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Judge Hall testified that he plans to serve the full term if elected and has no plans to return to private practice.

The Joint Committee did not receive any complaints or statements in opposition to Judge Hall's election.

Joint Committee's Finding: Legally Qualified

Ms. Clifford was screened on February 2, 1995, after a thorough investigation. The Joint Committee's findings as they relate to the nine evaluative criteria are as follows:

1. Integrity and Impartiality:

The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct. Most of the input the Joint Committee received from its own survey and the report of the Bar was that Ms. Clifford's character, integrity, and reputation are outstanding.

Ms. Clifford demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations of importance to judges. On the issue of ex parte communications, Ms. Clifford stated that she would not allow ex parte communications unless it was a matter in which ex parte communications were specifically allowed, such as the issuance of a search warrant.

On the issue of recusal, Ms. Clifford testified that if a party wanted her to recuse herself, she would do so to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Ms. Clifford also testified that she would not hear a case in which she held a de minimis financial interest.

Ms. Clifford testified that she would never accept gifts and would accept social hospitality only under strict guidelines to avoid the appearance of impropriety.

The Joint Committee questioned Ms. Clifford about her ability to shed her role of advocate, particularly in light of her extensive criminal experience and rather limited civil work. Ms. Clifford testified in response that as a judge she would not advocate either side and would decide cases based on the facts, the evidence, and the law. She indicated that she would not let her past experiences in the criminal arena improperly influence her decisions if elected.

The input the Joint Committee received from its survey and from the Bar indicated that Ms. Clifford is intelligent and knowledgeable, particularly in the area of criminal law. There was some concern expressed about a perceived lack of civil experience.

Ms. Clifford's score on the Joint Committee's practice and procedure questions was 2.71 out of a possible 4 points. Ms. Clifford was very knowledgeable about circumstances in which a witness can testify outside the defendant's presence, res gestae, when jeopardy attaches, and the admission of expert testimony. She was also familiar with when a defendant can be convicted solely on circumstantial evidence, the standard of review in an appeal from the Workers' Compensation Commission, and Allen charges. She was less familiar with when a judge can grant a new trial notwithstanding the verdict in a civil matter, when a juror may pose questions to a witness, when a motion for directed verdict should be granted, and the standard of appellate review in civil cases. Ms. Clifford did not know what damages are recoverable without a hearing in a default judgment.

Ms. Clifford has given more than twenty-five continuing legal education and other presentations in the last ten years and has written extensively for various professional publications. Most of her courses and publications have been about criminal law.

Ms. Clifford testified that she has had some experience with alternative dispute resolution. She also testified in response to the Chairman's questions about the role of the judiciary, that laws are entitled to a presumption of constitutionality and that she has read the case law concerning the constitutionality of the death penalty.

When asked about her sentencing philosophy for repeat offenders, Ms. Clifford responded that she would look at each case closely and consider such factors as what kind of help the person got the first time. She also testified that she would give juveniles the benefit of the doubt and look at the circumstances of the offense and the character of the offender.

3. Professional Experience:

The Joint Committee found that, while Ms. Clifford has had little experience in the civil law arena, she has extensive criminal experience with sophisticated matters and has the experience to be a knowledgeable and effective circuit court judge.

Ms. Clifford has served as an assistant solicitor for the ninth judicial circuit since 1991. Her work has involved prosecuting criminal charges in general sessions court, handling drug seizure and forfeiture cases in the

Ms. Clifford worked as an assistant Attorney General from 1984 to 1991. Her responsibilities included handling criminal appeals, representing state agencies and boards, and acting as an administrative hearing officer.

Ms. Clifford worked as a staff attorney with Piedmont Legal Services from 1983 to 1984. Her responsibilities included the representation of clients in adoption, custody, divorce, support, termination of parental rights and child removal matters, as well as employment, food stamp, housing, and social security cases. She testified that she did not appear in the court of common pleas during this time, as much of her work involved administrative matters and appellate practice.

4. Judicial Temperament:

The input the Joint Committee received from its surveys and from the Bar indicate that Ms. Clifford's judicial temperament would be good. There was some question raised by anonymous survey respondents as to Ms. Clifford's ability to be open-minded and see both sides of an issue, but no one came forward to testify on this issue and the Joint Committee found no first hand information of any potential problems with temperament. The Joint Committee is satisfied that Ms. Clifford has the qualities required for service on the bench.

5. Diligence and Industry:

Ms. Clifford was punctual and attentive in her dealings with the Joint Committee, and the Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any problems with her diligence and industry. In fact, the Joint Committee's investigation revealed that Ms. Clifford is clearly a very hard worker who takes her commitments seriously.

6. Mental and Physical Capabilities:

Ms. Clifford appears to be mentally and physically capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.

The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of a troubled financial status. Ms. Clifford has managed her financial affairs responsibly.

8. Public Service:

Ms. Clifford has worked in the public sector all her professional career. She belongs to numerous professional organizations and consistently volunteers her time for Bar and other professional endeavors.

9. Ethics:

Ms. Clifford testified that she has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening;
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening; or
(d) used the resources of the solicitor's office for her campaign.

Ms. Clifford also testified that she understood the new Joint Committee rule requiring her to wait forty-eight hours after the draft report is released before she may begin seeking commitments.

Ms. Clifford testified that she has spent $302.89 on her campaign and has filed reports with both the House and Senate Ethics Committees.

10. Miscellaneous:

The Joint Committee did not receive any complaints or statements in opposition to Ms. Clifford's election.

Joint Committee's Finding: Legally Qualified

Mr. DuTremble was screened on February 2, 1995, after a thorough investigation. The Joint Committee's findings as they relate to the nine evaluative criteria are as follows:

1. Integrity and Impartiality:

The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct. The input the Joint Committee received from its own survey and the report of the Bar was that Mr. DuTremble's character, integrity, and reputation are outstanding.

On the issue of recusal, Mr. DuTremble testified that he would have an absolute obligation to look into the matter and would recuse himself if there were any question of impropriety. He said that he believes that judges should take the lead in deciding whether recusal is necessary and that if an attorney asked him to recuse himself he would probably do so. He testified that if the reason a party wanted him to recuse himself was that he was more familiar with one side than the other he would have to take a look at the relationship and the reason for the recusal motion before making a decision. Mr. DuTremble also said that he would not hear a matter in which he held even a de minimis financial interest.

Mr. DuTremble said that there is an absolute prohibition on judges taking gifts and that judges make enough money to buy their own lunches. When questioned about whether he would accept ordinary social hospitality, Mr. DuTremble said that judges should know when to decline such invitations. He said, by way of example, that a judge should not accept an invitation for a golf outing or deep-sea fishing from people who practice before him.

Mr. DuTremble said that if elected he would not retain any interest in cases or property of his law firm and would not continue any other business associations.

2. Legal Knowledge and Ability:

The input the Joint Committee received from its survey and from the Bar indicated that Mr. DuTremble is intelligent and knowledgeable. He has complied with all continuing legal education requirements.

Mr. DuTremble's score on the Joint Committee's practice and procedure questions was a 2.86 out of 4 possible points. Mr. DuTremble was very familiar with when a witness might testify outside the defendant's presence. He also did well on questions about how a juror might ask a question of a witness, Allen charges, the admissibility of expert testimony, and when a judge should declare a mistrial. He was less familiar with the conditions that must exist before a judge issues a temporary restraining order.

Mr. DuTremble's Martindale-Hubbell rating is AV, their highest rating.

3. Professional Experience:

The Joint Committee found that, while Mr. DuTremble has focused on the practice of criminal rather than civil law, he has extensive experience with the type of issues he would encounter as a circuit court judge. Mr. DuTremble has specialized in criminal law and has limited civil experience. He does, however, have some civil experience and has extensive experience with complex criminal matters.

Mr. DuTremble has been a solo practitioner since 1991. From 1989 to 1991, he was an Assistant United States Attorney working on Operation Lost Trust. From 1987 to 1989 he was a solo practitioner with a general practice emphasizing criminal trial work and civil litigation. From 1983 to 1987, he was an Assistant United States Attorney responsible for all criminal prosecutions and appeals in the Charleston office. From 1982 to 1983, he was an instructor at the South Carolina Criminal Justice Academy. From 1979 to 1983, he worked for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, first as an assistant public defender and then as an assistant solicitor. From 1978 to 1979 he was law clerk for the Honorable Julius H. Baggett.

Over the past five years, Mr. DuTremble's practice has been 90% criminal and 10% civil with most of his court appearances in federal court. The Bar indicated that Mr. DuTremble has extensive criminal experience and experience with complex civil litigation. The Joint Committee received other input which also indicated that Mr. DuTremble has extensive criminal experience, but a very small number of people indicated that he lacks civil experience.

In response to the Joint Committee's request for additional information, Mr. DuTremble estimated that he handles approximately ten federal criminal cases per year and five civil trials per year. He provided the Joint Committee with a list of civil cases that he actually took to trial in recent years. These cases included an action for trespass and malicious injury to property, an action for malicious prosecution, a breach of contract action, a legal malpractice suit, and an EPA debarment. Mr.

Most of Mr. DuTremble's trial experience has been in federal court, but he testified, and the Joint Committee agrees, that federal practice is very similar to practice in state court. Mr. DuTremble estimated that over the past five years, 10% of his court appearances have been in state court and the other 90% have been in federal court.

4. Judicial Temperament:

The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal anything that would indicate a potential problem with judicial temperament. Throughout the Joint Committee's work with Mr. DuTremble he demonstrated the qualities and character required for a judge of outstanding judicial temperament. Furthermore, the input the Joint Committee received from its own survey and from the Bar's investigation indicated that Mr. DuTremble has the temperament required for service on the bench.

5. Diligence and Industry:

Mr. DuTremble was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Joint Committee, and the Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.

Mr. DuTremble's wife was present for his screening. His family appears to fully support his decision to seek this position, and he testified that he can balance his career and family life.

Mr. DuTremble testified that he would serve a full term if elected and that he had no plans to return to private practice.

6. Mental and Physical Capabilities:

Mr. DuTremble appears to be mentally and physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.

7. Financial Responsibility:

The Joint Committee's investigation did not reveal any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. DuTremble has managed his financial affairs responsibly.

Mr. DuTremble has worked in the public sector as an Assistant United States Attorney and for the Eleventh Circuit as an assistant public defender and solicitor.

9. Ethics:

Mr. DuTremble testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.

Mr. DuTremble also testified that he has not made campaign expenditures in excess of $100 and has, therefore, not been required to report expenditures to the House or Senate Ethics Committees.

Mr. DuTremble testified that he understood the new Joint Committee rule requiring him to wait forty-eight hours after the draft report is released before he may begin seeking commitments.

10. Miscellaneous:

The Joint Committee did not receive any complaints or statements in opposition to Mr. DuTremble's election.

Joint Committee's Finding: Legally Qualified

Judge Martin was screened on February 15th, 16th, and 21st, 1995, after a thorough investigation. The Joint Committee's findings as they relate to the nine evaluative criteria are as follows:

1. Integrity and Impartiality:

The input the Joint Committee received from its own survey and the report of the Bar was that Judge Martin is widely perceived to be compassionate and an ardent believer in the protection of constitutional rights. The Bar described Judge Martin's character as "impeccable" and praised his impartiality and judicial independence.

Judge Martin's testimony indicated that he understood the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations of importance to judges. The Joint Committee did, however, learn of one instance in which the Joint Committee found Judge Martin to have violated the prohibition

Mr. Daniel Norfleet, a Charleston attorney, filed an affidavit and testified before the Joint Committee alleging that Judge Martin had engaged in ex parte communication in a post-conviction relief matter in which Mr. Norfleet represented the defendant. Judge Martin presided over the initial post-conviction relief hearing in which the state was unable to produce a copy of the transcript from the defendant's trial. The transcript was presumed lost in Hurricane Hugo and there was discussion to that effect on the record. Mr. Norfleet left the courtroom at the end of the hearing and the court proceeded to hear other post-conviction relief matters. Later the same day, the attorney for the state and the assistant solicitor who was a witness in the matter produced a copy of the transcript, and Judge Martin accepted it and discussed the contents of the transcript on the record without Mr. Norfleet present. Judge Martin did not instruct the state's attorney to contact Mr. Norfleet and get him to court or otherwise avoid the ex parte nature of the proceedings.

The Joint Committee reviewed the transcript of Judge Martin's handling of this matter. The transcript clearly indicates that the matter was taken up ex parte and that the court discussed both the reasons for the transcript's disappearance and its content.

The Joint Committee subpoenaed two attorneys who handled this matter for the state and the assistant solicitor who was a witness in the matter. The assistant solicitor and one of the two attorneys for the state testified that they were merely attempting to allow the court to reserve jurisdiction when they introduced the transcript ex parte and that the communications were de minimis and, therefore, not a violation of the rules of conduct. Mr. Norfleet testified that, even though Judge Martin eventually granted his client a new trial, his client was still prejudiced by Judge Martin's conduct because the transcript was made a part of the record on appeal without a hearing on whether the state had a good reason for failing to produce the transcript at the original post-conviction relief hearing. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed Judge Martin's order of a new trial because Judge Martin inexplicably failed to consider the transcript after he had accepted it into the record. Judge Martin testified that in hindsight he should have not taken the matter up without Mr. Norfleet present in the courtroom.

The Joint Committee believes that Judge Martin's conduct in this matter likely violated the Canons of Judicial Conduct in that he engaged in ex

On the issue of recusal, Judge Martin testified that if there appears to be a conflict of interest or any suggestion of impropriety he should recuse himself. Judge Martin also testified that he does not accept gifts and does not often accept offers of social hospitality because his presence might be misinterpreted.

Judge Martin testified that none of the six attorneys who wrote letters of reference on his behalf had matters pending before him at the time they wrote the letters.

2. Legal Knowledge and Ability:

The Joint Committee believes that Judge Martin is a man of good character, but has concerns about his level of legal knowledge and ability. The Joint Committee reached this conclusion after listening to Judge Martin's responses to the Joint Committee's practice and procedure questions, analyzing his record on appeal, considering input from the Bar, reading transcripts which reflect his reasoning and the rulings that flowed therefrom, and considering the testimony of witnesses in support of and opposition to his election.

Judge Martin's score on the Joint Committee's practice and procedure questions was 1.0 out of 4 possible points. He failed to demonstrate knowledge of basic practice and procedure and the Joint Committee was disturbed by Judge Martin's poor performance on these questions. Judge Martin was familiar with Allen charges, when jeopardy attaches, whether an expert can testify as to legal conclusions, and the impeachment of witnesses with evidence of bad character. Judge Martin was, however, only vaguely familiar with the rule for removal of matters from the docket because of inactivity, when orders may be appealed, appeals from magistrate court, how a juror might pose a question of a witness, res gestae, whether an expert may testify on matters of common knowledge, and whether an expert may testify on ultimate issues. Judge Martin was completely unfamiliar with whether a party may seek inconsistent remedies, damages recoverable without a hearing in a default judgment, whether a witness may testify outside of the defendant's presence, whether it is a necessary prerequisite for the admission of scientific evidence that

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