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Section 33-31-204. Liability for preincorporation transactions.

All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation, knowing there was no incorporation under this chapter, are jointly and severally liable for all liabilities created while so acting except for any liability to any person who knew or reasonably should have known that there was no incorporation.
OFFICIAL COMMENT

There is a wide variety of factual situations in which third parties seek to impose liability on persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation that has not been formed. There are numerous situations in which such liability would lead to an unjust result. This is particularly true in the nonprofit area where corporations are not operated for personal gain and where members are often less sophisticated than shareholders.

At one extreme, section 2.04 by implication protects individuals who erroneously and in good faith believe that a corporation has been formed. At the other extreme, section 2.04 imposes liability on individuals who purport to act as or on behalf of a corporation knowing that it has not been formed and knowing that the party with whom they are dealing believes a corporation exists. In the myriad of factual patterns falling between these extremes, a court may deny recovery when it is equitable to do so after considering all the circumstances. For example, if a third party insisted that a contract be signed on behalf of a corporation knowing that the corporation had not been formed, a court could apply equitable principles and not impose personal liability on the individual who signed the contract.

Even if personal lability is appropriate, it should not be imposed on all members of the corporation. Not all members of nonprofit unincorporated associations are necessarily liable for the obligations of the association. See Libby v. Perry, 311 A.2d 527 (Me. 1973); Steuer v. Phelps, 41 Cal. App. 3d 468, 116 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1974).

1. Comparison to South Carolina Business Corporation Act

Section 33-2-104 of the South Carolina Business Corporation Act is the coun- terpart to this section. (It formerly applied to nonprofit corporations.) There are now significant differences between the two statutes. The South Carolina Business Corporation Act adopts a stringent test that makes it likely that a person acting prior to the formation of a corporation will be held personally liable for the debts of the purported entity. However, many nonprofit corporations will be churches and other bona fide charities. Likely true inno- cent mistakes will be made in forming these entities. It seems that as a matter of policy that it is not desirable to hold persons liable for the debts of these entities if simple or bona fide mistakes are made. Therefore, the "more liberal" section proposed in the Model Nonprofit Act was adopted for nonprofit corporations.

This section intends to insulate from liability persons who take action as an nonprofit corporation not knowing that the entity has not yet been formed. If there is no entity, those persons purporting to act on behalf of the entity will likely be deemed acting as members (or officers-directors) of an association. Without this section there would be a risk that they would be personally liable for the pre-incorporation activities of the purported nonprofit corporation.
2. Non-Model Act provision

The last phrase of the section, "except for any liability to any person who know or reasonably should have known that there was no incorporation," is a non-Model Act provision. The purpose of this language is to give the organizers additional protection. If the claimant knew that there was no corporation then there is no reason to permit such party to recover against the individuals.

3. Liability of members of an association

a. Common law. Dicta in Crocker v. Barr, 295 S.C. 195, 367 S.E.2d 471 (App.1988), rev'd, 305 S.C. 406, 409 S.E. 2d 368 (1991), citing, Elliot v. Greer Presbyterian Church, 181 S.C. 84, 186 S.E. 651 (1936), and Medlin v. Ebenezer Methodist Church, 132 S.C. 498, 129 S.E. 830 (1925) states that "case law in South Carolina generally recognizes that members of any unincorporated association are jointly and severally liable for its obligations." See also, Hall v. Walters, 226 S.C. 430, 437, 85 S.E.2d 729 (1955).

b. Statutory liability. Whatever the status of the common law, there is a very dangerous statute:

c. Members liable to their co-members. Not only may a member of an unincorporated association be liable for contracts entered between the association and third parties, for tortious wrongs committed by the association against a non-member, but he may also be liable for injuries suffered by a co-member. The case law in South Carolina on this point is still unclear. For example, church members may be personally liable, but this is somewhat unclear. Crocker v. Barr, 305 S.C. 406, 409 S. E. 2d 368 (1991). Union members may lose, and homeowner association members do lose. Murphy v. Yacht Cove Homeowners Association, 289 S.C. 367, 369, 345 S.E.2d 709 (1986).

d. Parent organizations may be liable for tortious acts done by members of a local unit or chapter. Not only may members of the association be personally liable, but there are two significant South Carolina cases which impose an "upstream" liability. In Ballou v. Sigma Nu General Fraternity, the "national organization" (itself an unincorporated association) was held responsible for the wrongful death (hazing) of a pledge at the University of South Carolina chapter of the fraternity (itself likely also another unincorporated association). Likewise in Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville,285 S.C. 348, 329 S.E.2d 753 (1985) the court found the national masonic organization liable for injuries inflicted during initiation rites conducted by the local unincorporated chapter.

e. Unincorporated charities, their members, and directors are not fully protected by statute. There is a popular misconception that unincorporated "charities," and therefore their members, are protected from claims. There are two protective statutes, Sections 33-55-210 and 33-31-834, but there are serious gaps in both. Section 33-31-834 appeared as Section 33-31-180 in the prior statute.

The directors of certain charitable entities are given certain protection by Section 33-31-834. An obvious weakness with Section 33-18-834 is that it does not protect either the members themselves or the entity (in the case of an incorporated body), see 1988 Op.S.C.Attorney General, 158 (#88-55). The only persons who are protected are the directors or those who function in that capacity. It would seem that high level officers would not be protected. Directors are only protected in cases of negligence. It would seem that if a problem is serious enough to consider a claim against the board, that many times the wrongful conduct would arguably be wanton or grossly negligent. Behavior of this type is not insulated. See, 1988 Op.S.C. Attorney General, 1558 (#88-55). Directors for various types of nonprofit corporations and associa- tions are not protected by this statute. If the corporation is not a section 501(c)(3), (6), or (12) entity for tax purposes, the directors receive no help. Missing from this list and thus not protected are again homeowner associations, country clubs, and others. (No opinion was expressed in 1988 Op.S.C. Attorney General, 1558 (#88-55) as to whether the Directors of the Alumni Association's National Council of Clemson University were within the protected class.)

Section 33-31-205. Organization of corporation.

(a) After incorporation:

(1) if initial directors are named in the articles of incorporation, the initial directors shall hold an organizational meeting, at the call of a majority of the directors, to complete the organization of the corporation by appointing officers, adopting bylaws, and carrying on any other business brought before the meeting;

(2) if initial directors are not named in the articles, the incorporator or incorporators shall hold an organizational meeting at a call of a majority of the incorporators:

(ii) to elect a board of directors who shall complete the organization of the corporation.

(b) Action required or permitted by this chapter to be taken by incorporators at an organizational meeting may be taken without a meeting if the action taken is evidenced by one or more written consents describing the action taken and signed by each incorporator.

(5c) An organizational meeting may be held in or out of this State in accordance with Section 33-31-821.
OFFICIAL COMMENT

Section 2.05 provides alternative ways to complete the process of incorporation.

If initial directors have been named in the articles, they may complete the organization of the corporation at a meeting or by unanimous written consent. See sections 2.05(a) and 8.21. There is no reason to name initial "dummy" directors as the same function can be carried out and privacy maintained by use of incorporators.

The completion of the organization typically includes opening a bank account, applying for federal and state tax-exempt status, electing officers, adopting bylaws, providing for and admitting members, if any, applying for licenses from state and local authorities, obtaining an employer identification number, regis- tering with the attorney general or other state authorities, and entering into arrangements and contracts for ongoing operations.

If initial directors have not been named in the articles, the incorporators at an organizational meeting may elect directors and complete the organization of the corporation. Section 2.05(a)(2). In completing the organization, incorporators should act with caution as they are responsible for their actions.

If no organizational meeting is held, the incorporators may act by signing a written approval of the actions they take. This procedure should be followed rather than preparing minutes of a meeting that does not take place.
SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTERS' COMMENTS

This section permits the initial directors either to hold an organizational meeting or to act by unanimous written consent as permitted by Section 33-8-210. This section is identical to the formerly applicable statute, Section 33-2-105 of the South Carolina Business Corporation Act. The former nonprofit statutes in Chapter 31, Title 33 had at best only vague

Section 33-31-206. Bylaws.

(a) The incorporators or board of directors of a corporation shall adopt bylaws for the corporation.

(b) The bylaws may contain any provision for regulating and managing the affairs of the corporation that is not inconsistent with law or the articles of incorporation.
OFFICIAL COMMENT

A nonprofit corporation is required to adopt bylaws. The term "bylaws" has a broad meaning. See section 1.40(3). Failure to adopt bylaws will lead to much confusion and uncertainty about the internal structure and organization of the corporation. However, failure to adopt bylaws will not affect the de jure status of a corporation.

The bylaws may contain any provision regulating and managing the affairs of the corporation not inconsistent with law or the articles. If a nonprofit corporation has members, its bylaws frequently contain detailed provisions dealing with their characteristics, qualifications, rights, limitations and obligations. Such provisions may relate to voting rights procedures governing admission, expulsion, suspension and other matters. The bylaws may either specify the exact number of directors or specify that the number of directors may be fixed within a stated range by the board or the members. Additional provisions that may appear in bylaws include: provisions for distribution of assets on dissolution in addition to those required by the articles (see section 2.02(a)(7)); levying dues, fees and assessments; setting the fiscal year; notice and the mechanics of meetings of directors and members; indemnification of officers, directors and agents; conventions and appointing delegates, if any; the authority of the officers and the executive director, if any; procedures to be followed in regard to checks and bank accounts; keeping and inspecting corporate records; and provisions, not inconsistent with the Model Act or articles, for amending the bylaws.

The incorporators or initial directors should adopt the initial bylaws of a corporation prior to the admission of members. The Model Act contains specific procedures that must be followed to amend the bylaws or to repeal them and adopt new bylaws. See sections 10.20-10.22.
SOUTH CAROLINA REPORTERS' COMMENTS

This section is identical to Section 33-2-106 of the South Carolina Business Corporation Act which previously governed nonprofit corporations.

Section 33-31-207. Emergency bylaws and powers.

(a) Unless the articles provide otherwise, the directors of a corporation may adopt, amend, or repeal bylaws to be effective only in an emergency defined in subsection (d). The emergency bylaws, which are subject to amendment or repeal by the members, may provide special procedures necessary for managing the corporation during the emergency, including:
(1) how to call a meeting of the board;
(2) quorum requirements for the meeting; and

(3) designation of additional or substitute directors.

(b) All provisions of the regular bylaws consistent with the emergency bylaws remain effective during the emergency. The emergency bylaws are not effective after the emergency ends.

(c) Corporate action taken in good faith in accordance with the emergency bylaws:
(1) binds the corporation; and

(2) may not be used to impose liability on a corporate director, officer, employee, or agent.

(d) An emergency exists for purposes of this section if a quorum of the corporation's directors cannot readily be assembled because of some catastrophic event.

(e) A corporate director, officer, employee, or agent is not liable for deviation from normal procedures if the conduct was authorized by emergency bylaws adopted as provided in this section.
OFFICIAL COMMENT

In the absence of an article provision to the contrary, the directors may adopt, amend or repeal bylaws to be effective only in the event of an emergency. Emergency bylaws are normally adopted prior to the existence of the emergency as defined in section 2.07(d). An emergency exists if a quorum of a corporation's directors cannot readily be achieved because of a catastrophe. A catastrophe could include an attack upon the United States or a serious fire or flooding that makes it difficult or impossible to obtain a quorum of the board. The emergency bylaws may provide special procedures necessary for managing the corporation during the emergency.

This section is intended to apply when the board members cannot meet because of some disaster. Section 33-31-160 provides a method whereby a court can order a meeting held if the entity cannot otherwise function. Section 33-31-160 anticipates the situation where the entity has become inactive or there has been a failure to keep up with the formalities or some other similar event.

This section is comparable to Section 33-2-107 of the South Carolina Business Corporation Act which was the previously applicable statute. A list is provided in the South Carolina Reporters' Comments to Section 33-2-107 of the provisions which might be included in a set of emergency bylaws.
Different from the Model Act, this section includes paragraph (e) which clarifies that a director or agent operating under the emergency bylaws is totally protected.

It should also be noted that nothing in this section implies that the corporation must have members.

Section 33-31-301. Purposes.

(a) Every corporation incorporated under this chapter has the purpose of engaging in any lawful activity unless a more limited purpose is set forth in the articles of incorporation.

(b) A corporation engaging in an activity that is subject to regulation under another statute of this State may incorporate under this chapter only if incorporation under this chapter is not prohibited by the other statute. The corporation is subject to all limitations of the other statute.
OFFICIAL COMMENT

1. Introduction

Public benefit corporations operate for some public or charitable purpose, while religious corporations operate primarily or exclusively for religious purposes. Mutual benefit corporations act on behalf of their members or those they hold themselves out as representing or benefiting. The Model Act requires an election between public benefit, mutual benefit and religious status and allows each type of nonprofit corporation to engage in any lawful activity unless a narrower purpose clause is set forth in its articles. See section 2.02 and the Introduction to the Model Act.

Mutual benefit corporations cannot pay unreasonable compensation, but can make distributions to members or controlling persons upon dissolution, and are subject to less extensive attorney general supervision than public benefit corporations. An entrepreneur might try to establish a mutual benefit corpora- tion without members and distribute its assets to himself upon dissolution. He should be prevented from doing so if the corporation led those from whom it received funds into believing that the corporation was operating for a public or charitable purpose, or that its assets would only be used for the benefit of those it represented or those to whom it provided goods or services. A court should find that the assets of the corporation may not be diverted for the personal benefit of a controlling person.

While section 3.01 does not impose any limitations on a corporation's purposes or the use of its assets, those forming nonprofit corporations may limit the corporate purposes in the articles of incorporation. Such limitations may be added to obtain tax exempt status, to attract a significant contribution, or to provide a limited purpose for a corporation. See the Official Comment to section 2.02 for a discussion of the dangers involved in narrowing a corporation's purposes or powers. Also see section 3.04 dealing with the ultra vires concept.

2. Other Statutes

A nonprofit corporation may incorporate pursuant to chapter 2 unless some other state statute or law prohibits incorporation or sets forth some condition to forming the nonprofit corporation. If so, incorporation is prohibited or may only take place after the condition has been meet. Section 3.01(b). For example, it may be necessary to obtain the consent of some regulatory body prior to incorporating.

Many nonprofit corporations are subject to regulation as a result of the nature of their activities. Hospitals, colleges, secondary schools and health maintenance organizations, for example, are subject to extensive regulation. Section 3.01(b) provides that nonprofit corporations continue

This section is comparable to Section 33-3-101 of the South Carolina Business Corporation Act. Some jurisdictions only allow incorporation of activities regulated by another statute if incorporation as a nonprofit corporation is affirmatively "permitted" by the other statute. This South Carolina provision, following the Model Act, permits the incorporation under this statute unless incorporation as a nonprofit corporation is expressly "prohibited" by another statute.

Under the former provisions of Chapter 31, Title 33, the corporation's specific purpose had to be identified. The Attorney General used this requirement as part of his reason for denying a charter to the Ku Klux Klan which had a purpose to deal generally in any business enterprise. The 1956-57 Op.S.C. Attorney General, 179 (April 8, 1957) noted such a purpose is "indefinite and far reaching," and "a charter should not be issued to any corporation to engage in any business enterprises" but its purpose should be stated with greater certainty and clarity.

It is important to remember that there is a difference between a corporation which is "nonprofit" and one which additionally is "charitable" in nature. "Charitable" South Carolina nonprofit corporations at one time enjoyed immunity from tort claims. (Abolished generally in Fitzer v. Young Men's Christian Association, 277 S.C. 1, 282 S.E. 2d 230 (1981).) Additionally, charitable nonprofit corporations did and may continue to enjoy certain tax advantages. This South Carolina Nonprofit Corporation Act of 1994 helps clarify this distinction, since likely only "religious" and "public benefit" nonprofit corporations will qualify as charities for federal tax purposes. "Mutual benefit" nonprofit corporations will be true nonprofit entities but not charities.

South Carolinians often refer to nonprofit corporations as "eleemosynary" corporations. As stated in Eiserhardt v. State Fair, 235 S.C. 305, 309, 111 S.E. 2d 568 (1959), the word "eleemosynary" has been used, "in a broader sense, to denote an unselfish purpose to advance the common good in any form or manner," and not merely denoting a "purpose to promote the welfare of mankind by works of charity." In the 1961-62 Op.S.C. Attorney General, 182 (#1406), the Attorney General indicated that the term included anything which would advance the common good of the community and includes the term "benevolent" (which is broader than "charitable") "intended for the conferring of benefits rather than for gain or profit.

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