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Judge Burnett testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening;
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly on his behalf prior to screening; or
(d) used his judicial letterhead or the services of his staff to campaign.

Judge Burnett testified that he has spent $155.80 on his campaign and that he would file the required campaign expenditure reports with the House and Senate Ethics Committees.

Judge Burnett also testified that he understood the new Joint Committee rule requiring him to wait forty-eight hours after the draft report is released before he may begin seeking commitments.

Last year Judge Burnett campaigned in the House antechamber, but testified that he did so before he knew that was a problem and would not do so again.

The Joint Committee asked Judge Burnett about allegations reported in the newspaper and elsewhere to the effect that Justice Waller campaigned for Judge Burnett during his last run for the Supreme Court. Judge Burnett denied those allegations, saying that Justice Waller did not campaign on his behalf.

10. Miscellaneous:

Ms. Kathryn Shelton and Mr. Thomas McDow filed affidavits in opposition to Judge Burnett's election. The allegations contained in those affidavits are discussed above.

Mr. Charles Hodge, Mr. John White, and Mr. Ben Harrison all filed affidavits and testified on Judge Burnett's behalf. Mr. Hodge testified that Judge Burnett runs an extremely efficient courtroom and praised Judge Burnett's use of computers. Mr. White testified that Judge Burnett conducts his courtroom in a fair and administratively efficient manner and that he disposes of matters promptly. Mr. Harrison testified that Judge Burnett understands the judicial system better than anyone he knows. All three men testified that Judge Burnett has excellent judicial temperament.

Joint Committee's Finding: Legally Qualified

Judge Pleicones was screened on February 9, 1995, after a thorough investigation. The Joint Committee's findings as they relate to the nine evaluative criteria are as follows:

1. Integrity and Impartiality:

The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct. The input the Joint Committee received from its own survey and the report of the Bar was that Judge Pleicones's character, integrity, and reputation are outstanding.

Judge Pleicones demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations of importance to judges. He testified as to the issue of ex parte communications, that he does not discuss substantive matters relating to anything in an adversarial situation with only one side, but will discuss procedural and scheduling matters ex parte. Judge Pleicones testified that his practice for handling orders is to draft a jointly addressed letter instructing the prevailing party to prepare an order in consonance with the instructions detailed in the letter and serve a copy of the proposed order on the other party so that the other party will have an opportunity to comment.

Judge Pleicones testified that if there is any articuable reason why he could not be impartial in a matter he recuses himself. He said that in criminal cases he allows himself to be voir dired about his impartiality. Judge Pleicones is involved in a partnership that owns a building which houses a law firm of which he was a partner before going on the bench. He testified that he always recuses himself when current or former members of that firm are to appear before him.

Judge Pleicones testified that he does not accept gifts and accepts ordinary social hospitality only from persons who do not appear before him.

2. Legal Knowledge and Ability:

The input the Joint Committee received from its own survey and from the Bar indicated that Judge Pleicones is very intelligent and knowledgeable. The Bar said he "is able to grasp issues quickly and makes rulings that the law requires, even when he may personally disagree with the outcome of such results." Judge Pleicones has attended all judicial continuing education since going on the bench and has given

As a practicing attorney, Judge Pleicones's Martindale-Hubbell rating was AV, their highest rating.

Judge Pleicones's score on the Joint Committee's practice and procedure questions was 3.06 out of 4 possible points. He demonstrated a very thorough knowledge of the standard of appeal from the Workers' Compensation Commission, peremptory strikes, damages awardable without a hearing in a default judgment, court witnesses, when jeopardy attaches, the admissibility of expert testimony, and writs of certiorari. He was also familiar with circumstances in which a witness may testify outside of the defendant's presence, Allen charges, writs of supersedeas, and arbitration.

In response to the Chairman's questions about separation of powers and the role of the judiciary, Judge Pleicones testified that acts of the legislature are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality and that the courts have no role in lawmaking. He also said that the death penalty is constitutional and that courts cannot order the General Assembly to appropriate or expend funds.

Judge Pleicones describes himself as a strong advocate of alternative sentencing.

3. Professional Experience:

Judge Pleicones was elected to the circuit court bench in 1991. He has since that time served as an Acting Associate Justice of the Supreme Court on ten different occasions.

At the time of his election to the circuit court bench, he had been in private practice since 1977 and had worked mainly on general civil litigation. During his period of private practice, he also served as a municipal judge from 1982 to 1988. His jurisdiction as a municipal judge was for criminal matters with a limit of $200 or 30 days.

Judge Pleicones worked as a deputy public defender from 1973 to 1977 and from 1968 to 1973 he was on active duty in the army serving as Chief of Miliary Justice and trial counsel.

He has been a reserve officer (Colonel) in the United States Army since 1973. He has served as Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer from the Second United States Army to the South Carolina National Guard and Militia since 1993. Prior to that he was commander of the 12th Military Law Center.

The input the Joint Committee received from its surveys and from the Bar indicates that Judge Pleicones's temperament is outstanding.

Judge Pleicones testified that he envisions himself as a consensus builder on the Supreme Court, but will not subvert his intellectual independence.

Judge Pleicones reported to the Joint Committee an incident in which an attorney criticized him for saying "don't bug me" in response to her questions during a hearing. Judge Pleicones testified that he regretted the remark and wished that he had come up with a more gentle admonition. The attorney involved did not file a complaint with Judicial Standards or otherwise pursue the matter, and the Joint Committee does not find cause for concern in the incident.

5. Diligence and Industry:

Judge Pleicones was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Joint Committee, and the Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.

Judge Pleicones testified that he would serve a full term if elected and that he had no immediate plans to return to private practice.

6. Mental and Physical Capabilities:

Judge Pleicones appears to be mentally and physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.

7. Financial Responsibility:

The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Pleicones has managed his financial affairs responsibly.

8. Public Service:

Judge Pleicones has been either an active or reserve member of the Army for most of his adult life.

9. Ethics:

Judge Pleicones testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening;
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening; or
(d) used his judicial letterhead or the services of his staff to campaign.

Judge Pleicones also testified that he understood the new Joint Committee rule requiring him to wait forty-eight hours after the draft report is released before he may begin seeking commitments.

10. Miscellaneous:

The Joint Committee did not receive any complaints or statements in opposition to Judge Pleicones's election. The Joint Committee did receive a statement in support from Marjorie L. Heggie who said that she had been a victim of violent crime and that through the ordeal of her assailant's trial, her "ultimate comfort was the confidence that any matters with which Judge Pleicones was associated would be handled appropriately and fairly . . . because Judge Pleicones and integrity are synonymous." Ms. Heggie also said that the election of Judge Pleicones to the Supreme Court would affirm the prodigious standards of our legislature, our community, and our state.

Joint Committee's Finding: Legally Qualified

Judge Pyle was screened on February 2, 1995, after a thorough investigation. The Joint Committee's findings as they relate to the nine evaluative criteria are as follows:

1. Integrity and Impartiality:

The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct. The input the Joint Committee received from its own survey and the report of the Bar was that Judge Pyle's character, integrity, and reputation are outstanding.

Judge Pyle demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations of importance to judges. He testified as to the issue of ex parte communications, that he does his best to avoid such communications at all times.

Judge Pyle testified that as a general rule he does not accept gifts from lawyers, but that he has friends who are attorneys and they exchange gifts of nominal value for Christmas. Judge Pyle does socialize with lawyers at times and accepts their ordinary social hospitality, but if he goes out to dinner or lunch with an attorney, he does not allow the attorney to pay for any food or beverages.

The input the Joint Committee received from its own survey and from the Bar indicated that Judge Pyle is very intelligent and knowledgeable. The Bar said that a "substantial majority of the members contacted respected his legal ability and the industry and promptness with which he handles his work." Judge Pyle has complied with the requirements for continuing judicial education and has taught several continuing legal education courses and served as a faculty advisor at the National Judicial College.

Judge Pyle's score on the Joint Committee's practice and procedure questions was 3.0 out of 4 possible points. He was familiar with how jurors may ask questions of witnesses, when a witness may testify out of the defendant's presence, the types of cases that are not referred to the Court of Appeals, and White v. State review.

The Joint Committee questioned Judge Pyle about a case in which he offered several men convicted of rape the option of castration and probation instead of the maximum prison term of thirty years. Judge Pyle testified that the matter involved the most brutal case of rape and torture that he had ever tried. Judge Pyle's sentence was appealed and reversed by the Supreme Court. Judge Pyle testified that in retrospect, he would not again give that alternative in a similar situation, but he feels that two positive things came out of the case: it alerted people to the problem of rape and also that the defendants will serve more time than they probably would have had there been no publicity.

In response to the Chairman's questions about separation of powers and the role of the judiciary, Judge Pyle testified that acts of the General Assembly are presumed constitutional, the Supreme Court has no role in law reform or lawmaking, and the death penalty is constitutional. Judge Pyle said that the judiciary probably could not force the General Assembly to appropriate funds, except perhaps if it refused to fund the judicial branch. Judge Pyle also testified that the best way to improve the cost effectiveness of litigation is to institute the rules of arbitration and mediation and that he is familiar with the rules now pending before the General Assembly. Judge Pyle was not familiar with the political abstention doctrine.

3. Professional Experience:

Judge Pyle practiced law and enjoyed a general civil and criminal practice from 1959 until 1976 when he was elected to the Greenville County Court. He served on the county court until elected circuit court judge in 1979.

The input the Joint Committee received from its surveys and from the Bar indicates that Judge Pyle's temperament is outstanding.

5. Diligence and Industry:

Judge Pyle was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Joint Committee, and the Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.

Judge Pyle testified that he would serve a full term if elected and that he had no plans to return to private practice.

6. Mental and Physical Capabilities:

Judge Pyle appears to be mentally and physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.

7. Financial Responsibility:

The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Pyle has managed his financial affairs responsibly.

8. Public Service:

Judge Pyle has been a judge for approximately twenty-three years. He served as director of the American Judicature Society from 1966 to 1970 and he chaired the Advisory Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct from 1980 to 1993. He is currently a member of the Judicial Council, the Circuit Judges Advisory Committee, and the S.C. Association of Circuit Judges. He currently chairs the Judicial Standards Commission and is a delegate to the National Conference of State Trial Judges.

Judge Pyle served as a member of the House of Representatives from 1969 to 1974.

9. Ethics:

Judge Pyle testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening;
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening; or
(d) used his judicial letterhead or the services of his staff to campaign.

Judge Pyle also testified that he understood the new Joint Committee rule requiring him to wait forty-eight hours after the draft report is released before he may begin seeking commitments.

10. Miscellaneous:

Judge Pyle testified that he seeks elevation to the Supreme Court because he feels that now is the time for a change in direction. Instead of the challenge and excitement in trial court, he would enjoy the luxury of having time to read briefs, listen to oral arguments, and prepare well-reasoned opinions.

The Joint Committee did not receive any complaints or statements in opposition to Judge Pyle's election.

Joint Committee's Finding: Legally Qualified

Judge Ervin was screened on February 1, 1995, after a thorough investigation. The Joint Committee's findings as they relate to the nine evaluative criteria are as follows:

1. Integrity and Impartiality:

The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct. The input the Joint Committee received from its own survey and the report of the Bar was that Judge Ervin's character, integrity, and reputation are outstanding.

Judge Ervin demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations of importance to judges. He testified as to the issue of ex parte communications, that he has always been very careful to avoid ex parte communications because they are prohibited by the Canons of Judicial Conduct.

Dr. Walter Herron, D.V.M. of Anderson filed an affidavit and testified about Judge Ervin's handling of an action to enforce a non-compete agreement in which Dr. Herron was the defendant. Dr. Herron alleged that there was ex parte communication in the drafting of the order and that he received no notice of Judge Ervin's order until it was served on him by an employee of the plaintiff in an embarrassing manner.

The matter was a non-jury action in which the attorneys submitted briefs and argued on stipulated facts. Judge Ervin testified that the order was in a format he uses to draft orders and that he did so himself without communication with counsel other than what was on the record at the oral argument stage. Both Dr. Herron's attorney, the attorney for the plaintiff, and Judge Ervin's law clerk submitted affidavits stating that there was no ex parte communication in the matter and that Judge Ervin drafted the order himself. Judge Ervin issued an amended order several days later changing the date on which the non-compete agreement would expire because of a scrivener's error in the original order. Judge Ervin testified that he or his law clerk caught the mistake and issued the amended order without contact from either attorney. The affidavits from the two attorneys and his law clerk support this testimony as well.

Dr. Herron's complaint about the service of the order was that the plaintiff received it several days before he did and one of the plaintiff's employees delivered it to Dr. Herron in a manner that embarrassed him publicly. Judge Ervin testified that he believed that the plaintiff's attorney received the order first because his office was in Anderson and since Dr. Herron's attorney is located in Columbia, he received the order several days later because of the mail service. Dr. Herron did not allege any specific wrongdoing in Judge Ervin's issuance of his order and the affidavits from the two attorneys tend to support Judge Ervin's view of what happened.

The Joint Committee found no evidence of ex parte communication or other inappropriate conduct in Judge Ervin's handling of this matter. Dr. Herron withdrew his allegation about ex parte communication after reading the affidavits on the matter, but still felt that the order was issued improperly. There is no evidence or even any specific allegation that Judge Ervin did anything wrong or out of the ordinary when he issued the order in this matter. The Joint Committee understands and regrets that Dr. Herron received notice of the order in a way that embarrassed him in front of his customers, but does not believe that Judge Ervin caused the unfortunate turn of events or otherwise acted improperly.

On the issue of recusal, Judge Ervin testified that he gives both sides an opportunity to be heard and if they want him to recuse himself, he will do so after full disclosure of the reasons for the motion. There are situations in which he would recuse himself right up front without further discussion, but he noted that it is a matter within the judge's discretion.

2. Legal Knowledge and Ability:

The input the Joint Committee received from its own survey and from the Bar indicated that Judge Ervin is very intelligent and knowledgeable. He has complied with all continuing judicial education requirements and has lectured at five continuing legal education programs. His books, Ervin's South Carolina Requests to Charge -- Civil and Ervin's South Carolina Requests to Charge -- Criminal, have been very well received. He has also published an article, "What Does `Beyond a Reasonable Doubt' Really Mean?" in the South Carolina Lawyer.

Judge Ervin's score on the Joint Committee's practice and procedure questions was a 2.4 out of a possible 4 points. He demonstrated a thorough understanding of the standards of appellate review, en banc hearings, and writs of certiorari. He was less well versed about writs of supersedeas and which matters may not be referred to the Court of Appeals.

Judge Ervin testified that he has experience with alternative dispute resolution measures as he held the first settlement week in Anderson county.

3. Professional Experience:

Judge Ervin has been a circuit court judge since 1985. Prior to his election, he was an administrative law judge with the South Carolina Industrial Commission (now the Workers' Compensation Commission) for almost one year. Prior to his appointment to the Industrial Commission he was engaged in the general practice of law from 1977 to 1984. His practice involved both criminal trial work and civil litigation as well as workers' compensation, employment security, social security, and domestic matters. He served as the town attorney for Honea Path, an assistant solicitor for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, and as Special Prosecutor for the Eighth Judicial Circuit.

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