until the facts can be ascertained. The broker who is acting for the owner has an opportunity to become acquainted with his customer, and may readily before sale ascertain, in case of a corporation, the name of the officer who is authorized to execute the power of attorney. It was therefore, we think, the purpose of the rule to cast upon the broker who witnesses the signature the duty of ascertaining whether the person signing the name of the corporation had authority to so do, and making the witness a guarantor that it is the signature of the corporation in whose name the stock stands."
3. Subsection (b) sets forth the warranties that can reasonably be expected from the guarantor of the signature of the originator of an instruction, who, though familiar with the signer, does not have any evidence that the purported owner is in fact the owner of the subject uncertificated security. This is in contrast to the position of the person guaranteeing a signature on a certificate who can see a certificate in the signer's possession in the name of or indorsed to the signer or in blank. Thus, the warranty in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) is expressly conditioned on the actual registration's conforming to that represented by the originator. If the signer purports to be the owner, the guarantor under paragraph (2), warrants only the identity of the signer. If, however, the signer is acting in a representative capacity, the guarantor warrants both the signer's identity and authority to act for the purported owner. The issuer needs no warranty as to the facts of registration because those facts can be ascertained from the issuer's own records.
4. Subsection (c) sets forth a "special guaranty of signature" under which the guarantor additionally warrants both registered ownership and freedom from undisclosed defects of record. The guarantor of the signature of an indorser of a security certificate effectively makes these warranties to a purchaser for value on the evidence of a clean certificate issued in the name of the indorser, indorsed to the indorser or indorsed in blank. By specially guaranteeing under subsection (c), the guarantor warrants that the instruction will, when presented to the issuer, result in the requested registration free from defects not specified.
5. Subsection (d) makes clear that the warranties of a signature guarantor are limited to those specified in this section and do not include a general warranty of rightfulness. On the other hand subsections (e) and (f) provide that a person guaranteeing an indorsement or an instruction does warrant that the transfer is rightful in all respects.
6. Subsection (g) makes clear what can be inferred from the combination of Sections 8-401 and 8-402, that the issuer may not require as a condition to transfer a guaranty of the indorsement or instruction nor may it require a special signature guaranty.
7. Subsection (h) specifies to whom the warranties in this section run, and also provides that a person who gives a guaranty under this section has an action against the indorser or originator for any loss suffered by the guarantor.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-306, incorporates concepts formerly found in Sections 36-8-306(6) and 36-8-312. The balance of the subject matter of former Section 36-8-306 is now found at Section [8-108] with the exception of former subsection (8) relating to registered pledges of uncertificated, which has been omitted.
Subsections (a) and (b) are substantively identical to former Section 36-8-312(1) and (2), with the addition of the warranty of actual authority of agents found in subsections (a)(2) and (b)(2). The warranty of the owner or pledgee's taxpayer identification number found in former Section 36-8-12(2)(d) has been deleted.
Subsection (c) is substantively identical to former Section 36-8-312(3) except for the deletion of the reference to pledgees in subsection (c)(1).
Subsection (d) is substantively identical to former Section 36-8-312(4) except for the deletion of the reference to pledge.
Subsection (e) is substantively identical to former Section 36-8-312(5).
Subsection (f) is substantively identical to former Section 36-8-312(6) except for the deletion of the reference to pledge.
Subsection (g) is substantively identical to former Section 36-8-312(7) except for the deletion of the reference to pledge.
The first sentence of subsection (h) is substantively identical to former Section 36-8-312(8). The second sentence is a rewritten version of former Section 36-8-306(6), with references to pledges deleted.
Definitional Cross References
"Appropriate person" Section 8-107
"Genuine" Section 1-201(18)
"Indorsement" Section 8-102(a)(11)
"Instruction" Section 8-102(a)(12)
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
Section 36-8-307. Purchaser's right to requisites for registration of transfer.
Unless otherwise agreed, the transferor of a security on due demand shall supply the purchaser with proof of authority to transfer or with any other requisite necessary to obtain registration of the transfer of the security, but if the transfer is not for value, a transferor need not comply unless the purchaser pays the necessary expenses. If the transferor fails within a reasonable time to comply with the demand, the purchaser may reject or rescind the transfer.
Official Comment
1. Because registration of the transfer of a security is a matter of vital importance, a purchaser is here provided with the means of obtaining such formal requirements for registration as signature guaranties, proof of authority, transfer tax stamps and the like. The transferor is the one in a position to supply most conveniently whatever documentation may be requisite for registration of transfer, and the duty to do so upon demand within a reasonable time is here stated affirmatively. If an essential item is peculiarly within the province of the transferor so that the transferor is the only one who can obtain it, the purchaser may specifically enforce the right to obtain it. Compare Section 8-304(d). If a transfer is not for value the transferor need not pay expenses.
2. If the transferor's duty is not performed the transferee may reject or rescind the contract to transfer. The transferee is not bound to do so. An action for damages for breach of contract may be preferred.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-307, incorporates the subject matter of former Sections 36-8-316. The subject matter of former Section 8-307 is now found at Section [8-304(d)].
The duties of transferors on demand described in this Section are the same as those in former law. The separate references to uncertificated securities have been deleted, as have references to pledges.
Definitional Cross References
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Value" Sections 1-201(44) & 8-116
Part 4
Registration
Section 36-8-401. Duty of issuer to register transfer.
(a) If a certificated security in registered form is presented to an issuer with a request to register transfer or an instruction is presented to an issuer with a request to register transfer of an uncertificated security, the issuer shall register the transfer as requested if:
(1) under the terms of the security the person seeking registration of transfer is eligible to have the security registered in its name;
(2) the indorsement or instruction is made by the appropriate person or by an agent who has actual authority to act on behalf of the appropriate person;
(3) reasonable assurance is given that the indorsement or instruction is genuine and authorized under Section 36-8-402;
(4) any applicable law relating to the collection of taxes has been complied with;
(5) the transfer does not violate any restriction on transfer imposed by the issuer in accordance with Section 36-8-204;
(6) a demand that the issuer not register transfer has not become effective under Section 36-8-403, or the issuer has complied with Section 36-8-403(b) but no legal process or indemnity bond is obtained as provided in Section 36-8-403(d); and
(7) the transfer is in fact rightful or is to a protected purchaser.
(b) If an issuer is under a duty to register a transfer of a security, the issuer is liable to a person presenting a certificated security or an instruction for registration or to the person's principal for loss resulting from unreasonable delay in registration or failure or refusal to register the transfer.
Official Comment
1. This section states the duty of the issuer to register transfers. A duty exists only if certain preconditions exist. If any of the preconditions do not exist, there is no duty to register transfer. If an indorsement on a security certificate is a forgery, there is no duty. If an instruction to transfer an uncertificated security is not originated by an appropriate person, there is no duty. If there has not been compliance with applicable tax laws, there is no duty. If a security certificate is properly indorsed but nevertheless the transfer is in fact wrongful, there is no duty unless the transfer is to a protected purchaser (and the other preconditions exist).
This section does not constitute a mandate that the issuer must establish that all preconditions are met before the issuer registers a transfer. The issuer may waive the reasonable assurances specified in paragraph (a)(3). If it has confidence in the responsibility of the persons requesting transfer, it may ignore questions of compliance with tax laws. Although an issuer has no duty if the transfer is wrongful, the issuer has no duty to inquire into adverse claims, see Section 8-404.
2. By subsection (b) the person entitled to registration may not only compel it but may hold the issuer liable in damages for unreasonable delay.
3. Section 8-201(c) provides that with respect to registration of transfer, "issuer" means the person on whose behalf transfer books are maintained. Transfer agents, registrars or the like within the scope of their respective functions have rights and duties under this Part similar to those of the issuer. See Section 8-407.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-401, modifies former Section 35-8-401. As the Official Comment observes, an issuer may register a transfer even if the requirements of this Section are not met, but, if all are met, registration is a duty.
This Section, taken together with other Sections in Part 4 of Article 8 and especially Section [8-404], change significantly the exposure of issuers registering transfers. See Section [8-404] and its Official and South Carolina comments.
The references to pledges in subsection (a) of the prior version are deleted, the law governing security interests having been moved to Article 9. The requirements of subsections (a)(1) and (a)(5), compliance with restrictions on transfer, are new. Reference to action by an agent is added to subsection (a)(2), making explicit what was implied under the prior version. The use of "authorized" in subsection (a)(3) similarly contemplates action by an agent. Subsection (a)(4) is not substantively changed from prior subsection 36-8-401(1)(d).
Subsection (a)(6) replaces former Section 36-8-401(1)(c), referring to absence of notice of wrongfulness of registration of transfer under Section [8-403]. Section [8-403] is significantly changed from prior law, as described in the South Carolina Reporter's Comment to Section [8-403].
Subsection (a)(7) replaces former Section 36-8-401(e), eliminating the reference to pledges and substituting "protected purchaser" for the concept of "bona fide purchaser" used in the former version. See Section [8-303].
Subsection (b) is substantively unchanged from prior law except for the deletion of prior law's references to pledges. Rules concerning pledges have been moved to Article 9.
Definitional Cross References
"Appropriate person" Section 8-107
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Genuine" Section 1-201(18)
"Indorsement" Section 8-102(a)(11)
"Instruction" Section 8-102(a)(12)
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Protected purchaser" Section 8-303
"Registered form" Section 8-102(a)(13)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
Section 36-8-402. Assurance that indorsement or instruction is effective.
(a) An issuer may require the following assurance that each necessary indorsement or each instruction is genuine and authorized:
(1) in all cases, a guaranty of the signature of the person making an indorsement or originating an instruction including, in the case of an instruction, reasonable assurance of identity;
(2) if the indorsement is made or the instruction is originated by an agent, appropriate assurance of actual authority to sign;
(3) if the indorsement is made or the instruction is originated by a fiduciary pursuant to Section 36-8-107(a)(4) or (a)(5), appropriate evidence of appointment or incumbency;
(4) if there is more than one fiduciary, reasonable assurance that all who are required to sign have done so; and
(5) if the indorsement is made or the instruction is originated by a person not covered by another provision of this subsection, assurance appropriate to the case corresponding as nearly as may be to the provisions of this subsection.
(b) An issuer may elect to require reasonable assurance beyond that specified in this section.
(c) In this section:
(1) 'Guaranty of the signature' means a guaranty signed by or on behalf of a person reasonably believed by the issuer to be responsible. An issuer may adopt standards with respect to responsibility if they are not manifestly unreasonable.
(2) 'Appropriate evidence of appointment or incumbency' means:
(i) in the case of a fiduciary appointed or qualified by a court, a certificate issued by or under the direction or supervision of the court or an officer thereof and dated within sixty days before the date of presentation for transfer; or
(ii) in any other case, a copy of a document showing the appointment or a certificate issued by or on behalf of a person reasonably believed by an issuer to be responsible or, in the absence of that document or certificate, other evidence the issuer reasonably considers appropriate.
Official Comment
1. An issuer is absolutely liable for wrongful registration of transfer if the indorsement or instruction is ineffective. See Section 8-404. Accordingly, an issuer is entitled to require such assurance as is reasonable under the circumstances that all necessary indorsements are effective, and thus to minimize its risk. This section establishes the requirements the issuer may make in terms of documentation which, except in the rarest of instances, should be easily furnished. Subsection (b) provides that an issuer may require additional assurances if that requirement is reasonable under the circumstances, but if the issuer demands more than reasonable assurance that the instruction or the necessary indorsements are genuine and authorized, the presenter may refuse the demand and sue for improper refusal to register. Section 8-401(b).
2. Under subsection (a)(1), the issuer may require in all cases a guaranty of signature. See Section 8-306. When an instruction is presented the issuer always may require reasonable assurance as to the identity of the originator. Subsection (c) allows the issuer to require that the person making these guaranties be one reasonably believed to be responsible, and the issuer may adopt standards of responsibility which are not manifestly unreasonable. Regulations under the federal securities laws, however, place limits on the requirements transfer agents may impose concerning the responsibility of eligible signature guarantors. See 17 CFR 240.17Ad-15.
3. This section, by paragraphs (2) through (5) of subsection (a), permits the issuer to seek confirmation that the indorsement or instruction is genuine and authorized. The permitted methods act as a double check on matters which are within the warranties of the signature guarantor. See Section 8-306. Thus, an agent may be required to submit a power of attorney, a corporation to submit a certified resolution evidencing the authority of its signing officer to sign, an executor or administrator to submit the usual "short-form certificate," etc. But failure of a fiduciary to obtain court approval of the transfer or to comply with other requirements does not make the fiduciary's signature ineffective. Section 8-107(c). Hence court orders and other controlling instruments are omitted from subsection (a).
Subsection (a)(3) authorizes the issuer to require "appropriate evidence" of appointment or incumbency, and subsection (c) indicates what evidence will be "appropriate". In the case of a fiduciary appointed or qualified by a court that evidence will be a court certificate dated within sixty days before the date of presentation, subsection (c)(2)(i). Where the fiduciary is not appointed or qualified by a court, as in the case of a successor trustee, subsection (c)(2)(ii) applies. In that case, the issuer may require a copy of a trust instrument or other document showing the appointment, or it may require the certificate of a responsible person. In the absence of such a document or certificate, it may require other appropriate evidence. If the security is registered in the name of the fiduciary as such, the person's signature is effective even though the person is no longer serving in that capacity, see Section 8-107(d), hence no evidence of incumbency is needed.
4. Circumstances may indicate that a necessary signature was unauthorized or was not that of an appropriate person. Such circumstances would be ignored at risk of absolute liability. To minimize that risk the issuer may properly exercise the option given by subsection (b) to require assurance beyond that specified in subsection (a). On the other hand, the facts at hand may reflect only on the rightfulness of the transfer. Such facts do not create a duty of inquiry, because the issuer is not liable to an adverse claimant unless the claimant obtains legal process. See Section 8-404.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-402, modifies former Section 35-8-402. Together with other Sections in Part 4 of Article 8 and especially Section [8-404], this Section changes significantly the exposure of issuers in registering transfers. See Section [8-404] and its Official and South Carolina comments.
This Section describes the assurances which an issuer may require before registering a transfer; see Section [8-401(a)(3)]. Subsection (a) is changed from prior subsection (1) by word changes adopting the lexicon of the Revision and by specific allusion to a fiduciary's status as an "appropriate person."
Subsection (b) is a revision of former subsection (4), making clear that this Section is not exclusive as a source of "reasonable assurances," and deleting former references to notice arising out of instruments bearing on the rightfulness of the transfer.
Subsection (c)(1), defining "guaranty of signature," is not substantively changed from former subsection (2).
Subsections (c)(2)(i) and (ii), defining "appropriate evidence," are analogous to former subsections (3)(a) and (b) and are substantively similar to those subsections except for the deletion of the former reference to certain documents as sources of notice of wrongfulness of transfers.
Definitional Cross References
"Appropriate person" Section 8-107
"Genuine" Section 1-201(18)
"Indorsement" Section 8-102(a)(11)
"Instruction" Section 8-102(a)(12)
"Issuer" Section 8-201
Section 36-8-403. Demand that issuer not register transfer.
(a) A person who is an appropriate person to make an indorsement or originate an instruction may demand that the issuer not register transfer of a security by communicating to the issuer a notification that identifies the registered owner and the issue of which the security is a part and provides an address for communications directed to the person making the demand. The demand is effective only if it is received by the issuer at a time and in a manner affording the issuer reasonable opportunity to act on it.
(b) If a certificated security in registered form is presented to an issuer with a request to register transfer or an instruction is presented to an issuer with a request to register transfer of an uncertificated security after a demand that the issuer not register transfer has become effective, the issuer shall promptly communicate to (i) the person who initiated the demand at the address provided in the demand and (ii) the person who presented the security for registration of transfer or initiated the instruction requesting registration of transfer a notification stating that:
(1) the certificated security has been presented for registration of transfer or the instruction for registration of transfer of the uncertificated security has been received;
(2) a demand that the issuer not register transfer had previously been received; and
(3) the issuer will withhold registration of transfer for a period of time stated in the notification in order to provide the person who initiated the demand an opportunity to obtain legal process or an indemnity bond.
(c) The period described in subsection (b)(3) may not exceed thirty days after the date of communication of the notification. A shorter period may be specified by the issuer if it is not manifestly unreasonable.
(d) An issuer is not liable to a person who initiated a demand that the issuer not register transfer for any loss the person suffers as a result of registration of a transfer pursuant to an effective indorsement or instruction if the person who initiated the demand does not, within the time stated in the issuer's communication, either:
(1) obtain an appropriate restraining order, injunction, or other process from a court of competent jurisdiction enjoining the issuer from registering the transfer; or
(2) file with the issuer an indemnity bond, sufficient in the issuer's judgment to protect the issuer and any transfer agent, registrar, or other agent of the issuer involved from any loss it or they may suffer by refusing to register the transfer.
(e) This section does not relieve an issuer from liability for registering transfer pursuant to an indorsement or instruction that was not effective.
Official Comment
1. The general rule under this Article is that if there has been an effective indorsement or instruction, a person who contends that registration of the transfer would be wrongful should not be able to interfere with the registration process merely by sending notice of the assertion to the issuer. Rather, the claimant must obtain legal process. See Section 8-404. Section 8-403 is an exception to this general rule. It permits the registered owner -- but not third parties -- to demand that the issuer not register a transfer.
2. This section is intended to alleviate the problems faced by registered owners of certificated securities who lose or misplace their certificates. A registered owner who realizes that a certificate may have been lost or stolen should promptly report that fact to the issuer, lest the owner be precluded from asserting a claim for wrongful registration. See Section 8-406. The usual practice of issuers and transfer agents is that when a certificate is reported as lost, the owner is notified that a replacement can be obtained if the owner provides an indemnity bond. See Section 8-405. If the registered owner does not plan to transfer the securities, the owner might choose not to obtain a replacement, particularly if the owner suspects that the certificate has merely been misplaced.
Under this section, the owner's notification that the certificate has been lost would constitute a demand that the issuer not register transfer. No indemnity bond or legal process is necessary. If the original certificate is presented for registration of transfer, the issuer is required to notify the registered owner of that fact, and defer registration of transfer for a stated period. In order to prevent undue delay in the process of registration, the stated period may not exceed thirty days. This gives the registered owner an opportunity to either obtain legal process or post an indemnity bond and thereby prevent the issuer from registering transfer.
3. Subsection (e) makes clear that this section does not relieve an issuer from liability for registering a transfer pursuant to an ineffective indorsement. An issuer's liability for wrongful registration in such cases does not depend on the presence or absence of notice that the indorsement was ineffective. Registered owners who are confident that they neither indorsed the certificates, nor did anything that would preclude them from denying the effectiveness of another's indorsement, see Sections 8-107(b) and 8-406, might prefer to pursue their rights against the issuer for wrongful registration rather than take advantage of the opportunity to post a bond or seek a restraining order when notified by the issuer under this section that their lost certificates have been presented for registration in apparently good order.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-403, modifies former Section 35-8-403. Together with other Sections in Part 4 of Article 8 especially Section [8-404], this Section changes significantly the exposure of issuers in registering transfers. See Section [8-404] and its Official and South Carolina comments.
Section [8-404(2)] provides that one manner in which issuers can be put on notice to investigate the bona fides of a request to transfer is by a third-party demand that the issuer not register a transfer. This Section describes the characteristics of such a demand.
Definitional Cross References
"Appropriate person" Section 8-107
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Communicate" Section 8-102(a)(6)
"Effective" Section 8-107
"Indorsement" Section 8-102(a)(11)
"Instruction" Section 8-102(a)(12)
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Registered form" Section 8-102(a)(13)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
Section 36-8-404. Wrongful registration.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-8-406, an issuer is liable for wrongful registration of transfer if the issuer has registered a transfer of a security to a person not entitled to it, and the transfer was registered:
(1) pursuant to an ineffective indorsement or instruction;
(2) after a demand that the issuer not register transfer became effective under Section 36-8-403(a) and the issuer did not comply with Section 36-8-403(b);
(3) after the issuer had been served with an injunction, restraining order, or other legal process enjoining it from registering the transfer, issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, and the issuer had a reasonable opportunity to act on the injunction, restraining order, or other legal process; or
(4) by an issuer acting in collusion with the wrongdoer.
(b) An issuer that is liable for wrongful registration of transfer under subsection (a) on demand shall provide the person entitled to the security with a like certificated or uncertificated security, and any payments or distributions that the person did not receive as a result of the wrongful registration. If an overissue would result, the issuer's liability to provide the person with a like security is governed by Section 36-8-210.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (a) or in a law relating to the collection of taxes, an issuer is not liable to an owner or other person suffering loss as a result of the registration of a transfer of a security if registration was made pursuant to an effective indorsement or instruction.
Official Comment
1. Subsection (a)(1) provides that an issuer is liable if it registers transfer pursuant to an indorsement or instruction that was not effective. For example, an issuer that registers transfer on a forged indorsement is liable to the registered owner. The fact that the issuer had no reason to suspect that the indorsement was forged or that the issuer obtained the ordinary assurances under Section 8-402 does not relieve the issuer from liability. The reason that issuers obtain signature guaranties and other assurances is that they are liable for wrongful registration.
Subsection (b) specifies the remedy for wrongful registration. Pre-Code cases established the registered owner's right to receive a new security where the issuer had wrongfully registered a transfer, but some cases also allowed the registered owner to elect between an equitable action to compel issue of a new security and an action for damages. Cf. Casper v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co., 159 Wis. 517, 149 N.W. 754 (1914). Article 8 does not allow such election. The true owner of a certificated security is required to take a new security except where an overissue would result and a similar security is not reasonably available for purchase. See Section 8-210. The true owner of an uncertificated security is entitled and required to take restoration of the records to their proper state, with a similar exception for overissue.
2. Read together, subsections (c) and (a) have the effect of providing that an issuer has no duties to an adverse claimant unless the claimant serves legal process on the issuer to enjoin registration. Issuers, or their transfer agents, perform a record-keeping function for the direct holding system that is analogous to the functions performed by clearing corporations and securities intermediaries in the indirect holding system. This section applies to the record-keepers for the direct holding system the same standard that Section 8-115 applies to the record-keepers for the indirect holding system. Thus, issuers are not liable to adverse claimants merely on the basis of notice. As in the case of the analogous rules for the indirect holding system, the policy of this section is to protect the right of investors to have their securities transfers processed without the disruption or delay that might result if the record-keepers risked liability to third parties. It would be undesirable to apply different standards to the direct and indirect holding systems, since doing so might operate as a disincentive to the development of a book-entry direct holding system.
3. This section changes prior law under which an issuer could be held liable, even though it registered transfer on an effective indorsement or instruction, if the issuer had in some fashion been notified that the transfer might be wrongful against a third party, and the issuer did not appropriately discharge its duty to inquire into the adverse claim. See Section 8-403 (1978).
The rule of former Section 8-403 was anomalous inasmuch as Section 8-207 provides that the issuer is entitled to "treat the registered owner as the person exclusively entitled to vote, receive notifications, and otherwise exercise all the rights and powers of an owner." Under Section 8-207, the fact that a third person notifies the issuer of a claim does not preclude the issuer from treating the registered owner as the person entitled to the security. See Kerrigan v. American Orthodontics Corp., 960 F.2d 43 (7th Cir. 1992). The change made in the present version of Section 8-404 ensures that the rights of registered owners and the duties of issuers with respect to registration of transfer will be protected against third-party interference in the same fashion as other rights of registered ownership.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-404, modifies former Section 35-8-404. Together with other Sections in Part 4 of Article 8 this Section changes significantly the exposure of issuers in registering transfers. According to the long-accepted rule in Lowry v. Commercial & Farmers' Bank, 15 F.Cas. 1040 (C.C.D. Md. 1848) (No. 4551), issuers were liable to third parties for registering transfers at the direction of a registered owner acting wrongfully against the third person in making a transfer. The duties imposed by the Lowry principle slowed transactions by effectively requiring issuers to require extensive documentation before making transfers, especially in circumstances involving fiduciaries. Former Sections 36-8-403 and -404 modified the Lowry rule somewhat, establishing a range of circumstances under which issuers had a duty of inquiry into the rightfulness of a transfer request (Section 36-8-403)(repealed) and making issuers strictly liable for breach of those duties (Section 36-8-404(b)(repealed). Revised Article 8 rejects the Lowry principle, limiting the circumstances under which an issuer may be liable for a wrongful transfer to the four numbered paragraphs of subsection (a). See the Official Comment to this Section.
The four numbered paragraphs of subsection (a) are effectively subject to an exception created by Section [8-406]: In cases of lost, stolen or apparently destroyed certificates later re-registered by the issuer, the issuer is liable to the former registered owner only if the owner gives the issuer timely notice. See Section [8-406]. This exception is designed to relegate costs to the party best able to avoid them.
As was true under prior law, a registered owner wronged under this Section is entitled under subsection (b) to a "like" replacement, subject to overissue, with respect to which see Section 36-8-210.
Definitional Cross References
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Effective" Section 8-107
"Indorsement" Section 8-102(a)(11)
"Instruction" Section 8-102(a)(12)
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
Section 36-8-405. Replacement of lost, destroyed, or wrongfully taken security certificate.
(a) If an owner of a certificated security, whether in registered or bearer form, claims that the certificate has been lost, destroyed, or wrongfully taken, the issuer shall issue a new certificate if the owner:
(1) so requests before the issuer has notice that the certificate has been acquired by a protected purchaser;
(2) files with the issuer a sufficient indemnity bond; and
(3) satisfies other reasonable requirements imposed by the issuer.
(b) If, after the issue of a new security certificate, a protected purchaser of the original certificate presents it for registration of transfer, the issuer shall register the transfer unless an overissue would result. In that case, the issuer's liability is governed by Section 36-8-210. In addition to any rights on the indemnity bond, an issuer may recover the new certificate from a person to whom it was issued or any person taking under that person, except a protected purchaser.
Official Comment
1. This section enables the owner to obtain a replacement of a lost, destroyed or stolen certificate, provided that reasonable requirements are satisfied and a sufficient indemnity bond supplied.
2. Where an "original" security certificate has reached the hands of a protected purchaser, the registered owner -- who was in the best position to prevent the loss, destruction or theft of the security certificate -- is now deprived of the new security certificate issued as a replacement. This changes the pre-UCC law under which the original certificate was ineffective after the issue of a replacement except insofar as it might represent an action for damages in the hands of a purchaser for value without notice. Keller v. Eureka Brick Mach. Mfg. Co., 43 Mo.App. 84, 11 L.R.A. 472 (1890). Where both the original and the new certificate have reached protected purchasers the issuer is required to honor both certificates unless an overissue would result and the security is not reasonably available for purchase. See Section 8-210. In the latter case alone, the protected purchaser of the original certificate is relegated to an action for damages. In either case, the issuer itself may recover on the indemnity bond.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-405, modifies material found in former Sections 36-8-405 and -406. The subject matter of former Section 36-8-405(1) is now found in Section [8-406]. The subject matter of former 36-8-405(2) and (3) now found in Section [8-405](a) and (b), respectively. Subsections (a) and (b) represent no substantive change from prior law with the exception of the exchange of the concept of "protected purchaser" for that of "bona fide purchaser" used in prior law.
Subsection (a) changes the rule of Section 17 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, which permits issuers to require court orders before issuing new certificates.
This Section is limited to certificates. Former subsection (3) contemplated "mixed issues," that is, securities issuable in either certificated or uncertificated form, raising the possibility that a lost certificate might be replaced using an uncertificated security. A holder of an uncertificated security under these circumstances would take no rights under this Section. The 2000 Revision has eliminated mixed issues as a statutory concept, leaving it to private ordering; see the South Carolina Reporter's Comment to Section [8-407].
Definitional Cross References
"Bearer form" Section 8-102(a)(2)
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Notice" Section 1-201(25)
"Overissue" Section 8-210
"Protected purchaser" Section 8-303
"Registered form" Section 8-102(a)(13)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
Section 36-8-406. Obligation to notify issuer of lost, destroyed, or wrongfully taken security certificate.
If a security certificate has been lost, apparently destroyed, or wrongfully taken, and the owner fails to notify the issuer of that fact within a reasonable time after the owner has notice of it and the issuer registers a transfer of the security before receiving notification, the owner may not assert against the issuer a claim for registering the transfer under Section 36-8-404 or a claim to a new security certificate under Section 36-8-405.
Official Comment
An owner who fails to notify the issuer within a reasonable time after the owner knows or has reason to know of the loss or theft of a security certificate is estopped from asserting the ineffectiveness of a forged or unauthorized indorsement and the wrongfulness of the registration of the transfer. If the lost certificate was indorsed by the owner, then the registration of the transfer was not wrongful under Section 8-404, unless the owner made an effective demand that the issuer not register transfer under Section 8-403.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-406, deals with the subject matter found in former Section 36-8-405(1), making no substantive change from that subsection. The matters formerly treated in Section 36-8-406 are now found in Section [8-407].
This Section does not apply when lost, stolen or apparent destroyed certificates are not later registered. In such circumstances, the rightful owner could rely Sections [8-405] and [8-406].
Were a lost, stolen or apparently destroyed certificate endorsed in blank or otherwise in bearer form, a request by the bearer for registration would not be appropriate but would be effective under Section [8-107], and the issuer's action in registering it would not be wrongful, as described in the Official Comment.
Definitional Cross References
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Notify" Section 1-201(25)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
Section 36-8-407. Authenticating trustee, transfer agent, and registrar.
A person acting as authenticating trustee, transfer agent, registrar, or other agent for an issuer in the registration of a transfer of its securities, in the issue of new security certificates or uncertificated securities, or in the cancellation of surrendered security certificates has the same obligation to the holder or owner of a certificated or uncertificated security with regard to the particular functions performed as the issuer has in regard to those functions.
Official Comment
1. Transfer agents, registrars, and the like are here expressly held liable both to the issuer and to the owner for wrongful refusal to register a transfer as well as for wrongful registration of a transfer in any case within the scope of their respective functions where the issuer would itself be liable. Those cases which have regarded these parties solely as agents of the issuer and have therefore refused to recognize their liability to the owner for mere nonfeasance, i.e., refusal to register a transfer, are rejected. Hulse v. Consolidated Quicksilver Mining Corp., 65 Idaho 768, 154 P.2d 149 (1944); Nicholson v. Morgan, 119 Misc. 309, 196 N.Y.Supp. 147 (1922); Lewis v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 305 Mo. 396, 274 S.W. 1041 (1924).
2. The practice frequently followed by authenticating trustees of issuing certificates of indebtedness rather than authenticating duplicate certificates where securities have been lost or stolen became obsolete in view of the provisions of Section 8-405, which makes express provision for the issue of substitute securities. It is not a breach of trust or lack of due diligence for trustees to authenticate new securities. Cf. Switzerland General Ins. Co. v. N.Y.C. & H.R.R. Co., 152 App.Div. 70, 136 N.Y.S. 726 (1912).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-407, deals with the subject matter found in former Section 36-8-406. References to pledges have been deleted, secured transactions having been shifted to Article 9 in the 2000 Revision. Allusions to uncertificated securities have also been deleted, commensurate with the policy of the 2000 Revision to minimize any distinction between certificated and uncertificated securities. Former subsections 1(a) and (2), which repeated standard agency concepts, have been deleted. Otherwise, this Section is substantively unchanged from former Section 36-8-406.
Former Section 36-8-407, dealing with "mixed issues" -- securities issuable in either certificated or uncertificated form -- has been omitted. According to Revision Note 8 accompanying the Official Text, "the provision seems unnecessary, since it applied only if the issuer decided that it should. The matter can be covered by agreement or corporate charter or bylaws."
Former Section 36-8-408, dealing with transaction statements for uncertificated securities, has also been omitted pursuant to the policy of the 2000 Revision to minimize the distinctions between certificated and uncertificated securities. According to Revision Note 4 accompanying the Official Text, the "record keeping and reporting obligations of issuers of uncertificated securities" performed by transaction statements are left to "agreement and other law, as is the case today for securities intermediaries."
Definitional Cross References
"Certificated security" Section 8-102(a)(4)
"Issuer" Section 8-201
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Security certificate" Section 8-102(a)(16)
"Uncertificated security" Section 8-102(a)(18)
Part 5
Security Entitlements
Section 36-8-501. Securities account; acquisition of security entitlement from securities intermediary.
(a) 'Securities account' means an account to which a financial asset is or may be credited in accordance with an agreement under which the person maintaining the account undertakes to treat the person for whom the account is maintained as entitled to exercise the rights that comprise the financial asset.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (d) and (e), a person acquires a security entitlement if a securities intermediary:
(1) indicates by book entry that a financial asset has been credited to the person's securities account;
(2) receives a financial asset from the person or acquires a financial asset for the person and, in either case, accepts it for credit to the person's securities account; or
(3) becomes obligated under other law, regulation, or rule to credit a financial asset to the person's securities account.
(c) If a condition of subsection (b) has been met, a person has a security entitlement even though the securities intermediary does not itself hold the financial asset.
(d) If a securities intermediary holds a financial asset for another person, and the financial asset is registered in the name of, payable to the order of, or specially indorsed to the other person, and has not been indorsed to the securities intermediary or in blank, the other person is treated as holding the financial asset directly rather than as having a security entitlement with respect to the financial asset.
(e) Issuance of a security is not establishment of a security entitlement.
Official Comment
1. Part 5 rules apply to security entitlements, and Section 8-501(b) provides that a person has a security entitlement when a financial asset has been credited to a "securities account." Thus, the term "securities account" specifies the type of arrangements between institutions and their customers that are covered by Part 5. A securities account is a consensual arrangement in which the intermediary undertakes to treat the customer as entitled to exercise the rights that comprise the financial asset. The consensual aspect is covered by the requirement that the account be established pursuant to agreement. The term agreement is used in the broad sense defined in Section 1-201(3). There is no requirement that a formal or written agreement be signed.
As the securities business is presently conducted, several significant relationships clearly fall within the definition of a securities account, including the relationship between a clearing corporation and its participants, a broker and customers who leave securities with the broker, and a bank acting as securities custodian and its custodial customers. Given the enormous variety of arrangements concerning securities that exist today, and the certainty that new arrangements will evolve in the future, it is not possible to specify all of the arrangements to which the term does and does not apply.
Whether an arrangement between a firm and another person concerning a security or other financial asset is a "securities account" under this Article depends on whether the firm has undertaken to treat the other person as entitled to exercise the rights that comprise the security or other financial asset. Section 1-102, however, states the fundamental principle of interpretation that the Code provisions should be construed and applied to promote their underlying purposes and policies. Thus, the question whether a given arrangement is a securities account should be decided not by dictionary analysis of the words of the definition taken out of context, but by considering whether it promotes the objectives of Article 8 to include the arrangement within the term securities account.
The effect of concluding that an arrangement is a securities account is that the rules of Part 5 apply. Accordingly, the definition of "securities account" must be interpreted in light of the substantive provisions in Part 5, which describe the core features of the type of relationship for which the commercial law rules of Revised Article 8 concerning security entitlements were designed. There are many arrangements between institutions and other persons concerning securities or other financial assets which do not fall within the definition of "securities account" because the institutions have not undertaken to treat the other persons as entitled to exercise the ordinary rights of an entitlement holder specified in the Part 5 rules. For example, the term securities account does not cover the relationship between a bank and its depositors or the relationship between a trustee and the beneficiary of an ordinary trust, because those are not relationships in which the holder of a financial asset has undertaken to treat the other as entitled to exercise the rights that comprise the financial asset in the fashion contemplated by the Part 5 rules.
In short, the primary factor in deciding whether an arrangement is a securities account is whether application of the Part 5 rules is consistent with the expectations of the parties to the relationship. Relationships not governed by Part 5 may be governed by other parts of Article 8 if the relationship gives rise to a new security, or may be governed by other law entirely.
2. Subsection (b) of this section specifies what circumstances give rise to security entitlements. Paragraph (1) of subsection (b) sets out the most important rule. It turns on the intermediary's conduct, reflecting a basic operating assumption of the indirect holding system that once a securities intermediary has acknowledged that it is carrying a position in a financial asset for its customer or participant, the intermediary is obligated to treat the customer or participant as entitled to the financial asset. Paragraph (1) does not attempt to specify exactly what accounting, record-keeping, or information transmission steps suffice to indicate that the intermediary has credited the account. That is left to agreement, trade practice, or rule in order to provide the flexibility necessary to accommodate varying or changing accounting and information processing systems. The point of paragraph (1) is that once an intermediary has acknowledged that it is carrying a position for the customer or participant, the customer or participant has a security entitlement. The precise form in which the intermediary manifests that acknowledgment is left to private ordering.
Paragraph (2) of subsection (b) sets out a different operational test, turning not on the intermediary's accounting system but on the facts that accounting systems are supposed to represent. Under paragraph (b)(2) a person has a security entitlement if the intermediary has received and accepted a financial asset for credit to the account of its customer or participant. For example, if a customer of a broker or bank custodian delivers a security certificate in proper form to the broker or bank to be held in the customer's account, the customer acquires a security entitlement. Paragraph (b)(2) also covers circumstances in which the intermediary receives a financial asset from a third person for credit to the account of the customer or participant. Paragraph (b)(2) is not limited to circumstances in which the intermediary receives security certificates or other financial assets in physical form. Paragraph (b)(2) also covers circumstances in which the intermediary acquires a security entitlement with respect to a financial asset which is to be credited to the account of the intermediary's own customer. For example, if a customer transfers her account from Broker A to Broker B, she acquires security entitlements against Broker B once the clearing corporation has credited the positions to Broker B's account. It should be noted, however, that paragraph (b)(2) provides that a person acquires a security entitlement when the intermediary not only receives but also accepts the financial asset for credit to the account. This limitation is included to take account of the fact that there may be circumstances in which an intermediary has received a financial asset but is not willing to undertake the obligations that flow from establishing a security entitlement. For example, a security certificate which is sent to an intermediary may not be in proper form, or may represent a type of financial asset which the intermediary is not willing to carry for others. It should be noted that in all but extremely unusual cases, the circumstances covered by paragraph (2) will also be covered by paragraph (1), because the intermediary will have credited the positions to the customer's account.
Paragraph (3) of subsection (b) sets out a residual test, to avoid any implication that the failure of an intermediary to make the appropriate entries to credit a position to a customer's securities account would prevent the customer from acquiring the rights of an entitlement holder under Part 5. As is the case with the paragraph (2) test, the paragraph (3) test would not be needed for the ordinary cases, since they are covered by paragraph (1).
3. In a sense, Section 8-501(b) is analogous to the rules set out in the provisions of Sections 8-313(1)(d) and 8-320 of the prior version of Article 8 that specified what acts by a securities intermediary or clearing corporation sufficed as a transfer of securities held in fungible bulk. Unlike the prior version of Article 8, however, this section is not based on the idea that an entitlement holder acquires rights only by virtue of a "transfer" from the securities intermediary to the entitlement holder. In the indirect holding system, the significant fact is that the securities intermediary has undertaken to treat the customer as entitled to the financial asset. It is up to the securities intermediary to take the necessary steps to ensure that it will be able to perform its undertaking. It is, for example, entirely possible that a securities intermediary might make entries in a customer's account reflecting that customer's acquisition of a certain security at a time when the securities intermediary did not itself happen to hold any units of that security. The person from whom the securities intermediary bought the security might have failed to deliver and it might have taken some time to clear up the problem, or there may have been an operational gap in time between the crediting of a customer's account and the receipt of securities from another securities intermediary. The entitlement holder's rights against the securities intermediary do not depend on whether or when the securities intermediary acquired its interests. Subsection (c) is intended to make this point clear. Subsection (c) does not mean that the intermediary is free to create security entitlements without itself holding sufficient financial assets to satisfy its entitlement holders. The duty of a securities intermediary to maintain sufficient assets is governed by Section 8-504 and regulatory law. Subsection (c) is included only to make it clear the question whether a person has acquired a security entitlement does not depend on whether the intermediary has complied with that duty.
4. Part 5 of Article 8 sets out a carefully designed system of rules for the indirect holding system. Persons who hold securities through brokers or custodians have security entitlements that are governed by Part 5, rather than being treated as the direct holders of securities. Subsection (d) specifies the limited circumstance in which a customer who leaves a financial asset with a broker or other securities intermediary has a direct interest in the financial asset, rather than a security entitlement.
The customer can be a direct holder only if the security certificate, or other financial asset, is registered in the name of, payable to the order of, or specially indorsed to the customer, and has not been indorsed by the customer to the securities intermediary or in blank. The distinction between those circumstances where the customer can be treated as direct owner and those where the customer has a security entitlement is essentially the same as the distinction drawn under the federal bankruptcy code between customer name securities and customer property. The distinction does not turn on any form of physical identification or segregation. A customer who delivers certificates to a broker with blank indorsements or stock powers is not a direct holder but has a security entitlement, even though the broker holds those certificates in some form of separate safe-keeping arrangement for that particular customer. The customer remains the direct holder only if there is no indorsement or stock power so that further action by the customer is required to place the certificates in a form where they can be transferred by the broker.
The rule of subsection (d) corresponds to the rule set out in Section 8-301(a)(3) specifying when acquisition of possession of a certificate by a securities intermediary counts as "delivery" to the customer.
5. Subsection (e) is intended to make clear that Part 5 does not apply to an arrangement in which a security is issued representing an interest in underlying assets, as distinguished from arrangements in which the underlying assets are carried in a securities account. A common mechanism by which new financial instruments are devised is that a financial institution that holds some security, financial instrument, or pool thereof, creates interests in that asset or pool which are sold to others. In many such cases, the interests so created will fall within the definition of "security" in Section 8-102(a)(15). If so, then by virtue of subsection (e) of Section 8-501, the relationship between the institution that creates the interests and the persons who hold them is not a security entitlement to which the Part 5 rules apply. Accordingly, an arrangement such as an American depositary receipt facility which creates freely transferable interests in underlying securities will be issuance of a security under Article 8 rather than establishment of a security entitlement to the underlying securities.
The subsection (e) rule can be regarded as an aspect of the definitional rules specifying the meaning of securities account and security entitlement. Among the key components of the definition of security in Section 8-102(a)(15) are the "transferability" and "divisibility" tests. Securities, in the Article 8 sense, are fungible interests or obligations that are intended to be tradable. The concept of security entitlement under Part 5 is quite different. A security entitlement is the package of rights that a person has against the person's own intermediary with respect to the positions carried in the person's securities account. That package of rights is not, as such, something that is traded. When a customer sells a security that she had held through a securities account, her security entitlement is terminated; when she buys a security that she will hold through her securities account, she acquires a security entitlement. In most cases, settlement of a securities trade will involve termination of one person's security entitlement and acquisition of a security entitlement by another person. That transaction, however, is not a "transfer" of the same entitlement from one person to another. That is not to say that an entitlement holder cannot transfer an interest in her security entitlement as such; granting a security interest in a security entitlement is such a transfer. On the other hand, the nature of a security entitlement is that the intermediary is undertaking duties only to the person identified as the entitlement holder.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to the Official Text of Uniform Commercial Code Section 8-501, is analogous to parts of former Part 3 of Article 8 dealing with the indirect holding system, but is new both in its approach to that system and in the names it gives to the structures of the system. This Section describes a system of indirect holding of securities and interests in securities which has existed as a matter of practice in South Carolina and nationally for perhaps two decades, but which has been regulated largely by contract and custom. A major purpose of the 2000 Revision is to codify this practice. CASES? This Section creates the fundamental statutory concept of "securities account" and in so doing gives meaning to other new statutory terms of art such as "securities intermediary" and "securities entitlement." See the Definitional Cross References, below. As statutory concepts, all of these terms and the effects of their interplay are new in South Carolina.
Definitional Cross References
"Financial asset" Section 8-102(a)(9)
"Indorsement" Section 8-102(a)(11)
"Securities intermediary" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Security" Section 8-102(a)(15)
"Security entitlement" Section 8-102(a)(17)
Section 36-8-502. Assertion of adverse claim against entitlement holder.
An action based on an adverse claim to a financial asset, whether framed in conversion, replevin, constructive trust, equitable lien, or other theory, may not be asserted against a person who acquires a security entitlement under Section 36-8-501 for value and without notice of the adverse claim.
Official Comment
1. The section provides investors in the indirect holding system with protection against adverse claims by specifying that no adverse claim can be asserted against a person who acquires a security entitlement under Section 8-501 for value and without notice of the adverse claim. It plays a role in the indirect holding system analogous to the rule of the direct holding system that protected purchasers take free from adverse claims (Section 8-303).
This section does not use the locution "takes free from adverse claims" because that could be confusing as applied to the indirect holding system. The nature of indirect holding system is that an entitlement holder has an interest in common with others who hold positions in the same financial asset through the same intermediary. Thus, a particular entitlement holder's interest in the financial assets held by its intermediary is necessarily "subject to" the interests of others. See Section 8-503. The rule stated in this section might have been expressed by saying that a person who acquires a security entitlement under Section 8-501 for value and without notice of adverse claims takes "that security entitlement" free from adverse claims. That formulation has not been used, however, for fear that it would be misinterpreted as suggesting that the person acquires a right to the underlying financial assets that could not be affected by the competing rights of others claiming through common or higher tier intermediaries. A security entitlement is a complex bundle of rights. This section does not deal with the question of what rights are in the bundle. Rather, this section provides that once a person has acquired the bundle, someone else cannot take it away on the basis of assertion that the transaction in which the security entitlement was created involved a violation of the claimant's rights.
2. Because securities trades are typically settled on a net basis by book-entry movements, it would ordinarily be impossible for anyone to trace the path of any particular security, no matter how the interest of parties who hold through intermediaries is described. Suppose, for example, that S has a 1000 share position in XYZ common stock through an account with a broker, Able & Co. S's identical twin impersonates S and directs Able to sell the securities. That same day, B places an order with Baker & Co., to buy 1000 shares of XYZ common stock. Later, S discovers the wrongful act and seeks to recover "her shares." Even if S can show that, at the stage of the trade, her sell order was matched with B's buy order, that would not suffice to show that "her shares" went to B. Settlement between Able and Baker occurs on a net basis for all trades in XYZ that day; indeed Able's net position may have been such that it received rather than delivered shares in XYZ through the settlement system.
In the unlikely event that this was the only trade in XYZ common stock executed in the market that day, one could follow the shares from S's account to B's account. The plaintiff in an action in conversion or similar legal action to enforce a property interest must show that the defendant has an item of property that belongs to the plaintiff. In this example, B's security entitlement is not the same item of property that formerly was held by S, it is a new package of rights that B acquired against Baker under Section 8-501. Principles of equitable remedies might, however, provide S with a basis for contending that if the position B received was the traceable product of the wrongful taking of S's property by S's twin, a constructive trust should be imposed on B's property in favor of S. See G. Palmer, The Law of Restitution ' 2.14. Section 8-502 ensures that no such claims can be asserted against a person, such as B in this example, who acquires a security entitlement under Section 8-501 for value and without notice, regardless of what theory of law or equity is used to describe the basis of the assertion of the adverse claim.
In the above example, S would ordinarily have no reason to pursue B unless Able is insolvent and S's claim will not be satisfied in the insolvency proceedings. Because S did not give an entitlement order for the disposition of her security entitlement, Able must recredit her account for the 1000 shares of XYZ common stock. See Section 8-507(b).
3. The following examples illustrate the operation of Section 8-502.
Example 1. Thief steals bearer bonds from Owner. Thief delivers the bonds to Broker for credit to Thief's securities account, thereby acquiring a security entitlement under Section 8-501(b). Under other law, Owner may have a claim to have a constructive trust imposed on the security entitlement as the traceable product of the bonds that Thief misappropriated. Because Thief was himself the wrongdoer, Thief obviously had notice of Owner's adverse claim. Accordingly, Section 8-502 does not preclude Owner from asserting an adverse claim against Thief.
Example 2. Thief steals bearer bonds from Owner. Thief owes a personal debt to Creditor. Creditor has a securities account with Broker. Thief agrees to transfer the bonds to Creditor as security for or in satisfaction of his debt to Creditor. Thief does so by sending the bonds to Broker for credit to Creditor's securities account. Creditor thereby acquires a security entitlement under Section 8-501(b). Under other law, Owner may have a claim to have a constructive trust imposed on the security entitlement as the traceable product of the bonds that Thief misappropriated. Creditor acquired the security entitlement for value, since Creditor acquired it as security for or in satisfaction of Thief's debt to Creditor. See Section 1-201(44). If Creditor did not have notice of Owner's claim, Section 8-502 precludes any action by Owner against Creditor, whether framed in constructive trust or other theory. Section 8-105 specifies what counts as notice of an adverse claim.
Example 3. Father, as trustee for Son, holds XYZ Co. shares in a securities account with Able & Co. In violation of his fiduciary duties, Father sells the XYZ Co. shares and uses the proceeds for personal purposes. Father dies, and his estate is insolvent. Assume -- implausibly -- that Son is able to trace the XYZ Co. shares and show that the "same shares" ended up in Buyer's securities account with Baker & Co. Section 8-502 precludes any action by Son against Buyer, whether framed in constructive trust or other theory, provided that Buyer acquired the security entitlement for value and without notice of adverse claims.
Example 4. Debtor holds XYZ Co. shares in a securities account with Able & Co. As collateral for a loan from Bank, Debtor grants Bank a security interest in the security entitlement to the XYZ Co. shares. Bank perfects by a method which leaves Debtor with the ability to dispose of the shares. See Section 9-312. In violation of the security agreement, Debtor sells the XYZ Co. shares and absconds with the proceeds. Assume -- implausibly -- that Bank is able to trace the XYZ Co. shares and show that the "same shares" ended up in Buyer's securities account with Baker & Co. Section 8-502 precludes any action by Bank against Buyer, whether framed in constructive trust or other theory, provided that Buyer acquired the security entitlement for value and without notice of adverse claims.
Example 5. Debtor owns controlling interests in various public companies, including Acme and Ajax. Acme owns 60% of the stock of another public company, Beta. Debtor causes the Beta stock to be pledged to Lending Bank as collateral for Ajax=s debt. Acme holds the Beta stock through an account with a securities custodian, C Bank, which in turn holds through Clearing Corporation. Lending Bank is also a Clearing Corporation participant. The pledge of the Beta stock is implemented by Acme instructing C Bank to instruct Clearing Corporation to debit C Bank=s account and credit Lending Bank=s account. Acme and Ajax both become insolvent. The Beta stock is still valuable. Acme=s liquidator asserts that the pledge of the Beta stock for Ajax=s debt was wrongful as against Acme and seeks to recover the Beta stock from Lending Bank. Because the pledge was implemented by an outright transfer into Lending Bank's account at Clearing Corporation, Lending Bank acquired a security entitlement to the Beta stock under Section 8-501. Lending Bank acquired the security entitlement for value, since it acquired it as security for a debt. See Section 1-201(44). If Lending Bank did not have notice of Acme=s claim, Section 8-502 will preclude any action by Acme against Lending Bank, whether framed in constructive trust or other theory.
Example 6. Debtor grants Alpha Company a security interest in a security entitlement that includes 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock that Debtor holds through an account with Able & Co. Alpha also has an account with Able. Debtor instructs Able to transfer the shares to Alpha, and Able does so by crediting the shares to Alpha's account, Alpha has control of the 1000 shares under Section 8-106(d). (The facts to this point are identical to those in Section 8-106, Comment 4, Example 1, except that Alpha Co. was Alpha Bank.) Alpha next grants Beta Co. a security interest in the 1000 shares included in Alpha's security entitlement. See Section 9-207(c)(3). Alpha instructs Able to transfer the shares to Gamma Co., Beta's custodian. Able does so, and Gamma credits the 1000 shares to Beta's account. Beta now has control under Section 8-106(d). By virtue of Debtor's explicit permission or by virtue of the permission inherent in Debtor's creation of a security interest in favor of Alpha and Alpha's resulting power to grant a security interest under Section 9-207, Debtor has no adverse claim to assert against Beta, assuming implausibly that Debtor could "trace" an interest to the Gamma account. Moreover, even if Debtor did hold an adverse claim, if Beta did not have notice of Debtor's claim, Section 8-502 will preclude any action by Debtor against Beta, whether framed in constructive trust or other theory.
4. Although this section protects entitlement holders against adverse claims, it does not protect them against the risk that their securities intermediary will not itself have sufficient financial assets to satisfy the claims of all of its entitlement holders. Suppose that Customer A holds 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock in an account with her broker, Able & Co. Able in turn holds 1000 shares of XYZ Co. through its account with Clearing Corporation, but has no other positions in XYZ Co. shares, either for other customers or for its own proprietary account. Customer B places an order with Able for the purchase of 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock, and pays the purchase price. Able credits B's account with a 1000 share position in XYZ Co. stock, but Able does not itself buy any additional XYZ Co. shares. Able fails, having only 1000 shares to satisfy the claims of A and B. Unless other insolvency law establishes a different distributional rule, A and B would share the 1000 shares held by Able pro rata, without regard to the time that their respective entitlements were established. See Section 8-503(b). Section 8-502 protects entitlement holders, such as A and B, against adverse claimants. In this case, however, the problem that A and B face is not that someone is trying to take away their entitlements, but that the entitlements are not worth what they thought. The only role that Section 8-502 plays in this case is to preclude any assertion that A has some form of claim against B by virtue of the fact that Able's establishment of an entitlement in favor of B diluted A's rights to the limited assets held by Able.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to Section 8-502 of the Official Text, is new. It has no direct analogue in prior law but is indirectly analogous to the prior concept of bona fide purchaser for value, in that it identifies certain entitlement holders in the indirect holding system as protected from adverse claims. Section [8-510] similarly protects those, such as secured parties, acquiring an interest in a security entitlement for value and without notice.
Definitional Cross References
"Adverse claim" Section 8-102(a)(1)
"Financial asset" Section 8-102(a)(9)
"Notice of adverse claim" Section 8-105
"Security entitlement" Section 8-102(a)(17)
"Value" Sections 1-201(44) & 8-116
Section 36-8-503. Property interest of entitlement holder in financial asset held by securities intermediary.
(a) To the extent necessary for a securities intermediary to satisfy all security entitlements with respect to a particular financial asset, all interests in that financial asset held by the securities intermediary are held by the securities intermediary for the entitlement holders, are not property of the securities intermediary, and are not subject to claims of creditors of the securities intermediary, except as otherwise provided in Section 36-8-511.
(b) An entitlement holder's property interest with respect to a particular financial asset under subsection (a) is a pro rata property interest in all interests in that financial asset held by the securities intermediary, without regard to the time the entitlement holder acquired the security entitlement or the time the securities intermediary acquired the interest in that financial asset.
(c) An entitlement holder's property interest with respect to a particular financial asset under subsection (a) may be enforced against the securities intermediary only by exercise of the entitlement holder's rights under Sections 36-8-505 through 36-8-508.
(d) An entitlement holder's property interest with respect to a particular financial asset under subsection (a) may be enforced against a purchaser of the financial asset or interest therein only if:
(1) insolvency proceedings have been initiated by or against the securities intermediary;
(2) the securities intermediary does not have sufficient interests in the financial asset to satisfy the security entitlements of all of its entitlement holders to that financial asset;
(3) the securities intermediary violated its obligations under Section 36-8-504 by transferring the financial asset or interest therein to the purchaser; and
(4) the purchaser is not protected under subsection (e).
The trustee or other liquidator, acting on behalf of all entitlement holders having security entitlements with respect to a particular financial asset, may recover the financial asset, or interest therein, from the purchaser. If the trustee or other liquidator elects not to pursue that right, an entitlement holder whose security entitlement remains unsatisfied has the right to recover its interest in the financial asset from the purchaser.
(e) An action based on the entitlement holder's property interest with respect to a particular financial asset under subsection (a), whether framed in conversion, replevin, constructive trust, equitable lien, or other theory, may not be asserted against any purchaser of a financial asset or interest therein who gives value, obtains control, and does not act in collusion with the securities intermediary in violating the securities intermediary's obligations under Section 36-8-504.
Official Comment
1. This section specifies the sense in which a security entitlement is an interest in the property held by the securities intermediary. It expresses the ordinary understanding that securities that a firm holds for its customers are not general assets of the firm subject to the claims of creditors. Since securities intermediaries generally do not segregate securities in such fashion that one could identify particular securities as the ones held for customers, it would not be realistic for this section to state that "customers' securities" are not subject to creditors' claims. Rather subsection (a) provides that to the extent necessary to satisfy all customer claims, all units of that security held by the firm are held for the entitlement holders, are not property of the securities intermediary, and are not subject to creditors' claims, except as otherwise provided in Section 8-511.
An entitlement holder's property interest under this section is an interest with respect to a specific issue of securities or financial assets. For example, customers of a firm who have positions in XYZ common stock have security entitlements with respect to the XYZ common stock held by the intermediary, while other customers who have positions in ABC common stock have security entitlements with respect to the ABC common stock held by the intermediary.
Subsection (b) makes clear that the property interest described in subsection (a) is an interest held in common by all entitlement holders who have entitlements to a particular security or other financial asset. Temporal factors are irrelevant. One entitlement holder cannot claim that its rights to the assets held by the intermediary are superior to the rights of another entitlement holder by virtue of having acquired those rights before, or after, the other entitlement holder. Nor does it matter whether the intermediary had sufficient assets to satisfy all entitlement holders' claims at one point, but no longer does. Rather, all entitlement holders have a pro rata interest in whatever positions in that financial asset the intermediary holds.
Although this section describes the property interest of entitlement holders in the assets held by the intermediary, it does not necessarily determine how property held by a failed intermediary will be distributed in insolvency proceedings. If the intermediary fails and its affairs are being administered in an insolvency proceeding, the applicable insolvency law governs how the various parties having claims against the firm are treated. For example, the distributional rules for stockbroker liquidation proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code and Securities Investor Protection Act ("SIPA") provide that all customer property is distributed pro rata among all customers in proportion to the dollar value of their total positions, rather than dividing the property on an issue by issue basis. For intermediaries that are not subject to the Bankruptcy Code and SIPA, other insolvency law would determine what distributional rule is applied.
2. Although this section recognizes that the entitlement holders of a securities intermediary have a property interest in the financial assets held by the intermediary, the incidents of this property interest are established by the rules of Article 8, not by common law property concepts. The traditional Article 8 rules on certificated securities were based on the idea that a paper certificate could be regarded as a nearly complete reification of the underlying right. The rules on transfer and the consequences of wrongful transfer could then be written using the same basic concepts as the rules for physical chattels. A person's claim of ownership of a certificated security is a right to a specific identifiable physical object, and that right can be asserted against any person who ends up in possession of that physical certificate, unless cut off by the rules protecting purchasers for value without notice. Those concepts do not work for the indirect holding system. A security entitlement is not a claim to a specific identifiable thing; it is a package of rights and interests that a person has against the person's securities intermediary and the property held by the intermediary. The idea that discrete objects might be traced through the hands of different persons has no place in the Revised Article 8 rules for the indirect holding system. The fundamental principles of the indirect holding system rules are that an entitlement holder's own intermediary has the obligation to see to it that the entitlement holder receives all of the economic and corporate rights that comprise the financial asset, and that the entitlement holder can look only to that intermediary for performance of the obligations. The entitlement holder cannot assert rights directly against other persons, such as other intermediaries through whom the intermediary holds the positions, or third parties to whom the intermediary may have wrongfully transferred interests, except in extremely unusual circumstances where the third party was itself a participant in the wrongdoing. Subsections (c) through (e) reflect these fundamental principles.
Subsection (c) provides that an entitlement holder's property interest can be enforced against the intermediary only by exercise of the entitlement holder's rights under Sections 8-505 through 8-508. These are the provisions that set out the duty of an intermediary to see to it that the entitlement holder receives all of the economic and corporate rights that comprise the security. If the intermediary is in insolvency proceedings and can no longer perform in accordance with the ordinary Part 5 rules, the applicable insolvency law will determine how the intermediary's assets are to be distributed.
Subsections (d) and (e) specify the limited circumstances in which an entitlement holder's property interest can be asserted against a third person to whom the intermediary transferred a financial asset that was subject to the entitlement holder's claim when held by the intermediary. Subsection (d) provides that the property interest of entitlement holders cannot be asserted against any transferee except in the circumstances therein specified. So long as the intermediary is solvent, the entitlement holders must look to the intermediary to satisfy their claims. If the intermediary does not hold financial assets corresponding to the entitlement holders' claims, the intermediary has the duty to acquire them. See Section 8-504. Thus, paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of subsection (d) specify that the only occasion in which the entitlement holders can pursue transferees is when the intermediary is unable to perform its obligation, and the transfer to the transferee was a violation of those obligations. Even in that case, a transferee who gave value and obtained control is protected by virtue of the rule in subsection (e), unless the transferee acted in collusion with the intermediary.
Subsections (d) and (e) have the effect of protecting transferees from an intermediary against adverse claims arising out of assertions by the intermediary's entitlement holders that the intermediary acted wrongfully in transferring the financial assets. These rules, however, operate in a slightly different fashion than traditional adverse claim cut-off rules. Rather than specifying that a certain class of transferee takes free from all claims, subsections (d) and (e) specify the circumstances in which this particular form of claim can be asserted against a transferee. Revised Article 8 also contains general adverse claim cut-off rules for the indirect holding system. See Sections 8-502 and 8-510. The rule of subsections (d) and (e) takes precedence over the general cut-off rules of those sections, because Section 8-503 itself defines and sets limits on the assertion of the property interest of entitlement holders. Thus, the question whether entitlement holders' property interest can be asserted as an adverse claim against a transferee from the intermediary is governed by the collusion test of Section 8-503(e), rather than by the "without notice" test of Sections 8-502 and 8-510.
3. The limitations that subsections (c) through (e) place on the ability of customers of a failed intermediary to recover securities or other financial assets from transferees are consistent with the fundamental policies of investor protection that underlie this Article and other bodies of law governing the securities business. The commercial law rules for the securities holding and transfer system must be assessed from the forward-looking perspective of their impact on the vast number of transactions in which no wrongful conduct occurred or will occur, rather than from the post hoc perspective of what rule might be most advantageous to a particular class of persons in litigation that might arise out of the occasional case in which someone has acted wrongfully. Although one can devise hypothetical scenarios where particular customers might find it advantageous to be able to assert rights against someone other than the customers' own intermediary, commercial law rules that permitted customers to do so would impair rather than promote the interest of investors and the safe and efficient operation of the clearance and settlement system. Suppose, for example, that Intermediary A transfers securities to B, that Intermediary A acted wrongfully as against its customers in so doing, and that after the transaction Intermediary A did not have sufficient securities to satisfy its obligations to its entitlement holders. Viewed solely from the standpoint of the customers of Intermediary A, it would seem that permitting the property to be recovered from B, would be good for investors. That, however, is not the case. B may itself be an intermediary with its own customers, or may be some other institution through which individuals invest, such as a pension fund or investment company. There is no reason to think that rules permitting customers of an intermediary to trace and recover securities that their intermediary wrongfully transferred work to the advantage of investors in general. To the contrary, application of such rules would often merely shift losses from one set of investors to another. The uncertainties that would result from rules permitting such recoveries would work to the disadvantage of all participants in the securities markets.
The use of the collusion test in Section 8-503(e) furthers the interests of investors generally in the sound and efficient operation of the securities holding and settlement system. The effect of the choice of this standard is that customers of a failed intermediary must show that the transferee from whom they seek to recover was affirmatively engaged in wrongful conduct, rather than casting on the transferee any burden of showing that the transferee had no awareness of wrongful conduct by the failed intermediary. The rule of Section 8-503(e) is based on the long-standing policy that it is undesirable to impose upon purchasers of securities any duty to investigate whether their sellers may be acting wrongfully.
Rather than imposing duties to investigate, the general policy of the commercial law of the securities holding and transfer system has been to eliminate legal rules that might induce participants to conduct investigations of the authority of persons transferring securities on behalf of others for fear that they might be held liable for participating in a wrongful transfer. The rules in Part 4 of Article 8 concerning transfers by fiduciaries provide a good example. Under Lowry v. Commercial & Farmers' Bank, 15 F. Cas. 1040 (C.C.D. Md. 1848) (No. 8551), an issuer could be held liable for wrongful transfer if it registered transfer of securities by a fiduciary under circumstances where it had any reason to believe that the fiduciary may have been acting improperly. In one sense that seems to be advantageous for beneficiaries who might be harmed by wrongful conduct by fiduciaries. The consequence of the Lowry rule, however, was that in order to protect against risk of such liability, issuers developed the practice of requiring extensive documentation for fiduciary stock transfers, making such transfers cumbersome and time consuming. Accordingly, the rules in Part 4 of Article 8, and in the prior fiduciary transfer statutes, were designed to discourage transfer agents from conducting investigations into the rightfulness of transfers by fiduciaries.
The rules of Revised Article 8 implement for the indirect holding system the same policies that the rules on protected purchasers and registration of transfer adopt for the direct holding system. A securities intermediary is, by definition, a person who is holding securities on behalf of other persons. There is nothing unusual or suspicious about a transaction in which a securities intermediary sells securities that it was holding for its customers. That is exactly what securities intermediaries are in business to do. The interests of customers of securities intermediaries would not be served by a rule that required counterparties to transfers from securities intermediaries to investigate whether the intermediary was acting wrongfully against its customers. Quite the contrary, such a rule would impair the ability of securities intermediaries to perform the function that customers want.
The rules of Section 8-503(c) through (e) apply to transferees generally, including pledgees. The reasons for treating pledgees in the same fashion as other transferees are discussed in the Comments to Section 8-511. The statement in subsection (a) that an intermediary holds financial assets for customers and not as its own property does not, of course, mean that the intermediary lacks power to transfer the financial assets to others. For example, although Article 9 provides that for a security interest to attach the debtor must have "rights" in the collateral, see Section 9-203, the fact that an intermediary is holding a financial asset in a form that permits ready transfer means that it has such rights, even if the intermediary is acting wrongfully against its entitlement holders in granting the security interest. The question whether the secured party takes subject to the entitlement holder's claim in such a case is governed by Section 8-511, which is an application to secured transactions of the general principles expressed in subsections (d) and (e) of this section.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to Section 8-503 of the Official Text, is new. It is widely remarked that under the 2000 Revision, an interest held through the indirect holding system is a blend of property and contract rights. Fundamental to this concept is that the investor who "holds" through the indirect holding system owns no property interest in particular shares or other financial assets; such an investor owns an undivided interest in, or claim against, the rights held by the investor's financial intermediary. The property aspect of this ownership is described in this Section.
In analyzing the interplay between rights of secured creditors and those of customers of securities intermediaries in the customer's property held by intermediaries, compare this Section with Section [8-511].
Definitional Cross References
"Control" Section 8-106
"Entitlement holder" Section 8-102(a)(7)
"Financial asset" Section 8-102(a)(9)
"Insolvency proceedings" Section 1-201(22)
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Securities intermediary" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Security entitlement" Section 8-102(a)(17)
"Value" Sections 1-201(44) & 8-116
Section 36-8-504. Duty of securities intermediary to maintain financial asset.
(a) A securities intermediary shall promptly obtain and thereafter maintain a financial asset in a quantity corresponding to the aggregate of all security entitlements it has established in favor of its entitlement holders with respect to that financial asset. The securities intermediary may maintain those financial assets directly or through one or more other securities intermediaries.
(b) Except to the extent otherwise agreed by its entitlement holder, a securities intermediary may not grant any security interests in a financial asset it is obligated to maintain pursuant to subsection (a).
(c) A securities intermediary satisfies the duty in subsection (a) if:
(1) the securities intermediary acts with respect to the duty as agreed upon by the entitlement holder and the securities intermediary; or
(2) in the absence of agreement, the securities intermediary exercises due care in accordance with reasonable commercial standards to obtain and maintain the financial asset.
(d) This section does not apply to a clearing corporation that is itself the obligor of an option or similar obligation to which its entitlement holders have security entitlements.
Official Comment
1. This section expresses one of the core elements of the relationships for which the Part 5 rules were designed, to wit, that a securities intermediary undertakes to hold financial assets corresponding to the security entitlements of its entitlement holders. The locution "shall promptly obtain and shall thereafter maintain" is taken from the corresponding regulation under federal securities law, 17 C.F.R. ' 240.15c3-3. This section recognizes the reality that as the securities business is conducted today, it is not possible to identify particular securities as belonging to customers as distinguished from other particular securities that are the firm's own property. Securities firms typically keep all securities in fungible form, and may maintain their inventory of a particular security in various locations and forms, including physical securities held in vaults or in transit to transfer agents, and book entry positions at one or more clearing corporations. Accordingly, this section states that a securities intermediary shall maintain a quantity of financial assets corresponding to the aggregate of all security entitlements it has established. The last sentence of subsection (a) provides explicitly that the securities intermediary may hold directly or indirectly. That point is implicit in the use of the term "financial asset," inasmuch as Section 8-102(a)(9) provides that the term "financial asset" may refer either to the underlying asset or the means by which it is held, including both security certificates and security entitlements.
2. Subsection (b) states explicitly a point that is implicit in the notion that a securities intermediary must maintain financial assets corresponding to the security entitlements of its entitlement holders, to wit, that it is wrongful for a securities intermediary to grant security interests in positions that it needs to satisfy customers' claims, except as authorized by the customers. This statement does not determine the rights of a secured party to whom a securities intermediary wrongfully grants a security interest; that issue is governed by Sections 8-503 and 8-511.
Margin accounts are common examples of arrangements in which an entitlement holder authorizes the securities intermediary to grant security interests in the positions held for the entitlement holder. Securities firms commonly obtain the funds needed to provide margin loans to their customers by "rehypothecating" the customers' securities. In order to facilitate rehypothecation, agreements between margin customers and their brokers commonly authorize the broker to commingle securities of all margin customers for rehypothecation to the lender who provides the financing. Brokers commonly rehypothecate customer securities having a value somewhat greater than the amount of the loan made to the customer, since the lenders who provide the necessary financing to the broker need some cushion of protection against the risk of decline in the value of the rehypothecated securities. The extent and manner in which a firm may rehypothecate customers' securities are determined by the agreement between the intermediary and the entitlement holder and by applicable regulatory law. Current regulations under the federal securities laws require that brokers obtain the explicit consent of customers before pledging customer securities or commingling different customers' securities for pledge. Federal regulations also limit the extent to which a broker may rehypothecate customer securities to 110% of the aggregate amount of the borrowings of all customers.
3. The statement in this section that an intermediary must obtain and maintain financial assets corresponding to the aggregate of all security entitlements it has established is intended only to capture the general point that one of the key elements that distinguishes securities accounts from other relationships, such as deposit accounts, is that the intermediary undertakes to maintain a direct correspondence between the positions it holds and the claims of its customers. This section is not intended as a detailed specification of precisely how the intermediary is to perform this duty, nor whether there may be special circumstances in which an intermediary's general duty is excused. Accordingly, the general statement of the duties of a securities intermediary in this and the following sections is supplemented by two other provisions. First, each of Sections 8-504 through 8-508 contains an "agreement/due care" provision. Second, Section 8-509 sets out general qualifications on the duties stated in these sections, including the important point that compliance with corresponding regulatory provisions constitutes compliance with the Article 8 duties.
4. The "agreement/due care" provision in subsection (c) of this section is necessary to provide sufficient flexibility to accommodate the general duty stated in subsection (a) to the wide variety of circumstances that may be encountered in the modern securities holding system. For the most common forms of publicly traded securities, the modern depository-based indirect holding system has made the likelihood of an actual loss of securities remote, though correctable errors in accounting or temporary interruptions of data processing facilities may occur. Indeed, one of the reasons for the evolution of book-entry systems is to eliminate the risk of loss or destruction of physical certificates. There are, however, some forms of securities and other financial assets which must still be held in physical certificated form, with the attendant risk of loss or destruction. Risk of loss or delay may be a more significant consideration in connection with foreign securities. An American securities intermediary may well be willing to hold a foreign security in a securities account for its customer, but the intermediary may have relatively little choice of or control over foreign intermediaries through which the security must in turn be held. Accordingly, it is common for American securities intermediaries to disclaim responsibility for custodial risk of holding through foreign intermediaries.
Subsection (c)(1) provides that a securities intermediary satisfies the duty stated in subsection (a) if the intermediary acts with respect to that duty in accordance with the agreement between the intermediary and the entitlement holder. Subsection (c)(2) provides that if there is no agreement on the matter, the intermediary satisfies the subsection (a) duty if the intermediary exercises due care in accordance with reasonable commercial standards to obtain and maintain the financial asset in question. This formulation does not state that the intermediary has a universally applicable statutory duty of due care. Section 1-102(3) provides that statutory duties of due care cannot be disclaimed by agreement, but the "agreement/due care" formula contemplates that there may be particular circumstances where the parties do not wish to create a specific duty of due care, for example, with respect to foreign securities. Under subsection (c)(1), compliance with the agreement constitutes satisfaction of the subsection (a) duty, whether or not the agreement provides that the intermediary will exercise due care.
In each of the sections where the "agreement/due care" formula is used, it provides that entering into an agreement and performing in accordance with that agreement is a method by which the securities intermediary may satisfy the statutory duty stated in that section. Accordingly, the general obligation of good faith performance of statutory and contract duties, see Sections 1-203 and 8-102(a)(10), would apply to such an agreement. It would not be consistent with the obligation of good faith performance for an agreement to purport to establish the usual sort of arrangement between an intermediary and entitlement holder, yet disclaim altogether one of the basic elements that define that relationship. For example, an agreement stating that an intermediary assumes no responsibilities whatsoever for the safekeeping any of the entitlement holder's securities positions would not be consistent with good faith performance of the intermediary's duty to obtain and maintain financial assets corresponding to the entitlement holder's security entitlements.
To the extent that no agreement under subsection (c)(1) has specified the details of the intermediary's performance of the subsection (a) duty, subsection (c)(2) provides that the intermediary satisfies that duty if it exercises due care in accordance with reasonable commercial standards. The duty of care includes both care in the intermediary's own operations and care in the selection of other intermediaries through whom the intermediary holds the assets in question. The statement of the obligation of due care is meant to incorporate the principles of the common law under which the specific actions or precautions necessary to meet the obligation of care are determined by such factors as the nature and value of the property, the customs and practices of the business, and the like.
5. This section necessarily states the duty of a securities intermediary to obtain and maintain financial assets only at the very general and abstract level. For the most part, these matters are specified in great detail by regulatory law. Broker-dealers registered under the federal securities laws are subject to detailed regulation concerning the safeguarding of customer securities. See 17 C.F.R. ' 240.15c3-3. Section 8-509(a) provides explicitly that if a securities intermediary complies with such regulatory law, that constitutes compliance with Section 8-504. In certain circumstances, these rules permit a firm to be in a position where it temporarily lacks a sufficient quantity of financial assets to satisfy all customer claims. For example, if another firm has failed to make a delivery to the firm in settlement of a trade, the firm is permitted a certain period of time to clear up the problem before it is obligated to obtain the necessary securities from some other source.
6. Subsection (d) is intended to recognize that there are some circumstances, where the duty to maintain a sufficient quantity of financial assets does not apply because the intermediary is not holding anything on behalf of others. For example, the Options Clearing Corporation is treated as a "securities intermediary" under this Article, although it does not itself hold options on behalf of its participants. Rather, it becomes the issuer of the options, by virtue of guaranteeing the obligations of participants in the clearing corporation who have written or purchased the options cleared through it. See Section 8-103(e). Accordingly, the general duty of an intermediary under subsection (a) does not apply, nor would other provisions of Part 5 that depend upon the existence of a requirement that the securities intermediary hold financial assets, such as Sections 8-503 and 8-508.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to Section 8-504 of the Official Text, is new, and had no analogue in prior law. Together with other Sections in Part 5, it codifies certain rights and duties defining ownership interest through the indirect holding system created by Part 5 of Article 8. It codifies duties necessary as a practical matter to support the structure of the indirect holding system created by Part 5 of Article 8.
Definitional Cross References
"Agreement" Section 1-201(3)
"Clearing corporation" Section 8-102(a)(5)
"Entitlement holder" Section 8-102(a)(7)
"Financial asset" Section 8-102(a)(9)
"Securities intermediary" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Security entitlement" Section 8-102(a)(17)
Section 36-8-505. Duty of securities intermediary with respect to payments and distributions.
(a) A securities intermediary shall take action to obtain a payment or distribution made by the issuer of a financial asset. A securities intermediary satisfies the duty if:
(1) the securities intermediary acts with respect to the duty as agreed upon by the entitlement holder and the securities intermediary; or
(2) in the absence of agreement, the securities intermediary exercises due care in accordance with reasonable commercial standards to attempt to obtain the payment or distribution.
(b) A securities intermediary is obligated to its entitlement holder for a payment or distribution made by the issuer of a financial asset if the payment or distribution is received by the securities intermediary.
Official Comment
1. One of the core elements of the securities account relationships for which the Part 5 rules were designed is that the securities intermediary passes through to the entitlement holders the economic benefit of ownership of the financial asset, such as payments and distributions made by the issuer. Subsection (a) expresses the ordinary understanding that a securities intermediary will take appropriate action to see to it that any payments or distributions made by the issuer are received. One of the main reasons that investors make use of securities intermediaries is to obtain the services of a professional in performing the record-keeping and other functions necessary to ensure that payments and other distributions are received.
2. Subsection (a) incorporates the same "agreement/due care" formula as the other provisions of Part 5 dealing with the duties of a securities intermediary. See Comment 4 to Section 8-504. This formulation permits the parties to specify by agreement what action, if any, the intermediary is to take with respect to the duty to obtain payments and distributions. In the absence of specification by agreement, the intermediary satisfies the duty if the intermediary exercises due care in accordance with reasonable commercial standards. The provisions of Section 8-509 also apply to the Section 8-505 duty, so that compliance with applicable regulatory requirements constitutes compliance with the Section 8-505 duty.
3. Subsection (b) provides that a securities intermediary is obligated to its entitlement holder for those payments or distributions made by the issuer that are in fact received by the intermediary. It does not deal with the details of the time and manner of payment. Moreover, as with any other monetary obligation, the obligation to pay may be subject to other rights of the obligor, by way of set-off counterclaim or the like. Section 8-509(c) makes this point explicit.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to Section 8-505 of the Official Text, is new, and had no analogue in prior law. Together with other Sections in Part 5, it codifies certain rights and duties which define ownership interest through the indirect holding system created by Part 5 of Article 8.
Definitional Cross References
"Agreement" Section 1-201(3)
"Entitlement holder" Section 8-102(a)(7)
"Financial asset" Section 8-102(a)(9)
"Securities intermediary" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Security entitlement" Section 8-102(a)(17)
Section 36-8-506. Duty of securities intermediary to exercise rights as directed by entitlement holder.
A securities intermediary shall exercise rights with respect to a financial asset if directed to do so by an entitlement holder. A securities intermediary satisfies the duty if:
(1) the securities intermediary acts with respect to the duty as agreed upon by the entitlement holder and the securities intermediary; or
(2) in the absence of agreement, the securities intermediary either places the entitlement holder in a position to exercise the rights directly or exercises due care in accordance with reasonable commercial standards to follow the direction of the entitlement holder.
Official Comment
1. Another of the core elements of the securities account relationships for which the Part 5 rules were designed is that although the intermediary may, by virtue of the structure of the indirect holding system, be the party who has the power to exercise the corporate and other rights that come from holding the security, the intermediary exercises these powers as representative of the entitlement holder rather than at its own discretion. This characteristic is one of the things that distinguishes a securities account from other arrangements where one person holds securities "on behalf of" another, such as the relationship between a mutual fund and its shareholders or a trustee and its beneficiary.
2. The fact that the intermediary exercises the rights of security holding as representative of the entitlement holder does not, of course, preclude the entitlement holder from conferring discretionary authority upon the intermediary. Arrangements are not uncommon in which investors do not wish to have their intermediaries forward proxy materials or other information. Thus, this section provides that the intermediary shall exercise corporate and other rights "if directed to do so" by the entitlement holder. Moreover, as with the other Part 5 duties, the "agreement/due care" formulation is used in stating how the intermediary is to perform this duty. This section also provides that the intermediary satisfies the duty if it places the entitlement holder in a position to exercise the rights directly. This is to take account of the fact that some of the rights attendant upon ownership of the security, such as rights to bring derivative and other litigation, are far removed from the matters that intermediaries are expected to perform.
3. This section, and the two that follow, deal with the aspects of securities holding that are related to investment decisions. For example, one of the rights of holding a particular security that would fall within the purview of this section would be the right to exercise a conversion right for a convertible security. It is quite common for investors to confer discretionary authority upon another person, such as an investment adviser, with respect to these rights and other investment decisions. Because this section, and the other sections of Part 5, all specify that a securities intermediary satisfies the Part 5 duties if it acts in accordance with the entitlement holder's agreement, there is no inconsistency between the statement of duties of a securities intermediary and these common arrangements.
4. Section 8-509 also applies to the Section 8-506 duty, so that compliance with applicable regulatory requirements constitutes compliance with this duty. This is quite important in this context, since the federal securities laws establish a comprehensive system of regulation of the distribution of proxy materials and exercise of voting rights with respect to securities held through brokers and other intermediaries. By virtue of Section 8-509(a), compliance with such regulatory requirement constitutes compliance with the Section 8-506 duty.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to Section 8-506 of the Official Text, is new, and had no analogue in prior law. Together with other Sections in Part 5, it codifies certain rights and duties which define ownership interest through the indirect holding system created by Part 5 of Article 8.
Definitional Cross References
"Agreement" Section 1-201(3)
"Entitlement holder" Section 8-102(a)(7)
"Financial asset" Section 8-102(a)(9)
"Securities intermediary" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Security entitlement" Section 8-102(a)(17)
Section 36-8-507. Duty of securities intermediary to comply with entitlement order.
(a) A securities intermediary shall comply with an entitlement order if the entitlement order is originated by the appropriate person, the securities intermediary has had reasonable opportunity to assure itself that the entitlement order is genuine and authorized, and the securities intermediary has had reasonable opportunity to comply with the entitlement order. A securities intermediary satisfies the duty if:
(1) the securities intermediary acts with respect to the duty as agreed upon by the entitlement holder and the securities intermediary; or
(2) in the absence of agreement, the securities intermediary exercises due care in accordance with reasonable commercial standards to comply with the entitlement order.
(b) If a securities intermediary transfers a financial asset pursuant to an ineffective entitlement order, the securities intermediary shall reestablish a security entitlement in favor of the person entitled to it, and pay or credit any payments or distributions that the person did not receive as a result of the wrongful transfer. If the securities intermediary does not reestablish a security entitlement, the securities intermediary is liable to the entitlement holder for damages.
Official Comment
1. Subsection (a) of this section states another aspect of duties of securities intermediaries that make up security entitlements -- the securities intermediary's duty to comply with entitlement orders. One of the main reasons for holding securities through securities intermediaries is to enable rapid transfer in settlement of trades. Thus the right to have one's orders for disposition of the security entitlement honored is an inherent part of the relationship. Subsection (b) states the correlative liability of a securities intermediary for transferring a financial asset from an entitlement holder's account pursuant to an entitlement order that was not effective.
2. The duty to comply with entitlement orders is subject to several qualifications. The intermediary has a duty only with respect to an entitlement order that is in fact originated by the appropriate person. Moreover, the intermediary has a duty only if it has had reasonable opportunity to assure itself that the order is genuine and authorized, and reasonable opportunity to comply with the order. The same "agreement/due care" formula is used in this section as in the other Part 5 sections on the duties of intermediaries, and the rules of Section 8-509 apply to the Section 8-507 duty.
3. Appropriate person is defined in Section 8-107. In the usual case, the appropriate person is the entitlement holder, see Section 8-107(a)(3). Entitlement holder is defined in Section 8-102(a)(7) as the person "identified in the records of a securities intermediary as the person having a security entitlement." Thus, the general rule is that an intermediary's duty with respect to entitlement orders runs only to the person with whom the intermediary has established a relationship. One of the basic principles of the indirect holding system is that securities intermediaries owe duties only to their own customers. See also Section 8-115. The only situation in which a securities intermediary has a duty to comply with entitlement orders originated by a person other than the person with whom the intermediary established a relationship is covered by Section 8-107(a)(4) and (a)(5), which provide that the term "appropriate person" includes the successor or personal representative of a decedent, or the custodian or guardian of a person who lacks capacity. If the entitlement holder is competent, another person does not fall within the defined term "appropriate person" merely by virtue of having power to act as an agent for the entitlement holder. Thus, an intermediary is not required to determine at its peril whether a person who purports to be authorized to act for an entitlement holder is in fact authorized to do so. If an entitlement holder wishes to be able to act through agents, the entitlement holder can establish appropriate arrangements in advance with the securities intermediary.
One important application of this principle is that if an entitlement holder grants a security interest in its security entitlements to a third-party lender, the intermediary owes no duties to the secured party, unless the intermediary has entered into a "control" agreement in which it agrees to act on entitlement orders originated by the secured party. See Section 8-106. Even though the security agreement or some other document may give the secured party authority to act as agent for the debtor, that would not make the secured party an "appropriate person" to whom the security intermediary owes duties. If the entitlement holder and securities intermediary have agreed to such a control arrangement, then the intermediary's action in following instructions from the secured party would satisfy the subsection (a) duty. Although an agent, such as the secured party in this example, is not an "appropriate person," an entitlement order is "effective" if originated by an authorized person. See Section 8-107(a) and (b). Moreover, Section 8-507(a) provides that the intermediary satisfies its duty if it acts in accordance with the entitlement holder's agreement.
4. Subsection (b) provides that an intermediary is liable for a wrongful transfer if the entitlement order was "ineffective." Section 8-107 specifies whether an entitlement order is effective. An "effective entitlement order" is different from an "entitlement order originated by an appropriate person." An entitlement order is effective under Section 8-107(b) if it is made by the appropriate person, or by a person who has power to act for the appropriate person under the law of agency, or if the appropriate person has ratified the entitlement order or is precluded from denying its effectiveness. Thus, although a securities intermediary does not have a duty to act on an entitlement order originated by the entitlement holder's agent, the intermediary is not liable for wrongful transfer if it does so.
Subsection (b), together with Section 8-107, has the effect of leaving to other law most of the questions of the sort dealt with by Article 4A for wire transfers of funds, such as allocation between the securities intermediary and the entitlement holder of the risk of fraudulent entitlement orders.
5. The term entitlement order does not cover all directions that a customer might give a broker concerning securities held through the broker. Article 8 is not a codification of all of the law of customers and stockbrokers. Article 8 deals with the settlement of securities trades, not the trades. The term entitlement order does not refer to instructions to a broker to make trades, that is, enter into contracts for the purchase or sale of securities. Rather, the entitlement order is the mechanism of transfer for securities held through intermediaries, just as indorsements and instructions are the mechanism for securities held directly. In the ordinary case the customer's direction to the broker to deliver the securities at settlement is implicit in the customer's instruction to the broker to sell. The distinction is, however, significant in that this section has no application to the relationship between the customer and broker with respect to the trade itself. For example, assertions by a customer that it was damaged by a broker's failure to execute a trading order sufficiently rapidly or in the proper manner are not governed by this Article.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to Section 8-507 of the Official Text, is new, and had no analogue in prior law. Together with other Sections in Part 5, it codifies certain rights and duties which define ownership interest through the indirect holding system created by Part 5 of Article 8.
Definitional Cross References
"Agreement" Section 1-201(3)
"Appropriate person" Section 8-107
"Effective" Section 8-107
"Entitlement holder" Section 8-102(a)(7)
"Entitlement order" Section 8-102(a)(8)
"Financial asset" Section 8-102(a)(9)
"Securities intermediary" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Security entitlement" Section 8-102(a)(17)
Section 36-8-508. Duty of securities intermediary to change entitlement holder's position to other form of security holding.
A securities intermediary shall act at the direction of an entitlement holder to change a security entitlement into another available form of holding for which the entitlement holder is eligible, or to cause the financial asset to be transferred to a securities account of the entitlement holder with another securities intermediary. A securities intermediary satisfies the duty if:
(1) the securities intermediary acts as agreed upon by the entitlement holder and the securities intermediary; or
(2) in the absence of agreement, the securities intermediary exercises due care in accordance with reasonable commercial standards to follow the direction of the entitlement holder.
Official Comment
1. This section states another aspect of the duties of securities intermediaries that make up security entitlements -- the obligation of the securities intermediary to change an entitlement holder's position into any other form of holding for which the entitlement holder is eligible or to transfer the entitlement holder's position to an account at another intermediary. This section does not state unconditionally that the securities intermediary is obligated to turn over a certificate to the customer or to cause the customer to be registered on the books of the issuer, because the customer may not be eligible to hold the security directly. For example, municipal bonds are now commonly issued in "book-entry only" form, in which the only entity that the issuer will register on its own books is a depository.
If security certificates in registered form are issued for the security, and individuals are eligible to have the security registered in their own name, the entitlement holder can request that the intermediary deliver or cause to be delivered to the entitlement holder a certificate registered in the name of the entitlement holder or a certificate indorsed in blank or specially indorsed to the entitlement holder. If security certificates in bearer form are issued for the security, the entitlement holder can request that the intermediary deliver or cause to be delivered a certificate in bearer form. If the security can be held by individuals directly in uncertificated form, the entitlement holder can request that the security be registered in its name. The specification of this duty does not determine the pricing terms of the agreement in which the duty arises.
2. The same "agreement/due care" formula is used in this section as in the other Part 5 sections on the duties of intermediaries. So too, the rules of Section 8-509 apply to the Section 8-508 duty.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to Section 8-508 of the Official Text, is new, and had no analogue in prior law. Together with other Sections in Part 5, it codifies certain rights and duties which define ownership interest through the indirect holding system created by Part 5 of Article 8.
Definitional Cross References
"Agreement" Section 1-201(3)
"Entitlement holder" Section 8-102(a)(7)
"Financial asset" Section 8-102(a)(9)
"Securities intermediary" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Security entitlement" Section 8-102(a)(17)
Section 36-8-509. Specification of duties of securities intermediary by other statute or regulation; manner of performance of duties of securities intermediary and exercise of rights of entitlement holder.
(a) If the substance of a duty imposed upon a securities intermediary by Sections 36-8-504 through 36-8-508 is the subject of other statute, regulation, or rule, compliance with that statute, regulation, or rule satisfies the duty.
(b) To the extent that specific standards for the performance of the duties of a securities intermediary or the exercise of the rights of an entitlement holder are not specified by other statute, regulation, or rule or by agreement between the securities intermediary and entitlement holder, the securities intermediary shall perform its duties and the entitlement holder shall exercise its rights in a commercially reasonable manner.
(c) The obligation of a securities intermediary to perform the duties imposed by Sections 36-8-504 through 36-8-508 is subject to:
(1) rights of the securities intermediary arising out of a security interest under a security agreement with the entitlement holder or otherwise; and
(2) rights of the securities intermediary under other law, regulation, rule, or agreement to withhold performance of its duties as a result of unfulfilled obligations of the entitlement holder to the securities intermediary.
(d) Sections 36-8-504 through 36-8-508 do not require a securities intermediary to take any action that is prohibited by other statute, regulation, or rule.
Official Comment
This Article is not a comprehensive statement of the law governing the relationship between broker-dealers or other securities intermediaries and their customers. Most of the law governing that relationship is the common law of contract and agency, supplemented or supplanted by regulatory law. This Article deals only with the most basic commercial/property law principles governing the relationship. Although Sections 8-504 through 8-508 specify certain duties of securities intermediaries to entitlement holders, the point of these sections is to identify what it means to have a security entitlement, not to specify the details of performance of these duties.
For many intermediaries, regulatory law specifies in great detail the intermediary's obligations on such matters as safekeeping of customer property, distribution of proxy materials, and the like. To avoid any conflict between the general statement of duties in this Article and the specific statement of intermediaries' obligations in such regulatory schemes, subsection (a) provides that compliance with applicable regulation constitutes compliance with the duties specified in Sections 8-504 through 8-508.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to Section 8-509 of the Official Text, is new, and had no analogue in prior law. Existing applicable law is preserved, and conflicts between such law and Part 5 avoided, by operation of this Section.
Definitional Cross References
"Agreement" Section 1-201(3)
"Entitlement holder" Section 8-102(a)(7)
"Securities intermediary" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Security agreement" Section 9-105(1)(l)
"Security interest" Section 1-201(37)
Section 36-8-510. Rights of purchaser of security entitlement from entitlement holder.
(a) In a case not covered by the priority rules in Article 9 or the rules stated in subsection (c), an action based on an adverse claim to a financial asset or security entitlement, whether framed in conversion, replevin, constructive trust, equitable lien, or other theory, may not be asserted against a person who purchases a security entitlement, or an interest therein, from an entitlement holder if the purchaser gives value, does not have notice of the adverse claim, and obtains control.
(b) If an adverse claim could not have been asserted against an entitlement holder under Section 36-8-502, the adverse claim cannot be asserted against a person who purchases a security entitlement, or an interest therein, from the entitlement holder.
(c) In a case not covered by the priority rules in Chapter 9, a purchaser for value of a security entitlement, or an interest therein, who obtains control has priority over a purchaser of a security entitlement, or an interest therein, who does not obtain control. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), purchasers who have control rank according to priority in time of:
(1) the purchaser's becoming the person for whom the securities account, in which the security entitlement is carried, is maintained, if the purchaser obtained control under Section 36-8-106(d)(1);
(2) the securities intermediary's agreement to comply with the purchaser's entitlement orders with respect to security entitlements carried or to be carried in the securities account in which the security entitlement is carried, if the purchaser obtained control under Section 36-8-106(d)(2); or
(3) if the purchaser obtained control through another person under Section 36-8-106(d)(3), the time on which priority would be based under this subsection if the other person were the secured party.
(d) A securities intermediary as purchaser has priority over a conflicting purchaser who has control unless otherwise agreed by the securities intermediary.
Official Comment
1. This section specifies certain rules concerning the rights of persons who purchase interests in security entitlements from entitlement holders. The rules of this section are provided to take account of cases where the purchaser's rights are derivative from the rights of another person who is and continues to be the entitlement holder.
2. Subsection (a) provides that no adverse claim can be asserted against a purchaser of an interest in a security entitlement if the purchaser gives value, obtains control, and does not have notice of the adverse claim. The primary purpose of this rule is to give adverse claim protection to persons who take security interests in security entitlements and obtain control, but do not themselves become entitlement holders.
The following examples illustrate subsection (a):
Example 1. X steals a certificated bearer bond from Owner. X delivers the certificate to Able & Co. for credit to X's securities account. Later, X borrows from Bank and grants bank a security interest in the security entitlement. Bank obtains control under Section 8-106(d)(2) by virtue of an agreement in which Able agrees to comply with entitlement orders originated by Bank. X absconds.
Example 2. Same facts as in Example 1, except that Bank does not obtain a control agreement. Instead, Bank perfects by filing a financing statement.
In both of these examples, when X deposited the bonds X acquired a security entitlement under Section 8-501. Under other law, Owner may be able to have a constructive trust imposed on the security entitlement as the traceable product of the bonds that X misappropriated. X granted a security interest in that entitlement to Bank. Bank was a purchaser of an interest in the security entitlement from X. In Example 1, although Bank was not a person who acquired a security entitlement from the intermediary, Bank did obtain control. If Bank did not have notice of Owner's claim, Section 8-510(a) precludes Owner from asserting an adverse claim against Bank. In Example 2, Bank had a perfected security interest, but did not obtain control. Accordingly, Section 8-510(a) does not preclude Owner from asserting its adverse claim against Bank.
3. Subsection (b) applies to the indirect holding system a limited version of the "shelter principle." The following example illustrates the relatively limited class of cases for which it may be needed:
Example 3. Thief steals a certificated bearer bond from Owner. Thief delivers the certificate to Able & Co. for credit to Thief's securities account. Able forwards the certificate to a clearing corporation for credit to Able's account. Later Thief instructs Able to sell the positions in the bonds. Able sells to Baker & Co., acting as broker for Buyer. The trade is settled by book-entries in the accounts of Able and Baker at the clearing corporation, and in the accounts of Thief and Buyer at Able and Baker respectively. Owner may be able to reconstruct the trade records to show that settlement occurred in such fashion that the "same bonds" that were carried in Thief's account at Able are traceable into Buyer's account at Baker. Buyer later decides to donate the bonds to Alma Mater University and executes an assignment of its rights as entitlement holder to Alma Mater.
Buyer had a position in the bonds, which Buyer held in the form of a security entitlement against Baker. Buyer then made a gift of the position to Alma Mater. Although Alma Mater is a purchaser, Section 1-201(33), it did not give value. Thus, Alma Mater is a person who purchased a security entitlement, or an interest therein, from an entitlement holder (Buyer). Buyer was protected against Owner's adverse claim by the Section 8-502 rule. Thus, by virtue of Section 8-510(b), Owner is also precluded from asserting an adverse claim against Alma Mater.
4. Subsection (c) specifies a priority rule for cases where an entitlement holder transfers conflicting interests in the same security entitlement to different purchasers. It follows the same principle as the Article 9 priority rule for investment property, that is, control trumps non-control. Indeed, the most significant category of conflicting "purchasers" may be secured parties. Priority questions for security interests, however, are governed by the rules in Article 9. Subsection (c) applies only to cases not covered by the Article 9 rules. It is intended primarily for disputes over conflicting claims arising out of repurchase agreement transactions that are not covered by the other rules set out in Articles 8 and 9.
The following example illustrates subsection (c):
Example 4. Dealer holds securities through an account at Alpha Bank. Alpha Bank in turns holds through a clearing corporation account. Dealer transfers securities to RP1 in a "hold in custody" repo transaction. Dealer then transfers the same securities to RP2 in another repo transaction. The repo to RP2 is implemented by transferring the securities from Dealer's regular account at Alpha Bank to a special account maintained by Alpha Bank for Dealer and RP2. The agreement among Dealer, RP2, and Alpha Bank provides that Dealer can make substitutions for the securities but RP2 can direct Alpha Bank to sell any securities held in the special account. Dealer becomes insolvent. RP1 claims a prior interest in the securities transferred to RP2.
In this example Dealer remained the entitlement holder but agreed that RP2 could initiate entitlement orders to Dealer's security intermediary, Alpha Bank. If RP2 had become the entitlement holder, the adverse claim rule of Section 8-502 would apply. Even if RP2 does not become the entitlement holder, the arrangement among Dealer, Alpha Bank, and RP2 does suffice to give RP2 control. Thus, under Section 8-510(c), RP2 has priority over RP1, because RP2 is a purchaser who obtained control, and RP1 is a purchaser who did not obtain control. The same result could be reached under Section 8-510(a) which provides that RP1's earlier in time interest cannot be asserted as an adverse claim against RP2. The same result would follow under the Article 9 priority rules if the interests of RP1 and RP2 are characterized as "security interests," see Section 9-328(1). The main point of the rules of Section 8-510(c) is to ensure that there will be clear rules to cover the conflicting claims of RP1 and RP2 without characterizing their interests as Article 9 security interests.
The priority rules in Article 9 for conflicting security interests also include a default temporal priority rule for cases where multiple secured parties have obtained control but omitted to specify their respective rights by agreement. See Section 9-328(2) and Comment 5 to Section 9-328. Because the purchaser priority rule in Section 8-510(c) is intended to track the Article 9 priority rules, it too has a temporal priority rule for cases where multiple non-secured party purchasers have obtained control but omitted to specify their respective rights by agreement. The rule is patterned on Section 9-328(2).
5. If a securities intermediary itself is a purchaser, subsection (d) provides that it has priority over the interest of another purchaser who has control. Article 9 contains a similar rule. See Section 9-328(3).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to Section 8-510 of the Official Text, is new. It has no direct analogue in prior law, but, generally speaking, addresses the concept of the bona fide purchaser for value, and in that respect replaces subject matter dealt with in prior law at Sections 36-8-304 and -305. See also Section [8-105](b), (c) and (d).
This Section describes conditions under which certain purchasers of interest in security entitlements for value and without notice who do not become entitlement holders (such as secured parties) will be protected. Section [8-502] similarly protects certain purchasers who become entitlement holders.
Definitional Cross References
"Adverse claim" Section 8-102(a)(1)
"Control" Section 8-106
"Entitlement holder" Section 8-102(a)(7)
"Notice of adverse claim" Section 8-105
"Purchase" Section 1-201(32)
"Purchaser" Sections 1-201(33) & 8-116
"Securities intermediary" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Security entitlement" Section 8-102(a)(17)
"Value" Sections 1-201(44) & 8-116
Section 36-8-511. Priority among security interests and entitlement holders.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b) and (c), if a securities intermediary does not have sufficient interests in a particular financial asset to satisfy both its obligations to entitlement holders who have security entitlements to that financial asset and its obligation to a creditor of the securities intermediary who has a security interest in that financial asset, the claims of entitlement holders, other than the creditor, have priority over the claim of the creditor.
(b) A claim of a creditor of a securities intermediary who has a security interest in a financial asset held by a securities intermediary has priority over claims of the securities intermediary's entitlement holders who have security entitlements with respect to that financial asset if the creditor has control over the financial asset.
(c) If a clearing corporation does not have sufficient financial assets to satisfy both its obligations to entitlement holders who have security entitlements with respect to a financial asset and its obligation to a creditor of the clearing corporation who has a security interest in that financial asset, the claim of the creditor has priority over the claims of entitlement holders."
Official Comment
1. This section sets out priority rules for circumstances in which a securities intermediary fails leaving an insufficient quantity of securities or other financial assets to satisfy the claims of its entitlement holders and the claims of creditors to whom it has granted security interests in financial assets held by it. Subsection (a) provides that entitlement holders' claims have priority except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), and subsection (b) provides that the secured creditor's claim has priority if the secured creditor obtains control, as defined in Section 8-106. The following examples illustrate the operation of these rules.
Example 1. Able & Co., a broker, borrows from Alpha Bank and grants Alpha Bank a security interest pursuant to a written agreement which identifies certain securities that are to be collateral for the loan, either specifically or by category. Able holds these securities in a clearing corporation account. Able becomes insolvent and it is discovered that Able holds insufficient securities to satisfy the claims of customers who have paid for securities that they held in accounts with Able and the collateral claims of Alpha Bank. Alpha Bank's security interest in the security entitlements that Able holds through the clearing corporation account may be perfected under the automatic perfection rule of Section 9-115(4)(c), but Alpha Bank did not obtain control under Section 8-106. Thus, under Section 8-511(a) the entitlement holders' claims have priority over Alpha Bank's claim.
Example 2. Able & Co., a broker, borrows from Beta Bank and grants Beta Bank a security interest in securities that Able holds in a clearing corporation account. Pursuant to the security agreement, the securities are debited from Alpha's account and credited to Beta's account in the clearing corporation account. Able becomes insolvent and it is discovered that Able holds insufficient securities to satisfy the claims of customers who have paid for securities that they held in accounts with Able and the collateral claims of Alpha Bank. Although the transaction between Able and Beta took the form of an outright transfer on the clearing corporation's books, as between Able and Beta, Able remains the owner and Beta has a security interest. In that respect the situation is no different than if Able had delivered bearer bonds to Beta in pledge to secure a loan. Beta's security interest is perfected, and Beta obtained control. See Sections 8-106 and 9-115. Under Section 8-511(b), Beta Bank's security interest has priority over claims of Able's customers.
The result in Example 2 is an application to this particular setting of the general principle expressed in Section 8-503, and explained in the Comments thereto, that the entitlement holders of a securities intermediary cannot assert rights against third parties to whom the intermediary has wrongfully transferred interests, except in extremely unusual circumstances where the third party was itself a participant in the transferor's wrongdoing. Under subsection (b) the claim of a secured creditor of a securities intermediary has priority over the claims of entitlement holders if the secured creditor has obtained control. If, however, the secured creditor acted in collusion with the intermediary in violating the intermediary's obligation to its entitlement holders, then under Section 8-503(e), the entitlement holders, through their representative in insolvency proceedings, could recover the interest from the secured creditor, that is, set aside the security interest.
2. The risk that investors who hold through an intermediary will suffer a loss as a result of a wrongful pledge by the intermediary is no different than the risk that the intermediary might fail and not have the securities that it was supposed to be holding on behalf of its customers, either because the securities were never acquired by the intermediary or because the intermediary wrongfully sold securities that should have been kept to satisfy customers' claims. Investors are protected against that risk by the regulatory regimes under which securities intermediaries operate. Intermediaries are required to maintain custody, through clearing corporation accounts or in other approved locations, of their customers' securities and are prohibited from using customers' securities in their own business activities. Securities firms who are carrying both customer and proprietary positions are not permitted to grant blanket liens to lenders covering all securities which they hold, for their own account or for their customers. Rather, securities firms designate specifically which positions they are pledging. Under SEC Rules 8c-1 and 15c2-1, customers' securities can be pledged only to fund loans to customers, and only with the consent of the customers. Customers' securities cannot be pledged for loans for the firm's proprietary business; only proprietary positions can be pledged for proprietary loans. SEC Rule 15c3-3 implements these prohibitions in a fashion tailored to modern securities firm accounting systems by requiring brokers to maintain a sufficient inventory of securities, free from any liens, to satisfy the claims of all of their customers for fully paid and excess margin securities. Revised Article 8 mirrors that requirement, specifying in Section 8-504 that a securities intermediary must maintain a sufficient quantity of investment property to satisfy all security entitlements, and may not grant security interests in the positions it is required to hold for customers, except as authorized by the customers.
If a failed brokerage has violated the customer protection regulations and does not have sufficient securities to satisfy customers= claims, its customers are protected against loss from a shortfall by the Securities Investor Protection Act ("SIPA"). Securities firms required to register as brokers or dealers are also required to become members of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation ("SIPC"), which provides their customers with protection somewhat similar to that provided by FDIC and other deposit insurance programs for bank depositors. When a member firm fails, SIPC is authorized to initiate a liquidation proceeding under the provisions of SIPA. If the assets of the securities firm are insufficient to satisfy all customer claims, SIPA makes contributions to the estate from a fund financed by assessments on its members to protect customers against losses up to $500,000 for cash and securities held at member firms.
Article 8 is premised on the view that the important policy of protecting investors against the risk of wrongful conduct by their intermediaries is sufficiently treated by other law.
3. Subsection (c) sets out a special rule for secured financing provided to enable clearing corporations to complete settlement. The reasons that secured financing arrangements are needed in such circumstances are explained in Comment 7 to Section 9-115. In order to permit clearing corporations to establish liquidity facilities where necessary to ensure completion of settlement, subsection (c) provides a priority for secured lenders to such clearing corporations. Subsection (c) does not turn on control because the clearing corporation may be the top tier securities intermediary for the securities pledged, so that there may be no practicable method for conferring control on the lender.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This Section, identical to Section 8-511 of the Official Text, is new. It clarifies priorities as between entitlement holders and secured creditors of financial intermediaries. Like Section [8-503], it is based on the concept that financial assets held by a financial intermediary for its entitlement holders are not assets of the intermediary and therefore not accessible to the intermediary's secured creditors. To this general rule this Section establishes two significant exceptions to that rule, found in subsections (b) (giving priority to secured creditors who have obtained control) and (c) (giving priority to secured creditors of clearing corporations). See the explanation and examples in the Official Comment.
Definitional Cross References
"Clearing corporation" Section 8-102(a)(5)
"Control" Section 8-106
"Entitlement holder" Section 8-102(a)(7)
"Financial asset" Section 8-102(a)(9)
"Securities intermediary" Section 8-102(a)(14)
"Security entitlement" Section 8-102(a)(17)
"Security interest" Section 1-201(37)
"Value" Sections 1-201(44) & 8-116
SECTION 8. Section 36-1-105(2) of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 221 of 1996, is further amended to read:
"(2) Where one of the following provisions of this title specifies the applicable law, that provision governs and a contrary agreement is effective only to the extent permitted by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) so specified:
Rights of seller's creditors against sold goods. Section 36-2-402.
Applicability of the Chapter on Bank Deposits and Collections. Section 36-4-102.
Bulk transfers subject to the Chapter on Bulk Transfers. Section 36-6-102.
Applicability of the Chapter on Investment Securities. Section 36-8-106 36-8-110.
Perfection provisions of the Chapter on Secured Transactions. Section 36-9-103.
Governing law in the Chapter on Funds Transfers. Section 36-4A-507."
SECTION 9. Official Comment 17 to Section 36-1-201 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"'Fungible'. See Sections 5, 6 and 76, Uniform Sales Act; Section 58, Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act. Fungibility of goods 'by agreement' has been added for clarity and accuracy. As to securities, see Section 8-107 and Comment."
SECTION 10. Official Comment to Section 36-1-206 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"Purposes:
To fill the gap left by the Statute of Frauds provisions for goods (Section 2-201), securities (Section 8-319), and security interests (Section 9-203). As to securities, see Section 8-114. The Uniform Sales Act covered the sale of "choses in action"; the principal gap relates to sale of the "general intangibles" defined in Article 9 (Section 9-106) and to transactions excluded from Article 9 by Section 9-104. Typical are the sale of bilateral contracts, royalty rights or the like. The informality normal to such transactions is recognized by lifting the limit for oral transactions to $5,000. In such transactions there is often no standard of practice by which to judge, and values can rise or drop without warning; troubling abuses are avoided when the dollar limit is exceeded by requiring that the subject-matter be reasonably identified in a signed writing which indicates that a contract for sale has been made at a defined or stated price."
SECTION 11. Official Comment 1 to Section 36-4-102 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"1. The rules governing negotiable instruments, their transfer, and the contracts of the parties thereto apply to the items collected through banking channels wherever no specific provision is found in this Article. In the case of conflict, this Article governs. See Section 3-103(2).
Bonds and like instruments constituting investment securities under Article 8 may also be handled by banks for collection purposes. Various sections of Article 8 prescribe rules of transfer some of which (see Sections 8-304 and 8-306 8-108 and 8-304) may conflict with provisions of this Article (Sections 4-205 and 4-207). In the case of conflict, Article 8 governs.
Section 4-208 deals specifically with overlapping problems and possible conflicts between this Article and Article 9. However, similar reconciling provisions are not necessary in the case of Articles 5 and 7. Sections 4-301 and 4-302 are consistent with Section 5-112. In the case of Article 7 documents of title frequently accompany items but they are not themselves items. See Section 4-104(g)."
SECTION 12. Section 36-4-104(f) of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"(f) 'Documentary draft' means any a negotiable or nonnegotiable draft with accompanying documents, certificated securities (Section 36-8-102), instructions for certificated securities (Section 36-8-102), or other papers to be delivered against honor of the draft;"
SECTION 13. Section 36-5-114(2) of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 161 of 1991, is further amended to read:
"(2) Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their face to comply with the terms of a credit but a required document does not in fact conform to the warranties made on negotiation or transfer of a document of title (Section 36-7-507) or of a certificated security (Section 36-8-306 36-8-108) or is forged or fraudulent or there is fraud in the transaction:
(a) the issuer must honor the draft or demand for payment if honor is demanded by a negotiating bank or other holder of the draft or demand under the credit and under circumstances which would make it a holder in due course (Section 36-3-302) and in an appropriate case would make it a person to whom a document of title has been duly negotiated (Section 36-7-502) or a bona fide purchaser of a certificated security (Section 36-8-302); and
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer acting in good faith may honor the draft or demand for payment despite notification from the customer of fraud, forgery, or other defect not apparent on the face of the documents but a court of appropriate jurisdiction may enjoin such honor."
SECTION 14. Section 33-6-260 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"Section 33-6-260. (a) Unless the articles of incorporation or bylaws provide otherwise, the board of directors of a corporation may authorize the issue of some or all of the shares of any or all of its classes or series without certificates to the extent that investment securities not evidenced by certificates are authorized by Chapter 8 of Title 36 of the South Carolina Uniform Commercial Code. The authorization does not affect shares already represented by certificates until they are surrendered to the corporation to the extent that investment securities not evidenced by certificates are contemplated by Chapter 8 of Title 36 of the South Carolina Uniform Commercial Code.
(b) Within a reasonable time after the issue or transfer of shares without certificates, the corporation shall send the shareholder a written statement of the information required on certificates by Section 33-6-250(b) and (c), and, if applicable, Section 33-6-270."
Official Comment
Section 6.26(a) (Section 33-6-260(a)) authorizes the creation of uncertificated shares either by original issue or in substitution for shares previously represented by certificates. This subsection gives the board of directors the widest discretion so that a particular class and series of shares might be entirely represented by certificates, entirely uncertificated, or represented partly by each. The second sentence ensures that a corporation may not treat as uncertificated, and accordingly transferable on its books without due presentation of a certificate, any shares for which a certificate is outstanding.
The statement required by section 6.26(b) (Section 33-6-260(b)) ensures that holders of uncertificated shares will receive from the corporation the same information that the holders of certificates receive when certificates are issued. There is no requirement that this information be delivered to purchasers of uncertificated shares before purchase.
Detailed rules with respect to the issuance, transfer, and registration of both certificated and uncertificated shares appear in article 8 of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE. In general terms there are no differences between certificated and uncertificated securities except in matters such as their manner of transfer. See the Official Comment to section 6.25 (Section 33-6-250).
South Carolina Reporters' Comment To 2000 Revision
Permitting securities to be issued without certificates enables the securities industry to operate more efficiently. This efficiency depends in part on recognition of uniform rules of issuance, registration, and transfer of such securities. A widely accepted set of such rules was incorporated in the 1978 amendments to Chapter 8 of Title 36 of the South Carolina Uniform Commercial Code. South Carolina had not adopted these rules at the time this act was enacted. Until the revised Article 8 is enacted, corporations formed in South Carolina will be required to issue share certificates for all issued shares. See Chapter 8 of Title 36 of the 1976 Code.
This section permits corporations wishing to issue securities not represented by certificates to do so using the rules found in Chapter 8 of Title 36 of the South Carolina Uniform Commercial Code. Chapter 8 of Title 36 was comprehensively amended effective July 1, 2000, deleting, among other things, the requirement that issuers of uncertificated securities provide information statements to new holders of such securities. This section has been amended in conformity, deleting the requirement for information statements found in former subsection (b). The balance of the amendment to this Section was nonsubstantive.
SECTION 15. Chapter 7 of Title 35 of the 1976 Code is repealed.
Official Comment
If the State has adopted the Uniform Act for the Simplification Fiduciary Security Transfers, or similar legislation, it should be repealed.
SECTION 16. (a) Chapter 8 does not affect an action or proceeding commenced before this chapter takes effect.
(b) If a security interest in a security is perfected at the date this chapter takes effect, and the action by which the security interest was perfected would suffice to perfect a security interest under this chapter, no further action is required to continue perfection. If a security interest in a security is perfected at the date this chapter takes effect but the action by which the security interest was perfected would not suffice to perfect a security interest under this chapter, the security interest remains perfected for a period of four months after the effective date and continues perfected thereafter if appropriate action to perfect under this chapter is taken within that period. If a security interest is perfected at the date this chapter takes effect and the security interest can be perfected by filing under this chapter, a financing statement signed by the secured party instead of the debtor may be filed within that period to continue perfection or thereafter to perfect.
Official Comment
The revision of Article 8 should present few significant transition problems. Although the revision involves significant changes in terminology and analysis, the substantive rules are, in large measure, based upon the current practices and are consistent with results that could be reached, albeit at times with some struggle, by proper interpretation of the rules of present law. Thus, the new rules can be applied, without significant dislocations, to transactions and events that occurred prior to enactment.
The enacting provisions should not, whether by applicability, transition, or savings clause language, attempt to provide that old Article 8 continues to apply to "transactions," "events," "rights," "duties," "liabilities," or the like that occurred or accrued before the effective date and that new Article 8 applies to those that occur or accrue after the effective date. The reason for revising Article 8 and corresponding provisions of Article 9 is the concern that the provisions of old Article 8 could be interpreted or misinterpreted to yield results that impede the safe and efficient operation of the national system for the clearance and settlement of securities transactions. Accordingly, it is not the case that any effort should be made to preserve the applicability of old Article 8 to transactions and events that occurred before the effective date.
Only two circumstances seem to warrant continued application of rules of old Article 8. First, to avoid disruption in the conduct of litigation, it may make sense to provide for continued application of the old Article 8 rules to lawsuits pending before the effective date. Second, there are some limited circumstances in which prior law permitted perfection of security interests by methods that are not provided for in the revised version. Section 8-313(1)(h) (1978) permitted perfection of security interests in securities held through intermediaries by notice to the intermediary. Under Revised Articles 8 and 9, security interests can be perfected in such cases by control, which requires the agreement of the intermediary, or by filing. It is likely that secured parties who relied strongly on such collateral under prior law did not simply send notices but obtained agreements from the intermediaries that would suffice for control under the new rules. However, it seems appropriate to include a provision that gives a secured creditor some opportunity after the effective date to perfect in this or any other case in which there is doubt whether the method of perfection used under prior law would be sufficient under the new version.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment to 2000 Revision
This means that security interests perfected by a means not contemplated by revised Articles 8 and 9 become unperfected at midnight four months after the simultaneous effectiveness of revised Articles 8 and 9. Continuity of perfection requires reperfection under revised Articles 8 and 9 before or on that date. At midnight on that date perfection lapses, and compliance after that date would constitute new perfection.
Note that this Section affects perfection of interests in securities, and also in securities entitlements, as defined in Section 8-102(17).
SECTION 17. Chapter 9, Title 36 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"CHAPTER 9
Secured Transactions
Part 1
General Provisions
Subpart 1.
Short Title, Definitions, and General Concepts
Section 36-9-101. Short title.
This chapter may be cited as Uniform Commercial Code--Secured Transactions.
Official Comment
1. Source. This Article supersedes former Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Article 9. As did its predecessor, it provides a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security interests in personal property and fixtures. For the most part this Article follows the general approach and retains much of the terminology of former Article 9. In addition to describing many aspects of the operation and interpretation of this Article, these Comments explain the material changes that this Article makes to former Article 9. Former Article 9 superseded the wide variety of pre-UCC security devices. Unlike the Comments to former Article 9, however, these Comments dwell very little on the pre-UCC state of the law. For that reason, the Comments to former Article 9 will remain of substantial historical value and interest. They also will remain useful in understanding the background and general conceptual approach of this Article.
Citations to the "Bankruptcy Code" in these Comments are to Title 11 of the United States Code as in effect on December 31, 1998.
2. Background and History. In 1990, the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC with the support of its sponsors, The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, established a committee to study Article 9 of the UCC. The study committee issued its report as of December 1, 1992, recommending the creation of a drafting committee for the revision of Article 9 and also recommending numerous specific changes to Article 9. Organized in 1993, a drafting committee met fifteen times from 1993 to 1998. This Article was approved by its sponsors in 1998.
3. Reorganization and Renumbering; Captions; Style. This Article reflects a substantial reorganization of former Article 9 and renumbering of most sections. New Part 4 deals with several aspects of third-party rights and duties that are unrelated to perfection and priority. Some of these were covered by Part 3 of former Article 9. Part 5 deals with filing (covered by former Part 4) and Part 6 deals with default and enforcement (covered by former Part 5). Appendix I contains conforming revisions to other articles of the UCC, and Appendix II contains model provisions for production-money priority.
This Article also includes headings for the subsections as an aid to readers. Unlike Section captions, which are part of the UCC, see Section 1-109, subsection headings are not a part of the official text itself and have not been approved by the sponsors. Each jurisdiction in which this Article is introduced may consider whether to adopt the headings as a part of the statute and whether to adopt a provision clarifying the effect, if any, to be given to the headings. This Article also has been conformed to current style conventions.
4. Summary of Revisions. Following is a brief summary of some of the more significant revisions of Article 9 that are included in this Article.
a. Scope of Article 9. This Article expands the scope of Article 9 in several respects.
Deposit accounts. Section 9-109 includes within this Article's scope deposit accounts as original collateral, except in consumer transactions. Former Article 9 dealt with deposit accounts only as proceeds of other collateral.
Sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes. Section 9-109 also includes within the scope of this Article most sales of "payment intangibles" (defined in Section 9-102 as general intangibles under which an account debtor's principal obligation is monetary) and "promissory notes" (also defined in Section 9-102). Former Article 9 included sales of accounts and chattel paper, but not sales of payment intangibles or promissory notes. In its inclusion of sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes, this Article continues the drafting convention found in former Article 9; it provides that the sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes creates a "security interest." The definition of "account" in Section 9-102 also has been expanded to include various rights to payment that were general intangibles under former Article 9.
Health-care-insurance receivables. Section 9-109 narrows Article 9's exclusion of transfers of interests in insurance policies by carving out of the exclusion "health-care-insurance receivables" (defined in Section 9-102). A health-care-insurance receivable is included within the definition of "account" in Section 9-102.
Nonpossessory statutory agricultural liens. Section 9-109 also brings nonpossessory statutory agricultural liens within the scope of Article 9.
Consignments. Section 9-109 provides that "true" consignments-bailments for the purpose of sale by the bailee-are security interests covered by Article 9, with certain exceptions. See Section 9-102 (defining "consignment"). Currently, many consignments are subject to Article 9's filing requirements by operation of former Section 2-326.
Supporting obligations and property securing rights to payment. This Article also addresses explicitly (i) obligations, such as guaranties and letters of credit, that support payment or performance of collateral such as accounts, chattel paper, and payment intangibles, and (ii) any property (including real property) that secures a right to payment or performance that is subject to an Article 9 security interest. See Sections 9-203, 9-308.
Commercial tort claims. Section 9-109 expands the scope of Article 9 to include the assignment of commercial tort claims by narrowing the exclusion of tort claims generally. However, this Article continues to exclude tort claims for bodily injury and other non-business tort claims of a natural person. See Section 9-102 (defining "commercial tort claim").
Transfers by States and governmental units of States. Section 9-109 narrows the exclusion of transfers by States and their governmental units. It excludes only transfers covered by another statute (other than a statute generally applicable to security interests) to the extent the statute governs the creation, perfection, priority, or enforcement of security interests.
Nonassignable general intangibles, promissory notes, health-care-insurance receivables, and letter-of-credit rights. This Article enables a security interest to attach to letter-of-credit rights, health-care-insurance receivables, promissory notes, and general intangibles, including contracts, permits, licenses, and franchises, notwithstanding a contractual or statutory prohibition against or limitation on assignment. This Article explicitly protects third parties against any adverse effect of the creation or attempted enforcement of the security interest. See Sections 9-408, 9-409.
Subject to Sections 9-408 and 9-409 and two other exceptions (Sections 9-406, concerning accounts, chattel paper, and payment intangibles, and 9-407, concerning interests in leased goods), Section 9-401 establishes a baseline rule that the inclusion of transactions and collateral within the scope of Article 9 has no effect on non-Article 9 law dealing with the alienability or inalienability of property. For example, if a commercial tort claim is nonassignable under other applicable law, the fact that a security interest in the claim is within the scope of Article 9 does not override the other applicable law's effective prohibition of assignment.
b. Duties of Secured Party. This Article provides for expanded duties of secured parties.
Release of control. Section 9-208 imposes upon a secured party having control of a deposit account, investment property, or a letter-of-credit right the duty to release control when there is no secured obligation and no commitment to give value. Section 9-209 contains analogous provisions when an account debtor has been notified to pay a secured party.
Information. Section 9-210 expands a secured party's duties to provide the debtor with information concerning collateral and the obligations that it secures.
Default and enforcement. Part 6 also includes some additional duties of secured parties in connection with default and enforcement. See, e.g., Section 9-616 (duty to explain calculation of deficiency or surplus in a consumer-goods transaction).
c. Choice of Law. The choice-of-law rules for the law governing perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and priority are found in Part 3, Subpart 1 (Sections 9-301 through 9-307). See also Section 9-316.
Where to file: Location of debtor. This Article changes the choice-of-law rule governing perfection (i.e., where to file) for most collateral to the law of the jurisdiction where the debtor is located. See Section 9-301. Under former Article 9, the jurisdiction of the debtor's location governed only perfection and priority of a security interest in accounts, general intangibles, mobile goods, and, for purposes of perfection by filing, chattel paper and investment property.
Determining debtor's location. As a baseline rule, Section 9-307 follows former Section 9-103, under which the location of the debtor is the debtor's place of business (or chief executive office, if the debtor has more than one place of business). Section 9-307 contains three major exceptions. First, a "registered organization," such as a corporation or limited liability company, is located in the State under whose law the debtor is organized, e.g., a corporate debtor's State of incorporation. Second, an individual debtor is located at his or her principal residence. Third, there are special rules for determining the location of the United States and registered organizations organized under the law of the United States.
Location of non-U.S. debtors. If, applying the foregoing rules, a debtor is located in a jurisdiction whose law does not require public notice as a condition of perfection of a nonpossessory security interest, the entity is deemed located in the District of Columbia. See Section 9-307. Thus, to the extent that this Article applies to non-U.S. debtors, perfection could be accomplished in many cases by a domestic filing.
Priority. For tangible collateral such as goods and instruments, Section 9-301 provides that the law applicable to priority and the effect of perfection or nonperfection will remain the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral is located, as under former Section 9-103 (but without the confusing "last event" test). For intangible collateral, such as accounts, the applicable law for priority will be that of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located.
Possessory security interests; agricultural liens. Perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and priority of a possessory security interest or an agricultural lien are governed by the law of the jurisdiction where the collateral subject to the security interest or lien is located. See Sections 9-301, 9-302.
Goods covered by certificates of title; deposit accounts; letter-of-credit rights; investment property. This Article includes several refinements to the treatment of choice-of-law matters for goods covered by certificates of title. See Section 9-303. It also provides special choice-of-law rules, similar to those for investment property under current Articles 8 and 9, for deposit accounts (Section 9-304), investment property (Section 9-305), and letter-of-credit rights (Section 9-306).
Change in applicable law. Section 9-316 addresses perfection following a change in applicable law.
d. Perfection. The rules governing perfection of security interests and agricultural liens are found in Part 3, Subpart 2 (Sections 9-308 through 9-316).
Deposit accounts; letter-of-credit rights. With certain exceptions, this Article provides that a security interest in a deposit account or a letter-of-credit right may be perfected only by the secured party's acquiring "control" of the deposit account or letter-of-credit right. See Sections 9-312, 9-314. Under Section 9-104, a secured party has "control" of a deposit account when, with the consent of the debtor, the secured party obtains the depositary bank's agreement to act on the secured party's instructions (including when the secured party becomes the account holder) or when the secured party is itself the depositary bank. The control requirements are patterned on Section 8-106, which specifies the requirements for control of investment property. Under Section 9-107, "control" of a letter-of-credit right occurs when the issuer or nominated person consents to an assignment of proceeds under Section 5-114.
Electronic chattel paper. Section 9-102 includes a new defined term: "electronic chattel paper." Electronic chattel paper is a record or records consisting of information stored in an electronic medium (i.e., it is not written). Perfection of a security interest in electronic chattel paper may be by control or filing. See Sections 9-105 (sui generis definition of control of electronic chattel paper), 9-312 (perfection by filing), 9-314 (perfection by control).
Investment property. The perfection requirements for "investment property" (defined in Section 9-102), including perfection by control under Section 9-106, remain substantially unchanged. However, a new provision in Section 9-314 is designed to ensure that a secured party retains control in "repledge" transactions that are typical in the securities markets.
Instruments, agricultural liens, and commercial tort claims. This Article expands the types of collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing to include instruments. See Section 9-312. Agricultural liens and security interests in commercial tort claims also are perfected by filing, under this Article. See Sections 9-308, 9-310.
Sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes. Although former Article 9 covered the outright sale of accounts and chattel paper, sales of most other types of receivables also are financing transactions to which Article 9 should apply. Accordingly, Section 9-102 expands the definition of "account" to include many types of receivables (including "health-care-insurance receivables," defined in Section 9-102) that former Article 9 classified as "general intangibles." It thereby subjects to Article 9's filing system sales of more types of receivables than did former Article 9. Certain sales of payment intangibles-primarily bank loan participation transactions-should not be subject to the Article 9 filing rules. These transactions fall in a residual category of collateral, "payment intangibles" (general intangibles under which the account debtor's principal obligation is monetary), the sale of which is exempt from the filing requirements of Article 9. See Sections 9-102, 9-109, 9-309 (perfection upon attachment). The perfection rules for sales of promissory notes are the same as those for sales of payment intangibles.
Possessory security interests. Several provisions of this Article address aspects of security interests involving a secured party or a third party who is in possession of the collateral. In particular, Section 9-313 resolves a number of uncertainties under former Section 9-305. It provides that a security interest in collateral in the possession of a third party is perfected when the third party acknowledges in an authenticated record that it holds for the secured party's benefit. Section 9-313 also provides that a third party need not so acknowledge and that its acknowledgment does not impose any duties on it, unless it otherwise agrees. A special rule in Section 9-313 provides that if a secured party already is in possession of collateral, its security interest remains perfected by possession if it delivers the collateral to a third party and the collateral is accompanied by instructions to hold it for the secured party or to redeliver it to the secured party. Section 9-313 also clarifies the limited circumstances under which a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title may be perfected by the secured party's taking possession.
Automatic perfection. Section 9-309 lists various types of security interests as to which no public-notice step is required for perfection (e.g., purchase-money security interests in consumer goods other than automobiles). This automatic perfection also extends to a transfer of a health-care-insurance receivable to a health-care provider. Those transfers normally will be made by natural persons who receive health-care services; there is little value in requiring filing for perfection in that context. Automatic perfection also applies to security interests created by sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes. Section 9-308 provides that a perfected security interest in collateral supported by a "supporting obligation" (such as an account supported by a guaranty) also is a perfected security interest in the supporting obligation, and that a perfected security interest in an obligation secured by a security interest or lien on property (e.g., a real-property mortgage) also is a perfected security interest in the security interest or lien.
e. Priority; Special Rules for Banks and Deposit Accounts. The rules governing priority of security interests and agricultural liens are found in Part 3, Subpart 3 (Sections 9-317 through 9-342). This Article includes several new priority rules and some special rules relating to banks and deposit accounts (Sections 9-340 through 9-342).
Purchase-money security interests: General; consumer-goods transactions; inventory. Section 9-103 substantially rewrites the definition of purchase-money security interest (PMSI) (although the term is not formally "defined"). The substantive changes, however, apply only to non-consumer-goods transactions. (Consumer transactions and consumer-goods transactions are discussed below in Comment 4.j.) For non-consumer-goods transactions, Section 9-103 makes clear that a security interest in collateral may be (to some extent) both a PMSI as well as a non-PMSI, in accord with the "dual status" rule applied by some courts under former Article 9 (thereby rejecting the "transformation" rule). The definition provides an even broader conception of a PMSI in inventory, yielding a result that accords with private agreements entered into in response to the uncertainty under former Article 9. It also treats consignments as purchase-money security interests in inventory. Section 9-324 revises the PMSI priority rules, but for the most part without material change in substance. Section 9-324 also clarifies the priority rules for competing PMSIs in the same collateral.
Purchase-money security interests in livestock; agricultural liens. Section 9-324 provides a special PMSI priority, similar to the inventory PMSI priority rule, for livestock. Section 9-322 (which contains the baseline first-to-file-or-perfect priority rule) also recognizes special non-Article 9 priority rules for agricultural liens, which can override the baseline first-in-time rule.
Purchase-money security interests in software. Section 9-324 contains a new priority rule for a software purchase-money security interest. (Section 9-102 includes a definition of "software.") Under Section 9-103, a software PMSI includes a PMSI in software that is used in goods that are also subject to a PMSI. (Note also that the definition of "chattel paper" has been expanded to include records that evidence a monetary obligation and a security interest in specific goods and software used in the goods.)
Investment property. The priority rules for investment property are substantially similar to the priority rules found in former Section 9-115, which was added in conjunction with the 1994 revisions to UCC Article 8. Under Section 9-328, if a secured party has control of investment property (Sections 8-106, 9-106), its security interest is senior to a security interest perfected in another manner (e.g., by filing). Also under Section 9-328, security interests perfected by control generally rank according to the time that control is obtained or, in the case of a security entitlement or a commodity contract carried in a commodity account, the time when the control arrangement is entered into. This is a change from former Section 9-115, under which the security interests ranked equally. However, as between a securities intermediary's security interest in a security entitlement that it maintains for the debtor and a security interest held by another secured party, the securities intermediary's security interest is senior.
Deposit accounts. This Article's priority rules applicable to deposit accounts are found in Section 9-327. They are patterned on and are similar to those for investment property in former Section 9-115 and Section 9-328 of this Article. Under Section 9-327, if a secured party has control of a deposit account, its security interest is senior to a security interest perfected in another manner (i.e., as cash proceeds). Also under Section 9-327, security interests perfected by control rank according to the time that control is obtained, but as between a depositary bank's security interest and one held by another secured party, the depositary bank's security interest is senior. A corresponding rule in Section 9-340 makes a depositary bank's right of set-off generally senior to a security interest held by another secured party. However, if the other secured party becomes the depositary bank's customer with respect to the deposit account, then its security interest is senior to the depositary bank's security interest and right of set-off. Sections 9-327, 9-340.
Letter-of-credit rights. The priority rules for security interests in letter-of-credit rights are found in Section 9-329. They are somewhat analogous to those for deposit accounts. A security interest perfected by control has priority over one perfected in another manner (i.e., as a supporting obligation for the collateral in which a security interest is perfected). Security interests in a letter-of-credit right perfected by control rank according to the time that control is obtained. However, the rights of a transferee beneficiary or a nominated person are independent and superior to the extent provided in Section 5-114. See Section 9-109(c)(4).
Chattel paper and instruments. Section 9-330 is the successor to former Section 9-308. As under former Section 9-308, differing priority rules apply to purchasers of chattel paper who give new value and take possession (or, in the case of electronic chattel paper, obtain control) of the collateral depending on whether a conflicting security interest in the collateral is claimed merely as proceeds. The principal change relates to the role of knowledge and the effect of an indication of a previous assignment of the collateral. Section 9-330 also affords priority to purchasers of instruments who take possession in good faith and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the competing secured party. In addition, to qualify for priority, purchasers of chattel paper, but not of instruments, must purchase in the ordinary course of business.
Proceeds. Section 9-322 contains new priority rules that clarify when a special priority of a security interest in collateral continues or does not continue with respect to proceeds of the collateral. Other refinements to the priority rules for proceeds are included in Sections 9-324 (purchase-money security interest priority) and 9-330 (priority of certain purchasers of chattel paper and instruments).
Miscellaneous priority provisions. This Article also includes (i) clarifications of selected good-faith-purchase and similar issues (Sections 9-317, 9-331); (ii) new priority rules to deal with the "double debtor" problem arising when a debtor creates a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor subject to a security interest created by another person (Section 9-325); (iii) new priority rules to deal with the problems created when a change in corporate structure or the like results in a new entity that has become bound by the original debtor's after-acquired property agreement (Section 9-326); (iv) a provision enabling most transferees of funds from a deposit account or money to take free of a security interest (Section 9-332); (v) substantially rewritten and refined priority rules dealing with accessions and commingled goods (Sections 9-335, 9-336); (vi) revised priority rules for security interests in goods covered by a certificate of title (Section 9-337); and (vii) provisions designed to ensure that security interests in deposit accounts will not extend to most transferees of funds on deposit or payees from deposit accounts and will not otherwise "clog" the payments system (Sections 9-341, 9-342).
Model provisions relating to production-money security interests. Appendix II to this Article contains model definitions and priority rules relating to "production-money security interests" held by secured parties who give new value used in the production of crops. Because no consensus emerged on the wisdom of these provisions during the drafting process, the sponsors make no recommendation on whether these model provisions should be enacted.
f. Proceeds. Section 9-102 contains an expanded definition of "proceeds" of collateral which includes additional rights and property that arise out of collateral, such as distributions on account of collateral and claims arising out of the loss or nonconformity of, defects in, or damage to collateral. The term also includes collections on account of "supporting obligations," such as guarantees.
g. Part 4: Additional Provisions Relating to Third-Party Rights. New Part 4 contains several provisions relating to the relationships between certain third parties and the parties to secured transactions. It contains new Sections 9-401 (replacing former Section 9-311) (alienability of debtor's rights), 9-402 (replacing former Section 9-317) (secured party not obligated on debtor's contracts), 9-403 (replacing former Section 9-206) (agreement not to assert defenses against assignee), 9-404, 9-405, and 9-406 (replacing former Section 9-318) (rights acquired by assignee, modification of assigned contract, discharge of account debtor, restrictions on assignment of account, chattel paper, promissory note, or payment intangible ineffective), 9-407 (replacing some provisions of former Section 2A-303) (restrictions on creation or enforcement of security interest in leasehold interest or lessor's residual interest ineffective). It also contains new Sections 9-408 (restrictions on assignment of promissory notes, health-care-insurance receivables ineffective, and certain general intangibles ineffective) and 9-409 (restrictions on assignment of letter-of-credit rights ineffective), which are discussed above.
h. Filing. Part 5 (formerly Part 4) of Article 9 has been substantially rewritten to simplify the statutory text and to deal with numerous problems of interpretation and implementation that have arisen over the years.
Medium-neutrality. This Article is "medium-neutral"; that is, it makes clear that parties may file and otherwise communicate with a filing office by means of records communicated and stored in media other than on paper.
Identity of person who files a record; authorization. Part 5 is largely indifferent as to the person who effects a filing. Instead, it addresses whose authorization is necessary for a person to file a record with a filing office. The filing scheme does not contemplate that the identity of a "filer" will be a part of the searchable records. This approach is consistent with, and a necessary aspect of, eliminating signatures or other evidence of authorization from the system (except to the extent that filing offices may choose to employ authentication procedures in connection with electronic communications). As long as the appropriate person authorizes the filing, or, in the case of a termination statement, the debtor is entitled to the termination, it is largely insignificant whether the secured party or another person files any given record.
Section 9-509 collects in one place most of the rules that determine when a record may be filed. In general, the debtor's authorization is required for the filing of an initial financing statement or an amendment that adds collateral. With one further exception, a secured party of record's authorization is required for the filing of other amendments. The exception arises if a secured party has failed to provide a termination statement that is required because there is no outstanding secured obligation or commitment to give value. In that situation, a debtor is authorized to file a termination statement indicating that it has been filed by the debtor.
Financing statement formal requisites. The formal requisites for a financing statement are set out in Section 9-502. A financing statement must provide the name of the debtor and the secured party and an indication of the collateral that it covers. Sections 9-503 and 9-506 address the sufficiency of a name provided on a financing statement and clarify when a debtor's name is correct and when an incorrect name is insufficient. Section 9-504 addresses the indication of collateral covered. Under Section 9-504, a super-generic description (e.g., "all assets" or "all personal property") in a financing statement is a sufficient indication of the collateral. (Note, however, that a super-generic description is inadequate for purposes of a security agreement. See Sections 9-108, 9-203.) To facilitate electronic filing, this Article does not require that the debtor's signature or other authorization appear on a financing statement. Instead, it prohibits the filing of unauthorized financing statements and imposes liability upon those who violate the prohibition. See Sections 9-509, 9-626.
Filing-office operations. Part 5 contains several provisions governing filing operations. First, it prohibits the filing office from rejecting an initial financing statement or other record for a reason other than one of the few that are specified. See Sections 9-520, 9-516. Second, the filing office is obliged to link all subsequent records (e.g., assignments, continuation statements, etc.) to the initial financing statement to which they relate. See Section 9-519. Third, the filing office may delete a financing statement and related records from the files no earlier than one year after lapse (lapse normally is five years after the filing date), and then only if a continuation statement has not been filed. See Sections 9-515, 9-519, 9-522. Thus, a financing statement and related records would be discovered by a search of the files even after the filing of a termination statement. This approach helps eliminate filing-office discretion and also eases problems associated with multiple secured parties and multiple partial assignments. Fourth, Part 5 mandates performance standards for filing offices. See Sections 9-519, 9-520, 9-523. Fifth, it provides for the promulgation of filing-office rules to deal with details best left out of the statute and requires the filing office to submit periodic reports. See Sections 9-526, 9-527.
Correction of records: Defaulting or missing secured parties and fraudulent filings. In some areas of the country, serious problems have arisen from fraudulent financing statements that are filed against public officials and other persons. This Article addresses the fraud problem by providing the opportunity for a debtor to file a termination statement when a secured party wrongfully refuses or fails to provide a termination statement. See Section 9-509. This opportunity also addresses the problem of secured parties that simply disappear through mergers or liquidations. In addition, Section 9-518 affords a statutory method by which a debtor who believes that a filed record is inaccurate or was wrongfully filed may indicate that fact in the files by filing a correction statement, albeit without affecting the efficacy, if any, of the challenged record.
Extended period of effectiveness for certain financing statements. Section 9-515 contains an exception to the usual rule that financing statements are effective for five years unless a continuation statement is filed to continue the effectiveness for another five years. Under that Section, an initial financing statement filed in connection with a "public-finance transaction" or a "manufactured-home transaction" (terms defined in Section 9-102) is effective for 30 years.
National form of financing statement and related forms. Section 9-521 provides for uniform, national written forms of financing statements and related written records that must be accepted by a filing office that accepts written records.
i. Default and Enforcement. Part 6 of Article 9 extensively revises former Part 5. Provisions relating to enforcement of consumer-goods transactions and consumer transactions are discussed in Comment 4.j.
Debtor, secondary obligor; waiver. Section 9-602 clarifies the identity of persons who have rights and persons to whom a secured party owes specified duties under Part 6. Under that Section, the rights and duties are enjoyed by and run to the "debtor," defined in Section 9-102 to mean any person with a non-lien property interest in collateral, and to any "obligor." However, with one exception (Section 9-616, as it relates to a consumer obligor), the rights and duties concerned affect non-debtor obligors only if they are "secondary obligors." "Secondary obligor" is defined in Section 9-102 to include one who is secondarily obligated on the secured obligation, e.g., a guarantor, or one who has a right of recourse against the debtor or another obligor with respect to an obligation secured by collateral. However, under Section 9-628, the secured party is relieved from any duty or liability to any person unless the secured party knows that the person is a debtor or obligor. Resolving an issue on which courts disagreed under former Article 9, this Article generally prohibits waiver by a secondary obligor of its rights and a secured party's duties under Part 6. See Section 9-602. However, Section 9-624 permits a secondary obligor or debtor to waive the right to notification of disposition of collateral and, in a non-consumer transaction, the right to redeem collateral, if the secondary obligor or debtor agrees to do so after default.
Rights of collection and enforcement of collateral. Section 9-607 explains in greater detail than former 9-502 the rights of a secured party who seeks to collect or enforce collateral, including accounts, chattel paper, and payment intangibles. It also sets forth the enforcement rights of a depositary bank holding a security interest in a deposit account maintained with the depositary bank. Section 9-607 relates solely to the rights of a secured party vis-a-vis a debtor with respect to collections and enforcement. It does not affect the rights or duties of third parties, such as account debtors on collateral, which are addressed elsewhere (e.g., Section 9-406). Section 9-608 clarifies the manner in which proceeds of collection or enforcement are to be applied.
Disposition of collateral: Warranties of title. Section 9-610 imposes on a secured party who disposes of collateral the warranties of title, quiet possession, and the like that are otherwise applicable under other law. It also provides rules for the exclusion or modification of those warranties.
Disposition of collateral: Notification, application of proceeds, surplus and deficiency, other effects. Section 9-611 requires a secured party to give notification of a disposition of collateral to other secured parties and lienholders who have filed financing statements against the debtor covering the collateral. (That duty was eliminated by the 1972 revisions to Article 9.) However, that Section relieves the secured party from that duty when the secured party undertakes a search of the records and a report of the results is unreasonably delayed. Section 9-613, which applies only to non-consumer transactions, specifies the contents of a sufficient notification of disposition and provides that a notification sent 10 days or more before the earliest time for disposition is sent within a reasonable time. Section 9-615 addresses the application of proceeds of disposition, the entitlement of a debtor to any surplus, and the liability of an obligor for any deficiency. Section 9-619 clarifies the effects of a disposition by a secured party, including the rights of transferees of the collateral.
Rights and duties of secondary obligor. Section 9-618 provides that a secondary obligor obtains the rights and assumes the duties of a secured party if the secondary obligor receives an assignment of a secured obligation, agrees to assume the secured party's rights and duties upon a transfer to it of collateral, or becomes subrogated to the rights of the secured party with respect to the collateral. The assumption, transfer, or subrogation is not a disposition of collateral under Section 9-610, but it does relieves the former secured party of further duties. Former Section 9-504(5) did not address whether a secured party was relieved of its duties in this situation.
Transfer of record or legal title. Section 9-619 contains a new provision making clear that a transfer of record or legal title to a secured party is not of itself a disposition under Part 6. This rule applies regardless of the circumstances under which the transfer of title occurs.
Strict foreclosure. Section 9-620, unlike former Section 9-505, permits a secured party to accept collateral in partial satisfaction, as well as full satisfaction, of the obligations secured. This right of strict foreclosure extends to intangible as well as tangible property. Section 9-622 clarifies the effects of an acceptance of collateral on the rights of junior claimants. It rejects the approach taken by some courts-deeming a secured party to have constructively retained collateral in satisfaction of the secured obligations-in the case of a secured party's unreasonable delay in the disposition of collateral. Instead, unreasonable delay is relevant when determining whether a disposition under Section 9-610 is commercially reasonable.
Effect of noncompliance: "Rebuttable presumption" test. Section 9-626 adopts the "rebuttable presumption" test for the failure of a secured party to proceed in accordance with certain provisions of Part 6. (As discussed in Comment 4.j., the test does not necessarily apply to consumer transactions.) Under this approach, the deficiency claim of a noncomplying secured party is calculated by crediting the obligor with the greater of the actual net proceeds of a disposition and the amount of net proceeds that would have been realized if the disposition had been conducted in accordance with Part 6 (e.g., in a commercially reasonable manner). For non-consumer transactions, Section 9-626 rejects the "absolute bar" test that some courts have imposed; that approach bars a noncomplying secured party from recovering any deficiency, regardless of the loss (if any) the debtor suffered as a consequence of the noncompliance.
"Low-price" dispositions: Calculation of deficiency and surplus. Section 9-615(f) addresses the problem of procedurally regular dispositions that fetch a low price. Subsection (f) provides a special method for calculating a deficiency if the proceeds of a disposition of collateral to a secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor are "significantly below the range of proceeds that a complying disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor would have brought." ("Person related to" is defined in Section 9-102.) In these situations there is reason to suspect that there may be inadequate incentives to obtain a better price. Consequently, instead of calculating a deficiency (or surplus) based on the actual net proceeds, the deficiency (or surplus) would be calculated based on the proceeds that would have been received in a disposition to person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor.
j. Consumer Goods, Consumer-Goods Transactions, and Consumer Transactions. This Article (including the accompanying conforming revisions (see Appendix I)) includes several special rules for "consumer goods," "consumer transactions," and "consumer-goods transactions." Each term is defined in Section 9-102.
(i) Revised Sections 2-502 and 2-716 provide a buyer of consumer goods with enhanced rights to possession of the goods, thereby accelerating the opportunity to achieve "buyer in ordinary course of business" status under Section 1-201.
(ii) Section 9-103(e) (allocation of payments for determining extent of purchase-money status), (f) (purchase-money status not affected by cross-collateralization, refinancing, restructuring, or the like), and (g) (secured party has burden of establishing extent of purchase-money status) do not apply to consumer-goods transactions. Sections 9-103 also provides that the limitation of those provisions to transactions other than consumer-goods transactions leaves to the courts the proper rules for consumer-goods transactions and prohibits the courts from drawing inferences from that limitation.
(iii) Section 9-108 provides that in a consumer transaction a description of consumer goods, a security entitlement, securities account, or commodity account "only by [UCC-defined] type of collateral" is not a sufficient collateral description in a security agreement.
(iv) Sections 9-403 and 9-404 make effective the Federal Trade Commission's anti-holder-in-due-course rule (when applicable), 16 C.F.R. Part 433, even in the absence of the required legend.
(v) The 10-day safe-harbor for notification of a disposition provided by Section 9-612 does not apply in a consumer transaction.
(vi) Section 9-613 (contents and form of notice of disposition) does not apply to a consumer-goods transaction.
(vii) Section 9-614 contains special requirements for the contents of a notification of disposition and a safe-harbor, "plain English" form of notification, for consumer-goods transactions.
(viii) Section 9-616 requires a secured party in a consumer-goods transaction to provide a debtor with a notification of how it calculated a deficiency at the time it first undertakes to collect a deficiency.
(ix) Section 9-620 prohibits partial strict foreclosure with respect to consumer goods collateral and, unless the debtor agrees to waive the requirement in an authenticated record after default, in certain cases requires the secured party to dispose of consumer goods collateral which has been repossessed.
(x) Section 9-626 ("rebuttable presumption" rule) does not apply to a consumer transaction. Section 9-626 also provides that its limitation to transactions other than consumer transactions leaves to the courts the proper rules for consumer transactions and prohibits the courts from drawing inferences from that limitation.
k. Good Faith. Section 9-102 contains a new definition of "good faith" that includes not only "honesty in fact" but also "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." The definition is similar to the ones adopted in connection with other, recently completed revisions of the UCC.
l. Transition Provisions. Part 7 (Sections 9-701 through 9-707) contains transition provisions. Transition from former Article 9 to this Article will be particularly challenging in view of its expanded scope, its modification of choice-of-law rules for perfection and priority, and its expansion of the methods of perfection.
m. Conforming and Related Amendments to Other UCC Articles. Appendix I contains several proposed revisions to the provisions and Comments of other UCC articles. For the most part the revisions are explained in the Comments to the proposed revisions. Cross-references in other UCC articles to Sections of Article 9 also have been revised.
Article 1. Revised Section 1-201 contains revisions to the definitions of "buyer in ordinary course of business," "purchaser," and "security interest."
Articles 2 and 2A. Sections 2-210, 2-326, 2-502, 2-716, 2A-303, and 2A-307 have been revised to address the intersection between Articles 2 and 2A and Article 9.
Article 5. New Section 5-118 is patterned on Section 4-210. It provides for a security interest in documents presented under a letter of credit in favor of the issuer and a nominated person on the letter of credit.
Article 8. Revisions to Section 8-106, which deals with "control" of securities and security entitlements, conform it to Section 8-302, which deals with "delivery." Revisions to Section 8-110, which deals with a "securities intermediary's jurisdiction," conform it to the revised treatment of a "commodity intermediary's jurisdiction" in Section 9-305. Sections 8-301 and 8-302 have been revised for clarification. Section 8-510 has been revised to conform it to the revised priority rules of Section 9-328. Several Comments in Article 8 also have been revised.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
The South Carolina Reporters Notes to Article 9 do not attempt to explain the substantive provisions of the statute or the changes effected by adopting 1999 Official Text. The Official Comments perform those functions. Rather, the South Carolina Reporters Notes address the effect of the 1999 Official Text upon South Carolina case law interpreted under former Article 9 and upon statutes other than the Uniform Commercial Code. See, e.g. Section 36-9-109, Note 2 addressing agricultural liens. In addition, the South Carolina Reporters Notes address Article 9 provisions enacted in South Carolina that are not consistent with the 1999 Official Text. See, e.g., Sections 36-9-109 and 36-9-317 addressing landlords' liens.
Section 36-9-102. Definitions and index of definitions.
(a) In this chapter:
(1) 'Accession' means goods that are physically united with other goods in such a manner that the identity of the original goods is not lost.
(2) 'Account' except as used in 'account for', means a right to payment of a monetary obligation, whether or not earned by performance, (i) for property that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of, (ii) for services rendered or to be rendered, (iii) for a policy of insurance issued or to be issued, (iv) for a secondary obligation incurred or to be incurred, (v) for energy provided or to be provided, (vi) for the use or hire of a vessel under a charter or other contract, (vii) arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card, or (viii) as winnings in a lottery or other game of chance operated or sponsored by a State, governmental unit of a State, or person licensed or authorized to operate the game by a State or governmental unit of a State. The term includes health-care-insurance receivables. The term does not include (i) rights to payment evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument, (ii) commercial tort claims, (iii) deposit accounts, (iv) investment property, (v) letter-of-credit rights or letters of credit, or (vi) rights to payment for money or funds advanced or sold, other than rights arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card.
(3) 'Account debtor' means a person obligated on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible. The term does not include persons obligated to pay a negotiable instrument, even if the instrument constitutes part of chattel paper.
(4) 'Accounting', except as used in 'accounting for', means a record:
(A) authenticated by a secured party;
(B) indicating the aggregate unpaid secured obligations as of a date not more than thirty-five days earlier or thirty-five days later than the date of the record; and
(C) identifying the components of the obligations in reasonable detail.
(5) 'Agricultural lien' means an interest, other than a security interest, in farm products:
(A) which secures payment or performance of an obligation for:
( i) goods or services furnished in connection with a debtor's farming operation; or
(ii) rent on real property leased by a debtor in connection with its farming operation;
(B) which is created by statute in favor of a person that:
( i) in the ordinary course of its business furnished goods or services to a debtor in connection with a debtor's farming operation; or
(ii) leased real property to a debtor in connection with the debtor's farming operation; and
(C) whose effectiveness does not depend on the person's possession of the personal property.
(6) 'As-extracted collateral' means:
(A) oil, gas, or other minerals that are subject to a security interest that:
( i) is created by a debtor having an interest in the minerals before extraction; and
(ii) attaches to the minerals as extracted; or
(B)accounts arising out of the sale at the wellhead or minehead of oil, gas, or other minerals in which the debtor had an interest before extraction.
(7) 'Authenticate' means:
(A) to sign; or
(B) to execute or otherwise adopt a symbol, or encrypt or similarly process a record in whole or in part, with the present intent of the authenticating person to identify the person and adopt or accept a record.
(8) 'Bank' means an organization that is engaged in the business of banking. The term includes savings banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, and trust companies.
(9) 'Cash proceeds' means proceeds that are money, checks, deposit accounts, or the like.
(10) 'Certificate of title' means a certificate of title with respect to which a statute provides for the security interest in question to be indicated on the certificate as a condition or result of the security interest's obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the collateral.
(11) 'Chattel paper' means a record or records that evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in specific goods, a security interest in specific goods and software used in the goods, or a lease of specific goods. The term does not include charters or other contracts involving the use or hire of a vessel. If a transaction is evidenced both by a security agreement or lease and by an instrument or series of instruments, the group of records taken together constitutes chattel paper.
(12) 'Collateral' means the property subject to a security interest or agricultural lien. The term includes:
(A) proceeds to which a security interest attaches;
(B) accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes that have been sold; and
(C) goods that are the subject of a consignment.
(13) 'Commercial tort claim' means a claim arising in tort with respect to which:
(A) the claimant is an organization; or
(B) the claimant is an individual and the claim:
( i) arose in the course of the claimant's business or profession; and
(ii) does not include damages arising out of personal injury to or the death of an individual.
(14) 'Commodity account' means an account maintained by a commodity intermediary in which a commodity contract is carried for a commodity customer.
(15) 'Commodity contract' means a commodity futures contract, an option on a commodity futures contract, a commodity option, or another contract if the contract or option is:
(A) traded on or subject to the rules of a board of trade that has been designated as a contract market for such a contract pursuant to federal commodities laws; or
(B) traded on a foreign commodity board of trade, exchange, or market, and is carried on the books of a commodity intermediary for a commodity customer.
(16) 'Commodity customer' means a person for which a commodity intermediary carries a commodity contract on its books.
(17) 'Commodity intermediary' means a person that:
(A) is registered as a futures commission merchant under federal commodities law; or
(B) in the ordinary course of its business provides clearance or settlement services for a board of trade that has been designated as a contract market pursuant to federal commodities law.
(18) 'Communicate' means:
(A) to send a written or other tangible record;
(B) to transmit a record by any means agreed upon by the persons sending and receiving the record; or
(C) in the case of transmission of a record to or by a filing office, to transmit a record by any means prescribed by filing-office rule.
(19) 'Consignee' means a merchant to which goods are delivered in a consignment.
(20) 'Consignment' means a transaction, regardless of its form, in which a person delivers goods to a merchant for the purpose of sale and:
(A) the merchant:
( i) deals in goods of that kind under a name other than the name of the person making delivery;
( ii) is not an auctioneer; and
(iii) is not generally known by its creditors to be substantially engaged in selling the goods of others;
(B) with respect to each delivery, the aggregate value of the goods is one thousand dollars or more at the time of delivery;
(C) the goods are not consumer goods immediately before delivery; and
(D) the transaction does not create a security interest that secures an obligation.
(21) 'Consignor' means a person that delivers goods to a consignee in a consignment.
(22) 'Consumer debtor' means a debtor in a consumer transaction.
(23) 'Consumer goods' means goods that are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
(24) 'Consumer-goods transaction' means a consumer transaction in which:
(A) an individual incurs an obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes; and
(B) a security interest in consumer goods secures the obligation.
(25) 'Consumer obligor' means an obligor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation as part of a transaction entered into primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
(26) 'Consumer transaction' means a transaction in which (i) an individual incurs an obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, (ii) a security interest secures the obligation, and (iii) the collateral is held or acquired primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. The term includes consumer-goods transactions.
(27) 'Continuation statement' means an amendment of a financing statement which:
(A) identifies, by its file number, the initial financing statement to which it relates; and
(B) indicates that it is a continuation statement for, or that it is filed to continue the effectiveness of, the identified financing statement.
(28) 'Debtor' means:
(A) a person having an interest, other than a security interest or other lien, in the collateral, whether or not the person is an obligor;
(B) a seller of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes; or
(C) a consignee.
(29) 'Deposit account' means a demand, time, savings, passbook, or similar account maintained with a bank. The term does not include investment property or accounts evidenced by an instrument.
(30) 'Document' means a document of title or a receipt of the type described in Section 36-7-201(2).
(31) 'Electronic chattel paper' means chattel paper evidenced by a record or records consisting of information stored in an electronic medium.
(32) 'Encumbrance' means a right, other than an ownership interest, in real property. The term includes mortgages and other liens on real property.
(33) 'Equipment' means goods other than inventory, farm products, or consumer goods.
(34) 'Farm products' means goods, other than standing timber, with respect to which the debtor is engaged in a farming operation and which are:
(A) crops grown, growing, or to be grown, including:
( i) crops produced on trees, vines, and bushes; and
(ii) aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations;
(B) livestock, born or unborn, including aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations;
(C) supplies used or produced in a farming operation; or
(D) products of crops or livestock in their unmanufactured states.
(35) 'Farming operation' means raising, cultivating, propagating, fattening, grazing, or any other farming, livestock, or aquacultural operation.
(36) 'File number' means the number assigned to an initial financing statement pursuant to Section 36-9-519(a).
(37) 'Filing office' means an office designated in Section 36-9-501 as the place to file a financing statement.
(38) 'Filing-office rule' means a rule adopted pursuant to Section 36-9-526.
(39) 'Financing statement' means a record or records composed of an initial financing statement and any filed record relating to the initial financing statement.
(40) 'Fixture filing' means the filing of a financing statement covering goods that are or are to become fixtures and satisfying Section 36-9-502(a) and (b). The term includes the filing of a financing statement covering goods of a transmitting utility which are or are to become fixtures.
(41) 'Fixtures' means goods that have become so related to particular real property that an interest in them arises under real property law.
(42) 'General intangible' means any personal property, including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction. The term includes payment intangibles and software.
(43) 'Good faith' means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.
(44) 'Goods' means all things that are movable when a security interest attaches. The term includes (i) fixtures, (ii) standing timber that is to be cut and removed under a conveyance or contract for sale, (iii) the unborn young of animals, (iv) crops grown, growing, or to be grown, even if the crops are produced on trees, vines, or bushes, and (v) manufactured homes. The term also includes a computer program embedded in goods and any supporting information provided in connection with a transaction relating to the program if (i) the program is associated with the goods in such a manner that it customarily is considered part of the goods, or (ii) by becoming the owner of the goods, a person acquires a right to use the program in connection with the goods. The term does not include a computer program embedded in goods that consist solely of the medium in which the program is embedded. The term also does not include accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, general intangibles, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, money, or oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction.
(45) 'Governmental unit' means a subdivision, agency, department, county, parish, municipality, or other unit of the government of the United States, a State, or a foreign country. The term includes an organization having a separate corporate existence if the organization is eligible to issue debt on which interest is exempt from income taxation under the laws of the United States.
(46) 'Health-care-insurance receivable' means an interest in or claim under a policy of insurance which is a right to payment of a monetary obligation for health-care goods or services provided.
(47) 'Instrument' means a negotiable instrument or any other writing that evidences a right to the payment of a monetary obligation, is not itself a security agreement or lease, and is of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment. The term does not include (i) investment property, (ii) letters of credit, or (iii) writings that evidence a right to payment arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card.
(48) 'Inventory' means goods, other than farm products, which:
(A) are leased by a person as lessor;
(B)are held by a person for sale or lease or to be furnished under a contract of service;
(C) are furnished by a person under a contract of service; or
(D) consist of raw materials, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a business.
(49) 'Investment property' means a security, whether certificated or uncertificated, security entitlement, securities account, commodity contract, or commodity account.
(50) 'Jurisdiction of organization', with respect to a registered organization, means the jurisdiction under whose law the organization is organized.
(51) 'Letter-of-credit right' means a right to payment or performance under a letter of credit, whether or not the beneficiary has demanded or is at the time entitled to demand payment or performance. The term does not include the right of a beneficiary to demand payment or performance under a letter of credit.
(52) 'Lien creditor' means:
(A) a creditor that has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy, or the like;
(B) an assignee for benefit of creditors from the time of assignment;
(C) a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition; or
(D) a receiver in equity from the time of appointment.
(53) 'Manufactured home' means a structure, transportable in one or more sections, which, in the traveling mode, is eight body feet or more in width or forty body feet or more in length, or, when erected on site, is three hundred twenty or more square feet, and which is built on a permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a permanent foundation when connected to the required utilities, and includes the plumbing, heating, air-conditioning, and electrical systems contained therein. The term includes any structure that meets all of the requirements of this item except the size requirements and with respect to which the manufacturer voluntarily files a certification required by the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development and complies with the standards established under Title 42 of the United States Code.
(54) 'Manufactured-home transaction' means a secured transaction:
(A) that creates a purchase-money security interest in a manufactured home, other than a manufactured home held as inventory; or
(B) in which a manufactured home, other than a manufactured home held as inventory, is the primary collateral.
(55) 'Mortgage' means a consensual interest in real property, including fixtures, which secures payment or performance of an obligation.
(56) 'New debtor' means a person that becomes bound as debtor under Section 36-9-203(d) by a security agreement previously entered into by another person.
(57) 'New value' means (i) money, (ii) money's worth in property, services, or new credit, or (iii) release by a transferee of an interest in property previously transferred to the transferee. The term does not include an obligation substituted for another obligation.
(58) 'Noncash proceeds' means proceeds other than cash proceeds.
(59) 'Obligor' means a person that, with respect to an obligation secured by a security interest in or an agricultural lien on the collateral, (i) owes payment or other performance of the obligation, (ii) has provided property other than the collateral to secure payment or other performance of the obligation, or (iii) is otherwise accountable in whole or in part for payment or other performance of the obligation. The term does not include issuers or nominated persons under a letter of credit.
(60) 'Original debtor' means a person that, as debtor, entered into a security agreement to which a new debtor has become bound under Section 36-9-203(d).
(61) 'Payment intangible' means a general intangible under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation.
(62) 'Person related to', with respect to an individual, means:
(A) the spouse of the individual;
(B) a brother, brother-in-law, sister, or sister-in-law of the individual;
(C) an ancestor or lineal descendant of the individual or the individual's spouse; or
(D) any other relative, by blood or marriage, of the individual or the individual's spouse who shares the same home with the individual.
(63) 'Person related to', with respect to an organization, means:
(A) a person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the organization;
(B) an officer or director of, or a person performing similar functions with respect to, the organization;
(C) an officer or director of, or a person performing similar functions with respect to, a person described in subitem (A);
(D) the spouse of an individual described in subitem (A), (B), or (C); or
(E) an individual who is related by blood or marriage to an individual described in subitem (A), (B), (C), or (D) and shares the same home with the individual.
(64) 'Proceeds' means the following property:
(A) whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition of collateral;
(B) whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of, collateral;
(C) rights arising out of collateral;
(D) to the extent of the value of collateral, claims arising out of the loss, nonconformity, or interference with the use of, defects or infringement of rights in, or damage to, the collateral; or
(E) to the extent of the value of collateral and to the extent payable to the debtor or the secured party, insurance payable by reason of the loss or nonconformity of, defects or infringement of rights in, or damage to, the collateral.
(65) 'Promissory note' means an instrument that evidences a promise to pay a monetary obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, and does not contain an acknowledgment by a bank that the bank has received for deposit a sum of money or funds.
(66) 'Proposal' means a record authenticated by a secured party which includes the terms on which the secured party is willing to accept collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures pursuant to Sections 36-9-620, 36-9-621, and 36-9-622.
(67) 'Public-finance transaction' means a secured transaction in connection with which:
(A) debt securities are issued;
(B) all or a portion of the securities issued have an initial stated maturity of at least twenty years; and
(C) the debtor, obligor, secured party, account debtor or other person obligated on collateral, assignor or assignee of a secured obligation, or assignor or assignee of a security interest is a State or a governmental unit of a State.
(68) 'Pursuant to commitment', with respect to an advance made or other value given by a secured party, means pursuant to the secured party's obligation, whether or not a subsequent event of default or other event not within the secured party's control has relieved or may relieve the secured party from its obligation.
(69) 'Record', except as used in 'for record', 'of record', 'record or legal title', and 'record owner', means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or which is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable form.
(70) 'Registered organization' means an organization organized solely under the law of a single State or the United States and as to which the State or the United States must maintain a public record showing the organization to have been organized.
(71) 'Secondary obligor' means an obligor to the extent that:
(A) the obligor's obligation is secondary; or
(B) the obligor has a right of recourse with respect to an obligation secured by collateral against the debtor, another obligor, or property of either.
(72) 'Secured party' means:
(A) a person in whose favor a security interest is created or provided for under a security agreement, whether or not any obligation to be secured is outstanding;
(B) a person that holds an agricultural lien;
(C) a consignor;
(D) a person to which accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes have been sold;
(E) a trustee, indenture trustee, agent, collateral agent, or other representative in whose favor a security interest or agricultural lien is created or provided for; or
(F) a person that holds a security interest arising under Section 36-2-401, 36-2-505, 36-2-711(3), 36-2A-508(5), 36-4-210, or 36-5-118.
(73) 'Security agreement' means an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest.
(74) 'Send', in connection with a record or notification, means:
(A) to deposit in the mail, deliver for transmission, or transmit by any other usual means of communication, with postage or cost of transmission provided for, addressed to any address reasonable under the circumstances; or
(B) to cause the record or notification to be received within the time that it would have been received if properly sent under subitem (A).
(75) 'Software' means a computer program and any supporting information provided in connection with a transaction relating to the program. The term does not include a computer program that is included in the definition of goods.
(76) 'State' means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
(77) 'Supporting obligation' means a letter-of-credit right or secondary obligation that supports the payment or performance of an account, chattel paper, a document, a general intangible, an instrument, or investment property.
(78) 'Tangible chattel paper' means chattel paper evidenced by a record or records consisting of information that is inscribed on a tangible medium.
(79) 'Termination statement' means an amendment of a financing statement which:
(A) identifies, by its file number, the initial financing statement to which it relates; and
(B) indicates either that it is a termination statement or that the identified financing statement is no longer effective.
(80) 'Transmitting utility' means a person primarily engaged in the business of:
(A) operating a railroad, subway, street railway, or trolley bus;
(B) transmitting communications electrically, electromagnetically, or by light;
(C) transmitting goods by pipeline or sewer; or
(D) transmitting or producing and transmitting electricity, steam, gas, or water.
(b) The following definitions in other chapters apply to this chapter:
'Beneficiary' Section 36-5-102.
'Broker' Section 36-8-102.
'Certificated security' Section 36-8-102.
'Check' Section 36-3-104.
'Clearing corporation' Section 36-8-102.
'Contract for sale' Section 36-2-106.
'Customer' Section 36-4-104.
'Entitlement holder' Section 36-8-102.
'Financial asset' Section 36-8-102.
'Holder in due course' Section 36-3-302.
'Issuer' (with respect to a letter
of credit or letter-of-credit right) Section 36-5-103.
'Issuer' (with respect to a security) Section 36-8-201.
'Lease' Section 36-2A-103.
'Lease agreement' Section 36-2A-103.
'Lease contract' Section 36-2A-103.
'Leasehold interest' Section 36-2A-103.
'Lessee' Section 36-2A-103.
'Lessee in ordinary course
of business' Section 36-2A-103.
'Lessor' Section 36-2A-103.
'Lessor's residual interest' Section 36-2A-103.
'Letter of credit' Section 36-5-103.
'Merchant' Section 36-2-104.
'Negotiable instrument' Section 36-3-104.
'Note' Section 36-3-104.
'Sale' Section 36-2-106.
'Securities account' Section 36-8-501.
'Securities intermediary' Section 36-8-102.
'Security' Section 36-8-102.
'Security certificate' Section 36-8-102.
'Security entitlement' Section 36-8-102.
'Uncertificated security' Section 36-8-102.
(c) In this chapter:
(1) 'Lease' means a transfer of the right to possession and use of goods for a period in return for consideration. The term includes a sublease unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. The term does not include a sale, including a sale on approval or a sale or return, or retention or creation of a security interest.
(2) 'Lease Agreement' means the bargain, with respect to the lease, of the lessor and the lessee in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term includes a sublease agreement.
(3) 'Lease Contract' means the total legal obligation that results from the lease agreement and applicable rules of law. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term includes a sublease contract.
(4) 'Lessor Interest' means the interest of the lessor or the lessee under a lease contract.
(5) 'Lessee' means a person who acquires the right to possession and use of goods under a lease. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term includes a sublessee.
(6) 'Lessee in Ordinary Course of Business' means a person that leases goods in good faith, without knowledge that the lease violates the rights of another person, and in the ordinary course from a person, other than a pawn broker, in the business of selling or leasing goods of that kind. A person leases in ordinary course if the lease to the person comports with the usual or customary practices in the kind business in which the lessor is engaged or with the lessor's own usual or customary practices. A lessee in the ordinary course of business may lease for cash, by exchange of other property, or on security or unsecured credit, and may acquire goods or documents of title under a preexisting contract. Only a lessee that takes possession of the goods or has a right to recover the goods from the lessor may be a lessee in the ordinary course of business. A person that acquires goods in a transfer in bulk or has security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt is not a lessee in the ordinary course of business.
(7) 'Lessor' means the person who transfers the right to possession and use of goods under a lease. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the term includes sublessor.
(8) 'Lessor's Residual Interest' means the lessor's interest in the goods after expiration, termination, or cancellation of the lease contract.
(9) 'Applicant' means a person at whose request or for whose account a letter of credit is issued . The term includes a person who requests an issuer to issue a letter of credit on behalf of another if the person making the request undertakes an obligation to reimburse the issuer.
(10) 'Nominated Person' means a person whom the issuer (i) designates or authorizes to pay, accept, negotiate, or otherwise give value under a letter of credit and (ii) undertakes by agreement or custom and practice to reimburse.
(11) 'Proceeds of a Letter of Credit' means the cash, check accepted draft, or other item of value paid or delivered upon honor or giving of value by the issuer or any nominated person under the letter of credit. The term does not include a beneficiary's drawing rights or documents presented by the beneficiary.
(12) 'Prove' means with respect to a fact means to meet the burden of establishing the fact (Section 36-1-201(8)).
(d) Chapter 1 contains general definitions and principles of construction and interpretation applicable throughout this chapter.
Official Comment
1. Source. All terms that are defined in Article 9 and used in more than one Section are consolidated in this Section. Note that the definition of "security interest" is found in Section 1-201, not in this Article, and has been revised. See Appendix I. Many of the definitions in this Section are new; many others derive from those in former Section 9-105. The following Comments also indicate other Sections of former Article 9 that defined (or explained) terms.
2. Parties to Secured Transactions.
a. "Debtor"; "Obligor"; "Secondary Obligor." Determining whether a person was a "debtor" under former Section 9-105(1)(d) required a close examination of the context in which the term was used. To reduce the need for this examination, this Article redefines "debtor" and adds new defined terms, "secondary obligor" and "obligor." In the context of Part 6 (default and enforcement), these definitions distinguish among three classes of persons: (i) those persons who may have a stake in the proper enforcement of a security interest by virtue of their non-lien property interest (typically, an ownership interest) in the collateral, (ii) those persons who may have a stake in the proper enforcement of the security interest because of their obligation to pay the secured debt, and (iii) those persons who have an obligation to pay the secured debt but have no stake in the proper enforcement of the security interest. Persons in the first class are debtors. Persons in the second class are secondary obligors if any portion of the obligation is secondary or if the obligor has a right of recourse against the debtor or another obligor with respect to an obligation secured by collateral. One must consult the law of suretyship to determine whether an obligation is secondary. The Restatement (3d), Suretyship and Guaranty Section 1 (1996), contains a useful explanation of the concept. Obligors in the third class are neither debtors nor secondary obligors. With one exception (Section 9-616, as it relates to a consumer obligor), the rights and duties in provided by Part 6 affect non-debtor obligors only if they are "secondary obligors."
By including in the definition of "debtor" all persons with a property interest (other than a security interest in or other lien on collateral), the definition includes transferees of collateral, whether or not the secured party knows of the transfer or the transferee's identity. Exculpatory provisions in Part 6 protect the secured party in that circumstance. See Sections 9-605 and 9-628. The definition renders unnecessary former Section 9-112, which governed situations in which collateral was not owned by the debtor. The definition also includes a "consignee," as defined in this Section, as well as a seller of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes.
Secured parties and other lienholders are excluded from the definition of "debtor" because the interests of those parties normally derive from and encumber a debtor's interest. However, if in a separate secured transaction a secured party grants, as debtor, a security interest in its own interest (i.e., its security interest and any obligation that it secures), the secured party is a debtor in that transaction. This typically occurs when a secured party with a security interest in specific goods assigns chattel paper.
Consider the following examples:
Example 1: Behnfeldt borrows money and grants a security interest in her Miata to secure the debt. Behnfeldt is a debtor and an obligor.
Example 2: Behnfeldt borrows money and grants a security interest in her Miata to secure the debt. Bruno co-signs a negotiable note as maker. As before, Behnfeldt is the debtor and an obligor. As an accommodation party (see Section 3-419), Bruno is a secondary obligor. Bruno has this status even if the note states that her obligation is a primary obligation and that she waives all suretyship defenses.
Example 3: Behnfeldt borrows money on an unsecured basis. Bruno co-signs the note and grants a security interest in her Honda to secure her obligation. Inasmuch as Behnfeldt does not have a property interest in the Honda, Behnfeldt is not a debtor. Having granted the security interest, Bruno is the debtor. Because Behnfeldt is a principal obligor, she is not a secondary obligor. Whatever the outcome of enforcement of the security interest against the Honda or Bruno's secondary obligation, Bruno will look to Behnfeldt for her losses. The enforcement will not affect Behnfeldt's aggregate obligations.
When the principal obligor (borrower) and the secondary obligor (surety) each has granted a security interest in different collateral, the status of each is determined by the collateral involved.
Example 4: Behnfeldt borrows money and grants a security interest in her Miata to secure the debt. Bruno co-signs the note and grants a security interest in her Honda to secure her obligation. When the secured party enforces the security interest in Behnfeldt's Miata, Behnfeldt is the debtor, and Bruno is a secondary obligor. When the secured party enforces the security interest in the Honda, Bruno is the "debtor." As in Example 3, Behnfeldt is an obligor, but not a secondary obligor.
b. "Secured Party." The secured party is the person in whose favor the security interest has been created, as determined by reference to the security agreement. This definition controls, among other things, which person has the duties and potential liability that Part 6 imposes upon a secured party. The definition of "secured party" also includes a "consignee," a person to which accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes have been sold, and the holder of an agricultural lien.
The definition of "secured party" clarifies the status of various types of representatives. Consider, for example, a multi-bank facility under which Bank A, Bank B, and Bank C are lenders and Bank A serves as the collateral agent. If the security interest is granted to the banks, then they are the secured parties. If the security interest is granted to Bank A as collateral agent, then Bank A is the secured party.
c. Other Parties. A "consumer obligor" is defined as the obligor in a consumer transaction. Definitions of "new debtor" and "original debtor" are used in the special rules found in Sections 9-326 and 9-508.
3. Definitions Relating to Creation of a Security Interest.
a. "Collateral." As under former Section 9-105, "collateral" is the property subject to a security interest and includes accounts and chattel paper that have been sold. It has been expanded in this Article. The term now explicitly includes proceeds subject to a security interest. It also reflects the broadened scope of the Article. It includes property subject to an agricultural lien as well as payment intangibles and promissory notes that have been sold.
b. "Security Agreement." The definition of "security agreement" is substantially the same as under former Section 9-105-an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest. However, the term frequently was used colloquially in former Article 9 to refer to the document or writing that contained a debtor's security agreement. This Article eliminates that usage, reserving the term for the more precise meaning specified in the definition.
Whether an agreement creates a security interest depends not on whether the parties intend that the law characterize the transaction as a security interest but rather on whether the transaction falls within the definition of "security interest" in Section 1-201. Thus, an agreement that the parties characterize as a "lease" of goods may be a "security agreement," notwithstanding the parties' stated intention that the law treat the transaction as a lease and not as a secured transaction.
4. Goods-Related Definitions.
a. "Goods"; "Consumer Goods"; "Equipment"; "Farm Products"; "Farming Operation"; "Inventory." The definition of "goods" is substantially the same as the definition in former Section 9-105. This Article also retains the four mutually-exclusive "types" of collateral that consist of goods: "consumer goods," "equipment," "farm products," and "inventory." The revisions are primarily for clarification.
The classes of goods are mutually exclusive. For example, the same property cannot simultaneously be both equipment and inventory. In borderline cases-a physician's car or a farmer's truck that might be either consumer goods or equipment-the principal use to which the property is put is determinative. Goods can fall into different classes at different times. For example, a radio may be inventory in the hands of a dealer and consumer goods in the hands of a consumer. As under former Article 9, goods are "equipment" if they do not fall into another category.
The definition of "consumer goods" follows former Section 9-109. The classification turns on whether the debtor uses or bought the goods for use "primarily for personal, family, or household purposes."
Goods are inventory if they are leased by a lessor or held by a person for sale or lease. The revised definition of "inventory" makes clear that the term includes goods leased by the debtor to others as well as goods held for lease. (The same result should have obtained under the former definition.) Goods to be furnished or furnished under a service contract, raw materials, and work in process also are inventory. Implicit in the definition is the criterion that the sales or leases are or will be in the ordinary course of business. For example, machinery used in manufacturing is equipment, not inventory, even though it is the policy of the debtor to sell machinery when it becomes obsolete or worn. Inventory also includes goods that are consumed in a business (e.g., fuel used in operations). In general, goods used in a business are equipment if they are fixed assets or have, as identifiable units, a relatively long period of use, but are inventory, even though not held for sale or lease, if they are used up or consumed in a short period of time in producing a product or providing a service.
Goods are "farm products" if the debtor is engaged in farming operations with respect to the goods. Animals in a herd of livestock are covered whether the debtor acquires them by purchase or as a result of natural increase. Products of crops or livestock remain farm products as long as they have not been subjected to a manufacturing process. The terms "crops" and "livestock" are not defined. The new definition of "farming operations" is for clarification only.
Crops, livestock, and their products cease to be "farm products" when the debtor ceases to be engaged in farming operations with respect to them. If, for example, they come into the possession of a marketing agency for sale or distribution or of a manufacturer or processor as raw materials, they become inventory. Products of crops or livestock, even though they remain in the possession of a person engaged in farming operations, lose their status as farm products if they are subjected to a manufacturing process. What is and what is not a manufacturing operation is not specified in this Article. At one end of the spectrum, some processes are so closely connected with farming-such as pasteurizing milk or boiling sap to produce maple syrup or sugar-that they would not constitute manufacturing. On the other hand an extensive canning operation would be manufacturing. Once farm products have been subjected to a manufacturing operation, they normally become inventory.
The revised definition of "farm products" clarifies the distinction between crops and standing timber and makes clear that aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations may be either crops or livestock. Although aquatic goods that are vegetable in nature often would be crops and those that are animal would be livestock, this Article leaves the courts free to classify the goods on a case-by-case basis. See Section 9-324, Comment 11.
b. "Accession"; "Manufactured Home"; "Manufactured-Home Transaction." Other specialized definitions of goods include "accession" (see the special priority and enforcement rules in Section 9-335), and "manufactured home" (see Section 9-515, permitting a financing statement in a "manufactured-home transaction" to be effective for 30 years). The definition of "manufactured home" borrows from the federal Manufactured Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. Sections 5401 et seq., and is intended to have the same meaning.
c. "As-Extracted Collateral." Under this Article, oil, gas, and other minerals that have not been extracted from the ground are treated as real property, to which this Article does not apply. Upon extraction, minerals become personal property (goods) and eligible to be collateral under this Article. See the definition of "goods," which excludes "oil, gas, and other minerals before extraction." To take account of financing practices reflecting the shift from real to personal property, this Article contains special rules for perfecting security interests in minerals which attach upon extraction and in accounts resulting from the sale of minerals at the wellhead or minehead. See, e.g., Sections 9-301(6) (law governing perfection and priority); 9-501 (place of filing), 9-502 (contents of financing statement), 9-519 (indexing of records). The new term, "as-extracted collateral," refers to the minerals and related accounts to which the special rules apply. The term "at the wellhead" encompasses arrangements based on a sale of the produce at the moment that it issues from the ground and is measured, without technical distinctions as to whether title passes at the "Christmas tree" of a well, the far side of a gathering tank, or at some other point. The term "at . . . the minehead" is comparable.
The following examples explain the operation of these provisions.
Example 5: Debtor owns an interest in oil that is to be extracted. To secure Debtor's obligations to Lender, Debtor enters into an authenticated agreement granting Lender an interest in the oil. Although Lender may acquire an interest in the oil under real-property law, Lender does not acquire a security interest under this Article until the oil becomes personal property, i.e., until is extracted and becomes "goods" to which this Article applies. Because Debtor had an interest in the oil before extraction and Lender's security interest attached to the oil as extracted, the oil is "as-extracted collateral."
Example 6: Debtor owns an interest in oil that is to be extracted and contracts to sell the oil to Buyer at the wellhead. In an authenticated agreement, Debtor agrees to sell to Lender the right to payment from Buyer. This right to payment is an account that constitutes "as-extracted collateral." If Lender then resells the account to Financer, Financer acquires a security interest. However, inasmuch as the debtor-seller in that transaction, Lender, had no interest in the oil before extraction, Financer's collateral (the account it owns) is not "as-extracted collateral."
Example 7: Under the facts of Example 6, before extraction, Buyer grants a security interest in the oil to Bank. Although Bank's security interest attaches when the oil is extracted, Bank's security interest is not in "as-extracted collateral," inasmuch as its debtor, Buyer, did not have an interest in the oil before extraction.
5. Receivables-related Definitions.
a. "Account"; "Health-Care-Insurance Receivable"; "As-Extracted Collateral." The definition of "account" has been expanded and reformulated. It is no longer limited to rights to payment relating to goods or services. Many categories of rights to payment that were classified as general intangibles under former Article 9 are accounts under this Article. Thus, if they are sold, a financing statement must be filed to perfect the buyer's interest in them. Among the types of property that are expressly excluded from the definition is "a right to payment for money or funds advanced or sold." As defined in Section 1-201, "money" is limited essentially to currency. As used in the exclusion from the definition of "account," however, "funds" is a broader concept (although the term is not defined). For example, when a bank-lender credits a borrower's deposit account for the amount of a loan, the bank's advance of funds is not a transaction giving rise to an account.
The definition of "health-care-insurance receivable" is new. It is a subset of the definition of "account." However, the rules generally applicable to account debtors on accounts do not apply to insurers obligated on health-care-insurance receivables. See Sections 9-404(e), 9-405(d), 9-406(i).
Note that certain accounts also are "as-extracted collateral." See Comment 4.c., Examples 6 and 7.
b. "Chattel Paper"; "Electronic Chattel Paper"; "Tangible Chattel Paper." "Chattel paper" consists of a monetary obligation together with a security interest in or a lease of specific goods if the obligation and security interest or lease are evidenced by "a record or records." The definition has been expanded from that found in former Article 9 to include records that evidence a monetary obligation and a security interest in specific goods and software used in the goods. Charters of vessels are expressly excluded from the definition of chattel paper; they are accounts. The term "charter" as used in this Section includes bareboat charters, time charters, successive voyage charters, contracts of affreightment, contracts of carriage, and all other arrangements for the use of vessels. Under former Section 9-105, only if the evidence of an obligation consisted of "a writing or writings" could an obligation qualify as chattel paper. In this Article, traditional, written chattel paper is included in the definition of "tangible chattel paper." "Electronic chattel paper" is chattel paper that is stored in an electronic medium instead of in tangible form. The concept of an electronic medium should be construed liberally to include electrical, digital, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, or any other current or similar emerging technologies.
The definition of electronic chattel paper does not dictate that it be created in any particular fashion. For example, a record consisting of a tangible writing may be converted to electronic form (e.g., by creating electronic images of a signed writing). Or, records may be initially created and executed in electronic form (e.g., a lessee might authenticate an electronic record of a lease that is then stored in electronic form). In either case the resulting records are electronic chattel paper.
c. "Instrument"; "Promissory Note." The definition of "instrument" includes a negotiable instrument. As under former Section 9-105, it also includes any other right to payment of a monetary obligation that is evidenced by a writing of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery (and, if necessary, an indorsement or assignment). Except in the case of chattel paper, the fact that an instrument is secured by a security interest or encumbrance on property does not change the character of the instrument as such or convert the combination of the instrument and collateral into a separate classification of personal property. The definition makes clear that rights to payment arising out of credit-card transactions are not instruments. The definition of "promissory note" is new, necessitated by the inclusion of sales of promissory notes within the scope of Article 9. It explicitly excludes obligations arising out of "orders" to pay (e.g., checks) as opposed to "promises" to pay. See Section 3-104.
d. "General Intangible"; "Payment Intangible." "General intangible" is the residual category of personal property, including things in action, that is not included in the other defined types of collateral. Examples are various categories of intellectual property and the right to payment of a loan of funds that is not evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument. The definition has been revised to exclude commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, and letter-of-credit rights. Each of the three is a separate type of collateral. One important consequence of this exclusion is that tortfeasors (commercial tort claims), banks (deposit accounts), and persons obligated on letters of credit (letter-or-credit rights) are not "account debtors" having the rights and obligations set forth in Sections 9-404, 9-405, and 9-406. In particular, tortfeasors, banks, and persons obligated on letters of credit are not obligated to pay an assignee (secured party) upon receipt of the notification described in Section 9-404(a). See Comment 5.h. Another important consequence relates to the adequacy of the description in the security agreement. See Section 9-108.
"Payment intangible" is a subset of the definition of "general intangible." The sale of a payment intangible is subject to this Article. See Section 9-109(a)(3). Virtually any intangible right could give rise to a right to payment of money once one hypothesizes, for example, that the account debtor is in breach of its obligation. The term "payment intangible," however, embraces only those general intangibles "under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation." (Emphasis added.)
In classifying intangible collateral, a court should begin by identifying the particular rights that have been assigned. The account debtor (promisor) under a particular contract may owe several types of monetary obligations as well as other, nonmonetary obligations. If the promisee's right to payment of money is assigned separately, the right is an account or payment intangible, depending on how the account debtor's obligation arose. When all the promisee's rights are assigned together, an account, a payment intangible, and a general intangible all may be involved, depending on the nature of the rights.
A right to the payment of money is frequently buttressed by ancillary covenants, such as covenants in a purchase agreement, note, or mortgage requiring insurance on the collateral or forbidding removal of the collateral, or covenants to preserve the creditworthiness of the promisor, such as covenants restricting dividends and the like. This Article does not treat these ancillary rights separately from the rights to payment to which they relate. For example, attachment and perfection of an assignment of a right to payment of a monetary obligation, whether it be an account or payment intangible, also carries these ancillary rights.
Every "payment intangible" is also a "general intangible." Likewise, "software" is a "general intangible" for purposes of this Article. See Comment 25. Accordingly, except as otherwise provided, statutory provisions applicable to general intangibles apply to payment intangibles and software.
e. "Letter-of-Credit Right." The term "letter-of-credit right" embraces the rights to payment and performance under a letter of credit (defined in Section 5-102). However, it does not include a beneficiary's right to demand payment or performance. Transfer of those rights to a transferee beneficiary is governed by Article 5. See Sections 9-107, Comment 4, and 9-329, Comments 3 and 4.
f. "Supporting Obligation." This new term covers the most common types of credit enhancements-suretyship obligations (including guarantees) and letter-of-credit rights that support one of the types of collateral specified in the definition. As explained in Comment 2.a., suretyship law determines whether an obligation is "secondary" for purposes of this definition. Section 9-109 generally excludes from this Article transfers of interests in insurance policies. However, the regulation of a secondary obligation as an insurance product does not necessarily mean that it is a "policy of insurance" for purposes of the exclusion in Section 9-109. Thus, this Article may cover a secondary obligation (as a supporting obligations), even if the obligation is issued by a regulated insurance company and the obligation is subject to regulation as an "insurance" product.
This Article contains rules explicitly governing attachment, perfection, and priority of security interests in supporting obligations. See Sections 9-203, 9-308, 9-310, and 9-322. These provisions reflect the principle that a supporting obligation is an incident of the collateral it supports.
Collections of or other distributions under a supporting obligations are "proceeds" of the supported collateral as well as "proceeds" of the supporting obligation itself. See Section 9-102 (defining "proceeds") and Comment 13.b. As such, the collections and distributions are subject to the priority rules applicable to proceeds generally. See Section 9-322. However, under the special rule governing security interests in a letter-of-credit right, a secured party's failure to obtain control (Section 9-107) of a letter-of-credit right supporting collateral may leave its security interest exposed to a priming interest of a party who does take control. See Section 9-329 (security interest in a letter-of-credit right perfected by control has priority over a conflicting security interest).
g. "Commercial Tort Claim." This term is new. A tort claim may serve as original collateral under this Article only if it is a "commercial tort claim." See Section 9-109(d). Although security interests in commercial tort claims are within its scope, this Article does not override other applicable law restricting the assignability of a tort claim. See Section 9-401. A security interest in a tort claim also may exist under this Article if the claim is proceeds of other collateral.
h. "Account Debtor." An "account debtor" is a person obligated on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible. The account debtor's obligation often is a monetary obligation; however, this is not always the case. For example, if a franchisee uses its rights under a franchise agreement (a general intangible) as collateral, then the franchisor is an "account debtor." As a general matter, Article 3, and not Article 9, governs obligations on negotiable instruments. Accordingly, the definition of "account debtor" excludes obligors on negotiable instruments constituting part of chattel paper. The principal effect of this change from the definition in former Article 9 is that the rules in Sections 9-403, 9-404, 9-405, and 9-406, dealing with the rights of an assignee and duties of an account debtor, do not apply to an assignment of chattel paper in which the obligation to pay is evidenced by a negotiable instrument. (Section 9-406(d), however, does apply to promissory notes, including negotiable promissory notes.) Rather, the assignee's rights are governed by Article 3. Similarly, the duties of an obligor on a nonnegotiable instrument are governed by non-Article 9 law unless the nonnegotiable instrument is a part of chattel paper, in which case the obligor is an account debtor.
i. Receivables Under Government Entitlement Programs. This Article does not contain a defined term that encompasses specifically rights to payment or performance under the many and varied government entitlement programs. Depending on the nature of a right under a program, it could be an account, a payment intangible, a general intangible other than a payment intangible, or another type of collateral. The right also might be proceeds of collateral (e.g., crops).
6. Investment-Property-Related Definitions: "Commodity Account"; "Commodity Contract"; "Commodity Customer"; "Commodity Intermediary"; "Investment Property." These definitions are substantially the same as the corresponding definitions in former Section 9-115. "Investment property" includes securities, both certificated and uncertificated, securities accounts, security entitlements, commodity accounts, and commodity contracts. The term investment property includes a "securities account" in order to facilitate transactions in which a debtor wishes to create a security interest in all of the investment positions held through a particular account rather than in particular positions carried in the account. Former Section 9-115 was added in conjunction with Revised Article 8 and contained a variety of rules applicable to security interests in investment property. These rules have been relocated to the appropriate Sections of Article 9. See, e.g., Sections 9-203 (attachment), 9-314 (perfection by control), 9-328 (priority).
The terms "security," "security entitlement," and related terms are defined in Section 8-102, and the term "securities account" is defined in Section 8-501. The terms "commodity account," "commodity contract," "commodity customer," and "commodity intermediary" are defined in this Section. Commodity contracts are not "securities" or "financial assets" under Article 8. See Section 8-103(f). Thus, the relationship between commodity intermediaries and commodity customers is not governed by the indirect-holding-system rules of Part 5 of Article 8. For securities, Article 9 contains rules on security interests, and Article 8 contains rules on the rights of transferees, including secured parties, on such matters as the rights of a transferee if the transfer was itself wrongful and gives rise to an adverse claim. For commodity contracts, Article 9 establishes rules on security interests, but questions of the sort dealt with in Article 8 for securities are left to other law.
The indirect-holding-system rules of Article 8 are sufficiently flexible to be applied to new developments in the securities and financial markets, where that is appropriate. Accordingly, the definition of "commodity contract" is narrowly drafted to ensure that it does not operate as an obstacle to the application of the Article 8 indirect-holding-system rules to new products. The term "commodity contract" covers those contracts that are traded on or subject to the rules of a designated contract market and foreign commodity contracts that are carried on the books of American commodity intermediaries. The effect of this definition is that the category of commodity contracts that are excluded from Article 8 but governed by Article 9 is essentially the same as the category of contracts that fall within the exclusive regulatory jurisdiction of the federal Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
Commodity contracts are different from securities or other financial assets. A person who enters into a commodity futures contract is not buying an asset having a certain value and holding it in anticipation of increase in value. Rather the person is entering into a contract to buy or sell a commodity at set price for delivery at a future time. That contract may become advantageous or disadvantageous as the price of the commodity fluctuates during the term of the contract. The rules of the commodity exchanges require that the contracts be marked to market on a daily basis; that is, the customer pays or receives any increment attributable to that day's price change. Because commodity customers may incur obligations on their contracts, they are required to provide collateral at the outset, known as "original margin," and may be required to provide additional amounts, known as "variation margin," during the term of the contract.
The most likely setting in which a person would want to take a security interest in a commodity contract is where a lender who is advancing funds to finance an inventory of a physical commodity requires the borrower to enter into a commodity contract as a hedge against the risk of decline in the value of the commodity. The lender will want to take a security interest in both the commodity itself and the hedging commodity contract. Typically, such arrangements are structured as security interests in the entire commodity account in which the borrower carries the hedging contracts, rather than in individual contracts.
One important effect of including commodity contracts and commodity accounts in Article 9 is to provide a clearer legal structure for the analysis of the rights of commodity clearing organizations against their participants and futures commission merchants against their customers. The rules and agreements of commodity clearing organizations generally provide that the clearing organization has the right to liquidate any participant's positions in order to satisfy obligations of the participant to the clearing corporation. Similarly, agreements between futures commission merchants and their customers generally provide that the futures commission merchant has the right to liquidate a customer's positions in order to satisfy obligations of the customer to the futures commission merchant.
The main property that a commodity intermediary holds as collateral for the obligations that the commodity customer may incur under its commodity contracts is not other commodity contracts carried by the customer but the other property that the customer has posted as margin. Typically, this property will be securities. The commodity intermediary's security interest in such securities is governed by the rules of this Article on security interests in securities, not the rules on security interests in commodity contracts or commodity accounts.
Although there are significant analytic and regulatory differences between commodities and securities, the development of commodity contracts on financial products in the past few decades has resulted in a system in which the commodity markets and securities markets are closely linked. The rules on security interests in commodity contracts and commodity accounts provide a structure that may be essential in times of stress in the financial markets. Suppose, for example that a firm has a position in a securities market that is hedged by a position in a commodity market, so that payments that the firm is obligated to make with respect to the securities position will be covered by the receipt of funds from the commodity position. Depending upon the settlement cycles of the different markets, it is possible that the firm could find itself in a position where it is obligated to make the payment with respect to the securities position before it receives the matching funds from the commodity position. If cross-margining arrangements have not been developed between the two markets, the firm may need to borrow funds temporarily to make the earlier payment. The rules on security interests in investment property would facilitate the use of positions in one market as collateral for loans needed to cover obligations in the other market.
7. Consumer-Related Definitions: "Consumer Debtor"; "Consumer Goods"; "Consumer-goods transaction"; "Consumer Obligor"; "Consumer Transaction." The definition of "consumer goods" (discussed above) is substantially the same as the definition in former Section 9-109. The definitions of "consumer debtor," "consumer obligor," "consumer-goods transaction," and "consumer transaction" have been added in connection with various new (and old) consumer-related provisions and to designate certain provisions that are inapplicable in consumer transactions.
"Consumer-goods transaction" is a subset of "consumer transaction." Under each definition, both the obligation secured and the collateral must have a personal, family, or household purpose. However, "mixed" business and personal transactions also may be characterized as a consumer-goods transaction or consumer transaction. Subparagraph (A) of the definition of consumer-goods transactions and clause (i) of the definition of consumer transaction are primary purposes tests. Under these tests, it is necessary to determine the primary purpose of the obligation or obligations secured. Subparagraph (B) and clause (iii) of these definitions are satisfied if any of the collateral is consumer goods, in the case of a consumer-goods transaction, or "is held or acquired primarily for personal, family, or household purposes," in the case of a consumer transaction. The fact that some of the obligations secured or some of the collateral for the obligation does not satisfy the tests (e.g., some of the collateral is acquired for a business purpose) does not prevent a transaction from being a "consumer transaction" or "consumer-goods transaction."
8. Filing-Related Definitions: "Continuation Statement"; "File Number"; "Filing Office"; "Filing-office Rule"; "Financing Statement"; "Fixture Filing"; "Manufactured-Home Transaction"; "New Debtor"; "Original Debtor"; "Public-Finance Transaction"; "Termination Statement"; "Transmitting Utility." These definitions are used exclusively or primarily in the filing-related provisions in Part 5. Most are self-explanatory and are discussed in the Comments to Part 5. A financing statement filed in a manufactured-home transaction or a public-finance transaction may remain effective for 30 years instead of the 5 years applicable to other financing statements. See Section 9-515(b). The definitions relating to medium neutrality also are significant for the filing provisions. See Comment 9.
The definition of "transmitting utility" has been revised to embrace the business of transmitting communications generally to take account of new and future types of communications technology. The term designates a special class of debtors for whom separate filing rules are provided in Part 5, thereby obviating the many local fixture filings that would be necessary under the rules of Section 9-501 for a far-flung public-utility debtor. A transmitting utility will not necessarily be regulated by or operating as such in a jurisdiction where fixtures are located. For example, a utility might own transmission lines in a jurisdiction, although the utility generates no power and has no customers in the jurisdiction.
9. Definitions Relating to Medium Neutrality.
a. "Record." In many, but not all, instances, the term "record" replaces the term "writing" and "written." A "record" includes information that is in intangible form (e.g., electronically stored) as well as tangible form (e.g., written on paper). Given the rapid development and commercial adoption of modern communication and storage technologies, requirements that documents or communications be "written," "in writing," or otherwise in tangible form do not necessarily reflect or aid commercial practices.
A "record" need not be permanent or indestructible, but the term does not include any oral or other communication that is not stored or preserved by any means. The information must be stored on paper or in some other medium. Information that has not been retained other than through human memory does not qualify as a record. Examples of current technologies commercially used to communicate or store information include, but are not limited to, magnetic media, optical discs, digital voice messaging systems, electronic mail, audio tapes, and photographic media, as well as paper. "Record" is an inclusive term that includes all of these methods of storing or communicating information. Any "writing" is a record. A record may be authenticated. See Comment 9.b. A record may be created without the knowledge or intent of a particular person.
Like the terms "written" or "in writing," the term "record" does not establish the purposes, permitted uses, or legal effect that a record may have under any particular provision of law. Whatever is filed in the Article 9 filing system, including financing statements, continuation statements, and termination statements, whether transmitted in tangible or intangible form, would fall within the definition. However, in some instances, statutes or filing-office rules may require that a paper record be filed. In such cases, even if this Article permits the filing of an electronic record, compliance with those statutes or rules is necessary. Similarly, a filer must comply with a statute or rule that requires a particular type of encoding or formatting for an electronic record.
This Article sometimes uses the terms "for record," "of record," "record or legal title," and "record owner." Some of these are terms traditionally used in real-property law. The definition of "record" in this Article now explicitly excepts these usages from the defined term. Also, this Article refers to a record that is filed or recorded in real-property recording systems to record a mortgage as a "record of a mortgage." This usage recognizes that the defined term "mortgage" means an interest in real property; it does not mean the record that evidences, or is filed or recorded with respect to, the mortgage.
b. "Authenticate"; "Communicate"; "Send." The terms "authenticate" and "authenticated" generally replace "sign" and "signed." "Authenticated" replaces and broadens the definition of "signed," in Section 1-201, to encompass authentication of all records, not just writings. (References to authentication of, e.g., an agreement, demand, or notification mean, of course, authentication of a record containing an agreement, demand, or notification.) The terms "communicate" and "send" also contemplate the possibility of communication by nonwritten media. These definitions include the act of transmitting both tangible and intangible records. The definition of "send" replaces, for purposes of this Article, the corresponding term in Section 1-201. The reference to "usual means of communication" in that definition contemplates an inquiry into the appropriateness of the method of transmission used in the particular circumstances involved.
10. Scope-Related Definitions.
a. Expanded Scope of Article: "Agricultural Lien"; "Consignment"; "Payment Intangible"; "Promissory Note." These new definitions reflect the expanded scope of Article 9, as provided in Section 9-109(a).
b. Reduced Scope of Exclusions: "Governmental Unit"; "Health-Care-Insurance Receivable"; "Commercial Tort Claims." These new definitions reflect the reduced scope of the exclusions, provided in Section 9-109(c) and (d), of transfers by governmental debtors and assignments of interests in insurance policies and commercial tort claims.
11. Choice-of-Law-Related Definitions: "Certificate of Title"; "Governmental Unit"; "Jurisdiction of Organization"; "Registered Organization"; "State." These new definitions reflect the changes in the law governing perfection and priority of security interests and agricultural liens provided in Part 3, Subpart 1.
Not every organization that may provide information about itself in the public records is a "registered organization." For example, a general partnership is not a "registered organization," even if it files a statement of partnership authority under Section 303 of the Uniform Partnership Act (1994) or an assumed name ("dba") certificate. This is because the State under whose law the partnership is organized is not required to maintain a public record showing that the partnership has been organized. In contrast, corporations, limited liability companies, and limited partnerships are "registered organizations."
12. Deposit-Account-Related Definitions: "Deposit Account"; "Bank." The revised definition of "deposit account" incorporates the definition of "bank," which is new. The definition derives from the definitions of "bank" in Sections 4-105(1) and 4A-105(a)(2), which focus on whether the organization is "engaged in the business of banking."
Deposit accounts evidenced by Article 9 "instruments" are excluded from the term "deposit account." In contrast, former Section 9-105 excluded from the former definition "an account evidenced by a certificate of deposit." The revised definition clarifies the proper treatment of nonnegotiable or uncertificated certificates of deposit. Under the definition, an uncertificated certificate of deposit would be a deposit account (assuming there is no writing evidencing the bank's obligation to pay) whereas a nonnegotiable certificate of deposit would be a deposit account only if it is not an "instrument" as defined in this Section (a question that turns on whether the nonnegotiable certificate of deposit is "of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.")
A deposit account evidenced by an instrument is subject to the rules applicable to instruments generally. As a consequence, a security interest in such an instrument cannot be perfected by "control" (see Section 9-104), and the special priority rules applicable to deposit accounts (see Sections 9-327 and 9-340) do not apply.
The term "deposit account" does not include "investment property," such as securities and security entitlements. Thus, the term also does not include shares in a money-market mutual fund, even if the shares are redeemable by check.
13. Proceeds-Related Definitions: "Cash Proceeds"; "Noncash Proceeds"; "Proceeds." The revised definition of "proceeds" expands the definition beyond that contained in former Section 9-306 and resolves ambiguities in the former Section.
a. Distributions on Account of Collateral. The phrase "whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of, collateral," in subparagraph (B), is broad enough to cover cash or stock dividends distributed on account of securities or other investment property that is original collateral. Compare former Section 9-306 ("Any payments or distributions made with respect to investment property collateral are proceeds."). This Section rejects the holding of Hastie v. FDIC, 2 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir. 1993) (postpetition cash dividends on stock subject to a prepetition pledge are not "proceeds" under Bankruptcy Code Section 552(b)), to the extent the holding relies on the Article 9 definition of "proceeds."
b. Distributions on Account of Supporting Obligations. Under subparagraph (B), collections on and distributions on account of collateral consisting of various credit-support arrangements ("supporting obligations," as defined in Section 9-102) also are proceeds. Consequently, they are afforded treatment identical to proceeds collected from or distributed by the obligor on the underlying (supported) right to payment or other collateral. Proceeds of supporting obligations also are proceeds of the underlying rights to payment or other collateral.
c. Proceeds of Proceeds. The definition of "proceeds" no longer provides that proceeds of proceeds are themselves proceeds. That idea is expressed in the revised definition of "collateral" in Section 9-102. No change in meaning is intended.
d. Proceeds Received by Person Who Did Not Create Security Interest. When collateral is sold subject to a security interest and the buyer then resells the collateral, a question arose under former Article 9 concerning whether the "debtor" had "received" what the buyer received on resale and, therefore, whether those receipts were "proceeds" under former Section 9-306(2). This Article contains no requirement that property be "received" by the debtor for the property to qualify as proceeds. It is necessary only that the property be traceable, directly or indirectly, to the original collateral.
e. Cash Proceeds and Noncash Proceeds. The definition of "cash proceeds" is substantially the same as the corresponding definition in former Section 9-306. The phrase "and the like" covers property that is functionally equivalent to "money, checks, or deposit accounts," such as some money-market accounts that are securities or part of securities entitlements. Proceeds other than cash proceeds are noncash proceeds.
14. Consignment-Related Definitions: "Consignee"; "Consignment"; "Consignor." The definition of "consignment" excludes, in subparagraphs (B) and (C), transactions for which filing would be inappropriate or of insufficient benefit to justify the costs. A consignment excluded from the application of this Article by one of those subparagraphs may still be a true consignment; however, it is governed by non-Article 9 law. The definition also excludes, in subparagraph (D), what have been called "consignments intended for security." These "consignments" are not bailments but secured transactions. Accordingly, all of Article 9 applies to them. See Sections 1-201(37), 9-109(a)(1). The "consignor" is the person who delivers goods to the "consignee" in a consignment.
The definition of "consignment" requires that the goods be delivered "to a merchant for the purpose of sale." If the goods are delivered for another purpose as well, such as milling or processing, the transaction is a consignment nonetheless because a purpose of the delivery is "sale." On the other hand, if a merchant-processor-bailee will not be selling the goods itself but will be delivering to buyers to which the owner-bailor agreed to sell the goods, the transaction would not be a consignment.
15. "Accounting." This definition describes the record and information that a debtor is entitled to request under Section 9-210.
16. "Document." The definition of "document" is unchanged in substance from the corresponding definitions in former Section 9-105. See Section 1-201(15) and Comment 15.
17. "Encumbrance"; "Mortgage." The definitions of "encumbrance" and "mortgage" are unchanged in substance from the corresponding definitions in former Section 9-105. They are used primarily in the special real-property-related priority and other provisions relating to crops, fixtures, and accessions.
18. "Fixtures." This definition is unchanged in substance from the corresponding definition in former Section 9-313. See Section 9-334 (priority of security interests in fixtures and crops).
19. "Good Faith." This Article expands the definition of "good faith" to include "the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing." The definition in this Section applies when the term is used in this Article, and the same concept applies in the context of this Article for purposes of the obligation of good faith imposed by Section 1-203. See subsection (c).
20. "Lien Creditor" This definition is unchanged in substance from the corresponding definition in former Section 9-301.
21. "New Value." This Article deletes former Section 9-108. Its broad formulation of new value, which embraced the taking of after-acquired collateral for a pre-existing claim, was unnecessary, counterintuitive, and ineffective for its original purpose of sheltering after-acquired collateral from attack as a voidable preference in bankruptcy. The new definition derives from Bankruptcy Code Section 547(a). The term is used with respect to temporary perfection of security interests in instruments, certificated securities, or negotiable documents under Section 9-312(e) and with respect to chattel paper priority in Section 9-330.
22. "Person Related To." Section 9-615 provides a special method for calculating a deficiency or surplus when "the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor" acquires the collateral at a foreclosure disposition. Separate definitions of the term are provided with respect to an individual secured party and with respect to a secured party that is an organization. The definitions are patterned on the corresponding definition in Section 1.301(32) of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (1974).
23. "Proposal." This definition describes a record that is sufficient to propose to retain collateral in full or partial satisfaction of a secured obligation. See Sections 9-620, 9-621, 9-622.
24. "Pursuant to Commitment." This definition is unchanged in substance from the corresponding definition in former Section 9-105. It is used in connection with special
priority rules applicable to future advances. See Section 9-323.
25. "Software." The definition of "software" is used in connection with the priority rules applicable to purchase-money security interests. See Sections 9-103, 9-324. Software, like a payment intangible, is a type of general intangible for purposes of this Article.
26. Terminology: "Assignment" and "Transfer." In numerous provisions, this Article refers to the "assignment" or the "transfer" of property interests. These terms and their derivatives are not defined. This Article generally follows common usage by using the terms "assignment" and "assign" to refer to transfers of rights to payment, claims, and liens and other security interests. It generally uses the term "transfer" to refer to other transfers of interests in property. Except when used in connection with a letter-of-credit transaction (see Section 9-107, Comment 4), no significance should be placed on the use of one term or the other. Depending on the context, each term may refer to the assignment or transfer of an outright ownership interest or to the assignment or transfer of a limited interest, such as a security interest.
Section 36-9-103. Purchase-money security interest; application of payments; burden of establishing.
(a) In this section:
(1) 'purchase-money collateral' means goods or software that secures a purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral; and
(2) 'purchase-money obligation' means an obligation of an obligor incurred as all or part of the price of the collateral or for value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the collateral if the value is in fact so used.
(b) A security interest in goods is a purchase-money security interest:
(1) to the extent that the goods are purchase-money collateral with respect to that security interest;
(2) if the security interest is in inventory that is or was purchase-money collateral, also to the extent that the security interest secures a purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to other inventory in which the secured party holds or held a purchase-money security interest; and
(3) also to the extent that the security interest secures a purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to software in which the secured party holds or held a purchase-money security interest.
(c) A security interest in software is a purchase-money security interest to the extent that the security interest also secures a purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to goods in which the secured party holds or held a purchase-money security interest if:
(1) the debtor acquired its interest in the software in an integrated transaction in which it acquired an interest in the goods; and
(2) the debtor acquired its interest in the software for the principal purpose of using the software in the goods.
(d) The security interest of a consignor in goods that are the subject of a consignment is a purchase-money security interest in inventory.
(e) In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, if the extent to which a security interest is a purchase-money security interest depends on the application of a payment to a particular obligation, the payment must be applied:
(1) in accordance with any reasonable method of application to which the parties agree;
(2) in the absence of the parties' agreement to a reasonable method, in accordance with any intention of the obligor manifested at or before the time of payment; or
(3) in the absence of an agreement to a reasonable method and a timely manifestation of the obligor's intention, in the following order:
(A) to obligations that are not secured; and
(B) if more than one obligation is secured, to obligations secured by purchase-money security interests in the order in which those obligations were incurred.
(f) In a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction, a purchase-money security interest does not lose its status as such, even if:
(1) the purchase-money collateral also secures an obligation that is not a purchase-money obligation;
(2) collateral that is not purchase-money collateral also secures the purchase-money obligation; or
(3) the purchase-money obligation has been renewed, refinanced, consolidated, or restructured.
(g) In a transaction other than a consumer-good transaction, a secured party claiming a purchase-money security interest has the burden of establishing the extent to which the security interest is a purchase-money security interest.
(h) The limitation of the rules in subsections (e), (f), and (g) to transactions other than consumer-goods transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination of the proper rules in consumer-goods transactions. The court may not infer from that limitation the nature of the proper rule in consumer-goods transactions and may continue to apply established approaches.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-107.
2. Scope of This Section. Under Section 9-309(1), a purchase-money security interest in consumer goods is perfected when it attaches. Sections 9-317 and 9-324 provide special priority rules for purchase-money security interests in a variety of contexts. This Section explains when a security interest enjoys purchase-money status.
3. "Purchase-Money Collateral"; "Purchase-Money Obligation"; "Purchase-Money Security Interest." Subsection (a) defines "purchase-money collateral" and "purchase-money obligation." These terms are essential to the description of what constitutes a purchase-money security interest under subsection (b). As used in subsection (a)(2), the definition of "purchase-money obligation," the "price" of collateral or the "value given to enable" includes obligations for expenses incurred in connection with acquiring rights in the collateral, sales taxes, duties, finance charges, interest, freight charges, costs of storage in transit, demurrage, administrative charges, expenses of collection and enforcement, attorney's fees, and other similar obligations.
The concept of "purchase-money security interest" requires a close nexus between the acquisition of collateral and the secured obligation. Thus, a security interest does not qualify as a purchase-money security interest if a debtor acquires property on unsecured credit and subsequently creates the security interest to secure the purchase price.
4. Cross-Collateralization of Purchase-Money Security Interests in Inventory. Subsection (b)(2) deals with the problem of cross-collateralized purchase-money security interests in inventory. Consider a simple example:
Example: Seller (S) sells an item of inventory (Item-1) to Debtor (D), retaining a security interest in Item-1 to secure Item-1's price and all other obligations, existing and future, of D to S. S then sells another item of inventory to D (Item-2), again retaining a security interest in Item-2 to secure Item-2's price as well as all other obligations of D to S. D then pays to S Item-1's price. D then sells Item-2 to a buyer in ordinary course of business, who takes Item-2 free of S's security interest.
Under subsection (b)(2), S's security interest in Item-1 securing Item-2's unpaid price would be a purchase-money security interest. This is so because S has a purchase-money security interest in Item-1, Item-1 secures the price of (a "purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to") Item-2 ("other inventory"), and Item-2 itself was subject to a purchase-money security interest. Note that, to the extent Item-1 secures the price of Item-2, S's security interest in Item-1 would not be a purchase-money security interest under subsection (b)(1). The security interest in Item-1 is a purchase-money security interest under subsection (b)(1) only to the extent that Item-1 is "purchase-money collateral," i.e., only to the extent that Item-1 "secures a purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral" (i.e., Item-1). See subsection (a)(1).
5. Purchase-Money Security Interests in Goods and Software. Subsections (b) and (c) limit purchase-money security interests to security interests in goods, including fixtures, and software. Otherwise, no change in meaning from former Section 9-107 is intended. The second sentence of former Section 9-115(5)(f) made the purchase-money priority rule (former Section 9-312(4)) inapplicable to investment property. This Section's limitation makes that provision unnecessary.
Subsection (c) describes the limited circumstances under which a security interest in goods may be accompanied by a purchase-money security interest in software. The software must be acquired by the debtor in a transaction integrated with the transaction in which the debtor acquired the goods, and the debtor must acquire the software for the principal purpose of using the software in the goods. "Software" is defined in Section 9-102.
6. Consignments. Under former Section 9-114, the priority of the consignor's interest is similar to that of a purchase-money security interest. Subsection (d) achieves this result more directly, by defining the interest of a "consignor," defined in Section 9-102, to be a purchase-money security interest in inventory for purposes of this Article. This drafting convention obviates any need to set forth special priority rules applicable to the interest of a consignor. Rather, the priority of the consignor's interest as against the rights of lien creditors of the consignee, competing secured parties, and purchasers of the goods from the consignee can be determined by reference to the priority rules generally applicable to inventory, such as Sections 9-317, 9-320, 9-322, and 9-324. For other purposes, including the rights and duties of the consignor and consignee as between themselves, the consignor would remain the owner of goods under a bailment arrangement with the consignee. See Section 9-319.
7. Provisions Applicable Only to Non-Consumer-Goods Transactions.
a. "Dual-Status" Rule. For transactions other than consumer-goods transactions, this Article approves what some cases have called the "dual-status" rule, under which a security interest may be a purchase-money security interest to some extent and a non-purchase-money security interest to some extent. (Concerning consumer-goods transactions, see subsection (h) and Comment 8.) Some courts have found this rule to be explicit or implicit in the words "to the extent," found in former Section 9-107 and continued in subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2). The rule is made explicit in subsection (e). For non-consumer-goods transactions, this Article rejects the "transformation" rule adopted by some cases, under which any cross-collateralization, refinancing, or the like destroys the purchase-money status entirely.
Consider, for example, what happens when a $10,000 loan secured by a purchase-money security interest is refinanced by the original lender, and, as part of the transaction, the debtor borrows an additional $2,000 secured by the collateral. Subsection (f) resolves any doubt that the security interest remains a purchase-money security interest. Under subsection (b), however, it enjoys purchase-money status only to the extent of $10,000.
b. Allocation of Payments. Continuing with the example, if the debtor makes a $1,000 payment on the $12,000 obligation, then one must determine the extent to which the security interest remains a purchase-money security interest-$9,000 or $10,000. Subsection (e)(1) expresses the overriding principle, applicable in cases other than consumer-goods transactions, for determining the extent to which a security interest is a purchase-money security interest under these circumstances: freedom of contract, as limited by principle of reasonableness. An unconscionable method of application, for example, is not a reasonable one and so would not be given effect under subsection (e)(1). In the absence of agreement, subsection (e)(2) permits the obligor to determine how payments should be allocated. If the obligor fails to manifest its intention, obligations that are not secured will be paid first. (As used in this Article, the concept of "obligations that are not secured" means obligations for which the debtor has not created a security interest. This concept is different from and should not be confused with the concept of an "unsecured claim" as it appears in Bankruptcy Code Section 506(a).) The obligor may prefer this approach, because unsecured debt is likely to carry a higher interest rate than secured debt. A creditor who would prefer to be secured rather than unsecured also would prefer this approach.
After the unsecured debt is paid, payments are to be applied first toward the obligations secured by purchase-money security interests. In the event that there is more than one such obligation, payments first received are to be applied to obligations first incurred. See subsection (e)(3). Once these obligations are paid, there are no purchase-money security interests and no additional allocation rules are needed.
Subsection (f) buttresses the dual-status rule by making it clear that (in a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction) cross-collateralization and renewals, refinancings, and restructurings do not cause a purchase-money security interest to lose its status as such. The statutory terms "renewed," "refinanced," and "restructured" are not defined. Whether the terms encompass a particular transaction depends upon whether, under the particular facts, the purchase-money character of the security interest fairly can be said to survive. Each term contemplates that an identifiable portion of the purchase-money obligation could be traced to the new obligation resulting from a renewal, refinancing, or restructuring.
c. Burden of Proof. As is the case when the extent of a security interest is in issue, under subsection (g) the secured party claiming a purchase-money security interest in a transaction other than a consumer-goods transaction has the burden of establishing whether the security interest retains its purchase-money status. This is so whether the determination is to be made following a renewal, refinancing, or restructuring or otherwise.
8. Consumer-Goods Transactions; Characterization Under Other Law. Under subsection (h), the limitation of subsections (e), (f), and (g) to transactions other than a consumer-goods transactions leaves to the court the determination of the proper rules in consumer-goods transactions. Subsection (h) also instructs the court not to draw any inference from this limitation as to the proper rules for consumer-goods transactions and leaves the court free to continue to apply established approaches to those transactions.
This Section addresses only whether a security interest is a "purchase-money security interest" under this Article, primarily for purposes of perfection and priority. See, e.g., Sections 9-317, 9-324. In particular, its adoption of the dual-status rule, allocation of payments rules, and burden of proof standards for non-consumer-goods transactions is not intended to affect or influence characterizations under other statutes. Whether a security interest is a "purchase-money security interest" under other law is determined by that law. For example, decisions under Bankruptcy Code Section 522(f) have applied both the dual-status and the transformation rules. The Bankruptcy Code does not expressly adopt the state law definition of "purchase-money security interest." Where federal law does not defer to this Article, this Article does not, and could not, determine a question of federal law.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
The most significant litigated issues under the former definition of a purchase-money security interest (former Section 36-9-107), were whether a security interest lost its purchase-money status if the original purchase-money obligation was refinanced or cross collateralized. These issues did arise in the commercial context in cases where an inventory financer that had cross-collateralized a series of purchase-money obligations attempted to claim a purchase-money priority under former Section 9-312(3). See Southtrust Bank v. Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp., 760 F. 2d. 1240 (11th Cir. 1985). The issues, however, were more frequently litigated in consumer bankruptcy cases when a debtor attempted to invoke Section 522(f)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. Section 522(f)(2) to avoid nonpossessory nonpurchase-money security interests to the extent they impaired the debtor's exemption in household goods.
Article 9 now clearly addresses the effect of refinancing and cross-collateralization upon purchase-money security interests in non-consumer goods transactions. Section 9-103(b) overrules the Southtrust Bank decision and preserves the purchase-money status of the security interest of an inventory floor-planner who cross-collateralizes its advances. See Section 36-9-103, Official Comment 4. In addition, in non-consumer goods transactions, revised Section 9-103(f) provides that neither the cross-collateralization or refinancing of purchase-money obligations destroys the purchase-money status of the security interest. The Comments to revised Section 9-103 state that the provision adopts the "dual status" doctrine. Moreover, revised Section 9-103(e) provides allocation rules when the purchase-money status of a security interest in a non-consumer goods transaction depends upon the application of a payment to a particular obligation.
Article 9 does not, however, provide rules governing the effect of refinancing or cross-collateralization upon the purchase-money status of security interests in consumer goods transactions. Section 9-103(h) expressly leaves that determination to the courts. The appellate courts of South Carolina have not addressed these issues. There are, however, some federal decisions applying South Carolina law which do.
Two reported federal court decisions interpreting former Section 36-9-107 in the context of a debtor's attempt to avoid a security interest under Section 522(f)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code indicate that the refinancing or cross-collateralization of a purchase-money obligation may destroy the purchase money status of the security interest. Rosen v. Associates Financial Services Co., 17 B.R. 436 (D.S.C. 1982); Haus v. Barclays American Corp. (In re Haus), 18 B.R. 413 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1982). In Rosen the District Court held that any refinancing of a purchase money obligation extinguished the purchase-money character of the security interest. This holding was subsequently adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Dominion Bank of the Cumberlands, NA v. Nuckolls, 780 F. 2d 408, 413 (4th Cir. 1985). In Haus, a case involving the cross-collateralization of purchase money obligations for consumer goods that the debtor purchased in a series of independent transactions, the Bankruptcy Court held that, "if consumer goods secure any indebtedness other than their own and there is no formula for the application of payments, the security interest is not a purchase-money security interest." 18 B.R. at 417.
The Haus decision leaves open the possibility that a secured seller can retain a purchase money security interest in consumer goods despite cross-collateralization if the secured party can allocate payments to the various items of collateral. The South Carolina Consumer Protection Code provides a formula for the application of payments on cross collateralization consumer credit sales. Section 37-2-409 S.C. Code Ann. (Rev. 1989). Under this provision payments on cross-collateralized sales are applied pro rata to the debts arising from the sales. The proration, however, is computed on the basis of the amounts of original debts secured by the various security interests. To illustrate assume that on January 1, 2002, Buyer purchased a television from seller for $600 and granted Seller a purchase money security interest in the television to secure her obligation to pay the price of the television in 12 monthly installments of $50. On July 1, 2002, and when the balance due on the television had been reduced to $300, Buyer purchased a VCR from Seller for $300. In conjunction with the purchase of the VCR Buyer executed a security agreement that granted Seller a security interest in the VCR to secure both the price of the VCR and the unpaid balance on the television and a security interest in the television to secure both the unpaid balance on the television and the price of the VCR. Under the terms of the July 1, 2002 security agreement Buyer was obligated to make 12 monthly installments of $50. Under Section 37-2-409(1) of the monthly installments commencing on July 1, 2002, $33.33 would be applied to the television and $16.67 would be applied to the VCR. As a result, under Section 37-2-409(1) Seller's security interest on the television would terminate upon its receipt of the March 1, 2003 installment payment.
In an unreported case, Horlbeck v. Dixie Furniture, No. 81-01782 (Bankr. D.S.C. July 9, 1982), the Bankruptcy Court invoked Section 37-2-409 to preserve, in part, a purchase money security interest of a secured seller that cross-collateralized a series of sales of consumer goods. See John B. Butler, II, Lien Avoidance under Section 522(f) in The District of South Carolina, 35 S.C.L. Rev. 311, 324-29 (1984). The impact of Horlbeck and Section 37-2-409 can be illustrated by assuming that in the above example that Buyer made all the installments through December 1, 2002, but filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on January 1, 2003. On the date of bankruptcy the total debt owed to Seller was $300. Under Section 37-2-409(1) the balance due on the television was $100 and the amount due on the VCR was $200. Under Horlbeck Seller's security interest in the VCR would retain its purchase money status to the extent of $200 because even though the security interest in the VCR secured the debt arising from the television as well as the price of the VCR, Section 37-2-409(1) provides a formula for the application of payments. Nevertheless, under Horlbeck and despite the payment allocation formula of Section 37-2-409(1) Seller's security interest in the television would be transformed into a nonpurchase-money security interest. The Bankruptcy Court concluded in Horlbeck that Rosen and Haus would require this result because the effect of the July 1, 2002, cross-collateralization was to refinance the television, satisfying the debt for the price of the television and obligating the Buyer to pay a new loan secured by the television.
Section 36-9-104. Control of deposit account.
(a) A secured party has control of a deposit account if:
(1) the secured party is the bank with which the deposit account is maintained;
(2) the debtor, secured party, and bank have agreed in an authenticated record that the bank will comply with instructions originated by the secured party directing disposition of the funds in the account without further consent by the debtor; or
(3) the secured party becomes the bank's customer with respect to the deposit account.
(b) A secured party that has satisfied subsection (a) has control, even if the debtor retains the right to direct the disposition of funds from the deposit account.
Official Comment
1. Source. New; derived from Section 8-106.
2. Why "Control" Matters. This Section explains the concept of "control" of a deposit account. "Control" under this Section may serve two functions. First, "control . . . pursuant to the debtor's agreement" may substitute for an authenticated security agreement as an element of attachment. See Section 9-203(b)(3)(D). Second, when a deposit account is taken as original collateral, the only method of perfection is obtaining control under this Section. See Section 9-312(b)(1).
3. Requirements for "Control." This Section derives from Section 8-106 of Revised Article 8, which defines "control" of securities and certain other investment property. Under subsection (a)(1), the bank with which the deposit account is maintained has control. The effect of this provision is to afford the bank automatic perfection. No other form of public notice is necessary; all actual and potential creditors of the debtor are always on notice that the bank with which the debtor's deposit account is maintained may assert a claim against the deposit account.
Under subsection (a)(2), a secured party may obtain control by obtaining the bank's authenticated agreement that it will comply with the secured party's instructions without further consent by the debtor. The analogous provision in Section 8-106 does not require that the agreement be authenticated. An agreement to comply with the secured party's instructions suffices for "control" of a deposit account under this Section even if the bank's agreement is subject to specified conditions, e.g., that the secured party's instructions are accompanied by a certification that the debtor is in default. (Of course, if the condition is the debtor's further consent, the statute explicitly provides that the agreement would not confer control.) See revised Section 8-106, Comment 7.
Under subsection (a)(3), a secured party may obtain control by becoming the bank's "customer," as defined in Section 4-104. As the customer, the secured party would enjoy the right (but not necessarily the exclusive right) to withdraw funds from, or close, the deposit account. See Sections 4-401(a), 4-403(a).
Although the arrangements giving rise to control may themselves prevent, or may enable the secured party at its discretion to prevent, the debtor from reaching the funds on deposit, subsection (b) makes clear that the debtor's ability to reach the funds is not inconsistent with "control."
Perfection by control is not available for bank accounts evidenced by an instrument (e.g., certain certificates of deposit), which by definition are "instruments" and not "deposit accounts." See Section 9-102 (defining "deposit account" and "instrument").
Section 36-9-105. Control of electronic chattel paper.
A secured party has control of electronic chattel paper if the record or records comprising the chattel paper are created, stored, and assigned in such a manner that:
(1) a single authoritative copy of the record or records exists which is unique, identifiable and, except as otherwise provided in items (4), (5), and (6), unalterable;
(2) the authoritative copy identifies the secured party as the assignee of the record or records;
(3) the authoritative copy is communicated to and maintained by the secured party or its designated custodian;
(4) copies or revisions that add or change an identified assignee of the authoritative copy can be made only with the participation of the secured party;
(5) each copy of the authoritative copy and any copy of a copy is readily identifiable as a copy that is not the authoritative copy; and
(6) any revision of the authoritative copy is readily identifiable as an authorized or unauthorized revision.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. "Control" of Electronic Chattel Paper. This Article covers security interests in "electronic chattel paper," a new term defined in Section 9-102. This Section governs how "control" of electronic chattel paper may be obtained. A secured party's control of electronic chattel paper (i) may substitute for an authenticated security agreement for purposes of attachment under Section 9-203, (ii) is a method of perfection under Section 9-314, and (iii) is a condition for obtaining special, non-temporal priority under Section 9-330. Because electronic chattel paper cannot be transferred, assigned, or possessed in the same manner as tangible chattel paper, a special definition of control is necessary. In descriptive terms, this Section provides that control of electronic chattel paper is the functional equivalent of possession of "tangible chattel paper" (a term also defined in Section 9-102).
3. "Authoritative Copy" of Electronic Chattel Paper. One requirement for establishing control is that a particular copy be an "authoritative copy. " Although other copies may exist, they must be distinguished from the authoritative copy. This may be achieved, for example, through the methods of authentication that are used or by business practices involving the marking of any additional copies. When tangible chattel paper is converted to electronic chattel paper, in order to establish that a copy of the electronic chattel paper is the authoritative copy it may be necessary to show that the tangible chattel paper no longer exists or has been permanently marked to indicate that it is not the authoritative copy.
4. Development of Control Systems. This Article leaves to the marketplace the development of systems and procedures, through a combination of suitable technologies and business practices, for dealing with control of electronic chattel paper in a commercial context. However, achieving control under this Section requires more than the agreement of interested persons that the elements of control are satisfied. For example, paragraph (4) contemplates that control requires that it be a physical impossibility (or sufficiently unlikely or implausible so as to approach practical impossibility) to add or change an identified assignee without the participation of the secured party (or its authorized representative). It would not be enough for the assignor merely to agree that it will not change the identified assignee without the assignee-secured party's consent. However, the standards applied to determine whether a party is in control of electronic chattel paper should not be more stringent than the standards now applied to determine whether a party is in possession of tangible chattel paper. Control of electronic chattel paper contemplates systems or procedures such that the secured party must take some action (either directly or through its designated custodian) to effect a change or addition to the authoritative copy. But just as a secured party does not lose possession of tangible chattel paper merely by virtue of the possibility that a person acting on its behalf could wrongfully redeliver the chattel paper to the debtor, so control of electronic chattel paper would not be defeated by the possibility that the secured party's interest could be subverted by the wrongful conduct of a person (such as a custodian) acting on its behalf.
Systems that evolve for control of electronic chattel paper may or may not involve a third party custodian of the relevant records. However, this Section and the concept of control of electronic chattel paper are not based on the same concepts as are control of deposit accounts (Section 9-104), security entitlements, a type of investment property (Section 9-106), and letter-of-credit rights (Section 9-107). The rules for control of that collateral are based on existing market practices and legal and regulatory regimes for institutions such as banks and securities intermediaries. Analogous practices for electronic chattel paper are developing nonetheless. The flexible approach adopted by this Section, moreover, should not impede the development of these practices and, eventually, legal and regulatory regimes, which may become analogous to those for, e.g., investment property.
Section 36-9-106. Control of investment property.
(a) A person has control of a certificated security, uncertificated security, or security entitlement as provided in Section 36-8-106.
(b) A secured party has control of a commodity contract if:
(1) the secured party is the commodity intermediary with which the commodity contract is carried; or
(2) the commodity customer, secured party, and commodity intermediary have agreed that the commodity intermediary will apply any value distributed on account of the commodity contract as directed by the secured party without further consent by the commodity customer.
(c) A secured party having control of all security entitlements or commodity contracts carried in a securities account or commodity account has control over the securities account or commodity account.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-115(e).
2. "Control" Under Article 8. For an explanation of "control" of securities and certain other investment property, see Section 8-106, Comments 4 and 7.
3. "Control" of Commodity Contracts. This Section, as did former Section 9-115(1)(e), contains provisions relating to control of commodity contracts which are analogous to those in Section 8-106 for other types of investment property.
4. Securities Accounts and Commodity Accounts. For drafting convenience, control with respect to a securities account or commodity account is defined in terms of obtaining control over the security entitlements or commodity contracts. Of course, an agreement that provides that (without further consent of the debtor) the securities intermediary or commodity intermediary will honor instructions from the secured party concerning a securities account or commodity account described as such is sufficient. Such an agreement necessarily implies that the intermediary will honor instructions concerning all security entitlements or commodity contracts carried in the account and thus affords the secured party control of all the security entitlements or commodity contracts.
Section 36-9-107. Control of letter-of-credit right.
A secured party has control of a letter-of-credit right to the extent of any right to payment or performance by the issuer or any nominated person if the issuer or nominated person has consented to an assignment of proceeds of the letter of credit under Section 36-5-114(c) or otherwise applicable law or practice.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. "Control" of Letter-of-Credit Right. Whether a secured party has control of a letter-of-credit right may determine the secured party's priority as against competing secured parties. See Section 9-329. This Section provides that a secured party acquires control of a letter-of-credit right by receiving an assignment if the secured party obtains the consent of the issuer or any nominated person, such as a confirmer or negotiating bank, under Section 5-114 or other applicable law or practice. Because both issuers and nominated persons may give or be obligated to give value under a letter of credit, this Section contemplates that a secured party obtains control of a letter-of-credit right with respect to the issuer or a particular nominated person only to the extent that the issuer or that nominated person consents to the assignment. For example, if a secured party obtains control to the extent of an issuer's obligation but fails to obtain the consent of a nominated person, the secured party does not have control to the extent that the nominated person gives value. In many cases the person or persons who will give value under a letter of credit will be clear from its terms. In other cases, prudence may suggest obtaining consent from more than one person. The details of the consenting issuer's or nominated person's duties to pay or otherwise render performance to the secured party are left to the agreement of the parties.
3. "Proceeds of a Letter of Credit." Section 5-114 follows traditional banking terminology by referring to a letter of credit beneficiary's assignment of its right to receive payment thereunder as an assignment of the "proceeds of a letter of credit." However, as the seller of goods can assign its right to receive payment (an "account") before it has been earned by delivering the goods to the buyer, so the beneficiary of a letter of credit can assign its contingent right to payment before the letter of credit has been honored. See Section 5-114(b). If the assignment creates a security interest, the security interest can be perfected at the time it is created. An assignment of, including the creation of a security interest in, a letter-of-credit right is an assignment of a present interest.
4. "Transfer" vs. "Assignment." Letter-of-credit law and practice distinguish the "transfer" of a letter of credit from an "assignment." Under a transfer, the transferee itself becomes the beneficiary and acquires the right to draw. Whether a new, substitute credit is issued or the issuer advises the transferee of its status as such, the transfer constitutes a novation under which the transferee is the new, substituted beneficiary (but only to the extent of the transfer, in the case of a partial transfer).
Section 5-114(e) provides that the rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person are independent of the beneficiary's assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit and are superior to the assignee's right to the proceeds. For this reason, transfer does not appear in this Article as a means of control or perfection. Section 9-109(c)(4) recognizes the independent and superior rights of a transferee beneficiary under Section 5-114(e); this Article does not apply to the rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person to the extent that those rights are independent and superior under Section 5-114.
5. Supporting Obligation: Automatic Attachment and Perfection. A letter-of-credit right is a type of "supporting obligation," as defined in Section 9-102. Under Sections 9-203 and 9-308, a security interest in a letter-of-credit right automatically attaches and is automatically perfected if the security interest in the supported obligation is a perfected security interest. However, unless the secured party has control of the letter-of-credit right or itself becomes a transferee beneficiary, it cannot obtain any rights against the issuer or a nominated person under Article 5. Consequently, as a practical matter, the secured party's rights would be limited to its ability to locate and identify proceeds distributed by the issuer or nominated person under the letter of credit.
Section 36-9-108. Sufficiency of description.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c), (d), and (e), a description of personal or real property is sufficient, whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies what is described.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), a description of collateral reasonably identifies the collateral if it identifies the collateral by:
(1) specific listing;
(2) category;
(3) except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a type of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial Code;
(4) quantity;
(5) computational or allocational formula or procedure; or
(6) except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), any other method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable.
(c) A description of collateral as 'all the debtor's assets' or 'all the debtor's personal property' or using words of similar import does not reasonably identify the collateral.
(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a description of a security entitlement, securities account, or commodity account is sufficient if it describes:
(1) the collateral by those terms or as investment property; or
(2) the underlying financial asset or commodity contract.
(e) A description only by type of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial Code is an insufficient description of:
(1) a commercial tort claim; or
(2) in a consumer transaction, consumer goods, a security entitlement, a securities account, or a commodity account.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Sections 9-110, 9-115(3).
2. General Rules. Subsection (a) retains substantially the same formulation as former Section 9-110. Subsection (b) expands upon subsection (a) by indicating a variety of ways in which a description might reasonably identify collateral. Whereas a provision similar to subsection (b) was applicable only to investment property under former Section 9-115(3), subsection (b) applies to all types of collateral, subject to the limitation in subsection (d). Subsection (b) is subject to subsection (c), which follows prevailing case law and adopts the view that an "all assets" or "all personal property" description for purposes of a security agreement is not sufficient. Note, however, that under Section 9-504, a financing statement sufficiently indicates the collateral if it "covers all assets or all personal property."
The purpose of requiring a description of collateral in a security agreement under Section 9-203 is evidentiary. The test of sufficiency of a description under this Section, as under former Section 9-110, is that the description do the job assigned to it: make possible the identification of the collateral described. This Section rejects any requirement that a description is insufficient unless it is exact and detailed (the so-called "serial number" test).
3. After-Acquired Collateral. Much litigation has arisen over whether a description in a security agreement is sufficient to include after-acquired collateral if the agreement does not explicitly so provide. This question is one of contract interpretation and is not susceptible to a statutory rule (other than a rule to the effect that it is a question of contract interpretation). Accordingly, this Section contains no reference to descriptions of after-acquired collateral.
4. Investment Property. Under subsection (d), the use of the wrong Article 8 terminology does not render a description invalid (e.g., a security agreement intended to cover a debtor's "security entitlements" is sufficient if it refers to the debtor's "securities"). Note also that given the broad definition of "securities account" in Section 8-501, a security interest in a securities account also includes all other rights of the debtor against the securities intermediary arising out of the securities account. For example, a security interest in a securities account would include credit balances due to the debtor from the securities intermediary, whether or not they are proceeds of a security entitlement. Moreover, describing collateral as a securities account is a simple way of describing all of the security entitlements carried in the account.
5. Consumer Investment Property; Commercial Tort Claims. Subsection (e) requires greater specificity of description in order to prevent debtors from inadvertently encumbering certain property. Subsection (e) requires that a description by defined "type" of collateral alone of a commercial tort claim or, in a consumer transaction, of a security entitlement, securities account, or commodity account, is not sufficient. For example, "all existing and after-acquired investment property" or "all existing and after-acquired security entitlements," without more, would be insufficient in a consumer transaction to describe a security entitlement, securities account, or commodity account. The reference to "only by type" in subsection (e) means that a description is sufficient if it satisfies subsection (a) and contains a descriptive component beyond the "type" alone. Moreover, if the collateral consists of a securities account or commodity account, a description of the account is sufficient to cover all existing and future security entitlements or commodity contracts carried in the account. See Section 9-203(h), (i).
Under Section 9-204, an after-acquired collateral clause in a security agreement will not reach future commercial tort claims. It follows that when an effective security agreement covering a commercial tort claim is entered into the claim already will exist. Subsection (e) does not require a description to be specific. For example, a description such as "all tort claims arising out of the explosion of debtor's factory" would suffice, even if the exact amount of the claim, the theory on which it may be based, and the identity of the tortfeasor(s) are not described. (Indeed, those facts may not be known at the time.)
Subpart 2.
Applicability of Article
Section 36-9-109. Scope.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) and (d), this chapter applies to:
(1) a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract;
(2) an agricultural lien;
(3) a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes;
(4) a consignment;
(5) a security interest arising under Section 36-2-401, 36-2-505, 36-2-711(3), or 36-2A-508(5), as provided in Section 36-9-110; and
(6) a security interest arising under Section 36-4-208 or 36-5-118.
(b) The application of this chapter to a security interest in a secured obligation is not affected by the fact that the obligation is itself secured by a transaction or interest to which this chapter does not apply.
(c) This chapter does not apply to the extent that:
(1) a statute, regulation, or treaty of the United States preempts this chapter;
(2) another statute of this State expressly governs the creation, perfection, priority, or enforcement of a security interest created by this State or a governmental unit of this State;
(3) a statute of another State, a foreign country, or a governmental unit of another State or a foreign country, other than a statute generally applicable to security interests, expressly governs creation, perfection, priority, or enforcement of a security interest created by the State, country, or governmental unit; or
(4) the rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person under a letter of credit are independent and superior under Section 36-5-114.
(d) This chapter does not apply to:
(1) a landlord's lien, other than an agricultural lien, but Section 36-9-317 applies as to the priority of the landlord's lien;
(2) a lien, other than an agricultural lien, given by statute or other rule of law for services or materials, but Section 36-9-333 applies with respect to priority of the lien;
(3) an assignment of a claim for wages, salary, or other compensation of an employee;
(4) a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes as part of a sale of the business out of which they arose;
(5) an assignment of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes which is for the purpose of collection only;
(6) an assignment of a right to payment under a contract to an assignee that is also obligated to perform under the contract;
(7) an assignment of a single account, payment intangible, or promissory note to an assignee in full or partial satisfaction of a preexisting indebtedness;
(8) a transfer of an interest in or an assignment of a claim under a policy of insurance, other than an assignment by or to a health-care provider of a health-care-insurance receivable and any subsequent assignment of the right to payment, but Sections 36-9-315 and 36-9-322 apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds;
(9) an assignment of a right represented by a judgment, other than a judgment taken on a right to payment that was collateral;
(10) a right of recoupment or set-off, but:
(A) Section 36-9-340 applies with respect to the effectiveness of rights of recoupment or set-off against deposit accounts; and
(B) Section 36-9-404 applies with respect to defenses or claims of an account debtor;
(11) the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real property, including a lease or rents thereunder, except to the extent that provision is made for:
(A) liens on real property in Sections 36-9-203 and 36-9-308;
(B) fixtures in Section 36-9-334;
(C) fixture filings in Sections 36-9-501, 36-9-502, 36-9-512, 36-9-516, and 36-9-519; and
(D) security agreements covering personal and real property in Section 36-9-604;
(12) an assignment of a claim arising in tort, other than a commercial tort claim, but Sections 36-9-315 and 36-9-322 apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds; or
(13) an assignment of a deposit account in a consumer transaction, but Sections 36-9-315 and 36-9-322 apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Sections 9-102, 9-104.
2. Basic Scope Provision. Subsection (a)(1) derives from former Section 9-102(1) and (2). These subsections have been combined and shortened. No change in meaning is intended. Under subsection (a)(1), all consensual security interests in personal property and fixtures are covered by this Article, except for transactions excluded by subsections (c) and (d). As to which transactions give rise to a "security interest," the definition of that term in Section 1-201 must be consulted. When a security interest is created, this Article applies regardless of the form of the transaction or the name that parties have given to it.
3. Agricultural Liens. Subsection (a)(2) is new. It expands the scope of this Article to cover agricultural liens, as defined in Section 9-102.
4. Sales of Accounts, Chattel Paper, Payment Intangibles, Promissory Notes, and Other Receivables. Under subsection (a)(3), as under former Section 9-102, this Article applies to sales of accounts and chattel paper. This approach generally has been successful in avoiding difficult problems of distinguishing between transactions in which a receivable secures an obligation and those in which the receivable has been sold outright. In many commercial financing transactions the distinction is blurred.
Subsection (a)(3) expands the scope of this Article by including the sale of a "payment intangible" (defined in Section 9-102 as "a general intangible under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation") and a "promissory note" (also defined in Section 9-102). To a considerable extent, this Article affords these transactions treatment identical to that given sales of accounts and chattel paper. In some respects, however, sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes are treated differently from sales of other receivables. See, e.g., Sections 9-309 (automatic perfection upon attachment), 9-408 (effect of restrictions on assignment). By virtue of the expanded definition of "account" (defined in Section 9-102), this Article now covers sales of (and other security interests in) "health-care-insurance receivables" (also defined in Section 9-102). Although this Article occasionally distinguishes between outright sales of receivables and sales that secure an obligation, neither this Article nor the definition of "security interest" (Section 1-201(37)) delineates how a particular transaction is to be classified. That issue is left to the courts.
5. Transfer of Ownership in Sales of Receivables. A "sale" of an account, chattel paper, a promissory note, or a payment intangible includes a sale of a right in the receivable, such as a sale of a participation interest. The term also includes the sale of an enforcement right. For example, a "[p]erson entitled to enforce" a negotiable promissory note (Section 3-301) may sell its ownership rights in the instrument. See Section 3-203, Comment 1 ("Ownership rights in instruments may be determined by principles of the law of property, independent of Article 3, which do not depend upon whether the instrument was transferred under Section 3-203."). Also, the right under Section 3-309 to enforce a lost, destroyed, or stolen negotiable promissory note may be sold to a purchaser who could enforce that right by causing the seller to provide the proof required under that Section. This Article rejects decisions reaching a contrary result, e.g., Dennis Joslin Co. v. Robinson Broadcasting, 977 F. Supp. 491 (D.D.C. 1997).
Nothing in this Section or any other provision of Article 9 prevents the transfer of full and complete ownership of an account, chattel paper, an instrument, or a payment intangible in a transaction of sale. However, as mentioned in Comment 4, neither this Article nor the definition of "security interest" in Section 1-201 provides rules for distinguishing sales transactions from those that create a security interest securing an obligation. This Article applies to both types of transactions. The principal effect of this coverage is to apply this Article's perfection and priority rules to these sales transactions. Use of terminology such as "security interest," "debtor," and "collateral" is merely a drafting convention adopted to reach this end, and its use has no relevance to distinguishing sales from other transactions. See PEB Commentary No. 14.
Following a debtor's outright sale and transfer of ownership of a receivable, the debtor-seller retains no legal or equitable rights in the receivable that has been sold. See Section 9-318(a). This is so whether or not the buyer's security interest is perfected. (A security interest arising from the sale of a promissory note or payment intangible is perfected upon attachment without further action. See Section 9-309.) However, if the buyer's interest in accounts or chattel paper is unperfected, a subsequent lien creditor, perfected secured party, or qualified buyer can reach the sold receivable and achieve priority over (or take free of) the buyer's unperfected security interest under Section 9-317. This is so not because the seller of a receivable retains rights in the property sold; it does not. Nor is this so because the seller of a receivable is a "debtor" and the buyer of a receivable is a "secured party" under this Article (they are). It is so for the simple reason that Sections 9-318(b), 9-317, and 9-322 make it so, as did former Sections 9-301 and 9-312. Because the buyer's security interest is unperfected, for purposes of determining the rights of creditors of and purchasers for value from the debtor-seller, under Section 9-318(b) the debtor-seller is deemed to have the rights and title it sold. Section 9-317 subjects the buyer's unperfected interest in accounts and chattel paper to that of the debtor-seller's lien creditor and other persons who qualify under that Section.
6. Consignments. Subsection (a)(4) is new. This Article applies to every "consignment." The term, defined in Section 9-102, includes many but not all "true" consignments (i.e., bailments for the purpose of sale). If a transaction is a "sale or return," as defined in revised Section 2-326, it is not a "consignment." In a "sale or return" transaction, the buyer becomes the owner of the goods, and the seller may obtain an enforceable security interest in the goods only by satisfying the requirements of Section 9-203.
Under common law, creditors of a bailee were unable to reach the interest of the bailor (in the case of a consignment, the consignor-owner). Like former Section 2-326 and former Article 9, this Article changes the common-law result; however, it does so in a different manner. For purposes of determining the rights and interests of third-party creditors of, and purchasers of the goods from, the consignee, but not for other purposes, such as remedies of the consignor, the consignee is deemed to acquire under this Article whatever rights and title the consignor had or had power to transfer. See Section 9-319. The interest of a consignor is defined to be a security interest under revised Section 1-201(37), more specifically, a purchase-money security interest in the consignee's inventory. See Section 9-103(d). Thus, the rules pertaining to lien creditors, buyers, and attachment, perfection, and priority of competing security interests apply to consigned goods. The relationship between the consignor and consignee is left to other law. Consignors also have no duties under Part 6. See Section 9-601(g).
Sometimes parties characterize transactions that secure an obligation (other than the bailee's obligation to returned bailed goods) as "consignments." These transactions are not "consignments" as contemplated by Section 9-109(a)(4). See Section 9-102. This Article applies also to these transactions, by virtue of Section 9-109(a)(1). They create a security interest within the meaning of the first sentence of Section 1-201(37).
This Article does not apply to bailments for sale that fall outside the definition of "consignment" in Section 9-102 and that do not create a security interest that secures an obligation.
7. Security Interest in Obligation Secured by Non-Article 9 Transaction. Subsection (b) is unchanged in substance from former Section 9-102(3). The following example provides an illustration.
Example 1: O borrows $10,000 from M and secures its repayment obligation, evidenced by a promissory note, by granting to M a mortgage on O's land. This Article does not apply to the creation of the real-property mortgage. However, if M sells the promissory note to X or gives a security interest in the note to secure M's own obligation to X, this Article applies to the security interest thereby created in favor of X. The security interest in the promissory note is covered by this Article even though the note is secured by a real-property mortgage. Also, X's security interest in the note gives X an attached security interest in the mortgage lien that secures the note and, if the security interest in the note is perfected, the security interest in the mortgage lien likewise is perfected. See Sections 9-203, 9-308.
It also follows from subsection (b) that an attempt to obtain or perfect a security interest in a secured obligation by complying with non-Article 9 law, as by an assignment of record of a real-property mortgage, would be ineffective. Finally, it is implicit from subsection (b) that one cannot obtain a security interest in a lien, such as a mortgage on real property, that is not also coupled with an equally effective security interest in the secured obligation. This Article rejects cases such as In re Maryville Savings & Loan Corp., 743 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1984), clarified on reconsideration, 760 F.2d 119 (1985).
8. Federal Preemption. Former Section 9-104(a) excluded from Article 9 "a security interest subject to any statute of the United States, to the extent that such statute governs the rights of parties to and third parties affected by transactions in particular types of property." Some (erroneously) read the former Section to suggest that Article 9 sometimes deferred to federal law even when federal law did not preempt Article 9. Subsection (c)(1) recognizes explicitly that this Article defers to federal law only when and to the extent that it must-i.e., when federal law preempts it.
9. Governmental Debtors. Former Section 9-104(e) excluded transfers by governmental debtors. It has been revised and replaced by the exclusions in new paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (c). These paragraphs reflect the view that Article 9 should apply to security interests created by a State, foreign country, or a "governmental unit" (defined in Section 9-102) of either except to the extent that another statute governs the issue in question. Under paragraph (2), this Article defers to all statutes of the forum State. (A forum cannot determine whether it should consult the choice-of-law rules in the forum's UCC unless it first determines that its UCC applies to the transaction before it.) Paragraph (3) defers to statutes of another State or a foreign country only to the extent that those statutes contain rules applicable specifically to security interests created by the governmental unit in question.
Example 2: A New Jersey state commission creates a security interest in favor of a New York bank. The validity of the security interest is litigated in New York. The relevant security agreement provides that it is governed by New York law. To the extent that a New Jersey statute contains rules peculiar to creation of security interests by governmental units generally, to creation of security interests by state commissions, or to creation of security interests by this particular state commission, then that law will govern. On the other hand, to the extent that New Jersey law provides that security interests created by governmental units, state commissions, or this state commission are governed by the law generally applicable to secured transactions (i.e., New Jersey's Article 9), then New York's Article 9 will govern.
Example 3: An airline that is an instrumentality of a foreign country creates a security interest in favor of a New York bank. The analysis used in the previous example would apply here. That is, if the matter is litigated in New York, New York law would govern except to the extent that the foreign country enacted a statute applicable to security interests created by governmental units generally or by the airline specifically.
The fact that New York law applies does not necessarily mean that perfection is accomplished by filing in New York. Rather, it means that the court should apply New York's Article 9, including its choice-of-law provisions. Under New York's Section 9-301, perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located. Section 9-307 determines the debtor's location for choice-of-law purposes.
If a transaction does not bear an appropriate relation to the forum State, then that State's Article 9 will not apply, regardless of whether the transaction would be excluded by paragraph (3).
Example 4: A Belgian governmental unit grants a security interest in its equipment to a Swiss secured party. The equipment is located in Belgium. A dispute arises and, for some reason, an action is brought in a New Mexico state court. Inasmuch as the transaction bears no "appropriate relation" to New Mexico, New Mexico's UCC, including its Article 9, is inapplicable. See Section 1-105(1). New Mexico's Section 9-109(c) on excluded transactions should not come into play. Even if the parties agreed that New Mexico law would govern, the parties' agreement would not be effective because the transaction does not bear a "reasonable relation" to New Mexico. See Section 1-105(1).
Conversely, Article 9 will come into play only if the litigation arises in a UCC jurisdiction or if a foreign choice-of-law rule leads a foreign court to apply the law of a UCC jurisdiction. For example, if issues concerning a security interest granted by a foreign airline to a New York bank are litigated overseas, the court may be bound to apply the law of the debtor's jurisdiction and not New York's Article 9.
10. Certain Statutory and Common-Law Liens; Interests in Real Property. With few exceptions (nonconsensual agricultural liens being one), this Article applies only to consensual security interests in personal property. Following former Section 9-104(b) and (j), paragraphs (1) and (11) of subsection (d) exclude landlord's liens and leases and most other interests in or liens on real property. These exclusions generally reiterate the limitations on coverage (i.e., "by contract," "in personal property and fixtures") made explicit in subsection (a)(1). Similarly, most jurisdictions provide special liens to suppliers of many types of services and materials, either by statute or by common law. With the exception of agricultural liens, it is not necessary for this Article to provide general codification of this lien structure, which is determined in large part by local conditions and which is far removed from ordinary commercial financing. As under former Section 9-104(c), subsection (d)(2) excludes these suppliers' liens (other than agricultural liens) from this Article. However, Section 9-333 provides a rule for determining priorities between certain possessory suppliers' liens and security interests covered by this Article.
11. Wage and Similar Claims. As under former Section 9-104(d), subsection (d)(3) excludes assignments of claims for wages and the like from this Article. These assignments present important social issues that other law addresses. The Federal Trade Commission has ruled that, with some exceptions, the taking of an assignment of wages or other earnings is an unfair act or practice under the Federal Trade Commission Act. See 16 C.F.R. Part 444. State statutes also may regulate such assignments.
12. Certain Sales and Assignments of Receivables; Judgments. In general this Article covers security interests in (including sales of) accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes. Paragraphs (4), (5), (6), and (7) of subsection (d) exclude from the Article certain sales and assignments of receivables that, by their nature, do not concern commercial financing transactions. These paragraphs add to the exclusions in former Section 9-104(f) analogous sales and assignments of payment intangibles and promissory notes. For similar reasons, subsection (d)(9) retains the exclusion of assignments of judgments under former Section 9-104(h) (other than judgments taken on a right to payment that itself was collateral under this Article).
13. Insurance. Subsection (d)(8) narrows somewhat the broad exclusion of interests in insurance policies under former Section 9-104(g). This Article now covers assignments by or to a health-care provider of "health-care-insurance receivables" (defined in Section 9-102).
14. Set-Off. Subsection (d)(10) adds two exceptions to the general exclusion of set-off rights from Article 9 under former Section 9-104(i). The first takes account of new Section 9-340, which regulates the effectiveness of a set-off against a deposit account that stands as collateral. The second recognizes Section 9-404, which affords the obligor on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible the right to raise claims and defenses against an assignee (secured party).
15. Tort Claims. Subsection (d)(12) narrows somewhat the broad exclusion of transfers of tort claims under former Section 9-104(k). This Article now applies to assignments of "commercial tort claims" (defined in Section 9-102) as well as to security interests in tort claims that constitute proceeds of other collateral (e.g., a right to payment for negligent destruction of the debtor's inventory). Note that once a claim arising in tort has been settled and reduced to a contractual obligation to pay (as in, but not limited to, a structured settlement) the right to payment becomes a payment intangible and ceases to be a claim arising in tort.
This Article contains two special rules governing creation of a security interest in tort claims. First, a description of collateral in a security agreement as "all tort claims" is insufficient to meet the requirement for attachment. See Section 9-108(e). Second, no security interest attaches under an after-acquired property clause to a tort claim. See Section 9-204(b). In addition, this Article does not determine whom the tortfeasor must pay to discharge its obligation. Inasmuch as a tortfeasor is not an "account debtor," the rules governing waiver of defenses and discharge of an obligation by an obligor (Sections 9-403, 9-404, 9-405, and 9-406) are inapplicable to tort-claim collateral.
16. Deposit Accounts. Except in consumer transactions, deposit accounts may be taken as original collateral under this Article. Under former Section 9-104(l), deposit accounts were excluded as original collateral, leaving security interests in deposit accounts to be governed by the common law. The common law is nonuniform, often difficult to discover and comprehend, and frequently costly to implement. As a consequence, debtors who wished to use deposit accounts as collateral sometimes were precluded from doing so as a practical matter. By excluding deposit accounts from the Article's scope as original collateral in consumer transactions, subsection (d)(13) leaves those transactions to law other than this Article. However, in both consumer and non-consumer transactions, Sections 9-315 and 9-322 apply to deposit accounts as proceeds and with respect to priorities in proceeds.
This Article contains several safeguards to protect debtors against inadvertently encumbering deposit accounts and to reduce the likelihood that a secured party will realize a windfall from a debtor's deposit accounts. For example, because "deposit account" is a separate type of collateral, a security agreement covering general intangibles will not adequately describe deposit accounts. Rather, a security agreement must reasonably identify the deposit accounts that are the subject of a security interest, e.g., by using the term "deposit accounts." See Section 9-108. To perfect a security interest in a deposit account as original collateral, a secured party (other than the bank with which the deposit account is maintained) must obtain "control" of the account either by obtaining the bank's authenticated agreement or by becoming the bank's customer with respect to the deposit account. See Sections 9-312(b)(1), 9-104. Either of these steps requires the debtor's consent.
This Article also contains new rules that determine which State's law governs perfection and priority of a security interest in a deposit account (Section 9-304), priority of conflicting security interests in and set-off rights against a deposit account (Sections 9-327, 9-340), the rights of transferees of funds from an encumbered deposit account (Section 9-332), the obligations of the bank (Section 9-341), enforcement of security interests in a deposit account (Section 9-607(c)), and the duty of a secured party to terminate control of a deposit account (Section 9-208(b)).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
1. Landlord's lien
Section 9-109(d)(1) of the 1999 Official Text provides that Article 9 does not apply to "a landlord's lien, other than an agricultural lien." South Carolina has revised the Official Text of Sections 9-109(d)(1) and 9-317(a)(2) to clarify that Article 9 provides the priority rule governing a conflict between an Article 9 security interest and a landlord's lien for distraint. The revision in Section 36-9-109(d)(1) provides that the priority conflict between a landlord's lien and a security interest is governed by Section 36-9-317. The revision in Section 36-9-317(a)(2), in effect, provides that a secured party who files or perfects before a landlord levies a distress warrant has priority over the landlord.
Under Section 36-9-317(a)(2) a landlord's lien for distraint will have priority over a security interest only if the landlord establishes its lien before the earlier of the time that the security interest is perfected or a financing statement covering the collateral is filed. A landlord seeking to collect rent through distraint does not obtain a lien until there is an actual levy of the distress warrant. Burnett v. Boukedes, 240 S.C. 144, 125 S.E. 2de 10, 115 (1962). Therefore, if a secured party files a financing statement or otherwise perfects its security interest before the landlord levies on the collateral pursuant to a distress warrant, the secured party will have priority over the landlord. The South Carolina revisions in Sections 36-9-109(d)(1) and 36-9-317(a)(2) overrule the decision in Ex Parte J.M. Smith Corp., 330 S.C. 459 , 498 S.E. 2d 908 (Ct. App. 1998).
2. Agricultural liens
Section 36-9-109(a)(2) provides that Article 9 extends to agricultural liens. Section 36-9-102(a)(5) defines an agricultural lien as an interest, other than a security interest, in farm products which meets three requirements. First, an agricultural lien must secure payment or performance of an obligation for either goods or services furnished in connection with a debtor's farming operation or rent on real property leased by a debtor in connection with its farming operation. Second, an agricultural lien must be created by statute in favor of a person that either in the ordinary course of business provided goods or services to the debtor in connection with the debtor's farming operation or leased real property to a debtor in connection with the debtor's farming operation. Third, the effectiveness of an agricultural lien must not depend upon the lienholder's possession of the encumbered property.
South Carolina has three statutory liens that qualify as agricultural liens under revised Section 36-9-102(a)(3). Section 29-13-10 S.C. Code Ann. (1976) provides that a landlord leasing land for agricultural purposes has "a prior and preferred lien" upon all crops raised on the leased land to secure the payment of rent. Under Section 29-13-10 no writing or recording is necessary to create a landlord's lien for rent and the lien exists from the date of the lease contract whether the contract is verbal or in writing.
Section 29-13-20, S.C. Code Ann. (1976) provides that laborers who assist in making a crop have a lien upon the crop to the extent of the amount due for their labor.
Section 29-13-10, S.C. Code Ann (1976) further provides that landlord has a lien on crops raised by a tenant for all advances that the landlord made to tenant during the year the crop was raised. Section 29-3-40 S.C. Code Ann. (Supp. 1999) provides that the landlord's lien for advances shall be indexed in the office of the register of deeds or clerk of court in the county in which the land is located. That Section further provides that indexing of the lien constitutes notice to third parties from the date of the indexing and protects the lienholder against the claims of purchasers or creditors who obtain possession of the crop after the lien is indexed..
Section 29-13-30, S.C. Code Ann (1976) provides priority rules for these three agricultural liens. Under that provision the landlord's lien upon a crop for rent is "in preference to all other liens." Next in priority is the laborer's lien upon crop for the amount due for such labor. As between unpaid laborers, the statute provides that there shall be no preference. Finally, the third priority is awarded to a landlord's lien for advances.
Including agricultural liens within the scope of Article 9 requires holders of such liens to meet the Code's requirements for perfection. Significantly, an agricultural lien does not have to satisfy the requirements of Section 36-9-203 in order to attach and become enforceable. Therefore, the inclusion of agricultural liens within the scope of Article 9 does not render a verbal landlord's lien for rent unenforceable. An agricultural lien holder, however, must meet the perfection requirements of revised Article 9. Under revised Section 36-9-302, South Carolina law controls the perfection of agricultural liens upon farm products located in the State. Section 36-9-310(a) provides that agricultural liens are perfected by filing a financing statement. Under Section 36-9-501(a)(2) the Secretary of State's Office is the place in which to file to perfect an agricultural lien.
Article 9 has a limited impact upon the priority of agricultural liens. If an agricultural lien is unperfected, Section 36-9-317 subordinates the lien to perfected agricultural liens and security interests, lien creditors, and buyers who give value and take delivery without knowledge of the lien. If a South Carolina agricultural lien is perfected, however, it is not subject to Article 9's normal priority rules. Section 36-9-322(g) provides that a perfected agricultural lien has priority over a conflicting security interest or agricultural lien on the same collateral if the statute creating the agricultural lien so provides. Section 29-13-30 sets forth priority rules governing the agricultural liens created by Sections 29-13-10 and 29-13-20. Under these priority rules the landlord's lien for rent is "in preference to all other liens", laborer's liens are "next in priority", and the landlord's lien for advances "shall be paid next, after the satisfaction of the landlord's lien for rent and the laborer's lien for labor. . ." The priority rules of Section 29-13-30 should be read as displacing Article 9 general priority rules. See Poinsett Construction Co., v. Fischer, 301 S.C. 343, 391 S.F. 2d 875 (Ct. App. 1990) (statutory liens afforded "first lien" status under the statutes creating the lien had priority over an earlier perfected security interest.
To illustrate the application of the priority rules governing agricultural liens consider the following:
On March 1, 2002, SP enters into a written security agreement with Farmer retaining a security interest in Farmer's crop to secure a loan. On March 1, 2002, SP files a financing statement to perfect its security interest. On April 1, 2002, Landlord enters into verbal contract with Farmer under which Landlord leases land to Farmer to raise his crop. Under Section 29-13-10 Landlord obtains an agricultural lien upon Farmer's crop to secure the rent arising under the lease. If Landlord perfects his agricultural lien by filing a financing statement, Landlord will have priority over SP under Section 36-9-322(g) and 29-13-30. If Landlord fails to perfect his agricultural lien, SP will have priority under Sections 36-9-317(a)(1) and 36-9-322(a)(2).
Section 36-9-110. Security interests arising under Chapter 2.
A security interest arising under Section 36-2-401, 36-2-505, 36-2-711(3), or 36-2A-508(5) is subject to this chapter. However, until the debtor obtains possession of the goods:
(1) the security interest is enforceable, even if Section 36-9-203(b)(3) has not been satisfied;
(2) filing is not required to perfect the security interest;
(3) the rights of the secured party after default by the debtor are governed by Chapter 2 or 2A; and
(4) the security interest has priority over a conflicting security interest created by the debtor.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-113.
2. Background. Former Section 9-113, from which this Section derives, referred generally to security interests "arising solely under the Article on Sales (Article 2) or the Article on Leases (Article 2A)." Views differed as to the precise scope of that Section. In contrast, Section 9-110 specifies the security interests to which it applies.
3. Security Interests Under Articles 2 and 2A. Section 2-505 explains how a seller of goods may reserve a security interest in them. Section 2-401 indicates that a reservation of title by the seller of goods, despite delivery to the buyer, is limited to reservation of a security interest. As did former Article 9, this Article governs a security interest arising solely under one of those Sections; however, until the buyer obtains possession of the goods, the security interest is enforceable even in the absence of a security agreement, filing is not necessary to perfect the security interest, and the seller-secured party's rights on the buyer's default are governed by Article 2.
Sections 2-711(3) and 2A-508(5) create a security interest in favor of a buyer or lessee in possession of goods that were rightfully rejected or as to which acceptance was justifiably revoked. As did former Article 9, this Article governs a security interest arising solely under one of those Sections; however, until the seller or lessor obtains possession of the goods, the security interest is enforceable even in the absence of a security agreement, filing is not necessary to perfect the security interest, and the secured party's (buyer's or lessee's) rights on the debtor's (seller's or lessor's) default are governed by Article 2 or 2A, as the case may be.
4. Priority. This Section adds to former Section 9-113 a priority rule. Until the debtor obtains possession of the goods, a security interest arising under one of the specified Sections of Article 2 or 2A has priority over conflicting security interests created by the debtor. Thus, a security interest arising under Section 2-401 or 2-505 has priority over a conflicting security interest in the buyer's after-acquired goods, even if the goods in question are inventory. Arguably, the same result would obtain under Section 9-322, but even if it would not, a purchase-money-like priority is appropriate. Similarly, a security interest under Section 2-711(3) or 2A-508(5) has priority over security interests claimed by the seller's or lessor's secured lender. This result is appropriate, inasmuch as the payments giving rise to the debt secured by the Article 2 or 2A security interest are likely to be included among the lender's proceeds.
Example: Seller owns equipment subject to a security interest created by Seller in favor of Lender. Buyer pays for the equipment, accepts the goods, and then justifiably revokes acceptance. As long as Seller does not recover possession of the equipment, Buyer's security interest under Section 2-711(3) is senior to that of Lender.
In the event that a security interest referred to in this Section conflicts with a security interest that is created by a person other than the debtor, Section 9-325 applies. Thus, if Lender's security interest in the example was created not by Seller but by the person from whom Seller acquired the goods, Section 9-325 would govern.
5. Relationship to Other Rights and Remedies Under Articles 2 and 2A. This Article does not specifically address the conflict between (i) a security interest created by a buyer or lessee and (ii) the seller's or lessor's right to withhold delivery under Section 2-702(1), 2-703(a), or 2A-525, the seller's or lessor's right to stop delivery under Section 2-705 or 2A-526, or the seller's right to reclaim under Section 2-507(2) or 2-702(2). These conflicts are governed by the first sentence of Section 2-403(1), under which the buyer's secured party obtains no greater rights in the goods than the buyer had or had power to convey, or Section 2A-307(1), under which creditors of the lessee take subject to the lease contract.
Part 2
Effectiveness of Security Agreement;
Attachment of Security Interest;
Rights of Parties to Security Agreement
Subpart 1.
Effectiveness and Attachment
Section 36-9-201. General effectiveness of security agreement.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in the Uniform Commercial Code, a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral, and against creditors.
(b) A transaction subject to this article is subject to any applicable rule of law which establishes a different rule for consumers and (i) Title 37 and (ii) any consumer-protection statute or regulation.
(c) In case of conflict between this article and a rule of law, statute, or regulation described in subsection (b), the rule of law, statute, or regulation controls. Failure to comply with a statute or regulation described in subsection (b) has only the effect the statute or regulation specifies.
(d) This chapter does not:
(1) validate any rate, charge, agreement, or practice that violates a rule of law, statute, or regulation described in subsection (b); or
(2) extend the application of the rule of law, statute, or regulation to a transaction not otherwise subject to it.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Sections 9-201, 9-203(4).
2. Effectiveness of Security Agreement. Subsection (a) provides that a security agreement is generally effective. With certain exceptions, a security agreement is effective between the debtor and secured party and is likewise effective against third parties. Note that "security agreement" is used here (and elsewhere in this Article) as it is defined in Section 9-102: "an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest." It follows that subsection (a) does not provide that every term or provision contained in a record that contains a security agreement or that is so labeled is effective. Properly read, former Section 9-201 was to the same effect. Exceptions to the general rule of subsection (a) arise where there is an overriding provision in this Article or any other Article of the UCC. For example, Section 9-317 subordinates unperfected security interests to lien creditors and certain buyers, and several provisions in Part 3 subordinate some security interests to other security interests and interests of purchasers.
3. Law, Statutes, and Regulations Applicable to Certain Transactions. Subsection (b) makes clear that certain transactions, although subject to this Article, also are subject to other applicable laws relating to consumers or specified in that subsection. Subsection (c) provides that the other law is controlling in the event of a conflict, and that a violation of other law does not ipso facto constitute a violation of this Article. Subsection (d) provides that this Article does not validate violations under or extend the application of the other applicable laws.
Section 36-9-202. Title to collateral immaterial.
Except as otherwise provided with respect to consignments or sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes, the provisions of this chapter with regard to rights and obligations apply whether title to collateral is in the secured party or the debtor.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-202.
2. Title Immaterial. The rights and duties of parties to a secured transaction and affected third parties are provided in this Article without reference to the location of "title" to the collateral. For example, the characteristics of a security interest that secures the purchase price of goods are the same whether the secured party appears to have retained title or the debtor appears to have obtained title and then conveyed title or a lien to the secured party.
3. When Title Matters.
a. Under This Article. This Section explicitly acknowledges two circumstances in which the effect of certain Article 9 provisions turns on ownership (title). First, in some respects sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes receive special treatment. See, e.g., Sections 9-207(a), 9-210(b), 9-615(e). Buyers of receivables under former Article 9 were treated specially, as well. See, e.g., former Section 9-502(2). Second, the remedies of a consignor under a true consignment and, for the most part, the remedies of a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes are determined by other law and not by Part 6. See Section 9-601(g).
b. Under Other Law. This Article does not determine which line of interpretation (e.g., title theory or lien theory, retained title or conveyed title) should be followed in cases in which the applicability of another rule of law depends upon who has title. If, for example, a revenue law imposes a tax on the "legal" owner of goods or if a corporation law makes a vote of the stockholders prerequisite to a corporation "giving" a security interest but not if it acquires property "subject" to a security interest, this Article does not attempt to define whether the secured party is a "legal" owner or whether the transaction "gives" a security interest for the purpose of such laws. Other rules of law or the agreement of the parties determines the location and source of title for those purposes.
Section 36-9-203. Attachment and enforceability of security interest; proceeds; supporting obligations; formal requisites.
(a) A security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral, unless an agreement expressly postpones the time of attachment.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (c) through (i), a security interest is enforceable against the debtor and third parties with respect to the collateral only if :
(1) value has been given;
(2) the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party; and
(3) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral and, if the security interest covers timber to be cut, a description of the land concerned;
(B) the collateral is not a certificated security and is in the possession of the secured party under Section 36-9-313 pursuant to the debtor's security agreement;
(C) the collateral is a certificated security in registered form and the security certificate has been delivered to the secured party under Section 36-8-301 pursuant to the debtor's security agreement; or
(D) the collateral is deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, investment property, or letter-of-credit rights, and the secured party has control under Section 36-9-104, 36-9-105, 36-9-106, or 36-9-107 pursuant to the debtor's security agreement.
(c) Subsection (b) is subject to Section 36-4-208 on the security interest of a collecting bank, Section 36-5-118 on the security interest of a letter-of-credit issuer or nominated person, Section 36-9-110 on a security interest arising under Chapter 2 or 2A, and Section 36-9-206 on security interests in investment property.
(d) A person becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person if, by operation of law other than this chapter or by contract:
(1) the security agreement becomes effective to create a security interest in the person's property; or
(2) the person becomes generally obligated for the obligations of the other person, including the obligation secured under the security agreement, and acquires or succeeds to all or substantially all of the assets of the other person.
(e) If a new debtor becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person:
(1) the agreement satisfies subsection (b)(3) with respect to existing or after-acquired property of the new debtor to the extent the property is described in the agreement; and
(2) another agreement is not necessary to make a security interest in the property enforceable.
(f) The attachment of a security interest in collateral gives the secured party the rights to proceeds provided by Section 36-9-315 and is also attachment of a security interest in a supporting obligation for the collateral.
(g) The attachment of a security interest in a right to payment or performance secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property is also attachment of a security interest in the security interest, mortgage, or other lien.
(h) The attachment of a security interest in a securities account is also attachment of a security interest in the security entitlements carried in the securities account.
(i) The attachment of a security interest in a commodity account is also attachment of a security interest in the commodity contracts carried in the commodity account.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Sections 9-203, 9-115(2), (6).
2. Creation, Attachment, and Enforceability. Subsection (a) states the general rule that a security interest attaches to collateral only when it becomes enforceable against the debtor. Subsection (b) specifies the circumstances under which a security interest becomes enforceable. Subsection (b) states three basic prerequisites to the existence of a security interest: value (paragraph (1)), rights or power to transfer rights in collateral (paragraph (2)), and agreement plus satisfaction of an evidentiary requirement (paragraph (3)). When all of these elements exist, a security interest becomes enforceable between the parties and attaches under subsection (a). Subsection (c) identifies certain exceptions to the general rule of subsection (b).
3. Security Agreement; Authentication. Under subsection (b)(3), enforceability requires the debtor's security agreement and compliance with an evidentiary requirement in the nature of a Statute of Frauds. Paragraph (3)(A) represents the most basic of the evidentiary alternatives, under which the debtor must authenticate a security agreement that provides a description of the collateral. Under Section 9-102, a "security agreement" is "an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest." Neither that definition nor the requirement of paragraph (3)(A) rejects the deeply rooted doctrine that a bill of sale, although absolute in form, may be shown in fact to have been given as security. Under this Article, as under prior law, a debtor may show by parol evidence that a transfer purporting to be absolute was in fact for security. Similarly, a self-styled "lease" may serve as a security agreement if the agreement creates a security interest. See Section 1-201(37) (distinguishing security interest from lease).
4. Possession, Delivery, or Control Pursuant to Security Agreement. The other alternatives in subsection (b)(3) dispense with the requirement of an authenticated security agreement and provide alternative evidentiary tests. Under paragraph (3)(B), the secured party's possession substitutes for the debtor's authentication under paragraph (3)(A) if the secured party's possession is "pursuant to the debtor's security agreement." That phrase refers to the debtor's agreement to the secured party's possession for the purpose of creating a security interest. The phrase should not be confused with the phrase "debtor has authenticated a security agreement," used in paragraph (3)(A), which contemplates the debtor's authentication of a record. In the unlikely event that possession is obtained without the debtor's agreement, possession would not suffice as a substitute for an authenticated security agreement. However, once the security interest has become enforceable and has attached, it is not impaired by the fact that the secured party's possession is maintained without the agreement of a subsequent debtor (e.g., a transferee). Possession as contemplated by Section 9-313 is possession for purposes of subsection (b)(3)(B), even though it may not constitute possession "pursuant to the debtor's agreement" and consequently might not serve as a substitute for an authenticated security agreement under subsection (b)(3)(A). Subsection (b)(3)(C) provides that delivery of a certificated security to the secured party under Section 8-301 pursuant to the debtor's security agreement is sufficient as a substitute for an authenticated security agreement. Similarly, under subsection (b)(3)(D), control of investment property, a deposit account, electronic chattel paper, or a letter-of-credit right satisfies the evidentiary test if control is pursuant to the debtor's security agreement.
5. Collateral Covered by Other Statute or Treaty. One evidentiary purpose of the formal requisites stated in subsection (b) is to minimize the possibility of future disputes as to the terms of a security agreement (e.g., as to the property that stands as collateral for the obligation secured). One should distinguish the evidentiary functions of the formal requisites of attachment and enforceability (such as the requirement that a security agreement contain a description of the collateral) from the more limited goals of "notice filing" for financing statements under Part 5, explained in Section 9-502, Comment 2. When perfection is achieved by compliance with the requirements of a statute or treaty described in Section 9-311(a), such as a federal recording act or a certificate-of-title statute, the manner of describing the collateral in a registry imposed by the statute or treaty may or may not be adequate for purposes of this Section and Section 9-108. However, the description contained in the security agreement, not the description in a public registry or on a certificate of title, controls for purposes of this Section.
6. Debtor's Rights; Debtor's Power to Transfer Rights. Subsection (b)(2) conditions attachment on the debtor's having "rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party." A debtor's limited rights in collateral, short of full ownership, are sufficient for a security interest to attach. However, in accordance with basic personal property conveyancing principles, the baseline rule is that a security interest attaches only to whatever rights a debtor may have, broad or limited as those rights may be.
Certain exceptions to the baseline rule enable a debtor to transfer, and a security interest to attach to, greater rights than the debtor has. See Part 3, Subpart 3 (priority rules). The phrase, "or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party," accommodates those exceptions. In some cases, a debtor may have power to transfer another person's rights only to a class of transferees that excludes secured parties. See, e.g., Section 2-403(2) (giving certain merchants power to transfer an entruster's rights to a buyer in ordinary course of business). Under those circumstances, the debtor would not have the power to create a security interest in the other person's rights, and the condition in subsection (b)(2) would not be satisfied.
7. New Debtors. Subsection (e) makes clear that the enforceability requirements of subsection (b)(3) are met when a new debtor becomes bound under an original debtor's security agreement. If a new debtor becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person, the security agreement satisfies the requirement of subsection (b)(3) as to the existing and after-acquired property of the new debtor to the extent the property is described in the agreement.
Subsection (d) explains when a new debtor becomes bound. Persons who become bound under paragraph (2) are limited to those who both become primarily liable for the original debtor's obligations and succeed to (or acquire) its assets. Thus, the paragraph excludes sureties and other secondary obligors as well as persons who become obligated through veil piercing and other non-successorship doctrines. In many cases, paragraph (2) will exclude successors to the assets and liabilities of a division of a debtor. See also Section 9-508, Comment 3.
8. Supporting Obligations. Under subsection (f), a security interest in a "supporting obligation" (defined in Section 9-102) automatically follows from a security interest in the underlying, supported collateral. This result was implicit under former Article 9. Implicit in subsection (f) is the principle that the secured party's interest in a supporting obligation extends to the supporting obligation only to the extent that it supports the collateral in which the secured party has a security interest. Complex issues may arise, however, if a supporting obligation supports many separate obligations of a particular account debtor and if the supported obligations are separately assigned as security to several secured parties. The problems may be exacerbated if a supporting obligation is limited to an aggregate amount that is less than the aggregate amount of the obligations it supports. This Article does not contain provisions dealing with competing claims to a limited supporting obligation. As under former Article 9, the law of suretyship and the agreements of the parties will control.
9. Collateral Follows Right to Payment or Performance. Subsection (g) codifies the common-law rule that a transfer of an obligation secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real property also transfers the security interest or lien. See Restatement (3d), Property (Mortgages) Section 5.4(a) (1997). See also Section 9-308(e) (analogous rule for perfection).
10. Investment Property. Subsections (h) and (i) make clear that attachment of a security interest in a securities account or commodity account is also attachment in security entitlements or commodity contracts carried in the accounts.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Section 36-9-203 sets forth the requirements for creating a security interest enforceable against the debtor and third parties. Under Section 36-9-203(b)(2) one of these requirements is that "the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party." This provision changed prior law which specified that a debtor must have rights in the collateral for a security interest to be enforceable. See Section 6-9-203(1)(c) (Supp. 1999). The change may effect the precedential value of the leading South Carolina case defining the term "rights in the collateral."
A. Lassberg & Co. v. Atlantic Cotton Co., 291 S.C. 161, 252 S.E. 2d 50 (Ct. App. 1987).
A. Lassberg involved a priority dispute between Pecot who had shipped cotton to Mahaffey, a cotton broker, for the purpose of closing a sale of the cotton and Lassberg that claimed a perfected security interest in negotiable warehouse receipts covering the cotton. Pecot and Mahaffey had a business relationship under which Mahaffey would find buyers for Pecot's cotton. When Mahaffey found a buyer and so informed Pecot, Pecot would ship the cotton to a warehouse in South Carolina where Mahaffey would close the sale. The buyer would take delivery of the cotton from the warehouse and pay the purchase price to Mahaffey. Mahaffey would then withhold a sales commission and forward the balance of the purchase price to Pecot.
The dispute in A. Lassberg arose when a buyer Mahaffey had located refused to take delivery of cotton that Pecot had shipped to South Carolina. After the sale fell through, Mahaffey had the warehouse issue negotiable warehouse receipts covering the cotton and Mahaffey then attempted unsuccessfully to sell the cotton covered by the receipts. Mahaffey then forwarded the receipts to Pecot.
The decision in A. Lassberg turned upon whether Mahaffey had sufficient rights in the negotiable warehouse receipts or underlying cotton for Lassberg's security interest to attach. Applying former Section 36-9-204 S.C. Code Ann. (1976), the court asserted that to have sufficient rights in collateral for a security interest to attach a debtor must have "an ownership interest or contract right" in the collateral. Under this standard the court held that because Mahaffey was merely a broker for Pecot rather than a buyer for the cotton, Mahaffey did not have sufficient rights in the negotiable warehouse receipts covering the cotton for Lassberg's security interest to attach.
The secured party in A. Lassberg may have been able to establish an enforceable security interest had the "power to transfer rights in the collateral to a secured party" provision of Section 6-9-203(b)(2) been applicable. An entrustment argument which is plausable under this language should not succeed. Pecot appears to have "entrusted" the cotton to Mahaffey which gave Mahaffey the power to transfer Pecot's rights in the cotton to a buyer in the ordinary course. See Section 36-2-403(3) S.C. Code Ann. (1976). This power, however, would not be sufficient under Section 6-9-203(b)(2) because Section 36-2-403(2) does not empower a merchant to whom goods have entrusted to transfer the entrustor's rights to a "secured party". See Section 36-9-203, Official Comment 6. Nevertheless, if Pecot was found to have acquiesced in Mahaffey's procurement of the negotiable warehouse receipts, under Sections 36-7-503(1)(b) and 36-7-502 Mahaffey would have had the power to transfer rights to a secured party who the took the negotiable documents by due negotiation. This power may have been sufficient to enable Mahaffey to create an enforceable security had Section 36-9-203(b)(2) been applied.
Section 36-9-204. After-acquired property; future advances.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a security agreement may create or provide for a security interest in after-acquired collateral.
(b) A security interest does not attach under a term constituting an after-acquired property clause to:
(1) consumer goods, other than an accession when given as additional security, unless the debtor acquires rights in them within ten days after the secured party gives value; or
(2) a commercial tort claim.
(c) A security agreement may provide that collateral secures, or that accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes are sold in connection with, future advances or other value, whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commitment.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-204.
2. After-Acquired Property; Continuing General Lien. Subsection (a) makes clear that a security interest arising by virtue of an after-acquired property clause is no less valid than a security interest in collateral in which the debtor has rights at the time value is given. A security interest in after-acquired property is not merely an "equitable" interest; no further action by the secured party-such as a supplemental agreement covering the new collateral-is required. This Section adopts the principle of a "continuing general lien" or "floating lien." It validates a security interest in the debtor's existing and (upon acquisition) future assets, even though the debtor has liberty to use or dispose of collateral without being required to account for proceeds or substitute new collateral. See Section 9-205. Subsection (a), together with subsection (c), also validates "cross-collateral" clauses under which collateral acquired at any time secures advances whenever made.
3. After-Acquired Consumer Goods. Subsection (b)(1) makes ineffective an after-acquired property clause covering consumer goods (defined in Section 9-109), except as accessions (see Section 9-335), acquired more than ten days after the secured party gives value. Subsection (b)(1) is unchanged in substance from the corresponding provision in former Section 9-204(2).
4. Commercial Tort Claims. Subsection (b)(2) provides that an after-acquired property clause in a security agreement does not reach future commercial tort claims. In order for a security interest in a tort claim to attach, the claim must be in existence when the security agreement is authenticated. In addition, the security agreement must describe the tort claim with greater specificity than simply "all tort claims." See Section 9-108(e).
5. Future Advances; Obligations Secured. Under subsection (c) collateral may secure future as well as past or present advances if the security agreement so provides. This is in line with the policy of this Article toward security interests in after-acquired property under subsection (a). Indeed, the parties are free to agree that a security interest secures any obligation whatsoever. Determining the obligations secured by collateral is solely a matter of construing the parties' agreement under applicable law. This Article rejects the holdings of cases decided under former Article 9 that applied other tests, such as whether a future advance or other subsequently incurred obligation was of the same or a similar type or class as earlier advances and obligations secured by the collateral.
6. Sales of Receivables. Subsections (a) and (c) expressly validate after-acquired property and future advance clauses not only when the transaction is for security purposes but also when the transaction is the sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes.. This result was implicit under former Article 9.
7. Financing Statements. The effect of after-acquired property and future advance clauses as components of a security agreement should not be confused with the requirements applicable to financing statements under this Article's system of perfection by notice filing. The references to after-acquired property clauses and future advance clauses in this Section are limited to security agreements. There is no need to refer to after-acquired property or future advances or other obligations secured in a financing statement. See Section 9-502, Comment 2.
Section 36-9-205. Use or disposition of collateral permissible.
(a) A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against creditors solely because:
(1) the debtor has the right or ability to:
(A) use, commingle, or dispose of all or part of the collateral, including returned or repossessed goods;
(B) collect, compromise, enforce, or otherwise deal with collateral;
(C) accept the return of collateral or make repossessions; or
(D) use, commingle, or dispose of proceeds; or
(2) the secured party fails to require the debtor to account for proceeds or replace collateral.
(b) This section does not relax the requirements of possession if attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest depends upon possession of the collateral by the secured party.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-205.
2. Validity of Unrestricted "Floating Lien." This Article expressly validates the "floating lien" on shifting collateral. See Sections 9-201, 9-204 and Comment 2. This Section provides that a security interest is not invalid or fraudulent by reason of the debtor's liberty to dispose of the collateral without being required to account to the secured party for proceeds or substitute new collateral. As did former Section 9-205, this Section repeals the rule of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), and other cases which held such arrangements void as a matter of law because the debtor was given unfettered dominion or control over collateral. The Benedict rule did not effectively discourage or eliminate security transactions in inventory and receivables. Instead, it forced financing arrangements to be self-liquidating. Although this Section repeals Benedict, the filing and other perfection requirements (see Part 3, Subpart 2, and Part 5) provide for public notice that overcomes any potential misleading effects of a debtor's use and control of collateral. Moreover, nothing in this Section prevents the debtor and secured party from agreeing to procedures by which the secured party polices or monitors collateral or to restrictions on the debtor's dominion. However, this Article leaves these matters to agreement based on business considerations, not on legal requirements.
3. Possessory Security Interests. Subsection (b) makes clear that this Section does not relax the requirements for perfection by possession under Section 9-315. If a secured party allows the debtor access to and control over collateral its security interest may be or become unperfected.
4. Permissible Freedom for Debtor to Enforce Collateral. Former Section 9-205 referred to a debtor's "liberty . . to collect or compromise accounts or chattel paper." This Section recognizes the broader rights of a debtor to "enforce," as well as to "collect" and "compromise" collateral. This Section's reference to collecting, compromising, and enforcing "collateral" instead of "accounts or chattel paper" contemplates the many other types of collateral that a debtor may wish to "collect, compromise, or enforce": e.g., deposit accounts, documents, general intangibles, instruments, investment property, and letter-of-credit rights.
Section 36-9-206. Security interest arising in purchase or delivery of financial asset.
(a) A security interest in favor of a securities intermediary attaches to a person's security entitlement if:
(1) the person buys a financial asset through the securities intermediary in a transaction in which the person is obligated to pay the purchase price to the securities intermediary at the time of the purchase; and
(2) the securities intermediary credits the financial asset to the buyer's securities account before the buyer pays the securities intermediary.
(b) The security interest described in subsection (a) secures the person's obligation to pay for the financial asset.
(c) A security interest in favor of a person that delivers a certificated security or other financial asset represented by a writing attaches to the security or other financial asset if:
(1) the security or other financial asset:
(A) in the ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment; and
(B) is delivered under an agreement between persons in the business of dealing with such securities or financial assets; and
(2) the agreement calls for delivery against payment.
(d) The security interest described in subsection (c) secures the obligation to make payment for the delivery.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former 9-116.
2. Codification of "Broker's Lien." Depending upon a securities intermediary's arrangements with its entitlement holders, the securities intermediary may treat the entitlement holder as entitled to financial assets before the entitlement holder has actually made payment for them. For example, many brokers permit retail customers to pay for financial assets by check. The broker may not receive final payment of the check until several days after the broker has credited the customer's securities account for the financial assets. Thus, the customer will have acquired a security entitlement prior to payment. Subsection (a) provides that, in such circumstances, the securities intermediary has a security interest in the entitlement holder's security entitlement. Under subsection (b) the security interest secures the customer's obligation to pay for the financial asset in question. Subsections (a) and (b) codify and adapt to the indirect holding system the so-called "broker's lien," which has long been recognized. See Restatement, Security Section 12.
3. Financial Assets Delivered Against Payment. Subsection (c) creates a security interest in favor of persons who deliver certificated securities or other financial assets in physical form, such as money market instruments, if the agreed payment is not received. In some arrangements for settlement of transactions in physical financial assets, the seller's securities custodian will deliver physical certificates to the buyer's securities custodian and receive a time-stamped delivery receipt. The buyer's securities custodian will examine the certificate to ensure that it is in good order, and that the delivery matches a trade in which the buyer has instructed the seller to deliver to that custodian. If all is in order, the receiving custodian will settle with the delivering custodian through whatever funds settlement system has been agreed upon or is used by custom and usage in that market. The understanding of the trade, however, is that the delivery is conditioned upon payment, so that if payment is not made for any reason, the security will be returned to the deliverer. Subsection (c) clarifies the rights of persons making deliveries in such circumstances. It provides the person making delivery with a security interest in the securities or other financial assets; under subsection (d), the security interest secures the seller's right to receive payment for the delivery. Section 8-301 specifies when delivery of a certificated security occurs; that Section should be applied as well to other financial assets as well for purposes of this Section.
4. Automatic Attachment and Perfection. Subsections (a) and (c) refer to attachment of a security interest. Attachment under this Section has the same incidents (enforceability, right to proceeds, etc.) as attachment under Section 9-203. This Section overrides the general attachment rules in Section 9-203. See Section 9-203(c). A securities intermediary's security interest under subsection (a) is perfected by control without further action. See Section 8-106 (control); 9-314 (perfection). Security interests arising under subsection (b) are automatically perfected. See Section 9-309(9).
Subpart 2.
Rights and Duties
Section 36-9-207. Rights and duties of secured party having possession or control of collateral.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), a secured party shall use reasonable care in the custody and preservation of collateral in the secured party's possession. In the case of chattel paper or an instrument, reasonable care includes taking necessary steps to preserve rights against prior parties unless otherwise agreed.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), if a secured party has possession of collateral:
(1) reasonable expenses, including the cost of insurance and payment of taxes or other charges, incurred in the custody, preservation, use, or operation of the collateral are chargeable to the debtor and are secured by the collateral;
(2) the risk of accidental loss or damage is on the debtor to the extent of a deficiency in any effective insurance coverage;
(3) the secured party shall keep the collateral identifiable, but fungible collateral may be commingled; and
(4) the secured party may use or operate the collateral:
(A) for the purpose of preserving the collateral or its value;
(B) as permitted by an order of a court having competent jurisdiction; or
(C) except in the case of consumer goods, in the manner and to the extent agreed by the debtor.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), a secured party having possession of collateral or control of collateral under Section 36-9-104, 36-9-105, 36-9-106, or 36-9-107:
(1) may hold as additional security any proceeds, except money or funds, received from the collateral;
(2) shall apply money or funds received from the collateral to reduce the secured obligation, unless remitted to the debtor; and
(3) may create a security interest in the collateral.
(d) If the secured party is a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes or a consignor:
(1) subsection (a) does not apply unless the secured party is entitled under an agreement:
(A) to charge back uncollected collateral; or
(B) otherwise to full or limited recourse against the debtor or a secondary obligor based on the nonpayment or other default of an account debtor or other obligor on the collateral; and
(2) subsections (b) and (c) do not apply.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-207.
2. Duty of Care for Collateral in Secured Party's Possession. Like former Section 9-207, subsection (a) imposes a duty of care, similar to that imposed on a pledgee at common law, on a secured party in possession of collateral. See Restatement, Security Sections 17, 18. In many cases a secured party in possession of collateral may satisfy this duty by notifying the debtor of action that should be taken and allowing the debtor to take the action itself. If the secured party itself takes action, its reasonable expenses may be added to the secured obligation. The revised definitions of "collateral," "debtor," and "secured party" in Section 9-102 make this Section applicable to collateral subject to an agricultural lien if the collateral is in the lienholder's possession. Under Section 1-102 the duty to exercise reasonable care may not be disclaimed by agreement, although under that Section the parties remain free to determine by agreement standards that are not manifestly unreasonable as to what constitutes reasonable care. Unless otherwise agreed, for a secured party in possession of chattel paper or an instrument, reasonable care includes the preservation of rights against prior parties. The secured party's right to have instruments or documents indorsed or transferred to it or its order is dealt with in the relevant Sections of Articles 3, 7, and 8. See Sections 3-201, 7-506, 8-304(d).
3. Specific Rules When Secured Party in Possession or Control of Collateral. Subsection (b) and (c) provide rules following common-law precedents which apply unless the parties otherwise agree. The rules in subsection (b) apply to typical issues that may arise while a secured party is in possession of collateral, including expenses, insurance, and taxes, risk of loss or damage, identifiable and fungible collateral, and use or operation of collateral. Subsection (c) contains rules that apply in certain circumstances that may arise when a secured party is in either possession or control of collateral. These circumstances include the secured party's receiving proceeds from the collateral and the secured party's creation of a security interest in the collateral.
4. Applicability Following Default. This Section applies when the secured party has possession of collateral either before or after default. See Sections 9-601(b), 9-609. Subsection (b)(4)(C) limits agreements concerning the use or operation of collateral to collateral other than consumer goods. Under Section 9-602(1), a debtor cannot waive or vary that limitation.
5. "Repledges" and Right of Redemption. Subsection (c)(3) eliminates the qualification in former Section 9-207 to the effect that the terms of a "repledge" may not "impair" a debtor's "right to redeem" collateral. The change is primarily for clarification. There is no basis on which to draw from subsection (c)(3) any inference concerning the debtor's right to redeem the collateral. The debtor enjoys that right under Section 9-621; this Section need not address it. For example, if the collateral is a negotiable note that the secured party (SP-1) repledges to SP-2, nothing in this Section suggests that the debtor (D) does not retain the right to redeem the note upon payment to SP-1 of all obligations secured by the note. But, as explained below, the debtor's unimpaired right to redeem as against the debtor's original secured party nevertheless may not be enforceable as against the new secured party.
In resolving questions that arise from the creation of a security interest by SP-1, one must take care to distinguish D's rights against SP-1 from D's rights against SP-2. Once D discharges the secured obligation, D becomes entitled to the note; SP-1 has no legal basis upon which to withhold it. If, as a practical matter, SP-1 is unable to return the note because SP-2 holds it as collateral for SP-1's unpaid debt, then SP-1 is liable to D under the law of conversion.
Whether SP-2 would be liable to D depends on the relative priority of SP-2's security interest and D's interest. By permitting SP-1 to create a security interest in the collateral (repledge), subsection (c)(3) provides a statutory power for SP-1 to give SP-2 a security interest (subject, of course, to any agreement by SP-1 not to give a security interest). In the vast majority of cases where repledge rights are significant, the security interest of the second secured party, SP-2 in the example, will be senior to the debtor's interest. By virtue of the debtor's consent or applicable legal rules, SP-2 typically would cut off D's rights in investment property or be immune from D's claims. See Sections 9-331, 3-306 (holder in due course), 8-303 (protected purchaser), 8-502 (acquisition of a security entitlement), 8-503(e) (action by entitlement holder). Moreover, the expectations and business practices in some markets, such as the securities markets, are such that D's consent to SP-2's taking free of D's rights inheres in D's creation of SP-1's security interest which gives rise to SP-1's power under this Section. In these situations, D would have no right to recover the collateral or recover damages from SP-2. Nevertheless, D would have a damage claim against SP-1 if SP-1 had given a security interest to SP-2 in breach of its agreement with D. Moreover, if SP-2's security interest secures an amount that is less than the amount secured by SP-1's security interest (granted by D), then D's exercise of its right to redeem would provide value sufficient to discharge SP-1's obligations to SP-2.
For the most part this Section does not change the law under former Section 9-207, although eliminating the reference to the debtor's right of redemption may alter the secured party's right to repledge in one respect. Former Section 9-207 could have been read to limit the secured party's statutory right to repledge collateral to repledge transactions in which the collateral did not secure a greater obligation than that of the original debtor. Inasmuch as this is a matter normally dealt with by agreement between the debtor and secured party, any change would appear to have little practical effect.
6. "Repledges" of Investment Property. The following example will aid the discussion of "repledges" of investment property.
Example. Debtor grants Alpha Bank a security interest in a security entitlement that includes 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock that Debtor holds through an account with Able & Co. Alpha does not have an account with Able. Alpha uses Beta Bank as its securities custodian. Debtor instructs Able to transfer the shares to Beta, for the account of Alpha, and Able does so. Beta then credits Alpha's account. Alpha has control of the security entitlement for the 1000 shares under Section 8-106(d). (These are the facts of Example 2, Section 8-106, Comment 4.) Although, as between Debtor and Alpha, Debtor may have become the beneficial owner of the new securities entitlement with Beta, Beta has agreed to act on Alpha's entitlement orders because, as between Beta and Alpha, Alpha has become the entitlement holder.
Next, Alpha grants Gamma Bank a security interest in the security entitlement with Beta that includes the 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock. In order to afford Gamma control of the entitlement, Alpha instructs Beta to transfer the stock to Gamma's custodian, Delta Bank, which credits Gamma's account for 1000 shares. At this point Gamma holds its securities entitlement for its benefit as well as that of its debtor, Alpha. Alpha's derivative rights also are for the benefit of Debtor.
In many, probably most, situations and at any particular point in time, it will be impossible for Debtor or Alpha to "trace" Alpha's "repledge" to any particular securities entitlement or financial asset of Gamma or anyone else. Debtor would retain, of course, a right to redeem the collateral from Alpha upon satisfaction of the secured obligation. However, in the absence of a traceable interest, Debtor would retain only a personal claim against Alpha in the event Alpha failed to restore the security entitlement to Debtor. Moreover, even in the unlikely event that Debtor could trace a property interest, in the context of the financial markets, normally the operation of this Section, Debtor's explicit agreement to permit Alpha to create a senior security interest, or legal rules permitting Gamma to cut off Debtor's rights or become immune from Debtor's claims would effectively subordinate Debtor's interest to the holder of a security interest created by Alpha. And, under the shelter principle, all subsequent transferees would obtain interests to which Debtor's interest also would be subordinate.
7. Buyers of Chattel Paper and Other Receivables; Consignors. This Section has been revised to reflect the fact that a seller of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes retains no interest in the collateral and so is not disadvantaged by the secured party's noncompliance with the requirements of this Section. Accordingly, subsection (d) provides that subsection (a) applies only to security interests that secure an obligation and to sales of receivables in which the buyer has recourse against the debtor. (Of course, a buyer of accounts or payment intangibles could not have "possession" of original collateral, but might have possession of proceeds, such as promissory notes or checks.) The meaning of "recourse" in this respect is limited to recourse arising out of the account debtor's failure to pay or other default.
Subsection (d) makes subsections (b) and (c) inapplicable to buyers of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes and consignors. Of course, there is no reason to believe that a buyer of receivables or a consignor could not, for example, create a security interest or otherwise transfer an interest in the collateral, regardless of who has possession of the collateral. However, this Section leaves the rights of those owners to law other than Article 9.
Section 36-9-208. Additional duties of secured party having control of collateral.
(a) This section applies to cases in which there is no outstanding secured obligation and the secured party is not committed to make advances, incur obligations, or otherwise give value.
(b) Within ten days after receiving an authenticated demand by the debtor:
(1) a secured party having control of a deposit account under Section 36-9-104(a)(2) shall send to the bank with which the deposit account is maintained an authenticated statement that releases the bank from any further obligation to comply with instructions originated by the secured party;
(2) a secured party having control of a deposit account under Section 36-9-104(a)(3) shall:
(A) pay the debtor the balance on deposit in the deposit account; or
(B) transfer the balance on deposit into a deposit account in the debtor's name;
(3) a secured party, other than a buyer, having control of electronic chattel paper under Section 36-9-105 shall:
(A) communicate the authoritative copy of the electronic chattel paper to the debtor or its designated custodian;
(B) if the debtor designates a custodian that is the designated custodian with which the authoritative copy of the electronic chattel paper is maintained for the secured party, communicate to the custodian an authenticated record releasing the designated custodian from any further obligation to comply with instructions originated by the secured party and instructing the custodian to comply with instructions originated by the debtor; and
(C) take appropriate action to enable the debtor or its designated custodian to make copies of or revisions to the authoritative copy which add or change an identified assignee of the authoritative copy without the consent of the secured party;
(4) a secured party having control of investment property under Section 36-8-106(d)(2) or 36-9-106(b) shall send to the securities intermediary or commodity intermediary with which the security entitlement or commodity contract is maintained an authenticated record that releases the securities intermediary or commodity intermediary from any further obligation to comply with entitlement orders or directions originated by the secured party; and
(5) a secured party having control of a letter-of-credit right under Section 36-9-107 shall send to each person having an unfulfilled obligation to pay or deliver proceeds of the letter of credit to the secured party an authenticated release from any further obligation to pay or deliver proceeds of the letter of credit to the secured party.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Scope and Purpose. This Section imposes duties on a secured party who has control of a deposit account, electronic chattel paper, investment property, or a letter-of-credit right. The duty to terminate the secured party's control is analogous to the duty to file a termination statement, imposed by Section 9-513. Under subsection (a), it applies only when there is no outstanding secured obligation and the secured party is not committed to give value. The requirements of this Section can be varied by agreement under Section 1-102(3). For example, a debtor could by contract agree that the secured party may release its control of investment property under subsection (a)(1) more than three days following demand. Also, duties under this Section should not be read to conflict with the terms of the collateral itself. For example, if the collateral is a time deposit account, subsection (b)(3) should not require a secured party with control to make an early withdrawal of the funds (assuming that were possible) in order to pay them over to the debtor or put them in an account in the debtor's name.
3. Remedy for Failure to Relinquish Control. If a secured party fails to comply with the requirements of subsection (b), the debtor has the remedy set forth in Section 9-625(e). This remedy is identical to that applicable to failure to provide or file a termination statement under Section 9-513.
4. Duty to Relinquish Possession. Although Section 9-207 addresses directly the duties of a secured party in possession of collateral, that Section does not require the secured party to relinquish possession when the secured party ceases to hold a security interest. Under common law, absent agreement to the contrary, the failure to relinquish possession of collateral upon satisfaction of the secured obligation would constitute a conversion. Inasmuch as problems apparently have not surfaced in the absence of statutory duties under former Article 9 and the common-law duty appears to have been sufficient, this Article does not impose a statutory duty to relinquish possession.
Section 36-9-209. Duties of secured party if account debtor has been notified of assignment.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), this section applies if:
(1) there is no outstanding secured obligation; and
(2) the secured party is not committed to make advances, incur obligations, or otherwise give value.
(b) Within ten days after receiving an authenticated demand by the debtor, a secured party shall send to an account debtor that has received notification of an assignment to the secured party as assignee under Section 36-9-406(a) an authenticated record that releases the account debtor from any further obligation to the secured party.
(c) This section does not apply to an assignment constituting the sale of an account, chattel paper, or payment intangible.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Scope and Purpose. Like Sections 9-208 and 9-513, which require a secured party to relinquish control of collateral and to file or provide a termination statement for a financing statement, this Section requires a secured party to free up collateral when there no longer is any outstanding secured obligation or any commitment to give value in the future. This Section addresses the case in which account debtors have been notified to pay a secured party to whom the receivables have been assigned. It requires the secured party (assignee) to inform the account debtors that they no longer are obligated to make payment to the secured party. See subsection (b). It does not apply to account debtors whose obligations on an account, chattel paper, or payment intangible have been sold. See subsection (c).
Section 36-9-210. Request for accounting; request regarding list of collateral or statement of account.
(a) In this section:
(1) 'Request' means a record of a type described in item (2), (3), or (4).
(2) 'Request for an accounting' means a record authenticated by a debtor requesting that the recipient provide an accounting of the unpaid obligations secured by collateral and reasonably identifying the transaction or relationship that is the subject of the request.
(3) 'Request regarding a list of collateral' means a record authenticated by a debtor requesting that the recipient approve or correct a list of what the debtor believes to be the collateral securing an obligation and reasonably identifying the transaction or relationship that is the subject of the request.
(4) 'Request regarding a statement of account' means a record authenticated by a debtor requesting that the recipient approve or correct a statement indicating what the debtor believes to be the aggregate amount of unpaid obligations secured by collateral as of a specified date and reasonably identifying the transaction or relationship that is the subject of the request.
(b) Subject to subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f), a secured party, other than a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes or a consignor, shall comply with a request within fourteen days after receipt:
(1) in the case of a request for an accounting, by authenticating and sending to the debtor an accounting; and
(2) in the case of a request regarding a list of collateral or a request regarding a statement of account, by authenticating and sending to the debtor an approval or correction.
(c) A secured party that claims a security interest in all of a particular type of collateral owned by the debtor may comply with a request regarding a list of collateral by sending to the debtor an authenticated record including a statement to that effect within fourteen days after receipt.
(d) A person that receives a request regarding a list of collateral, claims no interest in the collateral when it receives the request, and claimed an interest in the collateral at an earlier time shall comply with the request within fourteen days after receipt by sending to the debtor an authenticated record:
(1) disclaiming any interest in the collateral; and
(2) if known to the recipient, providing the name and mailing address of any assignee of or successor to the recipient's security interest in the collateral.
(e) A person that receives a request for an accounting or a request regarding a statement of account, claims no interest in the obligations when it receives the request, and claimed an interest in the obligations at an earlier time shall comply with the request within fourteen days after receipt by sending to the debtor an authenticated record:
(1) disclaiming any interest in the obligations; and
(2) if known to the recipient, providing the name and mailing address of any assignee of or successor to the recipient's interest in the obligations.
(f) A debtor is entitled without charge to one response to a request under this section during any six-month period. The secured party may require payment of a charge not exceeding twenty-five dollars for each additional response.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-208.
2. Scope and Purpose. This Section provides a procedure whereby a debtor may obtain from a secured party information about the secured obligation and the collateral in which the secured party may claim a security interest. It clarifies and resolves some of the issues that arose under former Section 9-208 and makes information concerning the secured indebtedness readily available to debtors, both before and after default. It applies to agricultural lien transactions (see the definitions of "debtor," secured party," and "collateral" in Section 9-102), but generally not to sales of receivables. See subsection (b).
3. Requests by Debtors Only. A financing statement filed under Part 5 may disclose only that a secured party may have a security interest in specified types of collateral. In most cases the financing statement will contain no indication of the obligation (if any) secured, whether any security interest actually exists, or the particular property subject to a security interest. Because creditors of and prospective purchasers from a debtor may have legitimate needs for more detailed information, it is necessary to provide a procedure under which the secured party will be required to provide information. On the other hand, the secured party should not be under a duty to disclose any details of the debtor's financial affairs to any casual inquirer or competitor who may inquire. For this reason, this Section gives the right to request information to the debtor only. The debtor may submit a request in connection with negotiations with subsequent creditors and purchasers, as well as for the purpose of determining the status of its credit relationship or demonstrating which of its assets are free of a security interest.
4. Permitted Types of Requests for Information. Subsection (a) contemplates that a debtor may request three types of information by submitting three types of "requests" to the secured party. First, the debtor may request the secured party to prepare and send an "accounting" (defined in Section 9-102). Second, the debtor may submit to the secured party a list of collateral for the secured party's approval or correction. Third, the debtor may submit to the secured party for its approval or correction a statement of the aggregate amount of unpaid secured obligations. Inasmuch as a secured party may have numerous transactions and relationships with a debtor, each request must identify the relevant transactions or relationships. Subsections (b) and (c) require the secured party to respond to a request within 14 days following receipt of the request.
5. Recipients Claiming No Interest in the Transaction. A debtor may be unaware that a creditor with whom it has dealt has assigned its security interest or the secured obligation. Subsections (d) and (e) impose upon recipients of requests under this Section the duty to inform the debtor that they claim no interest in the collateral or secured obligation, respectively, and to inform the debtor of the name and mailing address of any known assignee or successor. As under subsections (b) and (c), a response to a request under subsection (d) or (e) is due 14 days following receipt.
6. Waiver; Remedy for Failure to Comply. The debtor's rights under this Section may not be waived or varied. See Section 9-602(2). Section 9-625(e) sets forth the remedy for noncompliance with the requirements of this Section.
7. Limitation on Free Responses to Requests. Under subsection (f), during a six-month period a debtor is entitled to receive from the secured party one free response to a request. The debtor is not entitled to a free response to each type of request (i.e., three free responses) during a six-month period.
Part 3
Perfection and Priority
Subpart 1.
Law Governing Perfection and Priority
Section 36-9-301. Law governing perfection and priority of security interests.
Except as otherwise provided in Sections 36-9-303 through 36-9-306, the following rules determine the law governing perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in collateral:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, while a debtor is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in collateral.
(2) While collateral is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a possessory security interest in that collateral.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in item (4), while negotiable documents, goods, instruments, money, or tangible chattel paper is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs:
(A) perfection of a security interest in the goods by filing a fixture filing;
(B) perfection of a security interest in timber to be cut; and
(C) the effect of perfection or nonperfection and the priority of a nonpossessory security interest in the collateral.
(4) The local law of the jurisdiction in which the wellhead or minehead is located governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in as-extracted collateral.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Sections 9-103(1)(a), (b), 9-103(3)(a), (b), 9-103(5), substantially modified.
2. Scope of This Subpart. Part 3, Subpart 1 (Sections 9-301 through 9-307) contains choice-of-law rules similar to those of former Section 9-103. Former Section 9-103 generally addresses which State's law governs "perfection and the effect of perfection or non-perfection of" security interests. See, e.g., former Section 9-103(1)(b). This Article follows the broader and more precise formulation in former Section 9-103(6)(b), which was revised in connection with the promulgation of Revised Article 8 in 1994: "perfection, the effect of perfection or non-perfection, and the priority of" security interests. Priority, in this context, subsumes all of the rules in Part 3, including "cut off" or "take free" rules such as Sections 9-317(b), (c), and (d), 9-320(a), (b), and (d), and 9-332. This subpart does not address choice of law for other purposes. For example, the law applicable to issues such as attachment, validity, characterization (e.g., true lease or security interest), and enforcement is governed by the rules in Section 1-105; that governing law typically is specified in the same agreement that contains the security agreement. And, another jurisdiction's law may govern other third-party matters addressed in this Article. See Section 9-401, Comment 3.
3. Scope of Referral. In designating the jurisdiction whose law governs, this Article directs the court to apply only the substantive ("local") law of a particular jurisdiction and not its choice-of-law rules.
Example 1: Litigation over the priority of a security interest in accounts arises in State X. State X has adopted the official text of this Article, which provides that priority is determined by the local law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located. See Section 9-301(1). The debtor is located in State Y. Even if State Y has retained former Article 9 or enacted a nonuniform choice-of-law rule (e.g., one that provides that perfection is governed by the law of State Z), a State X court should look only to the substantive law of State Y and disregard State Y's choice-of-law rule. State Y's substantive law (e.g., its Section 9-501) provides that financing statements should be filed in a filing office in State Y. Note, however, that if the identical perfection issue were to be litigated in State Y, the court would look to State Y's former Section 9-103 or nonuniform 9-301 and conclude that a filing in State Y is ineffective.
Example 2: In the preceding Example, assume that State X has adopted the official text of this Article, and State Y has adopted a nonuniform Section 9-301(1) under which perfection is governed by the whole law of State X, including its choice-of-law rules. If litigation occurs in State X, the court should look to the substantive law of State Y, which provides that financing statements are to be filed in a filing office in State Y. If litigation occurs in State Y, the court should look to the law of State X, whose choice-of-law rule requires that the court apply the substantive law of State Y. Thus, regardless of the jurisdiction in which the litigation arises, the financing statement should be filed in State Y.
4. Law Governing Perfection: General Rule. Paragraph (1) contains the general rule: the law governing perfection of security interests in both tangible and intangible collateral, whether perfected by filing or automatically, is the law of the jurisdiction of the debtor's location, as determined under Section 9-307.
Paragraph (1) substantially simplifies the choice-of-law rules. Former Section 9-103 contained different choice-of-law rules for different types of collateral. Under Section 9-301(1), the law of a single jurisdiction governs perfection with respect to most types of collateral, both tangible and intangible. Paragraph (1) eliminates the need for former Section 9-103(1)(c), which concerned purchase-money security interests in tangible collateral that is intended to move from one jurisdiction to the other. It is likely to reduce the frequency of cases in which the governing law changes after a financing statement is properly filed. (Presumably, debtors change their own location less frequently than they change the location of their collateral.) The approach taken in paragraph (1) also eliminates some difficult priority issues and the need to distinguish between "mobile" and "ordinary" goods, and it reduces the number of filing offices in which secured parties must file or search when collateral is located in several jurisdictions.
5. Law Governing Perfection: Exceptions. The general rule is subject to several exceptions. It does not apply to goods covered by a certificate of title (see Section 9-303), deposit accounts (see Section 9-304), investment property (see Section 9-305), or letter-of-credit rights (see Section 9-306). Nor does it apply to possessory security interests, i.e., security interests that the secured party has perfected by taking possession of the collateral (see paragraph (2)), security interests perfected by filing a fixture filing (see paragraph (4)), security interests in timber to be cut (paragraph (5)), or security interests in as-extracted collateral (see paragraph (6)).
a. Possessory Security Interests. Paragraph (2) applies to possessory security interests and provides that perfection is governed by the local law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located. This is the rule of former Section 9-103(1)(b), except paragraph (2) eliminates the troublesome "last event" test of former law.
The distinction between nonpossessory and possessory security interests creates the potential for the same jurisdiction to apply two different choice-of-law rules to determine perfection in the same collateral. For example, were a secured party in possession of an instrument or document to relinquish possession in reliance on temporary perfection, the applicable law immediately would change from that of the location of the collateral to that of the location of the debtor. The applicability of two different choice-of-law rules for perfection is unlikely to lead to any material practical problems. The perfection rules of one Article 9 jurisdiction are likely to be identical to those of another. Moreover, under paragraph (3), the relative priority of competing security interests in tangible collateral is resolved by reference to the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located, regardless of how the security interests are perfected.
b. Fixtures. Application of the general rule in paragraph (1) to perfection of a security interest in fixtures would yield strange results. For example, perfection of a security interest in fixtures located in Arizona and owned by a Delaware corporation would be governed by the law of Delaware. Although Delaware law would send one to a filing office in Arizona for the place to file a financing statement as a fixture filing, see Section 9-501, Delaware law would not take account of local, nonuniform, real-property filing and recording requirements that Arizona law might impose. For this reason, paragraph (3)(A) contains a special rule for security interests perfected by a fixture filing; the law of the jurisdiction in which the fixtures are located governs perfection, including the formal requisites of a fixture filing. Under paragraph (3)(C), the same law governs priority. Fixtures are "goods" as defined in Section 9-102.
c. Timber to Be Cut. Application of the general rule in paragraph (1) to perfection of a security interest in timber to be cut would yield undesirable results analogous to those described with respect to fixtures. Paragraph (3)(B) adopts a similar solution: perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the timber is located. As with fixtures, under paragraph (3)(C), the same law governs priority. Timber to be cut also is "goods" as defined in Section 9-102.
Paragraph (3)(B) applies only to "timber to be cut," not to timber that has been cut. Consequently, once the timber is cut, the general choice-of-law rule in paragraph (1) becomes applicable. To ensure continued perfection, a secured party should file in both the jurisdiction in which the timber to be cut is located and in the state where the debtor is located. The former filing would be with the office in which a real property mortgage would be filed, and the latter would be a central filing. See Section 9-501.
d. As-Extracted Collateral. Paragraph (4) adopts the rule of former Section 9-103(5) with respect to certain security interests in minerals and related accounts. Like security interests in fixtures perfected by filing a fixture filing, security interests in minerals that are as-extracted collateral are perfected by filing in the office designated for the filing or recording of a mortgage on the real property. For the same reasons, the law governing perfection and priority is the law of the jurisdiction in which the wellhead or minehead is located.
6. Change in Law Governing Perfection. When the debtor changes its location to another jurisdiction, the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection under paragraph (1) changes, as well. Similarly, the law governing perfection of a possessory security interest in collateral under paragraph (2) changes when the collateral is removed to another jurisdiction. Nevertheless, these changes will not result in an immediate loss of perfection. See Section 9-316(a), (b).
7. Law Governing Effect of Perfection and Priority: Goods, Documents, Instruments, Money, Negotiable Documents, and Tangible Chattel Paper. Under former Section 9-103, the law of a single jurisdiction governed both questions of perfection and those of priority. This Article generally adopts that approach. See paragraph (1). But the approach may create problems if the debtor and collateral are located in different jurisdictions. For example, assume a security interest in equipment located in Pennsylvania is perfected by filing in Illinois, where the debtor is located. If the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located were to govern priority, then the priority of an execution lien on goods located in Pennsylvania would be governed by rules enacted by the Illinois legislature.
To address this problem, paragraph (3)(C) divorces questions of perfection from questions of "the effect of perfection or nonperfection and the priority of a security interest." Under paragraph (3)(C), the rights of competing claimants to tangible collateral are resolved by reference to the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located. A similar bifurcation applied to security interests in investment property under former Section 9-103(6). See Section 9-305.
Paragraph (3)(C) applies the law of the situs to determine priority only with respect to goods (including fixtures), instruments, money, negotiable documents, and tangible chattel paper. Compare former Section 9-103(1), which applied the law of the location of the collateral to documents, instruments, and "ordinary" (as opposed to "mobile") goods. This Article does not distinguish among types of goods. The ordinary/mobile goods distinction appears to address concerns about where to file and search, rather than concerns about priority. There is no reason to preserve this distinction under the bifurcated approach.
Particularly serious confusion may arise when the choice-of-law rules of a given jurisdiction result in each of two competing security interests in the same collateral being governed by a different priority rule. The potential for this confusion existed under former Section 9-103(4) with respect to chattel paper: Perfection by possession was governed by the law of the location of the paper, whereas perfection by filing was governed by the law of the location of the debtor. Consider the mess that would have been created if the language or interpretation of former Section 9-308 were to differ in the two relevant States, or if one of the relevant jurisdictions (e.g., a foreign country) had not adopted Article 9. The potential for confusion could have been exacerbated when a secured party perfected both by taking possession in the State where the collateral is located (State A) and by filing in the State where the debtor is located (State B)-a common practice for some chattel paper financers. By providing that the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located governs priority, paragraph (3) substantially diminishes this problem.
8. Non-U.S. Debtors. This Article applies the same choice-of-law rules to all debtors, foreign and domestic. For example, it adopts the bifurcated approach for determining the law applicable to security interests in goods and other tangible collateral. See Comment 5.a., above. The Article contains a new rule specifying the location of non-U.S. debtors for purposes of this Part. The rule appears in Section 9-307 and is explained in the Reporters' Comments following that Section. Former Section 9-103(3)(c), which contained a special choice-of-law rule governing security interests created by debtors located in a non-U.S. jurisdiction, proved unsatisfactory and was deleted.
Section 36-9-302. Law governing perfection and priority of agricultural liens.
While farm products are located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of an agricultural lien on the farm products.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Agricultural Liens. This Section provides choice-of-law rules for agricultural liens on farm products. Perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and priority all are governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the farm products are located. Other choice-of-law rules, including Section 1-105, determine which jurisdiction's law governs other matters, such as the secured party's rights on default. See Section 9-301, Comment 2. Inasmuch as no agricultural lien on proceeds arises under this Article, this Section does not expressly apply to proceeds of agricultural liens. However, if another statute creates an agricultural lien on proceeds, it may be appropriate for courts to apply the choice-of-law rule in this Section to determine priority in the proceeds.
Section 36-9-303. Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in goods covered by a certificate of title.
(a) This section applies to goods covered by a certificate of title, even if there is no other relationship between the jurisdiction under whose certificate of title the goods are covered and the goods or the debtor.
(b) Goods become covered by a certificate of title when a valid application for the certificate of title and the applicable fee are delivered to the appropriate authority. Goods cease to be covered by a certificate of title at the earlier of the time the certificate of title ceases to be effective under the law of the issuing jurisdiction or the time the goods become covered subsequently by a certificate of title issued by another jurisdiction.
(c) The local law of the jurisdiction under whose certificate of title the goods are covered governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title from the time the goods become covered by the certificate of title until the goods cease to be covered by the certificate of title.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-103(2)(a), (b), substantially revised.
2. Scope of This Section. This Section applies to "goods covered by a certificate of title." The new definition of "certificate of title" in Section 9-102 makes clear that this Section applies not only to certificate-of-title statutes under which perfection occurs upon notation of the security interest on the certificate but also to those that contemplate notation but provide that perfection is achieved by another method, e.g., delivery of designated documents to an official. Subsection (a), which is new, makes clear that this Section applies to certificates of a jurisdiction having no other contacts with the goods or the debtor. This result comports with most of the reported cases on the subject and with contemporary business practices in the trucking industry.
3. Law Governing Perfection and Priority. Subsection (c) is the basic choice-of-law rule for goods covered by a certificate of title. Perfection and priority of a security interest are governed by the law of the jurisdiction under whose certificate of title the goods are covered from the time the goods become covered by the certificate of title until the goods cease to be covered by the certificate of title.
Normally, under the law of the relevant jurisdiction, the perfection step would consist of compliance with that jurisdiction's certificate-of-title statute and a resulting notation of the security interest on the certificate of title. See Section 9-311(b). In the typical case of an automobile or over-the-road truck, a person who wishes to take a security interest in the vehicle can ascertain whether it is subject to any security interests by looking at the certificate of title. But certificates of title cover certain types of goods in some States but not in others. A secured party who does not realize this may extend credit and attempt to perfect by filing in the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located. If the goods had been titled in another jurisdiction, the lender would be unperfected.
Subsection (b) explains when goods become covered by a certificate of title and when they cease to be covered. Goods may become covered by a certificate of title, even though no certificate of title has issued. Former Section 9-103(2)(b) provided that the law of the jurisdiction issuing the certificate ceases to apply upon "surrender" of the certificate. This Article eliminates the concept of "surrender." However, if the certificate is surrendered in conjunction with an appropriate application for a certificate to be issued by another jurisdiction, the law of the original jurisdiction ceases to apply because the goods became covered subsequently by a certificate of title from another jurisdiction. Alternatively, the law of the original jurisdiction ceases to apply when the certificate "ceases to be effective" under the law of that jurisdiction. Given the diversity in certificate-of-title statutes, the term "effective" is not defined.
4. Continued Perfection. The fact that the law of one State ceases to apply under subsection (b) does not mean that a security interest perfected under that law becomes unperfected automatically. In most cases, the security interest will remain perfected. See Section 9-316(d), (e). Moreover, a perfected security interest may be subject to defeat by certain buyers and secured parties. See Section 9-337.
5. Inventory. Compliance with a certificate-of-title statute generally is not the method of perfecting security interests in inventory. Section 9-311(d) provides that a security interest created in inventory held by a person in the business of selling or leasing goods of that kind is subject to the normal filing rules; compliance with a certificate-of-title statute is not necessary or effective to perfect the security interest. Most certificate-of-title statutes are in accord.
The following example explains the subtle relationship between this rule and the choice-of-law rules in Section 9-303 and former Section 9-103(2):
Example: Goods are located in State A and covered by a certificate of title issued under the law of State A. The State A certificate of title is "clean"; it does not reflect a security interest. Owner takes the goods to State B and sells (trades in) the goods to Dealer, who is located (within the meaning of Section 9-307) in State B. As is customary, Dealer retains the duly assigned State A certificate of title pending resale of the goods. Dealer's inventory financer, SP, obtains a security interest in the goods under its after-acquired property clause.
Under Section 9-311(d) of both State A and State B, Dealer's inventory financer, SP, must perfect by filing instead of complying with a certificate-of-title statute. If Section 9-303 were read to provide that the law applicable to perfection of SP's security interest is that of State A, because the goods are covered by a State A certificate, then SP would be required to file in State A under State A's Section 9-501. That result would be anomalous, to say the least, since the principle underlying Section 9-311(d) is that the inventory should be treated as ordinary goods.
Section 9-303 (and former Section 9-103(2)) should be read as providing that the law of State B, not State A, applies. A court looking to the forum's Section 9-303(a) would find that Section 9-303 applies only if two conditions are met: (i) the goods are covered by the certificate as explained in Section 9-303(b), i.e., application had been made for a State (here, State A) to issue a certificate of title covering the goods and (ii) the certificate is a "certificate of title" as defined in Section 9-102, i.e., "a statute provides for the security interest in question to be indicated on the certificate as a condition or result of the security interest's obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor." Stated otherwise, Section 9-303 applies only when compliance with a certificate-of-title statute, and not filing, is the appropriate method of perfection. Under the law of State A, for purposes of perfecting SP's security interest in the dealer's inventory, the proper method of perfection is filing-not compliance with State A's certificate-of-title statute. For that reason, the goods are not covered by a "certificate of title," and the second condition is not met. Thus, Section 9-303 does not apply to the goods. Instead, Section 9-301 applies, and the applicable law is that of State B, where the debtor (dealer) is located.
6. External Constraints on This Section. The need to coordinate Article 9 with a variety of nonuniform certificate-of-title statutes, the need to provide rules to take account of situations in which multiple certificates of title are outstanding with respect to particular goods, and the need to govern the transition from perfection by filing in one jurisdiction to perfection by notation in another all create pressure for a detailed and complex set of rules. In an effort to minimize complexity, this Article does not attempt to coordinate Article 9 with the entire array of certificate-of-title statutes. In particular, Sections 9-303, 9-311, and 9-316(d) and (e) assume that the certificate-of-title statutes to which they apply do not have relation-back provisions (i.e., provisions under which perfection is deemed to occur at a time earlier than when the perfection steps actually are taken). A Legislative Note to Section 9-311 recommends the elimination of relation-back provisions in certificate-of-title statutes affecting perfection of security interests.
Ideally, at any given time, only one certificate of title is outstanding with respect to particular goods. In fact, however, sometimes more than one jurisdiction issues more than one certificate of title with respect to the same goods. This situation results from defects in certificate-of-title laws and the interstate coordination of those laws, not from deficiencies in this Article. As long as the possibility of multiple certificates of title remains, the potential for innocent parties to suffer losses will continue. At best, this Article can identify clearly which innocent parties will bear the losses in familiar fact patterns.
Section 36-9-304. Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in deposit accounts.
(a) The local law of a bank's jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in a deposit account maintained with that bank.
(b) The following rules determine a bank's jurisdiction for purposes of this part:
(1) If an agreement between the bank and the debtor governing the deposit account expressly provides that a particular jurisdiction is the bank's jurisdiction for purposes of this part, this chapter, or the Uniform Commercial Code, that jurisdiction is the bank's jurisdiction.
(2) If item (1) does not apply and an agreement between the bank and its customer governing the deposit account expressly provides that the agreement is governed by the law of a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is the bank's jurisdiction.
(3) If neither item (1) nor item (2) applies and an agreement between the bank and its customer governing the deposit account expressly provides that the deposit account is maintained at an office in a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is the bank's jurisdiction.
(4) If none of the preceding items applies, the bank's jurisdiction is the jurisdiction in which the office identified in an account statement as the office serving the customer's account is located.
(5) If none of the preceding paragraphs applies, the bank's jurisdiction is the jurisdiction in which the chief executive office of the bank is located.
Official Comment
1. Source. New; derived from Section 8-110(e) and former Section 9-103(6).
2. Deposit Accounts. Under this Section, the law of the "bank's jurisdiction" governs perfection and priority of a security interest in deposit accounts. Subsection (b) contains rules for determining the "bank's jurisdiction." The substance of these rules is substantially similar to that of the rules determining the "security intermediary's jurisdiction" under former Section 8-110(e), except that subsection (b)(1) provides more flexibility than the analogous provision in former Section 8-110(e)(1). Subsection (b)(1) permits the parties to choose the law of one jurisdiction to govern perfection and priority of security interests and a different governing law for other purposes. The parties' choice is effective, even if the jurisdiction whose law is chosen bears no relationship to the parties or the transaction. Section 8-110(e)(1) has been conformed to subsection (b)(1) of this Section, and Section 9-305(b)(1), concerning a commodity intermediary's jurisdiction, makes a similar departure from former Section 9-103(6)(e)(i).
3. Change in Law Governing Perfection. When the bank's jurisdiction changes, the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection under subsection (a) changes, as well. Nevertheless, the change will not result in an immediate loss of perfection. See Section 9-316(f), (g).
Section 36-9-305. Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in investment property.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), the following rules apply:
(1) While a security certificate is located in a jurisdiction, the local law of that jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in the certificated security represented thereby.
(2) The local law of the issuer's jurisdiction as specified in Section 36-8-110(d) governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in an uncertificated security.
(3) The local law of the securities intermediary's jurisdiction as specified in Section 36-8-110(e) governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in a security entitlement or securities account.
(4) The local law of the commodity intermediary's jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in a commodity contract or commodity account.
(b) The following rules determine a commodity intermediary's jurisdiction for purposes of this part:
(1) If an agreement between the commodity intermediary and commodity customer governing the commodity account expressly provides that a particular jurisdiction is the commodity intermediary's jurisdiction for purposes of this part, this chapter, or the Uniform Commercial Code, that jurisdiction is the commodity intermediary's jurisdiction.
(2) If item (1) does not apply and an agreement between the commodity intermediary and commodity customer governing the commodity account expressly provides that the agreement is governed by the law of a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is the commodity intermediary's jurisdiction.
(3) If neither item (1) nor item (2) applies and an agreement between the commodity intermediary and commodity customer governing the commodity account expressly provides that the commodity account is maintained at an office in a particular jurisdiction, that jurisdiction is the commodity intermediary's jurisdiction.
(4) If none of the preceding items applies, the commodity intermediary's jurisdiction is the jurisdiction in which the office identified in an account statement as the office serving the commodity customer's account is located.
(5) If none of the preceding items applies, the commodity intermediary's jurisdiction is the jurisdiction in which the chief executive office of the commodity intermediary is located.
(c) The local law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located governs:
(1) perfection of a security interest in investment property by filing;
(2) automatic perfection of a security interest in investment property created by a broker or securities intermediary; and
(3) automatic perfection of a security interest in a commodity contract or commodity account created by a commodity intermediary.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-103(6).
2. Investment Property: General Rules. This Section specifies choice-of-law rules for perfection and priority of security interests in investment property. Subsection (a)(1) covers security interests in certificated securities. Subsection (a)(2) covers security interests in uncertificated securities. Subsection (a)(3) covers security interests in security entitlements and securities accounts. Subsection (a)(4) covers security interests in commodity contracts and commodity accounts. The approach of each of these paragraphs is essentially the same. They identify the jurisdiction's law that governs questions of perfection and priority by using the same principles that Article 8 uses to determine other questions concerning that form of investment property. Thus, for certificated securities, the law of the jurisdiction in which the certificate is located governs. Cf. Section 8-110(c). For uncertificated securities, the law of the issuer's jurisdiction governs. Cf. Section 8-110(a). For security entitlements and securities accounts, the law of the securities intermediary's jurisdiction governs. Cf. Section 8-110(b). For commodity contracts and commodity accounts, the law of the commodity intermediary's jurisdiction governs. Because commodity contracts and commodity accounts are not governed by Article 8, subsection (b) contains rules that specify the commodity intermediary's jurisdiction. These are analogous to the rules in Section 8-110(e) specifying a securities intermediary's jurisdiction. Subsection (b)(1) affords the parties greater flexibility than did former Section 9-103(6)(3). See also Section 9-304(b) (bank's jurisdiction); Revised Section 8-110(e)(1) (securities intermediary's jurisdiction).
3. Investment Property: Exceptions. Subsection (c) establishes an exception to the general rules set out in subsection (a). It provides that perfection of a security interest by filing, automatic perfection of a security interest in investment property created by a debtor who is a broker or securities intermediary (see Section 9-309(10)), and automatic perfection of a security interest in a commodity contract or commodity account of a debtor who is a commodity intermediary (see Section 9-309(11) are governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor is located, as determined under Section 9-307.
4. Examples: The following examples illustrate the rules in this Section:
Example 1: A customer residing in New Jersey maintains a securities account with Able & Co. The agreement between the customer and Able specifies that it is governed by Pennsylvania law but expressly provides that the law of California is Able's jurisdiction for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code. Through the account the customer holds securities of a Massachusetts corporation, which Able holds through a clearing corporation located in New York. The customer obtains a margin loan from Able. Subsection (a)(3) provides that California law-the law of the securities intermediary's jurisdiction-governs perfection and priority of the security interest, even if California has no other relationship to the parties or the transaction.
Example 2: A customer residing in New Jersey maintains a securities account with Able & Co. The agreement between the customer and Able specifies that it is governed by Pennsylvania law. Through the account the customer holds securities of a Massachusetts corporation, which Able holds through a clearing corporation located in New York. The customer obtains a loan from a lender located in Illinois. The lender takes a security interest and perfects by obtaining an agreement among the debtor, itself, and Able, which satisfies the requirement of Section 8-106(d)(2) to give the lender control. Subsection (a)(3) provides that Pennsylvania law-the law of the securities intermediary's jurisdiction-governs perfection and priority of the security interest, even if Pennsylvania has no other relationship to the parties or the transaction.
Example 3: A customer residing in New Jersey maintains a securities account with Able & Co. The agreement between the customer and Able specifies that it is governed by Pennsylvania law. Through the account, the customer holds securities of a Massachusetts corporation, which Able holds through a clearing corporation located in New York. The customer borrows from SP-1, and SP-1 files a financing statement in New Jersey. Later, the customer obtains a loan from SP-2. SP-2 takes a security interest and perfects by obtaining an agreement among the debtor, itself, and Able, which satisfies the requirement of Section 8-106(d)(2) to give the SP-2 control. Subsection (c) provides that perfection of SP-1's security interest by filing is governed by the location of the debtor, so the filing in New Jersey was appropriate. Subsection (a)(3), however, provides that Pennsylvania law-the law of the securities intermediary's jurisdiction-governs all other questions of perfection and priority. Thus, Pennsylvania law governs perfection of SP-2's security interest, and Pennsylvania law also governs the priority of the security interests of SP-1 and SP-2.
5. Change in Law Governing Perfection. When the issuer's jurisdiction, the securities intermediary's jurisdiction, or commodity intermediary's jurisdiction changes, the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection under subsection (a) changes, as well. Similarly, the law governing perfection of a possessory security interest in a certificated security changes when the collateral is removed to another jurisdiction, see subsection (a)(1), and the law governing perfection by filing changes when the debtor changes its location. See subsection (c). Nevertheless, these changes will not result in an immediate loss of perfection. See Section 9-316.
Section 36-9-306. Law governing perfection and priority of security interests in letter-of-credit rights.
(a) Subject to subsection (c), the local law of the issuer's jurisdiction or a nominated person's jurisdiction governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in a letter-of-credit right if the issuer's jurisdiction or nominated person's jurisdiction is a State.
(b) For purposes of this part, an issuer's jurisdiction or nominated person's jurisdiction is the jurisdiction whose law governs the liability of the issuer or nominated person with respect to the letter-of-credit right as provided in Section 36-5-116.
(c) This section does not apply to a security interest that is perfected only under Section 36-9-308(d).
Official Comment
1. Source. New; derived in part from Section 8-110(e) and former Section 9-103(6).
2. Sui Generis Treatment. This Section governs the applicable law for perfection and priority of security interests in letter-of-credit rights, other than a security interest perfected only under Section 9-308(d) (i.e., as a supporting obligation). The treatment differs substantially from that provided in Section 9-304 for deposit accounts. The basic rule is that the law of the issuer's or nominated person's (e.g., confirmer's) jurisdiction, derived from the terms of the letter of credit itself, controls perfection and priority, but only if the issuer's or nominated person's jurisdiction is a State, as defined in Section 9-102. If the issuer's or nominated person's jurisdiction is not a State, the baseline rule of Section 9-301 applies-perfection and priority are governed by the law of the debtor's location, determined under Section 9-307. Export transactions typically involve a foreign issuer and a domestic nominated person, such as a confirmer, located in a State. The principal goal of this Section is to reduce the likelihood that perfection and priority would be governed by the law of a foreign jurisdiction in a transaction that is essentially domestic from the standpoint of the debtor-beneficiary, its creditors, and a domestic nominated person.
3. Issuer's or Nominated Person's Jurisdiction. Subsection (b) defers to the rules established under Section 5-116 for determination of an issuer's or nominated person's jurisdiction.
Example: An Italian bank issues a letter of credit that is confirmed by a New York bank. The beneficiary is a Connecticut corporation. The letter of credit provides that the issuer's liability is governed by Italian law, and the confirmation provides that the confirmer's liability is governed by the law of New York. Under Sections 9-306(b) and 5-116(a), Italy is the issuer's jurisdiction and New York is the confirmer's (nominated person's) jurisdiction. Because the confirmer's jurisdiction is a State, the law of New York governs perfection and priority of a security interest in the beneficiary's letter-of-credit right against the confirmer. See Section 9-306(a). However, because the issuer's jurisdiction is not a State, the law of that jurisdiction does not govern. See Section 9-306(a). Rather, the choice-of-law rule in Section 9-301(1) applies to perfection and priority of a security interest in the beneficiary's letter-of-credit right against the issuer. Under that Section, perfection and priority are governed by the law of the jurisdiction in which the debtor (beneficiary) is located. That jurisdiction is Connecticut. See Section 9-307.
4. Scope of this Section. This Section specifies only the law governing perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and priority of security interests. Section 5-116 specifies the law governing the liability of, and Article 5 (or other applicable law) deals with the rights and duties of, an issuer or nominated person. Perfection, nonperfection, and priority have no effect on those rights and duties.
5. Change in Law Governing Perfection. When the issuer's jurisdiction, or nominated person's jurisdiction changes, the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection under subsection (a) changes, as well. Nevertheless, this change will not result in an immediate loss of perfection. See Section 9-316(f), (g).
Section 36-9-307. Location of debtor.
(a) In this section, 'place of business' means a place where a debtor conducts its affairs.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, the following rules determine a debtor's location:
(1) A debtor who is an individual is located at the individual's principal residence.
(2) A debtor that is an organization and has only one place of business is located at its place of business.
(3) A debtor that is an organization and has more than one place of business is located at its chief executive office.
(c) Subsection (b) applies only if a debtor's residence, place of business, or chief executive office, as applicable, is located in a jurisdiction whose law generally requires information concerning the existence of a nonpossessory security interest to be made generally available in a filing, recording, or registration system as a condition or result of the security interest's obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the collateral. If subsection (b) does not apply, the debtor is located in the District of Columbia.
(d) A person that ceases to exist, have a residence, or have a place of business continues to be located in the jurisdiction specified by subsections (b) and (c).
(e) A registered organization that is organized under the law of a State is located in that State.
(f) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (i), a registered organization that is organized under the law of the United States and a branch or agency of a bank that is not organized under the law of the United States or a State are located:
(1) in the State that the law of the United States designates, if the law designates a State of location;
(2) in the State that the registered organization, branch, or agency designates, if the law of the United States authorizes the registered organization, branch, or agency to designate its State of location; or
(3) in the District of Columbia, if neither item (1) nor item (2) applies.
(g) A registered organization continues to be located in the jurisdiction specified by subsection (e) or (f) notwithstanding:
(1) the suspension, revocation, forfeiture, or lapse of the registered organization's status as such in its jurisdiction of organization; or
(2) the dissolution, winding up, or cancellation of the existence of the registered organization.
(h) The United States is located in the District of Columbia.
(i) A branch or agency of a bank that is not organized under the law of the United States or a State is located in the State in which the branch or agency is licensed, if all branches and agencies of the bank are licensed in only one State.
(j) A foreign air carrier under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, is located at the designated office of the agent upon which service of process may be made on behalf of the carrier.
(k) This section applies only for purposes of this part.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-103(3)(d), substantially revised.
2. General Rules. As a general matter, the location of the debtor determines the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection of a security interest. See Sections 9-301(1), 9-305(c). It also governs priority of a security interest in certain types of intangible collateral, such as accounts, electronic chattel paper, and general intangibles. This Section determines the location of the debtor for choice-of-law purposes, but not for other purposes. See subsection (k).
Subsection (b) states the general rules: An individual debtor is deemed to be located at the individual's principal residence with respect to both personal and business assets. Any other debtor is deemed to be located at its place of business if it has only one, or at its chief executive office if it has more than one place of business.
As used in this Section, a "place of business" means a place where the debtor conducts its affairs. See subsection (a). Thus, every organization, even eleemosynary institutions and other organizations that do not conduct "for profit" business activities, has a "place of business." Under subsection (d), a person who ceases to exist, have a residence, or have a place of business continues to be located in the jurisdiction determined by subsection (b).
The term "chief executive office" is not defined in this Section or elsewhere in the Uniform Commercial Code. "Chief executive office" means the place from which the debtor manages the main part of its business operations or other affairs. This is the place where persons dealing with the debtor would normally look for credit information, and is the appropriate place for filing. With respect to most multi-state debtors, it will be simple to determine which of the debtor's offices is the "chief executive office." Even when a doubt arises, it would be rare that there could be more than two possibilities. A secured party in such a case may protect itself by perfecting under the law of each possible jurisdiction.
Similarly, the term "principal residence" is not defined. If the security interest in question is a purchase-money security interest in consumer goods which is perfected upon attachment, see Section 9-309(1), the choice of law may make no difference. In other cases, when a doubt arises, prudence may dictate perfecting under the law of each jurisdiction that might be the debtor's "principal residence."
The general rule is subject to several exceptions, each of which is discussed below.
3. Non-U.S. Debtors. Under the general rules of this Section, a non-U.S. debtor normally would be located in a foreign jurisdiction and, as a consequence, foreign law would govern perfection. When foreign law affords no public notice of security interests, the general rule yields unacceptable results.
Accordingly, subsection (c) provides that the normal rules for determining the location of a debtor (i.e., the rules in subsection (b)) apply only if they yield a location that is "a jurisdiction whose law generally requires information concerning the existence of a nonpossessory security interest to be made generally available in a filing, recording, or registration system as a condition or result of the security interest's obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the collateral." The phrase "generally requires" is meant to include legal regimes that generally require notice in a filing or recording system as a condition of perfecting nonpossessory security interests, but which permit perfection by another method (e.g., control, automatic perfection, temporary perfection) in limited circumstances. A jurisdiction that has adopted this Article or an earlier version of this Article is such a jurisdiction. If the rules in subsection (b) yield a jurisdiction whose law does not generally require notice in a filing or registration system, the debtor is located in the District of Columbia.
Example 1: Debtor is an English corporation with 7 offices in the United States and its chief executive office in London, England. Debtor creates a security interest in its accounts. Under subsection (b)(3), Debtor would be located in England. However, subsection (c) provides that subsection (b) applies only if English law generally conditions perfection on giving public notice in a filing, recording, or registration system. Otherwise, Debtor is located in the District of Columbia. Under Section 9-301(1), perfection, the effect of perfection, and priority are governed by the law of the jurisdiction of the debtor's location-here, England or the District of Columbia (depending on the content of English law).
Example 2: Debtor is an English corporation with 7 offices in the United States and its chief executive office in London, England. Debtor creates a security interest in equipment located in London. Under subsection (b)(3) Debtor would be located in England. However, subsection (c) provides that subsection (b) applies only if English law generally conditions perfection on giving public notice in a filing, recording, or registration system. Otherwise, Debtor is located in the District of Columbia. Under Section 9-301(1), perfection is governed by the law of the jurisdiction of the debtor's location, whereas, under Section 9-301(3), the law of the jurisdiction in which the collateral is located-here, England-governs priority.
The foregoing discussion assumes that each transaction bears an appropriate relation to the forum State. In the absence of an appropriate relation, the forum State's entire UCC, including the choice-of-law provisions in Article 9 (Sections 9-301 through 9-307), will not apply. See Section 9-109, Comment 9.
4. Registered Organizations Organized Under Law of a State. Under subsection (e), a registered organization (e.g., a corporation or limited partnership) organized under the law of a "State" (defined in Section 9-102) is located in its State of organization. Subsection (g) makes clear that events affecting the status of a registered organization, such as the dissolution of a corporation or revocation of its charter, do not affect its location for purposes of subsection (e). However, certain of these events may result in, or be accompanied by, a transfer of collateral from the registered organization to another debtor. This Section does not determine whether a transfer occurs, nor does it determine the legal consequences of any transfer.
Determining the registered organization-debtor's location by reference to the jurisdiction of organization could provide some important side benefits for the filing systems. A jurisdiction could structure its filing system so that it would be impossible to make a mistake in a registered organization-debtor's name on a financing statement. For example, a filer would be informed if a filed record designated an incorrect corporate name for the debtor. Linking filing to the jurisdiction of organization also could reduce pressure on the system imposed by transactions in which registered organizations cease to exist-as a consequence of merger or consolidation, for example. The jurisdiction of organization might prohibit such transactions unless steps were taken to ensure that existing filings were refiled against a successor or terminated by the secured party.
5. Registered Organizations Organized Under Law of United States; Branches and Agencies of Banks Not Organized Under Law of United States. Subsection (f) specifies the location of a debtor that is a registered organization organized under the law of the United States. It defers to law of the United States, to the extent that that law determines, or authorizes the debtor to determine, the debtor's location. Thus, if the law of the United States designates a particular State as the debtor's location, that State is the debtor's location for purposes of this Article's choice-of-law rules. Similarly, if the law of the United States authorizes the registered organization to designate its State of location, the State that the registered organization designates is the State in which it is located for purposes of this Article's choice-of-law rules. In other cases, the debtor is located in the District of Columbia.
Subsection (f) also determines the location of branches and agencies of banks that are not organized under the law of the United States or a State. However, if all the branches and agencies of the bank are licensed only in one State, then they are located in that State. See subsection (i).
6. United States. To the extent that Article 9 governs (see Sections 1-105, 9-109(c)), the United States is located in the District of Columbia for purposes of this Article's choice-of-law rules. See subsection (h).
7. Foreign Air Carriers. Subsection (j) follows former Section 9-103(3)(d). To the extent that it is applicable, the Convention on the International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft (Geneva Convention) supersedes state legislation on this subject, as set forth in Section 9-311(b), but some nations are not parties to that Convention.
Subpart 2.
Perfection
Section 36-9-308. When security interest or agricultural lien is perfected; continuity of perfection.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section and Section 36-9-309, a security interest is perfected if it has attached and all of the applicable requirements for perfection in Sections 36-9-310 through 36-9-316 have been satisfied. A security interest is perfected when it attaches if the applicable requirements are satisfied before the security interest attaches.
(b) An agricultural lien is perfected if it has become effective and all of the applicable requirements for perfection in Section 36-9-310 have been satisfied. An agricultural lien is perfected when it becomes effective if the applicable requirements are satisfied before the agricultural lien becomes effective.
(c) A security interest or agricultural lien is perfected continuously if it is originally perfected by one method under this chapter and is later perfected by another method under this chapter, without an intermediate period when it was unperfected.
(d) Perfection of a security interest in collateral also perfects a security interest in a supporting obligation for the collateral.
(e) Perfection of a security interest in a right to payment or performance also perfects a security interest in a security interest, mortgage, or other lien on personal or real property securing the right.
(f) Perfection of a security interest in a securities account also perfects a security interest in the security entitlements carried in the securities account.
(g) Perfection of a security interest in a commodity account also perfects a security interest in the commodity contracts carried in the commodity account.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Sections 9-303, 9-115(2).
2. General Rule. This Article uses the term "attach" to describe the point at which property becomes subject to a security interest. The requisites for attachment are stated in Section 9-203. When it attaches, a security interest may be either perfected or unperfected. "Perfected" means that the security interest has attached and the secured party has taken all the steps required by this Article as specified in Sections 9-310 through 9-316. A perfected security interest may still be or become subordinate to other interests. See, e.g., Sections 9-320, 9-322. However, in general, after perfection the secured party is protected against creditors and transferees of the debtor and, in particular, against any representative of creditors in insolvency proceedings instituted by or against the debtor. See, e.g., Section 9-317.
Subsection (a) explains that the time of perfection is when the security interest has attached and any necessary steps for perfection, such as taking possession or filing, have been taken. The "except" clause refers to the perfection-upon-attachment rules appearing in Section 9-309. It also reflects that other subsections of this Section, e.g., subsection (d), contain automatic-perfection rules. If the steps for perfection have been taken in advance, as when the secured party files a financing statement before giving value or before the debtor acquires rights in the collateral, then the security interest is perfected when it attaches.
3. Agricultural Liens. Subsection (b) is new. It describes the elements of perfection of an agricultural lien.
4. Continuous Perfection. The following example illustrates the operation of subsection (c):
Example 1: Debtor, an importer, creates a security interest in goods that it imports and the documents of title that cover the goods. The secured party, Bank, takes possession of a negotiable bill of lading covering certain imported goods and thereby perfects its security interest in the bill of lading and the goods. See Sections 9-313(a), 9-312(c)(1). Bank releases the bill of lading to the debtor for the purpose of procuring the goods from the carrier and selling them. Under Section 9-312(f), Bank continues to have a perfected security interest in the document and goods for 20 days. Bank files a financing statement covering the collateral before the expiration of the 20-day period. Its security interest now continues perfected for as long as the filing is good.
If the successive stages of Bank's security interest succeed each other without an intervening gap, the security interest is "perfected continuously," and the date of perfection is when the security interest first became perfected (i.e., when Bank received possession of the bill of lading). If, however, there is a gap between stages-for example, if Bank does not file until after the expiration of the 20-day period specified in Section 9-312(f) and leaves the collateral in the debtor's possession-then, the chain being broken, the perfection is no longer continuous. The date of perfection would now be the date of filing (after expiration of the 20-day period). Bank's security interest would be vulnerable to any interests arising during the gap period which under Section 9-317 take priority over an unperfected security interest.
5. Supporting Obligations. Subsection (d) is new. It provides for automatic perfection of a security interest in a supporting obligation for collateral if the security interest in the collateral is perfected. This is unlikely to effect any change in the law prior to adoption of this Article.
Example 2: Buyer is obligated to pay Debtor for goods sold. Buyer's president guarantees the obligation. Debtor creates a security interest in the right to payment (account) in favor of Lender. Under Section 9-203(f), the security interest attaches to Debtor's rights under the guarantee (supporting obligation). Under subsection (d), perfection of the security interest in the account constitutes perfection of the security interest in Debtor's rights under the guarantee.
6. Rights to Payment Secured by Lien. Subsection (e) is new. It deals with the situation in which a security interest is created in a right to payment that is secured by a security interest, mortgage, or other lien.
Example 3: Owner gives to Mortgagee a mortgage on Blackacre to secure a loan. Owner's obligation to pay is evidenced by a promissory note. In need of working capital, Mortgagee borrows from Financer and creates a security interest in the note in favor of Financer. Section 9-203(g) adopts the traditional view that the mortgage follows the note; i.e., the transferee of the note acquires the mortgage, as well. This subsection adopts a similar principle: perfection of a security interest in the right to payment constitutes perfection of a security interest in the mortgage securing it.
An important consequence of the rules in Section 9-203(g) and subsection (e) is that, by acquiring a perfected security interest in a mortgage (or other secured) note, the secured party acquires a security interest in the mortgage (or other lien) that is senior to the rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor of the mortgagee (Article 9 debtor). See Section 9-317(a)(2). This result helps prevent the separation of the mortgage (or other lien) from the note.
Under this Article, attachment and perfection of a security interest in a secured right to payment do not of themselves affect the obligation to pay. For example, if the obligation is evidenced by a negotiable note, then Article 3 dictates the person whom the maker must pay to discharge the note and any lien securing it. See Section 3-602. If the right to payment is a payment intangible, then Section 9-406 determines whom the account debtor must pay.
Similarly, this Article does not determine who has the power to release a mortgage of record. That issue is determined by real-property law.
7. Investment Property. Subsections (f) and (g) follow former Section 9-115(2).
Section 36-9-309. Security interest perfected upon attachment.
The following security interests are perfected when they attach:
(1) a purchase-money security interest in consumer goods, except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-311(b) with respect to consumer goods that are subject to a statute or treaty described in Section 36-9-311(a);
(2) an assignment of accounts or payment intangibles which does not by itself or in conjunction with other assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant part of the assignor's outstanding accounts or payment intangibles;
(3) a sale of a payment intangible;
(4) a sale of a promissory note;
(5) a security interest created by the assignment of a health-care-insurance receivable to the provider of the health-care goods or services;
(6) a security interest arising under Section 36-2-401, 36-2-505, 36-2-711(3), or 36-2A-508(5), until the debtor obtains possession of the collateral;
(7) a security interest of a collecting bank arising under Section 36-4-210;
(8) a security interest of an issuer or nominated person arising under Section 36-5-118;
(9) a security interest arising in the delivery of a financial asset under Section 36-9-206(c);
(10) a security interest in investment property created by a broker or securities intermediary;
(11) a security interest in a commodity contract or a commodity account created by a commodity intermediary;
(12) an assignment for the benefit of all creditors of the transferor and subsequent transfers by the assignee thereunder; and
(13) a security interest created by an assignment of a beneficial interest in a decedent's estate.
Official Comment
1. Source. Derived from former Sections 9-302(1), 9-115(4)(c), (d), 9-116.
2. Automatic Perfection. This Section contains the perfection-upon-attachment rules previously located in former Sections 9-302(1), 9-115(4)(c), (d), and 9-116. Rather than continue to state the rule by indirection, this Section explicitly provides for perfection upon attachment.
3. Purchase-Money Security Interest in Consumer Goods. Former Section 9-302(1)(d) has been revised and appears here as paragraph (1). No filing or other step is required to perfect a purchase-money security interest in consumer goods, other than goods, such as automobiles, that are subject to a statute or treaty described in Section 9-311(a). However, filing is required to perfect a non-purchase-money security interest in consumer goods and is necessary to prevent a buyer of consumer goods from taking free of a security interest under Section 9-320(b). A fixture filing is required for priority over conflicting interests in fixtures to the extent provided in Section 9-334.
4. Rights to Payment. Paragraph (2) expands upon former Section 9-302(1)(e) by affording automatic perfection to certain assignments of payment intangibles as well as accounts. The purpose of paragraph (2) is to save from ex post facto invalidation casual or isolated assignments-assignments which no one would think of filing. Any person who regularly takes assignments of any debtor's accounts or payment intangibles should file. In this connection Section 9-109(d)(4) through (7), which excludes certain transfers of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes from this Article, should be consulted.
Paragraphs (3) and (4), which are new, afford automatic perfection to sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes, respectively. They reflect the practice under former Article 9. Under that Article, filing a financing statement did not affect the rights of a buyer of payment intangibles or promissory notes, inasmuch as the former Article did not cover those sales. To the extent that the exception in paragraph (2) covers outright sales of payment intangibles, which automatically are perfected under paragraph (3), the exception is redundant.
5. Health-Care-Insurance Receivables. Paragraph (5) extends automatic perfection to assignments of health-care-insurance receivables if the assignment is made to the health-care provider that provided the health-care goods or services. The primary effect is that, when an individual assigns a right to payment under an insurance policy to the person who provided health-care goods or services, the provider has no need to file a financing statement against the individual. The normal filing requirements apply to other assignments of health-care-insurance receivables covered by this Article, e.g., assignments from the health-care provider to a financer.
6. Investment Property. Paragraph (9) replaces the last clause of former Section 9-116(2), concerning security interests that arise in the delivery of a financial asset.
Paragraphs (10) and (11) replace former Section 9-115(4)(c) and (d), concerning secured financing of securities and commodity firms and clearing corporations. The former Sections indicated that, with respect to certain security interests created by a securities intermediary or commodity intermediary, "[t]he filing of a financing statement . . . has no effect for purposes of perfection or priority with respect to that security interest." No change in meaning is intended by the deletion of the quoted phrase.
Secured financing arrangements for securities firms are currently implemented in various ways. In some circumstances, lenders may require that the transactions be structured as "hard pledges," where the securities are transferred on the books of a clearing corporation from the debtor's account to the lender's account or to a special pledge account for the lender where they cannot be disposed of without the specific consent of the lender. In other circumstances, lenders are content with so-called "agreement to pledge" or "agreement to deliver" arrangements, where the debtor retains the positions in its own account, but reflects on its books that the positions have been hypothecated and promises that the securities will be transferred to the secured party's account on demand.
The perfection and priority rules of this Article are designed to facilitate current secured financing arrangements for securities firms as well as to provide sufficient flexibility to accommodate new arrangements that develop in the future. Hard pledge arrangements are covered by the concept of control. See Sections 9-314, 9-106, 8-106. Non-control secured financing arrangements for securities firms are covered by the automatic perfection rule of paragraph (10). Before the 1994 revision of Articles 8 and 9, agreement to pledge arrangements could be implemented under a provision that a security interest in securities given for new value under a written security agreement was perfected without filing or possession for a period of 21 days. Although the security interests were temporary in legal theory, the financing arrangements could, in practice, be continued indefinitely by rolling over the loans at least every 21 days. Accordingly, a knowledgeable creditor of a securities firm realizes that the firm's securities may be subject to security interests that are not discoverable from any public records. The automatic-perfection rule of paragraph (10) makes it unnecessary to engage in the purely formal practice of rolling over these arrangements every 21 days.
In some circumstances, a clearing corporation may be the debtor in a secured financing arrangement. For example, a clearing corporation that settles delivery-versus-payment transactions among its participants on a net, same-day basis relies on timely payments from all participants with net obligations due to the system. If a participant that is a net debtor were to default on its payment obligation, the clearing corporation would not receive some of the funds needed to settle with participants that are net creditors to the system. To complete end-of-day settlement after a payment default by a participant, a clearing corporation that settles on a net, same-day basis may need to draw on credit lines and pledge securities of the defaulting participant or other securities pledged by participants in the clearing corporation to secure such drawings. The clearing corporation may be the top-tier securities intermediary for the securities pledged, so that it would not be practical for the lender to obtain control. Even where the clearing corporation holds some types of securities through other intermediaries, however, the clearing corporation is unlikely to be able to complete the arrangements necessary to convey "control" over the securities to be pledged in time to complete settlement in a timely manner. However, the term "securities intermediary" is defined in Section 8-102(a)(14) to include clearing corporations. Thus, the perfection rule of paragraph (10) applies to security interests in investment property granted by clearing corporations.
7. Beneficial Interests in Trusts. Under former Section 9-302(1)(c), filing was not required to perfect a security interest created by an assignment of a beneficial interest in a trust. Because beneficial interests in trusts are now used as collateral with greater frequency in commercial transactions, under this Article filing is required to perfect a security interest in a beneficial interest.
8. Assignments for Benefit of Creditors. No filing or other action is required to perfect an assignment for the benefit of creditors. These assignments are not financing transactions, and the debtor ordinarily will not be engaging in further credit transactions.
Section 36-9-310. When filing required to perfect security interest or agricultural lien; security interests and agricultural liens to which filing provisions do not apply.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) and Section 36-9-312(b), a financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests and agricultural liens.
(b) The filing of a financing statement is not necessary to perfect a security interest:
(1) that is perfected under Section 36-9-308(d), (e), (f), or (g);
(2) that is perfected under Section 36-9-309 when it attaches;
(3) in property subject to a statute, regulation, or treaty described in Section 36-9-311(a);
(4) in goods in possession of a bailee which is perfected under Section 36-9-312(d)(1) or (2);
(5) in certificated securities, documents, goods, or instruments which is perfected without filing or possession under Section 36-9-312(e), (f), or (g);
(6) in collateral in the secured party's possession under Section 36-9-313;
(7) in a certificated security which is perfected by delivery of the security certificate to the secured party under Section 36-9-313;
(8) in deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, investment property, or letter-of-credit rights which is perfected by control under Section 36-9-314;
(9) in proceeds which is perfected under Section 36-9-315; or
(10) that is perfected under Section 36-9-316.
(c) If a secured party assigns a perfected security interest or agricultural lien, a filing under this article is not required to continue the perfected status of the security interest against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-302(1), (2).
2. General Rule. Subsection (a) establishes a central Article 9 principle: Filing a financing statement is necessary for perfection of security interests and agricultural liens. However, filing is not necessary to perfect a security interest that is perfected by another permissible method, see subsection (b), nor does filing ordinarily perfect a security interest in a deposit account, letter-of-credit right, or money. See Section 9-312(b). Part 5 of the Article deals with the office in which to file, mechanics of filing, and operations of the filing office.
3. Exemptions from Filing. Subsection (b) lists the security interests for which filing is not required as a condition of perfection, because they are perfected automatically upon attachment (subsections (b)(2) and (b)(9)) or upon the occurrence of another event (subsections (b)(1), (b)(5), and (b)(9)), because they are perfected under the law of another jurisdiction (subsection (b)(10)), or because they are perfected by another method, such as by the secured party's taking possession or control (subsections (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7), and (b)(8)).
4. Assignments of Perfected Security Interests. Subsection (c) concerns assignment of a perfected security interest or agricultural lien. It provides that no filing is necessary in connection with an assignment by a secured party to an assignee in order to maintain perfection as against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor.
Example 1: Buyer buys goods from Seller, who retains a security interest in them. After Seller perfects the security interest by filing, Seller assigns the perfected security interest to X. The security interest, in X's hands and without further steps on X's part, continues perfected against Buyer's transferees and creditors.
Example 2: Dealer creates a security interest in specific equipment in favor of Lender. After Lender perfects the security interest in the equipment by filing, Lender assigns the chattel paper (which includes the perfected security interest in Dealer's equipment) to X. The security interest in the equipment, in X's hands and without further steps on X's part, continues perfected against Dealer's transferees and creditors. However, regardless of whether Lender made the assignment to secure Lender's obligation to X or whether the assignment was an outright sale of the chattel paper, the assignment creates a security interest in the chattel paper in favor of X. Accordingly, X must take whatever steps may be required for perfection in order to be protected against Lender's transferees and creditors with respect to the chattel paper.
Subsection (c) applies not only to an assignment of a security interest perfected by filing but also to an assignment of a security interest perfected by a method other than by filing, such as by control or by possession. Although subsection (c) addresses explicitly only the absence of an additional filing requirement, the same result normally will follow in the case of an assignment of a security interest perfected by a method other than by filing. For example, as long as possession of collateral is maintained by an assignee or by the assignor or another person on behalf of the assignee, no further perfection steps need be taken on account of the assignment to continue perfection as against creditors and transferees of the original debtor. Of course, additional action may be required for perfection of the assignee's interest as against creditors and transferees of the assignor.
Similarly, subsection (c) applies to the assignment of a security interest perfected by compliance with a statute, regulation, or treaty under Section 9-311(b), such as a certificate-of-title statute. Unless the statute expressly provides to the contrary, the security interest will remain perfected against creditors of and transferees from the original debtor, even if the assignee takes no action to cause the certificate of title to reflect the assignment or to cause its name to appear on the certificate of title. See PEB Commentary No. 12, which discusses this issue under former Section 9-302(3). Compliance with the statute is "equivalent to filing" under Section 9-311(b).
Section 36-9-311. Perfection of security interests in property subject to certain statutes, regulations, and treaties.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), the filing of a financing statement is not necessary or effective to perfect a security interest in property subject to:
(1) a statute, regulation, or treaty of the United States whose requirements for a security interest's obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the property preempt Section 36-9-310(a);
(2) Chapter 19 of Title 56 (Protection of title to and interests in motor vehicles) and Chapter 23 of Title 50 (Filing of watercraft and outboard motors) but during any period in which collateral is inventory held for sale by a person who is in the business of selling goods of that kind, the filing provisions of this chapter (Part 5) apply to a security interest in that collateral created by him as debtor; or
(3) a certificate-of-title statute of another jurisdiction which provides for a security interest to be indicated on the certificate as a condition or result of the security interest's obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor with respect to the property.
(b) Compliance with the requirements of a statute, regulation, or treaty described in subsection (a) for obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement under this chapter. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) and Sections 36-9-313 and 36-9-316(d) and (e) for goods covered by a certificate of title, a security interest in property subject to a statute, regulation, or treaty described in subsection (a) may be perfected only by compliance with those requirements, and a security interest so perfected remains perfected notwithstanding a change in the use or transfer of possession of the collateral.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d) and Section 36-9-316(d) and (e), duration and renewal of perfection of a security interest perfected by compliance with the requirements prescribed by a statute, regulation, or treaty described in subsection (a) are governed by the statute, regulation, or treaty. In other respects, the security interest is subject to this chapter.
(d) During any period in which collateral is inventory held for sale or lease by a person or leased by that person as lessor and that person is in the business of selling or leasing goods of that kind, this section does not apply to a security interest in that collateral created by that person as debtor.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-302(3), (4).
2. Federal Statutes, Regulations, and Treaties. Subsection (a)(1) exempts from the filing provisions of this Article transactions as to which a system of filing-state or federal-has been established under federal law. Subsection (b) makes clear that when such a system exists, perfection of a relevant security interest can be achieved only through compliance with that system (i.e., filing under this Article is not a permissible alternative).
An example of the type of federal statute referred to in subsection (a)(1) is 49 U.S.C. 44107-11, for civil aircraft of the United States. The Assignment of Claims Act of 1940, as amended, provides for notice to contracting and disbursing officers and to sureties on bonds but does not establish a national filing system and therefore is not within the scope of subsection (a)(1). An assignee of a claim against the United States may benefit from compliance with the Assignment of Claims Act. But regardless of whether the assignee complies with that Act, the assignee must file under this Article in order to perfect its security interest against creditors and transferees of its assignor.
Subsection (a)(1) provides explicitly that the filing requirement of this Article defers only to federal statutes, regulations, or treaties whose requirements for a security interest's obtaining priority over the rights of a lien creditor preempt Section 9-310(a). The provision eschews reference to the term "perfection," inasmuch as Section 9-308 specifies the meaning of that term and a preemptive rule may use other terminology.
3. State Statutes. Subsections (a)(2) and (3) exempt from the filing requirements of this Article transactions covered by State certificate-of-title statutes covering motor vehicles and the like. The description of certificate-of-title statutes in subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) tracks the language of the definition of "certificate of title" in Section 9-102. For a discussion of the operation of state certificate-of-title statutes in interstate contexts, see the Comments to Section 9-303.
Some states have enacted central filing statutes with respect to secured transactions in kinds of property that are of special importance in the local economy. Subsection (a)(2) defers to these statutes with respect to filing for that property.
4. Inventory Covered by Certificate of Title. Under subsection (d), perfection of a security interest in the inventory of a dealer is governed by the normal perfection rules, even if the inventory is covered by a certificate of title. Under former Section 9-302(3), a secured party who financed a dealer may have needed to perfect by filing for goods held for sale and by compliance with a certificate-of-title statute for goods held for lease. In some cases, this may have required notation on thousands of certificates. The problem would have been compounded by the fact that dealers, particularly of automobiles, often do not know whether a particular item of inventory will be sold or leased. Under subsection (d), notation is both unnecessary and ineffective.
The filing and other perfection provisions of this Article apply to goods covered by a certificate of title only "during any period in which collateral is inventory held for sale or lease or leased." If the debtor takes goods of this kind out of inventory and uses them, say, as equipment, a filed financing statement would not remain effective to perfect a security interest.
5. Compliance with Perfection Requirements of Other Statute. Subsection (b) makes clear that compliance with the perfection requirements (i.e., the requirements for obtaining priority over a lien creditor), but not other requirements, of a statute, regulation, or treaty described in subsection (a) is sufficient for perfection under this Article. Perfection of a security interest under a such a statute, regulation, or treaty has all the consequences of perfection under this Article.
The interplay of this Section with certain certificate-of-title statutes may create confusion and uncertainty. For example, statutes under which perfection does not occur until a certificate of title is issued will create a gap between the time that the goods are covered by the certificate under Section 9-303 and the time of perfection. If the gap is long enough, it may result in turning some unobjectionable transactions into avoidable preferences under Bankruptcy Code Section 547. (The preference risk arises if more than ten days (or 20 days, in the case of a purchase-money security interest) passes between the time a security interest attaches (or the debtor receives possession of the collateral, in the case of a purchase-money security interest) and the time it is perfected.) Accordingly, the Legislative Note to this Section instructs the legislature to amend the applicable certificate-of-title statute to provide that perfection occurs upon receipt by the appropriate State official of a properly tendered application for a certificate of title on which the security interest is to be indicated.
Under some certificate-of-title statutes, including the Uniform Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title and Anti-Theft Act, perfection generally occurs upon delivery of specified documents to a state official but may, under certain circumstances, relate back to the time of attachment. This relation-back feature can create great difficulties for the application of the rules in Sections 9-303 and 9-311(b). Accordingly, the Legislative Note also recommends to legislatures that they remove any relation-back provisions from certificate-of-title statutes affecting security interests.
6. Compliance with Perfection Requirements of Other Statute as Equivalent to Filing. Under Subsection (b), compliance with the perfection requirements (i.e., the requirements for obtaining priority over a lien creditor) of a statute, regulation, or treaty described in subsection (a) "is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement."
The quoted phrase appeared in former Section 9-302(3). Its meaning was unclear, and many questions arose concerning the extent to which and manner in which Article 9 rules referring to "filing" were applicable to perfection by compliance with a certificate-of-title statute. This Article takes a variety of approaches for applying Article 9's filing rules to compliance with other statutes and treaties. First, as discussed above in Comment 5, it leaves the determination of some rules, such as the rule establishing time of perfection (Section 9-516(a)), to the other statutes themselves. Second, this Article explicitly applies some Article 9 filing rules to perfection under other statutes or treaties. See, e.g., Section 9-505. Third, this Article makes other Article 9 rules applicable to security interests perfected by compliance with another statute through the "equivalent to . . . filing" provision in the first sentence of Section 9-311(b). The third approach is reflected for the most part in occasional Comments explaining how particular rules apply when perfection is accomplished under Section 9-311(b). See, e.g., Section 9-310, Comment 4; Section 9-315, Comment 6; Section 9-317, Comment 8. The absence of a Comment indicating that a particular filing provision applies to perfection pursuant to Section 9-311(b) does not mean the provision is inapplicable.
7. Perfection by Possession of Goods Covered by Certificate-of-Title Statute. A secured party who holds a security interest perfected under the law of State A in goods that subsequently are covered by a State B certificate of title may face a predicament. Ordinarily, the secured party will have four months under State B's Section 9-316(c) and (d) in which to (re)perfect as against a purchaser of the goods by having its security interest noted on a State B certificate. This procedure is likely to require the cooperation of the debtor and any competing secured party whose security interest has been noted on the certificate. Comment 4(e) to former Section 9-103 observed that "that cooperation is not likely to be forthcoming from an owner who wrongfully procured the issuance of a new certificate not showing the out-of-state security interest, or from a local secured party finding himself in a priority contest with the out-of-state secured party." According to that Comment, "[t]he only solution for the out-of-state secured party under present certificate of title statutes seems to be to reperfect by possession, i.e., by repossessing the goods." But the "solution" may not have worked: Former Section 9-302(4) provided that a security interest in property subject to a certificate-of-title statute "can be perfected only by compliance therewith."
Sections 9-316(d) and (e), 9-311(c), and 9-313(b) of this Article resolve the conflict by providing that a security interest that remains perfected solely by virtue of Section 9-316(e) can be (re)perfected by the secured party's taking possession of the collateral. These Sections contemplate only that taking possession of goods covered by a certificate of title will work as a method of perfection. None of these Sections creates a right to take possession. Section 9-609 and the agreement of the parties define the secured party's right to take possession.
Section 36-9-312. Perfection of security interests in chattel paper, deposit accounts, documents, goods covered by documents, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, and money; perfection by permissive filing; temporary perfection without filing or transfer of possession.
(a) A security interest in chattel paper, negotiable documents, instruments, or investment property may be perfected by filing.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-315(c) and (d) for proceeds:
(1) a security interest in a deposit account may be perfected only by control under Section 36-9-314;
(2) and except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-308(d), a security interest in a letter-of-credit right may be perfected only by control under Section 36-9-314; and
(3) a security interest in money may be perfected only by the secured party's taking possession under Section 36-9-313.
(c) While goods are in the possession of a bailee that has issued a negotiable document covering the goods:
(1) a security interest in the goods may be perfected by perfecting a security interest in the document; and
(2) a security interest perfected in the document has priority over any security interest that becomes perfected in the goods by another method during that time.
(d) While goods are in the possession of a bailee that has issued a nonnegotiable document covering the goods, a security interest in the goods may be perfected by:
(1) issuance of a document in the name of the secured party;
(2) the bailee's receipt of notification of the secured party's interest; or
(3) filing as to the goods.
(e) A security interest in certificated securities, negotiable documents, or instruments is perfected without filing or the taking of possession for a period of twenty days from the time it attaches to the extent that it arises for new value given under an authenticated security agreement.
(f) A perfected security interest in a negotiable document or goods in possession of a bailee, other than one that has issued a negotiable document for the goods, remains perfected for twenty days without filing if the secured party makes available to the debtor the goods or documents representing the goods for the purpose of:
(1) ultimate sale or exchange; or
(2) loading, unloading, storing, shipping, transshipping, manufacturing, processing, or otherwise dealing with them in a manner preliminary to their sale or exchange.
(g) A perfected security interest in a certificated security or instrument remains perfected for twenty days without filing if the secured party delivers the security certificate or instrument to the debtor for the purpose of:
(1) ultimate sale or exchange; or
(2) presentation, collection, enforcement, renewal, or registration of transfer.
(h) After the twenty-day period specified in subsection (e), (f), or (g) expires, perfection depends upon compliance with this chapter.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-304, with additions and some changes.
2. Instruments. Under subsection (a), a security interest in instruments may be perfected by filing. This rule represents an important change from former Article 9, under which the secured party's taking possession of an instrument was the only method of achieving long-term perfection. The rule is likely to be particularly useful in transactions involving large number of notes that a debtor uses as collateral but continues to collect from the makers. A security interest perfected by filing is subject to defeat by certain subsequent purchasers (including secured parties). Under Section 9-330(d), purchasers for value who take possession of an instrument without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party generally would achieve priority over a security interest in the instrument perfected by filing. In addition, Section 9-331 provides that filing a financing statement does not constitute notice that would preclude a subsequent purchaser from becoming a holder in due course and taking free of all claims under Section 3-306.
3. Chattel Paper; Negotiable Documents. Subsection (a) further provides that filing is available as a method of perfection for security interests in chattel paper and negotiable documents. Tangible chattel paper is sometimes delivered to the assignee, and sometimes left in the hands of the assignor for collection. Subsection (a) allows the assignee to perfect its security interest by filing in the latter case. Alternatively, the assignee may perfect by taking possession. See Section 9-313(a). An assignee of electronic chattel paper may perfect by taking control. See Sections 9-314(a), 9-105. The security interest of an assignee who takes possession or control may qualify for priority over a competing security interest perfected by filing. See Section 9-330.
Negotiable documents may be, and usually are, delivered to the secured party. The secured party's taking possession will suffice as a perfection step. See Section 9-313(a). However, as is the case with chattel paper, a security interest in a negotiable document may be perfected by filing.
4. Investment Property. A security interest in investment property, including certificated securities, uncertificated securities, security entitlements, and securities accounts, may be perfected by filing. However, security interests created by brokers, securities intermediaries, or commodity intermediaries are automatically perfected; filing is of no effect. See Section 9-309(10), (11). A security interest in all kinds of investment property also may be perfected by control, see Sections 9-314, 9-106, and a security interest in a certificated security also may be perfected by the secured party's taking delivery under Section 8-301. See Section 9-313(a). A security interest perfected only by filing is subordinate to a conflicting security interest perfected by control or delivery. See Section 9-328(1), (5). Thus, although filing is a permissible method of perfection, a secured party who perfects by filing takes the risk that the debtor has granted or will grant a security interest in the same collateral to another party who obtains control. Also, perfection by filing would not give the secured party protection against other types of adverse claims, since the Article 8 adverse claim cut-off rules require control. See Section 8-510.
5. Deposit Accounts. Under new subsection (b)(1), the only method of perfecting a security interest in a deposit account as original collateral is by control. Filing is ineffective, except as provided in Section 9-315 with respect to proceeds. As explained in Section 9-104, "control" can arise as a result of an agreement among the secured party, debtor, and bank, whereby the bank agrees to comply with instructions of the secured party with respect to disposition of the funds on deposit, even though the debtor retains the right to direct disposition of the funds. Thus, subsection (b)(1) takes an intermediate position between certain non-UCC law, which conditions the effectiveness of a security interest on the secured party's enjoyment of such dominion and control over the deposit account that the debtor is unable to dispose of the funds, and the approach this Article takes to securities accounts, under which a secured party who is unable to reach the collateral without resort to judicial process may perfect by filing. By conditioning perfection on "control," rather than requiring the secured party to enjoy absolute dominion to the exclusion of the debtor, subsection (b)(1) permits perfection in a wide variety of transactions, including those in which the secured party actually relies on the deposit account in extending credit and maintains some meaningful dominion over it, but does not wish to deprive the debtor of access to the funds altogether.
6. Letter-of-Credit Rights. Letter-of-credit rights commonly are "supporting obligations," as defined in Section 9-102. Perfection as to the related account, chattel paper, document, general intangible, instrument, or investment property will perfect as to the letter-of-credit rights. See Section 9-308(d). Subsection (b)(2) provides that, in other cases, a security interest in a letter-of-credit right may be perfected only by control. "Control," for these purposes, is explained in Section 9-107.
7. Goods Covered by Document of Title. Subsection (c) applies to goods in the possession of a bailee who has issued a negotiable document covering the goods. Subsection (d) applies to goods in the possession of a bailee who has issued a nonnegotiable document of title, including a document of title that is "non-negotiable" under Section 7-104. Section 9-313 governs perfection of a security interest in goods in the possession of a bailee who has not issued a document of title.
Subsection (c) clarifies the perfection and priority rules in former Section 9-304(2). Consistently with the provisions of Article 7, subsection (c) takes the position that, as long as a negotiable document covering goods is outstanding, title to the goods is, so to say, locked up in the document. Accordingly, a security interest in goods covered by a negotiable document may be perfected by perfecting a security interest in the document. The security interest also may be perfected by another method, e.g., by filing. The priority rule in subsection (c) governs only priority between (i) a security interest in goods which is perfected by perfecting in the document and (ii) a security interest in the goods which becomes perfected by another method while the goods are covered by the document.
Example 1: While wheat is in a grain elevator and covered by a negotiable warehouse receipt, Debtor creates a security interest in the wheat in favor of SP-1 and SP-2. SP-1 perfects by filing a financing statement covering "wheat." Thereafter, SP-2 perfects by filing a financing statement describing the warehouse receipt. Subsection (c)(1) provides that SP-2's security interest is perfected. Subsection (c)(2) provides that SP-2's security interest is senior to SP-1's.
Example 2: The facts are as in Example 1, but SP-1's security interest attached and was perfected before the goods were delivered to the grain elevator. Subsection (c)(2) does not apply, because SP-1's security interest did not become perfected during the time that the wheat was in the possession of a bailee. Rather, the first-to-file-or-perfect priority rule applies. See Section 9-322.
A secured party may become "a holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated" under Section 7-501. If so, the secured party acquires the rights specified by Article 7. Article 9 does not limit those rights, which may include the right to priority over an earlier-perfected security interest. See Section 9-331(a).
Subsection (d) takes a different approach to the problem of goods covered by a nonnegotiable document. Here, title to the goods is not looked on as being locked up in the document, and the secured party may perfect its security interest directly in the goods by filing as to them. The subsection provides two other methods of perfection: issuance of the document in the secured party's name (as consignee of a straight bill of lading or the person to whom delivery would be made under a non-negotiable warehouse receipt) and receipt of notification of the secured party's interest by the bailee. Perfection under subsection (d) occurs when the bailee receives notification of the secured party's interest in the goods, regardless of who sends the notification. Receipt of notification is effective to perfect, regardless of whether the bailee responds. Unlike former Section 9-304(3), from which it derives, subsection (d) does not apply to goods in the possession of a bailee who has not issued a document of title. Section 9-313(c) covers that case and provides that perfection by possession as to goods not covered by a document requires the bailee's acknowledgment.
8. Temporary Perfection Without Having First Otherwise Perfected. Subsection (e) follows former Section 9-304(4) in giving perfected status to security interests in certificated securities, instruments, and negotiable documents for a short period (reduced from 21 to 20 days, which is the time period generally applicable in this Article), although there has been no filing and the collateral is in the debtor's possession. The 20-day temporary perfection runs from the date of attachment. There is no limitation on the purpose for which the debtor is in possession, but the secured party must have given "new value" (defined in Section 9-102) under an authenticated security agreement.
9. Maintaining Perfection After Surrendering Possession. There are a variety of legitimate reasons-many of them are described in subsections (f) and (g)-why certain types of collateral must be released temporarily to a debtor. No useful purpose would be served by cluttering the files with records of such exceedingly short term transactions.
Subsection (f) affords the possibility of 20-day perfection in negotiable documents and goods in the possession of a bailee but not covered by a negotiable document. Subsection (g) provides for 20-day perfection in certificated securities and instruments. These subsections derive from former Section 9-305(5). However, the period of temporary perfection has been reduced from 21 to 20 days, which is the time period generally applicable in this Article, and "enforcement" has been added in subsection (g) as one of the special and limited purposes for which a secured party can release an instrument or certificated security to the debtor and still remain perfected. The period of temporary perfection runs from the date a secured party who already has a perfected security interest turns over the collateral to the debtor. There is no new value requirement, but the turnover must be for one or more of the purposes stated in subsection (f) or (g). The 20-day period may be extended by perfecting as to the collateral by another method before the period expires. However, if the security interest is not perfected by another method until after the 20-day period expires, there will be a gap during which the security interest is unperfected.
Temporary perfection extends only to the negotiable document or goods under subsections (f) and only to the certificated security or instrument under subsection (g). It does not extend to proceeds. If the collateral is sold, the security interest will continue in the proceeds for the period specified in Section 9-315.
Subsections (f) and (g) deal only with perfection. Other Sections of this Article govern the priority of a security interest in goods after surrender of the document covering them. In the case of a purchase-money security interest in inventory, priority may be conditioned upon giving notification to a prior inventory financer. See Section 9-324.
Section 36-9-313. When possession by or delivery to secured party perfects security interest without filing.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a secured party may perfect a security interest in negotiable documents, goods, instruments, money, or tangible chattel paper by taking possession of the collateral. A secured party may perfect a security interest in certificated securities by taking delivery of the certificated securities under Section 36-8-301.
(b) With respect to goods covered by a certificate of title issued by this State, a secured party may perfect a security interest in the goods by taking possession of the goods only in the circumstances described in Section 36-9-316(d).
(c) With respect to collateral other than certificated securities and goods covered by a document, a secured party takes possession of collateral in the possession of a person other than the debtor, the secured party, or a lessee of the collateral from the debtor in the ordinary course of the debtor's business, when:
(1) the person in possession authenticates a record acknowledging that it holds possession of the collateral for the secured party's benefit; or
(2) the person takes possession of the collateral after having authenticated a record acknowledging that it will hold possession of collateral for the secured party's benefit.
(d) If perfection of a security interest depends upon possession of the collateral by a secured party, perfection occurs no earlier than the time the secured party takes possession and continues only while the secured party retains possession.
(e) A security interest in a certificated security in registered form is perfected by delivery when delivery of the certificated security occurs under Section 36-8-301 and remains perfected by delivery until the debtor obtains possession of the security certificate.
(f) A person in possession of collateral is not required to acknowledge that it holds possession for a secured party's benefit.
(g) If a person acknowledges that it holds possession for the secured party's benefit:
(1) the acknowledgment is effective under subsection (c) or Section 36-8-301(a), even if the acknowledgment violates the rights of a debtor; and
(2) unless the person otherwise agrees or law other than this chapter otherwise provides, the person does not owe any duty to the secured party and is not required to confirm the acknowledgment to another person.
(h) A secured party having possession of collateral does not relinquish possession by delivering the collateral to a person other than the debtor or a lessee of the collateral from the debtor in the ordinary course of the debtor's business if the person was instructed before the delivery or is instructed contemporaneously with the delivery:
(1) to hold possession of the collateral for the secured party's benefit; or
(2) to redeliver the collateral to the secured party.
(i) A secured party does not relinquish possession, even if a delivery under subsection (h) violates the rights of a debtor. A person to which collateral is delivered under subsection (h) does not owe any duty to the secured party and is not required to confirm the delivery to another person unless the person otherwise agrees or law other than this chapter otherwise provides.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Sections 9-305, 9-115(6).
2. Perfection by Possession. As under the common law of pledge, no filing is required by this Article to perfect a security interest if the secured party takes possession of the collateral. See Section 9-310(b)(6).
This Section permits a security interest to be perfected by the taking of possession only when the collateral is goods, instruments, negotiable documents, money, or tangible chattel paper. Accounts, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction are excluded. (But see Comment 6, below, regarding certificated securities.) A security interest in accounts and payment intangibles-property not ordinarily represented by any writing whose delivery operates to transfer the right to payment-may under this Article be perfected only by filing. This rule would not be affected by the fact that a security agreement or other record described the assignment of such collateral as a "pledge." Section 9-309(2) exempts from filing certain assignments of accounts or payment intangibles which are out of the ordinary course of financing. These exempted assignments are perfected when they attach. Similarly, under Section 9-309(3), sales of payment intangibles are automatically perfected.
3. "Possession." This Section does not define "possession." In determining whether a particular person has possession, the principles of agency apply. For example, if the collateral clearly is in possession of an agent of the secured party for the purposes of possessing on behalf of the secured party, and if the agent is not also an agent of the debtor, the secured party has taken actual possession without the need to rely on a third-party acknowledgment. See subsection (c) and Comments 4 and 8. However, if the agent is an agent of both the secured party and the debtor, prudence might suggest that the secured party obtain the agent's acknowledgment in order to ensure perfection by possession. The debtor cannot qualify as an agent for the secured party for purposes of the secured party's taking possession. And, under appropriate circumstances, a court may determine that a third person in possession is so closely connected to or controlled by the debtor that the debtor has retained effective possession, even though the third person may have agreed to take possession on behalf of the secured party. If so, the third person's taking possession would not constitute the secured party's taking possession and would not be sufficient for perfection. See also Section 9-205(b). In a typical escrow arrangement, where the escrowee holds possession of collateral as agent for both the secured party and the debtor, the debtor's relationship to the escrowee is not such as to constitute retention of possession by the debtor.
4. Goods in Possession of Third Party: Perfection. Former Section 9-305 permitted perfection of a security interest by notification to a bailee in possession of collateral. This Article distinguishes between goods in the possession of a bailee who has issued a document of title covering the goods and goods in the possession of a third party who has not issued a document. Section 9-312(c) or (d) applies to the former, depending on whether the document is negotiable. Section 9-313(c) applies to the latter. It provides a method of perfection by possession when the collateral is possessed by a third person who is not the secured party's agent.
Notification of a third person does not suffice to perfect under Section 9-313(c). Rather, perfection does not occur unless the third person authenticates an acknowledgment that it holds possession of the collateral for the secured party's benefit. Compare Section 9-312(d), under which receipt of notification of the security party's interest by a bailee holding goods covered by a nonnegotiable document is sufficient to perfect, even if the bailee does not acknowledge receipt of the notification. A third person may acknowledge that it will hold for the secured party's benefit goods to be received in the future. Under these circumstances, perfection by possession occurs when the third person obtains possession of the goods.
Under subsection (c), acknowledgment of notification by a "lessee . . . in . . . ordinary course of . . . business" (defined in Section 2A-103) does not suffice for possession. The Section thus rejects the reasoning of In re Atlantic Systems, Inc., 135 B.R. 463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that notification to debtor-lessor's lessee sufficed to perfect security interest in leased goods). See Steven O. Weise, Perfection by Possession: The Need for an Objective Test, 29 Idaho Law Rev. 705 (1992-93) (arguing that lessee's possession in ordinary course of debtor-lessor's business does not provide adequate public notice of possible security interest in leased goods). Inclusion of a per se rule concerning lessees is not meant to preclude a court, under appropriate circumstances, from determining that a third person is so closely connected to or controlled by the debtor that the debtor has retained effective possession. If so, the third person's acknowledgment would not be sufficient for perfection.
5. No Relation Back. Former Section 9-305 provided that a security interest is perfected by possession from the time possession is taken "without a relation back." As the Comment to former Section 9-305 observed, the relation-back theory, under which the taking of possession was deemed to relate back to the date of the original security agreement, has had little vitality since the 1938 revision of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. The theory is inconsistent with former Article 9 and with this Article. See Section 9-313(d). Accordingly, this Article deletes the quoted phrase as unnecessary. Where a pledge transaction is contemplated, perfection dates only from the time possession is taken, although a security interest may attach, unperfected. The only exceptions to this rule are the short, 20-day periods of perfection provided in Section 9-312(e), (f), and (g), during which a debtor may have possession of specified collateral in which there is a perfected security interest.
6. Certificated Securities. The second sentence of subsection (a) reflects the traditional rule for perfection of a security interest in certificated securities. Compare Section 9-115(6) (1994 Official Text); Sections 8-321, 8-313(1)(a) (1978 Official Text); Section 9-305 (1972 Official Text). It has been modified to refer to "delivery" under Section 8-301. Corresponding changes appear in Section 9-203(b).
Subsections (e), (f), and (g), which are new, apply to a person in possession of security certificates or holding security certificates for the secured party's benefit under Section 8-301. For delivery to occur when a person other than a secured party holds possession for the secured party, the person may not be a securities intermediary.
Under subsection (e), a possessory security interest in a certificated security remains perfected until the debtor obtains possession of the security certificate. This rule is analogous to that of Section 9-314(c), which deals with perfection of security interests in investment property by control. See Section 9-314, Comment 3.
7. Goods Covered by Certificate of Title. Subsection (b) is necessary to effect changes to the choice-of-law rules governing goods covered by a certificate of title. These changes are described in the Comments to Section 9-311. Subsection (b), like subsection (a), does not create a right to take possession. Rather, it indicates the circumstances under which the secured party's taking possession of goods covered by a certificate of title is effective to perfect a security interest in the goods: the goods become covered by a certificate of title issued by this State at a time when the security interest is perfected by any method under the law of another jurisdiction.
8. Goods in Possession of Third Party: No Duty to Acknowledge; Consequences of Acknowledgment. Subsections (f) and (g) are new and address matters as to which former Article 9 was silent. They derive in part from Section 8-106(g). Subsection (f) provides that a person in possession of collateral is not required to acknowledge that it holds for a secured party. Subsection (g)(1) provides that an acknowledgment is effective even if wrongful as to the debtor. Subsection (g)(2) makes clear that an acknowledgment does not give rise to any duties or responsibilities under this Article. Arrangements involving the possession of goods are hardly standardized. They include bailments for services to be performed on the goods (such as repair or processing), for use (leases), as security (pledges), for carriage, and for storage. This Article leaves to the agreement of the parties and to any other applicable law the imposition of duties and responsibilities upon a person who acknowledges under subsection (c). For example, by acknowledging, a third party does not become obliged to act on the secured party's direction or to remain in possession of the collateral unless it agrees to do so or other law so provides.
9. Delivery to Third Party by Secured Party. New subsections (h) and (i) address the practice of mortgage warehouse lenders. These lenders typically send mortgage notes to prospective purchasers under cover of letters advising the prospective purchasers that the lenders hold security interests in the notes. These lenders relied on notification to maintain perfection under former 9-305. Requiring them to obtain authenticated acknowledgments from each prospective purchaser under subsection (c) could be unduly burdensome and disruptive of established practices. Under subsection (h), when a secured party in possession itself delivers the collateral to a third party, instructions to the third party would be sufficient to maintain perfection by possession; an acknowledgment would not be necessary. Under subsection (i), the secured party does not relinquish possession by making a delivery under subsection (h), even if the delivery violates the rights of the debtor. That subsection also makes clear that a person to whom collateral is delivered under subsection (h) does not owe any duty to the secured party and is not required to confirm the delivery to another person unless the person otherwise agrees or law other than this Article provides otherwise.
Section 36-9-314. Perfection by control.
(a) A security interest in investment property, deposit accounts, letter-of-credit rights, or electronic chattel paper may be perfected by control of the collateral under Section 36-9-104, 36-9-105, 36-9-106, or 36-9-107.
(b) A security interest in deposit accounts, electronic chattel paper, or letter-of-credit rights is perfected by control under Section 36-9-104, 36-9-105, or 36-9-107 when the secured party obtains control and remains perfected by control only while the secured party retains control.
(c) A security interest in investment property is perfected by control under Section 36-9-106 from the time the secured party obtains control and remains perfected by control until:
(1) the secured party does not have control; and
(2) one of the following occurs:
(A) if the collateral is a certificated security, the debtor has or acquires possession of the security certificate;
(B) if the collateral is an uncertificated security, the issuer has registered or registers the debtor as the registered owner; or
(C) if the collateral is a security entitlement, the debtor is or becomes the entitlement holder.
Official Comment
1. Source. Substantially new; derived in part from former Section 9-115(4).
2. Control. This Section provides for perfection by control with respect to investment property, deposit accounts, letter-of-credit rights, and electronic chattel paper. For explanations of how a secured party takes control of these types of collateral, see Sections 9-104 through 9-107. Subsection (b) explains when a security interest is perfected by control and how long a security interest remains perfected by control. Like Section 9-313(d) and for the same reasons, subsection (b) makes no reference to the doctrine of "relation back." See Section 9-313, Comment 5.
3. Investment Property. Subsection (c) provides a special rule for investment property. Once a secured party has control, its security interest remains perfected by control until the secured party ceases to have control and the debtor receives possession of collateral that is a certificated security, becomes the registered owner of collateral that is an uncertificated security, or becomes the entitlement holder of collateral that is a security entitlement. The result is particularly important in the "repledge" context. See Section 9-207, Comment 5.
In a transaction in which a secured party who has control grants a security interest in investment property or sells outright the investment property, by virtue of the debtor's consent or applicable legal rules, a purchaser from the secured party typically will cut off the debtor's rights in the investment property or be immune from the debtor's claims. See Section 9-207, Comments 5 and 6. If the investment property is a security, the debtor normally would retain no interest in the security following the purchase from the secured party, and a claim of the debtor against the secured party for redemption (Section 9-623) or otherwise with respect to the security would be a purely personal claim. If the investment property transferred by the secured party is a financial asset in which the debtor had a security entitlement credited to a securities account maintained with the secured party as a securities intermediary, the debtor's claim against the secured party could arise as a part of its securities account notwithstanding its personal nature. (This claim would be analogous to a "credit balance" in the securities account, which is a component of the securities account even though it is a personal claim against the intermediary.) In the case in which the debtor may retain an interest in investment property notwithstanding a repledge or sale by the secured party, subsection (c) makes clear that the security interest will remain perfected by control.
Section 36-9-315. Secured party's rights on disposition of collateral and in proceeds.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this article and in Section 36-2-403(2):
(1) a security interest or agricultural lien continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition thereof unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the security interest or agricultural lien; and
(2) a security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collateral.
(b) Proceeds that are commingled with other property are identifiable proceeds:
(1) if the proceeds are goods, to the extent provided by Section 36-9-336; and
(2) if the proceeds are not goods, to the extent that the secured party identifies the proceeds by a method of tracing, including application of equitable principles, that is permitted under law other than this article with respect to commingled property of the type involved.
(c) A security interest in proceeds is a perfected security interest if the security interest in the original collateral was perfected.
(d) A perfected security interest in proceeds becomes unperfected on the twenty-first day after the security interest attaches to the proceeds unless:
(1) the following conditions are satisfied:
(A) a filed financing statement covers the original collateral;
(B) the proceeds are collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in the office in which the financing statement has been filed; and
(C) the proceeds are not acquired with cash proceeds;
(2) the proceeds are identifiable cash proceeds; or
(3) the security interest in the proceeds is perfected other than under subsection (c) when the security interest attaches to the proceeds or within twenty days thereafter.
(e) If a filed financing statement covers the original collateral, a security interest in proceeds which remains perfected under subsection (d)(1) becomes unperfected at the later of:
(1) when the effectiveness of the filed financing statement lapses under Section 36-9-515 or is terminated under Section 36-9-513; or
(2) the twenty-first day after the security interest attaches to the proceeds.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-306.
2. Continuation of Security Interest or Agricultural Lien Following Disposition of Collateral. Subsection (a)(1), which derives from former Section 9-306(2), contains the general rule that a security interest survives disposition of the collateral. In these cases, the secured party may repossess the collateral from the transferee or, in an appropriate case, maintain an action for conversion. The secured party may claim both any proceeds and the original collateral but, of course, may have only one satisfaction.
In many cases, a purchaser or other transferee of collateral will take free of a security interest, and the secured party's only right will be to proceeds. For example, the general rule does not apply, and a security interest does not continue in collateral, if the secured party authorized the disposition, in the agreement that contains the security agreement or otherwise. Subsection (a)(1) adopts the view of PEB Commentary No. 3 and makes explicit that the authorized disposition to which it refers is an authorized disposition "free of" the security interest or agricultural lien. The secured party's right to proceeds under this Section or under the express terms of an agreement does not in itself constitute an authorization of disposition. The change in language from former Section 9-306(2) is not intended to address the frequently litigated situation in which the effectiveness of the secured party's consent to a disposition is conditioned upon the secured party's receipt of the proceeds. In that situation, subsection (a) leaves the determination of authorization to the courts, as under former Article 9.
This Article contains several provisions under which a transferee takes free of a security interest or agricultural lien. For example, Section 9-317 states when transferees take free of unperfected security interests; Sections 9-320 and 9-321 on goods, 9-321 on general intangibles, 9-330 on chattel paper and instruments, and 9-331 on negotiable instruments, negotiable documents, and securities state when purchasers of such collateral take free of a security interest, even though perfected and even though the disposition was not authorized. Section 9-332 enables most transferees (including non-purchasers) of funds from a deposit account and most transferees of money to take free of a perfected security interest in the deposit account or money.
Likewise, the general rule that a security interest survives disposition does not apply if the secured party entrusts goods collateral to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind and the merchant sells the collateral to a buyer in ordinary course of business. Section 2-403(2) gives the merchant the power to transfer all the secured party's rights to the buyer, even if the sale is wrongful as against the secured party. Thus, under subsection (a)(1), an entrusting secured party runs the same risk as any other entruster.
3. Secured Party's Right to Identifiable Proceeds. Under subsection (a)(2), which derives from former Section 9-306(2), a security interest attaches to any identifiable "proceeds," as defined in Section 9-102. See also Section 9-203(f). Subsection (b) is new. It indicates when proceeds commingled with other property are identifiable proceeds and permits the use of whatever methods of tracing other law permits with respect to the type of property involved. Among the "equitable principles" whose use other law may permit is the "lowest intermediate balance rule." See Restatement (2d), Trusts Section 202.
4. Automatic Perfection in Proceeds: General Rule. Under subsection (c), a security interest in proceeds is a perfected security interest if the security interest in the original collateral was perfected. This Article extends the period of automatic perfection in proceeds from ten days to 20 days. Generally, a security interest in proceeds becomes unperfected on the 21st day after the security interest attaches to the proceeds. See subsection (d). The loss of perfected status under subsection (d) is prospective only. Compare, e.g., Section 9-515(c) (deeming security interest unperfected retroactively).
5. Automatic Perfection in Proceeds: Proceeds Acquired with Cash Proceeds. Subsection (d)(1) derives from former Section 9-306(3)(a). It carries forward the basic rule that a security interest in proceeds remains perfected beyond the period of automatic perfection if a filed financing statement covers the original collateral (e.g., inventory) and the proceeds are collateral in which a security interest may be perfected by filing in the office where the financing statement has been filed (e.g., equipment). A different rule applies if the proceeds are acquired with cash proceeds, as is the case if the original collateral (inventory) is sold for cash (cash proceeds) that is used to purchase equipment (proceeds). Under these circumstances, the security interest in the equipment proceeds remains perfected only if the description in the filed financing indicates the type of property constituting the proceeds (e.g., "equipment").
This Section reaches the same result but takes a different approach. It recognizes that the treatment of proceeds acquired with cash proceeds under former Section 9-306(3)(a) essentially was superfluous. In the example, had the filing covered "equipment" as well as "inventory," the security interest in the proceeds would have been perfected under the usual rules governing after-acquired equipment (see former Sections 9-302, 9-303); paragraph (3)(a) added only an exception to the general rule. Subsection (d)(1)(C) of this Section takes a more direct approach. It makes the general rule of continued perfection inapplicable to proceeds acquired with cash proceeds, leaving perfection of a security interest in those proceeds to the generally applicable perfection rules under subsection (d)(3).
Example 1: Lender perfects a security interest in Debtor's inventory by filing a financing statement covering "inventory." Debtor sells the inventory and deposits the buyer's check into a deposit account. Debtor draws a check on the deposit account and uses it to pay for equipment. Under the "lowest intermediate balance rule," which is a permitted method of tracing in the relevant jurisdiction, see Comment 3, the funds used to pay for the equipment were identifiable proceeds of the inventory. Because the proceeds (equipment) were acquired with cash proceeds (deposit account), subsection (d)(1) does not extend perfection beyond the 20-day automatic period.
Example 2: Lender perfects a security interest in Debtor's inventory by filing a financing statement covering "all debtor's property." As in Example 1, Debtor sells the inventory, deposits the buyer's check into a deposit account, draws a check on the deposit account, and uses the check to pay for equipment. Under the "lowest intermediate balance rule," which is a permitted method of tracing in the relevant jurisdiction, see Comment 3, the funds used to pay for the equipment were identifiable proceeds of the inventory. Because the proceeds (equipment) were acquired with cash proceeds (deposit account), subsection (d)(1) does not extend perfection beyond the 20-day automatic period. However, because the financing statement is sufficient to perfect a security interest in debtor's equipment, under subsection (d)(3) the security interest in the equipment proceeds remains perfected beyond the 20-day period.
6. Automatic Perfection in Proceeds: Lapse or Termination of Financing Statement During 20-Day Period; Perfection Under Other Statute or Treaty. Subsection (e) provides that a security interest in proceeds perfected under subsection (d)(1) ceases to be perfected when the financing statement covering the original collateral lapses or is terminated. If the lapse or termination occurs before the 21st day after the security interest attaches, however, the security interest in the proceeds remains perfected until the 21st day. Section 9-311(b) provides that compliance with the perfection requirements of a statute or treaty described in Section 9-311(a) "is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement." It follows that collateral subject to a security interest perfected by such compliance under Section 9-311(b) is covered by a "filed financing statement" within the meaning of Section 9-315(d) and (e).
7. Automatic Perfection in Proceeds: Continuation of Perfection in Cash Proceeds. Former Section 9-306(3)(b) provided that if a filed financing statement covered original collateral, a security interest in identifiable cash proceeds of the collateral remained perfected beyond the ten-day period of automatic perfection. Former Section 9-306(3)(c) contained a similar rule with respect to identifiable cash proceeds of investment property. Subsection (d)(2) extends the benefits of former Sections 9-306(3)(b) and (3)(c) to identifiable cash proceeds of all types of original collateral in which a security interest is perfected by any method. Under subsection (d)(2), if the security interest in the original collateral was perfected, a security interest in identifiable cash proceeds will remain perfected indefinitely, regardless of whether the security interest in the original collateral remains perfected. In many cases, however, a purchaser or other transferee of the cash proceeds will take free of the perfected security interest. See, e.g., Sections 9-330(d) (purchaser of check), 9-331 (holder in due course of check), 9-332 (transferee of money or funds from a deposit account).
8. Insolvency Proceedings; Returned and Repossessed Goods. This Article deletes former Section 9-306(4), which dealt with proceeds in insolvency proceedings. Except as otherwise provided by the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor's entering into bankruptcy does not affect a secured party's right to proceeds.
This Article also deletes former Section 9-306(5), which dealt with returned and repossessed goods. Section 9-330, Comments 9 to 11 explain and clarify the application of priority rules to returned and repossessed goods as proceeds of chattel paper.
9. Proceeds of Collateral Subject to Agricultural Lien. This Article does not determine whether a lien extends to proceeds of farm products encumbered by an agricultural lien. If, however, the proceeds are themselves farm products on which an "agricultural lien" (defined in Section 9-102) arises under other law, then the agricultural-lien provisions of this Article apply to the agricultural lien on the proceeds in the same way in which they would apply had the farm products not been proceeds.
Section 36-9-316. Continued perfection of security interest following change in governing law.
(a) A security interest perfected pursuant to the law of the jurisdiction designated in Section 36-9-301(1) or 36-9-305(c) remains perfected until the earliest of:
(1) the time perfection would have ceased under the law of that jurisdiction;
(2) the expiration of four months after a change of the debtor's location to another jurisdiction; or
(3) the expiration of one year after a transfer of collateral to a person that thereby becomes a debtor and is located in another jurisdiction.
(b) If a security interest described in subsection (a) becomes perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earliest time or event described in that subsection, it remains perfected thereafter. If the security interest does not become perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earliest time or event, it becomes unperfected and is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the collateral for value.
(c) A possessory security interest in collateral, other than goods covered by a certificate of title and as-extracted collateral consisting of goods, remains continuously perfected if:
(1) the collateral is located in one jurisdiction and subject to a security interest perfected under the law of that jurisdiction;
(2) thereafter the collateral is brought into another jurisdiction; and
(3) upon entry into the other jurisdiction, the security interest is perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction.
(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title which is perfected by any method under the law of another jurisdiction when the goods become covered by a certificate of title from this State remains perfected until the security interest would have become unperfected under the law of the other jurisdiction had the goods not become so covered.
(e) A security interest described in subsection (d) becomes unperfected as against a purchaser of the goods for value and is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the goods for value if the applicable requirements for perfection under Section 36-9-311(b) or 36-9-313 are not satisfied before the earlier of:
(1) the time the security interest would have become unperfected under the law of the other jurisdiction had the goods not become covered by a certificate of title from this State; or
(2) the expiration of four months after the goods had become so covered.
(f) A security interest in deposit accounts, letter-of-credit rights, or investment property which is perfected under the law of the bank's jurisdiction, the issuer's jurisdiction, a nominated person's jurisdiction, the securities intermediary's jurisdiction, or the commodity intermediary's jurisdiction, as applicable, remains perfected until the earlier of:
(1) the time the security interest would have become unperfected under the law of that jurisdiction; or
(2) the expiration of four months after a change of the applicable jurisdiction to another jurisdiction.
(g) If a security interest described in subsection (f) becomes perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earlier of the time or the end of the period described in that subsection, it remains perfected thereafter. If the security interest does not become perfected under the law of the other jurisdiction before the earlier of that time or the end of that period, it becomes unperfected and is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the collateral for value.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-103(1)(d), (2)(b), (3)(e), as modified.
2. Continued Perfection. This Section deals with continued perfection of security interests that have been perfected under the law of another jurisdiction. The fact that the law of a particular jurisdiction ceases to govern perfection under Sections 9-301 through 9-307 does not necessarily mean that a security interest perfected under that law automatically becomes unperfected. To the contrary: This Section generally provides that a security interest perfected under the law of one jurisdiction remains perfected for a fixed period of time (four months or one year, depending on the circumstances), even though the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection changes. However, cessation of perfection under the law of the original jurisdiction cuts short the fixed period. The four-month and one-year periods are long enough for a secured party to discover in most cases that the law of a different jurisdiction governs perfection and to reperfect (typically by filing) under the law of that jurisdiction. If a secured party properly reperfects a security interest before it becomes unperfected under subsection (a), then the security interest remains perfected continuously thereafter. See subsection (b).
Example 1: Debtor is a general partnership whose chief executive office is in Pennsylvania. Lender perfects a security interest in Debtor's equipment by filing in Pennsylvania on May 15, 2002. On April 1, 2005, without Lender's knowledge, Debtor moves its chief executive office to New Jersey. Lender's security interest remains perfected for four months after the move. See subsection (a)(2).
Example 2: Debtor is a general partnership whose chief executive office is in Pennsylvania. Lender perfects a security interest in Debtor's equipment by filing in Pennsylvania on May 15, 2002. On April 1, 2007, without Lender's knowledge, Debtor moves its chief executive office to New Jersey. Lender's security interest remains perfected only through May 14, 2007, when the effectiveness of the filed financing statement lapses. See subsection (a)(1). Although, under these facts, Lender would have only a short period of time to discover that Debtor had relocated and to reperfect under New Jersey law, Lender could have protected itself by filing a continuation statement in Pennsylvania before Debtor relocated. By doing so, Lender would have prevented lapse and allowed itself the full four months to discover Debtor's new location and refile there or, if Debtor is in default, to perfect by taking possession of the equipment.
Example 3: Under the facts of Example 2, Lender files a financing statement in New Jersey before the effectiveness of the Pennsylvania financing statement lapses. Under subsection (b), Lender's security interest is continuously perfected beyond May 14, 2007, for a period determined by New Jersey's Article 9.
Subsection (a)(3) allows a one-year period in which to reperfect. The longer period is necessary, because, even with the exercise of due diligence, the secured party may be unable to discover that the collateral has been transferred to a person located in another jurisdiction.
Example 4: Debtor is a Pennsylvania corporation. Lender perfects a security interest in Debtor's equipment by filing in Pennsylvania. Debtor's shareholders decide to "reincorporate" in Delaware. They form a Delaware corporation (Newcorp) into which they merge Debtor. The merger effectuates a transfer of the collateral from Debtor to Newcorp, which thereby becomes a debtor and is located in another jurisdiction. Under subsection (a)(3), the security interest remains perfected for one year after the merger. If a financing statement is filed in Delaware against Newcorp within the year following the merger, then the security interest remains perfected thereafter for a period determined by Delaware's Article 9.
Note that although Newcorp is a "new debtor" as defined in Section 9-102, the application of subsection (a)(3) is not limited to transferees who are new debtors. Note also that, under Section 9-507, the financing statement naming Debtor remains effective even though Newcorp has become the debtor.
This Section addresses security interests that are perfected (i.e., that have attached and as to which any required perfection step has been taken) before the debtor changes its location. It does not apply to security interests that have not attached before the location changes.
Example 5: Debtor is a Pennsylvania corporation. Debtor grants to Lender a security interest in Debtor's existing and after-acquired inventory. Lender perfects by filing in Pennsylvania. Debtor's shareholders decide to "reincorporate" in Delaware. They form a Delaware corporation (Newcorp) into which they merge Debtor. By virtue of the merger, Newcorp becomes bound by Debtor's security agreement. See Section 9-203. After the merger, Newcorp acquires inventory to which Lender's security interest attaches. Because Newcorp is located in Delaware, Delaware law governs perfection of a security interest in Newcorp's inventory. See Sections 9-301, 9-307. Having failed to perfect under Delaware law, Lender holds an unperfected security interest in the inventory acquired by Newcorp after the merger. The same result follows regardless of the name of the Delaware corporation (i.e., even if the Delaware corporation and Debtor have the same name).
3. Retroactive Unperfection. Subsection (b) sets forth the consequences of the failure to reperfect before perfection ceases under subsection (a): the security interest becomes unperfected prospectively and, as against purchasers for value, including buyers and secured parties, but not as against donees or lien creditors, retroactively. The rule applies to agricultural liens, as well. See also Section 9-515 (taking the same approach with respect to lapse). Although this approach creates the potential for circular priorities, the alternative-retroactive unperfection against lien creditors-would create substantial and unjustifiable preference risks.
Example 6: Under the facts of Example 4, six months after the merger, Buyer bought from Newcorp some equipment formerly owned by Debtor. At the time of the purchase, Buyer took subject to Lender's perfected security interest, of which Buyer was unaware. See Section 9-315(a)(1). However, subsection (b) provides that if Lender fails to reperfect in Delaware within a year after the merger, its security interest becomes unperfected and is deemed never to have been perfected against Buyer. Having given value and received delivery of the equipment without knowledge of the security interest and before it was perfected, Buyer would take free of the security interest. See Section 9-317(b).
Example 7: Under the facts of Example 4, one month before the merger, Debtor created a security interest in certain equipment in favor of Financer, who perfected by filing in Pennsylvania. At that time, Financer's security interest is subordinate to Lender's. See Section 9-322(a)(1). Financer reperfects by filing in Delaware within a year after the merger, but Lender fails to do so. Under subsection (b), Lender's security interest is deemed never to have been perfected against Financer, a purchaser for value. Consequently, under Section 9-322(a)(2), Financer's security interest is now senior.
Of course, the expiration of the time period specified in subsection (a) does not of itself prevent the secured party from later reperfecting under the law of the new jurisdiction. If the secured party does so, however, there will be a gap in perfection, and the secured party may lose priority as a result. Thus, in Example 7, if Lender perfects by filing in Delaware more than one year under the merger, it will have a new date of filing and perfection for purposes of Section 9-322(a)(1). Financer's security interest, whose perfection dates back to the filing in Pennsylvania under subsection (b), will remain senior.
4. Possessory Security Interests. Subsection (c) deals with continued perfection of possessory security interests. It applies not only to security interests perfected solely by the secured party's having taken possession of the collateral. It also applies to security interests perfected by a method that includes as an element of perfection the secured party's having taken possession, such as perfection by taking delivery of a certificated security in registered form, see Section 9-313(a) and perfection by obtaining control over a certificated security. See Section 9-314(a).
5. Goods Covered by Certificate of Title. Subsections (d) and (e) address continued perfection of a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title. The following examples explain the operation of those subsections.
Example 8: Debtor's automobile is covered by a certificate of title issued by Illinois. Lender perfects a security interest in the automobile by complying with Illinois' certificate-of-title statute. Thereafter, Debtor applies for a certificate of title in Indiana. Six months thereafter, Creditor acquires a judicial lien on the automobile. Under Section 9-303(b), Illinois law ceases to govern perfection; rather, once Debtor delivers the application and applicable fee to the appropriate Indiana authority, Indiana law governs. Nevertheless, under Indiana's Section 9-316(d), Lender's security interest remains perfected until it would become unperfected under Illinois law had no certificate of title been issued by Indiana. (For example, Illinois' certificate-of-title statute may provide that the surrender of an Illinois certificate of title in connection with the issuance of a certificate of title by another jurisdiction causes a security interest noted thereon to become unperfected.) If Lender's security interest remains perfected, it is senior to Creditor's judicial lien.
Example 9: Under the facts in Example 8, five months after Debtor applies for an Indiana certificate of title, Debtor sells the automobile to Buyer. Under subsection (e)(2), because Lender did not reperfect within the four months after the goods became covered by the Indiana certificate of title, Lender's security interest is deemed never to have been perfected against Buyer. Under Section 9-317(b), Buyer is likely to take free of the security interest. Lender could have protected itself by perfecting its security interest either under Indiana's certificate-of-title statute, see Section 9-311, or, if it had a right to do so under an agreement or Section 9-610, by taking possession of the automobile. See Section 9-313(b).
The results in Examples 8 and 9 do not depend on the fact that the original perfection was achieved by notation on a certificate of title. Subsection (d) applies regardless of the method by which a security interest is perfected under the law of another jurisdiction when the goods became covered by a certificate of title from this State.
Section 9-337 affords protection to a limited class of persons buying or acquiring a security interest in the goods while a security interest is perfected under the law of another jurisdiction but after this State has issued a clean certificate of title.
6. Deposit Accounts, Letter-of-Credit Rights, and Investment Property. Subsections (f) and (g) address changes in the jurisdiction of a bank, issuer of an uncertificated security, issuer of or nominated person under a letter of credit, securities intermediary, and commodity intermediary. The provisions are analogous to those of subsections (a) and (b).
7. Agricultural Liens. This Section does not apply to agricultural liens.
Example 10: Supplier holds an agricultural lien on corn. The lien arises under an Iowa statute. Supplier perfects by filing a financing statement in Iowa, where the corn is located. See Section 9-302. Debtor stores the corn in Missouri. Assume the Iowa agricultural lien survives or an agricultural lien arises under Missouri law (matters that this Article does not govern). Once the corn is located in Missouri, Missouri becomes the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection. See Section 9-302. Thus, the agricultural lien will not be perfected unless Supplier files a financing statement in Missouri.
Subpart 3.
Priority
Section 36-9-317. Interests that take priority over or take free of unperfected security interest or agricultural lien.
(a) An unperfected security interest or agricultural lien is subordinate to the rights of:
(1) a person entitled to priority under Section 36-9-322; and
(2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a person that becomes a lien creditor or acquires a lien pursuant to Section 27-39-210 before the earlier of the time the security interest or agricultural lien is perfected or a financing statement covering the collateral is filed.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a buyer, other than a secured party, of tangible chattel paper, documents, goods, instruments, or a security certificate takes free of a security interest or agricultural lien if the buyer gives value and receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest or agricultural lien and before it is perfected.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a lessee of goods takes free of a security interest or agricultural lien if the lessee gives value and receives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security interest or agricultural lien and before it is perfected.
(d) A licensee of a general intangible or a buyer, other than a secured party, of accounts, electronic chattel paper, general intangibles, or investment property other than a certificated security takes free of a security interest if the licensee or buyer gives value without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected.
(e) Except as otherwise provided in Sections 36-9-320 and 36-9-321, if a person files a financing statement with respect to a purchase-money security interest before or within twenty days after the debtor receives delivery of the collateral, the security interest takes priority over the rights of a buyer, lessee, or lien creditor which arise between the time the security interest attaches and the time of filing.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Sections 9-301, 2A-307(2).
2. Scope of This Section. As did former Section 9-301, this Section lists the classes of persons who take priority over, or take free of, an unperfected security interest. Section 9-308 explains when a security interest or agricultural lien is "perfected." A security interest that has attached (see Section 9-203) but as to which a required perfection step has not been taken is "unperfected." Certain provisions have been moved from former Section 9-301. The definition of "lien creditor" now appears in Section 9-102, and the rules governing priority in future advances are found in Section 9-323.
3. Competing Security Interests. Section 9-322 states general rules for determining priority among conflicting security interests and refers to other Sections that state special rules of priority in a variety of situations. The security interests given priority under Section 9-322 and the other Sections to which it refers take priority in general even over a perfected security interest. A fortiori they take priority over an unperfected security interest. Paragraph (a)(1) of this Section so states.
4. Filed but Unattached Security Interest vs. Lien Creditor. Under former Section 9-301(1)(b), a lien creditor's rights had priority over an unperfected security interest. Perfection required attachment (former Section 9-303) and attachment required the giving of value (former Section 9-203). It followed that, if a secured party had filed a financing statement but had not yet given value, an intervening lien creditor whose lien arose after filing but before attachment of the security interest acquired rights that are senior to those of the secured party who later gives value. This result comported with the nemo dat concept: When the security interest attached, the collateral was already subject to the judicial lien.
On the other hand, this result treated the first secured advance differently from all other advances. The special rule for future advances in former Section 9-301(4) (substantially reproduced in Section 9-323(b)) afforded priority to a discretionary advance made by a secured party within 45 days after the lien creditor's rights arose as long as the secured party was "perfected" when the lien creditor's lien arose-i.e., as long as the advance was not the first one and an earlier advance had been made.
Subsection (a)(2) revises former Section 9-301(1)(b) and treats the first advance the same as subsequent advances. That is, a judicial lien that arises after a financing statement is filed and before the security interest attaches and becomes perfected is subordinate to all advances secured by the security interest, even the first advance, except as otherwise provided in Section 9-323(b). However, if the security interest becomes unperfected (e.g., because the effectiveness of the filed financing statement lapses) before the judicial lien arises, the security interest is subordinate. If a financing statement is filed but a security interest does not attach, then no priority contest arises. The lien creditor has the only claim to the property.
5. Security Interest of Consignor or Receivables Buyer vs. Lien Creditor. Section 1-201(37) defines "security interest" to include the interest of most true consignors of goods and the interest of most buyers of certain receivables (accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes). A consignee of goods or a seller of accounts or chattel paper each is deemed to have rights in the collateral which a lien creditor may reach, as long as the competing security interest of the consignor or buyer is unperfected. This is so even though, as between the consignor and the debtor-consignee, the latter has only limited rights, and, as between the buyer and debtor-seller, the latter does not have any rights in the collateral. See Sections 9-318 (seller), 9-319 (consignee). Security interests arising from sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes are automatically perfected. See Section 9-309. Accordingly, a subsequent judicial lien always would be subordinate to the rights of a buyer of those types of receivables.
6. Purchasers Other Than Secured Parties. Subsections (b), (c), and (d) afford priority over an unperfected security interest to certain purchasers (other than secured parties) of collateral. They derive from former Sections 9-301(1)(c), 2A-307(2), and 9-301(d). Former Section 9-301(1)(c) and (1)(d) provided that unperfected security interests are "subordinate" to the rights of certain purchasers. But, as former Comment 9 suggested, the practical effect of subordination in this context is that the purchaser takes free of the security interest. To avoid any possible misinterpretation, subsections (b) and (d) of this Section use the phrase "takes free."
Subsection (b) governs goods, as well as intangibles of the type whose transfer is effected by physical delivery of the representative piece of paper (tangible chattel paper, documents, instruments, and security certificates). To obtain priority, a buyer must both give value and receive delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the existing security interest and before perfection. Even if the buyer gave value without knowledge and before perfection, the buyer would take subject to the security interest if perfection occurred before physical delivery of the collateral to the buyer. Subsection (c) contains a similar rule with respect to lessees of goods. Note that a lessee of goods in ordinary course of business takes free of all security interests created by the lessor, even if perfected. See Section 9-321.
Normally, there will be no question when a buyer of chattel paper, documents, instruments, or security certificates "receives delivery" of the property. See Section 1-201 (defining "delivery"). However, sometimes a buyer or lessee of goods, such as complex machinery, takes delivery of the goods in stages and completes assembly at its own location. Under those circumstances, the buyer or lessee "receives delivery" within the meaning of subsections (b) and (c) when, after an inspection of the portion of the goods remaining with the seller or lessor, it would be apparent to a potential lender to the seller or lessor that another person might have an interest in the goods.
The rule of subsection (b) obviously is not appropriate where the collateral consists of intangibles and there is no representative piece of paper whose physical delivery is the only or the customary method of transfer. Therefore, with respect to such intangibles (accounts, electronic chattel paper, general intangibles, and investment property other than certificated securities), subsection (d) gives priority to any buyer who gives value without knowledge, and before perfection, of the security interest. A licensee of a general intangible takes free of an unperfected security interest in the general intangible under the same circumstances. Note that a licensee of a general intangible in ordinary course of business takes rights under a nonexclusive license free of security interests created by the licensor, even if perfected. See Section 9-321.
Unless Section 9-109 excludes the transaction from this Article, a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes is a "secured party" (defined in Section 9-102), and subsections (b) and (d) do not determine priority of the security interest created by the sale. Rather, the priority rules generally applicable to competing security interests apply. See Section 9-322.
7. Agricultural Liens. Subsections (a), (b), and (c) subordinate unperfected agricultural liens in the same manner in which they subordinate unperfected security interests.
8. Purchase-Money Security Interests. Subsection (e) derives from former Section 9-301(2). It provides that, if a purchase-money security interest is perfected by filing no later than 20 days after the debtor receives delivery of the collateral, the security interest takes priority over the rights of buyers, lessees, or lien creditors which arise between the time the security interest attaches and the time of filing. Subsection (e) differs from former Section 9-301(2) in two significant respects. First, subsection (e) protects a purchase-money security interest against all buyers and lessees, not just against transferees in bulk. Second, subsection (e) conditions this protection on filing within 20, as opposed to ten, days after delivery.
Section 9-311(b) provides that compliance with the perfection requirements of a statute or treaty described in Section 9-311(a) "is equivalent to the filing of a financing statement." It follows that a person who perfects a security interest in goods covered by a certificate of title by complying with the perfection requirements of an applicable certificate-of-title statute "files a financing statement" within the meaning of subsection(e).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Section 9-317(a)(2) of the 1999 Official Text provides that an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor before the earlier of the time a security interest is perfected or a financing statement is filed covering the collateral. South Carolina has revised Section 9-317(a)(2) to provide that an unperfected security interest is also subordinate to a landlord who obtains a lien for distraint before the earlier of the time the secured party perfects or files a financing statement covering the collateral. See also Section 36-9-109(d)(1) (priority conflict between a landlord's lien and a security interest is governed by Section 36-9-317). A landlord does not acquire a lien for distraint until there is actual levy of a distress warrant. Burnett v. Boukedes, 240 S.C. 144, 125 S.E. 2d 10, 15 (1962). Therefore, under Section 36-9-317(a)(2) a secured party will be entitled to priority over landlord seeking to collect rent through distraint if the secured party files a financing statement covering the collateral or perfects its security interest before the actual levy of the distress warrant. The revision in Section 6-9-317(a)(2) was adopted to overrule the holding in Ex Parte J.M. Smith Corp., 330 S.C. 459, 498 S.E.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1998)
Section 36-9-318. No interest retained in right to payment that is sold; rights and title of seller of account or chattel paper with respect to creditors and purchasers.
(a) A debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the collateral sold.
(b) For purposes of determining the rights of creditors of, and purchasers for value of an account or chattel paper from, a debtor that has sold an account or chattel paper, while the buyer's security interest is unperfected, the debtor is deemed to have rights and title to the account or chattel paper identical to those the debtor sold.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Sellers of Accounts, Chattel Paper, Payment Intangibles, and Promissory Notes. Section 1-201(37) defines "security interest" to include the interest of a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes. See also Section 9-109(a) and Comment 5. Subsection (a) makes explicit what was implicit, but perfectly obvious, under former Article 9: The fact that a sale of an account or chattel paper gives rise to a "security interest" does not imply that the seller retains an interest in the property that has been sold. To the contrary, a seller of an account or chattel paper retains no interest whatsoever in the property to the extent that it has been sold. Subsection (a) also applies to sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes, transactions that were not covered by former Article 9. Neither this Article nor the definition of "security interest" in Section 1-201 provides rules for distinguishing sales transactions from those that create a security interest securing an obligation.
3. Buyers of Accounts and Chattel Paper. Another aspect of sales of accounts and chattel paper also was implicit, and equally obvious, under former Article 9: If the buyer's security interest is unperfected, then for purposes of determining the rights of certain third parties, the seller (debtor) is deemed to have all rights and title that the seller sold. The seller is deemed to have these rights even though, as between the parties, it has sold all its rights to the buyer. Subsection (b) makes this explicit. As a consequence of subsection (b), if the buyer's security interest is unperfected, the seller can transfer, and the creditors of the seller can reach, the account or chattel paper as if it had not been sold.
Example: Debtor sells accounts or chattel paper to Buyer-1 and retains no interest in them. Buyer-1 does not file a financing statement. Debtor then sells the same receivables to Buyer-2. Buyer-2 files a proper financing statement. Having sold the receivables to Buyer-1, Debtor would not have any rights in the collateral so as to permit Buyer-2's security (ownership) interest to attach. Nevertheless, under this Section, for purposes of determining the rights of purchasers for value from Debtor, Debtor is deemed to have the rights that Debtor sold. Accordingly, Buyer-2's security interest attaches, is perfected by the filing, and, under Section 9-322, is senior to Buyer-1's interest.
4. Effect of Perfection. If the security interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper is perfected the usual result would take effect: transferees from and creditors of the seller could not acquire an interest in the sold accounts or chattel paper. The same result would occur if payment intangibles or promissory notes were sold, inasmuch as the buyer's security interest is automatically perfected under Section 9-309.
Section 36-9-319. Rights and title of consignee with respect to creditors and purchasers.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), for purposes of determining the rights of creditors of, and purchasers for value of goods from, a consignee, while the goods are in the possession of the consignee, the consignee is deemed to have rights and title to the goods identical to those the consignor had or had power to transfer.
(b) For purposes of determining the rights of a creditor of a consignee, law other than this article determines the rights and title of a consignee while goods are in the consignee's possession if, under this part, a perfected security interest held by the consignor would have priority over the rights of the creditor.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Consignments. This Section takes an approach to consignments similar to that taken by Section 9-318 with respect to buyers of accounts and chattel paper. Revised Section 1-201(37) defines "security interest" to include the interest of a consignor of goods under many true consignments. Section 9-319(a) provides that, for purposes of determining the rights of certain third parties, the consignee is deemed to acquire all rights and title that the consignor had, if the consignor's security interest is unperfected. The consignee acquires these rights even though, as between the parties, it purchases a limited interest in the goods (as would be the case in a true consignment, under which the consignee acquires only the interest of a bailee). As a consequence of this Section, creditors of the consignee can acquire judicial liens and security interests in the goods.
Insofar as creditors of the consignee are concerned, this Article to a considerable extent reformulates the former law, which appeared in former Sections 2-326 and 9-114, without changing the results. However, neither Article 2 nor former Article 9 specifically addresses the rights of non-ordinary course buyers from the consignee. Former Section 9-114 contained priority rules applicable to security interests in consigned goods. Under this Article, the priority rules for purchase-money security interests in inventory apply to consignments. See Section 9-103(d). Accordingly, a special Section containing priority rules for consignments no longer is needed. Section 9-317 determines whether the rights of a judicial lien creditor are senior to the interest of the consignor, Sections 9-322 and 9-324 govern competing security interests in consigned goods, and Sections 9-317, 9-315, and 9-320 determine whether a buyer takes free of the consignor's interest.
The following example explains the operation of this Section:
Example 1: SP-1 delivers goods to Debtor in a transaction constituting a "consignment" as defined in Section 9-102. SP-1 does not file a financing statement. Debtor then grants a security interest in the goods to SP-2. SP-2 files a proper financing statement. Assuming Debtor is a mere bailee, as in a "true" consignment, Debtor would not have any rights in the collateral (beyond those of a bailee) so as to permit SP-2's security interest to attach to any greater rights. Nevertheless, under this Section, for purposes of determining the rights of Debtor's creditors, Debtor is deemed to acquire SP-1's rights. Accordingly, SP-2's security interest attaches, is perfected by the filing, and, under Section 9-322, is senior to SP-1's interest.
3. Effect of Perfection. Subsection (b) contains a special rule with respect to consignments that are perfected. If application of this Article would result in the consignor having priority over a competing creditor, then other law determines the rights and title of the consignee.
Example 2: SP-1 delivers goods to Debtor in a transaction constituting a "consignment" as defined in Section 9-102. SP-1 files a proper financing statement. Debtor then grants a security interest in the goods to SP-2. Under Section 9-322, SP-1's security interest is senior to SP-2's. Subsection (b) indicates that, for purposes of determining SP-2's rights, other law determines the rights and title of the consignee. If, for example, a consignee obtains only the special property of a bailee, then SP-2's security interest would attach only to that special property.
Example 3: SP-1 obtains a security interest in all Debtor's existing and after-acquired inventory. SP-1 perfects its security interest with a proper filing. Then SP-2 delivers goods to Debtor in a transaction constituting a "consignment" as defined in Section 9-102. SP-2 files a proper financing statement but does not send notification to SP-1 under Section 9-324(b). Accordingly, SP-2's security interest is junior to SP-1's under Section 9-322(a). Under Section 9-319(a), Debtor is deemed to have the consignor's rights and title, so that SP-1's security interest attaches to SP-2's ownership interest in the goods. Thereafter, Debtor grants a security interest in the goods to SP-3, and SP-3 perfects by filing. Because SP-2's perfected security interest is senior to SP-3's under Section 9-322(a), Section 9-319(b) applies: Other law determines Debtor's rights and title to the goods insofar as SP-3 is concerned, and SP-3's security interest attaches to those rights.
Section 36-9-320. Buyer of goods.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a buyer in ordinary course of business, other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations, takes free of a security interest created by the buyer's seller, even if the security interest is perfected and the buyer knows of its existence.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a buyer of goods from a person who used or bought the goods for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes takes free of a security interest, even if perfected, if the buyer buys:
(1) without knowledge of the security interest;
(2) for value;
(3) primarily for the buyer's personal, family, or household purposes; and
(4) before the filing of a financing statement covering the goods.
(c) To the extent that it affects the priority of a security interest over a buyer of goods under subsection (b), the period of effectiveness of a filing made in the jurisdiction in which the seller is located is governed by Section 36-9-316(a) and (b).
(d) A buyer in ordinary course of business buying oil, gas, or other minerals at the wellhead or minehead or after extraction takes free of an interest arising out of an encumbrance.
(e) Subsections (a) and (b) do not affect a security interest in goods in the possession of the secured party under Section 36-9-313.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-307.
2. Scope of This Section. This Section states when buyers of goods take free of a security interest even though perfected. Of course, a buyer who takes free of a perfected security interest takes free of an unperfected one. Section 9-317 should be consulted to determine what purchasers, in addition to the buyers covered in this Section, take free of an unperfected security interest. Article 2 states general rules on purchase of goods from a seller with defective or voidable title (Section 2-403).
3. Buyers in Ordinary Course. Subsection (a) derives from former Section 9-307(1). The definition of "buyer in ordinary course of business" in Section 1-201 restricts its application to buyers "from a person, other than a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of that kind." Thus subsection (a) applies primarily to inventory collateral. The subsection further excludes from its operation buyers of "farm products"(defined in Section 9-102) from a person engaged in farming operations. The buyer in ordinary course of business is defined as one who buys goods "in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person and in the ordinary course." Subsection (a) provides that such a buyer takes free of a security interest, even though perfected, and even though the buyer knows the security interest exists. Reading the definition together with the rule of law results in the buyer's taking free if the buyer merely knows that a security interest covers the goods but taking subject if the buyer knows, in addition, that the sale violates a term in an agreement with the secured party.
As did former Section 9-307(1), subsection (a) applies only to security interests created by the seller of the goods to the buyer in ordinary course. However, under certain circumstances a buyer in ordinary course who buys goods that were encumbered with a security interest created by a person other than the seller may take free of the security interest, as Example 2 explains. See also Comment 6, below.
Example 1: Manufacturer, who is in the business of manufacturing appliances, owns manufacturing equipment subject to a perfected security interest in favor of Lender. Manufacturer sells the equipment to Dealer, who is in the business of buying and selling used equipment. Buyer buys the equipment from Dealer. Even if Buyer qualifies as a buyer in the ordinary course of business, Buyer does not take free of Lender's security interest under subsection (a), because Dealer did not create the security interest; Manufacturer did.
Example 2: Manufacturer, who is in the business of manufacturing appliances, owns manufacturing equipment subject to a perfected security interest in favor of Lender. Manufacturer sells the equipment to Dealer, who is in the business of buying and selling used equipment. Lender learns of the sale but does nothing to assert its security interest. Buyer buys the equipment from Dealer. Inasmuch as Lender's acquiescence constitutes an "entrusting" of the goods to Dealer within the meaning of Section 2-403(3) Buyer takes free of Lender's security interest under Section 2-403(2) if Buyer qualifies as a buyer in ordinary course of business.
4. Buyers of Farm Products. This Section does not enable a buyer of farm products to take free of a security interest created by the seller, even if the buyer is a buyer in ordinary course of business. However, a buyer of farm products may take free of a security interest under Section 1324 of the Food Security Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. Section 1631.
5. Buyers of Consumer Goods. Subsection (b), which derives from former Section 9-307(2), deals with buyers of collateral that the debtor-seller holds as "consumer goods" (defined in Section 9-102). Under Section 9-309(1), a purchase-money interest in consumer goods, except goods that are subject to a statute or treaty described in Section 9-311(a) (such as automobiles that are subject to a certificate-of-title statute), is perfected automatically upon attachment. There is no need to file to perfect. Under subsection (b) a buyer of consumer goods takes free of a security interest, even though perfected, if the buyer buys (1) without knowledge of the security interest, (2) for value, (3) primarily for the buyer's own personal, family, or household purposes, and (4) before a financing statement is filed.
As to purchase money security interests which are perfected without filing under Section 9-309(1): A secured party may file a financing statement, although filing is not required for perfection. If the secured party does file, all buyers take subject to the security interest. If the secured party does not file, a buyer who meets the qualifications stated in the preceding paragraph takes free of the security interest.
As to security interests for which a perfection step is required: This category includes all non-purchase-money security interests, and all security interests, whether or not purchase-money, in goods subject to a statute or treaty described in Section 9-311(a), such as automobiles covered by a certificate-of-title statute. As long as the required perfection step has not been taken and the security interest remains unperfected, not only the buyers described in subsection (b) but also the purchasers described in Section 9-317 will take free of the security interest. After a financing statement has been filed or the perfection requirements of the applicable certificate-of-title statute have been complied with (compliance is the equivalent of filing a financing statement; see Section 9-311(b)), all subsequent buyers, under the rule of subsection (b), are subject to the security interest.
The rights of a buyer under subsection (b) turn on whether a financing statement has been filed against consumer goods. Occasionally, a debtor changes his or her location after a filing is made. Subsection (c), which derives from former Section 9-103(1)(d)(iii), deals with the continued effectiveness of the filing under those circumstances. It adopts the rules of Sections 9-316(a) and (b). These rules are explained in the Comments to that Section.
6. Authorized Dispositions. The limitations that subsections (a) and (b) impose on the persons who may take free of a security interest apply of course only to unauthorized sales by the debtor. If the secured party authorized the sale in an express agreement or otherwise, the buyer takes free under Section 9-315(a) without regard to the limitations of this Section. (That Section also states the right of a secured party to the proceeds of a sale, authorized or unauthorized.) Moreover, the buyer also takes free if the secured party waived or otherwise is precluded from asserting its security interest against the buyer. See Section 1-103.
7. Oil, Gas, and Other Minerals. Under subsection (d), a buyer in ordinary course of business of minerals at the wellhead or minehead or after extraction takes free of a security interest created by the seller. Specifically, it provides that qualified buyers take free not only of Article 9 security interests but also of interests "arising out of an encumbrance." As defined in Section 9-102, the term "encumbrance" means "a right, other than an ownership interest, in real property." Thus, to the extent that a mortgage encumbers minerals not only before but also after extraction, subsection (d) enables a buyer in ordinary course of the minerals to take free of the mortgage. This subsection does not, however, enable these buyers to take free of interests arising out of ownership interests in the real property. This issue is significant only in a minority of states. Several of them have adopted special statutes and nonuniform amendments to Article 9 to provide special protections to mineral owners, whose interests often are highly fractionalized in the case of oil and gas. See Terry I. Cross, Oil and Gas Product Liens--Statutory Security Interests for Producers and Royalty Owners Under the Statutes of Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas and Wyoming, 50 Consumer Fin. L. Q. Rep. 418 (1996). Inasmuch as a complete resolution of the issue would require the addition of complex provisions to this Article, and there are good reasons to believe that a uniform solution would not be feasible, this Article leaves its resolution to other legislation.
8. Possessory Security Interests. Subsection (e) is new. It rejects the holding of Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 350 N.E.2d 590 (N.Y. 1976) and, together with Section 9-317(b), prevents a buyer of goods collateral from taking free of a security interest if the collateral is in the possession of the secured party. "The secured party" referred in subsection (e) is the holder of the security interest referred to in subsection (a) or (b). Section 9-313 determines whether a secured party is in possession for purposes of this Section. Under some circumstances, Section 9-313 provides that a secured party is in possession of collateral even if the collateral is in the physical possession of a third party.
Section 36-9-321. Licensee of general intangible and lessee of goods in ordinary course of business.
(a) In this section, 'licensee in ordinary course of business' means a person that becomes a licensee of a general intangible in good faith, without knowledge that the license violates the rights of another person in the general intangible, and in the ordinary course from a person in the business of licensing general intangibles of that kind. A person becomes a licensee in the ordinary course if the license to the person comports with the usual or customary practices in the kind of business in which the licensor is engaged or with the licensor's own usual or customary practices.
b) A licensee in ordinary course of business takes its rights under a nonexclusive license free of a security interest in the general intangible created by the licensor, even if the security interest is perfected and the licensee knows of its existence.
c) A lessee in ordinary course of business takes its leasehold interest free of a security interest in the goods created by the lessor, even if the security interest is perfected and the lessee knows of its existence.
Official Comment
1. Source. Derived from Sections 2A-103(1)(o), 2A-307(3).
2. Licensee in Ordinary Course. Like the analogous rules in Section 9-320(a) with respect to buyers in ordinary course and subsection (c) with respect to lessees in ordinary course, the new rule in subsection (b) reflects the expectations of the parties and the marketplace: a licensee under a nonexclusive license takes subject to a security interest unless the secured party authorizes the license free of the security interest or other, controlling law such as that of this Section (protecting ordinary-course licensees) dictates a contrary result. See Sections 9-201, 9-315. The definition of "licensee in ordinary course of business" in subsection (a) is modeled upon that of "buyer in ordinary course of business."
3. Lessee in Ordinary Course. Subsection (c) contains the rule formerly found in Section 2A-307(3). The rule works in the same way as that of Section 9-320(a).
Section 36-9-322. Priorities among conflicting security interests in and agricultural liens on same collateral.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, priority among conflicting security interests and agricultural liens in the same collateral is determined according to the following rules:
(1) Conflicting perfected security interests and agricultural liens rank according to priority in time of filing or perfection. Priority dates from the earlier of the time a filing covering the collateral is first made or the security interest or agricultural lien is first perfected, if there is no period thereafter when there is neither filing nor perfection.
(2) A perfected security interest or agricultural lien has priority over a conflicting unperfected security interest or agricultural lien.
(3) The first security interest or agricultural lien to attach or become effective has priority if conflicting security interests and agricultural liens are unperfected.
(b) For the purposes subsection (a)(1):
(1) the time of filing or perfection as to a security interest in collateral is also the time of filing or perfection as to a security interest in proceeds; and
(2) the time of filing or perfection as to a security interest in collateral supported by a supporting obligation is also the time of filing or perfection as to a security interest in the supporting obligation.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (f), a security interest in collateral which qualifies for priority over a conflicting security interest under Section 36-9-327, 36-9-328, 36-9-329, 36-9-330, or 36-9-331 also has priority over a conflicting security interest in:
(1) any supporting obligation for the collateral; and
(2) proceeds of the collateral if:
(A) the security interest in proceeds is perfected;
(B) the proceeds are cash proceeds or of the same type as the collateral; and
(C) in the case of proceeds that are proceeds of proceeds, all intervening proceeds are cash proceeds, proceeds of the same type as the collateral, or an account relating to the collateral.
(d) Subject to subsection (e) and except as otherwise provided in subsection (f), if a security interest in chattel paper, deposit accounts, negotiable documents, instruments, investment property, or letter-of-credit rights is perfected by a method other than filing, conflicting perfected security interests in proceeds of the collateral rank according to priority in time of filing.
(e) Subsection (d) applies only if the proceeds of the collateral are not cash proceeds, chattel paper, negotiable documents, instruments, investment property, or letter-of-credit rights.
(f) Subsections (a) through (e) are subject to:
(1) subsection (g) and the other provisions of this part;
(2) Section 36-4-208 with respect to a security interest of a collecting bank;
(3) Section 36-5-118 with respect to a security interest of an issuer or nominated person; and
(4) Section 36-9-110 with respect to a security interest arising under Chapter 2 or 2A.
(g) A perfected agricultural lien on collateral has priority over a conflicting security interest in or agricultural lien on the same collateral if the statute creating the agricultural lien so provides.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-312(5), (6).
2. Scope of This Section. In a variety of situations, two or more people may claim a security interest in the same collateral. This Section states general rules of priority among conflicting security interests. As subsection (f) provides, the general rules in subsections (a) through (e) are subject to the rule in subsection (g) governing perfected agricultural liens and to the other rules in this Part of this Article. Rules that override this Section include those applicable to purchase-money security interests (Section 9-324) and those qualifying for special priority in particular types of collateral. See, e.g., Section 9-327 (deposit accounts); Section 9-328 (investment property); Section 9-329 (letter-of-credit rights); Section 9-330 (chattel paper and instruments); Section 9-334 (fixtures). In addition, the general rules of Sections (a) through (e) are subject to priority rules governing security interests arising under Articles 2, 2A, 4, and 5.
3. General Rules. Subsection (a) contains three general rules. Subsection (a)(1) governs the priority of competing perfected security interests. Subsection (a)(2) governs the priority of competing security interests if one is perfected and the other is not. Subsection (a)(3) governs the priority of competing unperfected security interests. The rules may be regarded an adaptations of the idea, deeply rooted at common law, of a race of diligence among creditors. The first two rules are based on precedence in the time as of which the competing secured parties either filed their financing statements or obtained perfected security interests. Under subsection (a)(1), the first secured party who files or perfects has priority. Under subsection (a)(2), which is new, a perfected security interest has priority over an unperfected one. Under subsection (a)(3), if both security interests are unperfected, the first to attach has priority. Note that Section 9-708(b) may affect the application of subsection (a) to a filing that occurred before the effective date of this Article and which would be ineffective to perfect a security interest under former Article 9 but effective under this Article.
4. Competing Perfected Security Interests. When there is more than one perfected security interest, the security interests rank according to priority in time of filing or perfection. "Filing," of course, refers to the filing of an effective financing statement. "Perfection" refers to the acquisition of a perfected security interest, i.e., one that has attached and as to which any required perfection step has been taken. See Section 9-308.
Example 1: On February 1, A files a financing statement covering a certain item of Debtor's equipment. On March 1, B files a financing statement covering the same equipment. On April 1, B makes a loan to Debtor and obtains a security interest in the equipment. On May 1, A makes a loan to Debtor and obtains a security interest in the same collateral. A has priority even though B's loan was made earlier and was perfected when made. It makes no difference whether A knew of B's security interest when A made its advance.
The problem stated in Example 1 is peculiar to a notice-filing system under which filing may occur before the security interest attaches (see Section 9-502). The justification for determining priority by order of filing lies in the necessity of protecting the filing system-that is, of allowing the first secured party who has filed to make subsequent advances without each time having to check for subsequent filings as a condition of protection. Note, however, that this first-to-file protection is not absolute. For example, Section 9-324 affords priority to certain purchase-money security interests, even if a competing secured party was the first to file or perfect.
Example 2: A and B make non-purchase-money advances secured by the same collateral. The collateral is in Debtor's possession, and neither security interest is perfected when the second advance is made. Whichever secured party first perfects its security interest (by taking possession of the collateral or by filing) takes priority. It makes no difference whether that secured party knows of the other security interest at the time it perfects its own.
The rule of subsection (a)(1), affording priority to the first to file or perfect, applies to security interests that are perfected by any method, including temporarily (Section 9-312) or upon attachment (Section 9-309), even though there may be no notice to creditors or subsequent purchasers and notwithstanding any common-law rule to the contrary. The form of the claim to priority, i.e., filing or perfection, may shift from time to time, and the rank will be based on the first filing or perfection as long as there is no intervening period without filing or perfection. See Section 9-308(c).
Example 3: On October 1, A acquires a temporarily perfected (20-day) security interest, unfiled, in a negotiable document in the debtor's possession under Section 9-312(e). On October 5, B files and thereby perfects a security interest that previously had attached to the same document. On October 10, A files. A has priority, even after the 20-day period expires, regardless of whether A knows of B's security interest when A files. A was the first to perfect and maintained continuous perfection or filing since the start of the 20-day period. However, the perfection of A's security interest extends only "to the extent it arises for new value given." To the extent A's security interest secures advances made by A beyond the 20-day period, its security interest would be subordinate to B's, inasmuch as B was the first to file.
In general, the rule in subsection (a)(1) does not distinguish among various advances made by a secured party. The priority of every advance dates from the earlier of filing or perfection. However, in rare instances, the priority of an advance dates from the time the advance is made. See Example 3 and Section 9-323.
5. Priority in After-Acquired Property. The application of the priority rules to after-acquired property must be considered separately for each item of collateral. Priority does not depend only on time of perfection but may also be based on priority in filing before perfection.
Example 4: On February 1, A makes advances to Debtor under a security agreement covering "all Debtor's machinery, both existing and after-acquired." A promptly files a financing statement. On April 1, B takes a security interest in all Debtor's machinery, existing and after-acquired, to secure an outstanding loan. The following day, B files a financing statement. On May 1, Debtor acquires a new machine. When Debtor acquires rights in the new machine, both A and B acquire security interests in the machine simultaneously. Both security interests are perfected simultaneously. However, A has priority because A filed before B.
When after-acquired collateral is encumbered by more than one security interest, one of the security interests often is a purchase-money security interest that is entitled to special priority under Section 9-324.
6. Priority in Proceeds: General Rule. Subsection (b)(1) follows former Section 9-312(6). It provides that the baseline rules of subsection (a) apply generally to priority conflicts in proceeds except where otherwise provided (e.g., as in subsections (c) through (e)). Under Section 9-203, attachment cannot occur (and therefore, under Section 9-308, perfection cannot occur) as to particular collateral until the collateral itself comes into existence and the debtor has rights in it. Thus, a security interest in proceeds of original collateral does not attach and is not perfected until the proceeds come into existence and the debtor acquires rights in them.
Example 5: On April 1, Debtor authenticates a security agreement granting to A a security interest in all Debtor's existing and after-acquired inventory. The same day, A files a financing statement covering inventory. On May 1, Debtor authenticates a security agreement granting B a security interest in all Debtor's existing and future accounts. On June 1, Debtor sells inventory to a customer on 30-day unsecured credit. When Debtor acquires the account, B's security interest attaches to it and is perfected by B's financing statement. At the very same time, A's security interest attaches to the account as proceeds of the inventory and is automatically perfected. See Section 9-315. Under subsection (b) of this Section, for purposes of determining A's priority in the account, the time of filing as to the original collateral (April 1, as to inventory) is also the time of filing as to proceeds (account). Accordingly, A's security interest in the account has priority over B's. Of course, had B filed its financing statement on before A filed (e.g., on March 1), then B would have priority in the accounts.
Section 9-324 governs the extent to which a special purchase-money priority in goods or software carries over into the proceeds of the original collateral.
7. Priority in Proceeds: Special Rules. Subsections (c), (d), and (e), which are new, provide additional priority rules for proceeds of collateral in situations where the temporal (first-in-time) rules of subsection (a)(1) are not appropriate. These new provisions distinguish what these Comments refer to as "non-filing collateral" from what they call "filing collateral." As used in these Comments, non-filing collateral is collateral of a type for which perfection may be achieved by a method other than filing (possession or control, mainly) and for which secured parties who so perfect generally do not expect or need to conduct a filing search. More specifically, non-filing collateral is chattel paper, deposit accounts, negotiable documents, instruments, investment property, and letter-of-credit rights. Other collateral-accounts, commercial tort claims, general intangibles, goods, nonnegotiable documents, and payment intangibles-is filing collateral.
8. Proceeds of Non-Filing Collateral: Non-Temporal Priority. Subsection (c)(2) provides a baseline priority rule for proceeds of non-filing collateral which applies if the secured party has taken the steps required for non-temporal priority over a conflicting security interest in non-filing collateral (e.g., control, in the case of deposit accounts, letter-of-credit rights, and investment property). This rule determines priority in proceeds of non-filing collateral whether or not there exists an actual conflicting security interest in the original non-filing collateral. Under subsection (c)(2), the priority in the original collateral continues in proceeds if the security interest in proceeds is perfected and the proceeds are cash proceeds or non-filing proceeds "of the same type" as the original collateral. As used in subsection (c)(2), "type" means a type of collateral defined in the Uniform Commercial Code and should be read broadly. For example, a security is "of the same type" as a security entitlement (i.e., investment property), and a promissory note is "of the same type" as a draft (i.e., an instrument).
Example 6: SP-1 perfects its security interest in investment property by filing. SP-2 perfects subsequently by taking control of a certificated security. Debtor receives cash proceeds of the security (e.g., dividends deposited into Debtor's deposit account). If the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of subsection (a)(1) were applied, SP-1's security interest in the cash proceeds would be senior, although SP-2's security interest continues perfected under Section 9-315 beyond the 20-day period of automatic perfection. This was the result under former Article 9. Under subsection (c), however, SP-2's security interest is senior.
Note that a different result would obtain in Example 1 (i.e., SP-1's security interest would be senior) if SP-1 were to obtain control of the deposit-account proceeds. This is so because subsection (c) is subject to subsection (f), which in turn provides that the priority rules under subsections (a) through (e) are subject to "the other provisions of this part." One of those "other provisions" is Section 9-327, which affords priority to a security interest perfected by control. See Section 9-327(1).
Example 7: SP-1 perfects its security interest in investment property by filing. SP-2 perfects subsequently by taking control of a certificated security. Debtor receives proceeds of the security consisting of a new certificated security issued as a stock dividend on the original collateral. Although the new security is of the same type as the original collateral (i.e., investment property), once the 20-day period of automatic perfection expires (see Section 9-315(d)), SP-2's security interest is unperfected. (SP-2 has not filed or taken delivery or control, and no temporary-perfection rule applies.) Consequently, once the 20-day period expires, subsection (c) does not confer priority, and, under subsection (a)(2), SP-1's security interest in the security is senior. This was the result under former Article 9.
Example 8: SP-1 perfects its security interest in investment property by filing. SP-2 perfects subsequently by taking control of a certificated security and also by filing against investment property. Debtor receives proceeds of the security consisting of a new certificated security issued as a stock dividend of the collateral. Because the new security is of the same type as the original collateral (i.e., investment property) and (unlike Example 7) SP-2's security interest is perfected by filing, SP-2's security interest is senior under subsection (c). If the new security were redeemed by the issuer upon surrender and yet another security were received by Debtor, SP-2's security interest would continue to enjoy priority under subsection (c). The new security would be proceeds of proceeds.
Example 9: SP-1 perfects its security interest in instruments by filing. SP-2 subsequently perfects its security interest in investment property by taking control of a certificated security and also by filing against investment property. Debtor receives proceeds of the security consisting of a dividend check that it deposits to a deposit account. Because the check and the deposit account are cash proceeds, SP-1's and SP-2's security interests in the cash proceeds are perfected under Section 9-315 beyond the 20-day period of automatic perfection. However, SP-2's security interest is senior under subsection (c).
Example 10: SP-1 perfects its security interest in investment property by filing. SP-2 perfects subsequently by taking control of a certificated security and also by filing against investment property. Debtor receives an instrument as proceeds of the security. (Assume that the instrument is not cash proceeds.) Because the instrument is not of the same type as the original collateral (i.e., investment property), SP-2's security interest, although perfected by filing, does not achieve priority under subsection (c). Under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of subsection (a)(1), SP-1's security interest in the proceeds is senior.
The proceeds of proceeds are themselves proceeds. See Section 9-102 (defining "proceeds" and "collateral"). Sometimes competing security interests arise in proceeds that are several generations removed from the original collateral. As the following example explains, the applicability of subsection (c) may turn on the nature of the intervening proceeds.
Example 11: SP-1 perfects its security interest in Debtor's deposit account by obtaining control. Thereafter, SP-2 files against inventory, (presumably) searches, finds no indication of a conflicting security interest, and advances against Debtor's existing and after-acquired inventory. Debtor uses funds from the deposit account to purchase inventory, which SP-1 can trace as identifiable proceeds of its security interest in Debtor's deposit account, and which SP-2 claims as original collateral. The inventory is sold and the proceeds deposited into another deposit account, as to which SP-1 has not obtained control. Subsection (c) does not govern priority in this other deposit account. This deposit account is cash proceeds and is also the same type of collateral as SP-1's original collateral, as required by subsections (c)(2)(A) and (B). However, SP-1's security interest does not satisfy subsection (c)(2)(C) because the inventory proceeds, which intervened between the original deposit account and the deposit account constituting the proceeds at issue, are not cash proceeds, proceeds of the same type as the collateral (original deposit account), or an account relating to the collateral. Stated otherwise, once proceeds other than cash proceeds, proceeds of the same type as the original collateral, or an account relating to the original collateral intervene in the chain of proceeds, priority under subsection (c) is thereafter unavailable. The special priority rule in subsection (d) also is inapplicable to this case. See Comment 9, Example 13, below. Instead, the general first-to-file-or-perfect rule of subsections (a) and (b) apply. Under that rule, SP-1 has priority unless its security interest in the inventory proceeds became unperfected under Section 9-315(d). Had SP-2 filed against inventory before SP-1 obtained control of the original deposit account, the SP-2 would have had priority even if SP-1's security interest in the inventory proceeds remained perfected.
9. Proceeds of Non-Filing Collateral: Special Temporal Priority. Under subsections (d) and (e), if a security interest in non-filing collateral is perfected by a method other than filing (e.g., control or possession), it does not retain its priority over a conflicting security interest in proceeds that are filing collateral. Moreover, it is not entitled to priority in proceeds under the first-to file-or-perfect rule of subsections (a)(1) and (b). Instead, under subsection (d), priority is determined by a new first-to-file rule.
Example 12: SP-1 perfects its security interest in Debtor's deposit account by obtaining control. Thereafter, SP-2 files against equipment, (presumably) searches, finds no indication of a conflicting security interest, and advances against Debtor's equipment. SP-1 then files against Debtor's equipment. Debtor uses funds from the deposit account to purchase equipment, which SP-1 can trace as proceeds of its security interest in Debtor's deposit account. If the first-to-file-or-perfect rule were applied, SP-1's security interest would be senior under subsections (a)(1) and (b), because it was the first to perfect in the original collateral and there was no period during which its security interest was unperfected. Under subsection (d), however, SP-2's security interest would be senior because it filed first. This corresponds with the likely expectations of the parties.
Note that under subsection (e), the first-to-file rule of subsection (d) applies only if the proceeds in question are other than non-filing collateral (i.e., if the proceeds are filing collateral). If the proceeds are non-filing collateral, either the first-to-file-or-perfect rule under subsections (a) and (b) or the non-temporal priority rule in subsection (c) would apply, depending on the facts.
Example 13: SP-1 perfects its security interest in Debtor's deposit account by obtaining control. Thereafter, SP-2 files against inventory, (presumably) searches, finds no indication of a conflicting security interest, and advances against Debtor's existing and after-acquired inventory. Debtor uses funds from the deposit account to purchase inventory, which SP-1 can trace as identifiable proceeds of its security interest in Debtor's deposit account, and which SP-2 claims as original collateral. The inventory is sold and the proceeds deposited into another deposit account, as to which SP-1 has not obtained control. As discussed above in Comment 8, Example 11, subsection (c) does not govern priority in this deposit account. Subsection (d) also does not govern, because the proceeds at issue (the deposit account) are cash proceeds. See subsection (e). Rather, the general rules of subsections (a) and (b) govern.
10. Priority in Supporting Obligations. Under subsections (b)(2) and (c)(1), a security interest having priority in collateral also has priority in a supporting obligation for that collateral. However, the rules in these subsections are subject to the special rule in Section 9-329 governing the priority of security interests in a letter-of-credit right. See subsection (f). Under Section 9-329, a secured party's failure to obtain control (Section 9-107) of a letter-of-credit right that serves as supporting collateral leaves its security interest exposed to a priming interest of a party who does take control.
11. Unperfected Security Interests. Under subsection (a)(3), if conflicting security interests are unperfected, the first to attach has priority. This rule may be of merely theoretical interest, inasmuch as it is hard to imagine a situation where the case would come into litigation without either secured party's having perfected its security interest. If neither security interest had been perfected at the time of the filing of a petition in bankruptcy, ordinarily neither would be good against the trustee in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Code.
12. Agricultural Liens. Statutes other than this Article may purport to grant priority to an agricultural lien as against a conflicting security interest or agricultural lien. Under subsection (g), if another statute grants priority to an agricultural lien, the agricultural lien has priority only if the same statute creates the agricultural lien and the agricultural lien is perfected. Otherwise, subsection (a) applies the same priority rules to an agricultural lien as to a security interest, regardless of whether the agricultural lien conflicts with another agricultural lien or with a security interest.
Inasmuch as no agricultural lien on proceeds arises under this Article, subsections (b) through (e) do not apply to proceeds of agricultural liens. However, if an agricultural lien has priority under subsection (g) and the statute creating the agricultural lien gives the secured party a lien on proceeds of the collateral subject to the lien, a court should apply the principle of subsection (g) and award priority in the proceeds to the holder of the perfected agricultural lien.
Section 36-9-323. Future advances.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), for purposes of determining the priority of a perfected security interest under Section 36-9-322(a)(1), perfection of the security interest dates from the time an advance is made to the extent that the security interest secures an advance that:
(1) is made while the security interest is perfected only:
(A) under Section 36-9-309 when it attaches; or
(B) temporarily under Section 36-9-312(e), (f), or (g); and
(2) is not made pursuant to a commitment entered into before or while the security interest is perfected by a method other than under Section 36-9-309 or 36-9-312(e), (f), or (g).
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a security interest is subordinate to the rights of a person that becomes a lien creditor while the security interest is perfected only to the extent that it secures advances made more than forty-five days after the person becomes a lien creditor unless the advance is made:
(1) without knowledge of the lien; or
(2) pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the lien.
(c) Subsections (a) and (b) do not apply to a security interest held by a secured party that is a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes or a consignor.
(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a buyer of goods other than a buyer in ordinary course of business takes free of a security interest to the extent that it secures advances made after the earlier of:
(1) the time the secured party acquires knowledge of the buyer's purchase; or
(2) forty-five days after the purchase.
(e) Subsection (d) does not apply if the advance is made pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the buyer's purchase and before the expiration of the forty-five-day period.
(f) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g), a lessee of goods, other than a lessee in ordinary course of business, takes the leasehold interest free of a security interest to the extent that it secures advances made after the earlier of:
(1) the time the secured party acquires knowledge of the lease; or
(2) forty-five days after the lease contract becomes enforceable.
(g) Subsection (f) does not apply if the advance is made pursuant to a commitment entered into without knowledge of the lease and before the expiration of the forty-five-day period.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Sections 9-312(7), 9-301(4), 9-307(3), 2A-307(4).
2. Scope of This Section. A security agreement may provide that collateral secures future advances. See Section 9-204(c). This Section collects all of the special rules dealing with the priority of advances made by a secured party after a third party acquires an interest in the collateral. Subsection (a) applies when the third party is a competing secured party. It replaces and clarifies former Section 9-312(7). Subsection (b) deals with lien creditors and replaces former Section 9-301(4). Subsections (d) and (e) deal with buyers and replace former Section 9-307(3). Subsections (f) and (g) deal with lessees and replace former Section 2A-307(4).
3. Competing Security Interests. Under a proper reading of the first-to-file-or perfect rule of Section 9-322(a)(1) (and former Section 9-312(5)), it is abundantly clear that the time when an advance is made plays no role in determining priorities among conflicting security interests except when a financing statement was not filed and the advance is the giving of value as the last step for attachment and perfection. Thus, a secured party takes subject to all advances secured by a competing security interest having priority under Section 9-322(a)(1). This result generally obtains regardless of how the competing security interest is perfected and regardless of whether the advances are made "pursuant to commitment" (Section 9-102). Subsection (a) of this Section states the only other instance when the time of an advance figures in the priority scheme in Section 9-322: when the security interest is perfected only automatically under Section 9-309 or temporarily under Section 9-312(e), (f), or (g), and the advance is not made pursuant to a commitment entered into while the security interest was perfected by another method. Thus, an advance has priority from the date it is made only in the rare case in which it is made without commitment and while the security interest is perfected only temporarily under Section 9-312.
The new formulation in subsection (a) clarifies the result when the initial advance is paid and a new ("future") advance is made subsequently. Under former Section 9-312(7), the priority of the new advance turned on whether it was "made while a security interest is perfected." This Section resolves any ambiguity by omitting the quoted phrase.
Example 1: On February 1, A makes an advance secured by machinery in the debtor's possession and files a financing statement. On March 1, B makes an advance secured by the same machinery and files a financing statement. On April 1, A makes a further advance, under the original security agreement, against the same machinery. A was the first to file and so, under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of Section 9-322(a)(1), A's security interest has priority over B's, B both as to the February 1 and as to the April 1 advance. It makes no difference whether A knows of B's intervening advance when A makes the second advance. Note that, as long as A was the first to file or perfect, A would have priority with respect to both advances if either A or B had perfected by taking possession of the collateral. Likewise, A would have priority if A's April 1 advance was not made under the original agreement with the debtor, but was under a new agreement.
Example 2: On October 1, A acquires a temporarily perfected (20-day) security interest, unfiled, in a negotiable document in the debtor's possession under Section 9-312(e) or (f). The security interest secures an advance made on that day as well as future advances. On October 5, B files and thereby perfects a security interest that previously had attached to the same document. On October 8, A makes an additional advance. On October 10, A files. Under Section 9-322(a)(1), because A was the first to perfect and maintained continuous perfection or filing since the start of the 20-day period, A has priority, even after the 20-day period expires. See Section 9-322, Comment 4, Example 3. However, under this Section, for purposes of Section 9-322(a)(1), to the extent A's security interest secures the October 8 advance, the security interest was perfected on October 8. Inasmuch as B perfected on October 5, B has priority over the October 8 advance.
The rule in subsection (a) is more liberal toward the priority of future advances than the corresponding rules applicable to intervening lien creditors (subsection (b)), buyers (subsections (d) and (e), and lessees (subsections (f) and (g)).
4. Competing Lien Creditors. Subsection (b) replaces former Section 9-301(4). It addresses the problem considered by PEB Commentary No. 2 and removes the ambiguity that necessitated the Commentary. Former Section 9-301(4) appeared to state a general rule that a lien creditor has priority over a perfected security interest and is "subject to" the security interest "only" in specified circumstances. Because that Section spoke to the making of an "advance," it arguably implied that to the extent a security interest secured non-advances (expenses, interest, etc.), it was junior to the lien creditor's interest. Under Section 9-317(a)(2), a perfected security interest is senior to the rights of a subsequent lien creditor. Subsection (b) of this Section eliminates the erroneous implication of former law by providing that a perfected security interest is subordinate only to the extent that the specified circumstances occur.
As under former Section 9-301(4), a secured party's knowledge does not cut short the 45-day period during which future advances can achieve priority over an intervening lien creditor's interest. Rather, because of the impact of the rule in subsection (b) on the question whether the security interest for future advances is "protected" under Section 6323(c)(2) and (d) of the Internal Revenue Code as amended by the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, the priority of the security interest for future advances over a lien creditor is made absolute for 45 days regardless of knowledge of the secured party concerning the lien. If, however, the advance is made after the 45 days, the advance will not have priority unless it was made or committed without knowledge of the lien.
5. Sales of Receivables; Consignments. Subsections (a) and (b) do not apply to outright sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes, nor do they apply to consignments.
6. Competing Buyers and Lessees. Under subsections (d) and (e), a buyer will not take subject to a security interest to the extent it secures advances made after the secured party has knowledge that the buyer has purchased the collateral or more than 45 days after the purchase unless the advances were made pursuant to a commitment entered into before the expiration of the 45-day period and without knowledge of the purchase. Subsections (f) and (g) provide an analogous rule for lessees. Of course, a buyer in ordinary course who takes free of the security interest under Section 9-320 and a lessee in ordinary course who takes free under Section 9-321 are not subject to any future advances. Subsections (d) and (e) replace former Section 9-307(3), and subsections (f) and (g) replace former Section 2A-307(4). No change in meaning is intended.
Section 36-9-324. Priority of purchase-money security interests.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g), a perfected purchase-money security interest in goods other than inventory or livestock has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same goods, and, except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-327, a perfected security interest in its identifiable proceeds also has priority, if the purchase-money security interest is perfected when the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within twenty days thereafter.
(b) Subject to subsection (c) and except as otherwise provided in subsection (g), a perfected purchase-money security interest in inventory has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same inventory, has priority over a conflicting security interest in chattel paper or an instrument constituting proceeds of the inventory and in proceeds of the chattel paper, if so provided in Section 36-9-330, and, except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-327, also has priority in identifiable cash proceeds of the inventory to the extent the identifiable cash proceeds are received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer, if:
(1) the purchase-money security interest is perfected when the debtor receives possession of the inventory;
(2) the purchase-money secured party sends an authenticated notification to the holder of the conflicting security interest;
(3) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notification within five years before the debtor receives possession of the inventory; and
(4) the notification states that the person sending the notification has or expects to acquire a purchase-money security interest in inventory of the debtor and describes the inventory.
(c) Subsections (b)(2) through (4) apply only if the holder of the conflicting security interest had filed a financing statement covering the same types of inventory:
(1) if the purchase-money security interest is perfected by filing, before the date of the filing; or
(2) if the purchase-money security interest is temporarily perfected without filing or possession under Section 36-9-312(f), before the beginning of the twenty-day period thereunder.
(d) Subject to subsection (e) and except as otherwise provided in subsection (g), a perfected purchase-money security interest in livestock that are farm products has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same livestock, and, except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-327, a perfected security interest in their identifiable proceeds and identifiable products in their unmanufactured states also has priority, if:
(1) the purchase-money security interest is perfected when the debtor receives possession of the livestock;
(2) the purchase-money secured party sends an authenticated notification to the holder of the conflicting security interest;
(3) the holder of the conflicting security interest receives the notification within six months before the debtor receives possession of the livestock; and
(4) the notification states that the person sending the notification has or expects to acquire a purchase-money security interest in livestock of the debtor and describes the livestock.
(e) Subsections (d)(2) through (4) apply only if the holder of the conflicting security interest had filed a financing statement covering the same types of livestock:
(1) if the purchase-money security interest is perfected by filing, before the date of the filing; or
(2) if the purchase-money security interest is temporarily perfected without filing or possession under Section 36-9-312(f), before the beginning of the twenty-day period thereunder.
(f) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g), a perfected purchase-money security interest in software has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral, and, except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-327, a perfected security interest in its identifiable proceeds also has priority, to the extent that the purchase-money security interest in the goods in which the software was acquired for use has priority in the goods and proceeds of the goods under this section.
(g) If more than one security interest qualifies for priority in the same collateral under subsection (a), (b), (d), or (f):
(1) a security interest securing an obligation incurred as all or part of the price of the collateral has priority over a security interest securing an obligation incurred for value given to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral; and
(2) in all other cases, Section 36-9-322(a) applies to the qualifying security interests.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-312(3), (4).
2. Priority of Purchase-Money Security Interests. This Section contains the priority rules applicable to purchase-money security interests, as defined in Section 9-103. It affords a special, non-temporal priority to those purchase-money security interests that satisfy the statutory conditions. In most cases, priority will be over a security interest asserted under an after-acquired property clause. See Section 9-204 on the extent to which security interests in after-acquired property are validated.
A purchase-money security interest can be created only in goods and software. See Section 9-103. Section 9-324(a), which follows former Section 9-312(4), contains the general rule for purchase-money security interests in goods. It is subject to subsections (b) and (c), which derive from former Section 9-312(3) and apply to purchase-money security interests in inventory, and subsections (d) and (e), which apply to purchase-money security interests in livestock that are farm products. Subsection (f) applies to purchase-money security interests in software. Subsection (g) deals with the relatively unusual case in which a debtor creates two purchase-money security interests in the same collateral and both security interests qualify for special priority under one of the other subsections.
Former Section 9-312(2) contained a rule affording special priority to those who provided secured credit that enabled a debtor to produce crops. This rule proved unworkable and has been eliminated from this Article. Instead, model Section 9-324A contains a revised production-money priority rule. That Section is a model, not uniform, provision. The sponsors of the UCC have taken no position as to whether it should be enacted, instead leaving the matter for state legislatures to consider if they are so inclined.
3. Purchase-Money Priority in Goods Other Than Inventory and Livestock. Subsection (a) states a general rule applicable to all types of goods except inventory and farm-products livestock: the purchase-money interest takes priority if it is perfected when the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within 20 days thereafter. (As to the 20-day "grace period," compare Section 9-317(e). Former Sections 9-312(4) and 9-301(2) contained a 10-day grace period.) The perfection requirement means that the purchase-money secured party either has filed a financing statement before that time or has a temporarily perfected security interest in goods covered by documents under Section 9-312(e) and (f) which is continued in a perfected status by filing before the expiration of the 20-day period specified in that Section. A purchase-money security interest qualifies for priority under subsection (a), even if the purchase-money secured party knows that a conflicting security interest has been created and or that the holder of the conflicting interest has filed a financing statement covering the collateral.
Normally, there will be no question when "the debtor receives possession of the collateral" for purposes of subsection (a). However, sometimes a debtor buys goods and takes possession of them in stages, and then assembly and testing are completed (by the seller or debtor-buyer) at the debtor's location. Under those circumstances, the buyer "takes possession" within the meaning of subsection (a) when, after an inspection of the portion of the goods in the debtor's possession, it would be apparent to a potential lender to the debtor that the debtor has acquired an interest in the goods taken as a whole.
A similar issue concerning the time when "the debtor receives possession" arises when a person acquires possession of goods under a transaction that is not governed by this Article and then later agrees to buy the goods on secured credit. For example, a person may take possession of goods as lessee under a lease contract and then exercise an option to purchase the goods from the lessor on secured credit. Under Section 2A-307(1), creditors of the lessee generally take subject to the lease contract; filing a financing statement against the lessee is unnecessary to protect the lessor's leasehold or residual interest. Once the lease is converted to a security interest, filing a financing statement is necessary to protect the seller's (former lessor's) security interest. Accordingly, the 20-day period in subsection (a) does not commence until a the goods become "collateral" (defined in Section 9-102), i.e., until they are subject to a security interest.
4. Purchase-Money Security Interests in Inventory. Subsections (b) and (c) afford a means by which a purchase-money security interest in inventory can achieve priority over an earlier-filed security interest in the same collateral. To achieve priority, the purchase-money security interest must be perfected when the debtor receives possession of the inventory. For a discussion of when "the debtor receives possession," see Comment 3, above. The 20-day grace period of subsection (a) does not apply.
The arrangement between an inventory secured party and its debtor typically requires the secured party to make periodic advances against incoming inventory or periodic releases of old inventory as new inventory is received. A fraudulent debtor may apply to the secured party for advances even though it has already given a purchase-money security interest in the inventory to another secured party. For this reason, subsections (b)(2) through (4) and (c) impose a second condition for the purchase-money security interest's achieving priority: the purchase-money secured party must give notification to the holder of a conflicting security interest who filed against the same item or type of inventory before the purchase-money secured party filed or its security interest became perfected temporarily under Section 9-312(e) or (f). The notification requirement protects the non-purchase-money inventory secured party in such a situation: if the inventory secured party has received notification, it presumably will not make an advance; if it has not received notification (or if the other security interest does not qualify as purchase-money), any advance the inventory secured party may make ordinarily will have priority under Section 9-322. Inasmuch as an arrangement for periodic advances against incoming goods is unusual outside the inventory field, subsection (a) does not contain a notification requirement.
5. Notification to Conflicting Inventory Secured Party: Timing. Under subsection (b)(3), the perfected purchase-money security interest achieves priority over a conflicting security interest only if the holder of the conflicting security interest receives a notification within five years before the debtor receives possession of the purchase-money collateral. If the debtor never receives possession, the five-year period never begins, and the purchase-money security interest has priority, even if notification is not given. However, where the purchase-money inventory financing began by the purchase-money secured party's possession of a negotiable document of title, to retain priority the secured party must give the notification required by subsection (b) at or before the usual time, i.e., when the debtor gets possession of the inventory, even though the security interest remains perfected for 20 days under Section 9-312(e) or (f).
Some people have mistakenly read former Section 9-312(3)(b) to require, as a condition of purchase-money priority in inventory, that the purchase-money secured party give the notification before it files a financing statement. Read correctly, the "before" clauses compare (i) the time when the holder of the conflicting security interest filed a financing statement with (ii) the time when the purchase-money security interest becomes perfected by filing or automatically perfected temporarily. Only if (i) occurs before (ii) must notification be given to the holder of the conflicting security interest. Subsection (c) has been rewritten to clarify this point.
6. Notification to Conflicting Inventory Secured Party: Address. Inasmuch as the address provided as that of the secured party on a filed financing statement is an "address that is reasonable under the circumstances," the holder of a purchase-money security interest may satisfy the requirement to "send" notification to the holder of a conflicting security interest in inventory by sending a notification to that address, even if the address is or becomes incorrect. See Section 9-102 (definition of "send"). Similarly, because the address is "held out by [the holder of the conflicting security interest] as the place for receipt of such communications [i.e., communications relating to security interests]," the holder is deemed to have "received" a notification delivered to that address. See Section 1-201(26).
7. Consignments. Subsections (b) and (c) also determine the priority of a consignor's interest in consigned goods as against a security interest in the goods created by the consignee. Inasmuch as a consignment subject to this Article is defined to be a purchase-money security interest, see Section 9-103(d), no inference concerning the nature of the transaction should be drawn from the fact that a consignor uses the term "security interest" in its notice under subsection (b)(4). Similarly, a notice stating that the consignor has delivered or expects to deliver goods, properly described, "on consignment" meets the requirements of subsection (b)(4), even if it does not contain the term "security interest," and even if the transaction subsequently is determined to be a security interest. Cf. Section 9-505 (use of "consignor" and "consignee" in financing statement).
8. Priority in Proceeds: General. When the purchase-money secured party has priority over another secured party, the question arises whether this priority extends to the proceeds of the original collateral. Subsections (a), (d), and (f) give an affirmative answer, but only as to proceeds in which the security interest is perfected (see Section 9-315). Although this qualification did not appear in former Section 9-312(4), it was implicit in that provision.
In the case of inventory collateral under subsection (b), where financing frequently is based on the resulting accounts, chattel paper, or other proceeds, the special priority of the purchase-money secured interest carries over into only certain types of proceeds. As under former Section 9-312(3), the purchase-money priority in inventory under subsection (b) carries over into identifiable cash proceeds (defined in Section 9-102) received on or before the delivery of the inventory to a buyer.
As a general matter, also like former Section 9-312(3), the purchase-money priority in inventory does not carry over into proceeds consisting of accounts or chattel paper. Many parties financing inventory are quite content to protect their first-priority security interest in the inventory itself. They realize that when the inventory is sold, someone else will be financing the resulting receivables (accounts or chattel paper), and the priority for inventory will not run forward to the receivables constituting the proceeds. Indeed, the cash supplied by the receivables financer often will be used to pay the inventory financing. In some situations, the party financing the inventory on a purchase-money basis makes contractual arrangements that the proceeds of receivables financing by another be devoted to paying off the inventory security interest.
However, the purchase-money priority in inventory does carry over to proceeds consisting of chattel paper and its proceeds (and also to instruments) to the extent provided in Section 9-330. Under Section 9-330(e), the holder of a purchase-money security interest in inventory is deemed to give new value for proceeds consisting of chattel paper. Taken together, Sections 9-324(b) and 9-330(e) enable a purchase-money inventory secured party to obtain priority in chattel paper constituting proceeds of the inventory, even if the secured party does not actually give new value for the chattel paper, provided the purchase-money secured party satisfies the other conditions for achieving priority.
When the proceeds of original collateral (goods or software) consist of a deposit account, Section 9-327 governs priority to the extent it conflicts with the priority rules of this Section.
9. Priority in Accounts Constituting Proceeds of Inventory. The application of the priority rules in subsection (b) is shown by the following examples:
Example 1: Debtor creates a security interest in its existing and after-acquired inventory in favor of SP-1, who files a financing statement covering inventory. SP-2 subsequently takes a purchase-money security interest in certain inventory and, under subsection (b), achieves priority in this inventory over SP-1. This inventory is then sold, producing accounts. Accounts are not cash proceeds, and so the special purchase-money priority in the inventory does not control the priority in the accounts. Rather, the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of Section 9-322(a)(1) applies. The time of SP-1's filing as to the inventory is also the time of filing as to the accounts under Section 9-322 (b). Assuming that each security interest in the accounts proceeds remains perfected under Section 9-315, SP-1 has priority as to the accounts.
Example 2: In Example 1, if SP-2 had filed directly against accounts, the date of that filing as to accounts would be compared with the date of SP-1's filing as to the inventory. The first filed would prevail under Section 9-322(a)(1).
Example 3: If SP-3 had filed against accounts in Example 1 before either SP-1 or SP-2 filed against inventory, SP-3's filing against accounts would have priority over the filings of SP-1 and SP-2. This result obtains even though the filings against inventory are effective to continue the perfected status of SP-1's and SP-2's security interest in the accounts beyond the 20-day period of automatic perfection. See Section 9-315. SP-1's and SP-2's position as to the inventory does not give them a claim to accounts (as proceeds of the inventory) which is senior to someone who has filed earlier against accounts. If, on the other hand, either SP-1's or SP-2's filing against the inventory preceded SP-3's filing against accounts, SP-1 or SP-2 would outrank SP-3 as to the accounts.
10. Purchase-Money Security Interests in Livestock. New subsections (d) and (e) provide a purchase-money priority rule for farm-products livestock. They are patterned on the purchase-money priority rule for inventory found in subsections (b) and (c) and include a requirement that the purchase-money secured party notify earlier-filed parties. Two differences between subsections (b) and (d) are noteworthy. First, unlike the purchase-money inventory lender, the purchase-money livestock lender enjoys priority in all proceeds of the collateral. Thus, under subsection (d), the purchase-money secured party takes priority in accounts over an earlier-filed accounts financer. Second, subsection (d) affords priority in certain products of the collateral as well as proceeds.
11. Purchase-Money Security Interests in Aquatic Farm Products. Aquatic goods produced in aquacultural operations (e.g., catfish raised on a catfish farm) are farm products. See Section 9-102 (definition of "farm products"). The definition does not indicate whether aquatic goods are "crops," as to which the model production money security interest priority in Section 9-324A applies, or "livestock," as to which the purchase-money priority in subsection (d) of this Section applies. This Article leaves courts free to determine the classification of particular aquatic goods on a case-by-case basis, applying whichever priority rule makes more sense in the overall context of the debtor's business.
12. Purchase-Money Security Interests in Software. Subsection (f) governs the priority of purchase-money security interests in software. Under Section 9-103(c), a purchase-money security interest arises in software only if the debtor acquires its interest in the software for the principal purpose of using the software in goods subject to a purchase-money security interest. Under subsection (f), a purchase-money security interest in software has the same priority as the purchase-money security interest in the goods in which the software was acquired for use. This priority is determined under subsections (b) and (c) (for inventory) or (a) (for other goods).
13. Multiple Purchase-Money Security Interests. New subsection (g) governs priority among multiple purchase-money security interests in the same collateral. It grants priority to purchase-money security interests securing the price of collateral (i.e., created in favor of the seller) over purchase-money security interests that secure enabling loans. Section 7.2(c) of the Restatement (3d) of the Law of Property (Mortgages) (1997) adopts this rule with respect to real property mortgages. As Comment d to that Section explains:
the equities favor the vendor. Not only does the vendor part with specific real estate rather than money, but the vendor would never relinquish it at all except on the understanding that the vendor will be able to use it to satisfy the obligation to pay the price. This is the case even though the vendor may know that the mortgagor is going to finance the transaction in part by borrowing from a third party and giving a mortgage to secure that obligation. In the final analysis, the law is more sympathetic to the vendor's hazard of losing real estate previously owned than to the third party lender's risk of being unable to collect from an interest in real estate that never previously belonged to it.
The first-to-file-or-perfect rule of Section 9-322 applies to multiple purchase-money security interests securing enabling loans.
Section 36-9-325. Priority of security interests in transferred collateral.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a security interest created by a debtor is subordinate to a security interest in the same collateral created by another person if:
(1) the debtor acquired the collateral subject to the security interest created by the other person;
(2) the security interest created by the other person was perfected when the debtor acquired the collateral; and
(3) there is no period thereafter when the security interest is unperfected.
(b) Subsection (a) subordinates a security interest only if the security interest:
(1) otherwise would have priority solely under Section 36-9-322(a) or 36-9-324; or
(2) arose solely under Section 36-2-711(3) or 36-2A-508(5).
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. "Double Debtor Problem." This Section addresses the "double debtor" problem, which arises when a debtor acquires property that is subject to a security interest created by another debtor.
3. Taking Subject to Perfected Security Interest. Consider the following scenario:
Example 1: A owns an item of equipment subject to a perfected security interest in favor of SP-A. A sells the equipment to B, not in the ordinary course of business. B acquires its interest subject to SP-A's security interest. See Sections 9-201, 9-315(a)(1). Under this Section, if B creates a security interest in the equipment in favor of SP-B, SP-B's security interest is subordinate to SP-A's security interest, even if SP-B filed against B before SP-A filed against A, and even if SP-B took a purchase-money security interest. Normally, SP-B could have investigated the source of the equipment and discovered SP-A's filing before making an advance against the equipment, whereas SP-A had no reason to search the filings against someone other than its debtor, A.
4. Taking Subject to Unperfected Security Interest. This Section applies only if the security interest in the transferred collateral was perfected when the transferee acquired the collateral. See subsection (a)(2). If this condition is not met, then the normal priority rules apply.
Example 2: A owns an item of equipment subject to an unperfected security interest in favor of SP-A. A sells the equipment to B, who gives value and takes delivery of the equipment without knowledge of the security interest. B takes free of the security interest. See Section 9-317(b). If B then creates a security interest in favor of SP-B, no priority issue arises; SP-B has the only security interest in the equipment.
Example 3: The facts are as in Example 2, except that B knows of SP-A's security interest and therefore takes the equipment subject to it. If B creates a security interest in the equipment in favor of SP-B, this Section does not determine the relative priority of the security interests. Rather, the normal priority rules govern. If SP-B perfects its security interest, then, under Section 9-322(a)(2), SP-A's unperfected security interest will be junior to SP-B's perfected security interest. The award of priority to SP-B is premised on the belief that SP-A's failure to file could have misled SP-B.
5. Taking Subject to Perfected Security Interest that Becomes Unperfected. This Section applies only if the security interest in the transferred collateral did not become unperfected at any time after the transferee acquired the collateral. See subsection (a)(3). If this condition is not met, then the normal priority rules apply.
Example 4: As in Example 1, A owns an item of equipment subject to a perfected security interest in favor of SP-A. A sells the equipment to B, not in the ordinary course of business. B acquires its interest subject to SP-A's security interest. See Sections 9-201, 9-315(a)(1). B creates a security interest in favor of SP-B, and SP-B perfects its security interest. This Section provides that SP-A's security interest is senior to SP-B's. However, if SP-A's financing statement lapses while SP-B's security interest is perfected, then the normal priority rules would apply, and SP-B's security interest would become senior to SP-A's security interest. See Sections 9-322(a)(2), 9-515(c).
6. Unusual Situations. The appropriateness of the rule of subsection (a) is most apparent when it works to subordinate security interests having priority under the basic priority rules of Section 9-322(a) or the purchase-money priority rules of Section 9-324. The rule also works properly when applied to the security interest of a buyer under Section 2-711(3) or a lessee under Section 2A-508(5). However, subsection (a) may provide an inappropriate resolution of the "double debtor" problem in some of the wide variety of other contexts in which the problem may arise. Although subsection (b) limits the application of subsection (a) to those cases in which subordination is known to be appropriate, courts should apply the rule in other settings, if necessary to promote the underlying purposes and policies of the Uniform Commercial Code. See Section 1-102(1).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Section 36-9-325 addresses the "double debtor" problem and overrules Seebrite Corp. v. Transouth Finance Co., 272 S.C. 483, 252 S.E. 2d 873 (1979). To illustrate the "double debtor" problem using facts suggested by the Seebrite decision consider the following example:
Partnership is a general partnership engaged in the business of selling construction equipment. Partner is one of three general partners in Partnership. On February 1, Partnership entered into a security agreement with SP-1 under which Partnership granted SP-1 a security interest in Partnership's inventory of construction equipment. The security agreement provided that any sale of an item of equipment without SP-1's prior written consent was unauthorized and would constitute an event of default. Also on February 1, SP-1 filed a financing statement in the Secretary of State's office covering Partnership's inventory of construction equipment.
On April 1, and without obtaining SP-1's prior written consent, Partnership sold a piece of construction equipment to Partner for use in an unrelated construction business which Partner operated as a sole proprietorship. Partner paid for the equipment with funds advanced by SP-2 under a security agreement that granted SP-2 a purchase-money security interest in the piece of equipment to secure the loan SP-2 made to enable Partner to acquire the equipment. On April 1, SP-2 filed a financing statement in the Secretary of State's office covering the piece of equipment and listing Partner as the debtor. Neither Partnership nor Partner disclosed the sale of the piece of equipment to SP-1.
When Partnership defaulted under its security agreement with SP-1 and Partner defaulted under his security agreement with SP-2, both SP-1 and SP-2 asserted security interests in the piece of equipment.
Under the holding in Seebrite, SP-2 would be entitled to priority over SP-1. The Court in Seebrite reasoned "[t]o hold that . . . an innocent retail lender [SP-2] for valuable consideration . . . must investigate the right of the dealer to sell and give good title, would stagnate retail sales so necessary to commerce." 272 S.C. at 487, 252 S.E. 2d at 875. The Court also asserted that its decision to award priority to the retail lender was consistent with the purchase-money priority rule now codified at Section 36-9-324(a). 272 S.C. at 488, 252 S.E. 2d at 875.
Under Section 36-9-325, SP-1 would be entitled to priority over SP-2. To claim priority under Section 36-9-325, SP-1 would be required to establish four facts. First, under Section 36-9-325(a)(1), SP-1 must establish that Partner acquired the piece of equipment subject to SP-1"s security interest. Because SP-1 did not authorize Partnership to sell the piece of equipment to Partner, under Section 36-9-315(a)(1) the sale did not discharge SP-1's security interest. Furthermore, because Partner must have know that the sale to him violated SP-1's security interest, Partner cannot qualify as "a buyer in ordinary course of business" under Section 36-9-201(9) who would take free of SP-1's security interest under Section 36-9-320(a). Therefore, SP-1 can establish that Partner acquired the piece of equipment subject to its security interest. Second, under Section 36-9-325(a)(2), SP-1 must establish that its security interest was perfected when Partner acquired the piece of equipment. SP-1 can meet this requirement because its filing in the Secretary of State's office was proper, the filing had not lapsed at the time of the sale to Partner, and under Section 36-9-507(a) SP-1's filed financing statement remains effective despite the sale of the piece of equipment to Partner.
Third, under Section 36-9-325(a)(3), SP-1 must establish that there was no period of time that its security interest was unperfected. For the reasons noted in the previous paragraph, SP-1 can satisfy this requirement.
Finally, under Section 36-9-325(b), SP-1 must establish that SP-2 would have priority solely under Section 36-9-322(a) (the first to file or perfect rule) or under Section 36-9-324 (the purchase-money priority rule). SP-1 can meet this condition because SP-2's sole basis for claiming priority is that it met the requirements under Section 36-9-324(a) for the purchase-money priority in goods other than inventory or livestock.
The practical effect of Section 36-9-325 and the overruling of Seebrite Corp. v. Transouth Financial Co. is to impose upon a buyer who does not qualify as "a buyer in ordinary course of business" protected under Section 36-9-320(a) the burden of determining whether the goods in the hands of his seller are encumbered and whether the secured party has authorized the sale. This problem is most likely to arise when a debtor not in the business of selling goods of that kind sells an item of collateral. In that context the buyer cannot qualify as a buyer in ordinary course under Section 36-1-201(9). For example, if Bank held a perfected security interest in a piece of equipment Debtor uses to manufacture a product and Debtor subsequently sells the piece of equipment to Used Equipment Dealer, Dealer cannot qualify as a buyer in ordinary course protected under Section 36-9-320 because Debtor was not in the business of selling used equipment. Therefore, whether Dealer acquired the goods subject to Bank's security interest will turn on whether Bank authorized the sale. If the sale was unauthorized not only does Dealer acquire the equipment subject to Bank's security interest but under Section 36-9-325 any security interest which Dealer grants in the equipment is also subject to Bank's security interest.
Section 36-9-326. Priority of security interests created by new debtor.
(a) Subject to subsection (b), a security interest created by a new debtor which is perfected by a filed financing statement that is effective solely under Section 36-9-508 in collateral in which a new debtor has or acquires rights is subordinate to a security interest in the same collateral which is perfected other than by a filed financing statement that is effective solely under Section 36-9-508.
(b) The other provisions of this part determine the priority among conflicting security interests in the same collateral perfected by filed financing statements that are effective solely under Section 36-9-508. However, if the security agreements to which a new debtor became bound as debtor were not entered into by the same original debtor, the conflicting security interests rank according to priority in time of the new debtor's having become bound.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Subordination of Security Interests Created by New Debtor. This Section addresses the priority contests that may arise when a new debtor becomes bound by the security agreement of an original debtor and each debtor has a secured creditor.
Subsection (a) subordinates the original debtor's secured party's security interest perfected against the new debtor solely under Section 9-508. The security interest is subordinated to security interests in the same collateral perfected by another method, e.g., by filing against the new debtor. As used in this Section, "a filed financing statement that is effective solely under Section 9-508" refers to a financing statement filed against the original debtor that continues to be effective under Section 9-508. It does not encompass a new initial financing statement providing the name of the new debtor, even if the initial financing statement is filed to maintain the effectiveness of a financing statement under the circumstances described in Section 9-508(b). Nor does it encompass a financing statement filed against the original debtor which remains effective against collateral transferred by the original debtor to the new debtor. See Section 9-508(c). Concerning priority contests involving transferred collateral, see Sections 9-325 and 9-507.
Example 1: SP-X holds a perfected-by-filing security interest in X Corp's existing and after-acquired inventory, and SP-Z holds a perfected-by-possession security interest in an item of Z Corp's inventory. Z Corp becomes bound as debtor by X Corp's security agreement (e.g., Z Corp buys X Corp's assets and assumes its security agreement). See Section 9-203(d). Under Section 9-508, SP-X's financing statement is effective to perfect a security interest in the item of inventory in which Z Corp has rights. However, subsection (a) provides that SP-X's security interest is subordinate to SP-Z's, regardless of whether SP-X's financing statement was filed before SP-Z perfected its security interest.
Example 2: SP-X holds a perfected-by-filing security interest in X Corp's existing and after-acquired inventory, and SP-Z holds a perfected-by-filing security interest in Z Corp's existing and after-acquired inventory. Z Corp becomes bound as debtor by X Corp's security agreement. Subsequently, Z Corp acquires a new item of inventory. Under Section 9-508, SP-X's financing statement is effective to perfect a security interest in the new item of inventory in which Z Corp has rights. However, because SP-Z's security interest was perfected by another method, subsection (a) provides that SP-X's security interest is subordinate to SP-Z's, regardless of which financing statement was filed first. This would be the case even if SP-Z filed after Z Corp became bound by X Corp's security agreement.
3. Other Priority Rules. Subsection (b) addresses the priority among security interests created by the original debtor (X Corp). By invoking the other priority rules of this subpart, as applicable, subsection (b) preserves the relative priority of security interests created by the original debtor.
Example 3: Under the facts of Example 2, SP-Y also holds a perfected-by-filing security interest in X Corp's existing and after-acquired inventory. SP-Y filed after SP-X. Inasmuch as both SP-X's and SP-Y's security interests in inventory acquired by Z Corp after it became bound are perfected solely under Section 9-508, the normal priority rules determine their relative priorities. Under the "first-to-file-or-perfect" rule of Section 9-322(a)(1), SP-X has priority over SP-Y.
Example 4: Under the facts of Example 3, after Z Corp became bound by X Corp's security agreement, SP-Y promptly filed a new initial financing statement against Z Corp. At that time, SP-X's security interest was perfected only by virtue of its original filing against X Corp which was "effective solely under Section 9-508." Because SP-Y's security interest no longer is perfected by a financing statement that is "effective solely under Section 9-508," this Section does not apply to the priority contest. Rather, the normal priority rules apply. Under Section 9-322, because SP-Y's financing statement was filed against Z Corp, the new debtor, before SP-X's, SP-Y's security interest is senior to that of SP-X. Similarly, the normal priority rules would govern priority between SP-Y and SP-Z.
The second sentence of subsection (b) effectively limits the applicability of the first sentence to situations in which a new debtor has become bound by more than one security agreement entered into by the same original debtor. When the new debtor has become bound by security agreements entered into by different original debtors, the second sentence provides that priority is based on priority in time of the new debtor's becoming bound.
Example 5: Under the facts of Example 2, SP-W holds a perfected-by-filing security interest in W Corp's existing and after-acquired inventory. After Z Corp became bound by X Corp's security agreement in favor of SP-X, Z Corp became bound by W Corp's security agreement. Under subsection (c), SP-W's security interest in inventory acquired by Z Corp is subordinate to that of SP-X, because Z Corp became bound under SP-X's security agreement before it became bound under SP-W's security agreement. This is the result regardless of which financing statement (SP-X's or SP-W's) was filed first.
The second sentence of subsection (b) reflects the generally accepted view that priority based on the first-to-file rule is inappropriate for resolving priority disputes when the filings were made against different debtors. Like subsection (a) and the first sentence of subsection (b), however, the second sentence of subsection (b) relates only to priority conflicts among security interests perfected by filed financing statements that are "effective solely under Section 9-508."
Example 6: Under the facts of Example 5, after Z Corp became bound by W Corp's security agreement, SP-W promptly filed a new initial financing statement against Z Corp. At that time, SP-X's security interest was perfected only pursuant to its original filing against X Corp which was "effective solely under Section 9-508." Because SP-W's security interest is not perfected by a financing statement that is "effective solely under Section 9-508," this Section does not apply to the priority contest. Rather, the normal priority rules apply. Under Section 9-322, because SP-W's financing statement was the first to be filed against Z Corp, the new debtor, SP-W's security interest is senior to that of SP-X. Similarly, the normal priority rules would govern priority between SP-W and SP-Z.
Section 36-9-327. Priority of security interests in deposit account.
The following rules govern priority among conflicting security interests in the same deposit account:
(1) A security interest held by a secured party having control of the deposit account under Section 36-9-104 has priority over a conflicting security interest held by a secured party that does not have control.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in items (3) and (4), security interests perfected by control under Section 36-9-314 rank according to priority in time of obtaining control.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in item (4), a security interest held by the bank with which the deposit account is maintained has priority over a conflicting security interest held by another secured party.
(4) A security interest perfected by control under Section 36-9-104(a)(3) has priority over a security interest held by the bank with which the deposit account is maintained.
Official Comment
1. Source. New; derived from former Section 9-115(5).
2. Scope of This Section. This Section contains the rules governing the priority of conflicting security interests in deposit accounts. It overrides conflicting priority rules. See Sections 9-322(f)(1), 9-324(a), (b), (d), (f). This Section does not apply to accounts evidenced by an instrument (e.g., certain certificates of deposit), which by definition are not "deposit accounts."
3. Control. Under paragraph (1), security interests perfected by control (Sections 9-314, 9-104) take priority over those perfected otherwise, e.g., as identifiable cash proceeds under Section 9-315. Secured parties for whom the deposit account is an integral part of the credit decision will, at a minimum, insist upon the right to immediate access to the deposit account upon the debtor's default (i.e., control). Those secured parties for whom the deposit account is less essential will not take control, thereby running the risk that the debtor will dispose of funds on deposit (either outright or for collateral purposes) after default but before the account can be frozen by court order or the secured party can obtain control.
Paragraph (2) governs the case (expected to be very rare) in which a bank enters into a Section 9-104(a)(2) control agreement with more than one secured party. It provides that the security interests rank according to time of obtaining control. If the bank is solvent and the control agreements are well drafted, the bank will be liable to each secured party, and the priority rule will have no practical effect.
4. Priority of Bank. Under paragraph (3), the security interest of the bank with which the deposit account is maintained normally takes priority over all other conflicting security interests in the deposit account, regardless of whether the deposit account constitutes the competing secured party's original collateral or its proceeds. A rule of this kind enables banks to extend credit to their depositors without the need to examine either the public record or their own records to determine whether another party might have a security interest in the deposit account.
A secured party who takes a security interest in the deposit account as original collateral can protect itself against the results of this rule in one of two ways. It can take control of the deposit account by becoming the bank's customer. Under paragraph (4), this arrangement operates to subordinate the bank's security interest. Alternatively, the secured party can obtain a subordination agreement from the bank. See Section 9-339.
A secured party who claims the deposit account as proceeds of other collateral can reduce the risk of becoming junior by obtaining the debtor's agreement to deposit proceeds into a specific cash-collateral account and obtaining the agreement of that bank to subordinate all its claims to those of the secured party. But if the debtor violates its agreement and deposits funds into a deposit account other than the cash-collateral account, the secured party risks being subordinated.
5. Priority in Proceeds of, and Funds Transferred from, Deposit Account. The priority afforded by this Section does not extend to proceeds of a deposit account. Rather, Section 9-322(c) through (e) and the provisions referred to in Section 9-322(f) govern priorities in proceeds of a deposit account. Section 9-315(d) addresses continuation of perfection in proceeds of deposit accounts. As to funds transferred from a deposit account that serves as collateral, see Section 9-332.
Section 36-9-328. Priority of security interests in investment property.
The following rules govern priority among conflicting security interests in the same investment property:
(1) A security interest held by a secured party having control of investment property under Section 36-9-106 has priority over a security interest held by a secured party that does not have control of the investment property.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in items (3) and (4), conflicting security interests held by secured parties each of which has control under Section 36-9-106 rank according to priority in time of:
(A) if the collateral is a security, obtaining control;
(B) if the collateral is a security entitlement carried in a securities account and:
( i) if the secured party obtained control under Section 36-8-106(d)(1), the secured party's becoming the person for which the securities account is maintained;
( ii) if the secured party obtained control under Section 36-8-106(d)(2), the securities intermediary's agreement to comply with the secured party's entitlement orders with respect to security entitlements carried or to be carried in the securities account; or
(iii) if the secured party obtained control through another person under Section 36-8-106(d)(3), the time on which priority would be based under this paragraph if the other person were the secured party; or
(C) if the collateral is a commodity contract carried with a commodity intermediary, the satisfaction of the requirement for control specified in Section 36-9-106(b)(2) with respect to commodity contracts carried or to be carried with the commodity intermediary.
(3) A security interest held by a securities intermediary in a security entitlement or a securities account maintained with the securities intermediary has priority over a conflicting security interest held by another secured party.
(4) A security interest held by a commodity intermediary in a commodity contract or a commodity account maintained with the commodity intermediary has priority over a conflicting security interest held by another secured party.
(5) A security interest in a certificated security in registered form which is perfected by taking delivery under Section 36-9-313(a) and not by control under Section 36-9-314 has priority over a conflicting security interest perfected by a method other than control.
(6) Conflicting security interests created by a broker, securities intermediary, or commodity intermediary which are perfected without control under Section 36-9-106 rank equally.
(7) In all other cases, priority among conflicting security interests in investment property is governed by Sections 36-9-322 and 36-9-323.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-115(5).
2. Scope of This Section. This Section contains the rules governing the priority of conflicting security interests in investment property. Paragraph (1) states the most important general rule-that a secured party who obtains control has priority over a secured party who does not obtain control. Paragraphs (2) through (4) deal with conflicting security interests each of which is perfected by control. Paragraph (5) addresses the priority of a security interest in a certificated security which is perfected by delivery but not control. Paragraph (6) deals with the relatively unusual circumstance in which a broker, securities intermediary, or commodity intermediary has created conflicting security interests none of which is perfected by control. Paragraph (7) provides that the general priority rules of Sections 9-322 and 9-323 apply to cases not covered by the specific rules in this Section. The principal application of this residual rule is that the usual first in time of filing rule applies to conflicting security interests that are perfected only by filing. Because the control priority rule of paragraph (1) provides for the ordinary cases in which persons purchase securities on margin credit from their brokers, there is no need for special rules for purchase-money security interests. See also Section 9-103 (limiting purchase-money collateral to goods and software).
3. General Rule: Priority of Security Interest Perfected by Control. Under paragraph (1), a secured party who obtains control has priority over a secured party who does not obtain control. The control priority rule does not turn on either temporal sequence or awareness of conflicting security interests. Rather, it is a structural rule, based on the principle that a lender should be able to rely on the collateral without question if the lender has taken the necessary steps to assure itself that it is in a position where it can foreclose on the collateral without further action by the debtor. The control priority rule is necessary because the perfection rules provide considerable flexibility in structuring secured financing arrangements. For example, at the "retail" level, a secured lender to an investor who wants the full measure of protection can obtain control, but the creditor may be willing to accept the greater measure of risk that follows from perfection by filing. Similarly, at the "wholesale" level, a lender to securities firms can leave the collateral with the debtor and obtain a perfected security interest under the automatic perfection rule of Section 9-309(a)(10), but a lender who wants to be entirely sure of its position will want to obtain control. The control priority rule of paragraph (1) is an essential part of this system of flexibility. It is feasible to provide more than one method of perfecting security interests only if the rules ensure that those who take the necessary steps to obtain the full measure of protection do not run the risk of subordination to those who have not taken such steps. A secured party who is unwilling to run the risk that the debtor has granted or will grant a conflicting control security interest should not make a loan without obtaining control of the collateral.
As applied to the retail level, the control priority rule means that a secured party who obtains control has priority over a conflicting security interest perfected by filing without regard to inquiry into whether the control secured party was aware of the filed security interest. Prior to the 1994 revisions to Articles 8 and 9, Article 9 did not permit perfection of security interests in securities by filing. Accordingly, parties who deal in securities never developed a practice of searching the UCC files before conducting securities transactions. Although filing is now a permissible method of perfection, in order to avoid disruption of existing practices in this business it is necessary to give perfection by filing a different and more limited effect for securities than for some other forms of collateral. The priority rules are not based on the assumption that parties who perfect by the usual method of obtaining control will search the files. Quite the contrary, the control priority rule is intended to ensure that, with respect to investment property, secured parties who do obtain control are entirely unaffected by filings. To state the point another way, perfection by filing is intended to affect only general creditors or other secured creditors who rely on filing. The rule that a security interest perfected by filing can be primed by a control security interest, without regard to awareness, is a consequence of the system of perfection and priority rules for investment property. These rules are designed to take account of the circumstances of the securities markets, where filing is not given the same effect as for some other forms of property. No implication is made about the effect of filing with respect to security interests in other forms of property, nor about other Article 9 rules, e.g., Section 9-330, which govern the circumstances in which security interests in other forms of property perfected by filing can be primed by subsequent perfected security interests.
The following examples illustrate the application of the priority rule in paragraph (1):
Example 1: Debtor borrows from Alpha and grants Alpha a security interest in a variety of collateral, including all of Debtor's investment property. At that time Debtor owns 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock for which Debtor has a certificate. Alpha perfects by filing. Later, Debtor borrows from Beta and grants Beta a security interest in the 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock. Debtor delivers the certificate, properly indorsed, to Beta. Alpha and Beta both have perfected security interests in the XYZ Co. stock. Beta has control, see Section 8-106(b)(1), and hence has priority over Alpha.
Example 2: Debtor borrows from Alpha and grants Alpha a security interest in a variety of collateral, including all of Debtor's investment property. At that time Debtor owns 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock, held through a securities account with Able & Co. Alpha perfects by filing. Later, Debtor borrows from Beta and grants Beta a security interest in the 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock. Debtor instructs Able to have the 1000 shares transferred through the clearing corporation to Custodian Bank, to be credited to Beta's account with Custodian Bank. Alpha and Beta both have perfected security interests in the XYZ Co. stock. Beta has control, see Section 8-106(d)(1), and hence has priority over Alpha.
Example 3: Debtor borrows from Alpha and grants Alpha a security interest in a variety of collateral, including all of Debtor's investment property. At that time Debtor owns 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock, which is held through a securities account with Able & Co. Alpha perfects by filing. Later, Debtor borrows from Beta and grants Beta a security interest in the 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock. Debtor, Able, and Beta enter into an agreement under which Debtor will continue to receive dividends and distributions, and will continue to have the right to direct dispositions, but Beta will also have the right to direct dispositions and receive the proceeds. Alpha and Beta both have perfected security interests in the XYZ Co. stock (more precisely, in the Debtor's security entitlement to the financial asset consisting of the XYZ Co. stock). Beta has control, see Section 8-106(d)(2), and hence has priority over Alpha.
Example 4: Debtor borrows from Alpha and grants Alpha a security interest in a variety of collateral, including all of Debtor's investment property. At that time Debtor owns 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock, held through a securities account with Able & Co. Alpha perfects by filing. Debtor's agreement with Able & Co. provides that Able has a security interest in all securities carried in the account as security for any obligations of Debtor to Able. Debtor incurs obligations to Able and later defaults on the obligations to Alpha and Able. Able has control by virtue of the rule of Section 8-106(e) that if a customer grants a security interest to its own intermediary, the intermediary has control. Since Alpha does not have control, Able has priority over Alpha under the general control priority rule of paragraph (1).
4. Conflicting Security Interests Perfected by Control: Priority of Securities Intermediary or Commodity Intermediary. Paragraphs (2) through (4) govern the priority of conflicting security interests each of which is perfected by control. The following example explains the application of the rules in paragraphs (3) and (4):
Example 5: Debtor holds securities through a securities account with Able & Co. Debtor's agreement with Able & Co. provides that Able has a security interest in all securities carried in the account as security for any obligations of Debtor to Able. Debtor borrows from Beta and grants Beta a security interest in 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock carried in the account. Debtor, Able, and Beta enter into an agreement under which Debtor will continue to receive dividends and distributions and will continue to have the right to direct dispositions, but Beta will also have the right to direct dispositions and receive the proceeds. Debtor incurs obligations to Able and later defaults on the obligations to Beta and Able. Both Beta and Able have control, so the general control priority rule of paragraph (1) does not apply. Compare Example 4. Paragraph (3) provides that a security interest held by a securities intermediary in positions of its own customer has priority over a conflicting security interest of an external lender, so Able has priority over Beta. (Paragraph (4) contains a parallel rule for commodity intermediaries.) The agreement among Able, Beta, and Debtor could, of course, determine the relative priority of the security interests of Able and Beta, see Section 9-339, but the fact that the intermediary has agreed to act on the instructions of a secured party such as Beta does not itself imply any agreement by the intermediary to subordinate.
5. Conflicting Security Interests Perfected by Control: Temporal Priority. Former Section 9-115 introduced into Article 9 the concept of conflicting security interests that rank equally. Paragraph (2) of this Section governs priority in those circumstances in which more than one secured party (other than a broker, securities intermediary, or commodity intermediary) has control. It replaces the equal-priority rule for conflicting security interests in investment property with a temporal rule. For securities, both certificated and uncertificated, under paragraph (2)(A) priority is based on the time that control is obtained. For security entitlements carried in securities accounts, the treatment is more complex. Paragraph (2)(B) bases priority on the timing of the steps taken to achieve control. The following example illustrates the application of paragraph (2).
Example 6: Debtor borrows from Alpha and grants Alpha a security interest in a variety of collateral, including all of Debtor's investment property. At that time Debtor owns a security entitlement that includes 1000 shares of XYZ Co. stock that Debtor holds through a securities account with Able & Co. Debtor, Able, and Alpha enter into an agreement under which Debtor will continue to receive dividends and distributions, and will continue to have the right to direct dispositions, but Alpha will also have the right to direct dispositions and receive the proceeds. Later, Debtor borrows from Beta and grants Beta a security interest all its investment property, existing and after-acquired. Debtor, Able, and Beta enter into an agreement under which Debtor will continue to receive dividends and distributions, and will continue to have the right to direct dispositions, but Beta will also have the right to direct dispositions and receive the proceeds. Alpha and Beta both have perfected-by-control security interests in the security entitlement to the XYZ Co. stock by virtue of their agreements with Able. See Sections 9-314(a), 9-106(a), 8-106(d)(2). Under paragraph (2)(B)(ii), the priority of each security interest dates from the time of the secured party's agreement with Able. Because Alpha's agreement was first in time, Alpha has priority. This priority applies equally to security entitlements to financial assets credited to the account after the agreement was entered into.
The priority rule is analogous to "first-to-file" priority under Section 9-322 with respect to after-acquired collateral. Paragraphs (2)(B)(i) and (2)(B)(iii) provide similar rules for security entitlements as to which control is obtained by other methods, and paragraph (2)(C) provides a similar rule for commodity contracts carried in a commodity account. Section 8-510 also has been revised to provide a temporal priority conforming to paragraph (2)(B).
6. Certificated Securities. A long-standing practice has developed whereby secured parties whose collateral consists of a security evidenced by a security certificate take possession of the security certificate. If the security certificate is in bearer form, the secured party's acquisition of possession constitutes "delivery" under Section 8-301(a)(1), and the delivery constitutes "control" under Section 8-106(a). Comment 5 discusses the priority of security interests perfected by control of investment property.
If the security certificate is in registered form, the secured party will not achieve control over the security unless the security certificate contains an appropriate indorsement or is (re)registered in the secured party's name. See Section 8-106(b). However, the secured party's acquisition of possession constitutes "delivery" of the security certificate under Section 8-301 and serves to perfect the security interest under Section 9-313(a), even if the security certificate has not been appropriately indorsed and has not been (re)registered in the secured party's name. A security interest perfected by this method has priority over a security interest perfected other than by control (e.g., by filing). See paragraph (5).
The priority rule stated in paragraph (5) may seem anomalous, in that it can afford less favorable treatment to purchasers who buy collateral outright that to those who take a security interest in it. For example, a buyer of a security certificate would cut off a security interest perfected by filing only if the buyer achieves the status of a protected purchaser under Section 8-303. The buyer would not be a protected purchaser, for example, if it does not obtain "control" under Section 8-106 (e.g., if it fails to obtain a proper indorsement of the certificate) or if it had notice of an adverse claim under Section 8-105. The apparent anomaly disappears, however, when one understands the priority rule not as one intended to protect careless or guilty parties, but as one that eliminates the need to conduct a search of the public records only insofar as necessary to serve the needs of the securities markets.
7. Secured Financing of Securities Firms. Priority questions concerning security interests granted by brokers and securities intermediaries are governed by the general control-beats-non-control priority rule of paragraph (1), as supplemented by the special rules set out in paragraphs (2) (temporal priority-first to control), (3) (special priority for securities intermediary), and (6) (equal priority for non-control). The following examples illustrate the priority rules as applied to this setting. (In all cases it is assumed that the debtor retains sufficient other securities to satisfy all customers' claims. This Section deals with the relative rights of secured lenders to a securities firm. Disputes between a secured lender and the firm's own customers are governed by Section 8-511.)
Example 7: Able & Co., a securities dealer, enters into financing arrangements with two lenders, Alpha Bank and Beta Bank. In each case the agreements provide that the lender will have a security interest in the securities identified on lists provided to the lender on a daily basis, that the debtor will deliver the securities to the lender on demand, and that the debtor will not list as collateral any securities which the debtor has pledged to any other lender. Upon Able's insolvency it is discovered that Able has listed the same securities on the collateral lists provided to both Alpha and Beta. Alpha and Beta both have perfected security interests under the automatic-perfection rule of Section 9-309(10). Neither Alpha nor Beta has control. Paragraph (6) provides that the security interests of Alpha and Beta rank equally, because each of them has a non-control security interest granted by a securities firm. They share pro-rata.
Example 8: Able enters into financing arrangements, with Alpha Bank and Beta Bank as in Example 7. At some point, however, Beta decides that it is unwilling to continue to provide financing on a non-control basis. Able directs the clearing corporation where it holds its principal inventory of securities to move specified securities into Beta's account. Upon Able's insolvency it is discovered that a list of collateral provided to Alpha includes securities that had been moved to Beta's account. Both Alpha and Beta have perfected security interests; Alpha under the automatic-perfection rule of Section 9-309(10), and Beta under that rule and also the perfection-by-control rule in Section 9-314(a). Beta has control but Alpha does not. Beta has priority over Alpha under paragraph (1).
Example 9: Able & Co. carries its principal inventory of securities through Clearing Corporation, which offers a "shared control" facility whereby a participant securities firm can enter into an arrangement with a lender under which the securities firm will retain the power to trade and otherwise direct dispositions of securities carried in its account, but Clearing Corporation agrees that, at any time the lender so directs, Clearing Corporation will transfer any securities from the firm's account to the lender's account or otherwise dispose of them as directed by the lender. Able enters into financing arrangements with two lenders, Alpha and Beta, each of which obtains such a control agreement from Clearing Corporation. The agreement with each lender provides that Able will designate specific securities as collateral on lists provided to the lender on a daily or other periodic basis, and that it will not pledge the same securities to different lenders. Upon Able's insolvency, it is discovered that Able has listed the same securities on the collateral lists provided to both Alpha and Beta. Both Alpha and Beta have control over the disputed securities. Paragraph (2) awards priority to whichever secured party first entered into the agreement with Clearing Corporation.
8. Relation to Other Law. Section 1-103 provides that "unless displaced by particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement its provisions." There may be circumstances in which a secured party's action in acquiring a security interest that has priority under this Section constitutes conduct that is wrongful under other law. Though the possibility of such resort to other law may provide an appropriate "escape valve" for cases of egregious conduct, care must be taken to ensure that this does not impair the certainty and predictability of the priority rules. Whether a court may appropriately look to other law to impose liability upon or estop a secured party from asserting its Article 9 priority depends on an assessment of the secured party's conduct under the standards established by such other law as well as a determination of whether the particular application of such other law is displaced by the UCC.
Some circumstances in which other law is clearly displaced by the UCC rules are readily identifiable. Common law "first in time, first in right" principles, or correlative tort liability rules such as common law conversion principles under which a purchaser may incur liability to a person with a prior property interest without regard to awareness of that claim, are necessarily displaced by the priority rules set out in this Section since these rules determine the relative ranking of security interests in investment property. So too, Article 8 provides protections against adverse claims to certain purchasers of interests in investment property. In circumstances where a secured party not only has priority under Section 9-328, but also qualifies for protection against adverse claims under Section 8-303, 8-502, or 8-510, resort to other law would be precluded.
In determining whether it is appropriate in a particular case to look to other law, account must also be taken of the policies that underlie the commercial law rules on securities markets and security interests in securities. A principal objective of the 1994 revision of Article 8 and the provisions of Article 9 governing investment property was to ensure that secured financing transactions can be implemented on a simple, timely, and certain basis. One of the circumstances that led to the revision was the concern that uncertainty in the application of the rules on secured transactions involving securities and other financial assets could contribute to systemic risk by impairing the ability of financial institutions to provide liquidity to the markets in times of stress. The control priority rule is designed to provide a clear and certain rule to ensure that lenders who have taken the necessary steps to establish control do not face a risk of subordination to other lenders who have not done so.
The control priority rule does not turn on an inquiry into the state of a secured party's awareness of potential conflicting claims because a rule under which a person's rights depended on that sort of after-the-fact inquiry could introduce an unacceptable measure of uncertainty. If an inquiry into awareness could provide a complete and satisfactory resolution of the problem in all cases, the priority rules of this Section would have incorporated that test. The fact that they do not necessarily means that resort to other law based solely on that factor is precluded, though the question whether a control secured party induced or encouraged its financing arrangement with actual knowledge that the debtor would be violating the rights of another secured party may, in some circumstances, appropriately be treated as a factor in determining whether the control party's action is the kind of egregious conduct for which resort to other law is appropriate.
Section 36-9-329. Priority of security interests in letter-of-credit right.
The following rules govern priority among conflicting security interests in the same letter-of-credit right:
(1) A security interest held by a secured party having control of the letter-of-credit right under Section 36-9-107 has priority to the extent of its control over a conflicting security interest held by a secured party that does not have control.
(2) Security interests perfected by control under Section 36-9-314 rank according to priority in time of obtaining control.
Official Comment
1. Source. New; loosely modeled after former Section 9-115(5).
2. General Rule. Paragraph (1) awards priority to a secured party who perfects a security interest directly in letter-of-credit rights (i.e., one that takes an assignment of proceeds and obtains consent of the issuer or any nominated person under Section 5-114(c)) over another conflicting security interest (i.e., one that is perfected automatically in the letter-of-credit rights as supporting obligations under Section 9-308(d)). This is consistent with international letter-of-credit practice and provides finality to payments made to recognized assignees of letter-of-credit proceeds. If an issuer or nominated person recognizes multiple security interests in a letter-of-credit right, resulting in multiple parties having control (Section 9-107), under paragraph (2) the security interests rank according to the time of obtaining control.
3. Drawing Rights; Transferee Beneficiaries. Drawing under a letter of credit is personal to the beneficiary and requires the beneficiary to perform the conditions for drawing under the letter of credit. Accordingly, a beneficiary's grant of a security interest in a letter of credit includes the beneficiary's "letter-of-credit right" as defined in Section 9-102 and the right to "proceeds of [the] letter of credit" as defined in Section 5-114(a), but does not include the right to demand payment under the letter of credit.
Section 5-114(e) provides that the "[r]ights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person are independent of the beneficiary's assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit and are superior to the assignee's right to the proceeds." To the extent the rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person are independent and superior, this Article does not apply. See Section 9-109(c).
Under Article 5, there is in effect a novation upon the transfer with the issuer becoming bound on a new, independent obligation to the transferee. The rights of nominated persons and transferee beneficiaries under a letter of credit include the right to demand payment from the issuer. Under Section 5-114(e), their rights to payment are independent of their obligations to the beneficiary (or original beneficiary) and superior to the rights of assignees of letter of credit proceeds (Section 5-114(c)) and others claiming a security interest in the beneficiary's (or original beneficiary's) letter of credit rights.
A transfer of drawing rights under a transferable letter of credit establishes independent Article 5 rights in the transferee and does not create or perfect an Article 9 security interest in the transferred drawing rights. The definition of "letter-of-credit right" in Section 9-102 excludes a beneficiary's drawing rights. The exercise of drawing rights by a transferee beneficiary may breach a contractual obligation of the transferee to the original beneficiary concerning when and how much the transferee may draw or how it may use the funds received under the letter of credit. If, for example, drawing rights are transferred to support a sale or loan from the transferee to the original beneficiary, then the transferee would be obligated to the original beneficiary under the sale or loan agreement to account for any drawing and for the use of any funds received. The transferee's obligation would be governed by the applicable law of contracts or restitution.
4. Secured Party-Transferee Beneficiaries. As described in Comment 3, drawing rights under letters of credit are transferred in many commercial contexts in which the transferee is not a secured party claiming a security interest in an underlying receivable supported by the letter of credit. Consequently, a transfer of a letter of credit is not a method of "perfection" of a security interest. The transferee's independent right to draw under the letter of credit and to receive and retain the value thereunder (in effect, priority) is not based on Article 9 but on letter-of-credit law and the terms of the letter of credit. Assume, however, that a secured party does hold a security interest in a receivable that is owned by a beneficiary-debtor and supported by a transferable letter of credit. Assume further that the beneficiary-debtor causes the letter of credit to be transferred to the secured party, the secured party draws under the letter of credit, and, upon the issuer's payment to the secured party-transferee, the underlying account debtor's obligation to the original beneficiary-debtor is satisfied. In this situation, the payment to the secured party-transferee is proceeds of the receivable collected by the secured party-transferee. Consequently, the secured party-transferee would have certain duties to the debtor and third parties under Article 9. For example, it would be obliged to collect under the letter of credit in a commercially reasonable manner and to remit any surplus pursuant to Sections 9-607 and 9-608.
This scenario is problematic under letter-of-credit law and practice, inasmuch as a transferee beneficiary collects in its own right arising from its own performance. Accordingly, under Section 5-114, the independent and superior rights of a transferee control over any inconsistent duties under Article 9. A transferee beneficiary may take a transfer of drawing rights to avoid reliance on the original beneficiary's credit and collateral, and it may consider any Article 9 rights superseded by its Article 5 rights. Moreover, it will not always be clear (i) whether a transferee beneficiary has a security interest in the underlying collateral, (ii) whether any security interest is senior to the rights of others, or (iii) whether the transferee beneficiary is aware that it holds a security interest. There will be clear cases in which the role of a transferee beneficiary as such is merely incidental to a conventional secured financing. There also will be cases in which the existence of a security interest may have little to do with the position of a transferee beneficiary as such. In dealing with these cases and less clear cases involving the possible application of Article 9 to a nominated person or a transferee beneficiary, the right to demand payment under a letter of credit should be distinguished from letter-of-credit rights. The courts also should give appropriate consideration to the policies and provisions of Article 5 and letter-of-credit practice as well as Article 9.
Section 36-9-330. Priority of purchaser of chattel paper or instrument.
(a) A purchaser of chattel paper has priority over a security interest in the chattel paper which is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest if:
(1) in good faith and in the ordinary course of the purchaser's business, the purchaser gives new value and takes possession of the chattel paper or obtains control of the chattel paper under Section 36-9-105; and
(2) the chattel paper does not indicate that it has been assigned to an identified assignee other than the purchaser.
(b) A purchaser of chattel paper has priority over a security interest in the chattel paper which is claimed other than merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest if the purchaser gives new value and takes possession of the chattel paper or obtains control of the chattel paper under Section 36-9-105 in good faith, in the ordinary course of the purchaser's business, and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-327, a purchaser having priority in chattel paper under subsection (a) or (b) also has priority in proceeds of the chattel paper to the extent that:
(1) Section 36-9-322 provides for priority in the proceeds; or
(2) the proceeds consist of the specific goods covered by the chattel paper or cash proceeds of the specific goods, even if the purchaser's security interest in the proceeds is unperfected.
(d) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-331(a), a purchaser of an instrument has priority over a security interest in the instrument perfected by a method other than possession if the purchaser gives value and takes possession of the instrument in good faith and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.
(e) For purposes of subsections (a) and (b), the holder of a purchase-money security interest in inventory gives new value for chattel paper constituting proceeds of the inventory.
(f) For purposes of subsections (b) and (d), if chattel paper or an instrument indicates that it has been assigned to an identified secured party other than the purchaser, a purchaser of the chattel paper or instrument has knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-308.
2. Non-Temporal Priority. This Article permits a security interest in chattel paper or instruments to be perfected either by filing or by the secured party's taking possession. This Section enables secured parties and other purchasers of chattel paper (both electronic and tangible) and instruments to obtain priority over earlier-perfected security interests.
3. Chattel Paper. Subsections (a) and (b) follow former Section 9-308 in distinguishing between earlier-perfected security interests in chattel paper that is claimed merely as proceeds of inventory subject to a security interest and chattel paper that is claimed other than merely as proceeds. Like former Section 9-308, this Section does not elaborate upon the phrase "merely as proceeds." For an elaboration, see PEB Commentary No. 8.
This Section makes explicit the "good faith" requirement and retains the requirements of "the ordinary course of the purchaser's business" and the giving of "new value" as conditions for priority. Concerning the last, this Article deletes former Section 9-108 and adds to Section 9-102 a completely different definition of the term "new value." Under subsection (e), the holder of a purchase-money security interest in inventory is deemed to give "new value" for chattel paper constituting the proceeds of the inventory. Accordingly, the purchase-money secured party may qualify for priority in the chattel paper under subsection (a) or (b), whichever is applicable, even if it does not make an additional advance against the chattel paper.
If a possessory security interest in tangible chattel paper or a perfected-by-control security interest in electronic chattel paper does not qualify for priority under this Section, it may be subordinate to a perfected-by-filing security interest under Section 9-322(a)(1).
4. Possession. The priority afforded by this Section turns in part on whether a purchaser "takes possession" of tangible chattel paper. Similarly, the governing law provisions in Section 9-301 address both "possessory" and "nonpossessory" security interests. Two common practices have raised particular concerns. First, in some cases the parties create more than one copy or counterpart of chattel paper evidencing a single secured obligation or lease. This practice raises questions as to which counterpart is the "original" and whether it is necessary for a purchaser to take possession of all counterparts in order to "take possession" of the chattel paper. Second, parties sometimes enter into a single "master" agreement. The master agreement contemplates that the parties will enter into separate "schedules" from time to time, each evidencing chattel paper. Must a purchaser of an obligation or lease evidenced by a single schedule also take possession of the master agreement as well as the schedule in order to "take possession" of the chattel paper?
The problem raised by the first practice is easily solved. The parties may in the terms of their agreement and by designation on the chattel paper identify only one counterpart as the original chattel paper for purposes of taking possession of the chattel paper. Concerns about the second practice also are easily solved by careful drafting. Each schedule should provide that it incorporates the terms of the master agreement, not the other way around. This will make it clear that each schedule is a "stand alone" document.
5. Chattel Paper Claimed Merely as Proceeds. Subsection (a) revises the rule in former Section 9-308(b) to eliminate reference to what the purchaser knows. Instead, a purchaser who meets the possession or control, ordinary course, and new value requirements takes priority over a competing security interest unless the chattel paper itself indicates that it has been assigned to an identified assignee other than the purchaser. Thus subsection (a) recognizes the common practice of placing a "legend" on chattel paper to indicate that it has been assigned. This approach, under which the chattel paper purchaser who gives new value in ordinary course can rely on possession of unlegended, tangible chattel paper without any concern for other facts that it may know, comports with the expectations of both inventory and chattel paper financers.
6. Chattel Paper Claimed Other Than Merely as Proceeds. Subsection (b) eliminates the requirement that the purchaser take without knowledge that the "specific paper" is subject to the security interest and substitutes for it the requirement that the purchaser take "without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party." This standard derives from the definition of "buyer in ordinary course of business" in Section 1-201(9). The source of the purchaser's knowledge is irrelevant. Note, however, that "knowledge" means "actual knowledge." Section 1-201(25).
In contrast to a junior secured party in accounts, who may be required in some special circumstances to undertake a search under the "good faith" requirement, see Comment 5 to Section 9-331, a purchaser of chattel paper under this Section is not required as a matter of good faith to make a search in order to determine the existence of prior security interests. There may be circumstances where the purchaser undertakes a search nevertheless, either on its own volition or because other considerations make it advisable to do so, e.g., where the purchaser also is purchasing accounts. Without more, a purchaser of chattel paper who has seen a financing statement covering the chattel paper or who knows that the chattel paper is encumbered with a security interest, does not have knowledge that its purchase violates the secured party's rights. However, if a purchaser sees a statement in a financing statement to the effect that a purchase of chattel paper from the debtor would violate the rights of the filed secured party, the purchaser would have such knowledge. Likewise, under new subsection (f), if the chattel paper itself indicates that it had been assigned to an identified secured party other than the purchaser, the purchaser would have wrongful knowledge for purposes of subsection (b), thereby preventing the purchaser from qualifying for priority under that subsection, even if the purchaser did not have actual knowledge. In the case of tangible chattel paper, the indication normally would consist of a written legend on the chattel paper. In the case of electronic chattel paper, this Article leaves to developing market and technological practices the manner in which the chattel paper would indicate an assignment.
7. Instruments. Subsection (d) contains a special priority rule for instruments. Under this subsection, a purchaser of an instrument has priority over a security interest perfected by a method other than possession (e.g., by filing, temporarily under Section 9-312(e) or (g), as proceeds under Section 9-315(d), or automatically upon attachment under Section 9-309(4) if the security interest arises out of a sale of the instrument) if the purchaser gives value and takes possession of the instrument in good faith and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party. Generally, to the extent subsection (d) conflicts with Section 3-306, subsection (d) governs. See Section 3-102(b). For example, notice of a conflicting security interest precludes a purchaser from becoming a holder in due course under Section 3-302 and thereby taking free of all claims to the instrument under Section 3-306. However, a purchaser who takes even with knowledge of the security interest qualifies for priority under subsection (d) if it takes without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the holder of the security interest. Likewise, a purchaser qualifies for priority under subsection (d) if it takes for "value" as defined in Section 1-201, even if it does not take for "value" as defined in Section 3-303.
Subsection (d) is subject to Section 9-331(a), which provides that Article 9 does not limit the rights of a holder in due course under Article 3. Thus, in the rare case in which the purchaser of an instrument qualifies for priority under subsection (d), but another person has the rights of a holder in due course of the instrument, the other person takes free of the purchaser's claim. See Section 3-306.
The rule in subsection (d) is similar to the rules in subsections (a) and (b), which govern priority in chattel paper. The observations in Comment 6 concerning the requirement of good faith and the phrase "without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party" apply equally to purchasers of instruments. However, unlike a purchaser of chattel paper, to qualify for priority under this Section a purchaser of an instrument need only give "value" as defined in Section 1-201; it need not give "new value." Also, the purchaser need not purchase the instrument in the ordinary course of its business.
Subsection (d) applies to checks as well as notes. For example, to collect and retain checks that are proceeds (collections) of accounts free of a senior secured party's claim to the same checks, a junior secured party must satisfy the good-faith requirement (honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing) of this subsection. This is the same good-faith requirement applicable to holders in due course. See Section 9-331, Comment 5.
8. Priority in Proceeds of Chattel Paper. Subsection (c) sets forth the two circumstances under which the priority afforded to a purchaser of chattel paper under subsection (a) or (b) extends also to proceeds of the chattel paper. The first is if the purchaser would have priority under the normal priority rules applicable to proceeds. The second, which the following Comments discuss in greater detail, is if the proceeds consist of the specific goods covered by the chattel paper. Former Article 9 generally was silent as to the priority of a security interest in proceeds when a purchaser qualifies for priority under Section 9-308 (but see former Section 9-306(5)(b), concerning returned and repossessed goods).
9. Priority in Returned and Repossessed Goods. Returned and repossessed goods may constitute proceeds of chattel paper. The following Comments explain the treatment of returned and repossessed goods as proceeds of chattel paper. The analysis is consistent with that of PEB Commentary No. 5, which these Comments replace, and is based upon the following example:
Example: SP-1 has a security interest in all the inventory of a dealer in goods (Dealer); SP-1's security interest is perfected by filing. Dealer sells some of its inventory to a buyer in the ordinary course of business (BIOCOB) pursuant to a conditional sales contract (chattel paper) that does not indicate that it has been assigned to SP-1. SP-2 purchases the chattel paper from Dealer and takes possession of the paper in good faith, in the ordinary course of business, and without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of SP-1. Subsequently, BIOCOB returns the goods to Dealer because they are defective. Alternatively, Dealer acquires possession of the goods following BIOCOB's default.
10. Assignment of Non-Lease Chattel Paper.
a. Loan by SP-2 to Dealer Secured by Chattel Paper (or Functional Equivalent Pursuant to Recourse Arrangement).
(1) Returned Goods. If BIOCOB returns the goods to Dealer for repairs, Dealer is merely a bailee and acquires thereby no meaningful rights in the goods to which SP-1's security interest could attach. (Although SP-1's security interest could attach to Dealer's interest as a bailee, that interest is not likely to be of any particular value to SP-1.) Dealer is the owner of the chattel paper (i.e., the owner of a right to payment secured by a security interest in the goods); SP-2 has a security interest in the chattel paper, as does SP-1 (as proceeds of the goods under Section 9-315). Under Section 9-330, SP-2's security interest in the chattel paper is senior to that of SP-1. SP-2 enjoys this priority regardless of whether, or when, SP-2 filed a financing statement covering the chattel paper. Because chattel paper and goods represent different types of collateral, Dealer does not have any meaningful interest in goods to which either SP-1's or SP-2's security interest could attach in order to secure Dealer's obligations to either creditor. See Section 9-102 (defining "chattel paper" and "goods").
Now assume that BIOCOB returns the goods to Dealer under circumstances whereby Dealer once again becomes the owner of the goods. This would be the case, for example, if the goods were defective and BIOCOB was entitled to reject or revoke acceptance of the goods. See Sections 2-602 (rejection), 2-608 (revocation of acceptance). Unless BIOCOB has waived its defenses as against assignees of the chattel paper, SP-1's and SP-2's rights against BIOCOB would be subject to BIOCOB's claims and defenses. See Sections 9-403, 9-404. SP-1's security interest would attach again because the returned goods would be proceeds of the chattel paper. Dealer's acquisition of the goods easily can be characterized as "proceeds" consisting of an "in kind" collection on or distribution on account of the chattel paper. See Section 9-102 (definition of "proceeds"). Assuming that SP-1's security interest is perfected by filing against the goods and that the filing is made in the same office where a filing would be made against the chattel paper, SP-1's security interest in the goods would remain perfected beyond the 20-day period of automatic perfection. See Section 9-315(e).
Because Dealer's newly reacquired interest in the goods is proceeds of the chattel paper, SP-2's security interest also would attach in the goods as proceeds. If SP-2 had perfected its security interest in the chattel paper by filing (again, assuming that filing against the chattel paper was made in the same office where a filing would be made against the goods), SP-2's security interest in the reacquired goods would be perfected beyond 20 days. See Section 9-315(e). However, if SP-2 had relied only on its possession of the chattel paper for perfection and had not filed against the chattel paper or the goods, SP-2's security interest would be unperfected after the 20-day period. See Section 9-315(e). Nevertheless, SP-2's unperfected security interest in the goods would be senior to SP-1's security interest under Section 9-330(c). The result in this priority contest is not affected by SP-2's acquiescence or non-acquiescence in the return of the goods to Dealer.
(2) Repossessed Goods. As explained above, Dealer owns the chattel paper covering the goods, subject to security interests in favor of SP-1 and SP-2. In Article 9 parlance, Dealer has an interest in chattel paper, not goods. If Dealer, SP-1, or SP-2 repossesses the goods upon BIOCOB's default, whether the repossession is rightful or wrongful as among Dealer, SP-1, or SP-2, Dealer's interest will not change. The location of goods and the party who possesses them does not affect the fact that Dealer's interest is in chattel paper, not goods. The goods continue to be owned by BIOCOB. SP-1's security interest in the goods does not attach until such time as Dealer reacquires an interest (other than a bare possessory interest) in the goods. For example, Dealer might buy the goods at a foreclosure sale from SP-2 (whose security interest in the chattel paper is senior to that of SP-1); that disposition would cut off BIOCOB's rights in the goods. Section 9-617.
In many cases the matter would end upon sale of the goods to Dealer at a foreclosure sale and there would be no priority contest between SP-1 and SP-2; Dealer would be unlikely to buy the goods under circumstances whereby SP-2 would retain its security interest. There can be exceptions, however. For example, Dealer may be obliged to purchase the goods from SP-2 and SP-2 may be obliged to convey the goods to Dealer, but Dealer may fail to pay SP-2. Or, one could imagine that SP-2, like SP-1, has a general security interest in the inventory of Dealer. In the latter case, SP-2 should not receive the benefit of any special priority rule, since its interest in no way derives from priority under Section 9-330. In the former case, SP-2's security interest in the goods reacquired by Dealer is senior to SP-1's security interest under Section 9-330.
b. Dealer's Outright Sale of Chattel Paper to SP-2. Article 9 also applies to a transaction whereby SP-2 buys the chattel paper in an outright sale transaction without recourse against Dealer. Sections 1-201(37), 9-109(a). Although Dealer does not, in such a transaction, retain any residual ownership interest in the chattel paper, the chattel paper constitutes proceeds of the goods to which SP-1's security interest will attach and continue following the sale of the goods. Section 9-315(a). Even though Dealer has not retained any interest in the chattel paper, as discussed above BIOCOB subsequently may return the goods to Dealer under circumstances whereby Dealer reacquires an interest in the goods. The priority contest between SP-1 and SP-2 will be resolved as discussed above; Section 9-330 makes no distinction among purchasers of chattel paper on the basis of whether the purchaser is an outright buyer of chattel paper or one whose security interest secures an obligation of Dealer.
11. Assignment of Lease Chattel Paper. As defined in Section 9-102, "chattel paper" includes not only writings that evidence security interests in specific goods but also those that evidence true leases of goods.
The analysis with respect to lease chattel paper is similar to that set forth above with respect to non-lease chattel paper. It is complicated, however, by the fact that, unlike the case of chattel paper arising out of a sale, Dealer retains a residual interest in the goods. See Section 2A-103(1)(q) (defining "lessor's residual interest"); In re Leasing Consultants, Inc., 486 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1973) (lessor's residual interest under true lease is an interest in goods and is a separate type of collateral from lessor's interest in the lease). If Dealer leases goods to a "lessee in ordinary course of business" (LIOCOB), then LIOCOB takes its interest under the lease (i.e., its "leasehold interest") free of the security interest of SP-1. See Sections 2A-307(3), 2A-103(1)(m) (defining "leasehold interest"), (1)(o) (defining "lessee in ordinary course of business"). SP-1 would, however, retain its security interest in the residual interest. In addition, SP-1 would acquire an interest in the lease chattel paper as proceeds. If Dealer then assigns the lease chattel paper to SP-2, Section 9-330 gives SP-2 priority over SP-1 with respect to the chattel paper, but not with respect to the residual interest in the goods. Consequently, assignees of lease chattel paper typically take a security interest in and file against the lessor's residual interest in goods, expecting their priority in the goods to be governed by the first-to-file-or-perfect rule of Section 9-322.
If the goods are returned to Dealer, other than upon expiration of the lease term, then the security interests of both SP-1 and SP-2 normally would attach to the goods as proceeds of the chattel paper. (If the goods are returned to Dealer at the expiration of the lease term and the lessee has made all payments due under the lease, however, then Dealer no longer has any rights under the chattel paper. Dealer's interest in the goods consists solely of its residual interest, as to which SP-2 has no claim.) This would be the case, for example, when the lessee rescinds the lease or when the lessor recovers possession in the exercise of its remedies under Article 2A. See, e.g., Section 2A-525. If SP-2 enjoyed priority in the chattel paper under Section 9-330, then SP-2 likewise would enjoy priority in the returned goods as proceeds. This does not mean that SP-2 necessarily is entitled to the entire value of the returned goods. The value of the goods represents the sum of the present value of (i) the value of their use for the term of the lease and (ii) the value of the residual interest. SP-2 has priority in the former, but SP-1 ordinarily would have priority in the latter. Thus, an allocation of a portion of the value of the goods to each component may be necessary. Where, as here, one secured party has a security interest in the lessor's residual interest and another has a priority security interest in the chattel paper, it may be advisable for the conflicting secured parties to establish a method for making such an allocation and otherwise to determine their relative rights in returned goods by agreement.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Section 36-9-330(c)(2) overrules Finance America Corporation v. Galaxy Boat Manufacturing Company, 292 S.C. 494, 357 S.E. 2d 460 (1987). In that case the Court found that Galaxy Boat held a perfected security interest upon a dealer's inventory of new boats. The dealer sold a boat to a buyer in ordinary course under a credit sales contract that constituted chattel paper. The dealer then sold the credit sales contract to Finance America which gave value for and took possession of the credit contract. Finance America, however, did not perfect its security interest in the boat against creditors of either the buyer or the dealer. Subsequently, the buyer revoked acceptance of the boat and returned it to the dealer. When the dealer defaulted under its security agreement with Galaxy Boat a priority dispute arose between Galaxy Boat and Finance America.
The Court applying former Section 36-9-306(5) held that Galaxy Boat was entitled to priority because Finance America had not perfected its security interest in the returned boat. Finance America based its claim on former Section 36-9-306(5)(b) under which an unpaid transferee of chattel paper had a security interest in returned goods that was entitled to priority over a security interest claimed by an inventory financer if the chattel paper purchaser had priority in the chattel paper. Galaxy Boat based its claim on former Section 36-9-306(5)(d) under which a security interest of a chattel paper purchaser in returned goods must be perfected for protection against creditors of the dealer. The Court appeared to concede that Finance America had priority over Galaxy Boat in the chattel paper under former Section 9-36-308. The Court, however, concluded that because Finance America had not perfected its security interest in the returned boat, former Section 36-9-306(5)(d) precluded Finance America from establishing priority with respect to the boat.
The interpretation of former Section 36-9-306(5) adopted in Finance America was rejected by the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code in PEB Commentary No. 5. (ALI 1990). Section 36-9-330(c)(2) codifies the conclusion reached in PEB Commentary No. 5. Under Section 36-9-330(c)(2) if a purchaser of chattel paper has priority in the chattel paper, it also has priority in the proceeds of the chattel paper if "the proceeds consist of the specific goods covered by the chattel paper or the cash proceeds of the specific goods, even if the purchaser's security interest in the proceeds is unperfected." (emphasis supplied). When a buyer revokes acceptance of goods subject to chattel paper and returns the goods to the seller, the returned goods are proceeds of the chattel paper. See Section 9-330, Comment 10. Therefore, had Finance America been decided under Section 36-9-330, Finance America would have been entitled to priority in the returned boat if it had priority in the chattel paper even though its security interest in the returned boat was unperfected.
Section 36-9-331. Priority of rights of purchasers of instruments, documents, and securities under other articles; priority of interests in financial assets and security entitlements under Chapter 8.
(a) This chapter does not limit the rights of a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument, a holder to which a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated, or a protected purchaser of a security. These holders or purchasers take priority over an earlier security interest, even if perfected, to the extent provided in Chapters 3, 7, and 8.
(b) This chapter does not limit the rights of or impose liability on a person to the extent that the person is protected against the assertion of an adverse claim under Chapter 8.
(c) Filing under this chapter does not constitute notice of a claim or defense to the holders, or purchasers, or persons described in subsections (a) and (b).
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-309.
2. "Priority." In some provisions, this Article distinguishes between claimants that take collateral free of a security interest (in the sense that the security interest no longer encumbers the collateral) and those that take an interest in the collateral that is senior to a surviving security interest. See, e.g., Section 9-317. Whether a holder or purchaser referred to in this Section takes free or is senior to a security interest depends on the whether the purchaser is a buyer of the collateral or takes a security interest in it. The term "priority" is meant to encompass both scenarios, as it does in Section 9-330.
3. Rights Acquired by Purchasers. The rights to which this Section refers are set forth in Sections 3-305 and 3-306 (holder in due course), 7-502 (holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated), and 8-303 (protected purchaser). The holders and purchasers referred to in this Section do not always take priority over a security interest. See, e.g., Section 7-503 (affording paramount rights to certain owners and secured parties as against holder to whom a negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated). Accordingly, this Section adds the clause, "to the extent provided in Articles 3, 7, and 8" to former Section 9-309.
4. Financial Assets and Security Entitlements. New subsection (b) provides explicit protection for those who deal with financial assets and security entitlements and who are immunized from liability under Article 8. See, e.g., Sections 8-502, 8-503(e), 8-510, 8-511. The new subsection makes explicit in Article 9 what is implicit in former Article 9 and explicit in several provisions of Article 8. It does not change the law.
5. Collections by Junior Secured Party. Under this Section, a secured party with a junior security interest in receivables (accounts, chattel paper, promissory notes, or payment intangibles) may collect and retain the proceeds of those receivables free of the claim of a senior secured party to the same receivables, if the junior secured party is a holder in due course of the proceeds. In order to qualify as a holder in due course, the junior must satisfy the requirements of Section 3-302, which include taking in "good faith." This means that the junior not only must act "honestly" but also must observe "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing" under the particular circumstances. See Section 9-102(a). Although "good faith" does not impose a general duty of inquiry, e.g., a search of the records in filing offices, there may be circumstances in which "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing" would require such a search.
Consider, for example, a junior secured party in the business of financing or buying accounts who fails to undertake a search to determine the existence of prior security interests. Because a search, under the usages of trade of that business, would enable it to know or learn upon reasonable inquiry that collecting the accounts violated the rights of a senior secured party, the junior may fail to meet the good-faith standard. See Utility Contractors Financial Services, Inc. v. Amsouth Bank, NA, 985 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1993). Likewise, a junior secured party who collects accounts when it knows or should know under the particular circumstances that doing so would violate the rights of a senior secured party, because the debtor had agreed not to grant a junior security interest in, or sell, the accounts, may not meet the good-faith test. Thus, if a junior secured party conducted or should have conducted a search and a financing statement filed on behalf of the senior secured party states such a restriction, the junior's collection would not meet the good-faith standard. On the other hand, if there was a course of performance between the senior secured party and the debtor which placed no such restrictions on the debtor and allowed the debtor to collect and use the proceeds without any restrictions, the junior secured party may then satisfy the requirements for being a holder in due course. This would be more likely in those circumstances where the junior secured party was providing additional financing to the debtor on an on-going basis by lending against or buying the accounts and had no notice of any restrictions against doing so. Generally, the senior secured party would not be prejudiced because the practical effect of such payment to the junior secured party is little different than if the debtor itself had made the collections and subsequently paid the secured party from the debtor's general funds. Absent collusion, the junior secured party would take the funds free of the senior security interests. See Section 9-332. In contrast, the senior secured party is likely to be prejudiced if the debtor is going out of business and the junior secured party collects the accounts by notifying the account debtors to make payments directly to the junior. Those collections may not be consistent with "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing."
Whether the junior secured party qualifies as a holder in due course is fact-sensitive and should be decided on a case-by-case basis in the light of those circumstances. Decisions such as Financial Management Services Inc. v. Familian, 905 P.2d 506 (Ariz. App. Div. 1995) (finding holder in due course status) could be determined differently under this application of the good-faith requirement.
The concepts addressed in this Comment are also applicable to junior secured parties as purchasers of instruments under Section 9-330(d). See Section 9-330, Comment 7.
Section 36-9-332. Transfer of money; transfer of funds from deposit account.
(a) A transferee of money takes the money free of a security interest unless the transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.
(b) A transferee of funds from a deposit account takes the funds free of a security interest in the deposit account unless the transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Scope of This Section. This Section affords broad protection to transferees who take funds from a deposit account and to those who take money. The term "transferee" is not defined; however, the debtor itself is not a transferee. Thus this Section does not cover the case in which a debtor withdraws money (currency) from its deposit account or the case in which a bank debits an encumbered account and credits another account it maintains for the debtor.
A transfer of funds from a deposit account, to which subsection (b) applies, normally will be made by check, by funds transfer, or by debiting the debtor's deposit account and crediting another depositor's account.
Example 1: Debtor maintains a deposit account with Bank A. The deposit account is subject to a perfected security interest in favor of Lender. Debtor draws a check on the account, payable to Payee. Inasmuch as the check is not the proceeds of the deposit account (it is an order to pay funds from the deposit account), Lender's security interest in the deposit account does not give rise to a security interest in the check. Payee deposits the check into its own deposit account, and Bank A pays it. Unless Payee acted in collusion with Debtor in violating Lender's rights, Payee takes the funds (the credits running in favor of Payee) free of Lender's security interest. This is true regardless of whether Payee is a holder in due course of the check and even if Payee gave no value for the check.
Example 2: Debtor maintains a deposit account with Bank A. The deposit account is subject to a perfected security interest in favor of Lender. At Bank B's suggestion, Debtor moves the funds from the account at Bank A to Debtor's deposit account with Bank B. Unless Bank B acted in collusion with Debtor in violating Lender's rights, Bank B takes the funds (the credits running in favor of Bank B) free from Lender's security interest. See subsection (b). However, inasmuch as the deposit account maintained with Bank B constitutes the proceeds of the deposit account at Bank A, Lender's security interest would attach to that account as proceeds. See Section 9-315.
Subsection (b) also would apply if, in the example, Bank A debited Debtor's deposit account in exchange for the issuance of Bank A's cashier's check. Lender's security interest would attach to the cashier's check as proceeds of the deposit account, and the rules applicable to instruments would govern any competing claims to the cashier's check. See, e.g., Sections 3-306, 9-322, 9-330, 9-331.
If Debtor withdraws money (currency) from an encumbered deposit account and transfers the money to a third party, then subsection (a), to the extent not displaced by federal law relating to money, applies. It contains the same rule as subsection (b).
Subsection (b) applies to transfers of funds from a deposit account; it does not apply to transfers of the deposit account itself or of an interest therein. For example, this Section does not apply to the creation of a security interest in a deposit account. Competing claims to the deposit account itself are dealt with by other Article 9 priority rules. See Sections 9-317(a), 9-327, 9-340, 9-341. Similarly, a corporate merger normally would not result in a transfer of funds from a deposit account. Rather, it might result in a transfer of the deposit account itself. If so, the normal rules applicable to transferred collateral would apply; this Section would not.
3. Policy. Broad protection for transferees helps to ensure that security interests in deposit accounts do not impair the free flow of funds. It also minimizes the likelihood that a secured party will enjoy a claim to whatever the transferee purchases with the funds. Rules concerning recovery of payments traditionally have placed a high value on finality. The opportunity to upset a completed transaction, or even to place a completed transaction in jeopardy by bringing suit against the transferee of funds, should be severely limited. Although the giving of value usually is a prerequisite for receiving the ability to take free from third-party claims, where payments are concerned the law is even more protective. Thus, Section 3-418(c) provides that, even where the law of restitution otherwise would permit recovery of funds paid by mistake, no recovery may be had from a person "who in good faith changed position in reliance on the payment." Rather than adopt this standard, this Section eliminates all reliance requirements whatsoever. Payments made by mistake are relatively rare, but payments of funds from encumbered deposit accounts (e.g., deposit accounts containing collections from accounts receivable) occur with great regularity. In the mine run of cases, unlike payment by mistake, no one would object to these payments. In the vast proportion of cases, the transferee probably would be able to show a change of position in reliance on the payment. This Section does not put the transferee to the burden of having to make this proof.
4. "Bad Actors." To deal with the question of the "bad actor," this Section borrows "collusion" language from Article 8. See, e.g., Sections 8-115, 8-503(e). This is the most protective (i.e., least stringent) of the various standards now found in the UCC. Compare, e.g., Section 1-201(9) ("without knowledge that the sale . . . is in violation of the . . . security interest"); Section 1-201(19) ("honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned"); Section 3-302(a)(2)(v) ("without notice of any claim").
5. Transferee Who Does Not Take Free. This Section sets forth the circumstances under which certain transferees of money or funds take free of security interests. It does not determine the rights of a transferee who does not take free of a security interest.
Example 3: The facts are as in Example 2, but, in wrongfully moving the funds from the deposit account at Bank A to Debtor's deposit account with Bank B, Debtor acts in collusion with Bank B. Bank B does not take the funds free of Lender's security interest under this Section. If Debtor grants a security interest to Bank B, Section 9-327 governs the relative priorities of Lender and Bank B. Under Section 9-327(3), Bank B's security interest in the Bank B deposit account is senior to Lender's security interest in the deposit account as proceeds. However, Bank B's senior security interest does not protect Bank B against any liability to Lender that might arise from Bank B's wrongful conduct.
Section 36-9-333. Priority of certain liens arising by operation of law.
(a) In this section, 'possessory lien' means an interest, other than a security interest or an agricultural lien:
(1) which secures payment or performance of an obligation for services or materials furnished with respect to goods by a person in the ordinary course of the person's business;
(2) which is created by statute or rule of law in favor of the person; and
(3) whose effectiveness depends on the person's possession of the goods.
(b) A possessory lien on goods has priority over a security interest in the goods unless the lien is created by a statute that expressly provides otherwise.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-310.
2. "Possessory Liens." This Section governs the relative priority of security interests arising under this Article and "possessory liens," i.e., common-law and statutory liens whose effectiveness depends on the lienor's possession of goods with respect to which the lienor provided services or furnished materials in the ordinary course of its business. As under former Section 9-310, the possessory lien has priority over a security interest unless the possessory lien is created by a statute that expressly provides otherwise. If the statute creating the possessory lien is silent as to its priority relative to a security interest, this Section provides a rule of interpretation that the possessory lien takes priority, even if the statute has been construed judicially to make the possessory lien subordinate.
Section 36-9-334. Priority of security interests in fixtures and crops.
(a) A security interest under this chapter may be created in goods that are fixtures or may continue in goods that become fixtures. A security interest does not exist under this chapter in ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on land.
(b) This chapter does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures under real property law.
(c) In cases not governed by subsections (d) through (h), a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the related real property other than the debtor.
(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (h), a perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real property if the debtor has an interest of record in or is in possession of the real property and:
(1) the security interest is a purchase-money security interest;
(2) the interest of the encumbrancer or owner arises before the goods become fixtures; and
(3) the security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the goods become fixtures or within twenty days thereafter.
(e) A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real property if:
(1) the debtor has an interest of record in the real property or is in possession of the real property and the security interest:
(A) is perfected by a fixture filing before the interest of the encumbrancer or owner is of record; and
(B) has priority over any conflicting interest of a predecessor in title of the encumbrancer or owner;
(2) before the goods become fixtures, the security interest is perfected by any method permitted by this chapter and the fixtures are readily removable:
(A) factory or office machines;
(B) equipment that is not primarily used or leased for use in the operation of the real property; or
(C) replacements of domestic appliances that are consumer goods;
(3) the conflicting interest is a lien on the real property obtained by legal or equitable proceedings after the security interest was perfected by any method permitted by this chapter; or
(4) the security interest is:
(A) created in a manufactured home in a manufactured-home transaction; and
(B) perfected pursuant to a statute described in Section 36-9-311(a)(2).
(f) A security interest in fixtures, whether or not perfected, has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real property if:
(1) the encumbrancer or owner has, in an authenticated record, consented to the security interest or disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures; or
(2) the debtor has a right to remove the goods as against the encumbrancer or owner.
(g) The priority of the security interest under subsection (f) continues for a reasonable time if the debtor's right to remove the goods as against the encumbrancer or owner terminates.
(h) A mortgage is a construction mortgage to the extent that it secures an obligation incurred for the construction of an improvement on land, including the acquisition cost of the land, if a recorded record of the mortgage so indicates. Except as otherwise provided in subsections (e) and (f), a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a construction mortgage if a record of the mortgage is recorded before the goods become fixtures and the goods become fixtures before the completion of the construction. A mortgage has this priority to the same extent as a construction mortgage to the extent that it is given to refinance a construction mortgage.
(i) A perfected security interest in crops growing on real property has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real property if the debtor has an interest of record in or is in possession of the real property.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-313.
2. Scope of This Section. This Section contains rules governing the priority of security interests in fixtures and crops as against persons who claim an interest in real property. Priority contests with other Article 9 security interests are governed by the other priority rules of this Article. The provisions with respect to fixtures follow those of former Section 9-313. However, they have been rewritten to conform to Section 2A-309 and to prevailing style conventions. Subsections (i) and (j), which apply to crops, are new.
3. Security Interests in Fixtures. Certain goods that are the subject of personal-property (chattel) financing become so affixed or otherwise so related to real property that they become part of the real property. These goods are called "fixtures." See Section 9-102 (definition of "fixtures"). Some fixtures retain their personal-property nature: a security interest under this Article may be created in fixtures and may continue in goods that become fixtures. See subsection (a). However, if the goods are ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on land, no security interest in them exists. Rather, the priority of claims to the building materials are determined by the law governing claims to real property. (Of course, the fact that no security interest exists in ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on land does not prejudice any rights the secured party may have against the debtor or any other person who violated the secured party's rights by wrongfully incorporating the goods into real property.)
Thus, this Section recognizes three categories of goods: (1) those that retain their chattel character entirely and are not part of the real property; (2) ordinary building materials that have become an integral part of the real property and cannot retain their chattel character for purposes of finance; and (3) an intermediate class that has become real property for certain purposes, but as to which chattel financing may be preserved.
To achieve priority under certain provisions of this Section, a security interest must be perfected by making a "fixture filing" (defined in Section 9-102) in the real-property records. Because the question whether goods have become fixtures often is a difficult one under applicable real-property law, a secured party may make a fixture filing as a precaution. Courts should not infer from a fixture filing that the secured party concedes that the goods are or will become fixtures.
4. Priority in Fixtures: General. In considering priority problems under this Section, one must first determine whether real-property claimants per se have an interest in the crops or fixtures as part of real property. If not, it is immaterial, so far as concerns real property parties as such, whether a security interest arising under this Article is perfected or unperfected. In no event does a real-property claimant (e.g., owner or mortgagee) acquire an interest in a "pure" chattel just because a security interest therein is unperfected. If on the other hand real-property law gives real-property parties an interest in the goods, a conflict arises and this Section states the priorities.
5. Priority in Fixtures: Residual Rule. Subsection (c) states the residual priority rule, which applies only if one of the other rules does not: A security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the related real property other than the debtor.
6. Priority in Fixtures: First to File or Record. Subsection (e)(1), which follows former Section 9-313(4)(b), contains the usual priority rule of conveyancing, that is, the first to file or record prevails. In order to achieve priority under this rule, however, the security interest must be perfected by a "fixture filing" (defined in Section 9-102), i.e., a filing for record in the real property records and indexed therein, so that it will be found in a real-property search.. The condition in subsection (e)(1)(B), that the security interest must have had priority over any conflicting interest of a predecessor in title of the conflicting encumbrancer or owner, appears to limit to the first-in-time principle. However, this apparent limitation is nothing other than an expression of the usual rule that a person must be entitled to transfer what he has. Thus, if the fixture security interest is subordinate to a mortgage, it is subordinate to an interest of an assignee of the mortgage, even though the assignment is a later recorded instrument. Similarly if the fixture security interest is subordinate to the rights of an owner, it is subordinate to a subsequent grantee of the owner and likewise subordinate to a subsequent mortgagee of the owner.
7. Priority in Fixtures: Purchase-Money Security Interests. Subsection (d), which follows former Section 9-313(4)(a), contains the principal exception to the first-to-file-or-record rule of subsection (e)(1). It affords priority to purchase-money security interests in fixtures as against prior recorded real-property interests, provided that the purchase-money security interest is filed as a fixture filing in the real-property records before the goods become fixtures or within 20 days thereafter. This priority corresponds to the purchase-money priority under Section 9-324(a). (Like other 10-day periods in former Article 9, the 10-day period in this Section has been changed to 20 days.)
It should be emphasized that this purchase-money priority with the 20-day grace period for filing is limited to rights against real-property interests that arise before the goods become fixtures. There is no such priority with the 20-day grace period as against real-property interests that arise subsequently. The fixture security interest can defeat subsequent real-property interests only if it is filed first and prevails under the usual conveyancing rule in subsection (e)(1) or one of the other rules in this Section.
8. Priority in Fixtures: Readily Removable Goods. Subsection (e)(2), which derives from Section 2A-309 and former Section 9-313(4)(d), contains another exception to the usual first-to-file-or-rule. It affords priority to the holders of security interests in certain types of readily removable goods-factory and office machines, equipment that is not primarily used or leased for use in the operation of the real property, and (as discussed below) certain replacements of domestic appliances. This rule is made necessary by the confusion in the law as to whether certain machinery, equipment, and appliances become fixtures. It protects a secured party who, perhaps in the mistaken belief that the readily removable goods will not become fixtures, makes a UCC filing (or otherwise perfects under this Article) rather than making a fixture filing.
Frequently, under applicable law, goods of the type described in subsection (e)(2) will not be considered to have become part of the real property. In those cases, the fixture security interest does not conflict with a real-property interest, and resort to this Section is unnecessary. However, if the goods have become part of the real property, subsection (e)(2) enables a fixture secured party to take priority over a conflicting real-property interest if the fixture security interest is perfected by a fixture filing or by any other method permitted by this Article. If perfection is by fixture filing, the fixture security interest would have priority over subsequently recorded real-property interests under subsection (e)(1) and, if the fixture security interest is a purchase-money security interest (a likely scenario), it would also have priority over most real property interests under the purchase-money priority of subsection (d). Note, however, that unlike the purchase-money priority rule in subsection (d), the priority rules in subsection (e) override the priority given to a construction mortgage under subsection (h).
The rule in subsection (e)(2) is limited to readily removable replacements of domestic appliances. It does not apply to original installations. Moreover, it is limited to appliances that are "consumer goods" (defined in Section 9-102) in the hands of the debtor. The principal effect of the rule is to make clear that a secured party financing occasional replacements of domestic appliances in noncommercial, owner-occupied contexts need not concern itself with real-property descriptions or records; indeed, for a purchase-money replacement of consumer goods, perfection without any filing will be possible. See Section 9-309(1).
9. Priority in Fixtures: Judicial Liens. Subsection (e)(3), which follows former Section 9-313(4)(d), adopts a first-in-time rule applicable to conflicts between a fixture security interest and a lien on the real property obtained by legal or equitable proceedings. Such a lien is subordinate to an earlier-perfected security interest, regardless of the method by which the security interest was perfected. Judgment creditors generally are not reliance creditors who search real-property records. Accordingly, a perfected fixture security interest takes priority over a subsequent judgment lien or other lien obtained by legal or equitable proceedings, even if no evidence of the security interest appears in the relevant real-property records. Subsection (e)(3) thus protects a perfected fixture security interest from avoidance by a trustee in bankruptcy under Bankruptcy Code Section 544(a), regardless of the method of perfection.
10. Priority in Fixtures: Manufactured Homes. A manufactured home may become a fixture. New subsection (e)(4) contains a special rule granting priority to certain security interests created in a "manufactured home" as part of a "manufactured-home transaction" (both defined in Section 9-102). Under this rule, a security interest in a manufactured home that becomes a fixture has priority over a conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real property if the security interest is perfected under a certificate-of-title statute (see Section 9-311). Subsection (e)(4) is only one of the priority rules applicable to security interests in a manufactured home that becomes a fixture. Thus, a security interest in a manufactured home which does not qualify for priority under this subsection may qualify under another.
11. Priority in Fixtures: Construction Mortgages. The purchase-money priority presents a difficult problem in relation to construction mortgages. The latter ordinarily will have been recorded even before the commencement of delivery of materials to the job, and therefore would take priority over fixture security interests were it not for the purchase-money priority. However, having recorded first, the holder of a construction mortgage reasonably expects to have first priority in the improvement built using the mortgagee's advances. Subsection (g) expressly gives priority to the construction mortgage recorded before the filing of the purchase-money security interest in fixtures. A refinancing of a construction mortgage has the same priority as the construction mortgage itself. The phrase "an obligation incurred for the construction of an improvement" covers both optional advances and advances pursuant to commitment. Both types of advances have the same priority under subsection (g).
The priority under this subsection applies only to goods that become fixtures during the construction period leading to the completion of the improvement. The construction priority will not apply to additions to the building made long after completion of the improvement, even if the additions are financed by the real-property mortgagee under an open-end clause of the construction mortgage. In such case, subsections (d), (e), and (f) govern.
Although this subsection affords a construction mortgage priority over a purchase-money security interest that otherwise would have priority under subsection (d), the subsection is subject to the priority rules in subsections (e) and (f). Thus, a construction mortgage may be junior to a fixture security interest perfected by a fixture filing before the construction mortgage was recorded. See subsection (e)(1).
12. Crops. Growing crops are "goods" in which a security interest may be created and perfected under this Article. In some jurisdictions, a mortgage of real property may cover crops, as well. In the event that crops are encumbered by both a mortgage and an Article 9 security interest, subsection (i) provides that the security interest has priority. States whose real-property law provides otherwise should either amend that law directly or override it by enacting subsection (j).
Section 36-9-335. Accessions.
(a) A security interest may be created in an accession and continues in collateral that becomes an accession.
(b) If a security interest is perfected when the collateral becomes an accession, the security interest remains perfected in the collateral.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), the other provisions of this part determine the priority of a security interest in an accession.
(d) A security interest in an accession is subordinate to a security interest in the whole which is perfected by compliance with the requirements of a certificate-of-title statute under Section 36-9-311(b).
(e) After default, subject to Part 6, a secured party may remove an accession from other goods if the security interest in the accession has priority over the claims of every person having an interest in the whole.
(f) A secured party that removes an accession from other goods under subsection (e) shall promptly reimburse any holder of a security interest or other lien on, or owner of, the whole or of the other goods, other than the debtor, for the cost of repair of any physical injury to the whole or the other goods. The secured party need not reimburse the holder or owner for any diminution in value of the whole or the other goods caused by the absence of the accession removed or by any necessity for replacing it. A person entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission to remove until the secured party gives adequate assurance for the performance of the obligation to reimburse.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-314.
2. "Accession." This Section applies to an "accession," as defined in Section 9-102, regardless of the cost or difficulty of removing the accession from the other goods, and regardless of whether the original goods have come to form an integral part of the other goods. This Section does not apply to goods whose identity has been lost. Goods of that kind are "commingled goods" governed by Section 9-336. Neither this Section nor the following one addresses the case of collateral that changes form without the addition of other goods.
3. "Accession" vs. "Other Goods." This Section distinguishes among the "accession," the "other goods," and the "whole." The last term refers to the combination of the "accession" and the "other goods." If one person's collateral becomes physically united with another person's collateral, each is an "accession."
Example 1: SP-1 holds a security interest in the debtor's tractors (which are not subject to a certificate-of-title statute), and SP-2 holds a security interest in a particular tractor engine. The engine is installed in a tractor. From the perspective of SP-1, the tractor becomes an "accession" and the engine is the "other goods." From the perspective of SP-2, the engine is the "accession" and the tractor is the "other goods." The completed tractor-tractor cum engine-constitutes the "whole."
4. Scope. This Section governs only a few issues concerning accessions. Subsection (a) contains rules governing continuation of a security interest in an accession. Subsection (b) contains a rule governing continued perfection of a security interest in goods that become an accession. Subsection (d) contains a special priority rule governing accessions that become part of a whole covered by a certificate of title. Subsections (e) and (f) govern enforcement of a security interest in an accession.
5. Matters Left to Other Provisions of This Article: Attachment and Perfection. Other provisions of this Article often govern accession-related issues. For example, this Section does not address whether a secured party acquires a security interest in the whole if its collateral becomes an accession. Normally this will turn on the description of the collateral in the security agreement.
Example 2: Debtor owns a computer subject to a perfected security interest in favor of SP-1. Debtor acquires memory and installs it in the computer. Whether SP-1's security interest attaches to the memory depends on whether the security agreement covers it.
Similarly, this Section does not determine whether perfection against collateral that becomes an accession is effective to perfect a security interest in the whole. Other provisions of this Article, including the requirements for indicating the collateral covered by a financing statement, resolve that question.
6. Matters Left to Other Provisions of This Article: Priority. With one exception, concerning goods covered by a certificate of title (see subsection (d)), the other provisions of this Part, including the rules governing purchase-money security interests, determine the priority of most security interests in an accession, including the relative priority of a security interest in an accession and a security interest in the whole. See subsection (c).
Example 3: Debtor owns an office computer subject to a security interest in favor of SP-1. Debtor acquires memory and grants a perfected security interest in the memory to SP-2. Debtor installs the memory in the computer, at which time (one assumes) SP-1's security interest attaches to the memory. The first-to-file-or-perfect rule of Section 9-322 governs priority in the memory. If, however, SP-2's security interest is a purchase-money security interest, Section 9-324(a) would afford priority in the memory to SP-2, regardless of which security interest was perfected first.
7. Goods Covered by Certificate of Title. This Section does govern the priority of a security interest in an accession that is or becomes part of a whole that is subject to a security interest perfected by compliance with a certificate-of-title statute. Subsection (d) provides that a security interest in the whole, perfected by compliance with a certificate-of-title statute, takes priority over a security interest in the accession. It enables a secured party to rely upon a certificate of title without having to check the UCC files to determine whether any components of the collateral may be encumbered. The subsection imposes a corresponding risk upon those who finance goods that may become part of goods covered by a certificate of title. In doing so, it reverses the priority that appeared reasonable to most pre-UCC courts.
Example 4: Debtor owns an automobile subject to a security interest in favor of SP-1. The security interest is perfected by notation on the certificate of title. Debtor buys tires subject to a perfected-by-filing purchase-money security interest in favor of SP-2 and mounts the tires on the automobile's wheels. If the security interest in the automobile attaches to the tires, then SP-1 acquires priority over SP-2. The same result would obtain if SP-1's security interest attached to the automobile and was perfected after the tires had been mounted on the wheels.
Section 36-9-336. Commingled goods.
(a) In this section, 'commingled goods' means goods that are physically united with other goods in such a manner that their identity is lost in a product or mass.
(b) A security interest does not exist in commingled goods as such. However, a security interest may attach to a product or mass that results when goods become commingled goods.
(c) If collateral becomes commingled goods, a security interest attaches to the product or mass.
(d) If a security interest in collateral is perfected before the collateral becomes commingled goods, the security interest that attaches to the product or mass under subsection (c) is perfected.
(e) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (f), the other provisions of this part determine the priority of a security interest that attaches to the product or mass under subsection (c).
(f) If more than one security interest attaches to the product or mass under subsection (c), the following rules determine priority:
(1) A security interest that is perfected under subsection (d) has priority over a security interest that is unperfected at the time the collateral becomes commingled goods.
(2) If more than one security interest is perfected under subsection (d), the security interests rank equally in proportion to value of the collateral at the time it became commingled goods.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-315.
2. "Commingled Goods." Subsection (a) defines "commingled goods." It is meant to include not only goods whose identity is lost through manufacturing or production (e.g., flour that has become part of baked goods) but also goods whose identity is lost by commingling with other goods from which they cannot be distinguished (e.g., ball bearings).
3. Consequences of Becoming "Commingled Goods." By definition, the identity of the original collateral cannot be determined once the original collateral becomes commingled goods. Consequently, the security interest in the specific original collateral alone is lost once the collateral becomes commingled goods, and no security interest in the original collateral can be created thereafter except as a part of the resulting product or mass. See subsection (b).
Once collateral becomes commingled goods, the secured party's security interest is transferred from the original collateral to the product or mass. See subsection (c). If the security interest in the original collateral was perfected, the security interest in the product or mass is a perfected security interest. See subsection (d). This perfection continues until lapse.
4. Priority of Perfected Security Interests That Attach Under This Section. This Section governs the priority of competing security interests in a product or mass only when both security interests arise under this Section. In that case, if both security interests are perfected by operation of this Section (see subsections (c) and (d)), then the security interests rank equally, in proportion to the value of the collateral at the time it became commingled goods. See subsection (f)(2).
Example 1: SP-1 has a perfected security interest in Debtor's eggs, which have a value of $300 and secure a debt of $400, and SP-2 has a perfected security interest in Debtor's flour, which has a value of $500 and secures a debt of $600. Debtor uses the flour and eggs to make cakes, which have a value of $1000. The two security interests rank equally and share in the ratio of 3:5. Applying this ratio to the entire value of the product, SP-1 would be entitled to $375 (i.e., 3/8 x $1000), and SP-2 would be entitled to $625 (i.e., 5/8 x $1000).
Example 2: Assume the facts of Example 1, except that SP-1's collateral, worth $300, secures a debt of $200. Recall that, if the cake is worth $1000, then applying the ratio of 3:5 would entitle SP-1 to $375 and SP-2 to $625. However, SP-1 is not entitled to collect from the product more than it is owed. Accordingly, SP-1's share would be only $200, SP-2 would receive the remaining value, up to the amount it is owed ($600).
Example 3: Assume that the cakes in the previous examples have a value of only $600. Again, the parties share in the ratio of 3:5. If, as in Example 1, SP-1 is owed $400, then SP-1 is entitled to $225 (i.e., 3/8 x $600), and SP-2 is entitled to $375 (i.e., 5/8 x $600). Debtor receives nothing. If, however, as in Example 2, SP-1 is owed only $200, then SP-2 receives $400.
The results in the foregoing examples remain the same, regardless of whether SP-1 or SP-2 (or each) has a purchase-money security interest.
5. Perfection: Unperfected Security Interests. The rule explained in the preceding Comment applies only when both security interests in original collateral are perfected when the goods become commingled goods. If a security interest in original collateral is unperfected at the time the collateral becomes commingled goods, subsection (f)(1) applies.
Example 4: SP-1 has a perfected security interest in the debtor's eggs, and SP-2 has an unperfected security interest in the debtor's flour. Debtor uses the flour and eggs to make cakes. Under subsection (c), both security interests attach to the cakes. But since SP-1's security interest was perfected at the time of commingling and SP-2's was not, only SP-1's security interest in the cakes is perfected. See subsection (d). Under subsection (f)(1) and Section 9-322(a)(2), SP-1's perfected security interest has priority over SP-2's unperfected security interest.
If both security interests are unperfected, the rule of Section 9-322(a)(3) would apply.
6. Multiple Security Interests. On occasion, a single input may be encumbered by more than one security interest. In those cases, the multiple secured parties should be treated like a single secured party for purposes of determining their collective share under subsection (f)(2). The normal priority rules would determine how that share would be allocated between them. Consider the following example, which is a variation on Example 1 above:
Example 5: SP-1A has a perfected, first-priority security interest in Debtor's eggs. SP-1B has a perfected, second-priority security interest in the same collateral. The eggs have a value of $300. Debtor owes $200 to SP-1A and $200 to SP-1B. SP-2 has a perfected security interest in Debtor's flour, which has a value of $500 and secures a debt of $600. Debtor uses the flour and eggs to make cakes, which have a value of $1000.
For purposes of subsection (f)(2), SP-1A and SP-1B should be treated like a single secured party. The collective security interest would rank equally with that of SP-2. Thus, the secured parties would share in the ratio of 3 (for SP-1A and SP-1B combined) to 5 (for SP-2). Applying this ratio to the entire value of the product, SP-1A and SP-1B in the aggregate would be entitled to $375 (i.e., 3/8 x $1000), and SP-2 would be entitled to $625 (i.e., 5/8 x $1000).
SP-1A and SP-1B would share the $300 in accordance with their priority, as established under other rules. Inasmuch as SP-1A has first priority, it would receive $200, and SP-1B would receive $100.
7. Priority of Security Interests That Attach Other Than by Operation of This Section. Under subsection (e), the normal priority rules determine the priority of a security interest that attaches to the product or mass other than by operation of this Section. For example, assume that SP-1 has a perfected security interest in Debtor's existing and after-acquired baked goods, and SP-2 has a perfected security interest in Debtor's flour. When the flour is processed into cakes, subsections (c) and (d) provide that SP-2 acquires a perfected security interest in the cakes. If SP-1 filed against the baked goods before SP-2 filed against the flour, then SP-1 will enjoy priority in the cakes. See Section 9-322 (first-to-file-or perfect). But if SP-2 filed against the flour before SP-1 filed against the baked goods, then SP-2 will enjoy priority in the cakes to the extent of its security interest.
Section 36-9-337. Priority of security interests in goods covered by certificate of title.
If, while a security interest in goods is perfected by any method under the law of another jurisdiction, this State issues a certificate of title that does not show that the goods are subject to the security interest or contain a statement that they may be subject to security interests not shown on the certificate:
(1) a buyer of the goods, other than a person in the business of selling goods of that kind, takes free of the security interest if the buyer gives value and receives delivery of the goods after issuance of the certificate and without knowledge of the security interest; and
(2) the security interest is subordinate to a conflicting security interest in the goods that attaches, and is perfected under Section 36-9-311(b), after issuance of the certificate and without the conflicting secured party's knowledge of the security interest.
Official Comment
1. Source. Derived from former Section 9-103(2)(d).
2. Protection for Buyers and Secured Parties. This Section affords protection to certain good-faith purchasers for value who are likely to have relied on a "clean" certificate of title, i.e., one that neither shows that the goods are subject to a particular security interest nor contains a statement that they may be subject to security interests not shown on the certificate. Under this Section, a buyer can take free of, and the holder of a conflicting security interest can acquire priority over, a security interest that is perfected by any method under the law of another jurisdiction. The fact that the security interest has been reperfected by possession under Section 9-313 does not of itself disqualify the holder of a conflicting security interest from protection under paragraph (2).
Section 36-9-338. Priority of security interest or agricultural lien perfected by filed financing statement providing certain incorrect information.
If a security interest or agricultural lien is perfected by a filed financing statement providing information described in Section 36-9-516(b)(5) which is incorrect at the time the financing statement is filed:
(1) the security interest or agricultural lien is subordinate to a conflicting perfected security interest in the collateral to the extent that the holder of the conflicting security interest gives value in reasonable reliance upon the incorrect information; and
(2) a purchaser, other than a secured party, of the collateral takes free of the security interest or agricultural lien to the extent that, in reasonable reliance upon the incorrect information, the purchaser gives value and, in the case of chattel paper, documents, goods, instruments, or a security certificate, receives delivery of the collateral.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Effect of Incorrect Information in Financing Statement. Section 9-520(a) requires the filing office to reject financing statements that do not contain information concerning the debtor as specified in Section 9-516(b)(5). A error in this information does not render the financing statement ineffective. On rare occasions, a subsequent purchaser of the collateral (i.e., a buyer or secured party) may rely on the misinformation to its detriment. This Section subordinates a security interest or agricultural lien perfected by an effective, but flawed, financing statement to the rights of a buyer or holder of a perfected security interest to the extent that, in reasonable reliance on the incorrect information, the purchaser gives value and, in the case of tangible collateral, receives delivery of the collateral. A purchaser who has not made itself aware of the information in the filing office with respect to the debtor cannot act in "reasonable reliance" upon incorrect information.
3. Relationship to Section 9-507. This Section applies to financing statements that contain information that is incorrect at the time of filing and imposes a small risk of subordination on the filer. In contrast, Section 9-507 deals with financing statements containing information that is correct at the time of filing but which becomes incorrect later. Except as provided in Section 9-507 with respect to changes in the debtor's name, an otherwise effective financing statement does not become ineffective if the information contained in it becomes inaccurate.
Section 36-9-339. Priority subject to subordination.
This chapter does not preclude subordination by agreement by a person entitled to priority.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-316.
2. Subordination by Agreement. The preceding Sections deal elaborately with questions of priority. This Section makes it entirely clear that a person entitled to priority may effectively agree to subordinate its claim. Only the person entitled to priority may make such an agreement: a person's rights cannot be adversely affected by an agreement to which the person is not a party.
Subpart 4.
Rights of Bank
Section 36-9-340. Effectiveness of right of recoupment or set-off against deposit account.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a bank with which a deposit account is maintained may exercise any right of recoupment or set-off against a secured party that holds a security interest in the deposit account.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), the application of this chapter to a security interest in a deposit account does not affect a right of recoupment or set-off of the secured party as to a deposit account maintained with the secured party.
(c) The exercise by a bank of a set-off against a deposit account is ineffective against a secured party that holds a security interest in the deposit account which is perfected by control under Section 36-9-104(a)(3), if the set-off is based on a claim against the debtor.
Official Comment
1. Source. New; subsection (b) is based on a nonuniform Illinois amendment.
2. Set-off vs. Security Interest. This Section resolves the conflict between a security interest in a deposit account and the bank's rights of recoupment and set-off.
Subsection (a) states the general rule and provides that the bank may effectively exercise rights of recoupment and set-off against the secured party. Subsection (c) contains an exception: if the secured party has control under Section 9-104(a)(3) (i.e., if it has become the bank's customer), then any set-off exercised by the bank against a debt owed by the debtor (as opposed to a debt owed to the bank by the secured party) is ineffective. The bank may, however, exercise its recoupment rights effectively. This result is consistent with the priority rule in Section 9-327(4), under which the security interest of a bank in a deposit account is subordinate to that of a secured party who has control under Section 9-104(a)(3).
This Section deals with rights of set-off and recoupment that a bank may have under other law. It does not create a right of set-off or recoupment, nor is it intended to override any limitations or restrictions that other law imposes on the exercise of those rights.
3. Preservation of Set-Off Right. Subsection (b) makes clear that a bank may hold both a right of set-off against, and an Article 9 security interest in, the same deposit account. By holding a security interest in a deposit account, a bank does not impair any right of set-off it would otherwise enjoy. This subsection does not pertain to accounts evidenced by an instrument (e.g., certain certificates of deposit), which are excluded from the definition of "deposit accounts."
Section 36-9-341. Bank's rights and duties with respect to deposit account.
Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-340(c), and unless the bank otherwise agrees in an authenticated record, a bank's rights and duties with respect to a deposit account maintained with the bank are not terminated, suspended, or modified by:
(1) the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in the deposit account;
(2) the bank's knowledge of the security interest; or
(3) the bank's receipt of instructions from the secured party.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Free Flow of Funds. This Section is designed to prevent security interests in deposit accounts from impeding the free flow of funds through the payment system. Subject to two exceptions, it leaves the bank's rights and duties with respect to the deposit account and the funds on deposit unaffected by the creation or perfection of a security interest or by the bank's knowledge of the security interest. In addition, the Section permits the bank to ignore the instructions of the secured party unless it had agreed to honor them or unless other law provides to the contrary. A secured party who wishes to deprive the debtor of access to funds on deposit or to appropriate those funds for itself needs to obtain the agreement of the bank, utilize the judicial process, or comply with procedures set forth in other law. Section 4-303(a), concerning the effect of notice on a bank's right and duty to pay items, is not to the contrary. That Section addresses only whether an otherwise effective notice comes too late; it does not determine whether a timely notice is otherwise effective.
3. Operation of Rule. The general rule of this Section is subject to Section 9-340(c), under which a bank's right of set-off may not be exercised against a deposit account in the secured party's name if the right is based on a claim against the debtor. This result reflects current law in many jurisdictions and does not appear to have unduly disrupted banking practices or the payments system. The more important function of this Section, which is not impaired by Section 9-340, is the bank's right to follow the debtor's (customer's) instructions (e.g., by honoring checks, permitting withdrawals, etc.) until such time as the depository institution is served with judicial process or receives instructions with respect to the funds on deposit from a secured party who has control over the deposit account.
4. Liability of Bank. This Article does not determine whether a bank that pays out funds from an encumbered deposit is liable to the holder of a security interest. Although the fact that a secured party has control over the deposit account and the manner by which control was achieved may be relevant to the imposition of liability, whatever rule applies generally when a bank pays out funds in which a third party has an interest would determine liability to a secured party. Often, this rule is found in a non-UCC adverse claim statute.
5. Certificates of Deposit. This Section does not address the obligations of banks that issue instruments evidencing deposits (e.g., certain certificates of deposit).
Section 36-9-342. Bank's right to refuse to enter into or disclose existence of control agreement.
This chapter does not require a bank to enter into an agreement of the kind described in Section 36-9-104(a)(2), even if its customer so requests or directs. A bank that has entered into such an agreement is not required to confirm the existence of the agreement to another person unless requested to do so by its customer.
Official Comment
1. Source. New; derived from Section 8-106(g).
2. Protection for Bank. This Section protects banks from the need to enter into agreements against their will and from the need to respond to inquiries from persons other than their customers.
Part 4
Rights of Third Parties
Section 36-9-401. Alienability of debtor's rights.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) and Sections 36-9-406, 36-9-407, 36-9-408, and 36-9-409, whether a debtor's rights in collateral may be voluntarily or involuntarily transferred is governed by law other than this chapter.
(b) An agreement between the debtor and secured party which prohibits a transfer of the debtor's rights in collateral or makes the transfer a default does not prevent the transfer from taking effect.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-311.
2. Scope of This Part. This Part deals with several issues affecting third parties (i.e., parties other than the debtor and the secured party). These issues are not addressed in Part 3, Subpart 3, which deals with priorities. This Part primarily addresses the rights and duties of account debtors and other persons obligated on collateral who are not, themselves, parties to a secured transaction.
3. Governing Law. There was some uncertainty under former Article 9 as to which jurisdiction's law (usually, which jurisdiction's version of Article 9) applied to the matters that this Part addresses. Part 3, Subpart 1, does not determine the law governing these matters because they do not relate to perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, or priority. However, it might be inappropriate for a designation of applicable law by a debtor and secured party under Section 1-105 to control the law applicable to an independent transaction or relationship between the debtor and an account debtor.
Consider an example under Section 9-408.
Example 1: State X has adopted this Article; former Article 9 is the law of State Y. A general intangible (e.g., a franchise agreement) between a debtor-franchisee, D, and an account debtor-franchisor, AD, is governed by the law of State Y. D grants to SP a security interest in its rights under the franchise agreement. The franchise agreement contains a term prohibiting D's assignment of its rights under the agreement. D and SP agree that their secured transaction is governed by the law of State X. Under State X's Section 9-408, the restriction on D's assignment is ineffective to prevent the creation, attachment, or perfection of SP's security interest. State Y's former Section 9-318(4), however, does not address restrictions on the creation of security interests in general intangibles other than general intangibles for money due or to become due. Accordingly, it does not address restrictions on the assignment to SP of D's rights under the franchise agreement. The non-Article-9 law of State Y, which does address restrictions, provides that the prohibition on assignment is effective.
This Article does not provide a specific answer to the question of which State's law applies to the restriction on assignment in the example. However, assuming that under non-UCC choice-of-law principles the effectiveness of the restriction would be governed by the law of State Y, which governs the franchise agreement, the fact that State X's Article 9 governs the secured transaction between SP and D would not override the otherwise applicable law governing the agreement. Of course, to the extent that jurisdictions eventually adopt identical versions of this Article and courts interpret it consistently, the inability to identify the applicable law in circumstances such as those in the example may be inconsequential.
4. Inalienability Under Other Law. Subsection (a) addresses the question whether property necessarily is transferable by virtue of its inclusion (i.e., its eligibility as collateral) within the scope of Article 9. It gives a negative answer, subject to the identified exceptions. The substance of subsection (a) was implicit under former Article 9.
5. Negative Pledge Covenant. Subsection (b) is an exception to the general rule in subsection (a). It makes clear that in secured transactions under this Article the debtor has rights in collateral (whether legal title or equitable) which it can transfer and which its creditors can reach. It is best explained with an example.
Example 2: A debtor, D, grants to SP a security interest to secure a debt in excess of the value of the collateral. D agrees with SP that it will not create a subsequent security interest in the collateral and that any security interest purportedly granted in violation of the agreement will be void. Subsequently, in violation of its agreement with SP, D purports to grant a security interest in the same collateral to another secured party.
Subsection (b) validates D's creation of the subsequent (prohibited) security interest, which might even achieve priority over the earlier security interest. See Comment 7. However, unlike some other provisions of this Part, such as Section 9-406, subsection (b) does not provide that the agreement restricting assignment itself is "ineffective." Consequently, the debtor's breach may create a default.
6. Rights of Lien Creditors. Difficult problems may arise with respect to attachment, levy, and other judicial procedures under which a debtor's creditors may reach collateral subject to a security interest. For example, an obligation may be secured by collateral worth many times the amount of the obligation. If a lien creditor has caused all or a portion of the collateral to be seized under judicial process, it may be difficult to determine the amount of the debtor's "equity" in the collateral that has been seized. The Section leaves resolution of this problem to the courts. The doctrine of marshaling may be appropriate.
7. Sale of Receivables. If a debtor sells an account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note outright, as against the buyer the debtor has no remaining rights to transfer. If, however, the buyer fails to perfect its interest, then solely insofar as the rights of certain third parties are concerned, the debtor is deemed to retain its rights and title. See Section 9-318. The debtor has the power to convey these rights to a subsequent purchaser. If the subsequent purchaser (buyer or secured lender) perfects its interest, it will achieve priority over the earlier, unperfected purchaser. See Section 9-322(a)(1).
Section 36-9-402. Secured party not obligated on contract of debtor or in tort.
The existence of a security interest, agricultural lien, or authority given to a debtor to dispose of or use collateral, without more, does not subject a secured party to liability in contract or tort for the debtor's acts or omissions.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-317.
2. Nonliability of Secured Party. This Section, like former Section 9-317, rejects theories on which a secured party might be held liable on a debtor's contracts or in tort merely because a security interest exists or because the debtor is entitled to dispose of or use collateral. This Section expands former Section 9-317 to cover agricultural liens.
Section 36-9-403. Agreement not to assert defenses against assignee.
(a) In this section, 'value' has the meaning provided in Section 36-3-303(a).
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor not to assert against an assignee any claim or defense that the account debtor may have against the assignor is enforceable by an assignee that takes an assignment:
(1) for value;
(2) in good faith;
(3) without notice of a claim of a property or possessory right to the property assigned; and
(4) without notice of a defense or claim in recoupment of the type that may be asserted against a person entitled to enforce a negotiable instrument under Section 36-3-305(a).
(c) Subsection (b) does not apply to defenses of a type that may be asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under Section 36-3-305(b).
(d) In a consumer transaction, if a record evidences the account debtor's obligation, law other than this chapter requires that the record include a statement to the effect that the rights of an assignee are subject to claims or defenses that the account debtor could assert against the original obligee, and the record does not include such a statement:
(1) the record has the same effect as if the record included such a statement; and
(2) the account debtor may assert against an assignee those claims and defenses that would have been available if the record included such a statement.
(e) This section is subject to law other than this chapter which establishes a different rule for an account debtor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
(f) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), this section does not displace law other than this chapter which gives effect to an agreement by an account debtor not to assert a claim or defense against an assignee.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-206.
2. Scope and Purpose. Subsection (b), like former Section 9-206, generally validates an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor that the account debtor will not assert against an assignee claims and defenses that it may have against the assignor. These agreements are typical in installment sale agreements and leases. However, this Section expands former Section 9-206 to apply to all account debtors; it is not limited to account debtors that have bought or leased goods. This Section applies only to the obligations of an "account debtor," as defined in Section 9-102. Thus, it does not determine the circumstances under which and the extent to which a person who is obligated on a negotiable instrument is disabled from asserting claims and defenses. Rather, Article 3 must be consulted. See, e.g., Sections 3-305, 3-306. Article 3 governs even when the negotiable instrument constitutes part of chattel paper. See Section 9-102 (an obligor on a negotiable instrument constituting part of chattel paper is not an "account debtor").
3. Conditions of Validation; Relationship to Article 3. Subsection (b) validates an account debtor's agreement only if the assignee takes an assignment for value, in good faith, and without notice of conflicting claims to the property assigned or of certain claims or defenses of the assignor. Like former Section 9-206, this Section is designed to put the assignee in a position that is no better and no worse than that of a holder in due course of an negotiable instrument under Article 3. However, former Section 9-206 left open certain issues, e.g., whether the Section incorporated the special Article 3 definition of "value" in Section 3-303 or the generally applicable definition in Section 1-201(44). Subsection (a) addresses this question; it provides that "value" has the meaning specified in Section 3-303(a). Similarly, subsection (c) provides that subsection (b) does not validate an agreement with respect to defenses that could be asserted against a holder in due course under Section 9-305(b) (the so-called "real" defenses). In 1990, the definition of "holder in due course" (Section 3-302) and the articulation of the rights of a holder in due course (Sections 3-305 and 3-306) were revised substantially. This Section tracks more closely the rules of Sections 3-302, 3-305, and 3-306.
4. Relationship to Terms of Assigned Property. Former Section 9-206(2), concerning warranties accompanying the sale of goods, has been deleted as unnecessary. This Article does not regulate the terms of the account, chattel paper, or general intangible that is assigned, except insofar as the account, chattel paper, or general intangible itself creates a security interest (as often is the case with chattel paper). Thus, Article 2, and not this Article, determines whether a seller of goods makes or effectively disclaims warranties, even if the sale is secured. Similarly, other law, and not this Article, determines the effectiveness of an account debtor's undertaking to pay notwithstanding, and not to assert, any defenses or claims against an assignor-e.g., a "hell or high water" provision in the underlying agreement that is assigned. If other law gives effect to this undertaking, then, under principles of nemo dat, the undertaking would be enforceable by the assignee (secured party). If other law prevents the assignor from enforcing the undertaking, this Section nevertheless might permit the assignee to do so. The right of the assignee to enforce would depend upon whether, under the particular facts, the account debtor's undertaking fairly could be construed as an agreement that falls within the scope of this Section and whether the assignee meets the requirements of this Section.
5. Relationship to Federal Trade Commission Rule. Subsection (d) is new. It applies to rights evidenced by a record that is required to contain, but does not contain, the notice set forth in Federal Trade Commission Rule 433, 16 C.F.R. Part 433 (the "Holder-in-Due-Course Regulations"). Under this subsection, an assignee of such a record takes subject to the consumer account debtor's claims and defenses to the same extent as it would have if the writing had contained the required notice. Thus, subsection (d) effectively renders waiver-of-defense clauses ineffective in the transactions with consumers to which it applies.
6. Relationship to Other Law. Like former Section 9-206(1), this Section takes no position on the enforceability of waivers of claims and defenses by consumer account debtors, leaving that question to other law. However, the reference to "law other than this article" in subsection (e) encompasses administrative rules and regulations; the reference in former Section 9-206(1) that it replaces ("statute or decision") arguably did not.
This Section does not displace other law that gives effect to a non-consumer account debtor's agreement not to assert defenses against an assignee, even if the agreement would not qualify under subsection (b). See subsection (f). It validates, but does not invalidate, agreements made by a non-consumer account debtor. This Section also does not displace other law to the extent that the other law permits an assignee, who takes an assignment with notice of a claim of a property or possessory right, a defense, or a claim in recoupment, to enforce an account debtor's agreement not to assert claims and defenses against the assignor (e.g., a "hell-or-high-water" agreement). See Comment 4. It also does not displace an assignee's right to assert that an account debtor is estopped from asserting a claim or defense. Nor does this Section displace other law with respect to waivers of potential future claims and defenses that are the subject of an agreement between the account debtor and the assignee. Finally, it does not displace Section 1-107, concerning waiver of a breach that allegedly already has occurred.
Section 36-9-404. Rights acquired by assignee; claims and defenses against assignee.
(a) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable agreement not to assert defenses or claims, and subject to subsections (b) through (e), the rights of an assignee are subject to:
(1) all terms of the agreement between the account debtor and assignor and any defense or claim in recoupment arising from the transaction that gave rise to the contract; and
(2) any other defense or claim of the account debtor against the assignor which accrues before the account debtor receives a notification of the assignment authenticated by the assignor or the assignee.
(b) Subject to subsection (c) and except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), the claim of an account debtor against an assignor may be asserted against an assignee under subsection (a) only to reduce the amount the account debtor owes.
(c) This section is subject to law other than this chapter which establishes a different rule for an account debtor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
(d) In a consumer transaction, if a record evidences the account debtor's obligation, law other than this chapter requires that the record include a statement to the effect that the account debtor's recovery against an assignee with respect to claims and defenses against the assignor may not exceed amounts paid by the account debtor under the record, and the record does not include such a statement, the extent to which a claim of an account debtor against the assignor may be asserted against an assignee is determined as if the record included such a statement.
(e) This section does not apply to an assignment of a health-care-insurance receivable.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-318(1).
2. Purpose; Rights of Assignee in General. Subsection (a), like former Section 9-318(1), provides that an assignee generally takes an assignment subject to defenses and claims of an account debtor. Under subsection (a)(1), if the account debtor's defenses on an assigned claim arise from the transaction that gave rise to the contract with the assignor, it makes no difference whether the defense or claim accrues before or after the account debtor is notified of the assignment. Under subsection (a)(2), the assignee takes subject to other defenses or claims only if they accrue before the account debtor has been notified of the assignment. Of course, an account debtor may waive its right to assert defenses or claims against an assignee under Section 9-403 or other applicable law. Subsection (a) tracks Section 3-305(a)(3) more closely than its predecessor.
3. Limitation on Affirmative Claims. Subsection (b) is new. It limits the claim that the account debtor may assert against an assignee. Borrowing from Section 3-305(a)(3) and cases construing former Section 9-318, subsection (b) generally does not afford the account debtor the right to an affirmative recovery from an assignee.
4. Consumer Account Debtors; Relationship to Federal Trade Commission Rule. Subsections (c) and (d) also are new. Subsection (c) makes clear that the rules of this Section are subject to other law establishing special rules for consumer account debtors. An "account debtor who is an individual" as used in subsection (c) includes individuals who are jointly or jointly and severally obligated. Subsection (d) applies to rights evidenced by a record that is required to contain, but does not contain, the notice set forth in Federal Trade Commission Rule 433, 16 C.F.R. Part 433 (the "Holder-in-Due-Course Regulations"). Under subsection (d), a consumer account debtor has the same right to an affirmative recovery from an assignee of such a record as the consumer would have had against the assignee had the record contained the required notice.
5. Scope; Application to "Account Debtor." This Section deals only with the rights and duties of "account debtors"-and for the most part only with account debtors on accounts, chattel paper, and payment intangibles. Subsection (e) provides that the obligation of an insurer with respect to a health-care-insurance receivable is governed by other law. References in this Section to an "account debtor" include account debtors on collateral that is proceeds. Neither this Section nor any other provision of this Article, including Sections 9-408 and 9-409, provides analogous regulation of the rights and duties of other obligors on collateral, such as the maker of a negotiable instrument (governed by Article 3), the issuer of or nominated person under a letter of credit (governed by Article 5), or the issuer of a security (governed by Article 8). Article 9 leaves those rights and duties untouched; however, Section 9-409 deals with the special case of letters of credit. When chattel paper is composed in part of a negotiable instrument, the obligor on the instrument is not an "account debtor," and Article 3 governs the rights of the assignee of the chattel paper with respect to the issues that this Section addresses. See, e.g., Section 3-601 (dealing with discharge of an obligation to pay a negotiable instrument).
Section 36-9-405. Modification of assigned contract.
(a) A modification of or substitution for an assigned contract is effective against an assignee if made in good faith. The assignee acquires corresponding rights under the modified or substituted contract. The assignment may provide that the modification or substitution is a breach of contract by the assignor. This subsection is subject to subsections (b) through (d).
(b) Subsection (a) applies to the extent that:
(1) the right to payment or a part thereof under an assigned contract has not been fully earned by performance; or
(2) the right to payment or a part thereof has been fully earned by performance and the account debtor has not received notification of the assignment under Section 36-9-406(a).
(c) This section is subject to law other than this chapter which establishes a different rule for an account debtor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
(d) This section does not apply to an assignment of a health-care-insurance receivable.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-318(2).
2. Modification of Assigned Contract. The ability of account debtors and assignors to modify assigned contracts can be important, especially in the case of government contracts and complex contractual arrangements (e.g., construction contracts) with respect to which modifications are customary. Subsections (a) and (b) provide that good-faith modifications of assigned contracts are binding against an assignee to the extent that (i) the right to payment has not been fully earned or (ii) the right to payment has been earned and notification of the assignment has not been given to the account debtor. Former Section 9-318(2) did not validate modifications of fully-performed contracts under any circumstances, whether or not notification of the assignment had been given to the account debtor. Subsection (a) protects the interests of assignees by (i) limiting the effectiveness of modifications to those made in good faith, (ii) affording the assignee with corresponding rights under the contract as modified, and (iii) recognizing that the modification may be a breach of the assignor's agreement with the assignee.
3. Consumer Account Debtors. Subsection (c) is new. It makes clear that the rules of this Section are subject to other law establishing special rules for consumer account debtors.
4. Account Debtors on Health-Care-Insurance Receivables. Subsection (d) also is new. It provides that this Section does not apply to an assignment of a heath-care-insurance receivable. The obligation of an insurer with respect to a health-care-insurance receivable is governed by other law.
Section 36-9-406. Discharge of account debtor; notification of assignment; identification and proof of assignment; restrictions on assignment of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes ineffective.
(a) Subject to subsections (b) through (i), an account debtor on an account, chattel paper, or a payment intangible may discharge its obligation by paying the assignor until, but not after, the account debtor receives a notification, authenticated by the assignor or the assignee, that the amount due or to become due has been assigned and that payment is to be made to the assignee. After receipt of the notification, the account debtor may discharge its obligation by paying the assignee and may not discharge the obligation by paying the assignor.
(b) Subject to subsection (h), notification is ineffective under subsection (a):
(1) if it does not reasonably identify the rights assigned;
(2) to the extent that an agreement between an account debtor and a seller of a payment intangible limits the account debtor's duty to pay a person other than the seller and the limitation is effective under law other than this chapter; or
(3) at the option of an account debtor, if the notification notifies the account debtor to make less than the full amount of any installment or other periodic payment to the assignee, even if:
(A) only a portion of the account, chattel paper, or general intangible has been assigned to that assignee;
(B) a portion has been assigned to another assignee; or
(C) the account debtor knows that the assignment to that assignee is limited.
(c) Subject to subsection (h), if requested by the account debtor, an assignee shall seasonably furnish reasonable proof that the assignment has been made. Unless the assignee complies, the account debtor may discharge its obligation by paying the assignor, even if the account debtor has received a notification under subsection (a).
(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) and Sections 36-2A-303 and 36-9-407, and subject to subsection (h), a term in an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor or in a promissory note is ineffective to the extent that it:
(1) prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the account debtor or person obligated on the promissory note to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in, the account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note; or
(2) provides that the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note.
(e) Subsection (d) does not apply to the sale of a payment intangible or promissory note.
(f) Except as otherwise provided in Sections 36-2A-303 and 36-9-407 and subject to subsections (h) and (i), a rule of law, statute, or regulation that prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of a government, governmental body or official, or account debtor to the assignment or transfer of, or creation of a security interest in, an account or chattel paper is ineffective to the extent that the rule of law, statute, or regulation:
(1) prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the government, governmental body or official, or account debtor to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in the account or chattel paper; or
(2) provides that the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the account or chattel paper.
(g) Subject to subsection (h), an account debtor may not waive or vary its option under subsection (b)(3).
(h) This section is subject to law other than this chapter which establishes a different rule for an account debtor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
(i) This section does not apply to an assignment of a health-care-insurance receivable.
(j) Subsection (d) does not apply to the assignment, transfer, or creation of a security interest in:
(1) a claim or right to receive compensation for injuries or sickness as described in 26 U.S.C. Section 104(a)(1) or (2), as amended; or
(2) a claim or right to receive benefits under a special needs trust as described in 42 U.S.C. Section 1396p(d)(4), as amended.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-318(3), (4).
2. Account Debtor's Right to Pay Assignor Until Notification. Subsection (a) provides the general rule concerning an account debtor's right to pay the assignor until the account debtor receives appropriate notification. The revision makes clear that once the account debtor receives the notification, the account debtor cannot discharge its obligation by paying the assignor. It also makes explicit that payment to the assignor before notification, or payment to the assignee after notification, discharges the obligation. No change in meaning from former Section 9-318 is intended. Nothing in this Section conditions the effectiveness of a notification on the identity of the person who gives it. An account debtor that doubts whether the right to payment has been assigned may avail itself of the procedures in subsection (c). See Comment 4.
An effective notification under subsection (a) must be authenticated. This requirement normally could be satisfied by sending notification on the notifying person's letterhead or on a form on which the notifying person's name appears. In each case the printed name would be a symbol adopted by the notifying person for the purpose of identifying the person and adopting the notification. See Section 9-102 (defining "authenticate").
Subsection (a) applies only to account debtors on accounts, chattel paper, and payment intangibles. (Section 9-102 defines the term "account debtor" more broadly, to include those obligated on all general intangibles.) Although subsection (a) is more precise than its predecessor, it probably does not change the rule that applied under former Article 9. Former Section 9-318(3) referred to the account debtor's obligation to "pay," indicating that the subsection was limited to account debtors on accounts, chattel paper, and other payment obligations.
3. Limitations on Effectiveness of Notification. Subsection (b) contains some special rules concerning the effectiveness of a notification under subsection (a).
Subsection (b)(1) tracks former Section 9-318(3) by making ineffective a notification that does not reasonably identify the rights assigned. A reasonable identification need not identify the right to payment with specificity, but what is reasonable also is not left to the arbitrary decision of the account debtor. If an account debtor has doubt as to the adequacy of a notification, it may not be safe in disregarding the notification unless it notifies the assignee with reasonable promptness as to the respects in which the account debtor considers the notification defective.
Subsection (b)(2), which is new, applies only to sales of payment intangibles. It makes a notification ineffective to the extent that other law gives effect to an agreement between an account debtor and a seller of a payment intangible that limits the account debtor's duty to pay a person other than the seller. Payment intangibles are substantially less fungible than accounts and chattel paper. In some (e.g., commercial bank loans), account debtors customarily and legitimately expect that they will not be required to pay any person other than the financial institution that has advanced funds.
It has become common in financing transactions to assign interests in a single obligation to more than one assignee. Requiring an account debtor that owes a single obligation to make multiple payments to multiple assignees would be unnecessarily burdensome. Thus, under subsection (b)(3), an account debtor that is notified to pay an assignee less than the full amount of any installment or other periodic payment has the option to treat the notification as ineffective, ignore the notice, and discharge the assigned obligation by paying the assignor. Some account debtors may not realize that the law affords them the right to ignore certain notices of assignment with impunity. By making the notification ineffective at the account debtor's option, subsection (b)(3) permits an account debtor to pay the assignee in accordance with the notice and thereby to satisfy its obligation pro tanto. Under subsection (g), the rights and duties created by subsection (b)(3) cannot be waived or varied.
4. Proof of Assignment. Subsection (c) links payment with discharge, as in subsection (a). It follows former Section 9-318(3) in referring to the right of the account debtor to pay the assignor if the requested proof of assignment is not seasonably forthcoming. Even if the proof is not forthcoming, the notification of assignment would remain effective, so that, in the absence of reasonable proof of the assignment, the account debtor could discharge the obligation by paying either the assignee or the assignor. Of course, if the assignee did not in fact receive an assignment, the account debtor cannot discharge its obligation by paying a putative assignee who is a stranger. The observations in Comment 3 concerning the reasonableness of an identification of a right to payment also apply here. An account debtor that questions the adequacy of proof submitted by an assignor would be well advised to promptly inform the assignor of the defects.
An account debtor may face another problem if its obligation becomes due while the account debtor is awaiting reasonable proof of the assignment that it has requested from the assignee. This Section does not excuse the account debtor from timely compliance with its obligations. Consequently, an account debtor that has received a notification of assignment and who has requested reasonable proof of the assignment may discharge its obligation by paying the assignor at the time (or even earlier if reasonably necessary to avoid risk of default) when a payment is due, even if the account debtor has not yet received a response to its request for proof. On the other hand, after requesting reasonable proof of the assignment, an account debtor may not discharge its obligation by paying the assignor substantially in advance of the time that the payment is due unless the assignee has failed to provide the proof seasonably.
5. Contractual Restrictions on Assignment. Former Section 9-318(4) rendered ineffective an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor which prohibited assignment of an account (whether outright or to secure an obligation) or prohibited a security assignment of a general intangible for the payment of money due or to become due. Subsection (d) essentially follows former Section 9-318(4), but expands the rule of free assignability to chattel paper (subject to Sections 2A-303 and 9-407) and promissory notes and explicitly overrides both restrictions and prohibitions of assignment. The policies underlying the ineffectiveness of contractual restrictions under this Section build on common-law developments that essentially have eliminated legal restrictions on assignments of rights to payment as security and other assignments of rights to payment such as accounts and chattel paper. Any that might linger for accounts and chattel paper are addressed by new subsection (f). See Comment 6.
Former Section 9-318(4) did not apply to a sale of a payment intangible (as described in the former provision, "a general intangible for money due or to become due") but did apply to an assignment of a payment intangible for security. Subsection (e) continues this approach and also makes subsection (d) inapplicable to sales of promissory notes. Section 9-408 addresses anti-assignment clauses with respect to sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes.
Like former Section 9-318(4), subsection (d) provides that anti-assignment clauses are "ineffective." The quoted term means that the clause is of no effect whatsoever; the clause does not prevent the assignment from taking effect between the parties and the prohibited assignment does not constitute a default under the agreement between the account debtor and assignor. However, subsection (d) does not override terms that do not directly prohibit, restrict, or require consent to an assignment but which might, nonetheless, present a practical impairment of the assignment. Properly read, however, subsection (d) reaches only covenants that prohibit, restrict, or require consents to assignments; it does not override all terms that might "impair" an assignment in fact.
Example: Buyer enters into an agreement with Seller to buy equipment that Seller is to manufacture according to Buyer's specifications. Buyer agrees to make a series of prepayments during the construction process. In return, Seller agrees to set aside the prepaid funds in a special account and to use the funds solely for the manufacture of the designated equipment. Seller also agrees that it will not assign any of its rights under the sale agreement with Buyer. Nevertheless, Seller grants to Secured Party a security interest in its accounts. Seller's anti-assignment agreement is ineffective under subsection (d); its agreement concerning the use of prepaid funds, which is not a restriction or prohibition on assignment, is not. However, if Secured Party notifies Buyer to make all future payments directly to Secured Party, Buyer will be obliged to do so under subsection (a) if it wishes the payments to discharge its obligation. Unless Secured Party releases the funds to Seller so that Seller can comply with its use-of-funds covenant, Seller will be in breach of that covenant.
In the example, there appears to be a plausible business purpose for the use-of-funds covenant. However, a court may conclude that a covenant with no business purpose other than imposing an impediment to an assignment actually is a direct restriction that is rendered ineffective by subsection (d).
6. Legal Restrictions on Assignment. Former Section 9-318(4), like subsection (d) of this Section, addressed only contractual restrictions on assignment. The former Section was grounded on the reality that legal, as opposed to contractual, restrictions on assignments of rights to payment had largely disappeared. New subsection (f) codifies this principle of free assignability for accounts and chattel paper. For the most part the discussion of contractual restrictions in Comment 5 applies as well to legal restrictions rendered ineffective under subsection (f).
7. Multiple Assignments. This Section, like former Section 9-318, is not a complete codification of the law of assignments of rights to payment. In particular, it is silent concerning many of the ramifications for an account debtor in cases of multiple assignments of the same right. For example, an assignor might assign the same receivable to multiple assignees (which assignments could be either inadvertent or wrongful). Or, the assignor could assign the receivable to assignee-1, which then might re-assign it to assignee-2, and so forth. The rights and duties of an account debtor in the face of multiple assignments and in other circumstances not resolved in the statutory text are left to the common-law rules. See, e.g., Restatement (2d), Contracts Sections 338(3), 339. The failure of former Article 9 to codify these rules does not appear to have caused problems.
8. Consumer Account Debtors. Subsection (h) is new. It makes clear that the rules of this Section are subject to other law establishing special rules for consumer account debtors.
9. Account Debtors on Health-Care-Insurance Receivables. Subsection (i) also is new. The obligation of an insurer with respect to a health-care-insurance receivable is governed by other law. Section 9-408 addresses contractual and legal restrictions on the assignment of a health-care-insurance receivable.
Section 36-9-407. Restrictions on creation or enforcement of security interest in leasehold interest or in lessor's residual interest.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a term in a lease agreement is ineffective to the extent that it:
(1) prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of a party to the lease to the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in an interest of a party under the lease contract or in the lessor's residual interest in the goods; or
(2) provides that the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the lease.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-2A-303(7), a term described in subsection (a)(2) is effective to the extent that there is:
(1) a transfer by the lessee of the lessee's right of possession or use of the goods in violation of the term; or
(2) a delegation of a material performance of either party to the lease contract in violation of the term.
(c) The creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in the lessor's interest under the lease contract or the lessor's residual interest in the goods is not a transfer that materially impairs the lessee's prospect of obtaining return performance or materially changes the duty of or materially increases the burden or risk imposed on the lessee within the purview of Section 36-2A-303(4) unless, and then only to the extent that, enforcement actually results in a delegation of material performance of the lessor.
Official Comment
1. Source. Section 2A-303.
2. Restrictions on Assignment Generally Ineffective. Under subsection (a), as under former Section 2A-303(3), a term in a lease agreement which prohibits or restricts the creation of a security interest generally is ineffective. This reflects the general policy of Section 9-406(d) and former Section 9-318(4). This Section has been conformed in several respects to analogous provisions in Sections 9-406, 9-408, and 9-409, including the substitution of "ineffective" for "not enforceable" and the substitution of "creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest" for "creation or enforcement of a security interest."
3. Exceptions for Certain Transfers and Delegations. Subsection (b) provides exceptions to the general ineffectiveness of restrictions under subsection (a). A term that otherwise is ineffective under subsection (a)(2) is effective to the extent that a lessee transfers its right to possession and use of goods or if either party delegates material performance of the lease contract in violation of the term. However, under subsection (c), as under former Section 2A-303(3), a lessor's creation of a security interest in its interest in a lease contract or its residual interest in the leased goods is not a material impairment under Section 2A-303(4) (former Section 2A-303(5)), absent an actual delegation of the lessor's material performance. The terms of the lease contract determine whether the lessor, in fact, has any remaining obligations to perform. If it does, it is then necessary to determine whether there has been an actual delegation of "material performance." See Section 2A-303, Comments 3 and 4.
Section 36-9-408. Restrictions on assignment of promissory notes, health-care-insurance receivables, and certain general intangibles ineffective.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a term in a promissory note or in an agreement between an account debtor and a debtor which relates to a health-care-insurance receivable or a general intangible, including a contract, permit, license, or franchise, and which term prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the person obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor to, the assignment or transfer of, or creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in, the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible, is ineffective to the extent that the term:
(1) would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest; or
(2) provides that the creation, attachment, or perfection of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible.
(b) Subsection (a) applies to a security interest in a payment intangible or promissory note only if the security interest arises out of a sale of the payment intangible or promissory note.
(c) A rule of law, statute, or regulation that prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of a government, governmental body or official, person obligated on a promissory note, or account debtor to the assignment or transfer of, or creation of a security interest in, a promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible, including a contract, permit, license, or franchise between an account debtor and a debtor, is ineffective to the extent that the rule of law, statute, or regulation:
(1) would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest; or
(2) provides that the creation, attachment, or perfection of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible.
(d) To the extent that a term in a promissory note or in an agreement between an account debtor and a debtor which relates to a health-care-insurance receivable or general intangible or a rule of law, statute, or regulation described in subsection (c) would be effective under law other than this chapter but is ineffective under subsection (a) or (c), the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible:
(1) is not enforceable against the person obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor;
(2) does not impose a duty or obligation on the person obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor;
(3) does not require the person obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor to recognize the security interest, pay or render performance to the secured party, or accept payment or performance from the secured party;
(4) does not entitle the secured party to use or assign the debtor's rights under the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible, including any related information or materials furnished to the debtor in the transaction giving rise to the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible;
(5) does not entitle the secured party to use, assign, possess, or have access to any trade secrets or confidential information of the person obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor; and
(6) does not entitle the secured party to enforce the security interest in the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible.
(e) Subsections (a) and (c) do not apply to the assignment, transfer, or creation of a security interest in:
(1) a claim or right to receive compensation for injuries or sickness as described in 26 U.S.C. Section 104(a)(1) or (2), as amended; or
(2) a claim or right to receive benefits under a special needs trust as described in 42 U.S.C. Section 1396p(d)(4), as amended.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Free Assignability. This Section makes ineffective any attempt to restrict the assignment of a general intangible, health-care-insurance receivable, or promissory note, whether the restriction appears in the terms of a promissory note or the agreement between an account debtor and a debtor (subsection (a)) or in a rule of law, including a statute or governmental rule or regulation (subsection (c)). This result allows the creation, attachment, and perfection of a security interest in a general intangible, such as an agreement for the nonexclusive license of software, as well as sales of certain receivables, such as a health-care-insurance receivable (which is an "account"), payment intangible, or promissory note, without giving rise to a default or breach by the assignor or from triggering a remedy of the account debtor or person obligated on a promissory note. This enhances the ability of certain debtors to obtain credit. On the other hand, subsection (d) protects the other party-the "account debtor" on a general intangible or the person obligated on a promissory note-from adverse effects arising from the security interest. It leaves the account debtor's or obligated person's rights and obligations unaffected in all material respects if a restriction rendered ineffective by subsection (a) or (c) would be effective under law other than Article 9.
Example 1: A term of an agreement for the nonexclusive license of computer software prohibits the licensee from assigning any of its rights as licensee with respect to the software. The agreement also provides that an attempt to assign rights in violation of the restriction is a default entitling the licensor to terminate the license agreement. The licensee, as debtor, grants to a secured party a security interest in its rights under the license and in the computers in which it is installed. Under this Section, the term prohibiting assignment and providing for a default upon an attempted assignment is ineffective to prevent the creation, attachment, or perfection of the security interest or entitle the licensor to terminate the license agreement. However, under subsection (d), the secured party (absent the licensor's agreement) is not entitled to enforce the license or to use, assign, or otherwise enjoy the benefits of the licensed software, and the licensor need not recognize (or pay any attention to) the secured party. Even if the secured party takes possession of the computers on the debtor's default, the debtor would remain free to remove the software from the computer, load it on another computer, and continue to use it, if the license so permits. If the debtor does not remove the software, other law may require the secured party to remove it before disposing of the computer. Disposition of the software with the computer could violate an effective prohibition on enforcement of the security interest. See subsection (d).
3. Nature of Debtor's Interest. Neither this Section nor any other provision of this Article determines whether a debtor has a property interest. The definition of the term "security interest" provides that it is an "interest in personal property." See Section 1-201(37). Ordinarily, a debtor can create a security interest in collateral only if it has "rights in the collateral." See Section 9-203(b). Other law determines whether a debtor has a property interest ("rights in the collateral") and the nature of that interest. For example, the nonexclusive license addressed in Example 1 may not create any property interest whatsoever in the intellectual property (e.g., copyright) that underlies the license and that effectively enables the licensor to grant the license. The debtor's property interest may be confined solely to its interest in the promises made by the licensor in the license agreement (e.g., a promise not to sue the debtor for its use of the software).
4. Scope: Sales of Payment Intangibles and Other General Intangibles; Assignments Unaffected by this Section. Subsections (a) and (c) render ineffective restrictions on assignments only "to the extent" that the assignments restrict the "creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest," including sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes. This Section does not render ineffective a restriction on an assignment that does not create a security interest. For example, if the debtor in Comment 2, Example 1 purported to assign the license to another entity that would use the computer software itself, other law would govern the effectiveness of the anti-assignment provisions.
Subsection (a) applies to a security interest in payment intangibles only if the security interest arises out of sale of the payment intangibles. Contractual restrictions directed to security interests in payment intangibles which secure an obligation are subject to Section 9-406(d). Subsection (a) also deals with sales of promissory notes which also create security interests. See Section 9-109(a). Subsection (c) deals with all security interests in payment intangibles or promissory notes, whether or not arising out of a sale.
Subsection (a) does not render ineffective any term, and subsection (c) does not render ineffective any law, statute or regulation, that restricts outright sales of general intangibles other than payment intangibles. They deal only with restrictions on security interests. The only sales of general intangibles that create security interests are sales of payment intangibles.
5. Terminology: "Account Debtor"; "Person Obligated on a Promissory Note." This Section uses the term "account debtor" as it is defined in Section 9-102. The term refers to the party, other than the debtor, to a general intangible, including a permit, license, franchise, or the like, and the person obligated on a health-care-insurance receivable, which is a type of account. The definition of "account debtor" does not limit the term to persons who are obligated to pay under a general intangible. Rather, the term includes all persons who are obligated on a general intangible, including those who are obligated to render performance in exchange for payment. In some cases, e.g., the creation of a security interest in a franchisee's rights under a franchise agreement, the principal payment obligation may be owed by the debtor (franchisee) to the account debtor (franchisor). This Section also refers to a "person obligated on a promissory note," inasmuch as those persons do not fall within the definition of "account debtor."
Example 2: A licensor and licensee enter into an agreement for the nonexclusive license of computer software. The licensee's interest in the license agreement is a general intangible. If the licensee grants to a secured party a security interest in its rights under the license agreement, the licensee is the debtor and the licensor is the account debtor. On the other hand, if the licensor grants to a secured party a security interest in its right to payment (an account) under the license agreement, the licensor is the debtor and the licensee is the account debtor. (This Section applies to the security interest in the general intangible but not to the security interest in the account, which is not a health-care-insurance receivable.)
6. Effects on Account Debtors and Persons Obligated on Promissory Notes. Subsections (a) and (c) affect two classes of persons. These subsections affect account debtors on general intangibles and health-care-insurance receivables and persons obligated on promissory notes. Subsection (c) also affects governmental entities that enact or determine rules of law. However, subsection (d) ensures that these affected persons are not affected adversely. That provision removes any burdens or adverse effects on these persons for which any rational basis could exist to restrict the effectiveness of an assignment or to exercise any remedies. For this reason, the effects of subsections (a) and (c) are immaterial insofar as those persons are concerned.
Subsection (a) does not override terms that do not directly prohibit, restrict, or require consent to an assignment but which might, nonetheless, present a practical impairment of the assignment. Properly read, however, this Section, like Section 9-406(d), reaches only covenants that prohibit, restrict, or require consents to assignments; it does not override all terms that might "impair" an assignment in fact.
Example 3: A licensor and licensee enter into an agreement for the nonexclusive license of valuable business software. The license agreement includes terms (i) prohibiting the licensee from assigning its rights under the license, (ii) prohibiting the licensee from disclosing to anyone certain information relating to the software and the licensor, and (iii) deeming prohibited assignments and prohibited disclosures to be defaults. The licensee wishes to obtain financing and, in exchange, is willing to grant a security interest in its rights under the license agreement. The secured party, reasonably, refuses to extend credit unless the licensee discloses the information that it is prohibited from disclosing under the license agreement. The secured party cannot determine the value of the proposed collateral in the absence of this information. Under this Section, the terms of the license prohibiting the assignment (grant of the security interest) and making the assignment a default are ineffective. However, the nondisclosure covenant is not a term that prohibits the assignment or creation of a security interest in the license. Consequently, the nondisclosure term is enforceable even though the practical effect is to restrict the licensee's ability to use its rights under the license agreement as collateral.
The nondisclosure term also would be effective in the factual setting of Comment 2, Example 1. If the secured party's possession of the computers loaded with software would put it in a position to discover confidential information that the debtor was prohibited from disclosing, the licensor should be entitled to enforce its rights against the secured party. Moreover, the licensor could have required the debtor to obtain the secured party's agreement that (i) it would immediately return all copies of software loaded on the computers and that (ii) it would not examine or otherwise acquire any information contained in the software. This Section does not prevent an account debtor from protecting by agreement its independent interests that are unrelated to the "creation, attachment, or perfection" of a security interest. In Example 1, moreover, the secured party is not in possession of copies of software by virtue of its security interest or in connection with enforcing its security interest in the debtor's license of the software. Its possession is incidental to its possession of the computers, in which it has a security interest. Enforcing against the secured party a restriction relating to the software in no way interferes with its security interest in the computers.
7. Effect in Assignor's Bankruptcy. This Section could have a substantial effect if the assignor enters bankruptcy. Roughly speaking, Bankruptcy Code Section 552 invalidates security interests in property acquired after a bankruptcy petition is filed, except to the extent that the postpetition property constitutes proceeds of prepetition collateral.
Example 4: A debtor is the owner of a cable television franchise that, under applicable law, cannot be assigned without the consent of the municipal franchisor. A lender wishes to extend credit to the debtor, provided that the credit is secured by the debtor's "going business" value. To secure the loan, the debtor grants a security interest in all its existing and after-acquired property. The franchise represents the principal value of the business. The municipality refuses to consent to any assignment for collateral purposes. If other law were given effect, the security interest in the franchise would not attach; and if the debtor were to enter bankruptcy and sell the business, the secured party would receive but a fraction of the business's value. Under this Section, however, the security interest would attach to the franchise. As a result, the security interest would attach to the proceeds of any sale of the franchise while a bankruptcy is pending. However, this Section would protect the interests of the municipality by preventing the secured party from enforcing its security interest to the detriment of the municipality.
8. Effect Outside of Bankruptcy. The principal effects of this Section will take place outside of bankruptcy. Compared to the relatively few debtors that enter bankruptcy, there are many more that do not. By making available previously unavailable property as collateral, this Section should enable debtors to obtain additional credit. For purposes of determining whether to extend credit, under some circumstances a secured party may ascribe value to the collateral to which its security interest has attached, even if this Section precludes the secured party from enforcing the security interest without the agreement of the account debtor or person obligated on the promissory note. This may be the case where the secured party sees a likelihood of obtaining that agreement in the future. This may also be the case where the secured party anticipates that the collateral will give rise to a type of proceeds as to which this Section would not apply.
Example 5: Under the facts of Example 4, the debtor does not enter bankruptcy. Perhaps in exchange for a fee, the municipality agrees that the debtor may transfer the franchise to a buyer. As consideration for the transfer, the debtor receives from the buyer its check for part of the purchase price and its promissory note for the balance. The security interest attaches to the check and promissory note as proceeds. See Section 9-315(a)(2). This Section does not apply to the security interest in the check, which is not a promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible. Nor does it apply to the security interest in the promissory note, inasmuch as it was not sold to the secured party.
9. Contrary Federal Law. This Section does not override federal law to the contrary. However, it does reflect an important policy judgment that should provide a template for future federal law reforms.
Section 36-9-409. Restrictions on assignment of letter-of-credit rights ineffective.
(a) A term in a letter of credit or a rule of law, statute, regulation, custom, or practice applicable to the letter of credit which prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of an applicant, issuer, or nominated person to a beneficiary's assignment of or creation of a security interest in a letter-of-credit right is ineffective to the extent that the term or rule of law, statute, regulation, custom, or practice:
(1) would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in the letter-of-credit right; or
(2) provides that the creation, attachment, or perfection of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the letter-of-credit right.
(b) To the extent that a term in a letter of credit is ineffective under subsection (a) but would be effective under law other than this chapter or a custom or practice applicable to the letter of credit, to the transfer of a right to draw or otherwise demand performance under the letter of credit, or to the assignment of a right to proceeds of the letter of credit, the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in the letter-of-credit right:
(1) is not enforceable against the applicant, issuer, nominated person, or transferee beneficiary;
(2) imposes no duties or obligations on the applicant, issuer, nominated person, or transferee beneficiary; and
(3) does not require the applicant, issuer, nominated person, or transferee beneficiary to recognize the security interest, pay or render performance to the secured party, or accept payment or other performance from the secured party.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Purpose and Relevance. This Section, patterned on Section 9-408, limits the effectiveness of attempts to restrict the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in letter-of-credit rights, whether the restriction appears in the letter of credit or a rule of law, custom, or practice applicable to the letter of credit. It protects the creation, attachment, and perfection of a security interest while preventing these events from giving rise to a default or breach by the assignor or from triggering a remedy or defense of the issuer or other person obligated on a letter of credit. Letter-of-credit rights are a type of supporting obligation. See Section 9-102. Under Sections 9-203 and 9-308, a security interest in a supporting obligation attaches and is perfected automatically if the security interest in the supported obligation attaches and is perfected. See Section 9-107, Comment 5. The automatic attachment and perfection under Article 9 would be anomalous or misleading if, under other law (e.g., Article 5), a restriction on transfer or assignment were effective to block attachment and perfection.
3. Relationship to Letter-of-Credit Law. Although restrictions on an assignment of a letter of credit are ineffective to prevent creation, attachment, and perfection of a security interest, subsection (b) protects the issuer and other parties from any adverse effects of the security interest by preserving letter-of-credit law and practice that limits the right of a beneficiary to transfer its right to draw or otherwise demand performance (Section 5-112) and limits the obligation of an issuer or nominated person to recognize a beneficiary's assignment of letter-of-credit proceeds (Section 5-114). Thus, this Section's treatment of letter-of-credit rights differs from this Article's treatment of instruments and investment property. Moreover, under Section 9-109(c)(4), this Article does not apply to the extent that the rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person are independent and superior under Section 5-114, thereby preserving the "independence principle" of letter-of-credit law.
Part 5
Filing
Subpart 1.
Filing Office; Contents and Effectiveness Of Financing Statement
Section 36-9-501. Filing office.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), if the local law of this State governs perfection of a security interest or agricultural lien, the office in which to file a financing statement to perfect the security interest or agricultural lien is:
(1) the office designated for the filing or recording of a record of a mortgage on the related real property, if:
(A) the collateral is as-extracted collateral or timber to be cut; or
(B) the financing statement is filed as a fixture filing and the collateral is goods that are or are to become fixtures; or
(2) the office of the Secretary of State or any office duly authorized by the Secretary of State, in all other cases, including a case in which the collateral is goods that are or are to become fixtures and the financing statement is not filed as a fixture filing.
(b) The office in which to file a financing statement to perfect a security interest in collateral, including fixtures, of a transmitting utility is the office of the Secretary of State. The financing statement also constitutes a fixture filing as to the collateral indicated in the financing statement which is or is to become fixtures.
Official Comment
1. Source. Derived from former Section 9-401.
2. Where to File. Subsection (a) indicates where in a given State a financing statement is to be filed. Former Article 9 afforded each State three alternative approaches, depending on the extent to which the State desires central filing (usually with the Secretary of State), local filing (usually with a county office), or both. As Comment 1 to former Section 9-401 observed, "The principal advantage of state-wide filing is ease of access to the credit information which the files exist to provide. Consider for example the national distributor who wishes to have current information about the credit standing of the thousands of persons he sells to on credit. The more completely the files are centralized on a state-wide basis, the easier and cheaper it becomes to procure credit information; the more the files are scattered in local filing units, the more burdensome and costly." Local filing increases the net costs of secured transactions also by increasing uncertainty and the number of required filings. Any benefit that local filing may have had in the 1950's is now insubstantial. Accordingly, this Article dictates central filing for most situations, while retaining local filing for real-estate-related collateral and special filing provisions for transmitting utilities.
3. Minerals and Timber. Under subsection (a)(1), a filing in the office where a record of a mortgage on the related real property would be filed will perfect a security interest in as-extracted collateral. Inasmuch as the security interest does not attach until extraction, the filing continues to be effective after extraction. A different result occurs with respect to timber to be cut, however. Unlike as-extracted collateral, standing timber may be goods before it is cut. See Section 9-102 (defining "goods"). Once cut, however, it is no longer timber to be cut, and the filing in the real-property-mortgage office ceases to be effective. The timber then becomes ordinary goods, and filing in the office specified in subsection (a)(2) is necessary for perfection. Note also that after the timber is cut the law of the debtor's location, not the location of the timber, governs perfection under Section 9-301.
4. Fixtures. There are two ways in which a secured party may file a financing statement to perfect a security interest in goods that are or are to become fixtures. It may file in the Article 9 records, as with most other goods. See subsection (a)(2). Or it may file the financing statement as a "fixture filing," defined in Section 9-102, in the office in which a record of a mortgage on the related real property would be filed. See subsection(a)(1)(B).
5. Transmitting Utilities. The usual filing rules do not apply well for a transmitting utility (defined in Section 9-102). Many pre-UCC statutes provided special filing rules for railroads and in some cases for other public utilities, to avoid the requirements for filing with legal descriptions in every county in which such debtors had property. Former Section 9-401(5) recreated and broadened these provisions, and subsection (b) follows this approach. The nature of the debtor will inform persons searching the record as to where to make a search.
Section 36-9-502. Contents of financing statement; record of mortgage as financing statement; time of filing financing statement.
(a) Subject to subsection (b), a financing statement is sufficient only if it:
(1) provides the name of the debtor;
(2) provides the name of the secured party or a representative of the secured party; and
(3) indicates the collateral covered by the financing statement.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-501(b), to be sufficient, a financing statement that covers as-extracted collateral or timber to be cut, or which is filed as a fixture filing and covers goods that are or are to become fixtures, must satisfy subsection (a) and also:
(1) indicate that it covers this type of collateral;
(2) indicate that it is to be filed for record in the real property records;
(3) provide a description of the real property to which the collateral is related sufficient to give constructive notice of a mortgage under the law of this State if the description were contained in a record of the mortgage of the real property; and
(4) if the debtor does not have an interest of record in the real property, provide the name of a record owner.
(c) A record of a mortgage is effective, from the date of recording, as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing or as a financing statement covering as-extracted collateral or timber to be cut only if:
(1) the record indicates the goods or accounts that it covers;
(2) the goods are or are to become fixtures related to the real property described in the record or the collateral is related to the real property described in the record and is as-extracted collateral or timber to be cut;
(3) the record satisfies the requirements for a financing statement in this Section other than an indication that it is to be filed in the real property records; and
(4) the record is duly recorded.
(d) A financing statement may be filed before a security agreement is made or a security interest otherwise attaches.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-402(1), (5), (6).
2. "Notice Filing." This Section adopts the system of "notice filing." What is required to be filed is not, as under pre-UCC chattel mortgage and conditional sales acts, the security agreement itself, but only a simple record providing a limited amount of information (financing statement). The financing statement may be filed before the security interest attaches or thereafter. See subsection (d). See also Section 9-308(a) (contemplating situations in which a financing statement is filed before a security interest attaches).
The notice itself indicates merely that a person may have a security interest in the collateral indicated. Further inquiry from the parties concerned will be necessary to disclose the complete state of affairs. Section 9-210 provides a statutory procedure under which the secured party, at the debtor's request, may be required to make disclosure. However, in many cases, information may be forthcoming without the need to resort to the formalities of that Section.
Notice filing has proved to be of great use in financing transactions involving inventory, accounts, and chattel paper, because it obviates the necessity of refiling on each of a series of transactions in a continuing arrangement under which the collateral changes from day to day. However, even in the case of filings that do not necessarily involve a series of transactions (e.g., a loan secured by a single item of equipment), a financing statement is effective to encompass transactions under a security agreement not in existence and not contemplated at the time the notice was filed, if the indication of collateral in the financing statement is sufficient to cover the collateral concerned. Similarly, a financing statement is effective to cover after-acquired property of the type indicated and to perfect with respect to future advances under security agreements, regardless of whether after-acquired property or future advances are mentioned in the financing statement and even if not in the contemplation of the parties at the time the financing statement was authorized to be filed.
3. Debtor's Signature; Required Authorization. Subsection (a) sets forth the simple formal requirements for an effective financing statement. These requirements are: (1) the debtor's name; (2) the name of a secured party or representative of the secured party; and (3) an indication of the collateral.
Whereas former Section 9-402(1) required the debtor's signature to appear on a financing statement, this Article contains no signature requirement. The elimination of the signature requirement facilitates paperless filing. (However, as PEB Commentary No. 15 indicates, a paperless financing statement was sufficient under former Article 9.) Elimination of the signature requirement also makes the exceptions provided by former Section 9-402(2) unnecessary.
The fact that this Article does not require that an authenticating symbol be contained in the public record does not mean that all filings are authorized. Rather, Section 9-509(a) entitles a person to file an initial financing statement, an amendment that adds collateral, or an amendment that adds a debtor only if the debtor authorizes the filing, and Section 9-509(d) entitles a person other than the debtor to file a termination statement only if the secured party of record authorizes the filing. Of course, a filing has legal effect only to the extent it is authorized. See Section 9-510.
Law other than this Article, including the law with respect to ratification of past acts, generally determines whether a person has the requisite authority to file a record under this Article. See Section 1-103. However, under Section 9-509(b), the debtor's authentication of (or becoming bound by) a security agreement ipso facto constitutes the debtor's authorization of the filing of a financing statement covering the collateral described in the security agreement. The secured party need not obtain a separate authorization.
Section 9-625 provides a remedy for unauthorized filings. Making an unauthorized filing also may give rise to civil or criminal liability under other law. In addition, this Article contains provisions that assist in the discovery of unauthorized filings and the amelioration of their practical effect. For example, Section 9-518 provides a procedure whereby a person may add to the public record a statement to the effect that a financing statement indexed under the person's name was wrongfully filed, and Section 9-509(d) entitles any person to file a termination statement if the secured party of record fails to comply with its obligation to file or send one to the debtor, the debtor authorizes the filing, and the termination statement so indicates. However, the filing office is neither obligated nor permitted to inquire into issues of authorization. See Section 9-520(a).
4. Certain Other Requirements. Subsection (a) deletes other provisions of former Section 9-402(1) because they seems unwise (real-property description for financing statements covering crops), unnecessary (adequacy of copies of financing statements), or both (copy of security agreement as financing statement). In addition, the filing office must reject a financing statement lacking certain other information formerly required as a condition of perfection (e.g., an address for the debtor or secured party). See Sections 9-516(b), 9-520(a). However, if the filing office accepts the record, it is effective nevertheless. See Section 9-520(c).
5. Real-Property-Related Filings. Subsection (b) contains the requirements for financing statements filed as fixture filings and financing statements covering timber to be cut or minerals and minerals-related accounts constituting as-extracted collateral. A description of the related real property must be sufficient to reasonably identify it. See Section 9-108. This formulation rejects the view that the real property description must be by metes and bounds, or otherwise conforming to traditional real-property practice in conveyancing, but, of course, the incorporation of such a description by reference to the recording data of a deed, mortgage or other instrument containing the description should suffice under the most stringent standards. The proper test is that a description of real property must be sufficient so that the financing statement will fit into the real-property search system and be found by a real-property searcher. Under the optional language in subsection (b)(3), the test of adequacy of the description is whether it would be adequate in a record of a mortgage of the real property. As suggested in the Legislative Note, more detail may be required if there is a tract indexing system or a land registration system.
If the debtor does not have an interest of record in the real property, a real-property-related financing statement must show the name of a record owner, and Section 9-519(d) requires the financing statement to be indexed in the name of that owner. This requirement also enables financing statements covering as-extracted collateral or timber to be cut and financing statements filed as fixture filings to fit into the real-property search system.
6. Record of Mortgage Effective as Financing Statement. Subsection (c) explains when a record of a mortgage is effective as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing or to cover timber to be cut or as-extracted collateral. Use of the term "record of a mortgage" recognizes that in some systems the record actually filed is not the record pursuant to which a mortgage is created. Moreover, "mortgage" is defined in Section 9-102 as an "interest in real property," not as the record that creates or evidences the mortgage or the record that is filed in the public recording systems. A record creating a mortgage may also create a security interest with respect to fixtures (or other goods) in conformity with this Article. A single agreement creating a mortgage on real property and a security interest in chattels is common and useful for certain purposes. Under subsection (c), the recording of the record evidencing a mortgage (if it satisfies the requirements for a financing statement) constitutes the filing of a financing statement as to the fixtures (but not, of course, as to other goods). Section 9-515(g) makes the usual five-year maximum life for financing statements inapplicable to mortgages that operate as fixture filings under Section 9-502(c). Such mortgages are effective for the duration of the real-property recording.
Of course, if a combined mortgage covers chattels that are not fixtures, a regular financing statement filing is necessary with respect to the chattels, and subsection (c) is inapplicable. Likewise, a financing statement filed as a "fixture filing" is not effective to perfect a security interest in personal property other than fixtures.
In some cases it may be difficult to determine whether goods are or will become fixtures. Nothing in this Part prohibits the filing of a "precautionary" fixture filing, which would provide protection in the event goods are determined to be fixtures. The fact of filing should not be a factor in the determining whether goods are fixtures. Cf. Section 9-505(b).
Section 36-9-503. Name of debtor and secured party.
(a) A financing statement sufficiently provides the name of the debtor:
(1) if the debtor is a registered organization, only if the financing statement provides the name of the debtor indicated on the public record of the debtor's jurisdiction of organization which shows the debtor to have been organized;
(2) if the debtor is a decedent's estate, only if the financing statement provides the name of the decedent and indicates that the debtor is an estate;
(3) if the debtor is a trust or a trustee acting with respect to property held in trust, only if the financing statement:
(A) provides the name specified for the trust in its organic documents or, if no name is specified, provides the name of the settlor and additional information sufficient to distinguish the debtor from other trusts having one or more of the same settlors; and
(B) indicates, in the debtor's name or otherwise, that the debtor is a trust or is a trustee acting with respect to property held in trust; and
(4) in other cases:
(A) if the debtor has a name, only if it provides the individual or organizational name of the debtor; and
(B) if the debtor does not have a name, only if it provides the names of the partners, members, associates, or other persons comprising the debtor.
(b) A financing statement that provides the name of the debtor in accordance with subsection (a) is not rendered ineffective by the absence of:
(1) a trade name or other name of the debtor; or
(2) unless required under subsection (a)(4)(B), names of partners, members, associates, or other persons comprising the debtor.
(c) A financing statement that provides only the debtor's trade name does not sufficiently provide the name of the debtor.
(d) Failure to indicate the representative capacity of a secured party or representative of a secured party does not affect the sufficiency of a financing statement.
(e) A financing statement may provide the name of more than one debtor and the name of more than one secured party.
Official Comment
1. Source. Subsections (a)(4)(A), (b), and (c) derive from former Section 9-402(7); otherwise, new.
2. Debtor's Name. The requirement that a financing statement provide the debtor's name is particularly important. Financing statements are indexed under the name of the debtor, and those who wish to find financing statements search for them under the debtor's name. Subsection (a) explains what the debtor's name is for purposes of a financing statement. If the debtor is a "registered organization" (defined in Section 9-102 so as to ordinarily include corporations, limited partnerships, and limited liability companies), then the debtor's name is the name shown on the public records of the debtor's "jurisdiction of organization" (also defined in Section 9-102). Subsections (a)(2) and (a)(3) contain special rules for decedent's estates and common-law trusts. (Subsection (a)(1) applies to business trusts that are registered organizations.)
Subsection (a)(4)(A) essentially follows the first sentence of former Section 9-402(7). Section 1-201(28) defines the term "organization," which appears in subsection (a)(4), very broadly, to include all legal and commercial entities as well as associations that lack the status of a legal entity. Thus, the term includes corporations, partnerships of all kinds, business trusts, limited liability companies, unincorporated associations, personal trusts, governments, and estates. If the organization has a name, that name is the correct name to put on a financing statement. If the organization does not have a name, then the financing statement should name the individuals or other entities who comprise the organization.
Together with subsections (b) and (c), subsection (a) reflects the view prevailing under former Article 9 that the actual individual or organizational name of the debtor on a financing statement is both necessary and sufficient, whether or not the financing statement provides trade or other names of the debtor and, if the debtor has a name, whether or not the financing statement provides the names of the partners, members, or associates who comprise the debtor.
Note that, even if the name provided in an initial financing statement is correct, the filing office nevertheless must reject the financing statement if does not identify an individual debtor's last name (e.g., if it is not clear whether the debtor's name is Perry Mason or Mason Perry). See Section 9-516(b)(3)(C).
3. Secured Party's Name. New subsection (d) makes clear that when the secured party is a representative, a financing statement is sufficient if it names the secured party, whether or not it indicates any representative capacity. Similarly, a financing statement that names a representative of the secured party is sufficient, even if it does not indicate the representative capacity.
Example: Debtor creates a security interest in favor of Bank X, Bank Y, and Bank Z, but not to their representative, the collateral agent (Bank A). The collateral agent is not itself a secured party. See Section 9-102. Under Sections 9-502(a) and 9-503(d), however, a financing statement is effective if it names as secured party Bank A and not the actual secured parties, even if it omits Bank A's representative capacity.
Each person whose name is provided in an initial financing statement as the name of the secured party or representative of the secured party is a secured party of record. See Section 9-511.
4. Multiple Names. Subsection (e) makes explicit what is implicit under former Article 9: a financing statement may provide the name of more than one debtor and secured party. See Section 1-102(5)(a) (words in the singular include the plural). With respect to records relating to more than one debtor, see Section 9-520(d). With respect to financing statements providing the name of more than one secured party, see Sections 9-509(e) and 9-510(b).
Section 36-9-504. Indication of collateral.
A financing statement sufficiently indicates the collateral that it covers only if the financing statement provides:
(1) a description of the collateral pursuant to Section 36-9-108; or
(2) an indication that the financing statement covers all assets or all personal property.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-402(1).
2. Indication of Collateral. To comply with Section 9-502(a), a financing statement must "indicate" the collateral it covers. This Section explains what suffices for an indication.
Paragraph (1) provides that a "description" of the collateral (as the term is explained in Section 9-108) suffices as an indication for purposes of the sufficiency of a financing statement.
Debtors sometimes create a security interest in all, or substantially all, of their assets. To accommodate this practice, paragraph (2) expands the class of sufficient collateral references to embrace "an indication that the financing statement covers all assets or all personal property." If the property in question belongs to the debtor and is personal property, any searcher will know that the property is covered by the financing statement. Of course, regardless of its breadth, a financing statement has no effect with respect to property indicated but to which a security interest has not attached. Note that a broad statement of this kind (e.g., "all debtor's personal property") would not be a sufficient "description" for purposes of a security agreement. See Sections 9-203(b)(3)(A), 9-108. It follows that a somewhat narrower description than "all assets," e.g., "all assets other than automobiles," is sufficient for purposes of this Section, even if it does not suffice for purposes of a security agreement.
Section 36-9-505. Filing and compliance with other statutes and treaties for consignments, leases, other bailments, and other transactions.
(a) A consignor, lessor, or other bailor of goods, a licensor, or a buyer of a payment intangible or promissory note may file a financing statement, or may comply with a statute or treaty described in Section 36-9-311(a), using the terms 'consignor', 'consignee', 'lessor', 'lessee', 'bailor', 'bailee', 'licensor', 'licensee', 'owner', 'registered owner', 'buyer', 'seller', or words of similar import, instead of the terms 'secured party' and 'debtor'.
(b) This part applies to the filing of a financing statement under subsection (a) and, as appropriate, to compliance that is equivalent to filing a financing statement under section 36-9-311(b), but the filing or compliance is not of itself a factor in determining whether the collateral secures an obligation. If it is determined for another reason that the collateral secures an obligation, a security interest held by the consignor, lessor, bailor, licensor, owner, or buyer which attaches to the collateral is perfected by the filing or compliance.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-408.
2. Precautionary Filing. Occasionally, doubts arise concerning whether a transaction creates a relationship to which this Article or its filing provisions apply. For example, questions may arise over whether a "lease" of equipment in fact creates a security interest or whether the "sale" of payment intangibles in fact secures an obligation, thereby requiring action to perfect the security interest. This Section, which derives from former Section 9-408, affords the option of filing of a financing statement with appropriate changes of terminology but without affecting the substantive question of classification of the transaction.
3. Changes from Former Section 9-408. This Section expands the rule of Section 9-408 to embrace more generally other bailments and transactions, as well as sales transactions, primarily sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes. It provides the same benefits for compliance with a statute or treaty described in Section 9-311(a) that former Section 9-408 provided for filing, in connection with the use of terms such as "lessor," consignor," etc. The references to "owner" and "registered owner" are intended to address, for example, the situation where a putative lessor is the registered owner of an automobile covered by a certificate of title and the transaction is determined to create a security interest. Although this Section provides that the security interest is perfected, the relevant certificate-of-title statute may expressly provide to the contrary or may be ambiguous. If so, it may be necessary or advisable to amend the certificate-of-title statute to ensure that perfection of the security interest will be achieved.
As does Section 1-201, former Article 9 referred to transactions, including leases and consignments, "intended as security." This misleading phrase created the erroneous impression that the parties to a transaction can dictate how the law will classify it (e.g., as a bailment or as a security interest) and thus affect the rights of third parties. This Article deletes the phrase wherever it appears. Subsection (b) expresses the principle more precisely by referring to a security interest that "secures an obligation."
4. Consignments. Although a "true" consignment is a bailment, the filing and priority provisions of former Article 9 applied to "true" consignments. See former Sections 2-326(3), 9-114. A consignment "intended as security" created a security interest that was in all respects subject to former Article 9. This Article subsumes most true consignments under the rubric of "security interest." See Sections 9-102 (definition of "consignment"), 9-109(a)(4), 1-201(37) (definition of "security interest"). Nevertheless, it maintains the distinction between a (true) "consignment," as to which only certain aspects of Article 9 apply, and a so-called consignment that actually "secures an obligation," to which Article 9 applies in full. The revisions to this Section reflect the change in terminology.
Section 36-9-506. Effect of errors or omissions.
(a) A financing statement substantially satisfying the requirements of this part is effective, even if it has minor errors or omissions, unless the errors or omissions make the financing statement seriously misleading.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a financing statement that fails sufficiently to provide the name of the debtor in accordance with Section 36-9-503(a) is seriously misleading.
(c) If a search of the records of the filing office under the debtor's correct name, using the filing office's standard search logic, if any, would disclose a financing statement that fails sufficiently to provide the name of the debtor in accordance with Section 36-9-503(a), the name provided does not make the financing statement seriously misleading.
(d) For purposes of Section 36-9-508(b), the 'debtor's correct name' in subsection (c) means the correct name of the new debtor.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-402(8).
2. Errors. Like former Section 9-402(8), subsection (a) is in line with the policy of this Article to simplify formal requisites and filing requirements. It is designed to discourage the fanatical and impossibly refined reading of statutory requirements in which courts occasionally have indulged themselves. Subsection (a) provides the standard applicable to indications of collateral. Subsections (b) and (c), which are new, concern the effectiveness of financing statements in which the debtor's name is incorrect. Subsection (b) contains the general rule: a financing statement that fails sufficiently to provide the debtor's name in accordance with Section 9-503(a) is seriously misleading as a matter of law. Subsection (c) provides an exception: If the financing statement nevertheless would be discovered in a search under the debtor's correct name, using the filing office's standard search logic, if any, then as a matter of law the incorrect name does not make the financing statement seriously misleading. A financing statement that is seriously misleading under this Section is ineffective even if it is disclosed by (i) using a search logic other than that of the filing office to search the official records, or (ii) using the filing office's standard search logic to search a data base other than that of the filing office.
In addition to requiring the debtor's name and an indication of the collateral, Section 9-502(a) requires a financing statement to provide the name of the secured party or a representative of the secured party. Inasmuch as searches are not conducted under the secured party's name, and no filing is needed to continue the perfected status of security interest after it is assigned, an error in the name of the secured party or its representative will not be seriously misleading. However, in an appropriate case, an error of this kind may give rise to an estoppel in favor of a particular holder of a conflicting claim to the collateral. See Section 1-103.
3. New Debtors. Subsection (d) provides that, in determining the extent to which a financing statement naming an original debtor is effective against a new debtor, the sufficiency of financing statement should be tested against the name of the new debtor.
Section 36-9-507. Effect of certain events on effectiveness of financing statement.
(a) A filed financing statement remains effective with respect to collateral that is sold, exchanged, leased, licensed, or otherwise disposed of and in which a security interest or agricultural lien continues, even if the secured party knows of or consents to the disposition.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) and Section 36-9-508, a financing statement is not rendered ineffective if, after the financing statement is filed, the information provided in the financing statement becomes seriously misleading under Section 36-9-506.
(c) If a debtor so changes its name that a filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading under Section 36-9-506:
(1) the financing statement is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor before, or within four months after, the change; and
(2) the financing statement is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor more than four months after the change, unless an amendment to the financing statement which renders the financing statement not seriously misleading is filed within four months after the change.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-402(7).
2. Scope of Section. This Section deals with situations in which the information in a proper financing statement becomes inaccurate after the financing statement is filed. Compare Section 9-338, which deals with situations in which a financing statement contains a particular kind of information concerning the debtor (i.e., the information described in Section 9-516(b)(5)) that is incorrect at the time it is filed.
3. Post-Filing Disposition of Collateral. Under subsection (a), a financing statement remains effective even if the collateral is sold or otherwise disposed of. This subsection clarifies the third sentence of former Section 9-402(7) by providing that a financing statement remains effective following the disposition of collateral only when the security interest or agricultural lien continues in that collateral. This result is consistent with the conclusion of PEB Commentary No. 3. Normally, a security interest does continue after disposition of the collateral. See Section 9-315(a). Law other than this Article determines whether an agricultural lien survives disposition of the collateral.
As a consequence of the disposition, the collateral may be owned by a person other than the debtor against whom the financing statement was filed. Under subsection (a), the secured party remains perfected even if it does not correct the public record. For this reason, any person seeking to determine whether a debtor owns collateral free of security interests must inquire as to the debtor's source of title and, if circumstances seem to require it, search in the name of a former owner. Subsection (a) addresses only the sufficiency of the information contained in the financing statement. A disposition of collateral may result in loss of perfection for other reasons. See Section 9-316.
Example: Dee Corp. is an Illinois corporation. It creates a security interest in its equipment in favor of Secured Party. Secured Party files a proper financing statement in Illinois. Dee Corp. sells an item of equipment to Bee Corp., a Pennsylvania corporation, subject to the security interest. The security interest continues, see Section 9-315(a), and remains perfected, see Section 9-507(a), notwithstanding that the financing statement is filed under "D" (for Dee Corp.) and not under "B." However, because Bee Corp. is located in Pennsylvania and not Illinois, see Section 9-307, unless Secured Party perfects under Pennsylvania law within one year after the transfer, its security interest will become unperfected and will be deemed to have been unperfected against purchasers of the collateral. See Section 9-316.
4. Other Post-Filing Changes. Subsection (b) provides that, as a general matter, post-filing changes that render a financing statement inaccurate and seriously misleading have no effect on a financing statement. The financing statement remains effective. It is subject to two exceptions: Section 9-508 and Section 9-507(c). Section 9-508 addresses the effectiveness of a financing statement filed against an original debtor when a new debtor becomes bound by the original debtor's security agreement. It is discussed in the Comments to that Section. Section 9-507(c) addresses a "pure" change of the debtor's name, i.e., a change that does not implicate a new debtor. It clarifies former Section 9-402(7). If a name change renders a filed financing statement seriously misleading, the financing statement is not effective as to collateral acquired more than four months after the change, unless before the expiration of the four months an amendment is filed that specifies the debtor's new correct name (or provides an incorrect name that renders the financing statement not seriously misleading under Section 9-506). As under former Section 9-402(7), the original financing statement would continue to be effective with respect to collateral acquired before the name change as well as collateral acquired within the four-month period.
Section 36-9-508. Effectiveness of financing statement if new debtor becomes bound by security agreement.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a filed financing statement naming an original debtor is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral in which a new debtor has or acquires rights to the extent that the financing statement would have been effective had the original debtor acquired rights in the collateral.
(b) If the difference between the name of the original debtor and that of the new debtor causes a filed financing statement that is effective under subsection (a) to be seriously misleading under Section 36-9-506:
(1) the financing statement is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the new debtor before, and within four months after, the new debtor becomes bound under Section 36-9-203(d); and
(2) the financing statement is not effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the new debtor more than four months after the new debtor becomes bound under Section 36-9-203(d) unless an initial financing statement providing the name of the new debtor is filed before the expiration of that time.
(c) This section does not apply to collateral as to which a filed financing statement remains effective against the new debtor under Section 36-9-507(a).
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. The Problem. Section 9-203(d) and (e) and this Section deal with situations where one party (the "new debtor") becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person (the "original debtor"). These situations often arise as a consequence of changes in business structure. For example, the original debtor may be an individual debtor who operates a business as a sole proprietorship and then incorporates it. Or, the original debtor may be a corporation that is merged into another corporation. Under both former Article 9 and this Article, collateral that is transferred in the course of the incorporation or merger normally would remain subject to a perfected security interest. See Sections 9-315(a), 9-507(a). Former Article 9 was less clear with respect to whether an after-acquired property clause in a security agreement signed by the original debtor would be effective to create a security interest in property acquired by the new corporation or the merger survivor and, if so, whether a financing statement filed against the original debtor would be effective to perfect the security interest. This Section and Sections 9-203(d) and (e) are a clarification.
3. How New Debtor Becomes Bound. Normally, a security interest is unenforceable unless the debtor has authenticated a security agreement describing the collateral. See Section 9-203(b). New Section 9-203(e) creates an exception, under which a security agreement entered into by one person is effective with respect to the property of another. This exception comes into play if a "new debtor" becomes bound as debtor by a security agreement entered into by another person (the "original debtor"). (The quoted terms are defined in Section 9-102.) If a new debtor does become bound, then the security agreement entered into by the original debtor satisfies the security-agreement requirement of Section 9-203(b)(3) as to existing or after-acquired property of the new debtor to the extent the property is described in the security agreement. In that case, no other agreement is necessary to make a security interest enforceable in that property. See Section 9-203(e).
Section 9-203(d) explains when a new debtor becomes bound by an original debtor's security agreement. Under Section 9-203(d)(1), a new debtor becomes bound as debtor if, by contract or operation of other law, the security agreement becomes effective to create a security interest in the new debtor's property. For example, if the applicable corporate law of mergers provides that when A Corp merges into B Corp, B Corp becomes a debtor under A Corp's security agreement, then B Corp would become bound as debtor following such a merger. Similarly, B Corp would become bound as debtor if B Corp contractually assumes A's obligations under the security agreement.
Under certain circumstances, a new debtor becomes bound for purposes of this Article even though it would not be bound under other law. Under Section 9-203(d)(2), a new debtor becomes bound when, by contract or operation of other law, it (i) becomes obligated not only for the secured obligation but also generally for the obligations of the original debtor and (ii) acquires or succeeds to substantially all the assets of the original debtor. For example, some corporate laws provide that, when two corporations merge, the surviving corporation succeeds to the assets of its merger partner and "has all liabilities" of both corporations. In the case where, for example, A Corp merges into B Corp (and A Corp ceases to exist), some people have questioned whether A Corp's grant of a security interest in its existing and after-acquired property becomes a "liability" of B Corp, such that B Corp's existing and after-acquired property becomes subject to a security interest in favor of A Corp's lender. Even if corporate law were to give a negative answer, under Section 9-203(d)(2), B Corp would become bound for purposes of Section 9-203(e) and this Section. The "substantially all of the assets" requirement of Section 9-203(d)(2) excludes sureties and other secondary obligors as well as persons who become obligated through veil piercing and other non-successorship doctrines. In most cases, it will exclude successors to the assets and liabilities of a division of a debtor.
4. When Financing Statement Effective Against New Debtor. Subsection (a) provides that a filing against the original debtor is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral that a new debtor has at the time it becomes bound by the original debtor's security agreement and collateral that it acquires before the expiration of four months after the new debtor becomes bound. Under subsection (b), however, if the filing against the original debtor is seriously misleading as to the new debtor's name, the filing is effective as to collateral acquired by the new debtor after the four-month period only if a person files during the four-month period an initial financing statement providing the name of the new debtor. Compare Section 9-507(c) (four-month period of effectiveness with respect to collateral acquired by a debtor after the debtor changes its name).
5. Transferred Collateral. This Section does not apply to collateral transferred by the original debtor to a new debtor. Under those circumstances, the filing against the original debtor continues to be effective until it lapses. See subsection (c); Section 9-507(a).
6. Priority. Section 9-326 governs the priority contest between a secured creditor of the original debtor and a secured creditor of the new debtor.
Section 36-9-509. Persons entitled to file a record.
(a) A person may file an initial financing statement, amendment that adds collateral covered by a financing statement, or amendment that adds a debtor to a financing statement only if:
(1) the debtor authorizes the filing in an authenticated record; or
(2) the person holds an agricultural lien that has become effective at the time of filing and the financing statement covers only collateral in which the person holds an agricultural lien.
(b) By authenticating or becoming bound as debtor by a security agreement, a debtor or new debtor authorizes the filing of an initial financing statement, and an amendment, covering:
(1) the collateral described in the security agreement; and
(2) property that becomes collateral under Section 36-9-315(a)(2), whether or not the security agreement expressly covers proceeds.
(c) By acquiring collateral in which a security interest or agricultural lien continues under Section 36-9-315(a)(1), a debtor authorizes the filing of an initial financing statement, and an amendment, covering the collateral and property that becomes collateral under Section 36-9-315(a)(2).
(d) A person may file an amendment other than an amendment that adds collateral covered by a financing statement or an amendment that adds a debtor to a financing statement only if:
(1) the secured party of record authorizes the filing; or
(2) the amendment is a termination statement for a financing statement as to which the secured party of record has failed to file or send a termination statement as required by Section 36-9-513(a) or (c), the debtor authorizes the filing, and the termination statement indicates that the debtor authorized it to be filed.
(e) If there is more than one secured party of record for a financing statement, each secured party of record may authorize the filing of an amendment under subsection (d).
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Scope and Approach of This Section. This Section collects in one place most of the rules determining whether a record may be filed. Section 9-510 explains the extent to which a filed record is effective. Under these Sections, the identity of the person who effects a filing is immaterial. The filing scheme contemplated by this Part does not contemplate that the identity of a "filer" will be a part of the searchable records. This is consistent with, and a necessary aspect of, eliminating signatures or other evidence of authorization from the system. (Note that the 1972 amendments to this Article eliminated the requirement that a financing statement contain the signature of the secured party.) As long as the appropriate person authorizes the filing, or, in the case of a termination statement, the debtor is entitled to the termination, it is insignificant whether the secured party or another person files any given record. The question of authorization is one for the court, not the filing office. However, a filing office may choose to employ authentication procedures in connection with electronic communications, e.g., to verify the identity of a filer who seeks to charge the filing fee.
3. Unauthorized Filings. Records filed in the filing office do not require signatures for their effectiveness. Subsection (a)(1) substitutes for the debtor's signature on a financing statement the requirement that the debtor authorize in an authenticated record the filing of an initial financing statement or an amendment that adds collateral. Also, under subsection (a)(1), if an amendment adds a debtor, the debtor who is added must authorize the amendment. A person who files an unauthorized record in violation of subsection (a)(1) is liable under Section 9-625 for actual and statutory damages. Of course, a filed financing statement is ineffective to perfect a security interest if the filing is not authorized. See Section 9-510(a). Law other than this Article, including the law with respect to ratification of past acts, generally determines whether a person has the requisite authority to file a record under this Section. See Sections 1-103, 9-502, Comment 3.
4. Ipso Facto Authorization. Under subsection (b), the authentication of a security agreement ipso facto constitutes the debtor's authorization of the filing of a financing statement covering the collateral described in the security agreement. The secured party need not obtain a separate authorization. Similarly, a new debtor's becoming bound by a security agreement ipso facto constitutes the new debtor's authorization of the filing of a financing statement covering the collateral described in the security agreement by which the new debtor has become bound. And, under subsection (c), the acquisition of collateral in which a security interest continues after disposition under Section 9-315(a)(1) ipso facto constitutes an authorization to file an initial financing statement against the person who acquired the collateral. The authorization to file an initial financing statement also constitutes an authorization to file a record covering actual proceeds of the original collateral, even if the security agreement is silent as to proceeds.
Example 1: Debtor authenticates a security agreement creating a security interest in Debtor's inventory in favor of Secured Party. Secured Party files a financing statement covering inventory and accounts. The financing statement is authorized insofar as it covers inventory and unauthorized insofar as it covers accounts. (Note, however, that the financing statement will be effective to perfect a security interest in accounts constituting proceeds of the inventory to the same extent as a financing statement covering only inventory.)
Example 2: Debtor authenticates a security agreement creating a security interest in Debtor's inventory in favor of Secured Party. Secured Party files a financing statement covering inventory. Debtor sells some inventory, deposits the buyer's payment into a deposit account, and withdraws the funds to purchase equipment. As long as the equipment can be traced to the inventory, the security interest continues in the equipment. See Section 9-315(a)(2). However, because the equipment was acquired with cash proceeds, the financing statement becomes ineffective to perfect the security interest in the equipment on the 21st day after the security interest attaches to the equipment unless Secured Party continues perfection beyond the 20-day period by filing a financing statement against the equipment or amending the filed financing statement to cover equipment. See Section 9-315(d). Debtor's authentication of the security agreement authorizes the filing of an initial financing statement or amendment covering the equipment, which is "property that becomes collateral under Section 9-315(a)(2)." See Section 9-509(b)(2).
5. Agricultural Liens. Under subsection (a)(2), the holder of an agricultural lien may file a financing statement covering collateral subject to the lien without obtaining the debtor's authorization. Because the lien arises as matter of law, the debtor's consent is not required. A person who files an unauthorized record in violation of this subsection is liable under Section 9-625(e) for a statutory penalty and damages.
6. Amendments; Termination Statements Authorized by Debtor. Most amendments may not be filed unless the secured party of record, as determined under Section 9-511, authorizes the filing. See subsection (d)(1). However, under subsection (d)(2), the authorization of the secured party of record is not required for the filing of a termination statement if the secured party of record failed to send or file a termination statement as required by Section 9-513, the debtor authorizes it to be filed, and the termination statement so indicates.
7. Multiple Secured Parties of Record. Subsection (e) deals with multiple secured parties of record. It permits each secured party of record to authorize the filing of amendments. However, Section 9-510(b) protects the rights and powers of one secured party of record from the effects of filings made by another secured party of record. See Section 9-510, Comment 3.
8. Successor to Secured Party of Record. A person may succeed to the powers of the secured party of record by operation of other law, e.g., the law of corporate mergers. In that case, the successor has the power to authorize filings within the meaning of this Section.
Section 36-9-510. Effectiveness of filed record.
(a) A filed record is effective only to the extent that it was filed by a person that may file it under Section 36-9-509.
(b) A record authorized by one secured party of record does not affect the financing statement with respect to another secured party of record.
(c) A continuation statement that is not filed within the six-month period prescribed by Section 36-9-515(d) is ineffective.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Ineffectiveness of Unauthorized or Overbroad Filings. Subsection (a) provides that a filed financing statement is effective only to the extent it was filed by a person entitled to file it.
Example 1: Debtor authorizes the filing of a financing statement covering inventory. Under Section 9-509, the secured party may file a financing statement covering only inventory; it may not file a financing statement covering other collateral. The secured party files a financing statement covering inventory and equipment. This Section provides that the financing statement is effective only to the extent the secured party may file it. Thus, the financing statement is effective to perfect a security interest in inventory but ineffective to perfect a security interest in equipment.
3. Multiple Secured Parties of Record. Section 9-509(e) permits any secured party of record to authorize the filing of most amendments. Subsection (b) of this Section prevents a filing authorized by one secured party of record from affecting the rights and powers of another secured party of record without the latter's consent.
Example 2: Debtor creates a security interest in favor of A and B. The filed financing statement names A and B as the secured parties. An amendment deleting some collateral covered by the financing statement is filed pursuant to B's authorization. Although B's security interest in the deleted collateral becomes unperfected, A's security interest remains perfected in all the collateral.
Example 3: Debtor creates a security interest in favor of A and B. The financing statement names A and B as the secured parties. A termination statement is filed pursuant to B's authorization. Although the effectiveness of the financing statement terminates with respect to B's security interest, A's rights are unaffected. That is, the financing statement continues to be effective to perfect A's security interest.
4. Continuation Statements. A continuation statement may be filed only within the six months immediately before lapse. See Section 9-515(d). The filing office is obligated to reject a continuation statement that is filed outside the six-month period. See Sections 9-520(a), 9-516(b)(7). Subsection (c) provides that if the filing office fails to reject a continuation statement that is not filed in a timely manner, the continuation statement is ineffective nevertheless.
Section 36-9-511. Secured party of record.
(a) A secured party of record with respect to a financing statement is a person whose name is provided as the name of the secured party or a representative of the secured party in an initial financing statement that has been filed. If an initial financing statement is filed under Section 36-9-514(a), the assignee named in the initial financing statement is the secured party of record with respect to the financing statement.
(b) If an amendment of a financing statement which provides the name of a person as a secured party or a representative of a secured party is filed, the person named in the amendment is a secured party of record. If an amendment is filed under Section 36-9-514(b), the assignee named in the amendment is a secured party of record.
(c) A person remains a secured party of record until the filing of an amendment of the financing statement which deletes the person.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Secured Party of Record. This new Section explains how the secured party of record is to be determined. If SP-1 is named as the secured party in an initial financing statement, it is the secured party of record. Similarly, if an initial financing statement reflects a total assignment from SP-0 to SP-1, then SP-1 is the secured party of record. See subsection (a). If, subsequently, an amendment is filed assigning SP-1's status to SP-2, then SP-2 becomes the secured party of record in place of SP-1. The same result obtains if a subsequent amendment deletes the reference to SP-1 and substitutes therefor a reference to SP-2. If, however, a subsequent amendment adds SP-2 as a secured party but does not purport to remove SP-1 as a secured party, then SP-2 and SP-1 each is a secured party of record. See subsection (b). An amendment purporting to remove the only secured party of record without providing a successor is ineffective. See Section 9-512(e). At any point in time, all effective records that comprise a financing statement must be examined to determine the person or persons that have the status of secured party of record.
3. Successor to Secured Party of Record. Application of other law may result in a person succeeding to the powers of a secured party of record. For example, if the secured party of record (A) merges into another corporation (B) and the other corporation (B) survives, other law may provide that B has all of A's powers. In that case, B is authorized to take all actions under this Part that A would have been authorized to take. Similarly, acts taken by a person who is authorized under generally applicable principles of agency to act on behalf of the secured party of record are effective under this Part.
Section 36-9-512. Amendment of financing statement.
(a) Subject to Section 36-9-509, a person may add or delete collateral covered by, continue or terminate the effectiveness of, or, subject to subsection (e), otherwise amend the information provided in, a financing statement by filing an amendment that:
(1) identifies, by its file number, the initial financing statement to which the amendment relates; and
(2) if the amendment relates to an initial financing statement filed or recorded in a filing office described in Section 36-9-501(a)(1), provides the date and time that the initial financing statement was filed or recorded and the information specified in Section 36-9-502(b).
(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-515, the filing of an amendment does not extend the period of effectiveness of the financing statement.
(c) A financing statement that is amended by an amendment that adds collateral is effective as to the added collateral only from the date of the filing of the amendment.
(d) A financing statement that is amended by an amendment that adds a debtor is effective as to the added debtor only from the date of the filing of the amendment.
(e) An amendment is ineffective to the extent it:
(1) purports to delete all debtors and fails to provide the name of a debtor to be covered by the financing statement; or
(2) purports to delete all secured parties of record and fails to provide the name of a new secured party of record.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former 9-402(4).
2. Changes to Financing Statements. This Section addresses changes to financing statements, including addition and deletion of collateral. Although termination statements, assignments, and continuation statements are types of amendment, this Article follows former Article 9 and contains separate Sections containing additional provisions applicable to particular types of amendments. See Section 9-513 (termination statements); 9-514 (assignments); 9-515 (continuation statements). One should not infer from this separate treatment that this Article requires a separate amendment to accomplish each change. Rather, a single amendment would be legally sufficient to, e.g., add collateral and continue the effectiveness of the financing statement.
3. Amendments. An amendment under this Article may identify only the information contained in a financing statement that is to be changed; alternatively, it may take the form of an amended and restated financing statement. The latter would state, for example, that the financing statement "is amended and restated to read as follows: . . ." References in this Part to an "amended financing statement" are to a financing statement as amended by an amendment using either technique.
This Section revises former Section 9-402(4) to permit secured parties of record to make changes in the public record without the need to obtain the debtor's signature. However, the filing of an amendment that adds collateral or adds a debtor must be authorized by the debtor or it will not be effective. See Sections 9-509(a), 9-510(a).
4. Amendment Adding Debtor. An amendment that adds a debtor is effective, provided that the added debtor authorizes the filing. See Section 9-509(a). However, filing an amendment adding a debtor to a previously filed financing statement affords no advantage over filing an initial financing statement against that debtor and may be disadvantageous. With respect to the added debtor, for purposes of determining the priority of the security interest, the time of filing is the time of the filing of the amendment, not the time of the filing of the initial financing statement. See subsection (d). However, the effectiveness of the financing statement lapses with respect to added debtor at the time it lapses with respect to the original debtor. See subsection (b).
5. Deletion of All Debtors or Secured Parties of Record. Subsection (e) assures that there will be a debtor and secured party of record for every financing statement.
Example: A filed financing statement names A and B as secured parties of record and covers inventory and equipment. An amendment deletes equipment and purports to delete A and B as secured parties of record without adding a substitute secured party. The amendment is ineffective to the extent it purports to delete the secured parties of record but effective with respect to the deletion of collateral. As a consequence, the financing statement, as amended, covers only inventory, but A and B remain as secured parties of record.
Section 36-9-513. Termination statement.
(a) A secured party shall cause the secured party of record for a financing statement to file a termination statement for the financing statement if the financing statement covers consumer goods and:
(1) there is no obligation secured by the collateral covered by the financing statement and no commitment to make an advance, incur an obligation, or otherwise give value; or
(2) the debtor did not authorize the filing of the initial financing statement.
(b) To comply with subsection (a), a secured party shall cause the secured party of record to file the termination statement:
(1) within one month after there is no obligation secured by the collateral covered by the financing statement and no commitment to make an advance, incur an obligation, or otherwise give value; or
(2) if earlier, within twenty days after the secured party receives an authenticated demand from a debtor.
(c) In cases not governed by subsection (a), within twenty days after a secured party receives an authenticated demand from a debtor, the secured party shall cause the secured party of record for a financing statement to send to the debtor a termination statement for the financing statement or file the termination statement in the filing office if:
(1) except in the case of a financing statement covering accounts or chattel paper that has been sold or goods that are the subject of a consignment, there is no obligation secured by the collateral covered by the financing statement and no commitment to make an advance, incur an obligation, or otherwise give value;
(2) the financing statement covers accounts or chattel paper that has been sold but as to which the account debtor or other person obligated has discharged its obligation;
(3) the financing statement covers goods that were the subject of a consignment to the debtor but are not in the debtor's possession; or
(4) the debtor did not authorize the filing of the initial financing statement.
(d) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-510, upon the filing of a termination statement with the filing office, the financing statement to which the termination statement relates ceases to be effective.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-404.
2. Duty to File or Send. This Section specifies when a secured party must cause the secured party of record to file or send to the debtor a termination statement for a financing statement. Because most financing statements expire in five years unless a continuation statement is filed (Section 9-515), no compulsion is placed on the secured party to file a termination statement unless demanded by the debtor, except in the case of consumer goods. Because many consumers will not realize the importance to them of clearing the public record, an affirmative duty is put on the secured party in that case. But many purchase-money security interests in consumer goods will not be filed, except for motor vehicles. See Section 9-309(1). Under Section 9-311(b), compliance with a certificate-of-title statute is "equivalent to the filing of a financing statement under this article." Thus, this Section applies to a certificate of title unless the Section is superseded by a certificate-of-title statute that contains a specific rule addressing a secured party's duty to cause a notation of a security interest to be removed from a certificate of title. In the context of a certificate of title, however, the secured party could comply with this Section by causing the removal itself or providing the debtor with documentation sufficient to enable the debtor to effect the removal.
Subsections (a) and (b) apply to a financing statement covering consumer goods. Subsection (c) applies to other financing statements. Subsection (a) and (c) each makes explicit what was implicit under former Article 9: If the debtor did not authorize the filing of a financing statement in the first place, the secured party of record should file or send a termination statement. The liability imposed upon a secured party that fails to comply with subsection (a) or (c) is identical to that imposed for the filing of an unauthorized financing statement or amendment. See Section 9-625(e).
3. "Bogus" Filings. A secured party's duty to send a termination statement arises when the secured party "receives" an authenticated demand from the debtor. In the case of an unauthorized financing statement, the person named as debtor in the financing statement may have no relationship with the named secured party and no reason to know the secured party's address. Inasmuch as the address in the financing statement is "held out by [the person named as secured party in the financing statement] as the place for receipt of such communications [i.e., communications relating to security interests]," the putative secured party is deemed to have "received" a notification delivered to that address. See Section 1-201(26). If a termination statement is not forthcoming, the person named as debtor itself may authorize the filing of a termination statement, which will be effective if it indicates that the person authorized it to be filed. See Sections 9-509(d)(2), 9-510(c).
4. Buyers of Receivables. Applied literally, former Section 9-404(1) would have required many buyers of receivables to file a termination statement immediately upon filing a financing statement because "there is no outstanding secured obligation and no commitment to make advances, incur obligations, or otherwise give value." Subsections (c)(1) and (2) remedy this problem. While the security interest of a buyer of accounts or chattel paper (B-1) is perfected, the debtor is not deemed to retain an interest in the sold receivables and thus could transfer no interest in them to another buyer (B-2) or to a lien creditor (LC). However, for purposes of determining the rights of the debtor's creditors and certain purchasers of accounts or chattel paper from the debtor, while B-1's security interest is unperfected, the debtor-seller is deemed to have rights in the sold receivables, and a competing security interest or judicial lien may attach to those rights. See Sections 9-318, 9-109, Comment 5. Suppose that B-1's security interest in certain accounts and chattel paper is perfected by filing, but the effectiveness of the financing statement lapses. Both before and after lapse, B-1 collects some of the receivables. After lapse, LC acquires a lien on the accounts and chattel paper. B-1's unperfected security interest in the accounts and chattel paper is subordinate to LC's rights. See Section 9-317(a)(2). But collections on accounts and chattel paper are not "accounts" or "chattel paper." Even if B-1's security interest in the accounts and chattel paper is or becomes unperfected, neither the debtor nor LC acquires rights to the collections that B-1 collects (and owns) before LC acquires a lien.
5. Effect of Filing. Subsection (d) states the effect of filing a termination statement: the related financing statement ceases to be effective. If one of several secured parties of record files a termination statement, subsection (d) applies only with respect to the rights of the person who authorized the filing of the termination statement. See Section 9-510(b). The financing statement remains effective with respect to the rights of the others. However, even if a financing statement is terminated (and thus no longer is effective) with respect to all secured parties of record, the financing statement, including the termination statement, will remain of record until at least one year after it lapses with respect to all secured parties of record. See Section 9-519(g).
Section 36-9-514. Assignment of powers of secured party of record.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), an initial financing statement may reflect an assignment of all of the secured party's power to authorize an amendment to the financing statement by providing the name and mailing address of the assignee as the name and address of the secured party.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a secured party of record may assign of record all or part of its power to authorize an amendment to a financing statement by filing in the filing office an amendment of the financing statement which:
(1) identifies, by its file number, the initial financing statement to which it relates;
(2) provides the name of the assignor; and
(3) provides the name and mailing address of the assignee.
(c) An assignment of record of a security interest in a fixture covered by a record of a mortgage which is effective as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing under Section 36-9-502(c) may be made only by an assignment of record of the mortgage in the manner provided by law of this State other than the Uniform Commercial Code.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-405.
2. Assignments. This Section provides a permissive device whereby a secured party of record may effectuate an assignment of its power to affect a financing statement. It may also be useful for a secured party who has assigned all or part of its security interest or agricultural lien and wishes to have the fact noted of record, so that inquiries concerning the transaction would be addressed to the assignee. See Section 9-502, Comment 2. Upon the filing of an assignment, the assignee becomes the "secured party of record" and may authorize the filing of a continuation statement, termination statement, or other amendment. Note that under Section 9-310(c) no filing of an assignment is required as a condition of continuing the perfected status of the security interest against creditors and transferees of the original debtor. However, if an assignment is not filed, the assignor remains the secured party of record, with the power (even if not the right) to authorize the filing of effective amendments. See Sections 9-511(c), 9-509(d).
Where a record of a mortgage is effective as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing (Section 9-502(c)), then an assignment of record of the security interest may be made only in the manner in which an assignment of record of the mortgage may be made under local real-property law.
3. Comparison to Prior Law. Most of the changes reflected in this Section are for clarification or to embrace medium-neutral drafting. As a general matter, this Section preserves the opportunity given by former Section 9-405 to assign a security interest of record in one of two different ways. Under subsection (a), a secured party may assign all of its power to affect a financing statement by naming an assignee in the initial financing statement. The secured party of record may accomplish the same result under subsection (b) by making a subsequent filing. Subsection (b) also may be used for an assignment of only some of the secured party of record's power to affect a financing statement, e.g., the power to affect the financing statement as it relates to particular items of collateral or as it relates to an undivided interest in a security interest in all the collateral. An initial financing statement may not be used to change the secured party of record under these circumstances. However, an amendment adding the assignee as a secured party of record may be used.
Section 36-9-515. Duration and effectiveness of financing statement; effect of lapsed financing statement.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (b), (e), (f), and (g), a filed financing statement is effective for a period of five years after the date of filing.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (e), (f), and (g), an initial financing statement filed in connection with a public-finance transaction or manufactured-home transaction is effective for a period of thirty years after the date of filing if it indicates that it is filed in connection with a public-finance transaction or manufactured-home transaction.
(c) The effectiveness of a filed financing statement lapses on the expiration of the period of its effectiveness unless before the lapse a continuation statement is filed pursuant to subsection (d). Upon lapse, a financing statement ceases to be effective and any security interest or agricultural lien that was perfected by the financing statement becomes unperfected, unless the security interest is perfected otherwise. If the security interest or agricultural lien becomes unperfected upon lapse, it is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the collateral for value.
(d) A continuation statement may be filed only within six months before the expiration of the five-year period specified in subsection (a) or the thirty-year period specified in subsection (b), whichever is applicable.
(e) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-510, upon timely filing of a continuation statement, the effectiveness of the initial financing statement continues for a period of five years commencing on the day on which the financing statement would have become ineffective in the absence of the filing. Upon the expiration of the five-year period, the financing statement lapses in the same manner as provided in subsection (c), unless, before the lapse, another continuation statement is filed pursuant to subsection (d). Succeeding continuation statements may be filed in the same manner to continue the effectiveness of the initial financing statement.
(f) If a debtor is a transmitting utility and a filed financing statement so indicates, the financing statement is effective until a termination statement is filed.
(g) A record of a mortgage that is effective as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing under Section 36-9-502(c) remains effective as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing until the mortgage is released or satisfied of record or its effectiveness otherwise terminates as to the real property.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-403(2), (3), (6).
2. Period of Financing Statement's Effectiveness. Subsection (a) states the general rule: a financing statement is effective for a five-year period unless its effectiveness is continued under this Section or terminated under Section 9-513. Subsection (b) provides that if the financing statement relates to a public-finance transaction or a manufactured-home transaction and so indicates, the financing statement is effective for 30 years. These financings typically extend well beyond the standard, five-year period. Under subsection (f), a financing statement filed against a transmitting utility remains effective indefinitely, until a termination statement is filed. Likewise, under subsection (g), a mortgage effective as a fixture filing remains effective until its effectiveness terminates under real-property law.
3. Lapse. When the period of effectiveness under subsection (a) or (b) expires, the effectiveness of the financing statement lapses. The last sentence of subsection (c) addresses the effect of lapse. The deemed retroactive unperfection applies only with respect to purchasers for value; unlike former Section 9-403(2), it does not apply with respect to lien creditors.
Example 1: SP-1 and SP-2 both hold security interests in the same collateral. Both security interests are perfected by filing. SP-1 filed first and has priority under Section 9-322(a)(1). The effectiveness of SP-1's filing lapses. As long as SP-2's security interest remains perfected thereafter, SP-2 is entitled to priority over SP-1's security interest, which is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser for value (SP-2). See Section 9-322(a)(2).
Example 2: SP holds a security interest perfected by filing. On July 1, LC acquires a judicial lien on the collateral. Two weeks later, the effectiveness of the financing statement lapses. Although the security interest becomes unperfected upon lapse, it was perfected when LC acquired its lien. Accordingly, notwithstanding the lapse, the perfected security interest has priority over the rights of LC, who is not a purchaser. See Section 9-317(a)(2).
4. Effect of Debtor's Bankruptcy. Under former Section 9-403(2), lapse was tolled if the debtor entered bankruptcy or another insolvency proceeding. Nevertheless, being unaware that insolvency proceedings had been commenced, filing offices routinely removed records from the files as if lapse had not been tolled. Subsection (c) deletes the former tolling provision and thereby imposes a new burden on the secured party: to be sure that a financing statement does not lapse during the debtor's bankruptcy. The secured party can prevent lapse by filing a continuation statement, even without first obtaining relief from the automatic stay. See Bankruptcy Code Section 362(b)(3). Of course, if the debtor enters bankruptcy before lapse, the provisions of this Article with respect to lapse would be of no effect to the extent that federal bankruptcy law dictates a contrary result (e.g., to the extent that the Bankruptcy Code determines rights as of the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition).
5. Continuation Statements. Subsection (d) explains when a continuation statement may be filed. A continuation statement filed at a time other than that prescribed by subsection (d) is ineffective, see Section 9-510(c), and the filing office may not accept it. See Sections 9-520(a), 9-516(b). Subsection (e) specifies the effect of a continuation statement and provides for successive continuation statements.
Section 36-9-516. What constitutes filing; effectiveness of filing.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), communication of a record to a filing office and tender of the filing fee or acceptance of the record by the filing office constitutes filing.
(b) Filing does not occur with respect to a record that a filing office refuses to accept because:
(1) the record is not communicated by a method or medium of communication authorized by the filing office;
(2) an amount equal to or greater than the applicable filing fee is not tendered;
(3) the filing office is unable to index the record because:
(A) in the case of an initial financing statement, the record does not provide a name for the debtor;
(B) in the case of an amendment or correction statement, the record:
( i) does not identify the initial financing statement as required by Section 36-9-512 or 36-9-518, as applicable; or
( ii) identifies an initial financing statement whose effectiveness has lapsed under Section 36-9-515;
(C) in the case of an initial financing statement that provides the name of a debtor identified as an individual or an amendment that provides a name of a debtor identified as an individual which was not previously provided in the financing statement to which the record relates, the record does not identify the debtor's last name; or
(D) in the case of a record filed or recorded in the filing office described in Section 36-9-501(a)(1), the record does not provide a sufficient description of the real property to which it relates;
(4) in the case of an initial financing statement or an amendment that adds a secured party of record, the record does not provide a name and mailing address for the secured party of record;
(5) in the case of an initial financing statement or an amendment that provides a name of a debtor which was not previously provided in the financing statement to which the amendment relates, the record does not:
(A) provide a mailing address for the debtor;
(B) indicate whether the debtor is an individual or an organization; or
(C) if the financing statement indicates that the debtor is an organization, provide:
( i) a type of organization for the debtor;
( ii) a jurisdiction of organization for the debtor; or
(iii) an organizational identification number for the debtor or indicate that the debtor has none;
(6) in the case of an assignment reflected in an initial financing statement under Section 36-9-514(a) or an amendment filed under Section 36-9-514(b), the record does not provide a name and mailing address for the assignee; or
(7) in the case of a continuation statement, the record is not filed within the six-month period prescribed by Section 36-9-515(d).
(c) For purposes of subsection (b):
(1) a record does not provide information if the filing office is unable to read or decipher the information; and
(2) a record that does not indicate that it is an amendment or identify an initial financing statement to which it relates, as required by Section 36-9-512, 36-9-514, or 36-9-518, is an initial financing statement.
(d) A record that is communicated to the filing office with tender of the filing fee, but which the filing office refuses to accept for a reason other than one set forth in subsection (b), is effective as a filed record except as against a purchaser of the collateral which gives value in reasonable reliance upon the absence of the record from the files.
Official Comment
1. Source. Subsection (a): former Section 9-403(1); the remainder is new.
2. What Constitutes Filing. Subsection (a) deals generically with what constitutes filing of a record, including an initial financing statement and amendments of all kinds (e.g., assignments, termination statements, and continuation statements). It follows former Section 9-403(1), under which either acceptance of a record by the filing office or presentation of the record and tender of the filing fee constitutes filing.
3. Effectiveness of Rejected Record. Subsection (b) provides an exclusive list of grounds upon which the filing office may reject a record. See Section 9-520(a). Although some of these grounds would also be grounds for rendering a filed record ineffective (e.g., an initial financing statement does not provide a name for the debtor), many others would not be (e.g., an initial financing statement does not provide a mailing address for the debtor or secured party of record). Neither this Section nor Section 9-520 requires or authorizes the filing office to determine, or even consider, the accuracy of information provided in a record. For example, the State A filing office may not reject under subsection (b)(5)(C) an initial financing statement indicating that the debtor is a State A corporation and providing a three-digit organizational identification number, even if all State A organizational identification numbers contain at least five digits and two letters.
A financing statement or other record that is communicated to the filing office but which the filing office refuses to accept provides no public notice, regardless of the reason for the rejection. However, this Section distinguishes between records that the filing office rightfully rejects and those that it wrongfully rejects. A filer is able to prevent a rightful rejection by complying with the requirements of subsection (b). No purpose is served by giving effect to records that justifiably never find their way into the system, and subsection (b) so provides.
Subsection (d) deals with the filing office's unjustified refusal to accept a record. Here, the filer is in no position to prevent the rejection and as a general matter should not be prejudiced by it. Although wrongfully rejected records generally are effective, subsection (d) contains a special rule to protect a third-party purchaser of the collateral (e.g., a buyer or competing secured party) who gives value in reliance upon the apparent absence of the record from the files. As against a person who searches the public record and reasonably relies on what the public record shows, subsection (d) imposes upon the filer the risk that a record failed to make its way into the filing system because of the filing office's wrongful rejection of it. (Compare Section 9-517, under which a mis-indexed financing statement is fully effective.) This risk is likely to be small, particularly when a record is presented electronically, and the filer can guard against this risk by conducting a post-filing search of the records. Moreover, Section 9-520(b) requires the filing office to give prompt notice of its refusal to accept a record for filing.
4. Method or Medium of Communication. Rejection pursuant to subsection (b)(1) for failure to communicate a record properly should be understood to mean noncompliance with procedures relating to security, authentication, or other communication-related requirements that the filing office may impose. Subsection (b)(1) does not authorize a filing office to impose additional substantive requirements. See Section 9-520, Comment 2.
5. Address for Secured Party of Record. Under subsection (b)(4) and Section 9-520(a), the lack of a mailing address for the secured party of record requires the filing office to reject an initial financing statement. The failure to include an address for the secured party of record no longer renders a financing statement ineffective. See Section 9-502(a). The function of the address is not to identify the secured party of record but rather to provide an address to which others can send required notifications, e.g., of a purchase-money security interest in inventory or of the disposition of collateral. Inasmuch as the address shown on a filed financing statement is an "address that is reasonable under the circumstances," a person required to send a notification to the secured party may satisfy the requirement by sending a notification to that address, even if the address is or becomes incorrect. See Section 9-102 (definition of "send"). Similarly, because the address is "held out by [the secured party] as the place for receipt of such communications [i.e., communications relating to security interests]," the secured party is deemed to have received a notification delivered to that address. See Section 1-201(26).
6. Uncertainty Concerning Individual Debtor's Last Name. Subsection (b)(3)(C) requires the filing office to reject an initial financing statement or amendment adding an individual debtor if the office cannot index the record because it does not identify the debtor's last name (e.g., it is unclear whether the debtor's name is Elton John or John Elton).
7. Inability of Filing Office to Read or Decipher Information. Under subsection (c)(1), if the filing office cannot read or decipher information, the information is not provided by a record for purposes of subsection (b).
8. Classification of Records. For purposes of subsection (b), a record that does not indicate it is an amendment or identify an initial financing statement to which it relates is deemed to be an initial financing statement. See subsection (c)(2).
9. Effectiveness of Rejectable But Unrejected Record. Section 9-520(a) requires the filing office to refuse to accept an initial financing statement for a reason set forth in subsection (b). However, if the filing office accepts such a financing statement nevertheless, the financing statement generally is effective if it complies with the requirements of Section 9-502(a) and (b). See Section 9-520(c). Similarly, an otherwise effective financing statement generally remains so even though the information in the financing statement becomes incorrect. See Section 9-507(b). (Note that if the information required by subsection (b)(5) is incorrect when the financing statement is filed, Section 9-338 applies.)
Section 36-9-517. Effect of indexing errors.
The failure of the filing office to index a record correctly does not affect the effectiveness of the filed record.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Effectiveness of Mis-Indexed Records. This Section provides that the filing office's error in mis-indexing a record does not render ineffective an otherwise effective record. As did former Section 9-401, this Section imposes the risk of filing-office error on those who search the files rather than on those who file.
Section 36-9-518. Claim concerning inaccurate or wrongfully filed record.
(a) A person may file in the filing office a correction statement with respect to a record indexed there under the person's name if the person believes that the record is inaccurate or was wrongfully filed.
(b) A correction statement must:
(1) identify the record to which it relates by:
(A) the file number assigned to the initial financing statement to which the record relates; and
(B) if the correction statement relates to a record filed or recorded in a filing office described in Section 36-9-501(a)(1), the date and time that the initial financing statement was filed or recorded and the information specified in Section 36-9-502(b);
(2) indicate that it is a correction statement; and
(3) provide the basis for the person's belief that the record is inaccurate and indicate the manner in which the person believes the record should be amended to cure any inaccuracy or provide the basis for the person's belief that the record was wrongfully filed.
(c) The filing of a correction statement does not affect the effectiveness of an initial financing statement or other filed record.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Correction Statements. Former Article 9 did not afford a nonjudicial means for a debtor to correct a financing statement or other record that was inaccurate or wrongfully filed. Subsection (a) affords the debtor the right to file a correction statement. Among other requirements, the correction statement must provide the basis for the debtor's belief that the public record should be corrected. See subsection (b). These provisions, which resemble the analogous remedy in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. Section 1681i, afford an aggrieved person the opportunity to state its position on the public record. They do not permit an aggrieved person to change the legal effect of the public record. Thus, although a filed correction statement becomes part of the "financing statement," as defined in Section 9-102, the filing does not affect the effectiveness of the initial financing statement or any other filed record. See subsection (c).
This Section does not displace other provisions of this Article that impose liability for making unauthorized filings or failing to file or send a termination statement. See Section 9-625(e). Nor does it displace any available judicial remedies.
3. Resort to Other Law. This Article cannot provide a satisfactory or complete solution to problems caused by misuse of the public records. The problem of "bogus" filings is not limited to the UCC filing system but extends to the real-property records, as well. A summary judicial procedure for correcting the public record and criminal penalties for those who misuse the filing and recording systems are likely to be more effective and put less strain on the filing system than provisions authorizing or requiring action by filing and recording offices.
Subpart 2.
Duties and Operation of Filing Office
Section 36-9-519. Numbering, maintaining, and indexing records; communicating information provided in records.
(a) For each record filed in a filing office, the filing office shall:
(1) assign a unique number to the filed record;
(2) create a record that bears the number assigned to the filed record and the date and time of filing;
(3) maintain the filed record for public inspection; and
(4) index the filed record in accordance with subsections (c), (d), and (e).
(b) A file number assigned after January 1, 2002, must include a digit that:
(1) is mathematically derived from or related to the other digits of the file number; and
(2) aids the filing office in determining whether a number communicated as the file number includes a single-digit or transpositional error.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsections (d) and (e), the filing office shall:
(1) index an initial financing statement according to the name of the debtor and index all filed records relating to the initial financing statement in a manner that associates with one another an initial financing statement and all filed records relating to the initial financing statement; and
(2) index a record that provides a name of a debtor which was not previously provided in the financing statement to which the record relates also according to the name that was not previously provided.
(d) If a financing statement is filed as a fixture filing or covers as-extracted collateral or timber to be cut, it must be filed for record and the filing office shall index it:
(1) under the names of the debtor and of each owner of record shown on the financing statement as if they were the mortgagors under a mortgage of the real property described; and
(2) to the extent that the law of this State provides for indexing of records of mortgages under the name of the mortgagee, under the name of the secured party as if the secured party were the mortgagee thereunder, or, if indexing is by description, as if the financing statement were a record of a mortgage of the real property described.
(e) If a financing statement is filed as a fixture filing or covers as-extracted collateral or timber to be cut, the filing office shall index an assignment filed under Section 36-9-514(a) or an amendment filed under Section 36-9-514(b):
(1) under the name of the assignor as grantor; and
(2) to the extent that the law of this State provides for indexing a record of the assignment of a mortgage under the name of the assignee.
(f) The filing office shall maintain a capability:
(1) to retrieve a record by the name of the debtor and:
(A) if the filing office is described in Section 36-9-501(a)(1), by the file number assigned to the initial financing statement to which the record relates and the date and time that the record was filed or recorded; or
(B) if the filing office is described in Section 36-9-501(a)(2), by the file number assigned to the initial financing statement to which the record relates; and
(2) to associate and retrieve with one another an initial financing statement and each filed record relating to the initial financing statement.
(g) The filing office may not remove a debtor's name from the index until one year after the effectiveness of a financing statement naming the debtor lapses under Section 36-9-515 with respect to all secured parties of record.
(h) The filing office shall perform the acts required by subsections (a) through (e) at the time and in the manner prescribed by filing-office rule, but not later than two business days after the filing office receives the record in question.
(i) Subsections (b) and (h) do not apply to a filing office described in Section 36-9-501(a)(1).
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Sections 9-403(4), (7), 9-405(2).
2. Filing Office's Duties. Subsections (a) through (e) set forth the duties of the filing office with respect to filed records. Subsection (h), which is new, imposes a minimum standard of performance for those duties. Prompt indexing is crucial to the effectiveness of any filing system. An accepted but un-indexed record affords no public notice. Subsection (f) requires the filing office to maintain appropriate storage and retrieval facilities, and subsection (g) contains minimum requirements for the retention of records.
3. File Number. Subsection (a)(1) requires the filing office to assign a unique number to each filed record. That number is the "file number" only if the record is an initial financing statement. See Section 9-102.
4. Time of Filing. Subsection (a)(2) and Section 9-523 refer to the "date and time" of filing. The statutory text does not contain any instructions to a filing office as to how the time of filing is to be determined. The method of determining or assigning a time of filing is an appropriate matter for filling-office rules to address.
5. Related Records. Subsections (c) and (f) are designed to ensure that an initial financing statement and all filed records relating to it are associated with one another, indexed under the name of the debtor, and retrieved together. To comply with subsection (f), a filing office (other than a real-property recording office in a State that enacts subsection (f), Alternative B) must be capable of retrieving records in each of two ways: by the name of the debtor and by the file number of the initial financing statement to which the record relates.
6. Prohibition on Deleting Names from Index. This Article contemplates that the filing office will not delete the name of a debtor from the index until at least one year passes after the effectiveness of the financing statement lapses as to all secured parties of record. See subsection (g). This rule applies even if the filing office accepts an amendment purporting to delete or modify the name of a debtor or terminate the effectiveness of the financing statement. If an amendment provides a modified name for a debtor, the amended name should be added to the index, see subsection (c)(2), but the pre-amendment name should remain in the index.
Compared to former Article 9, the rule in subsection (g) increases the amount of information available to those who search the public records. The rule also contemplates that searchers-not the filing office-will determine the significance and effectiveness of filed records.
Section 36-9-520. Acceptance and refusal to accept record.
(a) A filing office shall refuse to accept a record for filing for a reason set forth in Section 36-9-516(b) and may refuse to accept a record for filing only for a reason set forth in Section 36-9-516(b).
(b) If a filing office refuses to accept a record for filing, it shall communicate to the person that presented the record the fact of and reason for the refusal and the date and time the record would have been filed had the filing office accepted it. The communication must be made at the time and in the manner prescribed by filing-office rule but, in the case of a filing office described in Section 36-9-501(a)(2), in no event more than two business days after the filing office receives the record.
(c) A filed financing statement satisfying Section 36-9-502(a) and (b) is effective, even if the filing office is required to refuse to accept it for filing under subsection (a). However, Section 36-9-338 applies to a filed financing statement providing information described in Section 36-9-516(b)(5) which is incorrect at the time the financing statement is filed.
(d) If a record communicated to a filing office provides information that relates to more than one debtor, this part applies as to each debtor separately.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Refusal to Accept Record for Filing. In some States, filing offices considered themselves obligated by former Article 9 to review the form and content of a financing statement and to refuse to accept those that they determine are legally insufficient. Some filing offices imposed requirements for or conditions to filing that do not appear in the statute. Under this Section, the filing office is not expected to make legal judgments and is not permitted to impose additional conditions or requirements.
Subsection (a) both prescribes and limits the bases upon which the filing office must and may reject records by reference to the reasons set forth in Section 9-516(b). For the most part, the bases for rejection are limited to those that prevent the filing office from dealing with a record that it receives-because some the requisite information (e.g., the debtor's name) is missing or cannot be deciphered, because the record is not communicated by a method (e.g., it is MIME- rather than UU-encoded) or medium (e.g., it is written rather than electronic) that the filing office accepts, or because the filer fails to tender an amount equal to or greater than the filing fee.
3. Consequences of Accepting Rejectable Record. Section 9-516(b) includes among the reasons for rejecting an initial financing statement the failure to give certain information that is not required as a condition of effectiveness. In conjunction with Section 9-516(b)(5), this Section requires the filing office to refuse to accept a financing statement that is legally sufficient to perfect a security interest under Section 9-502 but does not contain a mailing address for the debtor, does not disclose whether the debtor is an individual or an organization (e.g., a partnership or corporation) or, if the debtor is an organization, does not give certain specified information concerning the organization. The information required by Section 9-516(b)(5) assists searchers in weeding out "false positives," i.e., records that a search reveals but which do not pertain to the debtor in question. It assists filers by helping to ensure that the debtor's name is correct and that the financing statement is filed in the proper jurisdiction.
If the filing office accepts a financing statement that does not give this information at all, the filing is fully effective. Section 9-520(c). The financing statement also generally is effective if the information is given but is incorrect; however, Section 9-338 affords protection to buyers and holders of a perfected security interests who gives value in reasonable reliance upon the incorrect information.
4. Filing Office's Duties with Respect to Rejected Record. Subsection (b) requires the filing office to communicate the fact of rejection and the reason therefor within a fixed period of time. Inasmuch as a rightfully rejected record is ineffective and a wrongfully rejected record is not fully effective, prompt communication concerning any rejection is important.
5. Partial Effectiveness of Record. Under subsection (d), the provisions of this Part apply to each debtor separately. Thus, a filing office may reject an initial financing statement or other record as to one named debtor but accept it as to the other.
Example: An initial financing statement is communicated to the filing office. The financing statement names two debtors, John Smith and Jane Smith. It contains all of the information described in Section 9-516(b)(5) with respect to John but lacks some of the information with respect to Jane. The filing office must accept the financing statement with respect to John, reject it with respect to Jane, and notify the filer of the rejection.
Section 36-9-521. Uniform form of written financing statement and amendment.
(a) A filing office that accepts written records may not refuse to accept a written initial financing statement in the following form and format except for a reason set forth in Section 36-9-516(b):
UCC FINANCING STATEMENT
Follow instructions (front and back) CAREFULLY
A. NAME & PHONE OF CONTACT AT FILER (optional) |
B. SEND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO: (name and address)
|
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY
1. DEBTOR'S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME: insert only one debtor's name 1(a) or 1(b) - do not abbreviate or combine names.
1a ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR |
|
|
|
|
1b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME
|
FIRST NAME |
MIDDLE NAME |
SUFFIX |
|
1c. MAILING ADDRESS
|
CITY |
STATE POSTAL CODE |
COUNTY |
|
1d. TAX ID#: SSN OR EIN
|
Additional Info Re Organization Debtor
|
1e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION |
1f. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION |
1g. ORGANIZATIONAL ID, if any
[]; NONE |
2. ADDITIONAL DEBTOR'S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME: insert only one debtor's name 2 (a) or 2(b) - do not abbreviate or combine names
2a ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR |
|
|
|
|
2b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME
|
FIRST NAME |
MIDDLE NAME |
SUFFIX |
|
2c. MAILING ADDRESS
|
CITY |
STATE POSTAL CODE |
COUNTY |
|
2d. TAX ID#: SSN OR EIN
|
Additional Info Re Organization Debtor
|
2e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION |
2f. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION |
2g. ORGANIZATIONAL ID, if any
[]; NONE |
3. SECURED PARTY'S NAME (or NAME of TOTAL ASSIGNEE or ASSIGNOR S/P) - insert only one secured party name 3(a) or 3(b)
2a ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR |
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|
|
|
2b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME
|
FIRST NAME |
MIDDLE NAME |
SUFFIX |
|
2c. MAILING ADDRESS
|
CITY |
STATE POSTAL CODE |
COUNTY |
|
4. This FINANCING STATEMENT covers the following collateral:
5. ALTERNATIVE DESIGNATION (if applicable) [];LESSEE/LESSOR []; CONSIGNEE/CONSIGNOR [];BAILEE/BAILOR [];SELLOR/BUYER [];AG. LIEN []; NON-UCC FILING
6. [];This FINANCING STATEMENT IS TO BE FILED (for record) (or recorded) in the REAL ESTATE RECORDS. Attach Addendum (if applicable)
7.. Check to request SEARCH REPORT(S) on Debtors ADDITIONAL FEE Optional [];All Debtors []; Debtor 1
[]; Debtor 2
8. OPTIONAL FILER REFERENCE DATA
UCC FINANCING STATEMENT ADDENDUM
FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS (front and back) CAREFULLY
9. NAME OF FIRST DEBTOR (1(a) or 1(b) ON RELATED FINANCING STATEMENT
9a. ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR |
|
|
9b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME
|
FIRST NAME |
MIDDLE NAME, SUFFIX |
10. MISCELLANEOUS
|
|
|
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY
11. ADDITIONAL DEBTOR'S EXACT FULL LEGAL NAME: Insert only one name: 11(a) or 11(b) do not abbreviate or combine names
11a ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR |
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|
|
|
11b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME
|
FIRST NAME |
MIDDLE NAME |
SUFFIX |
|
11c. MAILING ADDRESS
|
CITY |
STATE POSTAL CODE |
COUNTY |
|
11d. TAX ID#: SSN OR EIN
|
Additional Info Re Organization Debtor
|
11e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION |
11f. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION |
11g. ORGANIZATIONAL ID, if any
[]; NONE |
12a ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR |
|
|
|
|
12b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME
|
FIRST NAME |
MIDDLE NAME |
SUFFIX |
|
12c. MAILING ADDRESS
|
CITY |
STATE POSTAL CODE |
COUNTY |
|
13. This FINANCING STATEMENT covers []; timber to be cut or []; as extracted collateral, or is filed as a []; fixture filing
14. Description of real estate
15. Name and address of a RECORD OWNER of above-described real estate ((if Debtor does not have a record interest):
|
16. Additional collateral description |
|
17. Check only if applicable and check only one box.
Debtor is a []; Trust or []; Trustee acting with respect to property held in a trust of []; Decendent's Estate |
|
18. Check only if applicable and check only one box
[]; Debtor is a TRANSMITTING UTILITY
[]; Filed in connection with a Manufactured Home Transaction - effective 30 years
[]; Filed in connection with a Public Finance Transaction - effective 30 years |
(b) A filing office that accepts written records may not refuse to accept a written record in the following form and format except for a reason set forth in Section 36-9-516(b):
A. NAME & PHONE OF CONTACT AT FILER (optional) |
B. SEND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO: (name and address)
|
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY
1a INITIAL FINANCING STATEMENT FILE #
|
1b. This FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT is to be filed (for record) (or recorded) in the
[]; REAL ESTATE RECORDS. |
2. []; TERMINATION: Effectiveness of the Financing Statement identified above is terminated with respect to security of the Secured Party authorizing the Termination Statement. |
3. []; CONTINUATION: Effectiveness of the Financing Statement identified above with respect to security interest(s) of the Secured Party authorizing this Continuation Statement is continued for the additional period provided by applicable law. |
4. []; ASSIGNMENT (full or partial): Give names of assignee in Item 7a or 7B and address of assignee in Item 7c, and also give name of assignor in Item 9. |
5. AMENDMENT (PARTY INFORMATION): This Amendment affects []; Debtor or []; Secured Party or record. Check only one of these two boxes.
Also check one of the following three boxes and provide appropriate information in Iitems 6 and/or 7.
[]; Change name and/or address. Give current record name in Item 6a or 6b; also give new name (if name change) in Item 7a or 7b and/or new address (if address change in Item 7c.
[]; DELETE name. Give record name to be deleted in Item 6a or 6b.
[]; ADD name: Complete Item 7a or 7b and also Item 7c; also complete IItems 7d-7g (if applicable)
|
6. CURRENT RECORD INFORMATION
12a ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR |
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|
|
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12b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME
|
FIRST NAME |
MIDDLE NAME |
SUFFIX |
|
7. CHANGED (NEW) OR ADDED INFORMATION:
7a ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR |
|
|
|
|
7b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME
|
FIRST NAME |
MIDDLE NAME |
SUFFIX |
|
7c. MAILING ADDRESS
|
CITY |
STATE POSTAL CODE |
COUNTY |
|
7d. TAX ID#: SSN OR EIN
|
Additional Info Re Organization Debtor
|
7e. TYPE OF ORGANIZATION |
7f. JURISDICTION OF ORGANIZATION |
7g. ORGANIZATIONAL ID, if any
[]; NONE |
8. AMENDED (COLLATERAL CHANGE) check only one box.
Describe collateral []; deleted or []; added or give []; restated collateral description, or describe collateral []; assigned.
9. NAME OF SECURED PARTY of RECORD AUTHORIZING THIS AMENDMENT (name of assignor, if this is an Assignment). If this is an Amendment authorized by a Debtor which adds collateral or adds the authorizing Debtor, or if this is a Termination authorized by a Debtor, check here []; and enter name of DEBTOR authorizing this Amendment.
9a ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR |
|
|
|
|
9b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME
|
FIRST NAME |
MIDDLE NAME |
SUFFIX |
|
10. OPTIONAL FILER REFERENCE DATA
UCC FINANCING STATEMENT AMENDMENT ADDENDUM
FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS (front and back) CAREFULLY
11 INITIAL FINANCING STATEMENT FILE # (same as Item 1a on Amendment form)
12., NAME of PARTY AUTHORIZING THIS AMENDMENT (same as Item 9 on Amendment form)
12a ORGANIZATION'S NAME
OR |
|
|
|
|
12b. INDIVIDUAL'S LAST NAME
|
FIRST NAME |
MIDDLE NAME |
SUFFIX |
|
THE ABOVE SPACE IS FOR FILING OFFICE USE ONLY
13. Use this space for additional information.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. "Safe Harbor" Written Forms. Although Section 9-520 limits the bases upon which the filing office can refuse to accept records, this Section provide sample written forms that must be accepted in every filing office in the country, as long as the filing office's rules permit it to accept written communications. By completing one of the forms in this Section, a secured party can be certain that the filing office is obligated to accept it.
The forms in this Section are based upon national financing statement forms that were in use under former Article 9. Those forms were developed over an extended period and reflect the comments and suggestions of filing officers, secured parties and their counsel, and service companies. The formatting of those forms and of the ones in this Section has been designed to reduce error by both filers and filing offices.
A filing office that accepts written communications may not reject, on grounds of form or format, a filing using these forms. Although filers are not required to use the forms, they are encouraged and can be expected to do so, inasmuch as the forms are well designed and avoid the risk of rejection on the basis of form or format. As their use expands, the forms will rapidly become familiar to both filers and filing-office personnel. Filing offices may and should encourage the use of these forms by declaring them to be the "standard" (but not exclusive) forms for each jurisdiction, albeit without in any way suggesting that alternative forms are unacceptable.
The multi-purpose form in subsection (b) covers changes with respect to the debtor, the secured party, the collateral, and the status of the financing statement (termination and continuation). A single form may be used for several different types of amendments at once (e.g., both to change a debtor's name and continue the effectiveness of the financing statement).
Section 36-9-522. Maintenance and destruction of records.
(a) The filing office shall maintain a record of the information provided in a filed financing statement for at least one year after the effectiveness of the financing statement has lapsed under Section 36-9-515 with respect to all secured parties of record. The record must be retrievable by using the name of the debtor and:
(1) if the record was filed or recorded in the filing office described in Section 36-9-501(a)(1), by using the file number assigned to the initial financing statement to which the record relates and the date and time that the record was filed or recorded; or
(2) if the record was filed in the filing office described in Section 36-9-501(a)(2), by using the file number assigned to the initial financing statement to which the record relates.
(b) Except to the extent that a statute governing disposition of public records provides otherwise, the filing office immediately may destroy any written record evidencing a financing statement. However, if the filing office destroys a written record, it shall maintain another record of the financing statement which complies with subsection (a).
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-403(3), revised substantially.
2. Maintenance of Records. Section 9-523 requires the filing office to provide information concerning certain lapsed financing statements. Accordingly, subsection (a) requires the filing office to maintain a record of the information in a financing statement for at least one year after lapse. During that time, the filing office may not delete any information with respect to a filed financing statement; it may only add information. This approach relieves the filing office from any duty to determine whether to substitute or delete information upon receipt of an amendment. It also assures searchers that they will receive all information with respect to financing statements filed against a debtor and thereby be able themselves to determine the state of the public record.
The filing office may maintain this information in any medium. Subsection (b) permits the filing office immediately to destroy written records evidencing a financing statement, provided that the filing office maintains another record of the information contained in the financing statement as required by subsection (a).
Section 36-9-523. Information from filing office; sale or license of records.
(a) If a person that files a written record requests an acknowledgment of the filing, the filing office shall send to the person an image of the record showing the number assigned to the record pursuant to Section 36-9-519(a)(1) and the date and time of the filing of the record. However, if the person furnishes a copy of the record to the filing office, the filing office may instead:
(1) note upon the copy the number assigned to the record pursuant to Section 36-9-519(a)(1) and the date and time of the filing of the record; and
(2) send the copy to the person.
(b) If a person files a record other than a written record, the filing office shall communicate to the person an acknowledgment that provides:
(1) the information in the record;
(2) the number assigned to the record pursuant to Section 36-9-519(a)(1); and
(3) the date and time of the filing of the record.
(c) The filing office shall communicate or otherwise make available in a record the following information to any person that requests it:
(1) whether there is on file on a date and time specified by the filing office, but not a date earlier than three business days before the filing office receives the request, any financing statement that:
(A) designates a particular debtor or, if the request so states, designates a particular debtor at the address specified in the request;
(B) has not lapsed under Section 36-9-515 with respect to all secured parties of record; and
(C) if the request so states, has lapsed under Section 36-9-515 and a record of which is maintained by the filing office under Section 36-9-522(a);
(2) the date and time of filing of each financing statement; and
(3) the information provided in each financing statement.
(d) In complying with its duty under subsection (c), the filing office may communicate information in any medium. However, if requested, the filing office shall communicate information by issuing its written certificate or a record that can be admitted into evidence in the courts of this State without extrinsic evidence of its authenticity.
(e) The filing office described in Section 36-9-501(a)(2) shall perform the acts required by subsections (a) through (d) at the time and in the manner prescribed by filing-office rule, but not later than two business days after the filing office receives the request.
(f) At least weekly, the filing office described in Section 36-9-501(a)(2) shall offer to sell or license to the public on a nonexclusive basis, in bulk, copies of all records filed in it under this part, in every medium from time to time available to the filing office.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-407; subsections (d) and (e) are new.
2. Filing Office's Duty to Provide Information. Former Section 9-407, dealing with obtaining information from the filing office, was bracketed to suggest to legislatures that its enactment was optional. Experience has shown that the method by which interested persons can obtain information concerning the public records should be uniform. Accordingly, the analogous provisions of this Article are not in brackets.
Most of the other changes from former Section 9-407 are for clarification, to embrace medium-neutral drafting, or to impose standards of performance on the filing office.
3. Acknowledgments of Filing. Subsections (a) and (b) require the filing office to acknowledge the filing of a record. Under subsection (a), the filing office is required to acknowledge the filing of a written record only upon request of the filer. Subsection (b) requires the filing office to acknowledge the filing of a non-written record even in the absence of a request from the filer.
4. Response to Search Request. Subsection (c)(3) requires the filing office to provide "the information contained in each financing statement" to a person who requests it. This requirement can be satisfied by providing copies, images, or reports. The requirement does not in any manner inhibit the filing office from also offering to provide less than all of the information (presumably for a lower fee) to a person who asks for less. Thus, subsection (c) accommodates the practice of providing only the type of record (e.g., initial financing statement, continuation statement), number assigned to the record, date and time of filing, and names and addresses of the debtor and secured party when a requesting person asks for no more (i.e., when the person does not ask for copies of financing statements). In contrast, the filing office's obligation under subsection (b) to provide an acknowledgment containing "the information contained in the record" is not defined by a customer's request. Thus unless the filer stipulates otherwise, to comply with subsection (b) the filing office's acknowledgment must contain all of the information in a record.
Subsection (c) assures that a minimum amount of information about filed records will be available to the public. It does not preclude a filing office from offering additional services.
5. Lapsed and Terminated Financing Statements. This Section reflects the policy that terminated financing statements will remain part of the filing office's data base. The filing office may remove from the data base only lapsed financing statements, and then only when at least a year has passed after lapse. See Section 9-519(g). Subsection (c)(1)(C) requires a filing office to conduct a search and report as to lapsed financing statements that have not been removed from the data base, when requested.
6. Search by Debtor's Address. Subsection (c)(1)(A) contemplates that, by making a single request, a searcher will receive the results of a search of the entire public record maintained by any given filing office. Addition of the bracketed language in subsection (c)(1)(A) would permit a search report limited to financing statements showing a particular address for the debtor, but only if the search request is so limited. With or without the bracketed language, this subsection does not permit the filing office to compel a searcher to limit a request by address.
7. Medium of Communication; Certificates. Former Article 9 provided that the filing office respond to a request for information by providing a certificate. The principle of medium-neutrality would suggest that the statute not require a written certificate. Subsection (d) follows this principle by permitting the filing office to respond by communicating "in any medium." By permitting communication "in any medium," subsection (d) is not inconsistent with a system in which persons other than filing office staff conduct searches of the filing office's (computer) records.
Some searchers find it necessary to introduce the results of their search into evidence. Because official written certificates might be introduced into evidence more easily than official communications in another medium, subsection (d) affords States the option of requiring the filing office to issue written certificates upon request. The alternative bracketed language in subsection (d) recognizes that some States may prefer to permit the filing office to respond in another medium, as long as the response can be admitted into evidence in the courts of that State without extrinsic evidence of its authenticity.
8. Performance Standard. The utility of the filing system depends on the ability of searchers to get current information quickly. Accordingly, subsection (e) requires that the filing office respond to a request for information no later than two business days after it receives the request. The information contained in the response must be current as of a date no earlier than three business days before the filing office receives the request. See subsection (c)(1). The failure of the filing office to comply with performance standards, such as subsection (e), has no effect on the private rights of persons affected by the filing of records.
9. Sales of Records in Bulk. Subsection (f), which is new, mandates that the appropriate official or the filing office sell or license the filing records to the public in bulk, on a nonexclusive basis, in every medium available to the filing office. The details of implementation are left to filing-office rules.
Section 36-9-524. Delay by filing office.
Delay by the filing office beyond a time limit prescribed by this part is excused if:
(1) the delay is caused by interruption of communication or computer facilities, war, emergency conditions, failure of equipment, or other circumstances beyond control of the filing office; and
(2) the filing office exercises reasonable diligence under the circumstances.
Official Comment
Source. New; derived from Section 4-109.
Section 36-9-525. Fees.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), the fee for filing and indexing a record under this part, other than an initial financing statement of the kind described in Section 36-9-502(c), is the amount specified in subsection (c), if applicable, plus:
(1) eight dollars if the record is communicated in writing and consists of one or two pages;
(2) ten dollars if the record is communicated in writing and consists of more than two pages; and
(3) ten dollars if the record is communicated by another medium authorized by filing-office rule.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), the fee for filing and indexing an initial financing statement of the kind described in Section 36-9-502(c) is the amount specified in subsection (c), if applicable, plus:
(1) twenty dollars if the financing statement indicates that it is filed in connection with a public-finance transaction;
(2) twenty dollars if the financing statement indicates that it is filed in connection with a manufactured-home transaction.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), if a record is communicated in writing, the fee for each name more than two required to be indexed is two dollars.
(d) The fee for responding to a request for information from the filing office, including for issuing a certificate showing whether there is on file any financing statement naming a particular debtor, is:
(1) five dollars if the request is communicated in writing; and
(2) five dollars if the request is communicated by another medium authorized by filing-office rule.
(e) This section does not require a fee with respect to a record of a mortgage which is effective as a financing statement filed as a fixture filing or as a financing statement covering as-extracted collateral or timber to be cut under Section 36-9-502(c). However, the recording and satisfaction fees that otherwise would be applicable to the record of the mortgage apply.
Official Comment
1. Source. Various Sections of former Part 4.
2. Fees. This Section contains all fee requirements for filing, indexing, and responding to requests for information. Uniformity in the fee structure (but not necessarily in the amount of fees) makes this Article easier for secured parties to use and reduces the likelihood that a filed record will be rejected for failure to pay at least the correct amount of the fee. See Section 9-516(b)(2).
The costs of processing electronic records are less than those with respect to written records. Accordingly, this Section mandates a lower fee as an incentive to file electronically and imposes the additional charge (if any) for multiple debtors only with respect to written records. When written records are used, this Article encourages the use of the uniform forms in Section 9-521. The fee for filing these forms should be no greater than the fee for other written records.
To make the relevant information included in a filed record more accessible once the record is found, this Section mandates a higher fee for longer written records than for shorter ones. Finally, recognizing that financing statements naming more than one debtor are most often filed against a husband and wife, any additional charge for multiple debtors applies to records filed with respect to more than two debtors, rather than with respect to more than one.
Section 36-9-526. Filing-office rules.
(a) The Secretary of State shall adopt and publish rules to implement this chapter. The filing-office rules must be:
(1) consistent with this chapter; and
(2) adopted and published in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act.
(b) To keep the filing-office rules and practices of the filing office in harmony with the rules and practices of filing offices in other jurisdictions that enact substantially this part, and to keep the technology used by the filing office compatible with the technology used by filing offices in other jurisdictions that enact substantially this part, the Secretary of State, so far as is consistent with the purposes, policies, and provisions of this chapter, in adopting, amending, and repealing filing-office rules, shall:
(1) consult with filing offices in other jurisdictions that enact substantially this part; and
(2) consult the most recent version of the Model Rules promulgated by the International Association of Corporate Administrators or any successor organization; and
(3) take into consideration the rules and practices of, and the technology used by, filing offices in other jurisdictions that enact substantially this part.
Official Comment
1. Source. New; subsection (b) derives in part from the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (1974).
2. Rules Required. Operating a filing office is a complicated business, requiring many more rules and procedures than this Article can usefully provide. Subsection (a) requires the adoption of rules to carry out the provisions of Article 9. The filing-office rules must be consistent with the provisions of the statute and adopted in accordance with local procedures. The publication requirement informs secured parties about filing-office practices, aids secured parties in evaluating filing-related risks and costs, and promotes regularity of application within the filing office.
3. Importance of Uniformity. In today's national economy, uniformity of the policies and practices of the filing offices will reduce the costs of secured transactions substantially. The International Association of Corporate Administrators (IACA), referred to in subsection (b), is an organization whose membership includes filing officers from every State. These individuals are responsible for the proper functioning of the Article 9 filing system and have worked diligently to develop model filing-office rules, with a view toward efficiency and uniformity.
Although uniformity is an important desideratum, subsection (a) affords considerable flexibility in the adoption of filing-office rules. Each State may adopt a version of subsection (a) that reflects the desired relationship between the statewide filing office described in Section 9-501(a)(2) and the local filing offices described in Section 9-501(a)(1) and that takes into account the practices of its filing offices. Subsection (a) need not designate a single official or agency to adopt rules applicable to all filing offices, and the rules applicable to the statewide filing office need not be identical to those applicable to the local filing office. For example, subsection (a) might provide for the statewide filing office to adopt filing-office rules, and, if not prohibited by other law, the filing office might adopt one set of rules for itself and another for local offices. Or, subsection (a) might designate one official or agency to adopt rules for the statewide filing office and another to adopt rules for local filing offices.
Section 36-9-527. Duty to report.
The Secretary of State shall report annually on or before September thirtieth to the Governor and Legislature on the operation of the filing office. The report must contain a statement of the extent to which the filing-office rules are not in harmony with the:
(1) rules of filing offices in other jurisdictions that enact substantially this part and the reasons for these variations; and
(2) most recent version of the Model Rules promulgated by the International Association of Corporate Administrators, or any successor organization, and the reasons for these variations.
Official Comment
1. Source. New; derived in part from the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (1974).
2. Duty to Report. This Section is designed to promote compliance with the standards of performance imposed upon the filing office and with the requirement that the filing office's policies, practices, and technology be consistent and compatible with the policies, practices, and technology of other filing offices.
Part 6
Default
Subpart 1.
Default and Enforcement of Security Interest
Section 36-9-601. Rights after default; judicial enforcement; consignor or buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes.
(a) After default, a secured party has the rights provided in this part and, except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-602, those provided by agreement of the parties. A secured party:
(1) may reduce a claim to judgment, foreclose, or otherwise enforce the claim, security interest, or agricultural lien by any available judicial procedure; and
(2) if the collateral is documents, may proceed either as to the documents or as to the goods they cover.
(b) A secured party in possession of collateral or control of collateral under Section 36-9-104, 36-9-105, 36-9-106, or 36-9-107 has the rights and duties provided in Section 36-9-207.
(c) The rights under subsections (a) and (b) are cumulative and may be exercised simultaneously.
(d) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g) and Section 36-9-605, after default, a debtor and an obligor have the rights provided in this part and by agreement of the parties.
(e) If a secured party has reduced its claim to judgment, the lien of any levy that may be made upon the collateral by virtue of an execution based upon the judgment relates back to the earliest of:
(1) the date of perfection of the security interest or agricultural lien in the collateral;
(2) the date of filing a financing statement covering the collateral; or
(3) any date specified in a statute under which the agricultural lien was created.
(f) A sale pursuant to an execution is a foreclosure of the security interest or agricultural lien by judicial procedure within the meaning of this Section. A secured party may purchase at the sale and thereafter hold the collateral free of any other requirements of this chapter.
(g) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-607(c), this part imposes no duties upon a secured party that is a consignor or is a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-501(1), (2), (5).
2. Enforcement: In General. The rights of a secured party to enforce its security interest in collateral after the debtor's default are an important feature of a secured transaction. (Note that the term "rights," as defined in Section 1-201, includes "remedies.") This Part provides those rights as well as certain limitations on their exercise for the protection of the defaulting debtor, other creditors, and other affected persons. However, subsections (a) and (d) make clear that the rights provided in this Part do not exclude other rights provided by agreement.
3. When Remedies Arise. Under subsection (a) the secured party's rights arise "[a]fter default." As did former Section 9-501, this Article leaves to the agreement of the parties the circumstances giving rise to a default. This Article does not determine whether a secured party's post-default conduct can constitute a waiver of default in the face of an agreement stating that such conduct shall not constitute a waiver. Rather, it continues to leave to the parties' agreement, as supplemented by law other than this Article, the determination whether a default has occurred or has been waived. See Section 1-103.
4. Possession of Collateral; Section 9-207. After a secured party takes possession of collateral following a default, there is no longer any distinction between a security interest that before default was nonpossessory and a security interest that was possessory before default, as under a common-law pledge. This Part generally does not distinguish between the rights of a secured party with a nonpossessory security interest and those of a secured party with a possessory security interest. However, Section 9-207 addresses rights and duties with respect to collateral in a secured party's possession. Under subsection (b) of this Section, Section 9-207 applies not only to possession before default but also to possession after default. Subsection (b) also has been conformed to Section 9-207, which, unlike former Section 9-207, applies to secured parties having control of collateral.
5. Cumulative Remedies. Former Section 9-501(1) provided that the secured party's remedies were cumulative, but it did not explicitly provide whether the remedies could be exercised simultaneously. Subsection (c) permits the simultaneous exercise of remedies if the secured party acts in good faith. The liability scheme of Subpart 2 affords redress to an aggrieved debtor or obligor. Moreover, permitting the simultaneous exercise of remedies under subsection (c) does not override any non-UCC law, including the law of tort and statutes regulating collection of debts, under which the simultaneous exercise of remedies in a particular case constitutes abusive behavior or harassment giving rise to liability.
6. Judicial Enforcement. Under subsection (a) a secured party may reduce its claim to judgment or foreclose its interest by any available procedure outside this Article under applicable law. Subsection (e) generally follows former Section 9-501(5). It makes clear that any judicial lien that the secured party may acquire against the collateral effectively is a continuation of the original security interest (if perfected) and not the acquisition of a new interest or a transfer of property on account of a preexisting obligation. Under former Section 9-501(5), the judicial lien was stated to relate back to the date of perfection of the security interest. Subsection (e), however, provides that the lien relates back to the earlier of the date of filing or the date of perfection. This provides a secured party who enforces a security interest by judicial process with the benefit of the "first-to-file-or-perfect" priority rule of Section 9-322(a)(1).
7. Agricultural Liens. Part 6 provides parallel treatment for the enforcement of agricultural liens and security interests. Because agricultural liens are statutory rather than consensual, this Article does draw a few distinctions between these liens and security interests. Under subsection (e), the statute creating an agricultural lien would govern whether and the date to which an execution lien relates back. Section 9-606 explains when a "default" occurs in the agricultural lien context.
8. Execution Sales. Subsection (f) also follows former Section 9-501(5). It makes clear that an execution sale is an appropriate method of foreclosure contemplated by this Part. However, the sale is governed by other law and not by this Article, and the limitations under Section 9-610 on the right of a secured party to purchase collateral do not apply.
9. Sales of Receivables; Consignments. Subsection (g) provides that, except as provided in Section 9-607(c), the duties imposed on secured parties do not apply to buyers of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes. Although denominated "secured parties," these buyers own the entire interest in the property sold and so may enforce their rights without regard to the seller ("debtor") or the seller's creditors. Likewise, a true consignor may enforce its ownership interest under other law without regard to the duties that this Part imposes on secured parties. Note, however, that Section 9-615 governs cases in which a consignee's secured party (other than a consignor) is enforcing a security interest that is senior to the security interest (i.e., ownership interest) of a true consignor.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Section 36-9-601(c) provides that a secured party's rights on default "are commutative and may be exercised simultaneously." Former Section 36-9-501((1) provided that a secured party's remedies were cumulative but did not address whether the remedies could be exercised simultaneously. In Andrews v. Van Elten & Walker, Inc., 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E. 2d 500 (Ct. App. 1993), however, the Court of Appeals interpreted former Section 36-9-501(1) to permit a secured party to take possession of collateral and simultaneously bring an action of the underling debt. Therefore, the language in Section 36-9-601(1)(c) expressly permitting the simultaneous exercise of cumulative remedies dos not effect a change in the law of South Carolina.
Section 36-9-602. Waiver and variance of rights and duties.
Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-624, to the extent that they give rights to a debtor or obligor and impose duties on a secured party, the debtor or obligor may not waive or vary the rules stated in the following listed sections:
(1) Section 36-9-207(b)(4)(C), which deals with use and operation of the collateral by the secured party;
(2) Section 36-9-210, which deals with requests for an accounting and requests concerning a list of collateral and statement of account;
(3) Section 36-9-607(c), which deals with collection and enforcement of collateral;
(4) Sections 36-9-608(a) and 36-9-615(c) to the extent that they deal with application or payment of noncash proceeds of collection, enforcement, or disposition;
(5) Sections 36-9-608(a) and 36-9-615(d) to the extent that they require accounting for or payment of surplus proceeds of collateral;
(6) Section 36-9-609 to the extent that it imposes upon a secured party that takes possession of collateral without judicial process the duty to do so without breach of the peace;
(7) Sections 36-9-610(b), 36-9-611, 36-9-613, and 36-9-614, which deal with disposition of collateral;
(8) Section 36-9-615(f), which deals with calculation of a deficiency or surplus when a disposition is made to the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor;
(9) Section 36-9-616, which deals with explanation of the calculation of a surplus or deficiency;
(10) Sections 36-9-620, 36-9-621, and 36-9-622, which deal with acceptance of collateral in satisfaction of obligation;
(11) Section 36-9-623, which deals with redemption of collateral;
(12) Section 36-9-624, which deals with permissible waivers; and
(13) Sections 36-9-625 and 36-9-626, which deal with the secured party's liability for failure to comply with this chapter.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-501(3).
2. Waiver: In General. Section 1-102(3) addresses which provisions of the UCC are mandatory and which may be varied by agreement. With exceptions relating to good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care, immediate parties, as between themselves, may vary its provisions by agreement. However, in the context of rights and duties after default, our legal system traditionally has looked with suspicion on agreements that limit the debtor's rights and free the secured party of its duties. As stated in former Section 9-501, Comment 4, "no mortgage clause has ever been allowed to clog the equity of redemption." The context of default offers great opportunity for overreaching. The suspicious attitudes of the courts have been grounded in common sense. This Section, like former Section 9-501(3), codifies this long-standing and deeply rooted attitude. The specified rights of the debtor and duties of the secured party may not be waived or varied except as stated. Provisions that are not specified in this Section are subject to the general rules in Section 1-102(3).
3. Nonwaivable Rights and Duties. This Section revises former Section 9-501(3) by restricting the ability to waive or modify additional specified rights and duties: (i) duties under Section 9-207(c)(4)(C), which deals with the use and operation of consumer goods, (ii) the right to a response to a request for an accounting, concerning a list of collateral, or concerning a statement of account (Section 9-210), (iii) the duty to collect collateral in a commercially reasonable manner (Section 9-607), (iv) the implicit duty to refrain from a breach of the peace in taking possession of collateral under Section 9-609, (v) the duty to apply noncash proceeds of collection or disposition in a commercially reasonable manner (Sections 9-608 and 9-615), (vi) the right to a special method of calculating a surplus or deficiency in certain dispositions to a secured party, a person related to secured party, or a secondary obligor (Section 9-615), (vii) the duty to give an explanation of the calculation of a surplus or deficiency (Section 9-616), (viii) the right to limitations on the effectiveness of certain waivers (Section 9-624), and (ix) the right to hold a secured party liable for failure to comply with this Article (Sections 9-625 and 9-626). For clarity and consistency, this Article uses the term "waive or vary" instead of "renounc[e] or modify[]," which appeared in former Section 9-504(3).
This Section provides generally that the specified rights and duties "may not be waived or varied" However, it does not restrict the ability of parties to agree to settle, compromise, or renounce claims for past conduct that may have constituted a violation or breach of those rights and duties, even if the settlement involves an express "waiver."
4. Waiver by Debtors and Obligors. The restrictions on waiver contained in this Section apply to obligors as well as debtors. This resolves a question under former Article 9 as to whether secondary obligors, assuming that they were "debtors" for purposes of former Part 5, were permitted to waive, under the law of suretyship, rights and duties under that Part.
5. Certain Post-Default Waivers. Section 9-624 permits post-default waivers in limited circumstances. These waivers must be made in agreements that are authenticated. Under Section 1-201, an "'agreement' means the bargain of the parties in fact." In considering waivers under Section 9-624 and analogous agreements in other contexts, courts should carefully scrutinize putative agreements that appear in records that also address many additional or unrelated matters.
Section 36-9-603. Agreement on standards concerning rights and duties.
(a) The parties may determine by agreement the standards measuring the fulfillment of the rights of a debtor or obligor and the duties of a secured party under a rule stated in Section 36-9-602 if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
(b) Subsection (a) does not apply to the duty under Section 36-9-609 to refrain from breaching the peace.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-501(3).
2. Limitation on Ability to Set Standards. Subsection (a), like former Section 9-501(3), permits the parties to set standards for compliance with the rights and duties under this Part if the standards are not "manifestly unreasonable." Under subsection (b), the parties are not permitted to set standards measuring fulfillment of the secured party's duty to take collateral without breaching the peace.
Section 36-9-604. Procedure if security agreement covers real property or fixtures.
(a) If a security agreement covers both personal and real property, a secured party may proceed:
(1) under this part as to the personal property without prejudicing any rights with respect to the real property; or
(2) as to both the personal property and the real property in accordance with the rights with respect to the real property, in which case the other provisions of this part do not apply.
(b) Subject to subsection (c), if a security agreement covers goods that are or become fixtures, a secured party may proceed:
(1) under this part; or
(2) in accordance with the rights with respect to real property, in which case the other provisions of this part do not apply.
(c) Subject to the other provisions of this part, if a secured party holding a security interest in fixtures has priority over all owners and encumbrancers of the real property, the secured party, after default, may remove the collateral from the real property.
(d) A secured party that removes collateral shall promptly reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of the real property, other than the debtor, for the cost of repair of any physical injury caused by the removal. The secured party need not reimburse the encumbrancer or owner for any diminution in value of the real property caused by the absence of the goods removed or by any necessity of replacing them. A person entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission to remove until the secured party gives adequate assurance for the performance of the obligation to reimburse.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Sections 9-501(4), 9-313(8).
2. Real-Property-Related Collateral. The collateral in many transactions consists of both real and personal property. In the interest of simplicity, speed, and economy, subsection (a), like former Section 9-501(4), permits (but does not require) the secured party to proceed as to both real and personal property in accordance with its rights and remedies with respect to the real property. Subsection (a) also makes clear that a secured party who exercises rights under Part 6 with respect to personal property does not prejudice any rights under real-property law.
This Article does not address certain other real-property-related problems. In a number of States, the exercise of remedies by a creditor who is secured by both real property and non-real property collateral is governed by special legal rules. For example, under some anti-deficiency laws, creditors risk loss of rights against personal property collateral if they err in enforcing their rights against the real property. Under a "one-form-of-action" rule (or rule against splitting a cause of action), a creditor who judicially enforces a real property mortgage and does not proceed in the same action to enforce a security interest in personalty may (among other consequences) lose the right to proceed against the personalty. Although statutes of this kind create impediments to enforcement of security interests, this Article does not override these limitations under other law.
3. Fixtures. Subsection (b) is new. It makes clear that a security interest in fixtures may be enforced either under real-property law or under any of the applicable provisions of Part 6, including sale or other disposition either before or after removal of the fixtures (see subsection (c)). Subsection (b) also serves to overrule cases holding that a secured party's only remedy after default is the removal of the fixtures from the real property. See, e.g., Maplewood Bank & Trust v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 625 A.2d 537 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
Subsection (c) generally follows former Section 9-313(8). It gives the secured party the right to remove fixtures under certain circumstances. A secured party whose security interest in fixtures has priority over owners and encumbrancers of the real property may remove the collateral from the real property. However, subsection (d) requires the secured party to reimburse any owner (other than the debtor) or encumbrancer for the cost of repairing any physical injury caused by the removal. This right to reimbursement is implemented by the last sentence of subsection (d), which gives the owner or encumbrancer a right to security or indemnity as a condition for giving permission to remove.
Section 36-9-605. Unknown debtor or secondary obligor.
A secured party does not owe a duty based on its status as secured party:
(1) to a person that is a debtor or obligor, unless the secured party knows:
(A) that the person is a debtor or obligor;
(B) the identity of the person; and
(C) how to communicate with the person; or
(2) to a secured party or lienholder that has filed a financing statement against a person, unless the secured party knows:
(A) that the person is a debtor; and
(B) the identity of the person.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Duties to Unknown Persons. This Section relieves a secured party from duties owed to a debtor or obligor, if the secured party does not know about the debtor or obligor. Similarly, it relieves a secured party from duties owed to a secured party or lienholder who has filed a financing statement against the debtor, if the secured party does not know about the debtor. For example, a secured party may be unaware that the original debtor has sold the collateral subject to the security interest and that the new owner has become the debtor. If so, the secured party owes no duty to the new owner (debtor) or to a secured party who has filed a financing statement against the new owner. This Section should be read in conjunction with the exculpatory provisions in Section 9-628. Note that it relieves a secured party not only from duties arising under this Article but also from duties arising under other law by virtue of the secured party's status as such under this Article, unless the other law otherwise provides.
Section 36-9-606. Time of default for agricultural lien.
For purposes of this part, a default occurs in connection with an agricultural lien at the time the secured party becomes entitled to enforce the lien in accordance with the statute under which it was created.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Time of Default. Remedies under this Part become available upon the debtor's "default." See Section 9-601. This Section explains when "default" occurs in the agricultural-lien context. It requires one to consult the enabling statute to determine when the lienholder is entitled to enforce the lien.
Section 36-9-607. Collection and enforcement by secured party.
(a) If so agreed, and in any event after default, a secured party:
(1) may notify an account debtor or other person obligated on collateral to make payment or otherwise render performance to or for the benefit of the secured party;
(2) may take any proceeds to which the secured party is entitled under Section 36-9-315;
(3) may enforce the obligations of an account debtor or other person obligated on collateral and exercise the rights of the debtor with respect to the obligation of the account debtor or other person obligated on collateral to make payment or otherwise render performance to the debtor, and with respect to any property that secures the obligations of the account debtor or other person obligated on the collateral;
(4) if it holds a security interest in a deposit account perfected by control under Section 36-9-104(a)(1), may apply the balance of the deposit account to the obligation secured by the deposit account; and
(5) if it holds a security interest in a deposit account perfected by control under Section 36-9-104(a)(2) or (3), may instruct the bank to pay the balance of the deposit account to or for the benefit of the secured party.
(b) If necessary to enable a secured party to exercise under subsection (a)(3) the right of a debtor to enforce a mortgage nonjudicially, the secured party may record in the office in which a record of the mortgage is recorded:
(1) a copy of the security agreement that creates or provides for a security interest in the obligation secured by the mortgage; and
(2) the secured party's sworn affidavit in recordable form stating that:
(A) a default has occurred; and
(B) the secured party is entitled to enforce the mortgage nonjudicially.
(c) A secured party shall proceed in a commercially reasonable manner if the secured party:
(1) undertakes to collect from or enforce an obligation of an account debtor or other person obligated on collateral; and
(2) is entitled to charge back uncollected collateral or otherwise to full or limited recourse against the debtor or a secondary obligor.
(d) A secured party may deduct from the collections made pursuant to subsection (c) reasonable expenses of collection and enforcement, including reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured party.
(e) This section does not determine whether an account debtor, bank, or other person obligated on collateral owes a duty to a secured party.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-502; subsections (b), (d), and (e) are new.
2. Collections: In General. Collateral consisting of rights to payment is not only the most liquid asset of a typical debtor's business but also is property that may be collected without any interruption of the debtor's business This situation is far different from that in which collateral is inventory or equipment, whose removal may bring the business to a halt. Furthermore, problems of valuation and identification, present with collateral that is tangible personal property, frequently are not as serious in the case of rights to payment and other intangible collateral. Consequently, this Section, like former Section 9-502, recognizes that financing through assignments of intangibles lacks many of the complexities that arise after default in other types of financing. This Section allows the assignee to liquidate collateral by collecting whatever may become due on the collateral, whether or not the method of collection contemplated by the security arrangement before default was direct (i.e., payment by the account debtor to the assignee, "notification" financing) or indirect (i.e., payment by the account debtor to the assignor, "nonnotification" financing).
3. Scope. The scope of this Section is broader than that of former Section 9-502. It applies not only to collections from account debtors and obligors on instruments but also to enforcement more generally against all persons obligated on collateral. It explicitly provides for the secured party's enforcement of the debtor's rights in respect of the account debtor's (and other third parties') obligations and for the secured party's enforcement of supporting obligations with respect to those obligations. (Supporting obligations are components of the collateral under Section 9-203(f).) The rights of a secured party under subsection (a) include the right to enforce claims that the debtor may enjoy against others. For example, the claims might include a breach- of-warranty claim arising out of a defect in equipment that is collateral or a secured party's action for an injunction against infringement of a patent that is collateral. Those claims typically would be proceeds of original collateral under Section 9-315.
4. Collection and Enforcement Before Default. Like Part 6 generally, this Section deals with the rights and duties of secured parties following default. However, as did former Section 9-502 with respect to collection rights, this Section also applies to the collection and enforcement rights of secured parties even if a default has not occurred, as long as the debtor has so agreed. It is not unusual for debtors to agree that secured parties are entitled to collect and enforce rights against account debtors prior to default.
5. Collections by Junior Secured Party. A secured party who holds a security interest in a right to payment may exercise the right to collect and enforce under this Section, even if the security interest is subordinate to a conflicting security interest in the same right to payment. Whether the junior secured party has priority in the collected proceeds depends on whether the junior secured party qualifies for priority as a purchaser of an instrument (e.g., the account debtor's check) under Section 9-330(d), as a holder in due course of an instrument under Sections 3-305 and 9-331(a), or as a transferee of money under Section 9-332(a). See Sections 9-330, Comment 7, 9-331, Comment 5, and 9-332.
6. Relationship to Rights and Duties of Persons Obligated on Collateral. This Section permits a secured party to collect and enforce obligations included in collateral in its capacity as a secured party. It is not necessary for a secured party first to become the owner of the collateral pursuant to a disposition or acceptance. However, the secured party's rights, as between it and the debtor, to collect from and enforce collateral against account debtors and others obligated on collateral under subsection (a) are subject to Section 9-341, Part 4, and other applicable law. Neither this Section nor former Section 9-502 should be understood to regulate the duties of an account debtor or other person obligated on collateral. Subsection (e) makes this explicit. For example, the secured party may be unable to exercise the debtor's rights under an instrument if the debtor is in possession of the instrument, or under a non-transferable letter of credit if the debtor is the beneficiary. Unless a secured party has control over a letter-of-credit right and is entitled to receive payment or performance from the issuer or a nominated person under Article 5, its remedies with respect to the letter-of-credit right may be limited to the recovery of any identifiable proceeds from the debtor. This Section establishes only the baseline rights of the secured party vis-a-vis the debtor-the secured party is entitled to enforce and collect after default or earlier if so agreed.
7. Deposit Account Collateral. Subsections (a)(4) and (5) set forth the self-help remedy for a secured party whose collateral is a deposit account. Subsection (a)(4) addresses the rights of a secured party that is the bank with which the deposit account is maintained. That secured party automatically has control of the deposit account under Section 9-104(a)(1). After default, and otherwise if so agreed, the bank/secured party may apply the funds on deposit to the secured obligation.
If a security interest of a third party is perfected by control (Section 9-104(a)(2) or (a)(3)), then after default, and otherwise if so agreed, the secured party may instruct the bank to pay out the funds in the account. If the third party has control under Section 9-104(a)(3), the depositary institution is obliged to obey the instruction because the secured party is its customer. See Section 4-401. If the third party has control under Section 9-104(a)(2), the control agreement determines the depositary institution's obligation to obey.
If a security interest in a deposit account is unperfected, or is perfected by filing by virtue of the proceeds rules of Section 9-315, the depositary institution ordinarily owes no obligation to obey the secured party's instructions. See Section 9-341. To reach the funds without the debtor's cooperation, the secured party must use an available judicial procedure.
8. Rights Against Mortgagor of Real Property. Subsection (b) addresses the situation in which the collateral consists of a mortgage note (or other obligation secured by a mortgage on real property). After the debtor's (mortgagee's) default, the secured party (assignee) may wish to proceed with a nonjudicial foreclosure of the mortgage securing the note but may be unable to do so because it has not become the assignee of record. The assignee/secured party may not have taken a recordable assignment at the commencement of the transaction (perhaps the mortgage note in question was one of hundreds assigned to the secured party as collateral). Having defaulted, the mortgagee may be unwilling to sign a recordable assignment. This Section enables the secured party (assignee) to become the assignee of record by recording in the applicable real-property records the security agreement and an affidavit certifying default. Of course, the secured party's rights derive from those of its debtor. Subsection (b) would not entitle the secured party to proceed with a foreclosure unless the mortgagor also were in default or the debtor (mortgagee) otherwise enjoyed the right to foreclose.
9. Commercial Reasonableness. Subsection (c) provides that the secured party's collection and enforcement rights under subsection (a) must be exercised in a commercially reasonable manner. These rights include the right to settle and compromise claims against the account debtor. The secured party's failure to observe the standard of commercial reasonableness could render it liable to an aggrieved person under Section 9-625, and the secured party's recovery of a deficiency would be subject to Section 9-626. Subsection (c) does not apply if, as is characteristic of most sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes, the secured party (buyer) has no right of recourse against the debtor (seller) or a secondary obligor. However, if the secured party does have a right of recourse, the commercial-reasonableness standard applies to collection and enforcement even though the assignment to the secured party was a "true" sale. The obligation to proceed in a commercially reasonable manner arises because the collection process affects the extent of the seller's recourse liability, not because the seller retains an interest in the sold collateral (the seller does not).
10. Attorney's Fees and Legal Expenses. The phrase "reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses," which appears in subsection (d), includes only those fees and expenses incurred in proceeding against account debtors or other third parties. The secured party's right to recover these expenses from the collections arises automatically under this Section. The secured party also may incur other attorney's fees and legal expenses in proceeding against the debtor or obligor. Whether the secured party has a right to recover those fees and expenses depends on whether the debtor or obligor has agreed to pay them, as is the case with respect to attorney's fees and legal expenses under Sections 9-608(a)(1)(A) and 9-615(a)(1). The parties also may agree to allocate a portion of the secured party's overhead to collection and enforcement under subsection (d) or Section 9-608(a).
Section 36-9-608. Application of proceeds of collection or enforcement; liability for deficiency and right to surplus.
(a) If a security interest or agricultural lien secures payment or performance of an obligation, the following rules apply:
(1) A secured party shall apply or pay over for application the cash proceeds of collection or enforcement under this section in the following order to:
(A) the reasonable expenses of collection and enforcement and, to the extent provided for by agreement and not prohibited by law, reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured party;
(B) the satisfaction of obligations secured by the security interest or agricultural lien under which the collection or enforcement is made; and
(C) the satisfaction of obligations secured by any subordinate security interest in or other lien on the collateral subject to the security interest or agricultural lien under which the collection or enforcement is made if the secured party receives an authenticated demand for proceeds before distribution of the proceeds is completed.
(2) If requested by a secured party, a holder of a subordinate security interest or other lien shall furnish reasonable proof of the interest or lien within a reasonable time. Unless the holder complies, the secured party need not comply with the holder's demand under item (1)(C).
(3) A secured party need not apply or pay over for application noncash proceeds of collection and enforcement under this section unless the failure to do so would be commercially unreasonable. A secured party that applies or pays over for application noncash proceeds shall do so in a commercially reasonable manner.
(4) A secured party shall account to and pay a debtor for any surplus, and the obligor is liable for any deficiency.
(b) If the underlying transaction is a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes, the debtor is not entitled to any surplus, and the obligor is not liable for any deficiency.
Official Comment
1. Source. Subsection (a) is new; subsection (b) derives from former Section 9-502(2).
2. Modifications of Prior Law. Subsections (a) and (b) modify former Section 9-502(2) by explicitly providing for the application of proceeds recovered by the secured party in substantially the same manner as provided in Section 9-615(a) and (e) for dispositions of collateral.
3. Surplus and Deficiency. Subsections (a)(4) and (b) omit, as unnecessary, the references contained in former Section 9-502(2) to agreements varying the baseline rules on surplus and deficiency. The parties are always free to agree that an obligor will not be liable for a deficiency, even if the collateral secures an obligation, and that an obligor is liable for a deficiency, even if the transaction is a sale of receivables. For parallel provisions, see Section 9-615(d) and (e).
4. Noncash Proceeds. Subsection (a)(3) addresses the situation in which an enforcing secured party receives noncash proceeds.
Example: An enforcing secured party receives a promissory note from an account debtor who is unable to pay an account when it is due. The secured party accepts the note in exchange for extending the date on which the account debtor's obligation is due. The secured party may wish to credit its debtor (the assignor) with the principal amount of the note upon receipt of the note, but probably will prefer to credit the debtor only as and when the note is paid.
Under subsection (a)(3), the secured party is under no duty to apply the note or its value to the outstanding obligation unless its failure to do so would be commercially unreasonable. If the secured party does apply the note to the outstanding obligation, however, it must do so in a commercially reasonable manner. The parties may provide for the method of application of noncash proceeds by agreement, if the method is not manifestly unreasonable. See Section 9-603. This Section does not explain when the failure to apply noncash proceeds would be commercially unreasonable; it leaves that determination to case-by-case adjudication. In the example, the secured party appears to have accepted the account debtor's note in order to increase the likelihood of payment and decrease the likelihood that the account debtor would dispute its obligation. Under these circumstances, it may well be commercially reasonable for the secured party to credit its debtor's obligations only as and when cash proceeds are collected from the account debtor, especially given the uncertainty that attends the account debtor's eventual payment. For an example of a secured party's receipt of noncash proceeds in which it may well be commercially unreasonable for the secured party to delay crediting its debtor's obligations with the value of noncash proceeds, see Section 9-615, Comment 3.
When the secured party is not required to "apply or pay over for application noncash proceeds," the proceeds nonetheless remain collateral subject to this Article. If the secured party were to dispose of them, for example, appropriate notification would be required (see Section 9-611), and the disposition would be subject to the standards provided in this Part (see Section 9-610). Moreover, a secured party in possession of the noncash proceeds would have the duties specified in Section 9-207.
5. No Effect on Priority of Senior Security Interest. The application of proceeds required by subsection (a) does not affect the priority of a security interest in collateral which is senior to the interest of the secured party who is collecting or enforcing collateral under Section 9-607. Although subsection (a) imposes a duty to apply proceeds to the enforcing secured party's expenses and to the satisfaction of the secured obligations owed to it and to subordinate secured parties, that duty applies only among the enforcing secured party and those persons. Concerning the priority of a junior secured party who collects and enforces collateral, see Section 9-607, Comment 5.
Section 36-9-609. Secured party's right to take possession after default.
(a) After default, a secured party:
(1) may take possession of the collateral; and
(2) without removal, may render equipment unusable and dispose of collateral on a debtor's premises under Section 36-9-610.
(b) A secured party may proceed under subsection (a):
(1) pursuant to judicial process; or
(2) without judicial process, if it proceeds without breach of the peace.
(c) If so agreed, and in any event after default, a secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to both parties.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-503.
2. Secured Party's Right to Possession. This Section follows former Section 9-503 and earlier uniform legislation. It provides that the secured party is entitled to take possession of collateral after default.
3. Judicial Process; Breach of Peace. Subsection (b) permits a secured party to proceed under this Section without judicial process if it does so "without breach of the peace." Although former Section 9-503 placed the same condition on a secured party's right to take possession of collateral, subsection (b) extends the condition to the right provided in subsection (a)(2) as well. Like former Section 9-503, this Section does not define or explain the conduct that will constitute a breach of the peace, leaving that matter for continuing development by the courts. In considering whether a secured party has engaged in a breach of the peace, however, courts should hold the secured party responsible for the actions of others taken on the secured party's behalf, including independent contractors engaged by the secured party to take possession of collateral.
This Section does not authorize a secured party who repossesses without judicial process to utilize the assistance of a law-enforcement officer. A number of cases have held that a repossessing secured party's use of a law-enforcement officer without benefit of judicial process constituted a failure to comply with former Section 9-503.
4. Damages for Breach of Peace. Concerning damages that may be recovered based on a secured party's breach of the peace in connection with taking possession of collateral, see Section 9-625, Comment 3.
5. Multiple Secured Parties. More than one secured party may be entitled to take possession of collateral under this Section. Conflicting rights to possession among secured parties are resolved by the priority rules of this Article. Thus, a senior secured party is entitled to possession as against a junior claimant. Non-UCC law governs whether a junior secured party in possession of collateral is liable to the senior in conversion. Normally, a junior who refuses to relinquish possession of collateral upon the demand of a secured party having a superior possessory right to the collateral would be liable in conversion.
6. Secured Party's Right to Disable and Dispose of Equipment on Debtor's Premises. In the case of some collateral, such as heavy equipment, the physical removal from the debtor's plant and the storage of the collateral pending disposition may be impractical or unduly expensive. This Section follows former Section 9-503 by providing that, in lieu of removal, the secured party may render equipment unusable or may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premises. Unlike former Section 9-503, however, this Section explicitly conditions these rights on the debtor's default. Of course, this Section does not validate unreasonable action by a secured party. Under Section 9-610, all aspects of a disposition must be commercially reasonable.
7. Debtor's Agreement to Assemble Collateral. This Section follows former Section 9-503 also by validating a debtor's agreement to assemble collateral and make it available to a secured party at a place that the secured party designates. Similar to the treatment of agreements to permit collection prior to default under Section 9-607 and former 9-502, however, this Section validates these agreements whether or not they are conditioned on the debtor's default. For example, a debtor might agree to make available to a secured party, from time to time, any instruments or negotiable documents that the debtor receives on account of collateral. A court should not infer from this Section's validation that a debtor's agreement to assemble and make available collateral would not be enforceable under other applicable law.
8. Agreed Standards. Subject to the limitation imposed by Section 9-603(b), this Section's provisions concerning agreements to assemble and make available collateral and a secured party's right to disable equipment and dispose of collateral on a debtor's premises are likely topics for agreement on standards as contemplated by Section 9-603.
Section 36-9-610. Disposition of collateral after default.
(a) After default, a secured party may sell, lease, license, or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its present condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing.
(b) Every aspect of a disposition of collateral, including the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be commercially reasonable. If commercially reasonable, a secured party may dispose of collateral by public or private proceedings, by one or more contracts, as a unit or in parcels, and at any time and place and on any terms.
(c) A secured party may purchase collateral:
(1) at a public disposition; or
(2) at a private disposition only if the collateral is of a kind that is customarily sold on a recognized market or the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations.
(d) A contract for sale, lease, license, or other disposition includes the warranties relating to title, possession, quiet enjoyment, and the like which by operation of law accompany a voluntary disposition of property of the kind subject to the contract.
(e) A secured party may disclaim or modify warranties under subsection (d):
(1) in a manner that would be effective to disclaim or modify the warranties in a voluntary disposition of property of the kind subject to the contract of disposition; or
(2) by communicating to the purchaser a record evidencing the contract for disposition and including an express disclaimer or modification of the warranties.
(f) A record is sufficient to disclaim warranties under subsection (e) if it indicates 'there is no warranty relating to title, possession, quiet enjoyment, or the like in this disposition' or uses words of similar import.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-504(1), (3)
2. Commercially Reasonable Dispositions. Subsection (a) follows former Section 9-504 by permitting a secured party to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner following a default. Although subsection (b) permits both public and private dispositions, "every aspect of a disposition . . . must be commercially reasonable." This Section encourages private dispositions on the assumption that they frequently will result in higher realization on collateral for the benefit of all concerned. Subsection (a) does not restrict dispositions to sales; collateral may be sold, leased, licensed, or otherwise disposed. Section 9-627 provides guidance for determining the circumstances under which a disposition is "commercially reasonable."
3. Time of Disposition. This Article does not specify a period within which a secured party must dispose of collateral. This is consistent with this Article's policy to encourage private dispositions through regular commercial channels. It may, for example, be prudent not to dispose of goods when the market has collapsed. Or, it might be more appropriate to sell a large inventory in parcels over a period of time instead of in bulk. Of course, under subsection (b) every aspect of a disposition of collateral must be commercially reasonable. This requirement explicitly includes the "method, manner, time, place and other terms." For example, if a secured party does not proceed under Section 9-620 and holds collateral for a long period of time without disposing of it, and if there is no good reason for not making a prompt disposition, the secured party may be determined not to have acted in a "commercially reasonable" manner. See also Section 1-203 (general obligation of good faith).
4. Pre-Disposition Preparation and Processing. Former Section 9-504(1) appeared to give the secured party the choice of disposing of collateral either "in its then condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing." Some courts held that the "commercially reasonable" standard of former Section 9-504(3) nevertheless could impose an affirmative duty on the secured party to process or prepare the collateral prior to disposition. Subsection (a) retains the substance of the quoted language. Although courts should not be quick to impose a duty of preparation or processing on the secured party, subsection (a) does not grant the secured party the right to dispose of the collateral "in its then condition" under all circumstances. A secured party may not dispose of collateral "in its then condition" when, taking into account the costs and probable benefits of preparation or processing and the fact that the secured party would be advancing the costs at its risk, it would be commercially unreasonable to dispose of the collateral in that condition.
5. Disposition by Junior Secured Party. Disposition rights under subsection (a) are not limited to first-priority security interests. Rather, any secured party as to whom there has been a default enjoys the right to dispose of collateral under this subsection. The exercise of this right by a secured party whose security interest is subordinate to that of another secured party does not of itself constitute a conversion or otherwise give rise to liability in favor of the holder of the senior security interest. Section 9-615 addresses application of the proceeds of a disposition by a junior secured party. Under Section 9-615(a), a junior secured party owes no obligation to apply the proceeds of disposition to the satisfaction of obligations secured by a senior security interest. Section 9-615(g) builds on this general rule by protecting certain juniors from claims of a senior concerning cash proceeds of the disposition. Even if a senior were to have a non-Article 9 claim to proceeds of a junior's disposition, Section 9-615(g) would protect a junior that acts in good faith and without knowledge that its actions violate the rights of a senior party. Because the disposition by a junior would not cut off a senior's security interest or other lien (see Section 9-617), in many (probably most) cases the junior's receipt of the cash proceeds would not violate the rights of the senior.
The holder of a senior security interest is entitled, by virtue of its priority, to take possession of collateral from the junior secured party and conduct its own disposition, provided that the senior enjoys the right to take possession of the collateral from the debtor. See Section 9-609. The holder of a junior security interest normally must notify the senior secured party of an impending disposition. See Section 9-611. Regardless of whether the senior receives a notification from the junior, the junior's disposition does not of itself discharge the senior's security interest. See Section 9-617. Unless the senior secured party has authorized the disposition free and clear of its security interest, the senior's security interest ordinarily will survive the disposition by the junior and continue under Section 9-315(a). If the senior enjoys the right to repossess the collateral from the debtor, the senior likewise may recover the collateral from the transferee.
When a secured party's collateral is encumbered by another security interest or other lien, one of the claimants may seek to invoke the equitable doctrine of marshaling. As explained by the Supreme Court, that doctrine "rests upon the principle that a creditor having two funds to satisfy his debt, may not by his application of them to his demand, defeat another creditor, who may resort to only one of the funds." Meyer v. United States, 375 U.S. 233, 236 (1963), quoting Sowell v. Federal Reserve Bank, 268 U.S. 449, 456-57 (1925). The purpose of the doctrine is "to prevent the arbitrary action of a senior lienor from destroying the rights of a junior lienor or a creditor having less security." Id. at 237. Because it is an equitable doctrine, marshaling "is applied only when it can be equitably fashioned as to all of the parties" having an interest in the property. Id. This Article leaves courts free to determine whether marshaling is appropriate in any given case. See Section 1-103.
6. Security Interests of Equal Rank. Sometimes two security interests enjoy the same priority. This situation may arise by contract, e.g., pursuant to "equal and ratable" provisions in indentures, or by operation of law. See Section 9-328(6). This Article treats a security interest having equal priority like a senior security interest in many respects. Assume, for example, that SP-X and SP-Y enjoy equal priority, SP-W is senior to them, and SP-Z is junior. If SP-X disposes of the collateral under this Section, then (i) SP-W's and SP-Y's security interests survive the disposition but SP-Z's does not, see Section 9-617, and (ii) neither SP-W nor SP-Y is entitled to receive a distribution of proceeds, but SP-Z is. See Section 9-615(a)(3).
When one considers the ability to obtain possession of the collateral, a secured party with equal priority is unlike a senior secured party. As the senior secured party, SP-W should enjoy the right to possession as against SP-X. See Section 9-609, Comment 5. If SP-W takes possession and disposes of the collateral under this Section, it is entitled to apply the proceeds to satisfy its secured claim. SP-Y, however, should not have such a right to take possession from SP-X; otherwise, once SP-Y took possession from SP-X, SP-X would have the right to get possession from SP-Y, which would be obligated to redeliver possession to SP-X, and so on. Resolution of this problem is left to the parties and, if necessary, the courts.
7. Public vs. Private Dispositions. This Part maintains two distinctions between "public" and other dispositions: (i) the secured party may buy at the former, but normally not at the latter (Section 9-610(c)), and (ii) the debtor is entitled to notification of "the time and place of a public disposition" and notification of "the time after which" a private disposition or other intended disposition is to be made (Section 9-613(1)(E)). It does not retain the distinction under former Section 9-504(4), under which transferees in a noncomplying public disposition could lose protection more easily than transferees in other noncomplying dispositions. Instead, Section 9-617(b) adopts a unitary standard. Although the term is not defined, as used in this Article, a "public disposition" is one at which the price is determined after the public has had a meaningful opportunity for competitive bidding. "Meaningful opportunity" is meant to imply that some form of advertisement or public notice must precede the sale (or other disposition) and that the public must have access to the sale (disposition).
8. Investment Property. Dispositions of investment property may be regulated by the federal securities laws. Although a "public" disposition of securities under this Article may implicate the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, it need not do so. A disposition that qualifies for a "private placement" exemption under the Securities Act of 1933 nevertheless may constitute a "public" disposition within the meaning of this Section. Moreover, the "commercially reasonable" requirements of subsection (b) need not prevent a secured party from conducting a foreclosure sale without the issuer's compliance with federal registration requirements.
9. "Recognized Market." A "recognized market," as used in subsection (c) and Section 9-611(d), is one in which the items sold are fungible and prices are not subject to individual negotiation. For example, the New York Stock Exchange is a recognized market. A market in which prices are individually negotiated or the items are not fungible is not a recognized market, even if the items are the subject of widely disseminated price guides or are disposed of through dealer auctions.
10. Relevance of Price. While not itself sufficient to establish a violation of this Part, a low price suggests that a court should scrutinize carefully all aspects of a disposition to ensure that each aspect was commercially reasonable. Note also that even if the disposition is commercially reasonable, Section 9-615(f) provides a special method for calculating a deficiency or surplus if (i) the transferee in the disposition is the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor, and (ii) the amount of proceeds of the disposition is significantly below the range of proceeds that a complying disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor would have brought.
11. Warranties. Subsection (d) affords the transferee in a disposition under this Section the benefit of any title, possession, quiet enjoyment, and similar warranties that would have accompanied the disposition by operation of non-Article 9 law had the disposition been conducted under other circumstances. For example, the Article 2 warranty of title would apply to a sale of goods, the analogous warranties of Article 2A would apply to a lease of goods, and any common-law warranties of title would apply to dispositions of other types of collateral. See, e.g., Restatement (2d), Contracts Section 333 (warranties of assignor).
Subsection (e) explicitly provides that these warranties can be disclaimed either under other applicable law or by communicating a record containing an express disclaimer. The record need not be written, but an oral communication would not be sufficient. See Section 9-102 (definition of "record"). Subsection (f) provides a sample of wording that will effectively exclude the warranties in a disposition under this Section, whether or not the exclusion would be effective under non-Article 9 law.
The warranties incorporated by subsection (d) are those relating to "title, possession, quiet enjoyment, and the like." Depending on the circumstances, a disposition under this Section also may give rise to other statutory or implied warranties, e.g., warranties of quality or fitness for purpose. Law other than this Article determines whether such other warranties apply to a disposition under this Section. Other law also determines issues relating to disclaimer of such warranties. For example, a foreclosure sale of a car by a car dealer could give rise to an implied warranty of merchantability (Section 2-314) unless effectively disclaimed or modified (Section 2-316).
This Section's approach to these warranties conflicts with the former Comment to Section 2-312. This Article rejects the baseline assumption that commercially reasonable dispositions under this Section are out of the ordinary commercial course or peculiar. The Comment to Section 2-312 has been revised accordingly.
Section 36-9-611. Notification before disposition of collateral.
(a) In this section, 'notification date' means the earlier of the date on which:
(1) a secured party sends to the debtor and any secondary obligor an authenticated notification of disposition; or
(2) the debtor and any secondary obligor waive the right to notification.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), a secured party that disposes of collateral under Section 36-9-610 shall send to the persons specified in subsection (c) a reasonable authenticated notification of disposition.
(c) To comply with subsection (b), the secured party shall send an authenticated notification of disposition to:
(1) the debtor;
(2) any secondary obligor; and
(3) if the collateral is other than consumer goods:
(A) any other person from which the secured party has received, before the notification date, an authenticated notification of a claim of an interest in the collateral;
(B) any other secured party or lienholder that, ten days before the notification date, held a security interest in or other lien on the collateral perfected by the filing of a financing statement that:
( i) identified the collateral;
( ii) was indexed under the debtor's name as of that date; and
(iii) was filed in the office in which to file a financing statement against the debtor covering the collateral as of that date; and
(C) any other secured party that, ten days before the notification date, held a security interest in the collateral perfected by compliance with a statute, regulation, or treaty described in Section 36-9-311(a).
(d) Subsection (b) does not apply if the collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market.
(e) A secured party complies with the requirement for notification prescribed by subsection (c)(3)(B) if:
(1) not later than twenty days or earlier than thirty days before the notification date, the secured party requests, in a commercially reasonable manner, information concerning financing statements indexed under the debtor's name in the office indicated in subsection (c)(3)(B); and
(2) before the notification date, the secured party:
(A) did not receive a response to the request for information; or
(B) received a response to the request for information and sent an authenticated notification of disposition to each secured party or other lienholder named in that response whose financing statement covered the collateral.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-504(3).
2. Reasonable Notification. This Section requires a secured party who wishes to dispose of collateral under Section 9-610 to send "a reasonable authenticated notification of disposition" to specified interested persons, subject to certain exceptions. The notification must be reasonable as to the manner in which it is sent, its timeliness (i.e., a reasonable time before the disposition is to take place), and its content. See Sections 9-612 (timeliness of notification), 9-613 (contents of notification generally), 9-614 (contents of notification in consumer-goods transactions).
3. Notification to Debtors and Secondary Obligors. This Section imposes a duty to send notification of a disposition not only to the debtor but also to any secondary obligor. Subsections (b) and (c) resolve an uncertainty under former Article 9 by providing that secondary obligors (sureties) are entitled to receive notification of an intended disposition of collateral, regardless of who created the security interest in the collateral. If the surety created the security interest, it would be the debtor. If it did not, it would be a secondary obligor. (This Article also resolves the question of the secondary obligor's ability to waive, pre-default, the right to notification-waiver generally is not permitted. See Section 9-602.) Section 9-605 relieves a secured party from any duty to send notification to a debtor or secondary obligor unknown to the secured party.
Under subsection (b), the principal obligor (borrower) is not always entitled to notification of disposition.
Example: Behnfeldt borrows on an unsecured basis, and Bruno grants a security interest in her car to secure the debt. Behnfeldt is a primary obligor, not a secondary obligor. As such, she is not entitled to notification of disposition under this Section.
4. Notification to Other Secured Parties. Prior to the 1972 amendments to Article 9, former Section 9-504(3) required the enforcing secured party to send reasonable notification of the disposition:
except in the case of consumer goods to any other person who has a security interest in the collateral and who has duly filed a financing statement indexed in the name of the debtor in this State or who is known by the secured party to have a security interest in the collateral.
The 1972 amendments eliminated the duty to give notice to secured parties other than those from whom the foreclosing secured party had received written notice of a claim of an interest in the collateral.
Many of the problems arising from dispositions of collateral encumbered by multiple security interests can be ameliorated or solved by informing all secured parties of an intended disposition and affording them the opportunity to work with one another. To this end, subsection (c)(3)(B) expands the duties of the foreclosing secured party to include the duty to notify (and the corresponding burden of searching the files to discover) certain competing secured parties. The subsection imposes a search burden that in some cases may be greater than the pre-1972 burden on foreclosing secured parties but certainly is more modest than that faced by a new secured lender.
To determine who is entitled to notification, the foreclosing secured party must determine the proper office for filing a financing statement as of a particular date, measured by reference to the "notification date," as defined in subsection (a). This determination requires reference to the choice-of-law provisions of Part 3. The secured party must ascertain whether any financing statements covering the collateral and indexed under the debtor's name, as the name existed as of that date, in fact were filed in that office. The foreclosing secured party generally need not notify secured parties whose effective financing statements have become more difficult to locate because of changes in the location of the debtor, proceeds rules, or changes in the debtor's name.
Under subsection (c)(3)(C), the secured party also must notify a secured party who has perfected a security interest by complying with a statute or treaty described in Section 9-311(a), such as a certificate-of-title statute.
Subsection (e) provides a "safe harbor" that takes into account the delays that may be attendant to receiving information from the public filing offices. It provides, generally, that the secured party will be deemed to have satisfied its notification duty under subsection (c)(3)(B) if it requests a search from the proper office at least 20 but not more than 30 days before sending notification to the debtor and if it also sends a notification to all secured parties (and other lienholders) reflected on the search report. The secured party's duty under subsection (c)(3)(B) also will be satisfied if the secured party requests but does not receive a search report before the notification is sent to the debtor. Thus, if subsection (e) applies, a secured party who is entitled to notification under subsection (c)(3)(B) has no remedy against a foreclosing secured party who does not send the notification. The foreclosing secured party has complied with the notification requirement. Subsection (e) has no effect on the requirements of the other paragraphs of subsection (c). For example, if the foreclosing secured party received a notification from the holder of a conflicting security interest in accordance with subsection (c)(3)(A) but failed to send to the holder a notification of the disposition, the holder of the conflicting security interest would have the right to recover any loss under Section 9-625(b).
5. Authentication Requirement. Subsections (b) and (c) explicitly provide that a notification of disposition must be "authenticated." Some cases read former Section 9-504(3) as validating oral notification.
6. Second Try. This Article leaves to judicial resolution, based upon the facts of each case, the question whether the requirement of "reasonable notification" requires a "second try," i.e., whether a secured party who sends notification and learns that the debtor did not receive it must attempt to locate the debtor and send another notification.
7. Recognized Market; Perishable Collateral. New subsection (d) makes it clear that there is no obligation to give notification of a disposition in the case of perishable collateral or collateral customarily sold on a recognized market (e.g., marketable securities). Former Section 9-504(3) might be read (incorrectly) to relieve the secured party from its duty to notify a debtor but not from its duty to notify other secured parties in connection with dispositions of such collateral.
8. Failure to Conduct Notified Disposition. Nothing in this Article prevents a secured party from electing not to conduct a disposition after sending a notification. Nor does this Article prevent a secured party from electing to send a revised notification if its plans for disposition change. This assumes, however, that the secured party acts in good faith, the revised notification is reasonable, and the revised plan for disposition and any attendant delay are commercially reasonable.
9. Waiver. A debtor or secondary obligor may waive the right to notification under this Section only by a post-default authenticated agreement. See Section 9-624(a).
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Former Section 36-9-504(3) required a secured party to send notification of a disposition of collateral to the debtor. Under former Section 36-9-105(d)(1) a debtor is a person who owes payment or performance of an obligation secured by a security interest. An issue of some uncertainty under former law was whether a secured party was required to send notification of a disposition of collateral to a guarantor or other surety for the principal debtor under a secured obligation. Section 36-9-611(c)(2) clarifies the law by requiring the secured party to send authenticated notification to "secondary obligors." The term secondary obligor is defined in Section 36-9-102(a)(71) to include persons whose obligation to pay a secured obligation is secondary or who have a right of recourse against the debtor, another obligor, or the property of either.
The leading South Carolina case under former Section 36-9-504(3) addressing a secured party's duty to send notification to a debtor's sureties is Crane v. Citicorp National Services, Inc., 313 S.C. 70, 437 S.E. 2d 50 (1993). In that case the Cranes purchased a mobile home pursuant to a sales contract that granted the seller a security interest in the mobile home. The contract was assigned to Citicorp. A year later the Cranes sold their interest in the mobile home to Allen but remained co-liable with Allen on the debt to Citicorp. After Allen defaulted Citicorp repossessed the mobile home and sold it at a private sale without giving the Cranes notice of the sale. The Cranes brought an action for damages under former Section 36-9-507(1).
The Court in Crane held that the Cranes were entitled to notification of the sale under former Section 36-9-504(3) because as co-obligators the Cranes were debtors as defined in former Section 36-9-105(d). The Court asserted that the Cranes' obligation to Citicorp was analogous to that of a guarantor and noted that most courts had held that guarantors were debtors entitled to notice of a disposition of collateral.
The Cranes would not qualify as debtors under Section 36-9-102(a)(A) because they had no interest in the mobile home at the time of the repossession. Therefore, the Cranes would not be entitled to notification of the disposition under Section 36-9-611(c)(1). Nevertheless, if the Cranes qualified as "secondary obligors" as defined in Section 36-9-102(a)(71) they would be entitled to notification under Section 36-9-611(c)(2).
The Official Comments to Section 9-102 provide that one must consult the law of suretyship to determine whether an obligation is secondary for purposes of Section 36-9-102(a)(71)(A). Section 36-9-102, Official Comment 2.a. Under South Carolina law when a mortgagor transfers his interest in property subject to a mortgage or when the grantee assumes the mortgage, the mortgagor becomes secondarily liable on the mortgage debt. See United Carolina Bank v. Caroprop. Ltd., 316 S.C. 1, 446 S.E. 2d 415 (1994); Dunn v. Chapman, 149 S.C. 163, 146 S.E. 818 (1929); Walker v. Queen Insurance Co., 136 S.C. 144, 134 S.E. 236 (1926). Since Allen purchased the mobile home subject to the Citicorp's security interest, under South Carolina law the Cranes became secondarily liable on the mortgage debt. As a result, if Sections 36-9-102(a)(71) and 36-9-611(c)(2) had applied the Cranes would have been entitled to notification of Citicorp's disposition of the mobile home.
Section 36-9-612. Timeliness of notification before disposition of collateral.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), whether a notification is sent within a reasonable time is a question of fact.
(b) In a transaction other than a consumer transaction, a notification of disposition sent after default and ten days or more before the earliest time of disposition set forth in the notification is sent within a reasonable time before the disposition.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Reasonable Notification. Section 9-611(b) requires the secured party to send a "reasonable authenticated notification." Under that Section, as under former Section 9-504(3), one aspect of a reasonable notification is its timeliness. This generally means that the notification must be sent at a reasonable time in advance of the date of a public disposition or the date after which a private disposition is to be made. A notification that is sent so near to the disposition date that a notified person could not be expected to act on or take account of the notification would be unreasonable.
3. Timeliness of Notification: Safe Harbor. The 10-day notice period in subsection (b) is intended to be a "safe harbor" and not a minimum requirement. To qualify for the "safe harbor" the notification must be sent after default. A notification also must be sent in a commercially reasonable manner. See Section 9-611(b) ("reasonable authenticated notification"). Those requirements prevent a secured party from taking advantage of the "safe harbor" by, for example, giving the debtor a notification at the time of the original extension of credit or sending the notice by surface mail to a debtor overseas.
Section 36-9-613. Contents and form of notification before disposition of collateral: general.
Except in a consumer-goods transaction, the following rules apply:
(1) The contents of a notification of disposition are sufficient if the notification:
(A) describes the debtor and the secured party;
(B) describes the collateral that is the subject of the intended disposition;
(C) states the method of intended disposition;
(D) states that the debtor is entitled to an accounting of the unpaid indebtedness and states the charge, if any, for an accounting; and
(E) states the time and place of a public sale or the time after which any other disposition is to be made.
(2) Whether the contents of a notification that lacks any of the information specified in item (1) are nevertheless sufficient is a question of fact.
(3) The contents of a notification providing substantially the information specified in item (1) are sufficient, even if the notification includes:
(A) information not specified by that item; or
(B) minor errors that are not seriously misleading.
(4) A particular phrasing of the notification is not required.
(5) The following form of notification and the form appearing in Section 36-9-614(3), when completed, each provides sufficient information:
'NOTIFICATION OF DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL
To: [Name of debtor, obligor, or other person to which the notification is sent]
From: [Name, address, and telephone number of secured party]
Name of Debtor(s): [Include only if debtor(s) are not an addressee]
[For a public disposition:]
We will sell [or lease or license, as applicable] the [describe collateral] [to the highest qualified bidder] in public as follows:
Day and Date:
Time:
Place:
We will sell [or lease or license, as applicable] the [describe collateral] privately sometime after [day and date].
You are entitled to an accounting of the unpaid indebtedness secured by the property that we intend to sell [or lease or license, as applicable] [for a charge of $ ]. You may request an accounting by calling us at [telephone number]'.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Contents of Notification. To comply with the "reasonable authenticated notification" requirement of Section 9-611(b), the contents of a notification must be reasonable. Except in a consumer-goods transaction, the contents of a notification that includes the information set forth in paragraph (1) are sufficient as a matter of law, unless the parties agree otherwise. (The reference to "time" of disposition means here, as it did in former Section 9-504(3), not only the hour of the day but also the date.) Although a secured party may choose to include additional information concerning the transaction or the debtor's rights and obligations, no additional information is required unless the parties agree otherwise. A notification that lacks some of the information set forth in paragraph (1) nevertheless may be sufficient if found to be reasonable by the trier of fact, under paragraph (2). A properly completed sample form of notification in paragraph (5) or in Section 9-614(a)(3) is an example of a notification that would contain the information set forth in paragraph (1). Under paragraph (4), however, no particular phrasing of the notification is required.
Section 36-9-614. Contents and form of notification before disposition of collateral: consumer-goods transaction.
In a consumer-goods transaction, the following rules apply:
(1) A notification of disposition must provide the following information:
(A) the information specified in Section 36-9-613(1);
(B) a description of any liability for a deficiency of the person to which the notification is sent;
(C) a telephone number from which the amount that must be paid to the secured party to redeem the collateral under Section 36-9-623 is available; and
(D) a telephone number or mailing address from which additional information concerning the disposition and the obligation secured is available.
(2) A particular phrasing of the notification is not required.
(3) The following form of notification, when completed, provides sufficient information:
'[Name and address of secured party]
[Date]
NOTICE OF OUR PLAN TO SELL PROPERTY
[Name and address of any obligor who is also a debtor]
Subject: [Identification of Transaction]
We have your [describe collateral], because you broke promises in our agreement.
[For a public disposition:]
We will sell [describe collateral] at public sale. A sale could include a lease or license. The sale will be held as follows:
Date:
Time:
Place:
You may attend the sale and bring bidders if you want.
[For a private disposition:]
We will sell [describe collateral] at private sale sometime after [date]. A sale could include a lease or license.
The money that we get from the sale (after paying our costs) will reduce the amount you owe. If we get less money than you owe, you [will or will not, as applicable] still owe us the difference. If we get more money than you owe, you will get the extra money, unless we must pay it to someone else.
You can get the property back at any time before we sell it by paying us the full amount you owe (not just the past due payments), including our expenses. To learn the exact amount you must pay, call us at [telephone number].
If you want us to explain to you in writing how we have figured the amount that you owe us, you may call us at [telephone number] [or write us at [secured party's address] and request a written explanation. [We will charge you $ for the explanation if we sent you another written explanation of the amount you owe us within the last six months.]
If you need more information about the sale call us at [telephone number] [or write us at [secured party's address].
We are sending this notice to the following other people who have an interest in [describe collateral] or who owe money under your agreement:
[Names of all other debtors and obligors, if any]'
(4) A notification in the form of item (3) is sufficient, even if additional information appears at the end of the form.
(5) A notification in the form of item (3) is sufficient, even if it includes errors in information not required by item (1), unless the error is misleading with respect to rights arising under this chapter.
(6) If a notification under this section is not in the form of item (3), law other than this chapter determines the effect of including information not required by item (1).
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Notification in Consumer-Goods Transactions. Paragraph (1) sets forth the information required for a reasonable notification in a consumer-goods transaction. A notification that lacks any of the information set forth in paragraph (1) is insufficient as a matter of law. Compare Section 9-613(2), under which the trier of fact may find a notification to be sufficient even if it lacks some information listed in paragraph (1) of that Section.
3. Safe-Harbor Form of Notification; Errors in Information. Although paragraph (2) provides that a particular phrasing of a notification is not required, paragraph (3) specifies a safe-harbor form that, when properly completed, satisfies paragraph (1). Paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) contain special rules applicable to erroneous and additional information. Under paragraph (4), a notification in the safe-harbor form specified in paragraph (3) is not rendered insufficient if it contains additional information at the end of the form. Paragraph (5) provides that non-misleading errors in information contained in a notification are permitted if the safe-harbor form is used and if the errors are in information not required by paragraph (1). Finally, if a notification is in a form other than the paragraph (3) safe-harbor form, other law determines the effect of including in the notification information other than that required by paragraph (1).
Section 36-9-615. Application of proceeds of disposition; liability for deficiency and right to surplus.
(a) A secured party shall apply or pay over for application the cash proceeds of disposition in the following order to:
(1) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for disposition, processing, and disposing, and, to the extent provided for by agreement and not prohibited by law, reasonable attorney's fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured party;
(2) the satisfaction of obligations secured by the security interest or agricultural lien under which the disposition is made;
(3) the satisfaction of obligations secured by any subordinate security interest in or other subordinate lien on the collateral if:
(A) the secured party receives from the holder of the subordinate security interest or other lien an authenticated demand for proceeds before distribution of the proceeds is completed; and
(B) in a case in which a consignor has an interest in the collateral, the subordinate security interest or other lien is senior to the interest of the consignor; and
(4) a secured party that is a consignor of the collateral if the secured party receives from the consignor an authenticated demand for proceeds before distribution of the proceeds is completed.
(b) If requested by a secured party, a holder of a subordinate security interest or other lien shall furnish reasonable proof of the interest or lien within a reasonable time. Unless the holder does so, the secured party need not comply with the holder's demand under subsection (a)(3).
(c) A secured party need not apply or pay over for application noncash proceeds of disposition under this Section unless the failure to do so would be commercially unreasonable. A secured party that applies or pays over for application noncash proceeds shall do so in a commercially reasonable manner.
(d) If the security interest under which a disposition is made secures payment or performance of an obligation, after making the payments and applications required by subsection (a) and permitted by subsection (c):
(1) unless subsection (a)(4) requires the secured party to apply or pay over cash proceeds to a consignor, the secured party shall account to and pay a debtor for any surplus; and
(2) the obligor is liable for any deficiency.
(e) If the underlying transaction is a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes:
(1) the debtor is not entitled to any surplus; and
(2) the obligor is not liable for any deficiency.
(f) The surplus or deficiency following a disposition is calculated based on the amount of proceeds that would have been realized in a disposition complying with this part to a transferee other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor if:
(1) the transferee in the disposition is the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor; and
(2) the amount of proceeds of the disposition is significantly below the range of proceeds that a complying disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor would have brought.
(g) A secured party that receives cash proceeds of a disposition in good faith and without knowledge that the receipt violates the rights of the holder of a security interest or other lien that is not subordinate to the security interest or agricultural lien under which the disposition is made:
(1) takes the cash proceeds free of the security interest or other lien;
(2) is not obligated to apply the proceeds of the disposition to the satisfaction of obligations secured by the security interest or other lien; and
(3) is not obligated to account to or pay the holder of the security interest or other lien for any surplus.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-504(1), (2).
2. Application of Proceeds. This Section contains the rules governing application of proceeds and the debtor's liability for a deficiency following a disposition of collateral. Subsection (a) sets forth the basic order of application. The proceeds are applied first to the expenses of disposition, second to the obligation secured by the security interest that is being enforced, and third, in the specified circumstances, to interests that are subordinate to that security interest.
Subsections (a) and (d) also address the right of a consignor to receive proceeds of a disposition by a secured party whose interest is senior to that of the consignor. Subsection (a) requires the enforcing secured party to pay excess proceeds first to subordinate secured parties or lienholders whose interests are senior to that of a consignor and, finally, to a consignor. Inasmuch as a consignor is the owner of the collateral, secured parties and lienholders whose interests are junior to the consignor's interest will not be entitled to any proceeds. In like fashion, under subsection (d)(1) the debtor is not entitled to a surplus when the enforcing secured party is required to pay over proceeds to a consignor.
3. Noncash Proceeds. Subsection (c) addresses the application of noncash proceeds of a disposition, such as a note or lease. The explanation in Section 9-608, Comment 4, generally applies to this subsection.
Example: A secured party in the business of selling or financing automobiles takes possession of collateral (an automobile) following its debtor's default. The secured party decides to sell the automobile in a private disposition under Section 9-610 and sends appropriate notification under Section 9-611. After undertaking its normal credit investigation and in accordance with its normal credit policies, the secured party sells the automobile on credit, on terms typical of the credit terms normally extended by the secured party in the ordinary course of its business. The automobile stands as collateral for the remaining balance of the price. The noncash proceeds received by the secured party are chattel paper. The secured party may wish to credit its debtor (the assignor) with the principal amount of the chattel paper or may wish to credit the debtor only as and when the payments are made on the chattel paper by the buyer.
Under subsection (c), the secured party is under no duty to apply the noncash proceeds (here, the chattel paper) or their value to the secured obligation unless its failure to do so would commercially unreasonable. If a secured party elects to apply the chattel paper to the outstanding obligation, however, it must do so in a commercially reasonable manner. The facts in the example indicate that it would be commercially unreasonable for the secured party to fail to apply the value of the chattel paper to the original debtor's secured obligation. Unlike the example in Comment 4 to Section 9-608, the noncash proceeds received in this example are of the type that the secured party regularly generates in the ordinary course of its financing business in nonforeclosure transactions. The original debtor should not be exposed to delay or uncertainty in this situation. Of course, there will be many situations that fall between the examples presented in the Comment to Section 9-608 and in this Comment. This Article leaves their resolution to the court based on the facts of each case.
One would expect that where noncash proceeds are or may be material, the secured party and debtor would agree to more specific standards in an agreement entered into before or after default. The parties may agree to the method of application of noncash proceeds if the method is not manifestly unreasonable. See Section 9-603.
When the secured party is not required to "apply or pay over for application noncash proceeds," the proceeds nonetheless remain collateral subject to this Article. See Section 9-608, Comment 4.
4. Surplus and Deficiency. Subsection (d) deals with surplus and deficiency. It revises former Section 9-504(2) by imposing an explicit requirement that the secured party "pay" the debtor for any surplus, while retaining the secured party's duty to "account." Inasmuch as the debtor may not be an obligor, subsection (d) provides that the obligor (not the debtor) is liable for the deficiency. The special rule governing surplus and deficiency when receivables have been sold likewise takes into account the distinction between a debtor and an obligor. Subsection (d) also addresses the situation in which a consignor has an interest that is subordinate to the security interest being enforced.
5. Collateral Under New Ownership. When the debtor sells collateral subject to a security interest, the original debtor (creator of the security interest) is no longer a debtor inasmuch as it no longer has a property interest in the collateral; the buyer is the debtor. See Section 9-102. As between the debtor (buyer of the collateral) and the original debtor (seller of the collateral), the debtor (buyer) normally would be entitled to the surplus following a disposition. Subsection (d) therefore requires the secured party to pay the surplus to the debtor (buyer), not to the original debtor (seller) with which it has dealt. But, because this situation typically arises as a result of the debtor's wrongful act, this Article does not expose the secured party to the risk of determining ownership of the collateral. If the secured party does not know about the buyer and accordingly pays the surplus to the original debtor, the exculpatory provisions of this Article exonerate the secured party from liability to the buyer. See Sections 9-605, 9-628(a), (b). If a debtor sells collateral free of a security interest, as in a sale to a buyer in ordinary course of business (see Section 9-320(a)), the property is no longer collateral and the buyer is not a debtor.
6. Certain "Low-Price" Dispositions. Subsection (f) provides a special method for calculating a deficiency or surplus when the secured party, a person related to the secured party (defined in Section 9-102), or a secondary obligor acquires the collateral at a foreclosure disposition. It recognizes that when the foreclosing secured party or a related party is the transferee of the collateral, the secured party sometimes lacks the incentive to maximize the proceeds of disposition. As a consequence, the disposition may comply with the procedural requirements of this Article (e.g., it is conducted in a commercially reasonable manner following reasonable notice) but nevertheless fetch a low price.
Subsection (f) adjusts for this lack of incentive. If the proceeds of a disposition of collateral to a secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor are "significantly below the range of proceeds that a complying disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor would have brought," then instead of calculating a deficiency (or surplus) based on the actual net proceeds, the calculation is based upon the amount that would have been received in a commercially reasonable disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor. Subsection (f) thus rejects the view that the secured party's receipt of such a price necessarily constitutes noncompliance with Part 6. However, such a price may suggest the need for greater judicial scrutiny. See Section 9-610, Comment 10.
7. "Person Related To." Section 9-102 defines "person related to." That term is a key element of the system provided in subsection (f) for low-price dispositions. One part of the definition applies when the secured party is an individual, and the other applies when the secured party is an organization. The definition is patterned closely on the corresponding definition in Section 1.301(32) of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
Section 36-9-616. Explanation of calculation of surplus or deficiency.
(a) In this section:
(1) 'Explanation' means a writing that:
(A) states the amount of the surplus or deficiency;
(B) provides an explanation in accordance with subsection (c) of how the secured party calculated the surplus or deficiency;
(C) states, if applicable, that future debits, credits, charges, including additional credit service charges or interest, rebates, and expenses may affect the amount of the surplus or deficiency; and
(D) provides a telephone number or mailing address from which additional information concerning the transaction is available.
(2) 'Request' means a record:
(A) authenticated by a debtor or consumer obligor;
(B) requesting that the recipient provide an explanation; and
(C) sent after disposition of the collateral under Section 36-9-610.
(b) In a consumer-goods transaction in which the debtor is entitled to a surplus or a consumer obligor is liable for a deficiency under Section 36-9-615, the secured party shall:
(1) send an explanation to the debtor or consumer obligor, as applicable, after the disposition and:
(A) before or when the secured party accounts to the debtor and pays any surplus or first makes written demand on the consumer obligor after the disposition for payment of the deficiency; and
(B) within fourteen days after receipt of a request; or
(2) in the case of a consumer obligor who is liable for a deficiency, within fourteen days after receipt of a request, send to the consumer obligor a record waiving the secured party's right to a deficiency.
(c) To comply with subsection (a)(1)(B), a writing must provide the following information in the following order:
(1) the aggregate amount of obligations secured by the security interest under which the disposition was made, and, if the amount reflects a rebate of unearned interest or credit service charge, an indication of that fact, calculated as of a specified date:
(A) if the secured party takes or receives possession of the collateral after default, not more than thirty-five days before the secured party takes or receives possession; or
(B) if the secured party takes or receives possession of the collateral before default or does not take possession of the collateral, not more than thirty-five days before the disposition;
(2) the amount of proceeds of the disposition;
(3) the aggregate amount of the obligations after deducting the amount of proceeds;
(4) the amount, in the aggregate or by type, and types of expenses, including expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for disposition, processing, and disposing of the collateral, and attorney's fees secured by the collateral which are known to the secured party and relate to the current disposition;
(5) the amount, in the aggregate or by type, and types of credits, including rebates of interest or credit service charges, to which the obligor is known to be entitled and which are not reflected in the amount in item (1); and
(6) the amount of the surplus or deficiency.
(d) A particular phrasing of the explanation is not required. An explanation complying substantially with the requirements of subsection (a) is sufficient, even if it includes minor errors that are not seriously misleading.
(e) A debtor or consumer obligor is entitled without charge to one response to a request under this section during any six-month period in which the secured party did not send to the debtor or consumer obligor an explanation pursuant to subsection (b)(1). The secured party may require payment of a charge not exceeding twenty-five dollars for each additional response.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Duty to Send Information Concerning Surplus or Deficiency. This Section reflects the view that, in every consumer-goods transaction, the debtor or obligor is entitled to know the amount of a surplus or deficiency and the basis upon which the surplus or deficiency was calculated. Under subsection (b)(1), a secured party is obligated to provide this information (an "explanation," defined in subsection (a)(1)) no later than the time that it accounts for and pays a surplus or the time of its first written attempt to collect the deficiency. The obligor need not make a request for an accounting in order to receive an explanation. A secured party who does not attempt to collect a deficiency in writing or account for and pay a surplus has no obligation to send an explanation under subsection (b)(1) and, consequently, cannot be liable for noncompliance.
A debtor or secondary obligor need not wait until the secured party commences written collection efforts in order to receive an explanation of how a deficiency or surplus was calculated. Subsection (b)(2) obliges the secured party to send an explanation within 14 days after it receives a "request" (defined in subsection (a)(2)).
3. Explanation of Calculation of Surplus or Deficiency. Subsection (c) contains the requirements for how a calculation of a surplus or deficiency must be explained in order to satisfy subsection (a)(1)(B). It gives a secured party some discretion concerning rebates of interest or credit service charges. The secured party may include these rebates in the aggregate amount of obligations secured, under subsection (c)(1), or may include them with other types of rebates and credits under subsection (c)(5). Rebates of interest or credit service charges are the only types of rebates for which this discretion is provided. If the secured party provides an explanation that includes rebates of pre-computed interest, its explanation must so indicate. The expenses and attorney's fees to be described pursuant to subsection (c)(4) are those relating to the most recent disposition, not those that may have been incurred in connection with earlier enforcement efforts and which have been resolved by the parties.
4. Liability for Noncompliance. A secured party who fails to comply with subsection (b)(2) is liable for any loss caused plus $500. See Section 9-625(b), (c), (e)(6). A secured party who fails to send an explanation under subsection (b)(1) is liable for any loss caused plus, if the noncompliance was "part of a pattern, or consistent with a practice of noncompliance," $500. See Section 9-625(b), (c), (e)(5). However, a secured party who fails to comply with this Section is not liable for statutory minimum damages under Section 9-625(c)(2). See Section 9-628(d).
Section 36-9-617. Rights of transferee of collateral.
(a) A secured party's disposition of collateral after default:
(1) transfers to a transferee for value all of the debtor's rights in the collateral;
(2) discharges the security interest under which the disposition is made; and
(3) discharges any subordinate security interest or other subordinate lien [other than liens created under [cite acts or statutes providing for liens, if any, that are not to be discharged]].
(b) A transferee that acts in good faith takes free of the rights and interests described in subsection (a), even if the secured party fails to comply with this chapter or the requirements of any judicial proceeding.
(c) If a transferee does not take free of the rights and interests described in subsection (a), the transferee takes the collateral subject to:
(1) the debtor's rights in the collateral;
(2) the security interest or agricultural lien under which the disposition is made; and
(3) any other security interest or other lien.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-504(4).
2. Title Taken by Good-Faith Transferee. Subsection (a) sets forth the rights acquired by persons who qualify under subsection (b)-transferees who act in good faith. Such a person is a "transferee," inasmuch as a buyer at a foreclosure sale does not meet the definition of "purchaser" in Section 1-201 (the transfer is not, vis-a-vis the debtor, "voluntary"). By virtue of the expanded definition of the term "debtor" in Section 9-102, subsection (a) makes clear that the ownership interest of a person who bought the collateral subject to the security interest is terminated by a subsequent disposition under this Part. Such a person is a debtor under this Article. Under former Article 9, the result arguably was the same, but the statute was less clear. Under subsection (a), a disposition normally discharges the security interest being foreclosed and any subordinate security interests and other liens.
A disposition has the effect specified in subsection (a), even if the secured party fails to comply with this Article. An aggrieved person (e.g., the holder of a subordinate security interest to whom a notification required by Section 9-611 was not sent) has a right to recover any loss under Section 9-625(b).
3. Unitary Standard in Public and Private Dispositions. Subsection (b) now contains a unitary standard that applies to transferees in both private and public dispositions--acting in good faith. However, this change from former Section 9-504(4) should not be interpreted to mean that a transferee acts in good faith even though it has knowledge of defects or buys in collusion, standards applicable to public dispositions under the former Section. Properly understood, those standards were specific examples of the absence of good faith.
4. Title Taken by Nonqualifying Transferee. Subsection (c) specifies the consequences for a transferee who does not qualify for protection under subsections (a) and (b) (i.e., a transferee who does not act in good faith). The transferee takes subject to the rights of the debtor, the enforcing secured party, and other security interests or other liens.
Section 36-9-618. Rights and duties of certain secondary obligors.
(a) A secondary obligor acquires the rights and becomes obligated to perform the duties of the secured party after the secondary obligor:
(1) receives an assignment of a secured obligation from the secured party;
(2) receives a transfer of collateral from the secured party and agrees to accept the rights and assume the duties of the secured party; or
(3) is subrogated to the rights of a secured party with respect to collateral.
(b) An assignment, transfer, or subrogation described in subsection (a):
(1) is not a disposition of collateral under Section 36-9-610; and
(2) relieves the secured party of further duties under this chapter.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-504(5).
2. Scope of This Section. Under this Section, assignments of secured obligations and other transactions (regardless of form) that function like assignments of secured obligations are not dispositions to which Part 6 applies. Rather, they constitute assignments of rights and (occasionally) delegations of duties. Application of this Section may require an investigation into the agreement of the parties, which may not be reflected in the words of the repurchase agreement (e.g., when the agreement requires a recourse party to "purchase the collateral" but contemplates that the purchaser will then conduct an Article 9 foreclosure disposition).
This Section, like former Section 9-504(5), does not constitute a general and comprehensive rule for allocating rights and duties upon assignment of a secured obligation. Rather, it applies only in situations involving a secondary obligor described in subsection (a). In other contexts, the agreement of the parties and applicable law other than Article 9 determine whether the assignment imposes upon the assignee any duty to the debtor and whether the assignor retains its duties to the debtor after the assignment.
Subsection (a)(1) applies when there has been an assignment of an obligation that is secured at the time it is assigned. Thus, if a secondary obligor acquires the collateral at a disposition under Section 9-610 and simultaneously or subsequently discharges the unsecured deficiency claim, subsection (a)(1) is not implicated. Similarly, subsection (a)(3) applies only when the secondary obligor is subrogated to the secured party's rights with respect to collateral. Thus, this subsection will not be implicated if a secondary obligor discharges the debtor's unsecured obligation for a post-disposition deficiency. Similarly, if the secured party disposes of some of the collateral and the secondary obligor thereafter discharges the remaining obligation, subsection (a) applies only with respect to rights and duties concerning the remaining collateral, and, under subsection (b), the subrogation is not a disposition of the remaining collateral.
As discussed more fully in Comment 3, a secondary obligor may receive a transfer of collateral in a disposition under Section 9-610 in exchange for a payment that is applied against the secured obligation. However, a secondary obligor who pays and receives a transfer of collateral does not necessarily become subrogated to the rights of the secured party as contemplated by subsection (a)(3). Only to the extent the secondary obligor makes a payment in satisfaction of its secondary obligation would it become subrogated. To the extent its payment constitutes the price of the collateral in a Section 9-610 disposition by the secured party, the secondary obligor would not be subrogated. Thus, if the amount paid by the secondary obligor for the collateral in a Section 9-610 disposition is itself insufficient to discharge the secured obligation, but the secondary obligor makes an additional payment that satisfies the remaining balance, the secondary obligor would be subrogated to the secured party's deficiency claim. However, the duties of the secured party as such would have come to an end with respect to that collateral. In some situations the capacity in which the payment is made may be unclear. Accordingly, the parties should in their relationship provide clear evidence of the nature and circumstances of the payment by the secondary obligor.
3. Transfer of Collateral to Secondary Obligor. It is possible for a secured party to transfer collateral to a secondary obligor in a transaction that is a disposition under Section 9-610 and that establishes a surplus or deficiency under Section 9-615. Indeed, this Article includes a special rule, in Section 9-615(f), for establishing a deficiency in the case of some dispositions to, inter alia, secondary obligors. This Article rejects the view, which some may have ascribed to former Section 9-504(5), that a transfer of collateral to a recourse party can never constitute a disposition of collateral which discharges a security interest. Inasmuch as a secured party could itself buy collateral at its own public sale, it makes no sense to prohibit a recourse party ever from buying at the sale.
4. Timing and Scope of Obligations. Under subsection (a), a recourse party acquires rights and incurs obligations only "after" one of the specified circumstances occurs. This makes clear that when a successor assignee, transferee, or subrogee becomes obligated it does not assume any liability for earlier actions or inactions of the secured party whom it has succeeded unless it agrees to do so. Once the successor becomes obligated, however, it is responsible for complying with the secured party's duties thereafter. For example, if the successor is in possession of collateral, then it has the duties specified in Section 9-207.
Under subsection (b), the same event (assignment, transfer, or subrogation) that gives rise to rights to, and imposes obligations on, a successor relieves its predecessor of any further duties under this Article. For example, if the security interest is enforced after the secured obligation is assigned, the assignee-but not the assignor-has the duty to comply with this Part. Similarly, the assignment does not excuse the assignor from liability for failure to comply with duties that arose before the event or impose liability on the assignee for the assignor's failure to comply.
Section 36-9-619. Transfer of record or legal title.
(a) In this section, 'transfer statement' means a record authenticated by a secured party stating:
(1) that the debtor has defaulted in connection with an obligation secured by specified collateral;
(2) that the secured party has exercised its post-default remedies with respect to the collateral;
(3) that, by reason of the exercise, a transferee has acquired the rights of the debtor in the collateral; and
(4) the name and mailing address of the secured party, debtor, and transferee.
(b) A transfer statement entitles the transferee to the transfer of record of all rights of the debtor in the collateral specified in the statement in any official filing, recording, registration, or certificate-of-title system covering the collateral. If a transfer statement is presented with the applicable fee and request form to the official or office responsible for maintaining the system, the official or office shall:
(1) accept the transfer statement;
(2) promptly amend its records to reflect the transfer; and
(3) if applicable, issue a new appropriate certificate of title in the name of the transferee.
(c) A transfer of the record or legal title to collateral to a secured party under subsection (b) or otherwise is not of itself a disposition of collateral under this chapter and does not of itself relieve the secured party of its duties under this chapter.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Transfer of Record or Legal Title. Potential buyers of collateral that is covered by a certificate of title (e.g., an automobile) or is subject to a registration system (e.g., a copyright) typically require as a condition of their purchase that the certificate or registry reflect their ownership. In many cases, this condition can be met only with the consent of the record owner. If the record owner is the debtor and, as may be the case after the default, the debtor refuses to cooperate, the secured party may have great difficulty disposing of the collateral.
Subsection (b) provides a simple mechanism for obtaining record or legal title, for use primarily when other law does not provide one. Of course, use of this mechanism will not be effective to clear title to the extent that subsection (b) is preempted by federal law. Subsection (b) contemplates a transfer of record or legal title to a third party, following a secured party's exercise of its disposition or acceptance remedies under this Part, as well as a transfer by a debtor to a secured party prior to the secured party's exercise of those remedies. Under subsection (c), a transfer of record or legal title (under subsection (b) or under other law) to a secured party prior to the exercise of those remedies merely puts the secured party in a position to pass legal or record title to a transferee at foreclosure. A secured party who has obtained record or legal title retains its duties with respect to enforcement of its security interest, and the debtor retains its rights as well.
3. Title-Clearing Systems Under Other Law. Applicable non-UCC law (e.g., a certificate-of-title statute, federal registry rules, or the like) may provide a means by which the secured party may obtain or transfer record or legal title for the purpose of a disposition of the property under this Article. The mechanism provided by this Section is in addition to any title-clearing provision under law other than this Article.
Section 36-9-620. Acceptance of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of obligation; compulsory disposition of collateral.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (g), a secured party may accept collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures only if:
(1) the debtor consents to the acceptance under subsection (c);
(2) the secured party does not receive, within the time set forth in subsection (d), a notification of objection to the proposal authenticated by:
(A) a person to which the secured party was required to send a proposal under Section 36-9-621; or
(B) any other person, other than the debtor, holding an interest in the collateral subordinate to the security interest that is the subject of the proposal;
(3) if the collateral is consumer goods, the collateral is not in the possession of the debtor when the debtor consents to the acceptance; and
(4) subsection (e) does not require the secured party to dispose of the collateral or the debtor waives the requirement pursuant to Section 36-9-624.
(b) A purported or apparent acceptance of collateral under this Section is ineffective unless:
(1) the secured party consents to the acceptance in an authenticated record or sends a proposal to the debtor; and
(2) the conditions of subsection (a) are met.
(c) For purposes of this section:
(1) a debtor consents to an acceptance of collateral in partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures only if the debtor agrees to the terms of the acceptance in a record authenticated after default; and
(2) a debtor consents to an acceptance of collateral in full satisfaction of the obligation it secures only if the debtor agrees to the terms of the acceptance in a record authenticated after default or the secured party:
(A) sends to the debtor after default a proposal that is unconditional or subject only to a condition that collateral not in the possession of the secured party be preserved or maintained;
(B) in the proposal, proposes to accept collateral in full satisfaction of the obligation it secures; and
(C) does not receive a notification of objection authenticated by the debtor within twenty days after the proposal is sent.
(d) To be effective under subsection (a)(2), a notification of objection must be received by the secured party:
(1) in the case of a person to which the proposal was sent pursuant to Section 36-9-621, within twenty days after notification was sent to that person; and
(2) in other cases:
(A) within twenty days after the last notification was sent pursuant to Section 36-9-621; or
(B) if a notification was not sent, before the debtor consents to the acceptance under subsection (c).
(e) A secured party that has taken possession of collateral shall dispose of the collateral pursuant to Section 36-9-610 within the time specified in subsection (f) if:
(1) sixty percent of the cash price has been paid in the case of a purchase-money security interest in consumer goods; or
(2) sixty percent of the principal amount of the obligation secured has been paid in the case of a nonpurchase-money security interest in consumer goods.
(f) To comply with subsection (e), the secured party shall dispose of the collateral:
(1) within ninety days after taking possession; or
(2) within any longer period to which the debtor and all secondary obligors have agreed in an agreement to that effect entered into and authenticated after default.
(g) In a consumer transaction, a secured party may not accept collateral in partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-505.
2. Overview. This Section and the two Sections following deal with strict foreclosure, a procedure by which the secured party acquires the debtor's interest in the collateral without the need for a sale or other disposition under Section 9-610. Although these provisions derive from former Section 9-505, they have been entirely reorganized and substantially rewritten. The more straightforward approach taken in this Article eliminates the fiction that the secured party always will present a "proposal" for the retention of collateral and the debtor will have a fixed period to respond. By eliminating the need (but preserving the possibility) for proceeding in that fashion, this Section eliminates much of the awkwardness of former Section 9-505. It reflects the belief that strict foreclosures should be encouraged and often will produce better results than a disposition for all concerned.
Subsection (a) sets forth the conditions necessary to an effective acceptance (formerly, retention) of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the secured obligation. Section 9-621 requires in addition that a secured party who wishes to proceed under this Section notify certain other persons who have or claim to have an interest in the collateral. Unlike the failure to meet the conditions in subsection (a), under Section 9-622(b) the failure to comply with the notification requirement of Section 9-621 does not render the acceptance of collateral ineffective. Rather, the acceptance can take effect notwithstanding the secured party's noncompliance. A person to whom the required notice was not sent has the right to recover damages under Section 9-625(b). Section 9-622(a) sets forth the effect of an acceptance of collateral.
3. Conditions to Effective Acceptance. Subsection (a) contains the conditions necessary to the effectiveness of an acceptance of collateral. Subsection (a)(1) requires the debtor's consent. Under subsections (c)(1) and (c)(2), the debtor may consent by agreeing to the acceptance in writing after default. Subsection (c)(2) contains an alternative method by which to satisfy the debtor's-consent condition in subsection (a)(1). It follows the proposal-and-objection model found in former Section 9-505: The debtor consents if the secured party sends a proposal to the debtor and does not receive an objection within 20 days. Under subsection (c)(1), however, that silence is not deemed to be consent with respect to acceptances in partial satisfaction. Thus, a secured party who wishes to conduct a "partial strict foreclosure" must obtain the debtor's agreement in a record authenticated after default. In all other respects, the conditions necessary to an effective partial strict foreclosure are the same as those governing acceptance of collateral in full satisfaction. (But see subsection (g), prohibiting partial strict foreclosure of a security interest in consumer transactions.)
The time when a debtor consents to a strict foreclosure is significant in several circumstances under this Section and the following one. See Sections 9-620(a)(1), (d)(2), 9-621(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3). For purposes of determining the time of consent, a debtor's conditional consent constitutes consent.
Subsection (a)(2) contains the second condition to the effectiveness of an acceptance under this Section-the absence of a timely objection from a person holding a junior interest in the collateral or from a secondary obligor. Any junior party-secured party or lienholder-is entitled to lodge an objection to a proposal, even if that person was not entitled to notification under Section 9-621. Subsection (d), discussed below, indicates when an objection is timely.
Subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) contain special rules for transactions in which consumers are involved. See Comment 12.
4. Proposals. Section 9-102 defines the term "proposal." It is necessary to send a "proposal" to the debtor only if the debtor does not agree to an acceptance in an authenticated record as described in subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2). Section 9-621(a) determines whether it is necessary to send a proposal to third parties. A proposal need not take any particular form as long as it sets forth the terms under which the secured party is willing to accept collateral in satisfaction. A proposal to accept collateral should specify the amount (or a means of calculating the amount, such as by including a per diem accrual figure) of the secured obligations to be satisfied, state the conditions (if any) under which the proposal may be revoked, and describe any other applicable conditions. Note, however, that a conditional proposal generally requires the debtor's agreement in order to take effect. See subsection (c).
5. Secured Party's Agreement; No "Constructive" Strict Foreclosure. The conditions of subsection (a) relate to actual or implied consent by the debtor and any secondary obligor or holder of a junior security interest or lien. To ensure that the debtor cannot unilaterally cause an acceptance of collateral, subsection (b) provides that compliance with these conditions is necessary but not sufficient to cause an acceptance of collateral. Rather, under subsection (b), acceptance does not occur unless, in addition, the secured party consents to the acceptance in an authenticated record or sends to the debtor a proposal. For this reason, a mere delay in collection or disposition of collateral does not constitute a "constructive" strict foreclosure. Instead, delay is a factor relating to whether the secured party acted in a commercially reasonable manner for purposes of Section 9-607 or 9-610. A debtor's voluntary surrender of collateral to a secured party and the secured party's acceptance of possession of the collateral does not, of itself, necessarily raise an implication that the secured party intends or is proposing to accept the collateral in satisfaction of the secured obligation under this Section.
6. When Acceptance Occurs. This Section does not impose any formalities or identify any steps that a secured party must take in order to accept collateral once the conditions of subsections (a) and (b) have been met. Absent facts or circumstances indicating a contrary intention, the fact that the conditions have been met provides a sufficient indication that the secured party has accepted the collateral on the terms to which the secured party has consented or proposed and the debtor has consented or failed to object. Following a proposal, acceptance of the collateral normally is automatic upon the secured party's becoming bound and the time for objection passing. As a matter of good business practice, an enforcing secured party may wish to memorialize its acceptance following a proposal, such as by notifying the debtor that the strict foreclosure is effective or by placing a written record to that effect in its files. The secured party's agreement to accept collateral is self-executing and cannot be breached. The secured party is bound by its agreement to accept collateral and by any proposal to which the debtor consents.
7. No Possession Requirement. This Section eliminates the requirement in former Section 9-505 that the secured party be "in possession" of collateral. It clarifies that intangible collateral, which cannot be possessed, may be subject to a strict foreclosure under this Section. However, under subsection (a)(3), if the collateral is consumer goods, acceptance does not occur unless the debtor is not in possession.
8. When Objection Timely. Subsection (d) explains when an objection is timely and thus prevents an acceptance of collateral from taking effect. An objection by a person to which notification was sent under Section 9-621 is effective if it is received by the secured party within 20 days from the date the notification was sent to that person. Other objecting parties (i.e., third parties who are not entitled to notification) may object at any time within 20 days after the last notification is sent under Section 9-621. If no such notification is sent, third parties must object before the debtor agrees to the acceptance in writing or is deemed to have consented by silence. The former may occur any time after default, and the latter requires a 20-day waiting period. See subsection (c).
9. Applicability of Other Law. This Section does not purport to regulate all aspects of the transaction by which a secured party may become the owner of collateral previously owned by the debtor. For example, a secured party's acceptance of a motor vehicle in satisfaction of secured obligations may require compliance with the applicable motor vehicle certificate-of-title law. State legislatures should conform those laws so that they mesh well with this Section and Section 9-610, and courts should construe those laws and this Section harmoniously. A secured party's acceptance of collateral in the possession of the debtor also may implicate statutes dealing with a seller's retention of possession of goods sold.
10. Accounts, Chattel Paper, Payment Intangibles, and Promissory Notes. If the collateral is accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, or promissory notes, then a secured party's acceptance of the collateral in satisfaction of secured obligations would constitute a sale to the secured party. That sale normally would give rise to a new security interest (the ownership interest) under Sections 1-201(37) and 9-109. In the case of accounts and chattel paper, the new security interest would remain perfected by a filing that was effective to perfect the secured party's original security interest. In the case of payment intangibles or promissory notes, the security interest would be perfected when it attaches. See Section 9-309. However, the procedures for acceptance of collateral under this Section satisfy all necessary formalities and a new security agreement authenticated by the debtor would not be necessary.
11. Role of Good Faith. Section 1-203 imposes an obligation of good faith on a secured party's enforcement under this Article. This obligation may not be disclaimed by agreement. See Section 1-102. Thus, a proposal and acceptance made under this Section in bad faith would not be effective. For example, a secured party's proposal to accept marketable securities worth $1,000 in full satisfaction of indebtedness in the amount of $100, made in the hopes that the debtor might inadvertently fail to object, would be made in bad faith. On the other hand, in the normal case proposals and acceptances should be not second-guessed on the basis of the "value" of the collateral involved. Disputes about valuation or even a clear excess of collateral value over the amount of obligations satisfied do not necessarily demonstrate the absence of good faith.
12. Special Rules in Consumer Cases. Subsection (e) imposes an obligation on the secured party to dispose of consumer goods under certain circumstances. Subsection (f) explains when a disposition that is required under subsection (e) is timely. An effective acceptance of collateral cannot occur if subsection (e) requires a disposition unless the debtor waives this requirement pursuant to Section 9-624(b). Moreover, a secured party who takes possession of collateral and unreasonably delays disposition violates subsection (e), if applicable, and may also violate Section 9-610 or other provisions of this Part. Subsection (e) eliminates as superfluous the express statutory reference to "conversion" found in former Section 9-505. Remedies available under other law, including conversion, remain available under this Article in appropriate cases. See Sections 1-103, 1-106.
Subsection (g) prohibits the secured party in consumer transactions from accepting collateral in partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures. If a secured party attempts an acceptance in partial satisfaction in a consumer transaction, the attempted acceptance is void.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Section 36-9-620(b)(1) provides that a purported or apparent acceptance of collateral in satisfaction of an obligation is ineffective unless the secured party expressly consents to the acceptance. This provision addresses the problem that arises when a secured party takes possession of collateral following a default and delays in disposing of the collateral. Under former law, some courts held that the delay in disposing of the collateral could constitute a constructive strict foreclosure. See, e.g., Lamp Fair, Inc. v. Perez-Ortiz, 888 F. 2d 173, 176 (1st Cir. 1989); Millican v. Turner, 503 So 2d 289, 291 (Miss. 1987). By precluding constructive strict foreclosure, Section 36-9-620(b)(1) establishes that a debtor cannot compel a secured party to accept collateral in satisfaction of the debt. See Section 36-9-620, Official Comment 5.
Section 36-9-620 (1)(b) clarifies the law of South Carolina. In Andrews v. Van Elton & Walker, Inc., 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E. 2d 500 (Ct. App. 1993), the Court of Appeals considered a case involving an apparent constructive strict foreclosure. The secured party in Andrews lawfully repossessed the business assets of a debtor securing the debtor's obligations under a consulting and a noncompetition agreement. The secured party retained the assets and used them in the operation of the business without providing the debtor written notice of a proposal to retain the assets in satisfaction of the secured obligations. See former Section 36-9-505(20. The court held that the retention of the collateral did not necessarily result in the satisfaction of the obligations. Rather Andrews held that the trial court must first determine whether the secured party acted in a commercially reasonable manner in retaining the collateral. If that conduct was commercially unreasonable, the court asserted that a rebutable presumption would arise that had the collateral been disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner the secured obligations would have been satisfied. The Court noted that the secured party could rebut this presumption be proving that the value of the collateral was less than the amount of the debt at the time of the repossession. If the secured party fails to rebut the presumption, the Court held that the secured party had "by retention of the collateral elected to accept it in satisfaction of his (total) indebtedness." 315 S.C. at 204, 432 S.E. 2d at 503. Although the quoted language suggests that the Court adopted the position that the retention of the collateral can constitute a constructive strict foreclosure, the opinion when read in its entirety belies that conclusion. More accurately stated the holding in Andrews appears to be that the secured party will be precluded from recovering a deficiency to the extent it fails to rebut the presumption that the value of the collateral equaled the amount of the debt.
Had Andrews v. Von Elton & Walker been decided under the current statute, the Court would have reached the same result. Assuming that the secured party's retention of the collateral was commercially unreasonable, under Section 36-9-626(a)(3)(8) the debtor's liability for a deficiency would be limited to the amount by which the secured obligation exceeds the amount that would have been realized had the collateral been disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner. Moreover, for the purpose of determining that deficiency, Section 36-9-626(a)(4) provides a rebutable presumption that the proceeds of a commercially reasonable disposition would have satisfied the full amount of the secured obligation.
Section 36-9-621. Notification of proposal to accept collateral.
(a) A secured party that desires to accept collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures shall send its proposal to:
(1) any person from which the secured party has received, before the debtor consented to the acceptance, an authenticated notification of a claim of an interest in the collateral;
(2) any other secured party or lienholder that, ten days before the debtor consented to the acceptance, held a security interest in or other lien on the collateral perfected by the filing of a financing statement that:
(A) identified the collateral;
(B) was indexed under the debtor's name as of that date; and
(C) was filed in the office or offices in which to file a financing statement against the debtor covering the collateral as of that date; and
(3) any other secured party that, ten days before the debtor consented to the acceptance, held a security interest in the collateral perfected by compliance with a statute, regulation, or treaty described in Section 36-9-311(a).
(b) A secured party that desires to accept collateral in partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures shall send its proposal to any secondary obligor in addition to the persons described in subsection (a).
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-505.
2. Notification Requirement. Subsection (a) specifies three classes of competing claimants to whom the secured party must send notification of its proposal: (i) those who notify the secured party that they claim an interest in the collateral, (ii) holders of certain security interests and liens who have filed against the debtor, and (iii) holders of certain security interests who have perfected by compliance with a statute (including a certificate-of-title statute), regulation, or treaty described in Section 9-311(a). With regard to (ii), see Section 9-611, Comment 4. Subsection (b) also requires notification to any secondary obligor if the proposal is for acceptance in partial satisfaction.
Unlike Section 9-611, this Section contains no "safe harbor," which excuses an enforcing secured party from notifying certain secured parties and other lienholders. This is because, unlike Section 9-610, which requires that a disposition of collateral be commercially reasonable, Section 9-620 permits the debtor and secured party to set the amount of credit the debtor will receive for the collateral subject only to the requirement of good faith. An effective acceptance discharges subordinate security interests and other subordinate liens. See Section 9-622. If collateral is subject to several liens securing debts much larger than the value of the collateral, the debtor may be disinclined to refrain from consenting to an acceptance by the holder of the senior security interest, even though, had the debtor objected and the senior disposed of the collateral under Section 9-610, the collateral may have yielded more than enough to satisfy the senior security interest (but not enough to satisfy all the liens). Accordingly, this Section imposes upon the enforcing secured party the risk of the filing office's errors and delay. The holder of a security interest who is entitled to notification under this Section but does not receive it has the right to recover under Section 9-625(b) any loss resulting from the enforcing secured party's noncompliance with this Section.
Section 36-9-622. Effect of acceptance of collateral.
(a) A secured party's acceptance of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures:
(1) discharges the obligation to the extent consented to by the debtor;
(2) transfers to the secured party all of a debtor's rights in the collateral;
(3) discharges the security interest or agricultural lien that is the subject of the debtor's consent and any subordinate security interest or other subordinate lien; and
(4) terminates any other subordinate interest.
(b) A subordinate interest is discharged or terminated under subsection (a), even if the secured party fails to comply with this chapter.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Effect of Acceptance. Subsection (a) specifies the effect of an acceptance of collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the secured obligation. The acceptance to which it refers is an effective acceptance. If a purported acceptance is ineffective under Section 9-620, e.g., because the secured party receives a timely objection from a person entitled to notification, then neither this subsection nor subsection (b) applies. Paragraph (1) expresses the fundamental consequence of accepting collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the secured obligation-the obligation is discharged to the extent consented to by the debtor. Unless otherwise agreed, the obligor remains liable for any deficiency. Paragraphs (2) through (4) indicate the effects of an acceptance on various property rights and interests. Paragraph (2) follows Section 9-617(a) in providing that the secured party acquires "all of a debtor's rights in the collateral." Under paragraph (3), the effect of strict foreclosure on holders of junior security interests and other liens is the same regardless of whether the collateral is accepted in full or partial satisfaction of the secured obligation: all junior encumbrances are discharged. Paragraph (4) provides for the termination of other subordinate interests.
Subsection (b) makes clear that subordinate interests are discharged under subsection (a) regardless of whether the secured party complies with this Article. Thus, subordinate interests are discharged regardless of whether a proposal was required to be sent or, if required, was sent. However, a secured party's failure to send a proposal or otherwise to comply with this Article may subject the secured party to liability under Section 9-625.
Section 36-9-623. Right to redeem collateral.
(a) A debtor, any secondary obligor, or any other secured party or lienholder may redeem collateral.
(b) To redeem collateral, a person shall tender:
(1) fulfillment of all obligations secured by the collateral; and
(2) the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees described in Section 36-9-615(a)(1).
(c) A redemption may occur at any time before a secured party:
(1) has collected collateral under Section 36-9-607;
(2) has disposed of collateral or entered into a contract for its disposition under Section 36-9-610; or
(3) has accepted collateral in full or partial satisfaction of the obligation it secures under Section 36-9-622.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-506.
2. Redemption Right. Under this Section, as under former Section 9-506, the debtor or another secured party may redeem collateral as long as the secured party has not collected (Section 9-607), disposed of or contracted for the disposition of (Section 9-610), or accepted (Section 9-620) the collateral. Although this Section generally follows former Section 9-506, it extends the right of redemption to holders of nonconsensual liens. To redeem the collateral a person must tender fulfillment of all obligations secured, plus certain expenses. If the entire balance of a secured obligation has been accelerated, it would be necessary to tender the entire balance. A tender of fulfillment obviously means more than a new promise to perform an existing promise. It requires payment in full of all monetary obligations then due and performance in full of all other obligations then matured. If unmatured secured obligations remain, the security interest continues to secure them (i.e., as if there had been no default).
3. Redemption of Remaining Collateral Following Partial Enforcement. Under Section 9-610 a secured party may make successive dispositions of portions of its collateral. These dispositions would not affect the debtor's, another secured party's, or a lienholder's right to redeem the remaining collateral.
4. Effect of "Repledging." Section 9-207 generally permits a secured party having possession or control of collateral to create a security interest in the collateral. As explained in the Comments to that Section, the debtor's right (as opposed to its practical ability) to redeem collateral is not affected by, and does not affect, the priority of a security interest created by the debtor's secured party.
Section 36-9-624. Waiver.
(a) A debtor or secondary obligor may waive the right to notification of disposition of collateral under Section 36-9-611 only by an agreement to that effect entered into and authenticated after default.
(b) A debtor may waive the right to require disposition of collateral under Section 36-9-620(e) only by an agreement to that effect entered into and authenticated after default.
(c) Except in a consumer-goods transaction, a debtor or secondary obligor may waive the right to redeem collateral under Section 36-9-623 only by an agreement to that effect entered into and authenticated after default.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Sections 9-504(3), 9-505, 9-506.
2. Waiver. This Section is a limited exception to Section 9-602, which generally prohibits waiver by debtors and obligors. It makes no provision for waiver of the rule prohibiting a secured party from buying at its own private disposition. Transactions of this kind are equivalent to "strict foreclosures" and are governed by Sections 9-620, 9-621, and 9-622.
Subpart 2.
Noncompliance with Chapter
Section 36-9-625. Remedies for secured party's failure to comply with chapter.
(a) If it is established that a secured party is not proceeding in accordance with this chapter, a court may order or restrain collection, enforcement, or disposition of collateral on appropriate terms and conditions.
(b) Subject to subsections (c), (d), and (f), a person is liable for damages in the amount of any loss caused by a failure to comply with this chapter. Loss caused by a failure to comply with a request under Section 36-9-210 may include loss resulting from the debtor's inability to obtain, or increased costs of, alternative financing.
(c) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-628:
(1) a person that, at the time of the failure, was a debtor, was an obligor, or held a security interest in or other lien on the collateral may recover damages under subsection (b) for its loss; and
(2) if the collateral is consumer goods, a person that was a debtor or a secondary obligor at the time a secured party failed to comply with this part may recover for that failure in any event an amount not less than the credit service charge plus ten percent of the principal amount of the obligation or the time-price differential plus ten percent of the cash price.
(d) A debtor whose deficiency is eliminated under Section 36-9-626 may recover damages for the loss of any surplus. However, a debtor or secondary obligor whose deficiency is eliminated or reduced under Section 36-9-626 may not otherwise recover under subsection (b) for noncompliance with the provisions of this part relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance.
(e) In addition to any damages recoverable under subsection (b), the debtor, consumer obligor, or person named as a debtor in a filed record, as applicable, may recover five hundred dollars in each case from a person that:
(1) fails to comply with Section 36-9-208;
(2) fails to comply with Section 36-9-209;
(3) files a record that the person is not entitled to file under Section 36-9-509(a);
(4) fails to cause the secured party of record to file or send a termination statement as required by Section 36-9-513(a) or (c);
(5) fails to comply with Section 36-9-616(b)(1) and whose failure is part of a pattern, or consistent with a practice, of noncompliance; or
(6) fails to comply with Section 36-9-616(b)(2).
(f) A debtor or consumer obligor may recover damages under subsection (b) and, in addition, five hundred dollars in each case from a person that, without reasonable cause, fails to comply with a request under Section 36-9-210. A recipient of a request under Section 36-9-210 which never claimed an interest in the collateral or obligations that are the subject of a request under that section has a reasonable excuse for failure to comply with the request within the meaning of this subsection.
(g) If a secured party fails to comply with a request regarding a list of collateral or a statement of account under Section 36-9-210, the secured party may claim a security interest only as shown in the statement included in the request as against a person that is reasonably misled by the failure.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-507.
2. Remedies for Noncompliance; Scope. Subsections (a) and (b) provide the basic remedies afforded to those aggrieved by a secured party's failure to comply with this Article. Like all provisions that create liability, they are subject to Section 9-628, which should be read in conjunction with Section 9-605. The principal limitations under this Part on a secured party's right to enforce its security interest against collateral are the requirements that it proceed in good faith (Section 1-203), in a commercially reasonable manner (Sections 9-607 and 9-610), and, in most cases, with reasonable notification (Sections 9-611 through 9-614). Following former Section 9-507, under subsection (a) an aggrieved person may seek injunctive relief, and under subsection (b) the person may recover damages for losses caused by noncompliance. Unlike former Section 9-507, however, subsections (a) and (b) are not limited to noncompliance with provisions of this Part of Article 9. Rather, they apply to noncompliance with any provision of this Article. The change makes this Section applicable to noncompliance with Sections 9-207 (duties of secured party in possession of collateral), 9-208 (duties of secured party having control over deposit account), 9-209 (duties of secured party if account debtor has been notified of an assignment), 9-210 (duty to comply with request for accounting, etc.), 9-509(a) (duty to refrain from filing unauthorized financing statement), and 9-513(a) or (c) (duty to provide termination statement). Subsection (a) also modifies the first sentence of former Section 9-507(1) by adding the references to "collection" and "enforcement." Subsection (c)(2), which gives a minimum damage recovery in consumer-goods transactions, applies only to noncompliance with the provisions of this Part.
3. Damages for Noncompliance with This Article. Subsection (b) sets forth the basic remedy for failure to comply with the requirements of this Article: a damage recovery in the amount of loss caused by the noncompliance. Subsection (c) identifies who may recover under subsection (b). It affords a remedy to any aggrieved person who is a debtor or obligor. However, a principal obligor who is not a debtor may recover damages only for noncompliance with Section 9-616, inasmuch as none of the other rights and duties in this Article run in favor of such a principal obligor. Such a principal obligor could not suffer any loss or damage on account of noncompliance with rights or duties of which it is not a beneficiary. Subsection (c) also affords a remedy to an aggrieved person who holds a competing security interest or other lien, regardless of whether the aggrieved person is entitled to notification under Part 6. The remedy is available even to holders of senior security interests and other liens. The exercise of this remedy is subject to the normal rules of pleading and proof. A person who has delegated the duties of a secured party but who remains obligated to perform them is liable under this subsection. The last sentence of subsection (d) eliminates the possibility of double recovery or other over-compensation arising out of a reduction or elimination of a deficiency under Section 9-626, based on noncompliance with the provisions of this Part relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance. Assuming no double recovery, a debtor whose deficiency is eliminated under Section 9-626 may pursue a claim for a surplus. Because Section 9-626 does not apply to consumer transactions, the statute is silent as to whether a double recovery or other over-compensation is possible in a consumer transaction.
Damages for violation of the requirements of this Article, including Section 9-609, are those reasonably calculated to put an eligible claimant in the position that it would have occupied had no violation occurred. See Section 1-106. Subsection (b) supports the recovery of actual damages for committing a breach of the peace in violation of Section 9-609, and principles of tort law supplement this subsection. See Section 1-103. However, to the extent that damages in tort compensate the debtor for the same loss dealt with by this Article, the debtor should be entitled to only one recovery.
4. Minimum Damages in Consumer-Goods Transactions. Subsection (c)(2) provides a minimum, statutory, damage recovery for a debtor and secondary obligor in a consumer-goods transaction. It is patterned on former Section 9-507(1) and is designed to ensure that every noncompliance with the requirements of Part 6 in a consumer-goods transaction results in liability, regardless of any injury that may have resulted. Subsection (c)(2) leaves the treatment of statutory damages as it was under former Article 9. A secured party is not liable for statutory damages under this subsection more than once with respect to any one secured obligation. See Section 9-628(e). Nor is a secured party liable under this subsection for failure to comply with Section 9-616. See Section 9-628(d).
Following former Section 9-507(1), this Article does not include a definition or explanation of the terms "credit service charge," "principal amount," "time-price differential," or "cash price," as used in subsection (c)(2). It leaves their construction and application to the court, taking into account the subsection's purpose of providing a minimum recovery in consumer-goods transactions.
5. Supplemental Damages. Subsections (e) and (f) provide damages that supplement the recovery, if any, under subsection (b). Subsection (e) imposes an additional $500 liability upon a person who fails to comply with the provisions specified in that subsection, and subsection (f) imposes like damages on a person who, without reasonable excuse, fails to comply with a request for an accounting or a request regarding a list of collateral or statement of account under Section 9-210. However, under subsection (f), a person has a reasonable excuse for the failure if the person never claimed an interest in the collateral or obligations that were the subject of the request.
6. Estoppel. Subsection (g) limits the extent to which a secured party who fails to comply with a request regarding a list of collateral or statement of account may claim a security interest.
Section 36-9-626. Action in which deficiency or surplus is in issue.
(a) In an action arising from a transaction, other than a consumer transaction, in which the amount of a deficiency or surplus is in issue, the following rules apply:
(1) A secured party need not prove compliance with the provisions of this part relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance unless the debtor or a secondary obligor places the secured party's compliance in issue.
(2) If the secured party's compliance is placed in issue, the secured party has the burden of establishing that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance was conducted in accordance with this part.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-628, if a secured party fails to prove that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance was conducted in accordance with the provisions of this part relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance, the liability of a debtor or a secondary obligor for a deficiency is limited to an amount by which the sum of the secured obligation, expenses, and attorney's fees exceeds the greater of:
(A) the proceeds of the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance; or
(B) the amount of proceeds that would have been realized had the noncomplying secured party proceeded in accordance with the provisions of this part relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance.
(4) For purposes of item (3)(B), the amount of proceeds that would have been realized is equal to the sum of the secured obligation, expenses, and attorney's fees unless the secured party proves that the amount is less than that sum.
(5) If a deficiency or surplus is calculated under Section 36-9-615(f), the debtor or obligor has the burden of establishing that the amount of proceeds of the disposition is significantly below the range of prices that a complying disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor would have brought.
(b) The limitation of the rules in subsection (a) to transactions other than consumer transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination of the proper rules in consumer transactions. The court may not infer from that limitation the nature of the proper rule in consumer transactions and may continue to apply established approaches.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Scope. The basic damage remedy under Section 9-625(b) is subject to the special rules in this Section for transactions other than consumer transactions. This Section addresses situations in which the amount of a deficiency or surplus is in issue, i.e., situations in which the secured party has collected, enforced, disposed of, or accepted the collateral. It contains special rules applicable to a determination of the amount of a deficiency or surplus. Because this Section affects a person's liability for a deficiency, it is subject to Section 9-628, which should be read in conjunction with Section 9-605. The rules in this Section apply only to noncompliance in connection with the "collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance" under Part 6. For other types of noncompliance with Part 6, the general liability rule of Section 9-625(b)-recovery of actual damages-applies. Consider, for example, a repossession that does not comply with Section 9-609 for want of a default. The debtor's remedy is under Section 9-625(b). In a proper case, the secured party also may be liable for conversion under non-UCC law. If the secured party thereafter disposed of the collateral, however, it would violate Section 9-610 at that time, and this Section would apply.
3. Rebuttable Presumption Rule. Subsection (a) establishes the rebuttable presumption rule for transactions other than consumer transactions. Under paragraph (1), the secured party need not prove compliance with the relevant provisions of this Part as part of its prima facie case. If, however, the debtor or a secondary obligor raises the issue (in accordance with the forum's rules of pleading and practice), then the secured party bears the burden of proving that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance complied. In the event the secured party is unable to meet this burden, then paragraph (3) explains how to calculate the deficiency. Under this rebuttable presumption rule, the debtor or obligor is to be credited with the greater of the actual proceeds of the disposition or the proceeds that would have been realized had the secured party complied with the relevant provisions. If a deficiency remains, then the secured party is entitled to recover it. The references to "the secured obligation, expenses, and attorney's fees" in paragraphs (3) and (4) embrace the application rules in Sections 9-608(a) and 9-615(a).
Unless the secured party proves that compliance with the relevant provisions would have yielded a smaller amount, under paragraph (4) the amount that a complying collection, enforcement, or disposition would have yielded is deemed to be equal to the amount of the secured obligation, together with expenses and attorney's fees. Thus, the secured party may not recover any deficiency unless it meets this burden.
4. Consumer Transactions. Although subsection (a) adopts a version of the rebuttable presumption rule for transactions other than consumer transactions, with certain exceptions Part 6 does not specify the effect of a secured party's noncompliance in consumer transactions. (The exceptions are the provisions for the recovery of damages in Section 9-625.) Subsection (b) provides that the limitation of subsection (a) to transactions other than consumer transactions is intended to leave to the court the determination of the proper rules in consumer transactions. It also instructs the court not to draw any inference from the limitation as to the proper rules for consumer transactions and leaves the court free to continue to apply established approaches to those transactions.
Courts construing former Section 9-507 disagreed about the consequences of a secured party's failure to comply with the requirements of former Part 5. Three general approaches emerged. Some courts have held that a noncomplying secured party may not recover a deficiency (the "absolute bar" rule). A few courts held that the debtor can offset against a claim to a deficiency all damages recoverable under former Section 9-507 resulting from the secured party's noncompliance (the "offset" rule). A plurality of courts considering the issue held that the noncomplying secured party is barred from recovering a deficiency unless it overcomes a rebuttable presumption that compliance with former Part 5 would have yielded an amount sufficient to satisfy the secured debt. In addition to the nonuniformity resulting from court decisions, some States enacted special rules governing the availability of deficiencies.
5. Burden of Proof When Section 9-615(f) Applies. In a non-consumer transaction, subsection (a)(5) imposes upon a debtor or obligor the burden of proving that the proceeds of a disposition are so low that, under Section 9-615(f), the actual proceeds should not serve as the basis upon which a deficiency or surplus is calculated. Were the burden placed on the secured party, then debtors might be encouraged to challenge the price received in every disposition to the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor.
6. Delay in Applying This Section. There is an inevitable delay between the time a secured party engages in a noncomplying collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance and the time of a subsequent judicial determination that the secured party did not comply with Part 6. During the interim, the secured party, believing that the secured obligation is larger than it ultimately is determined to be, may continue to enforce its security interest in collateral. If some or all of the secured indebtedness ultimately is discharged under this Section, a reasonable application of this Section would impose liability on the secured party for the amount of any excess, unwarranted recoveries but would not make the enforcement efforts wrongful.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
1. Transactions Other Than Consumer Transactions
Section 36-9-626 addresses the affect of a secured party's failure to comply with the requirements of part 6 upon the secured party's right to a deficiency. This issue typically arises when a secured party fails to give notification of a disposition of collateral or fails to dispose of the collateral in a commercially reasonable manner. Under former law the courts developed three approaches to the problem. See Section 36-9-626, Official Comment 4. First, some courts adopted an "absolute bar" rule under which a secured party who failed to give notice of or conducted a disposition in a commercially unreasonable manner was precluded from recovering a deficiency. Second, some courts limited an aggrieved debtor to a setoff against a deficiency for damages recoverable under former Section 9-507(1). Third, a plurality of courts adopted the "rebuttable presumption" rule. Under this rule a court presumes that had a secured party given notice of and conducted a disposition in a commercially reasonable manner, the collateral would have sold for the full amount of the secured obligation and no deficiency would have arisen. The secured party, however, can rebut the presumption by proving that the proceeds from a disposition complying with the statutory requirements would not have satisfied the secured obligation.
Section 36-9-626(a) adopts the rebuttable presumption test for transactions other than consumer transactions. This provision does not, however, change the law of South Carolina. Under former law, South Carolina courts adopted the "rebuttable presumption" rule. In Republic National Bank v. DLP Industries, Inc., 314 S.C. 108, 441 S.E. 2d 827 (1994) Supreme Court held that a secured party's failure to give notice of a disposition of collateral results in a rebuttable presumption that the value of the collateral was equal to the amount of the debt. In Andrews v. Von Elton & Walker, Inc, 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.C. 2d 500 (Ct. App. 1993), the Court of Appeals held that a secured party's failure to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner also gave use to a rebuttable presumption that the value of the collateral was equal to the amount of the debt.
2. Consumer Transactions
The statutory rebuttable presumption rule of Section 36-9-626(a) does not apply to consumer transactions. In consumer transactions, Section 36-9-626(b) provides that determining the affect of a secured party's failure to comply with part 6 is left to the courts. Moreover, Section 36-0-626(b) provides that in making that determination a court may not infer from the limitation of Section 36-9-626(a) to non-consumer transactions the proper rule in consumer transactions.
Although the South Carolina case adopting the rebuttable presumption rule draws no distinction between commercial transactions and consumer transactions, all of the cases involved a commercial transaction. See Republic National Bank v. DLP Industries, Inc., 314 S.C. 108, 441 S.E. 2d 827 (1994) ($100,000 loan secured by 33,000 pieces of surplus clothing); Andrews v. Von Elten & Walker, Inc., 315 S.C. 199, 432 S.E. 2d 500 (Ct. App. 1993) (security interest in equipment securing the purchase price of a business); Mathias v. Hicks, 294 S.C. 305, 363 S.E. 2d 914 (Ct. App. 1987) (security interest in equipment securing price of business.) As a result, the established law of South Carolina might not preclude a court from adopting the "absolute bar" rule in a consumer transaction. Moreover, the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code, Section 37-5-103(1) provides that in consumer credit sales of goods or services and in certain consumer loans, "(a) consumer is not liable for a deficiency unless the creditor has disposed of the goods in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner." With respect to consumer transactions within its scope, Section 37-5-103(1) mandates the application of the "absolute bar" rule. Moreover, with respect to consumer transactions outside the scope of Section 37-5-103(1), the statute may be a statement of public policy on which a court could rely in adopting the "absolute bar" rule.
Section 36-9-627. Determination of whether conduct was commercially reasonable.
(a) The fact that a greater amount could have been obtained by a collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance at a different time or in a different method from that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to preclude the secured party from establishing that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance was made in a commercially reasonable manner.
(b) A disposition of collateral is made in a commercially reasonable manner if the disposition is made:
(1) in the usual manner on any recognized market;
(2) at the price current in any recognized market at the time of the disposition; or
(3) otherwise in conformity with reasonable commercial practices among dealers in the type of property that was the subject of the disposition.
(c) A collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance is commercially reasonable if it has been approved:
(1) in a judicial proceeding;
(2) by a bona fide creditors' committee;
(3) by a representative of creditors; or
(4) by an assignee for the benefit of creditors.
(d) Approval under subsection (c) need not be obtained, and lack of approval does not mean that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance is not commercially reasonable.
Official Comment
1. Source. Former Section 9-507(2).
2. Relationship of Price to Commercial Reasonableness. Some observers have found the notion contained in subsection (a) (derived from former Section 9-507(2)) (the fact that a better price could have been obtained does not establish lack of commercial reasonableness) to be inconsistent with that found in Section 9-610(b) (derived from former Section 9-504(3) (every aspect of the disposition, including its terms, must be commercially reasonable). There is no such inconsistency. While not itself sufficient to establish a violation of this Part, a low price suggests that a court should scrutinize carefully all aspects of a disposition to ensure that each aspect was commercially reasonable.
The law long has grappled with the problem of dispositions of personal and real property which comply with applicable procedural requirements (e.g., advertising, notification to interested persons, etc.) but which yield a price that seems low. This Article addresses that issue in Section 9-615(f). That Section applies only when the transferee is the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor. It contains a special rule for calculating a deficiency or surplus in a complying disposition that yields a price that is "significantly below the range of proceeds that a complying disposition to a person other than the secured party, a person related to the secured party, or a secondary obligor would have brought."
3. Determination of Commercial Reasonableness; Advance Approval. It is important to make clear the conduct and procedures that are commercially reasonable and to provide a secured party with the means of obtaining, by court order or negotiation with a creditors' committee or a representative of creditors, advance approval of a proposed method of enforcement as commercially reasonable. This Section contains rules that assist in that determination and provides for advance approval in appropriate situations. However, none of the specific methods of disposition specified in subsection (b) is required or exclusive.
4. "Recognized Market." As in Sections 9-610(c) and 9-611(d), the concept of a "recognized market" in subsections (b)(1) and (2) is quite limited; it applies only to markets in which there are standardized price quotations for property that is essentially fungible, such as stock exchanges.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Section 36-9-627(b) provides that dispositions of collateral that meet the requirements of that subsection are commercially reasonable. Section 36-9-627(c) provides that dispositions of collateral and other forms of enforcement are commercially reasonable if approved by a court, creditors' committee, or a representative of the creditors. In addition to these methods of establishing that a disposition is commercially reasonable, South Carolina provides that a public sale conducted in conformity with the requirements of Section 36-9-701 et seq is conclusively presumed to be commercially reasonable.
Section 36-9-628. Nonliability and limitation on liability of secured party; liability of secondary obligor.
(a) Unless a secured party knows that a person is a debtor or obligor, knows the identity of the person, and knows how to communicate with the person:
(1) the secured party is not liable to the person, or to a secured party or lienholder that has filed a financing statement against the person, for failure to comply with this chapter; and
(2) the secured party's failure to comply with this chapter does not affect the liability of the person for a deficiency.
(b) A secured party is not liable because of its status as secured party:
(1) to a person that is a debtor or obligor, unless the secured party knows:
(A) that the person is a debtor or obligor;
(B) the identity of the person; and
(C) how to communicate with the person; or
(2) to a secured party or lienholder that has filed a financing statement against a person, unless the secured party knows:
(A) that the person is a debtor; and
(B) the identity of the person.
(c) A secured party is not liable to any person, and a person's liability for a deficiency is not affected, because of any act or omission arising out of the secured party's reasonable belief that a transaction is not a consumer-goods transaction or a consumer transaction or that goods are not consumer goods, if the secured party's belief is based on its reasonable reliance on:
(1) a debtor's representation concerning the purpose for which collateral was to be used, acquired, or held; or
(2) an obligor's representation concerning the purpose for which a secured obligation was incurred.
(d) A secured party is not liable to any person under Section 36-9-625(c)(2) for its failure to comply with Section 36-9-616.
(e) A secured party is not liable under Section 36-9-625(c)(2) more than once with respect to any one secured obligation.
Official Comment
1. Source. New.
2. Exculpatory Provisions. Subsections (a), (b), and (c) contain exculpatory provisions that should be read in conjunction with Section 9-605. Without this group of provisions, a secured party could incur liability to unknown persons and under circumstances that would not allow the secured party to protect itself. The broadened definition of the term "debtor" underscores the need for these provisions.
If a secured party reasonably, but mistakenly, believes that a consumer transaction or consumer-goods transaction is a non-consumer transaction or non-consumer-goods transaction, and if the secured party's belief is based on its reasonable reliance on a representation of the type specified in subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2), then this Article should be applied as if the facts reasonably believed and reasonably relied upon were true. For example, if a secured party reasonably believed that a transaction was a non-consumer transaction and its belief was based on reasonable reliance on the debtor's misrepresentation that the collateral secured an obligation incurred for business purposes, the rebuttable presumption rule would apply under 9-626(b). Of course, if the secured party's belief is not reasonable or, even if reasonable, is not based on reasonable reliance on the debtor's misrepresentation, this limitation on liability is inapplicable.
3. Inapplicability of Statutory Damages to Section 9-616. Subsection (d) excludes noncompliance with Section 9-616 entirely from the scope of statutory damage liability under Section 9-625(c)(2).
4. Single Liability for Statutory Minimum Damages. Subsection (e) ensures that a secured party will incur statutory damages only once in connection with any one secured obligation.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
Section 36-9-615(c)(2) recodifies the minimum statutory damages provision of former Section 36-9-507(1). Under Section 36-9-625(c)(2) when the collateral is consumer goods and the secured party fails to comply with part 6 of Article 9, a debtor or a secondary obligor is entitled to recover an amount not less than the credit service charge plus 10 percent of the principal amount of the obligation or the time-price differential plus 10 percent of the cash price.
Section 36-9-628(e) limits a secured party's liability for damages under Section 36-9-625(c)(2) and applies when more than one person has a claim under that provision. Under Section 36-9-628(e) a secured party is not liable for the minimum statutory damages more than once with respect to any one secured obligation. For example, assume that Debtor granted Secured Party a security interest in consumer goods to secure a loan and Guarantor guaranteed Debtor's obligation to pay the loan. Following Debtor's default, Secured Party repossessed the consumer goods and sold them without providing notification to either Debtor or Guarantor as required under Section 36-9-611(c)(1) and (2). Under Section 36-9-625(c)(2) both Debtor and Guarantor, as a secondary obligor, have claims for statutory damages. Section 36-9-628(e), however, limits Secured Party's aggregate liability to a single recovery under Section 36-9-625(c)(2).
Section 36-9-328(e) overrules one of the holdings in Crane v. Citicorp National Services, Inc., 313 S.C. 70, 437 S.E. 2d 945 (1993). In Crane the Court asserted that a debtor and a guarantor could both recover statutory minimum damages under former Section 36-9-507(1) for a secured party's misconduct with respect to a single secured obligation.
Section 36-9-629. Disposition of collateral by public sale.
Disposition of collateral by public proceedings as permitted by Section 36-9-610 may be made in accordance with the provisions of this part. The provisions of this part are not mandatory for disposition by public proceedings, but any disposition of the collateral by public sale wherein the secured party has substantially complied with the procedures provided in this part is conclusively considered to be commercially reasonable in all aspects.
Official Comment
None.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
1. Part 6 is not part of the UCC Official Text. It is derived from similar provisions in the North Carolina UCC, North Carolina general statute, Sections 25-9-601 through 25-9-607. As is pointed out in Reporter's Note 3 to Section 36-9-505, it is designed to provide a "safe harbor" for public sales of repossessed collateral. This is accomplished by the last part of Section 39-9-601, which states that a public sale that substantially complies "with the procedures provided in this Part shall conclusively be deemed to be commercially reasonable in all respects." At the present time the only other similar "safe harbor" is a judicially approved public, sale, a more cumbersome and expensive procedure.
2. The North Carolina Supreme Court has held its similar provisions to be constitutional. See North Carolina National Bank v. Burnette, 297 N.C. 524, 256 S.E.2d 388 (1979); Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Murphy, 36 N.C. App. 760, 245 S.E.2d 101, appeal dismissed, 295 N.C. 557, 248 S.E.2d 734 (1978).
3. A public sale not made in conformity to this Part and all private sales would continue to be subject to the commercial reasonableness test in Part 5. Section 36-9-507 specifies the remedies for a sale that is determined not to be commercially reasonable.
Section 36-9-630. Contents of notice of sale.
The notice of sale shall substantially:
(a) Refer to the security agreement pursuant to which the sale is held;
(b) Designate the date, hour, and place of sale consistent with the provisions of the security agreement and the provisions found in this part;
(c) Describe personal property to be sold substantially as it is described in the security agreement pursuant to which the power of sale is being exercised and may add a further description as will acquaint bidders with the nature of the property;
(d) State the terms of the sale provided by the security agreement pursuant to which the sale is held, including the amount of the cash deposit, if any, to be made by the highest bidder at the sale;
(e) Include any other provisions required by the security agreement to be included therein;
(f) State that the property will be sold subject to taxes and special assessments if it is to be so sold.
Official Comment
None.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section sets out the information that must be included in the notice of a public sale conducted pursuant to this part.
Section 36-9-631. Posting and mailing notice of sale.
(1) In each public sale conducted, the notice of sale must be posted on a bulletin board provided for the posting of legal notices, in the courthouse, in the county in which the sale is to be held, for at least five days immediately preceding the sale.
(2) In addition to the posting of notice required by subsection 91), the secured party or other party holding a public sale shall, at least five days before the date of sale, mail by registered or certified mail a copy of the notice of sale to each debtor obligated under the security agreement:
(a) At the actual address of the debtors, if known to the secured party, or
(b) At the address, if any, furnished the secured party, in writing, by the debtors, or otherwise at the last known address.
(c) In the case of consumer goods, no other notification need be sent. In other cases, in addition to mailing a copy of the notice of sale to each debtor, the secured party shall also mail a copy of such notice by registered or certified mail to any other secured party from whom the secured party has received (before sending the notice of sale to the debtor) written notice of a claim or an interest in the collateral.
(4) The time for the posting of the notice of sale and the mailing of the notice required by this section shall be computed so as to exclude the first day of posting and mailing and to include the day on which the sale is to occur.
Official Comment
None.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
1. The section sets out the places where the notice of the sale must be posted and mailed. It is somewhat similar to former Section 45-164 of the 1962 South Carolina Code of Laws. Section 45-164, however, required posting in three public places at least fifty days prior to the sale or publication in a newspaper at least two weeks prior to the sale, and it did not require that any notice be given to the debtor or other person claiming a security interest in the property being sold. The implied repeal of Section 45-164 of the 1962 Code by the 1966 UCC created uncertainty concerning the notice requirements of a public sale. A secured party clearly had to send the notices to debtors and other secured parties required by Section 36-9-504(3); but it was unclear whether any public posting or publication was also required. This section resolves this issue.
2. Except for the public posting of the notice of sale the notice requirements in this section are the same as those established in revised Section 36-9-504(3) for sales of collateral.
Cross References: Postponement of public sale, see Section 36-9-605.
Procedure dissolution of order restraining or enjoining sale, see Section 36-9-606.
Section 36-9-632. Exception as to perishable property.
If in the opinion of a secured party about to conduct a public sale of personal property, the property is perishable because subject to rapid deterioration or threatens to decline speedily in value, he may report this fact, together with a description of the property to the clerk of court of the county in which the property is to be sold, and apply for authority to sell the property at an earlier date than is provided in this chapter. Upon the clerk's determination that the property is perishable or speedily depreciating property, he shall order a sale of the property to be held at a time and place and upon notice, if any, as he considers advisable.
Official Comment
None.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section provides for a different procedure where perishable property is involved. The clerk of court must determine the time and place and the notice requirements. It provides for more certainty than the more general language in Section 36-9-504(3).
Section 36-9-633. Postponement of public sale.
(1) Any person exercising a power of sale or conducting a public sale may postpone the sale to a day certain not later than six days, exclusive of Sunday, after the original date for the sale:
(a) When there are no bidders; or
(b) When, in his judgment, the number of prospective bidders at the sale is substantially decreased by inclement weather or by any casualty; or
(c) When there are so many other sales advertised to be held at the same time and place as to make it inexpedient and impracticable in his judgment to hold the sale on that day; or
(d) When he is unable to hold the sale because of illness or for other good reason; or
(e) When other good cause exists.
(2) Upon postponement of a public sale, the person exercising the power of sale shall personally, or through his agent or attorney:
(a) At the time and place advertised for the sale, publicly announce the postponement of the sale;
(b) On the same day, attach to or enter on the original notice of sale or a copy of the original notice of sale, posted on the bulletin board provided for this purpose, as provided by Section 36-9-631, a notice of the postponement.
(3) The posted notice of postponement shall:
(a) State that the public sale is postponed;
(b) State the hour and date to which the public sale is postponed;
(c) Substantially state the reason for the postponement;
(d) Be signed by the person authorized to hold the public sale, or by his agent or attorney.
(4) If a public sale is not held at the time fixed for the public sale and is not postponed as provided by this section, or if a postponed sale is not held at the time fixed for the postponed sale, the person authorized to hold the public sale may readvertise the property in the same manner as he was required to advertise the sale which was not held and may hold a public sale at a later date as is fixed in the new notice of sale.
Official Comment
None.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section sets out procedures for postponed sales. No additional notices to the debtor or secured parties are required unless the rescheduled date is more than six days from the original date or the second sale is not held as scheduled.
Section 36-9-634. Procedure upon dissolution of order restraining or enjoining sale.
(1) When, before the date fixed for a sale, a judge of competent jurisdiction dissolves an order restraining or enjoining the sale, he may, if the required notice of sale has been given, as provided in Section 36-9-631, provide by order that the public sale must be held without additional notice at the time and place originally fixed for the public sale; or he may, in his discretion, make an order with respect to the public sale as provided in subsection (2).
(2) When, after the date fixed for a public sale, a judge of competent jurisdiction dissolves an order restraining or enjoining the sale, he shall, by order, fix the time and place for the sale to be held upon notice to be given and in a manner and for a length of time as he considers advisable.
Official Comment
None.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This debtor or another secured party might seek to enjoin a proposed public sale brought under this part. If the selling party is successful in getting an injunction dissolved, the judge who issued the injunction must decide when and where the sale will be held and who shall be required to receive notice of the sale.
Section 36-9-635. Disposition of proceeds of sale.
The proceeds of any sale or other disposition of the collateral must be applied by the person making the sale in the manner prescribed by Section 36-9-610 and by other applicable provisions of law.
Official Comment
None.
South Carolina Reporter's Comment
This section provides that the proceeds of any public sale conducted under this Part will be applied in the same manner as any other sale of collateral covered by an Article 9 security interest. See Section 39-9-504.
Part 7
Transition
Section 36-9-702. Savings clause.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this part, this act applies to a transaction or lien within its scope, even if the transaction or lien was entered into or created before this act takes effect.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) and Sections 36-9-703 through 36-9-708:
(1) transactions and liens that were not governed by former Chapter 9, were validly entered into or created before this act takes effect, and would be subject to this act if they had been entered into or created after this act takes effect, and the rights, duties, and interests flowing from those transactions and liens remain valid after this act takes effect; and
(2) the transactions and liens may be terminated, completed, consummated, and enforced as required or permitted by this act or by the law that otherwise would apply if this act had not taken effect.
(c) This act does not affect an action, case, or proceeding commenced before this act takes effect.
Official Comment
1. Pre-Effective-Date Transactions. Subsection (a) contains the general rule that this Article applies to transactions, security interests, and other liens within its scope (see Section 9-109), even if the transaction or lien was entered into or created before the effective date. Thus, secured transactions entered into under former Article 9 must be terminated, completed, consummated, and enforced under this Article. Subsection (b) is an exception to the general rule. It applies to valid, pre-effective-date transactions and liens that were not governed by former Article 9 but would be governed by this Article if they had been entered into or created after this Article takes effect. Under subsection (b), these valid transactions, such as the creation of agricultural liens and security interests in commercial tort claims, retain their validity under this Article and may be terminated, completed, consummated, and enforced under this Article. However, these transactions also may be terminated, completed, consummated, and enforced by the law that otherwise would apply had this Article not taken effect.
2. Judicial Proceedings Commenced Before Effective Date. As is usual in transition provisions, subsection (c) provides that this Article does not affect litigation pending on the effective date.
Section 36-9-703. Security interest perfected before effective date.
(a) A security interest that is enforceable immediately before this act takes effect and would have priority over the rights of a person that becomes a lien creditor at that time is a perfected security interest under this act if, when this act takes effect, the applicable requirements for enforceability and perfection under this act are satisfied without further action.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in Section 36-9-705, if, immediately before this act takes effect, a security interest is enforceable and would have priority over the rights of a person that becomes a lien creditor at that time, but the applicable requirements for enforceability or perfection under this act are not satisfied when this act takes effect, the security interest:
(1) is a perfected security interest for one year after this act takes effect;
(2) remains enforceable thereafter only if the security interest becomes enforceable under Section 36-9-203 before the year expires; and
(3) remains perfected thereafter only if the applicable requirements for perfection under this act are satisfied before the year expires.
Official Comment
1. Perfected Security Interests Under Former Article 9 and This Article. This Section deals with security interests that are perfected (i.e., that are enforceable and have priority over the rights of a lien creditor) under former Article 9 or other applicable law immediately before this Article takes effect. Subsection (a) provides, not surprisingly, that if the security interest would be a perfected security interest under this Article (i.e., if the transaction satisfies this Article's requirements for enforceability (attachment) and perfection), no further action need be taken for the security interest to be a perfected security interest.
2. Security Interests Enforceable and Perfected Under Former Article 9 but Unenforceable or Unperfected Under This Article. Subsection (b) deals with security interests that are enforceable and perfected under former Article 9 or other applicable law immediately before this Article takes effect but do not satisfy the requirements for enforceability (attachment) or perfection under this Article. Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-705, these security interests are perfected security interests for one year after the effective date. If the security interest satisfies the requirements for attachment and perfection within that period, the security interest remains perfected thereafter. If the security interest satisfies only the requirements for attachment within that period, the security interest becomes unperfected at the end of the one-year period.
Example 1: A pre-effective-date security agreement in a consumer transaction covers "all securities accounts." The security interest is properly perfected. The collateral description was adequate under former Article 9 (see former Section 9-115(3)) but is insufficient under this Article (see Section 9-108(e)(2)). Unless the debtor authenticates a new security agreement describing the collateral other than by "type" (or Section 9-203(b)(3) otherwise is satisfied) within the one-year period following the effective date, the security interest becomes unenforceable at the end of that period.
Other examples under former Article 9 or other applicable law that may be effective as attachment or enforceability steps but may be ineffective under this Article include an oral agreement to sell a payment intangible or possession by virtue of a notification to a bailee under former Section 9-305. Neither the oral agreement nor the notification would satisfy the revised Section 9-203 requirements for attachment.
Example 2: A pre-effective-date possessory security interest in instruments is perfected by a bailee's receipt of notification under former 9-305. The bailee has not, however, acknowledged that it holds for the secured party's benefit under revised Section 9-313. Unless the bailee authenticates a record acknowledging that it holds for the secured party (or another appropriate perfection step is taken) within the one-year period following the effective date, the security interest becomes unperfected at the end of that period.
3. Interpretation of Pre-Effective-Date Security Agreements. Section 9-102 defines "security agreement" as "an agreement that creates or provides for a security interest." Under Section 1-201(3), an "agreement" is a "bargain of the parties in fact." If parties to a pre-effective-date security agreement describe the collateral by using a term defined in former Article 9 in one way and defined in this Article in another way, in most cases it should be presumed that the bargain of the parties contemplated the meaning of the term under former Article 9.
Example 3: A pre-effective-date security agreement covers "all accounts" of a debtor. As defined under former Article 9, an "account" did not include a right to payment for lottery winnings. These rights to payment are "accounts" under this Article, however. The agreement of the parties presumptively created a security interest in "accounts" as defined in former Article 9. A different result might be appropriate, for example, if the security agreement explicitly contemplated future changes in the Article 9 definitions of types of collateral-e.g., "'Accounts' means 'accounts' as defined in the UCC Article 9 of [State X], as that definition may be amended from time to time." Whether a different approach is appropriate in any given case depends on the bargain of the parties, as determined by applying ordinary principles of contract construction.
Section 36-9-704. Security interest unperfected before effective date.
A security interest that is enforceable immediately before this act takes effect but which would be subordinate to the rights of a person that becomes a lien creditor at that time:
(1) remains an enforceable security interest for one year after this act takes effect;
(2) remains enforceable thereafter if the security interest becomes enforceable under Section 36-9-203 when this act takes effect or within one year thereafter; and
(3) becomes perfected:
(A) without further action, when this act takes effect if the applicable requirements for perfection under this act are satisfied before or at that time; or
(B) when the applicable requirements for perfection are satisfied if the requirements are satisfied after that time.
Official Comment
This Section deals with security interests that are enforceable but unperfected (i.e., subordinate to the rights of a person who becomes a lien creditor) under former Article 9 or other applicable law immediately before this Article takes effect. These security interests remain enforceable for one year after the effective date, and thereafter if the appropriate steps for attachment under this Article are taken before the one-year period expires. (This Section's treatment of enforceability is the same as that of Section 9-703.) The security interest becomes a perfected security interest on the effective date if, at that time, the security interest satisfies the requirements for perfection under this Article. If the security interest does not satisfy the requirements for perfection until sometime thereafter, it becomes a perfected security interest at that later time.
Example: A security interest has attached under former Article 9 but is unperfected because the filed financing statement covers "all of debtor's personal property" and controlling case law in the applicable jurisdiction has determined that this identification of collateral in a financing statement is insufficient. Upon the effective date of this Article, the financing statement becomes sufficient under Section 9-504(2). On that date the security interest becomes perfected. (This assumes, of course, that the financing statement is filed in the proper filing office under this Article.)
Section 36-9-705. Effectiveness of action taken before effective date.
(a) If action, other than the filing of a financing statement, is taken before this act takes effect and the action would have resulted in priority of a security interest over the rights of a person that becomes a lien creditor had the security interest become enforceable before this act takes effect, the action is effective to perfect a security interest that attaches under this act within one year after this act takes effect. An attached security interest becomes unperfected one year after this act takes effect unless the security interest becomes a perfected security interest under this act before the expiration of that period.
(b) The filing of a financing statement before this act takes effect is effective to perfect a security interest to the extent the filing would satisfy the applicable requirements for perfection under this act.
(c) This act does not render ineffective an effective financing statement that, before this act takes effect, is filed and satisfies the applicable requirements for perfection under the law of the jurisdiction governing perfection as provided in former Section 36-9-103. However, except as otherwise provided in subsections (d) and (e) and Section 36-9-706, the financing statement ceases to be effective at the earlier of:
(1) the time the financing statement would have ceased to be effective under the law of the jurisdiction in which it is filed; or
(2) June 30, 2006.
(d) The filing of a continuation statement after this act takes effect does not continue the effectiveness of the financing statement filed before this act takes effect. However, upon the timely filing of a continuation statement after this act takes effect and in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction governing perfection as provided in Part 3, the effectiveness of a financing statement filed in the same office in that jurisdiction before this act takes effect continues for the period provided by the law of that jurisdiction.
(e) Subsection (c)(2) applies to a financing statement that, before this act takes effect, is filed against a transmitting utility and satisfies the applicable requirements for perfection under the law of the jurisdiction governing perfection as provided in former Section 36-9-103 only to the extent that Part 3 provides that the law of a jurisdiction other than jurisdiction in which the financing statement is filed governs perfection of a security interest in collateral covered by the financing statement.
(f) A financing statement that includes a financing statement filed before this act takes effect and a continuation statement filed after this act takes effect is effective only to the extent that it satisfies the requirements of Part 5 for an initial financing statement.
Official Comment
1. General. This Section addresses primarily the situation in which the perfection step is taken under former Article 9 or other applicable law before the effective date of this Article, but the security interest does not attach until after that date.
2. Perfection Other Than by Filing. Subsection (a) applies when the perfection step is a step other than the filing of a financing statement. If the step that would be a valid perfection step under former Article 9 or other law is taken before this Article takes effect, and if a security interest attaches within one year after this Article takes effect, then the security interest becomes a perfected security interest upon attachment. However, the security interest becomes unperfected one year after the effective date unless the requirements for attachment and perfection under this Article are satisfied within that period.
3. Perfection by Filing: Ineffective Filings Made Effective. Subsection (b) deals with financing statements that were filed under former Article 9 and which would not have perfected a security interest under the former Article (because, e.g., they did not accurately describe the collateral or were filed in the wrong place), but which would perfect a security interest under this Article. Under subsection (b), such a financing statement is effective to perfect a security interest to the extent it complies with this Article. Subsection (b) applies regardless of the reason for the filing. For example, a secured party need not wait until the effective date to respond to the change this Article makes with respect to the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection of certain security interests. Rather, a secured party may wish to prepare for this change by filing a financing statement before the effective date in the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection under this Article. When this Article takes effect, the filing becomes effective to perfect a security interest (assuming the filing satisfies the perfection requirements of this Article). Note, however, that Section 9-706 determines whether a financing statement filed before the effective date operates to continue the effectiveness of a financing statement filed in another office before the effective date.
4. Perfection by Filing: Change in Applicable Law. Subsection (c) provides that a financing statement filed in the proper jurisdiction under former Section 9-103 remains effective for all purposes, despite the fact that Part 3 of this Article would require filing of a financing statement in a different jurisdiction. This means that, during the early years of this Article's effectiveness, it may be necessary to search the files not only in the jurisdiction whose law governs perfection under this Article but also (if different) in the jurisdiction(s) whose law governed perfection under former Article 9. To limit this burden, subsection (c) provides that a financing statement filed in the jurisdiction determined by former Section 9-103 becomes ineffective at the earlier of the time it would become ineffective under the law of that jurisdiction or June 30, 2006. The June 30, 2006, limitation addresses some nonuniform versions of former Article 9 that extended the effectiveness of a financing statement beyond five years. Note that a financing statement filed before the effective date may remain effective beyond June 30, 2006, if subsection (d) (concerning continuation statements) or (e) (concerning transmitting utilities) or Section 9-706 (concerning initial financing statements that operate to continue pre-effective-date financing statements) so provides.
Subsection (c) is an exception to Section 9-703(b). Under the general rule in Section 9-703(b), a security interest that is enforceable and perfected on the effective date of this Article is a perfected security interest for one year after this Article takes effect, even if the security interest is not enforceable under this Article and the applicable requirements for perfection under this Article have not been met. However, in some cases subsection (c) may shorten the one-year period of perfection; in others, if the security interest is enforceable under Section 9-203, it may extend the period of perfection. A financing statement that remains effective under subsection (c) may be amended (but generally may not be continued) after this Article takes effect by filing an amendment in the office where the financing statement was filed.
Example 1: On July 3, 1996, D, a State X corporation, creates a security interest in certain manufacturing equipment located in State Y. On July 6, 1996, SP perfects a security interest in the equipment under former Article 9 by filing in the office of the State Y Secretary of State. See former Section 9-103(1)(b). This Article takes effect in States X and Y on July 1, 2001. Under Section 9-705(c), the financing statement remains effective for the first five days of July, 2001, after which it lapses. See former Section 9-403. Had SP continued the effectiveness of the financing statement by filing a continuation statement in State Y under former Article 9 before July 1, 2001, the financing statement would have remained effective to perfect the security interest through June 30, 2006. See subsection (c)(2). Alternatively, SP could have filed an initial financing statement in State X under subsection (b) or Section 9-706 before the State Y financing statement lapsed. Had SP done so, the security interest would have remained perfected without interruption until the State X financing statement lapsed.
5. Continuing Effectiveness of Filed Financing Statement. A financing statement filed before the effective date of this Article may be continued only by filing in the State and office designated by this Article. This result is accomplished in the following manner: Subsection (d) indicates that, as a general matter, a continuation statement filed after the effective date of this Article does not continue the effectiveness of a financing statement filed under the law designated by former Section 9-103. Instead, an initial financing statement must be filed under Section 9-706. The second sentence of subsection (d) contains an exception to the general rule. It provides that a continuation statement is effective to continue the effectiveness of a financing statement filed before this Article takes effect if this Article prescribes not only the same jurisdiction but also the same filing office.
Example 2: On November 8, 2000, D, a State X corporation, creates a security interest in certain manufacturing equipment located in State Y. On November 15, 2000, SP perfects a security interest in the equipment under former Article 9 by filing in office of the State Y Secretary of State. See former Section 9-103(1)(b). This Article takes effect in States X and Y on July 1, 2001. Under Section 9-705(c), the financing statement ceases to be effective in November, 2005, when it lapses. See Section 9-515. Under this Article, the law of D's location (State X, see Section 9-307) governs perfection. See Section 9-301. Thus, the filing of a continuation statement in State Y after the effective date would not continue the effectiveness of the financing statement. See subsection (d). However, the effectiveness of the financing statement could be continued under Section 9-706.
Example 3: The facts are as in Example 2, except that D is a State Y corporation. Assume State Y adopted former Section 9-401(1) (second alternative). State Y law governs perfection under Part 3 of this Article. (See Sections 9-301, 9-307.) Under the second sentence of subsection (d), the timely filing of a continuation statement in accordance with the law of State Y continues the effectiveness of the financing statement.
Example 4: The facts are as in Example 3, except that the collateral is equipment used in farming operations and, in accordance with former Section 9-401(1) (second alternative) as enacted in State Y, the financing statement was filed in State Y, in the office of the Shelby County Recorder of Deeds. Under this Article, a continuation statement must be filed in the office of the State Y Secretary of State. See Section 9-501(a)(2). Under the second sentence of subsection (d), the timely filing of a continuation statement in accordance with the law of State Y operates to continue a pre-effective-date financing statement only if the continuation statement is filed in the same office as the financing statement. Accordingly, the continuation statement is not effective in this case, but the financing statement may be continued under Section 9-706.
Example 5: The facts are as in Example 3, except that State Y enacted former Section 9-401(1) (third alternative). As required by former Section 9-401(1), SP filed financing statements in both the office of the State Y Secretary of State and the office of the Shelby County Recorder of Deeds. Under this Article, a continuation statement must be filed in the office of the State Y Secretary of State. See Section 9-501(a)(2). The timely filing of a continuation statement in that office after this Article takes effect would be effective to continue the effectiveness of the financing statement (and thus continue the perfection of the security interest), even if the financing statement filed with the County Recorder lapses.
6. Continuation Statements. In some cases, this Article reclassifies collateral covered by a financing statement filed under former Article 9. For example, collateral consisting of the right to payment for real property sold would be a "general intangible" under the former Article but an "account" under this Article. To continue perfection under those circumstances, a continuation statement must comply with the normal requirements for a continuation statement. See Section 9-515. In addition, the pre-effective-date financing statement and continuation statement, taken together, must satisfy the requirements of this Article concerning the sufficiency of the debtor's name, secured party's name, and indication of collateral. See subsection (f).
Example 6: A pre-effective-date financing statement covers "all general intangibles" of a debtor. As defined under former Article 9, a "general intangible," would include rights to payment for lottery winnings. These rights to payment are "accounts" under this Article, however. A post-effective-date continuation statement will not continue the effectiveness of the pre-effective-date financing statement with respect to lottery winnings unless it amends the indication of collateral covered to include lottery winnings (e.g., by adding "accounts," "rights to payment for lottery winnings," or the like). If the continuation statement does not amend the indication of collateral, the continuation statement will be effective to continue the effectiveness of the financing statement only with respect to "general intangibles" as defined in this Article.
Example 7: The facts are as in Example 6, except that the pre-effective-date financing statement covers "all accounts and general intangibles." Even though rights to payment for lottery winnings are "general intangibles" under former Article 9 and "accounts" under this Article, a post-effective-date continuation statement would continue the effectiveness of the pre-effective-date financing statement with respect to lottery winnings. There would be no need to amend the indication of collateral covered, inasmuch as the indication ("accounts") satisfies the requirements of this Article.
Section 36-9-706. When initial financing statement suffices to continue effectiveness of financing statement.
(a) The filing of an initial financing statement in the office specified in Section 36-9-501 continues the effectiveness of a financing statement filed before this act takes effect if:
(1) the filing of an initial financing statement in that office would be effective to perfect a security interest under this act;
(2) the pre-effective-date financing statement was filed in an office in another state or another office in this State; and
(3) the initial financing statement satisfies subsection (c).
(b) The filing of an initial financing statement under subsection (a) continues the effectiveness of the pre-effective-date financing statement:
(1) if the initial financing statement is filed before this act takes effect, for the period provided in former Section 36-9-403 with respect to a financing statement; and
(2) if the initial financing statement is filed after this act takes effect, for the period provided in Section 36-9-515 with respect to an initial financing statement.
(c) To be effective for purposes of subsection (a), an initial financing statement must:
(1) satisfy the requirements of Part 5 for an initial financing statement;
(2) identify the pre-effective-date financing statement by indicating the office in which the financing statement was filed and providing the dates of filing and file numbers, if any, of the financing statement and of the most recent continuation statement filed with respect to the financing statement; and
(3) indicate that the pre-effective-date financing statement remains effective.
Official Comment
1. Continuation of Financing Statements Not Filed in Proper Filing Office Under This Article. This Section deals with continuing the effectiveness of financing statements that are filed in the proper State and office under former Article 9, but which would be filed in the wrong State or in the wrong office of the proper State under this Article. Section 9-705(d) provides that, under these circumstances, filing a continuation statement after the effective date of this Article in the office designated by former Article 9 would not be effective. This Section provides the means by which the effectiveness of such a financing statement can be continued if this Article governs perfection under the applicable choice-of-law rule: filing an initial financing statement in the office specified by Section 9-501.
Although it has the effect of continuing the effectiveness of a pre-effective-date financing statement, an initial financing statement described in this Section is not a continuation statement. Rather, it is governed by the rules applicable to initial financing statements. (However, the debtor need not authorize the filing. See Section 9-707.) Unlike a continuation statement, the initial financing statement described in this Section may be filed any time during the effectiveness of the pre-effective-date financing statement-even before this Article is enacted- and not only within the six months immediately prior to lapse. In contrast to a continuation statement, which extends the lapse date of a filed financing statement for five years, the initial financing statement has its own lapse date, which bears no relation to the lapse date of the pre-effective-date financing statement whose effectiveness the initial financing statement continues. See subsection (b).
As subsection (a) makes clear, the filing of an initial financing statement under this Section continues the effectiveness of a pre-effective-date financing statement. If the effectiveness of a pre-effective-date financing statement lapses before the initial financing statement is filed, the effectiveness of the pre-effective-date financing statement cannot be continued. Rather, unless the security interest is perfected otherwise, there will be a period during which the security interest is unperfected before becoming perfected again by the filing of the initial financing statement under this Section.
If an initial financing statement is filed under this Section before the effective date of this Article, it takes effect when this Article takes effect (assuming that it is ineffective under former Article 9). Note, however, that former Article 9 determines whether the filing office is obligated to accept such an initial financing statement. For the reason given in the preceding paragraph, an initial financing statement filed before the effective date of this Article does not continue the effectiveness of a pre-effective-date financing statement unless the latter remains effective on the effective date of this Article. Thus, for example, if the effectiveness of the pre-effective-date financing statement lapses before this Article takes effect, the initial financing statement would not continue its effectiveness.
2. Requirements of Initial Financing Statement Filed in Lieu of Continuation Statement. Subsection (c) sets forth the requirements for the initial financing statement under subsection (a). These requirements are needed to inform searchers that the initial financing statement operates to continue a financing statement filed elsewhere and to enable searchers to locate and discover the attributes of the other financing statement. A single initial financing statement may continue the effectiveness of more than one financing statement filed before this Article's effective date. See Section 1-102(5)(a) (words in the singular include the plural). If under this Article the collateral is of a type different from its type under former Article 9-as would be the case, e.g., with a right to payment of lottery winnings (a "general intangible" under former Article 9 and an "account" under this Article), then subsection (c) requires that the initial financing statement indicate the type under this Article.
Section 36-9-707. Persons entitled to file initial financing statement or continuation statement.
A person may file an initial financing statement or a continuation statement under this part if:
(1) the secured party of record authorizes the filing; and
(2) the filing is necessary under this part:
(A) to continue the effectiveness of a financing statement filed before this act takes effect; or
(B) to perfect or continue the perfection of a security interest.
Official Comment
This Section permits a secured party to file an initial financing statement or continuation statement necessary under this Part to continue the effectiveness of a financing statement filed before this Article takes effect or to perfect or otherwise continue the perfection of a security interest. Because a filing described in this Section typically operates to continue the effectiveness of a financing statement whose filing the debtor already has authorized, this Section does not require authorization from the debtor.
Section 36-9-708. Priority.
(a) This act determines the priority of conflicting claims to collateral. However, if the relative priorities of the claims were established before this act takes effect, former Chapter 9 determines priority.
(b) For purposes of Section 36-9-322(a), the priority of a security interest that becomes enforceable under Section 36-9-203 of this act dates from the time this act takes effect if the security interest is perfected under this act by the filing of a financing statement before this act takes effect which would not have been effective to perfect the security interest under former Chapter 9. This subsection does not apply to conflicting security interests each of which is perfected by the filing of such a financing statement."
Official Comment
1. Law Governing Priority. Ordinarily, this Article determines the priority of conflicting claims to collateral. However, when the relative priorities of the claims were established before this Article takes effect, former Article 9 governs.
Example 1: In 1999, SP-1 obtains a security interest in a right to payment for goods sold ("account"). SP-1 fails to file a financing statement. This Article takes effect on July 1, 2001. Thereafter, on August 1, 2001, D creates a security interest in the same account in favor of SP-2, who files a financing statement. This Article determines the relative priorities of the claims. SP-2's security interest has priority under Section 9-322(a)(1).
Example 2: In 1999, SP-1 obtains a security interest in a right to payment for goods sold ("account"). SP-1 fails to file a financing statement. In 2000, D creates a security interest in the same account in favor of SP-2, who likewise fails to file a financing statement. This Article takes effect on July 1, 2001. Because the relative priorities of the security interests were established before the effective date of this Article, former Article 9 governs priority, and SP-1's security interest has priority under former Section 9-312(5)(b).
Example 3: The facts are as in Example 2, except that, on August 1, 2001, SP-2 files a proper financing statement under this Article. Until August 1, 2001, the relative priorities of the security interests were established before the effective date of this Article, as in Example 2. However, by taking the affirmative step of filing a financing statement, SP-2 established anew the relative priority of the conflicting claims after the effective date. Thus, this Article determines priority. SP-2's security interest has priority under Section 9-322(a)(1).
As Example 3 illustrates, relative priorities that are "established" before the effective date do not necessarily remain unchanged following the effective date. Of course, unlike priority contests among unperfected security interests, some priorities are established permanently, e.g., the rights of a buyer of property who took free of a security interest under former Article 9.
One consequence of the rule in subsection (a) is that the mere taking effect of this Article does not of itself adversely affect the priority of conflicting claims to collateral.
Example 4: In 1999, SP-1 obtains a security interest in a right to payment for lottery winnings (a "general intangible" as defined in former Article 9 but an "account" as defined in this Article). SP-1's security interest is unperfected because its filed financing statement covers only "accounts." In 2000, D creates a security interest in the same right to payment in favor of SP-2, who files a financing statement covering "accounts and general intangibles." Before this Article takes effect on July 1, 2001, SP-2's perfected security interest has priority over SP-1's unperfected security interest under former 9-312(5). Because the relative priorities of the security interests were established before the effective date of this Article, former Article 9 continues to govern priority after this Article takes effect. Thus, SP-2's priority is not adversely affected by this Article's having taken effect.
Note that were this Article to govern priority, SP-2 would become subordinated to SP-1 under Section 9-322(a)(1), even though nothing changes other than this Article's having taken effect. Under Section 9-704, SP-1's security interest would become perfected; the financing statement covering "accounts" adequately covers the lottery winnings and complies with the other perfection requirements of this Article, e.g., it is filed in the proper office.
Example 5: In 1999, SP-1 obtains a security interest in a right to payment for lottery winnings-a "general intangible" (as defined under former Article 9). SP-1's security interest is unperfected because its filed financing statement covers only "accounts." In 2000, D creates a security interest in the same right to payment in favor of SP-2, who makes the same mistake and also files a financing statement covering only "accounts." Before this Article takes effect on July 1, 2001, SP-1's unperfected security interest has priority over SP-2's unperfected security interest, because SP-1's security interest was the first to attach. See former Section 9-312(5)(b). Because the relative priorities of the security interests were established before the effective date of this Article, former Article 9 continues to govern priority after this Article takes effect. Although Section 9-704 makes both security interests perfected for purposes of this Article, both are unperfected under former Article 9, which determines their relative priorities.
2. Financing Statements Ineffective Under Former Article 9 but Effective Under This Article. If this Article determines priority, subsection (b) may apply. It deals with the case in which a filing that occurs before the effective date of this Article would be ineffective to perfect a security interest under former Article 9 but effective under this Article. For purposes of Section 9-322(a), the priority of a security interest that attaches after this Article takes effect and is perfected in this manner dates from the time this Article takes effect.
Example 6: In 1999, SP-1 obtains a security interest in D's existing and after-acquired instruments and files a financing statement covering "instruments." In 2000, D grants a security interest in its existing and after-acquired accounts in favor of SP-2, who files a financing statement covering "accounts." After this Article takes effect on July 1, 2001, one of D's account debtors gives D a negotiable note to evidence its obligation to pay an overdue account. Under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule in Section 9-322(a), SP-1 would have priority in the instrument, which constitutes SP-2's proceeds. SP-1's filing in 1999 was earlier than SP-2's in 2000. However, subsection (b) provides that, for purposes of Section 9-322(a), SP-1's priority dates from the time this Article takes effect (July 1, 2001). Under Section 9-322(b), SP-2's priority with respect to the proceeds (instrument) dates from its filing as to the original collateral (accounts). Accordingly, SP-2's security interest would be senior.
Subsection (b) does not apply to conflicting security interests each of which is perfected by a pre-effective-date filing that was not effective under former Article 9 but is effective under this Article.
Example 7: In 1999, SP-1 obtains a security interest in D's existing and after-acquired instruments and files a financing statement covering "instruments." In 2000, D grants a security interest in its existing and after-acquired instruments in favor of SP-2, who files a financing statement covering "instruments." After this Article takes effect on July 1, 2001, one of D's account debtors gives D a negotiable note to evidence its obligation to pay an overdue account. Under the first-to-file-or-perfect rule in Section 9-322(a), SP-1 would have priority in the instrument. Both filings are effective under this Article, see Section 9-705(b), and SP-1's filing in 1999 was earlier than SP-2's in 2000. Subsection (b) does not change this result.
SECTION 18. Chapter 6 of Title 36, Bulk Transfers, is repealed.
SECTION 19. SECTIONS 1 through 5 of this act take effect upon approval by the Governor. SECTIONS 6 through 18 of this act take effect July 1, 2001. /
Amend further by striking the title above the enacting words and inserting:
/ TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING CHAPTER 2A TO TITLE 36 SO AS TO ADD GENERAL PROVISIONS TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REGARDING LEASES AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE FORMATION, CONSTRUCTION, EFFECT, PERFORMANCE, AND DEFAULT OF A LEASE CONTRACT; TO AMEND SECTIONS 36-1-105, AS AMENDED, 36-1-201, AS AMENDED, AND 36-9-113, RELATING TO OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, SO AS TO REVISE THESE PROVISIONS TO CONFORM THEM TO THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 2A; TO AMEND CHAPTER 8, TITLE 36, RELATING TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REGARDING INVESTMENT SECURITIES, SO AS TO, INTER ALIA, TRANSFER THE STATUTORY LAW CONCERNING CREATION AND PERFECTION OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN INVESTMENT SECURITIES TO CHAPTER 9, TITLE 36, RELATING TO SECURED TRANSACTIONS, TO CODIFY INDUSTRY PRACTICES OF HOLDING INVESTMENT SECURITIES INDIRECTLY THROUGH INTERMEDIARIES, TO INCREASE LIQUIDITY AND CERTAINTY IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS BY ESTABLISHING FINALITY IN SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS, AND TO CLARIFY CHOICE OF LAW RULES IN SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS; TO AMEND SECTIONS 36-1-105, AS AMENDED, 36-4-104, AND 36-5-114, AS AMENDED, ALL RELATING TO VARIOUS COMMERCIAL PRACTICES AND TRANSACTIONS GOVERNED BY THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, SO AS TO CONFORM THE REMAINING CHAPTERS IN THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO THE MODIFICATIONS MADE IN CHAPTER 8, INVESTMENT SECURITIES; TO MAKE CORRESPONDING CHANGES TO APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL COMMENTS AS NECESSARY TO REFLECT THE CHANGES TO CHAPTER 8; TO AMEND SECTION 33-6-260, RELATING TO RESTRICTION ON TRANSFER OR REGISTRATION OF SECURITIES, SO AS TO CONFORM THE REFERENCE TO "SECURITIES"; TO REPEAL CHAPTER 7 OF TITLE 35 RELATING TO THE "UNIFORM ACT FOR SIMPLIFICATION OF FIDUCIARY SECURITY TRANSFERS"; TO AMEND CHAPTER 9, TITLE 36, RELATING TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE REGARDING SECURED TRANSACTIONS, SO AS TO, INTER ALIA, EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE PROVISIONS TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL TYPES OF PROPERTY AS COLLATERAL, INCLUDING INVESTMENT SECURITIES FORMERLY ADDRESSED IN CHAPTER 8, AND NEW KINDS OF TRANSACTIONS; TO PROVIDE FOR CLARITY OF METHODS OF PERFECTION AND FOR CENTRALIZED AND ELECTRONIC FILING OF FINANCING STATEMENTS; TO PROVIDE THAT THE LOCATION OF THE DEBTOR DETERMINES THE PLACE OF FILING AND THE EFFECT OF PERFECTION; TO PROVIDE NEW DEFAULT AND ENFORCEMENT RULES FOR DEALING WITH GUARANTORS, NEW KINDS OF PROPERTY, AND SUBORDINATE CREDITORS; TO DISTINGUISH MORE CLEARLY THE TREATMENT OF A CONSUMER TRANSACTION INVOLVING A SECURITY INTEREST AND THE PROTECTIONS AFFORDED A CONSUMER DEBTOR; TO CLARIFY CERTAIN AMBIGUITIES ARISING FROM CONFLICTING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE APPLICATIONS OF SOME PROVISIONS; TO PROVIDE FOR INCREASED UNIFORMITY IN THE TREATMENT OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING OIL AND GAS AND AGRICULTURE; TO REPEAL CHAPTER 6, TITLE 36, RELATING TO BULK TRANSFERS; AND TO MAKE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CHAPTERS 8 AND 9 SIMULTANEOUS ON JULY 1, 2001. /
DONALD H. HOLLAND, for Committee.
A BILL
TO AMEND SECTIONS 36-9-301 AND 36-9-312, BOTH AS AMENDED, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BOTH RELATING TO ESTABLISHING PRIORITY OF A PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST IN COLLATERAL OTHER THAN INVENTORY, SO AS TO INCREASE THE "GRACE PERIOD" FOR FILING FROM TEN DAYS TO TWENTY DAYS.
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina:
SECTION 1. Section 36-9-301(2) of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 494 of 1988, is further amended to read:
"(2) If the secured party files with respect to a purchase money security interest before or within ten twenty days after the debtor receives possession of the collateral, he takes priority over the rights of a transferee in bulk or of a lien creditor which arise between the time the security interest attaches and the time of filing."
SECTION 2. Section 36-9-312(4) of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 494 of 1988, is further amended to read:
"(4) A purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral or its proceeds if the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within ten twenty days thereafter."
SECTION 3. This act takes effect upon approval by the Governor.
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