Indicates Matter Stricken
Indicates New Matter
The House assembled at 10:00 A.M.
Deliberations were opened with prayer by the Chaplain of the House of Representatives, the Rev. Dr. Alton C. Clark as follows:
O God, from everlasting to everlasting the same, give us to see that the priceless wisdom gained in our yesterdays is to be woven into our todays and tomorrows. As custodians of many good things, make of us good stewards of all that has been entrusted to us. Cause us always to look to You Whose mercy is like the wideness of the sea. Show us Your way, then give us the determination to follow it.
To Your altar of understanding we lift up the offering of humble and grateful hearts for Yours is the power and the glory now and forever. Amen.
Pursuant to Rule 6.3, the House of Representatives was led in the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America by the SPEAKER.
After corrections to the Journal of the proceedings of yesterday, the SPEAKER ordered it confirmed.
Rep. BARFIELD moved that when the House adjourns, it adjourn in memory of Harold M. Huggins of Nichols, which was agreed to.
TO: The Clerk of the Senate
The Clerk of the House
FROM: F.G. Delleney, Jr., Chairman
Judicial Merit Selection Commission
DATE: May 18, 1998
In compliance with the provisions of Act No. 119, 1975, S.C. Acts 122, it is respectfully requested that the following information be printed in the Journals of the Senate and the House.
Respectfully submitted,
Representative F.G. Delleney, Jr., Chairman
Senate Glenn F. McConnell, Vice-Chairman
Senator Edward E. Saleeby
Senator Thomas L. Moore
Representative Ralph W. Canty
Representative William Douglas Smith
Dr. Harry M. Lightsey, Jr.
Judge Curtis G. Shaw
Richard S. Fisher, Esquire
Mrs. Amy Johnson McLester
Date Draft Report Issued: Friday, May 15, 1998
at 3:00 p.m.
Date and Time Final Report Issued: Sunday, May 17, 1998
at 3:00 p.m.
The following chart includes a list of all candidates. If the candidate has a "*" symbol under a category (i.e. Academic Ability), that symbol indicates that the Commission expressed concern about the candidate in that area. The placement of a "*" symbol is not, in and of itself, an indication of a candidates' failure to comply with the Commission's established criteria.
These abbreviations were used in the following chart:
Const. Qual., Constitutional Qualifications
Prac. & Proc., Practice and Procedure
Acad. Ability, Academic Ability
Char., Character
Rep., Reputation
Phy. Hth, Physical Health
Men. Hth, Mental Health
Exp., Experience
Temp., Temperament
The Judicial Merit Selection Commission is charged by law to consider the qualifications of candidates for the judiciary. The Commission has carefully investigated the candidates currently set for screening and found eleven candidates qualified for judicial office. This report details the reasons for the Commission's findings, as well as each candidate's qualifications as they relate to the Commission's evaluative criteria. The Commission is operating under its new law which went into effect July 1, 1997, and which has dramatically changed the powers and duties of the Commission. One component of this law is that the Commission's finding of "qualified" or "not qualified" is binding on the General Assembly. Furthermore, the Commission is required to submit no more than three names for any particular judicial race; therefore, for two races the Commission was required to pare the number of candidates presented for consideration by the General Assembly. The Commission is also cognizant of the need for members of the General Assembly to be able to differentiate between candidates and, therefore, has attempted to provide as detailed a report as possible.
The Judicial Merit Selection Commission is composed of ten members, four of whom are non-legislators. The Commission has continued the more in-depth screening format started previously. The Commission has asked Family Court candidates their views on issues peculiar to service on that particular court. These questions were posed in an effort to provide the members of the General Assembly more information about candidates and their thought processes on issues relevant to their candidacies. The Commission has also engaged in a more probing inquiry into the depth of a candidate's experience in areas of practice that are germane to the office he or she is seeking. The Commission feels that candidates should have familiarity with the subject matter of the courts for which they offer, and feels that candidates' responses should indicate their familiarity with most major areas of the law with which they will be confronted.
In assessing each candidate's performance on the practice and procedure questions, the Commission has placed candidates in either the "failed to meet expectations" or the "met expectations" category. The Commission feels that these categories should accurately impart the candidate's performance on the practice and procedure questions.
The Commission has also used the Citizens Committees on Judicial Qualifications as an adjunct of the Commission. The Commission was concerned that since the decisions of our judiciary play such an important role in people's personal and professional lives, all South Carolinians should have a voice in the selection of the state's judges. It was this desire for broad-based grassroots participation that led the Commission to create the Citizens Committees on Judicial Qualifications. These committees composed of people from a broad range of experience (doctors, lawyers, teachers, businessmen, and advocates for varied organizations; members of these committees are also diverse in their racial and gender backgrounds) were asked to advise the Commission on the judicial candidates in their regions. Each regional committee interviewed the candidates from its assigned area and also interviewed other individuals in that region who were familiar with the candidate either personally or professionally. Based on those interviews and its own investigation, each committee provided the Commission with a confidential report on their assigned candidates based on the Commission's evaluative criteria. The Commission then used these confidential reports as a tool for further investigation of the candidate if the committee's report so warranted.
The Commission conducts a thorough investigation of each candidate's professional, personal, and financial affairs, and holds public hearings during which each candidate is questioned on a wide variety of issues. The Commission's investigation focuses on the following evaluative criteria: constitutional qualifications; ethical fitness; professional and academic ability; character; reputation; physical health; mental health; and judicial temperament. The Commission's investigation includes the following:
(1) survey of the bench and bar;
(2) SLED and FBI investigation;
(3) credit investigation;
(4) grievance investigation;
(5) study of application materials;
(6) verification of ethics compliance;
(7) search of newspaper articles;
(8) conflict of interest investigation;
(9) court schedule study;
(10) study of appellate record;
(11) court observation; and
(12) investigation of complaints.
While the law provides that the Commission must make findings as to qualifications, the Commission views its role as also including an obligation to consider candidates in the context of the judiciary on which they would serve and, to some degree, govern. To that end, the Commission inquires as to the quality of justice delivered in the courtrooms of South Carolina and seeks to impart, through its questioning, the view of the public as to matters of legal knowledge and ability, judicial temperament, and the absoluteness of the Judicial Canons of Conduct as to recusal for conflict of interest, prohibition of ex parte communication, and the disallowance of the acceptance of gifts. However, the Commission is not a forum for reviewing the individual decisions of the state's judicial system absent credible allegations of a candidate's violations of the Judicial Canons of Conduct, the Rules of Professional Conduct, or any of the Commission's nine evaluative criteria that would impact on a candidate's fitness for judicial service.
The Commission expects each candidate to possess a basic level of legal knowledge and ability, to have experience that would be applicable to the office sought, and to exhibit a strong adherence to codes of ethical behavior. These expectations are all important, and excellence in one category does not make up for deficiencies in another.
This report is the culmination of weeks of investigatory work and public hearings. The Commission takes its responsibilities very seriously as it believes that the quality of justice delivered in South Carolina's courtrooms is directly affected by the thoroughness of its screening process. Please carefully consider the contents of this report as we believe it will help you make a more informed decision. If you would like to review portions of the screening transcript or other public information about a candidate before it is printed in the Journal, please contact Irma R. Pringle or John P. Hazzard, V at 212-6610 or Elizabeth Atwater at 734-3125.
This report conveys the Commission's findings as to the qualifications of all candidates currently offering for election to the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Circuit Court, Family Court, Masters-in-Equity, and the Administrative Law Judge Division.
•Denotes information taken verbatim from the candidate's personal data questionnaire that was submitted by the candidate as a part of the application process.
Commission's Findings: QUALIFIED
(1) Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. Prickett meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service on the Circuit Court.
Mr. Prickett was born on March 3, 1950. He is 48 years old and a resident of St. Matthews, South Carolina. Mr. Prickett provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since November 1975.
(2) Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. Prickett.
Mr. Prickett demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. Prickett testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. Prickett testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the screening report.
(3) Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. Prickett to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. Prickett described his past continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years as follows:
(a) SC Association of Counties Annual Seminar - 1993;
(b) SC Association of Counties Attorneys Institute - 1993;
(c) SC Bar - This Was The Year That Was 1993;
(d) SCTLA Annual Convention - 1994, 1995;
(e) SCAC County & Municipal Attorney's Institute - 1994;
(f) CISI SC Elder Law & Medicaid Planning - 1995;
(g) SCTLA Auto Torts XIX - 1996;
(h) SC Bar Basic office Computer Systems - 1997; and
(I) SC Association of Counties - Legal Issue of Counties 1997.
(4) Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. Prickett did not reveal any evidence of complaints, grievances, or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. Prickett did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Prickett has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Mr. Prickett was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5) Reputation:
Mr. Prickett reported that his Martindale-Hubbell rating was "BV."
(6) Physical Health:
Mr. Prickett appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7) Mental Stability:
Mr. Prickett appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8) Experience:
Mr. Prickett was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in November 1975.
Since his graduation from law school, Mr. Prickett worked as a paralegal with the law firm of Gressette & Gressette until he was admitted to the Bar in November 1975. Upon admission to the Bar, he was hired and worked as an associate for the same law firm, working for L. Marion Gressette and Lawrence M. Gressette. In 1980, he was made a partner. The firm's name was changed to Gressette & Prickett. Lawrence M. Gressette left the firm in 1983, and Mr. Prickett continued to practice with L. Marion Gressette until his death in 1984. Mr. Prickett maintained his own practice until 1990, when he joined with John G. Felder and Charles W. Whetstone to form Felder, Prickett & Whetstone.
Mr. Prickett's firm is now practicing as Felder, Prickett & McGee, LLP. Mr. Prickett has been practicing law in Calhoun County, South Carolina, for his entire legal career of 22 years. The firm is a small town general practice. He handles all types of real estate transactions and closings, and is an approved attorney and agent for Lawyers Title Insurance Company. In that capacity he deals with all banks and financial institutions making real estate loans in Calhoun and Orangeburg counties. He prepares deeds, mortgages, wills, and Powers of Attorney, as well as other business legal documents. He also practices in the Probate Court and handles civil and criminal matters.
Mr. Prickett has had 20 years' experience handling Workers' Compensation cases for both employers and claimants. He has represented several self-insured Workers' Compensation funds including Merchant's Association and Automobile Dealer's Association. He has appealed Workers' Compensation cases.
He also has 20 years' experience appearing before the South Carolina Public Service Commission handling regulatory matters and has represented both applicants and protestants in trucking authority cases. His firm represented Southeastern Freight Lines for many years on all regulatory matters before the Public Service Commission.
He has been the attorney for Calhoun County for the last ten years, representing the County Council on all legal matters including litigation involving the county, issuing of bonds for county operations and capital improvements. He has appeared before state regulatory agencies and drafted ordinances and resolutions for County Council. He provides legal advice for the Calhoun County Tax Assessor and other county agencies with the exception of law enforcement.
His general practice gives him a wide range of legal experience. Many of the administrative and regulatory issues are handled by the Circuit Court on appeal.
Mr. Prickett reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a) Federal: Few
(b) State: Often
(c) Other: He has appeared before the Workers' Compensation Commission and the Public Service Commission on a regular basis.
Mr. Prickett reported the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a) Civil: 50%
(b) Criminal: 20%
(c) Domestic: 30%
Mr. Prickett reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a) Jury: 10%
(b) Non-jury: 90%
Mr. Prickett provided that he served as sole or chief counsel.
•The following is Mr. Prickett's account of his most significant litigated matters:
(a) State v. Irick, 94-GS-38-1461; 94-GS-38-1462; 94-GS-38-1463 (Not reported). The defendant in this case was indicted on one count of Assault and Battery with Intent to Kill and two counts of Murder. The case was tried in January 1996 in Orangeburg General Sessions Court before Honorable Victor Rawl. The defendant was found Not Guilty on all counts by a jury after several days of trial.
The case is significant because it covered many evidentiary matters and issues in criminal defense, including dying declarations, severance, Brady motions, bond hearings, request for exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence.
(b) State v. Pipkin, 294 S.C. 336, 364 S.E.2d 464 (1988)
I represented James Pipkin on a Driving Under the Influence charge in General Sessions Court, Orangeburg County. The defendant was convicted at trial and I appealed his conviction to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Prior to taking testimony, the trial judge heard a Motion to Suppress the results of both the breathalyser and the blood test since the blood sample was sent to SLED for analysis. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and mandated a suppression of both the breathalyser and blood test results.
This case was significant because it determined that a defendant charged with Driving Under the Influence was only required to submit to one examination by the State of his blood alcohol content and thus was entitled to retain possession of blood drawn during an independent test which he had requested after having submitted to a breathalyser test.
(c) State v. Dasher, 298 S.E.2d 215, 278 S.C. 454; 297 S.E.2d 414, 278 S.C. 395
I, along with L. Marion Gressette, represented Leon J. Dasher. Mr. Dasher was a police officer who was indicted on two separate indictments alleging criminal conspiracy to transport, store, and distribute a controlled substance. In the first indictment, the overt acts alleged cited my client with the financing of the importation and distribution of cocaine, and in the second indictment the overt acts alleged cited the financing of the importation and distribution of marijuana. Both indictments alleged conspiracy during overlapping periods with the same individuals. Dasher was found guilty at trial of the crime of criminal conspiracy. This conviction was overturned by the trial judge on a Motion for Judgment non obstante veredicto. The State appealed and the case was significant because it established the right of the State to appeal such a verdict. However, a separate trial judge dismissed the second indictment on the grounds that it violated the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution. The State appealed again and the Supreme Court sustained the dismissal of the second indictment. The second case was significant because the prosecution of the defendant under the second conspiracy indictment was barred by former jeopardy because both indictments charged them and others with conspiring to transport, store with intent to distribute, and distribute certain quantities of controlled substances with the dates of conspiracies overlapping, the principals involved in alleged conspiracies were substantially the same, and the alleged conspiracies involved transporting drugs into same place.
(d) David J. Rogers v. Yvonne D. Rogers, Memorandum Opinion No. 90-MO-169 Filed November 2, 1990.
I represented Yvonne D. Rogers, the respondent in a domestic action to terminate and/or modify alimony on the basis that after the divorce, Yvonne established a relationship with a man tantamount to marriage. In a detailed Order, the Family Court judge found that the evidence fell short of establishing a relationship tantamount to marriage with her admitted paramour. The petitioner appealed the Order and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the Order of the trial judge.
(e) John B. Rembert, et al. v. Mary Sims Gressette, et al., 458 S.E.2d 552 (S.C. App. 1995)
I represented Mary Sims Gressette and Cherry Sims Rembert in protracted litigation involving the distribution of a trust, approval of commission of attorney's fees, and for damages for mismanagement of trust by relatives of my client, Case No. 90-CP-38-867. The case was tried before the Honorable J. Derham Cole on May 19-22, 1992.
The case denying damages and upholding the actions of the trustees was appealed. The South Carolina Court of Appeals held that (1) trustee was not personally at fault for any alleged mismanagement of trust assets; (2) award of trustee commissions was reasonable; and (3) no abuse of discretion resulted from ordering payment of attorney fees from trust.
The case was significant because it held that residuary beneficiaries were barred from asserting claims against original trustee for alleged mismanagement of trust assets given that beneficiaries benefitted from an agreement with my clients that resulted in the alleged mismanagement and that laches applied given that beneficiaries delayed in making claims until after the death of the trustees involved in making the disputed decisions.
•Mr. Prickett listed five civil appeals which he has personally handled as follows:
(a) Shuler v. Crook, 290 S.C. 538, 351 S.E.2d 862 (1986);
(b) Weatherford v. Longstreet Farms, WCC File No. 9227631 and 9546759;
(c) Rogers v. Rogers, Supreme Court Docket 89-760, Memorandum Opinion No. 90-MO-169;
(d) Rembert, et al. v. Gressette, et al., 458 S.E.2d 552 (S.C. App.1995);
(e) Mielish v. The Legends Group, WCC No. 9332587.
(9) Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. Prickett's temperament would be excellent.
(10) Miscellaneous:
Mr. Prickett is married to Carol Crook Prickett. He has three children: Ashley Claire Prickett (student at Clemson University, age 21); Elizabeth Jenelle Prickett (student in high school, age 18); and Fairey Lee Prickett, III (student in high school, age 17).
Mr. Prickett reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional organizations:
(a) South Carolina Bar Association - 1975 to present;
(b) American Bar Association - 1975 to 1990;
(c) South Carolina Trial Lawyers Association - 1985 to present, Board of Directors from 1991-1997;
Mr. Prickett provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, educational, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a) First Baptist Church, St. Matthews, South Carolina (Past Deacon and currently serving on the Finance Committee);
(b) Clemson University Board of Visitors (1994-1996);
(c) Calhoun County Public Defender Corporation Board (President 1988-present).
Mr. Prickett reported that he served without pay on the Calhoun Academy Board of Directors from 1984 to 1997. The Academy is a non-profit eleemosynary corporation which operates a school, grades K-3 through 12, in St. Matthews, South Carolina.
•Mr. Prickett stated, "I was a Boy Scout awarded the Eagle Scout Badge. I served as a Scout Master of Troop 62 in St. Matthews, South Carolina, for several years. I have also coached Mite baseball. Additionally, I am a past President of the St. Matthews Rotary Club, and past President of the Calhoun Country Club. I am also a past member of the Board of Directors for Calhoun County Chamber of Commerce."
Commission's Findings: QUALIFIED
(1) Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. Walsh meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service on the Circuit Court.
Mr. Walsh was born on April 22, 1945. He is 52 years old and a resident of Orangeburg, South Carolina. Mr. Walsh provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1971.
(2) Ethical Fitness:
Mr. Walsh demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. Walsh testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. Walsh testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the screening report.
(3) Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. Walsh to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. Walsh provided that during the previous five years, he completed 70.83 hours of continuing legal education and 11.8 hours in ethics. Areas of study were:
(a) Eminent Domain and Land Valuation;
(b) Employment and Labor Law;
(c) Better Client Relations;
(d) Limited Liability Companies;
(e) Special Purpose Districts;
(f) Municipal Franchises;
(g) Administrative Law Division Procedural Rules;
(h) S. C. Tort Claims Act;
(I) Rules of Civil Procedure;
(j) Liability for Serving Alcohol;
(k) Recognizing Hearsay;
(l) The Whistleblower Act;
(m) Fair Labor Standards Act;
(n) Wetlands and Coastal Zone Management;
(o) Legal Ethics and Real Life;
(p) Sexual Harassment;
(q) The Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Mr. Walsh reported that he had briefed municipal attorneys on the status of then-pending litigation of City of Orangeburg v. Jones Intercable, which involved the entry of a municipality into cable television. He also briefed attorneys about the City of Orangeburg v. Southern Bell, which involved the requirement of a franchise to provide local telephone service in a municipality, the amount of the franchise fee and the sources of revenue on which the fee was to be calculated.
(4) Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. Walsh did not reveal any evidence of complaints, grievances, or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. Walsh did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Walsh has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Mr. Walsh was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5) Reputation:
Mr. Walsh provided that he had served in the South Carolina Air National Guard from 1968-1974 in the position of S.SGT. He received an Honorable Discharge.
Mr. Walsh reported that his Martindale-Hubbell rating is "AV."
Mr. Walsh reported that he was appointed City Attorney for the City of Orangeburg in 1984 and is still serving in that capacity.
(6) Physical Health:
Mr. Walsh appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7) Mental Stability:
Mr. Walsh appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8) Experience:
Mr. Walsh was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1971.
After graduating from law school, Mr. Walsh worked with C. Walker Limehouse, P.A. from 1971 to 1976. He practiced in residential real estate and prosecution in Municipal Court. From 1976 to 1985, he worked with Limehouse & Walsh. Mr. Walsh reduced his practice in the area of residential real estate and concentrated more in trial work, probate, corporate, governmental law and prosecution in Municipal Court. From 1985 to the present, he has been with James F. Walsh, Jr., P. A. and Limehouse & Walsh, working in real estate, with a concentration in commercial and development, probate, civil trial, governmental law and prosecution in Municipal Court.
Mr. Walsh reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a) Federal: no more than once a year
(b) State: monthly
(c) Other: municipal and lower courts - monthly
Mr. Walsh reported the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a) Civil: 70%
(b) Criminal: 30%
(c) Domestic: 0%
Mr. Walsh reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a) Jury: 70%
(b) Non-jury: 30%
Mr. Walsh provided that he usually acted as sole counsel.
•The following is Mr. Walsh's account of his most significant litigated matters:
(a) Israel v. Carolina Bar-B-Que, Inc., (S.C.App) 292 S.C. 282, 356 S.E.2d 123 (1987). This case involved the novel question as to whether or not an adjoining property owner with knowledge of a defective or unsound natural tree on his property is liable for injuries to an invitee of the adjacent property owner sustained as the result of the fall of said defective tree and is still cited as authority in Am Jur 2d, Premises Liability, Sec.690. (Represented Israel)
(b) City of Orangeburg v. Carter, 303 S.C. 291, 400 S.E.2d 141 (S.C.1991). This case is often cited as authority for the proposition that the prosecution does not have to prove impairment of both the mental and physical faculties of a defendant to sustain a conviction of driving under the influence. (Represented City of Orangeburg)
(c) Culler v. Helena Chemical Company. This case is significant to me because I represented the plaintiff and obtained what I believe is still the largest jury verdict in an agricultural crop loss case in Orangeburg County. (Represented Culler)
(d) Sheppard v. City of Orangeburg, ____ S.C.____, 442 S.E.2d 601 (S.C. 1994). This case had statewide significance because the Court held that municipalities in South Carolina do not have constitutional nor statutory authority to own and operate a cable television system. (Represented City of Orangeburg with co-counsel)
(e) Owens, et al. v. City Council of Orangeburg, South Carolina, et al. This case was significant to me because it established single-member electoral districts in the City of Orangeburg and I am of the opinion that as City Attorney I played a role in the smooth and orderly transition of government and the public's acceptance of same. (Represented City of Orangeburg with co-counsel).
•Mr. Walsh listed five civil appeals that he has personally handled as follows:
(a) South Carolina Department of Social Services v. Martell, 279 S.C. 289, 307 S.E.2d 601(S.C. 1983);
(b) Israel v. Carolina Bar-B-Que, Inc., 292 S.C. 282, 356 S.E.2d 123 (S.C. 1987);
(c) City of Orangeburg v. Carter, 303 S.C. 291, 400 S.E.2d 141 (S.C. 1991);
(d) Barton v. Superior Motors, Inc., 309 S.C. 491, 424 S.E.2d 524 (S.C. App. 1992);
(e) McCallum v. Bookhart, (unpublished) (1995).
(9) Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. Walsh's temperament would be excellent.
(10) Miscellaneous:
Mr. Walsh is married to Chris Limehouse Walsh and has two children: Kathryn Eliza Walsh, employed at Loving Choice Adoption Agency, Charleston, (age 26); and Clare Phillips Walsh, law student, (age 22).
Mr. Walsh reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional organizations:
(a) South Carolina Bar;
(b) American Bar Association;
(c) Orangeburg County Bar Association (President, 1979-1981);
(d) International Municipal Lawyers Association;
(e) South Carolina Municipal Attorneys Association (Director, 1996- present);
(f) Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (Supreme Court, 1980-1983; Special Appointment, 1996).
Mr. Walsh provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, educational, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a) Kiwanis Club;
(b) University of South Carolina Alumni Association (Circuit Vice- President).
•Mr. Walsh stated, "I have practiced law for twenty-six years in a small firm and have held the position of City Attorney for the City of Orangeburg for the past twelve years. Before being appointed City Attorney, my partner, C. Walker Limehouse, held the position and I served as Assistant City Attorney. Practicing in a small firm, I have represented parties in all areas of the law and have gained extensive knowledge in governmental law as City Attorney. As City Attorney, I also prosecute and schedule all jury trial cases in Municipal Court dealing directly with lawyers and pro se parties. I believe that it is important that a judge have some experience in all areas and be able to communicate with both lawyers, parties, and court personnel. I have done so and my record will reflect that I have done so with patience, courtesy, and respect for all, regardless of economic status, race, gender or education."
Commission's Findings: QUALIFIED
(1) Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. Williams meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service on the Circuit Court.
Mr. Williams was born on December 20, 1943. He is 54 years old and a resident of Norway, South Carolina. Mr. Williams provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1979.
(2) Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. Williams.
Mr. Williams demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communication, acceptance of gifts and ordinary social hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. Williams reported that he had been sued twice since becoming a Deputy Solicitor. The two cases were related and involved an investigative subpoena he issued. The litigations involved a pending Federal Grand Jury matter. The case was dismissed by the court.
Mr. Williams reported that he had never been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics or unprofessional conduct by any group and has not been the subject of a formal complaint.
Mr. Williams testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. Williams testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the screening report.
(3) Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. Williams to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. Williams provided that during the previous five years he has attended the following CLE classes:
(a) South Carolina Solicitor's Association CLE Conference (1993, 1994, 1995, and 1997);
(b) Executive Prosecutor Course sponsored by the National College of District Attorneys (1996);
(c) Evidence Course sponsored by the National College of District Attorneys (1997).
Mr. Williams provided that he has taught the following law-related courses:
(a) Coached mock trial team for a local high school for two years in the South Carolina Bar Mock Trial Program;
(b) Taught constitutional law courses for law enforcement agencies;
(c) Taught 1998 re-certification course for state constables.
(4) Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. Williams did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Williams has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission noted that Mr. Williams was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
The Commission incorporated the prior testimony of Mr. Clyde C. Dean, Jr., from January 9, 1998, filed in opposition to Mr. Williams' candidacy. Mr. Dean's complaint consisted of the following allegations: (1) that Mr. Williams, in his capacity as deputy solicitor, made comments to a newspaper reporter that amounted to publishing the criminal record of Mr. Dean's client in the middle of the trial, during which the jury was not sequestered; (2) that Mr. Williams obtained an ex parte order from a judge in order to obtain a transcript; and (3) that Mr. Williams made several comments in the newspaper that would reflect on his qualifications to sit as a circuit court judge.
The Commission carefully considered the information presented and concluded that Mr. Williams abided by the Professional Rules of Conduct and that his actions are not disqualifying for service on the circuit court bench.
(5) Reputation:
Mr. Williams reported that he served in the United States Army Reserve from October 1965 to March 1976. The highest rank he attained was E-7. He received an Honorable Discharge.
Mr. Williams reported his Martindale-Hubbell rating as "BV."
Mr. Williams reported that he served as the Mayor of the Town of Norway for eight years and as a member of the town council for fourteen years, from 1966 to 1988. He was responsible for receiving federal and state aid used for the construction of a recreational area in the community. He was also responsible for receiving federal assistance in expanding the water system to a low-income minority area. In addition, he serves as a member of the Orangeburg Soil and Water Conservation Commission. He was appointed to this position in 1996 to fill an unexpired term. His term expires in 1998.
(6) Physical Health:
Mr. Williams appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7) Mental Stability:
Mr. Williams appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8) Experience:
Mr. Williams was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1979.
After graduating from law school, Mr. Williams practiced law as an associate of J.C. Nicholson, Jr., from 1979 to 1980. He had a general law practice, including domestic, real estate, tort litigation, defense work, insurance claims, and other general practice areas. From 1980 to 1981, he practiced law as a partner in the law firm of Marshall, Nicholson and Williams, which was a general practice. From 1981 to 1982, he practiced law as a partner in the law firm of Nicholson and Williams, a general practice. From 1982 to 1984, Mr. Williams was a sole practitioner with a general practice. From 1984 to 1992, he practiced as Senior Partner in the law firm of Williams and Houser with a general practice.
Mr. Williams reported that he served as Mayor of the Town of Norway for eight years. During that time, he presided over the Mayor's Court, which tries criminal matters within its jurisdiction and holds preliminary hearings in more serious matters. It could levy fines up to $200.00.
From 1993 to the present, Mr. Williams has been Deputy Solicitor for the First Judicial Circuit. He is responsible for criminal prosecution in Orangeburg and Calhoun counties. He supervises a staff of seven attorneys and eight non-attorneys.
Mr. Williams reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a) Federal: One case
(b) State: Weekly
Mr. Williams reported the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a) Civil: 0%
(b) Criminal: 100%
(c) Domestic: 0%
Mr. Williams reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a) Jury: 35%
(b) Non-jury: 65%
Mr. Williams provided that he usually acted as sole counsel. He was chief counsel in a few cases, but he was never associate counsel.
•The following is Mr. Williams' account of his most significant litigated matters:
(a) Rothrock v. McCall Thomas Engineering Company, Inc.
This was a slander and tortuous interference with a contract action brought by a disgruntled construction supervisor against the design engineering firm. The case was tried in Berkeley County, South Carolina and verdict rendered for the Defendant after five days of trial. The case was not appealed. This case was significant because it involved questions of federal constitutional law under the New York Times case which was relatively recent at the time. The Defense Verdict was especially meaningful as I was defending an out-of-town corporation. I was assisted by two associate counsel.
(b) Reed v. Medlin, 281 S.E.2d 125, (S.C. 1981) and 328 S.E.2d 115, (S.C. App. 1985)
On September 12, 1979, Mr. Reed was burned to death in a collision while stopped at a road block set up by two highway patrolmen. Representing the widow, we brought suit against a highway patrolman, the South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation, three individual defendants and a corporate defendant. After two appeals, which resulted in the Department being dismissed as a defendant and after having settled with all defendants other than Patrolman Medlin and having added a Patrolman Morris as a defendant, the case was tried in November of 1985. After a four day trial, we received a verdict for the Plaintiff in the amount of $250,000.00, which was one of largest jury verdicts ever rendered in Orangeburg County to that time. The case involved several interesting questions of law which were decided on appeal. I was chief counsel assisted by two associate counsel.
(c) Joseph Broughton v. Seaboard Airline Railroad.
Mr. Broughton drove his automobile into the side of a switch engine which was crossing a spur track in North Charleston, South Carolina. He received severe permanent brain damage which resulted in total disability and loss of his well-paying job as a long shoreman. The case was extremely difficult because of the contributory negligence issue. The case was tried in Federal court in Charleston with Simmons Tate defending. During the course of the trial, defendant raised its offer to $25,000.00 which was rejected by our client, Mrs. Broughton, against our advice. At the conclusion of the trial of the case, we entered into a "high/low" agreement wherein we agreed to limit any possible recovery to $250,000.00 and the defendant agreed to a minimum recovery in the amount of $50,000.00 plus attorney's fees. This agreement was entered into by the Defendant against the advice of its counsel. The jury was out less than two hours before returning a verdict for the defendant. The case is significant for me because it resulted in a significant monetary recovery for a family which had been placed in destitute circumstances by this unfortunate incident.
(d) Dixie Kemmerlin v. Roy Campbell, M.D.
This medical malpractice case was one of the first cases tried after being admitted to the bar and was the first time a local physician had been sued by a local attorney. Our expert testified that the physician had failed to meet the standard of care in treating a gun shot wound to the chest. Neither the defense counsel or the presiding judge treated the case with much significance as we began the trial. However, by the end of my examination of our expert witness, we had the interest of not only defense counsel and the presiding judge but many members of the Orangeburg County Bar who had come into the courtroom to watch the proceedings. The jury rendered a defense verdict, but the case is significant for a number of reasons. First, I learned that I could prepare and try a very complicated medical malpractice case as well as anyone. Secondly, I learned that an individual shot in a barroom brawl on the wrong side of the tracks does not make an attractive subject for a medical malpractice action. Thirdly, I learned that the fact that there has never been a jury verdict in Orangeburg County against a local physician is not likely to change soon.
(e) Till v. Dairymen, Inc., et al.
In the mid 1980's I brought an action in federal court on behalf of Dr. John E. Till, a local dairy farmer, against Dairymen, Inc. and Coble Dairy, Inc. This action was tried in federal court in Charleston after extensive discovery by both defendants. We were threatened by the defendants and their attorneys, who flew in by private jet from Louisville, Kentucky, that if we pursued this case they would bury us under paperwork so that we would never recover sufficient to go to trial. Settled the case for our initial figure.
•The following is Mr. Williams' account of his three civil appeals that he had personally handled.
(a) Reed v. Medlin.
This case, discussed above, was appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court once and to the South Carolina Court of Appeals later. In the first appeal, the Court sustained the Department of Highways and Public Transportation's demurrer on the grounds of sovereign immunity. However, the Court overruled the Department's demurrers as to whether or not the conditions alleged constituted a defect and as to whether or not we were entitled to an action for damages to the widow and children. The second appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of the Highway Department on the survivor cause of action as well as the denial of a Motion to Amend by adding the Chief Highway Commissioner as party. The second appeal resulted in the trial of case shortly before McCall v. Batson, 329 S.E.2d 741 (S.C. 1985) (repealed the doctrine of sovereign immunity).
(b) Nancy B. Evans v. Dan W. Evans, Memorandum Opinion No. 88- Mo-018, filed February 29, 1988.
In this appeal from the Orangeburg County Family Court, I represented the defendant/respondent. In this custody, visitation, support and property action, the trial court's judgment was viewed as an almost total victory for the defendant. The Court of Appeals in its decision affirmed the lower court's order.
(c) Ballard v. Ballard, 443 S.E.2d 802 (1994).
I represented Mrs. Ballard, the mother of a young man killed in an accidental shooting. She did not want to share the proceeds of a wrongful death suit with her ex-husband who had had no contact with his son for years and had failed to support him. We felt that the language of the statute was sufficient to allow the court to apportion the proceeds other than equally. We lost, but the statute has now been changed to allow just what we tried to accomplish.
(9) Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. Williams' temperament would be excellent.
(10) Miscellaneous:
Mr. Williams is single.
Mr. Williams reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional organizations:
(a) Orangeburg County Bar (President, 1989);
(b) South Carolina Bar Association.
Mr. Williams provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, educational, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a) Former member of Orangeburg County United Fund Board of Directors;
(b) Norway Ruritan Club since 1966 (Served several terms as President and Secretary);
(c) Forty-year member of Norway Baptist Church, present member of Denmark Baptist Church (Has served as a member and Chairman of the Board of Deacons on numerous occasions, has served as Sunday School Teacher for 25 of the last 30 years and in various other leadership positions in both churches);
(d) Founding member of the Board of Directors of Heritage Hall Academy in Norway, South Carolina (Served continuously as President from 1970 until 1993);
(e) South Carolina Independent School Association since 1970 (Has served as Board Representative, served on the Athletic Committee from 1983 to 1986, was elected President of the Association in 1984 and has served continuously since that time).
(f) Commissioner, Orangeburg Conservation District since 1989 (served as chairman for two years).
•Mr. Williams stated, "I was 33 years old and had been out of college for eleven years when I enrolled in law school. During these years I gained invaluable business, political and personal experience. Although it was difficult to become a student again, especially since I commuted 90 miles each day and continued to farm full time in order to support myself and service my farm debt, my maturity was of great value in understanding the law and its applications to every day life and business experience.
From my graduation in 1979 until January 1, 1993, I practiced almost exclusively in the civil arena. I practiced in several partnership situations, but was always the chief litigator. The Reed case, mentioned in my resume, was drafted before I was admitted to the bar, and filed shortly thereafter. I personally handled all of the procedural matters and technical aspects of the litigations and trial.
On January 1, 1993, I became Deputy Solicitor for the First Judicial Circuit and was named Chief Deputy Solicitor in 1995. I have been responsible for all criminal prosecution in Orangeburg and Calhoun counties for the past five years. Even though I had very little experience on the criminal side, I have been successful in setting up and administering a system which has resulted in reducing the case backlog by more than 50%, even though the number of cases filed has increased.
My experience working very closely with the various administrative judges and presiding judges has given me a broad and valuable perspective into the judiciary.
From my college days, I have been elected to a top leadership position in every organization of which I have been a member. These facts, coupled with my varied and extensive professional, business, and personal background, make me uniquely qualified to serve the State of South Carolina as a Circuit Court Judge."
Commission's Findings: QUALIFIED
(1) Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. McCravy meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service on the Circuit Court.
Mr. McCravy was born on September 6, 1958. He is 39 years old and a resident of Hodges, South Carolina. Mr. McCravy provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1985.
(2) Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. McCravy.
Mr. McCravy demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. McCravy reported that he had been sued professionally. A consultant who was hired by a client and then subsequently terminated for failing to do any work filed a lawsuit against Mr. McCravy in small claims court in Chicago, Illinois. He alleged Mr. McCravy's client owed him a fee for services, even though he did not earn the fee. Mr. McCravy settled out of court for $750 as a nuisance value so he would not have to go to Illinois to defend himself.
Mr. McCravy testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. McCravy testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the screening report.
(3) Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. McCravy to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. McCravy provided that during the previous five years he has attended numerous CLEs and seminars.
Mr. McCravy reported that he had taught the following law-related courses:
(a) Constitutional Law Courses and Criminal Law Courses at Piedmont Technical College;
(b) Professional Secretaries Course at Lander University;
(c) Constable legal review course at Piedmont Technical College.
Mr. McCravy reported that he had published the following articles:
(a) "Legal Pad" -Approximately 450 Weekly Newspaper articles in the Index-Journal, 1988-date;
(b) "S.C. Jurisprudence" Legal Encyclopedia - Appeals section on procedure, 1990;
(c) "Handling Pulmonary W. C. Claims" - Article in "Trial Bulletin," Fall, 1997.
(4) Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. McCravy did not reveal any evidence of complaints, grievances, or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. McCravy did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. McCravy has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Mr. McCravy was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5) Reputation:
Mr. McCravy reported his Martindale-Hubbell rating as "BV."
(6) Physical Health:
Mr. McCravy appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7) Mental Stability:
Mr. McCravy appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8) Experience:
Mr. McCravy was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1985.
Mr. McCravy provided that he had served as a law clerk in the U.S. Attorney's Office and in the S.C. Attorney General's Office.
Since his graduation from law school, Mr. McCravy served as a staff attorney to the Supreme Court of S.C. from 1985 to 1987. From 1987 to 1995, he was in private practice with Callison, Dorn, Thomason, Garrett & McCravy, P.A. in Greenwood, South Carolina. The firm was a general practice with a concentration on civil litigation. From 1995 to 1997, he worked in private practice at the McCravy Law Firm, P.A., a general practice firm concentrating in circuit court. From 1996 to present, he has also been a City Attorney in Greenwood.
Mr. McCravy reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a) Federal: Approximately 30 appearances
(b) State: Approximately 200 appearances
(c) Other: Planning Boards, Magistrate's Court, County Council
Mr. McCravy reported the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a) Civil: 80%
(b) Criminal: 5%
(c) Domestic: 1%
Mr. McCravy reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a) Jury: 50%
(b) Non-jury: 50%
Mr. McCravy provided that he usually acted as sole counsel.
•The following is Mr. McCravy's account of his most significant litigated matters:
(a) Shirley v. Builders Transport. This was a multi-party wreck case which was tried for three days. Obtained a favorable jury verdict in Kershaw County.
(b) Cohen v. Grede Foundry, Inc. This was a complicated occupational disease workers compensation case. Obtained a favorable ruling after a prolonged hearing and was affirmed by the Full Commission. This was the first known case in the United States recognizing hypersensitivity pneumonitis as an occupational disease.
(c) Aiken v. Roberts Foundry, Inc. This was a class action for environmental nuisance involving over 250 Plaintiffs. The case eventually settled after years of discovery as trial approached.
(d) Laughlin v. K-Mart. Obtained a favorable jury verdict after several days of trial.
(e) Lewis v. U. S. Navy. Represented a Navy Veteran who was exposed to Mustard Gas in secret experiments in WWII. Used a novel theory in an attempt to circumvent the Feres Doctrine. Client was awarded 100% disability by the VA while the trial was pending.
•Mr. McCravy listed five civil appeals that he has personally handled as follows:
(a) State v. Eustace, 299 S.C. 145, 382 S.E.2d 918 (1989);
(b) Stewart v. State Crop Pest Commission, 307 S.C. 133, 414 S.E.2d 121 (1992);
(c) Garrett v. SCDC, 93-CP-35-01 (1993) (appeal to Circuit Court from Full Commission);
(d) Arnold v. Clinton Mills, Inc., W.C.C. No: 8566288 (appeal to Full Commission);
(e) Webb v. First Federal S & L of Anderson, 299 S.C. 1, 282 S.E.2d 4 (1989).
Mr. McCravy reported that he served on the SC Board of Grievances and Discipline from 1991 to 1996. He served on various panels as a member and chairman in proceedings concerning alleged misconduct by attorneys.
(9) Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. McCravy's temperament would be excellent.
(10) Miscellaneous:
Mr. McCravy is married to Dana Shaw McCravy and has two children: John R. McCravy, IV (age 12); and Kelley McCravy (age 9).
Mr. McCravy reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional organizations:
(a) SC Bar Association;
(b) Greenwood County Bar Association (Secretary/Treasurer, 1994- 1996);
(c) S.C. Trial Lawyers Association;
(d) Association of Trial Lawyers of America.
Mr. McCravy provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, educational, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a) South Main Street Baptist Church, Greenwood (Vice-Chairman, Deacon Board);
(b) Greater Greenwood United Ministries (President);
(c) Masonic Lodge (32nd Degree Mason).
Commission's Finding: QUALIFIED
(1) Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Rucker meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service on the Circuit Court.
Judge Rucker was born on October 22, 1944. He is 53 years old and a resident of Newberry County. Judge Rucker provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years, and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1969.
(2) Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Rucker.
Judge Rucker demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communication, acceptance of gifts and ordinary social hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Rucker testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Rucker testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the screening report.
(3) Professional and Academic Ability:
Judge Rucker's performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Rucker provided that during the previous five years he had attended the following JCLE courses and judicial conferences:
6-14-93 Family Court Judicial Conference
8-26-93 Judicial Conference
11-4-93 Best Interest of Children
6-20-94 Orientation School for Family Court Judges
6-4-94 Lawyers Caring About Kids
8-25-94 Judicial Conference
8-19-94 Juvenile Crime
6-21-95 Family Court Judges' Conference
8-24-95 Judicial Conference
11-17-95 Family Law Bench/Bar Update
6-26-96 Family Court Judges Conference
8-8-96 Trial Lawyers CLE
8-22-96 Judicial Conference
1-3-97 Seminar for Chief Administrative Judges
3-6-97 Governor's Conference on Youth Crime
8-21-97 Judicial Conference
Judge Rucker reported that in 1996, he was a speaker and panel member at the Child Support Decision-Making 2000, National Child Support Enforcement Association Conference in Washington D.C.
(4) Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Rucker did not reveal any evidence of grievances or criminal allegations made against him.
Two complaints were filed against Judge Rucker. The first complaint was filed by Samuel Stevenson who alleged that he received unfavorable rulings in his divorce and child custody case due to Judge Rucker's bias in favor of Mr. Stevenson's ex-wife. Mr. Stevenson claimed that Judge Rucker knew his ex-wife's family. The Commission noted that Mr. Stevenson had no first-hand knowledge of this claim. Judge Rucker testified that he did not know this family. The Commission did not find any bias or other wrongdoing by Judge Rucker.
The second complaint was filed by William Stewart who alleged that Judge Rucker did not properly rule on a motion to terminate alimony arising from Mr. Stewart's divorce case. The Commission found that the complaint was a matter for the appellate court and did not find any wrongdoing by Judge Rucker.
The Commission's investigation of Judge Rucker did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Rucker has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Rucker was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5) Reputation:
Judge Rucker reported that as a member of the judiciary, his last available rating in Martindale-Hubbell was "BV."
Judge Rucker served in the South Carolina House of Representatives from 1976 until 1980.
Judge Rucker served as Commissioner with the South Carolina Tax Commission from 1984 until 1988.
(6) Physical Health:
Judge Rucker appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7) Mental Stability:
Judge Rucker appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8) Experience:
Judge Rucker was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1969.
Since his graduation from law school, Judge Rucker has worked as an associate for Attorney Tench P. Owens from June 1969 until October 1969; as a sole practitioner from 1969 until 1988; and has been a Family Court Judge since 1988.
Judge Rucker reported that he was elected as the Recorder for the City of Newberry from September 1971 to June 1976. His jurisdiction was limited to minor criminal and traffic offenses. He has been a Family Court judge since July 1, 1988, and his jurisdiction has been limited to family and juvenile matters.
•The following is Judge Rucker's account of his five most significant orders or opinions:
(a) McElveen v. McElveen, 94-DR-40-5024
Among the many issues presented to the court was the issue as to whether a buy sell agreement between husband and partners not entered into in contemplation of marital litigation was controlling as to value of the husbands interest in the partnership. This is an issue which had not been ruled upon in South Carolina. I ruled that it was controlling. This matter is presently under appeal.
(b) Chanko v. Chanko, Court of Appeals, Opinion 2706 Filed July 28, 1997
Included in this case was the issue of whether TWOP Accounts (Time off with pay accounts) used by some businesses rather than sick leave or vacation days are income to be added to the employee's gross income for child support purposes. I determined that this was not be included in the gross income. This was upheld by the Court of Appeals.
(c) Snook v. Snook, 97-DR-36-11
Issue as to whether South Carolina Family Court or the Courts of another state had jurisdiction to determine custody of a minor child when child had along with parents moved to another state and remained for five months until mother and child moved back to South Carolina. Father contended that mother did not make evident her intention to remain in South Carolina until she filed custody action several months later. The statute in issue was the portion of the UCCJA (S.C. Code 20-7-786(5))(1996) which states "Periods of temporary absence of any such persons are counted as part of the six month period." Case turned on factual issues. I ruled that South Carolina had jurisdiction under provisions of the UCCJA.
(d) Richardson v. Richardson, 95-DR-36-0588
This case involved the equitable distribution of a employer funded retirement plan for partners in the firm. The husband had been a partner for approximately four years at the time of filing of the marital litigation. The partnership agreement required that an individual be a partner for seven years before the retirement vested. I ruled that under the terms of the partnership agreement the non-contributory retirement benefits had not become marital property and denied the wife any interest in the retirement. Another issue in this case was the ownership of a Gamecock Club membership. This membership was obtained by the husband several years prior to the marriage and after the parties separation the husband maintained the contribution level, I ruled that the Gamecock Club membership was the property of the husband.
(e) Seymore v. Seymore, 94-DR-30-833
This action was one for divorce on fault grounds. The parties had been married in excess of 30 years. The parties had accumulated substantial assets, many through inheritance. Many of the inherited assets had been co-mingled. Court was faced with the task of determining what constituted marital assets. This task was further complicated by transfers of investment accounts by one of the parties after the commencement of the action.
(9) Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Rucker's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10) Miscellaneous:
Judge Rucker is married to Harriett S. Lee. They have two children: John B. Rucker, a graduate student at the University of South Carolina, (age 23); Wylie M. Rucker, a student at Newberry College (age 22).
Judge Rucker reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional organizations:
(a) South Carolina Bar
(b) American Bar Association
(c) South Carolina Family Court Judges Association, (President 1996- 97), and (Secretary-Treasurer 1995-96)
Judge Rucker provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, educational, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a) Central United Methodist Church;
(b) Mason, Shriner;
(c) Rotary Club of Newberry;
(d) Country Club of Newberry.
Commission's Findings: QUALIFIED
(1) Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Saunders meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service on the Circuit Court.
Judge Saunders was born on September 20, 1942. He is 55 years old and a resident of Laurens, South Carolina. Judge Saunders provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1968.
(2) Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Saunders.
Judge Saunders demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Saunders testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Saunders testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the screening report.
(3) Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Saunders to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Saunders reported that he has complied with the CLE requirements by attending approved seminars and reporting annually on his attendance. As a practicing attorney, the seminars have been on various subjects relating to his interests and intellectual needs. Since election to the judiciary in 1994, he has complied with the JCLE requirements by attending approved seminars and reporting on his attendance.
Judge Saunders reported that he has taught business law for adult education classes held at night school in Laurens from approximately 1973 until 1975.
(4) Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Saunders did not reveal any evidence of grievances or criminal allegations made against him.
One complaint was filed against Judge Saunders. The complaint was filed by Samuel Stevenson who alleged he received unfavorable rulings in matters pertaining to his divorce and child custody case due to Judge Saunders' bias in favor of Mr. Stevenson's ex-wife. Mr. Stevenson claimed that Judge Saunders knew his ex-wife's family. The Commission noted that Mr. Stevenson had no first-hand knowledge of this claim. Judge Saunders testified that he did not know this family. The Commission did not find any bias or other wrongdoing by Judge Saunders.
The Commission's investigation of Judge Saunders did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Saunders has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Saunders was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5) Reputation:
Judge Saunders reported that his Martindale-Hubbell rating was "AV."
(6) Physical Health:
Judge Saunders appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7) Mental Stability:
Judge Saunders appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8) Experience:
Judge Saunders was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1968.
Judge Saunders reported that he was a Police Officer for the City of Laurens from 1962-1965 and was appointed by Chief of Police, William J. "Bill" Power. He was the City Attorney for the City of Laurens from 1972 to 1992. He was Counsel to the Commission of Public Works in Laurens from 1993 until September 30, 1994, having been elected by the public body making the appointment.
Since his graduation from law school, Judge Saunders reported he began the general practice of law in Laurens in 1968, always as a sole practitioner. He was the city attorney for the City of Laurens from 1972 to 1992. He represented the Commission of Public Works as counsel from 1993 to 1994; then he was elected to the judiciary. During the period from 1972 through 1988, he represented the South Carolina Highway Department, by association with the Office of the Attorney General, Duke Power Company, insurance companies, and smaller corporations. After 1988, he represented only one insurance company and smaller, closely-held local corporations. His practice of law was general and included civil, criminal, domestic, and administrative law practice in the state and federal courts.
Judge Saunders reported that he was elected on May 25, 1994, to fill the unexpired term of the Honorable Williams J. Craine, Jr., as Family Court Judge, Seat 1, Eighth Judicial Circuit, commencing October 1, 1994. He was reelected to this position on May 25, 1995.
Judge Saunders reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a) Federal: Occasionally
(b) State: Frequently
(c) Other: Administrative (Social Security Administration, Workers' Compensation Commission): Frequently
Judge Saunders reported the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a) Civil: 40%
(b) Criminal: 25%
(c) Domestic: 35%
Judge Saunders reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a) Jury: 20%
(b) Non-jury: 80%
Judge Saunders provided that he most often served as sole counsel.
•The following is Judge Saunders' account of his most significant litigated matters:
(a) James Calvin Davenport v. Reigel Textile Corporation (WCC File No: unknown) was a worker's compensation claim for total permanent disability to a textile worker because of byssinosis or "cotton dust disease". The case was settled in December 1981 for $47,500.00 and I believe it contributed substantially to improved working conditions in textile mills.
(b) Paul Kochon v. Spartan Grain and Feed, Inc. was a civil action for damages to a cattle herd allegedly caused by molded feed, or cattle feed which had allegedly became adulterated by aflatoxins. In December 1984, the case was tried before a court and jury in Laurens County and resulted in a verdict for the defendant. Nevertheless, I feel that the case had a significant effect on improving the quality of cattle feed and controls for molds and other potential carcinogens.
(c) The Estate of Noree Garlington v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad was a third-party suit against the railroad by an employee who was compensated by the State Fund for an on-the-job injury. The plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile driven by a co-worker. The plaintiff alleged that the driver of the automobile and the railroad were negligent. The case is significant because the jury found the driver contributory negligent but did not impute contributory negligence to the passenger and returned a verdict for the plaintiff.
(d) Kerr v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 731 F.2d 229 (1984) is significant because it reaffirmed the South Carolina law that a policy of insurance is severable and fraud for the claim of personal property loss will not forfeit the entire policy if there was no fraud in the claim for the loss of the structure. The case was tried before a court and jury in United States District Court by the applicant, was lead counsel in the appeal.
(e) Walton v. Stewart, 289 S.E.2d 403, 277 S.C. 436 (1982) is significant because this case established that the abolition of parental immunity by the South Carolina Supreme Court in 1980 was prospective only.
•Judge Saunders listed five civil appeals which he has personally handled as follows:
(a) Lurey v. City of Laurens, 217 S.E.2d 226, 265 S.C. 975 (1976). (Exhibit "D", pages 001 - 027);
(b) Garlington v. South Carolina Department of Mental Retardation, et al., 81-CP-30-182, wherein a consent order of dismissal was entered by acting Justice William Rhodes. (Exhibit "D", pages 028 - 059);
(c) Walton v. Stewart, 289 S.E.2d 403, 277 S.C. 436 (1982).
(Exhibit "D", pages 060 - 071);
(d) Kerr v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 731 F.2d 229 (1984). (Exhibit "D", pages 072 - 096);
(e) Saluda Motor Lines, Inc. v. Crouch, S.C. App., 386 S.E.2d 290, 300 S.C. 43 (1989). (Exhibit "D", pages 097 - 119).
Judge Saunders reported that he was elected on May 25, 1994, to fill the unexpired term of the Honorable Williams J. Craine, Jr., as Family Court Judge, Seat 1, Eighth Judicial Circuit, commencing October 1, 1994. He was reelected to this position on May 25, 1995.
•Judge Saunders listed his five most significant orders or opinions as the following:
(a) Stevenson v. Stevenson, 93-DR-24-615, Order dated 27 May 1995, and Decision of Court of Appeals filed 22 July 1996, cited as Unpublished Opinion Number 96-UP-216;
(b) Ridley v. Ridley, 91-DR-30-327, Order dated 02 August 1995, and Decision of Court of Appeals filed 02 December 1996, cited as Unpublished Opinion Number 96-UP-439;
(c) Epperly v. Epperly, 94-DR-30-526, Orders dated 26 October 1995 and 02 May 1996, and Decision of Court of Appeals, filed 17 February 1998, cited as Unpublished Opinion Number 98-UP-075;
(d) In the Interest of Christopher P., 96-JU-01-01, and 96-JU-01-22, Order dated 14 May 1996, and Decision of Court of Appeals, 13 October 1997, cited as Published Opinion Number 2734;
(e) Davis v. Davis, 94-DR-36-105.
(9) Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Saunders temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10) Miscellaneous:
Judge Saunders is married to Laura Holland Uzzell. He has three children: Laura McCall Saunders (page in the SC House of Representatives, age 18); Lillie Dupre' Saunders (life guard at the Laurens YMCA, age 16); Leigh Holland Saunders (clerk at Master Dry Cleaners in Laurens, age 16).
Judge Saunders reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional organizations:
(a) South Carolina Bar Association;
(b) South Carolina Conference of Family Court Judges.
Judge Saunders provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, educational, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a) The First Methodist Church, Laurens, SC;
(b) Laurens Cotillion Club;
(c) Laurens Carolean Club (resigned 1996);
(d) Laurens Supper Club (resigned 1996);
(e) Hejaz Shrine Temple, (Greenville became inactive, 1997);
(f) Laurens Palmetto Lodge #19;), AFM (became inactive 1997);
(g) Laurens County Shrine Club (became inactive 1997);
(h) The Knights of Shag, which is also known as The Sherlock Holmes Society, Greenville, SC.
•Judge Saunders stated, "My experience as police officer has been of immense value to me in my practice of law and as a judge."
Commission's Findings: QUALIFIED
(1) Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. John meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service on the Circuit Court.
Mr. John was born on December 1, 1953. He is 44 years old and a resident of North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. Mr. John provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1978.
(2) Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. John.
Mr. John demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. John testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. John testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the screening report.
(3) Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. John to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. John reported the following list describing his continuing legal or judicial education during the past five years not including carry-over hours.
(a) 1998 - to date - 12.5 legal ed. hours and .5 ethics hours;
(b) 1997 - 25.5 legal ed. hours and 5.75 ethics hours;
(c) 1996 - 42.92 legal ed. hours and 9.5 ethics hours;
(d) 1995 - 29.5 legal ed. hours and 7.75 ethics hours;
(e) 1994 - 18.25 legal ed. hours and 2.0 ethics hours;
(f) 1993 - 34.75 legal ed. hours and 1.5 ethics hours;
(g) 1992 - 22.75 legal ed. hours and 4.5 ethics hours.
(4) Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. John did not reveal any evidence of complaints, grievances, or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. John did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. John has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Mr. John was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5) Reputation:
Mr. John reported that his Martindale-Hubbell rating was "BV."
(6) Physical Health:
Mr. John appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7) Mental Stability:
Mr. John appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8) Experience:
Mr. John was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1978.
Since his graduation from law school, Mr. John served as a law clerk to the Honorable Sidney T. Floyd, Resident Judge, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, from 1978 to 1980.
He has worked in private trial practice since 1981. He opened a solo practice in North Myrtle Beach in 1986, having an active trial practice in all of the state courts. In civil court, he has tried cases ranging from contracts and automobile accidents to multi-million dollar construction cases. In criminal court, he has tried cases ranging from traffic offenses to court-appointed defense in death penalty cases. In family court, he has tried cases from uncontested divorces to all manners of contested family disputes.
Mr. John served as a court-appointed special referee in the circuit court, appointed by Judges Sidney T. Floyd and David H. Maring, Sr., in over 50 cases. Mr. John was also named a Certified Circuit Court Arbitrator by the South Carolina Supreme Court Board of Arbitration. He was named a court-appointed mediator in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, appointed by Judges Sidney T. Floyd and David H. Maring, Sr., in over 50 cases. He was also named a court-appointed guardian ad litem in disputed child custody cases in the Family Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in over 100 cases.
Mr. John has served on the City of North Myrtle Beach Zoning Board since 1993.
Mr. John has also been a Pro Bono Lawyer for Horry County Disabilities and Special Needs agency since 1993.
Mr. John reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a) Federal: Infrequent
(b) State: Over the last five years in Circuit Court and Family Court, he has had a variety of matters, whether by motion, uncontested action, non-jury trial, or jury trial, and virtually every week that there has been Court in the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit.
Mr. John reported the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a) Civil: 40%
(b) Criminal: 20%
(c) Domestic: 20%
Mr. John reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a) Jury: 40%
(b) Non-jury: 60%
Mr. John provided that he most often served as sole counsel.
•The following is Mr. John's account of his most significant litigated matters:
(a) Mariners Pointe Homeowners Association v. U.D.C.-Universal Development, d/b/a U.D.C. Homes Limited Partnership v. over thirty (30) Third Party Defendants, and Paul Martin and Be Bushong, Individually and as Class Representatives v. U.D.C.-Universal Development, d/b/a U.D.C. Homes Limited Partnership - 1990-1996. As the title indicates, this was an extremely complex construction case. The main action by the Association dealt with the damages to the common elements at the Mariners Pointe Condominium and Marina project. The construction issues involved roofing damage, settlement of the marsh in areas near the buildings, pool defects, marina design defects, porch and deck defects, fire wall defects, spoilage basin design defects, ventilation defects, irrigation system defects, parking lot design defects, sighting defects, and a host of other general construction problems, many of which violated the standard building code. The class action dealt with interior unit damages suffered by the individual owners.
I developed the case from its initial interviews through development of all of the necessary experts, numerous depositions and production of documents, and upon the eve of trial, through the use of mediation, this case was eventually settled to the satisfaction of the Plaintiffs in the multi-million dollar range.
(b) State v. Titus Huggins, 1996. This was a death penalty case. I was court appointed with a public defender for Horry County to provide the defense. There was an initial trial of the first phase, during which Mr. Huggins was convicted armed robbery and murder with a pistol. The defense presented motions to the trial judge regarding juror improprieties, which led the court to declare a mistrial. There was a retrial in which I again participated as one of the two defense counsels for Mr. Huggins, in which Mr. Huggins was again convicted of armed robbery and murder of a shop keeper and subsequently received the death penalty. This matter is currently on appeal.
(c) North Carolina Federal Savings and Loan Association v. DAV Corporation, et. al, 1986-1993. I was retained to file a mortgage foreclosure action on certain ocean view property, upon which there had been a failed condominium project. Before trial, due to motions for a jury trial made by one of the defendants on certain of his counter-claims, this matter was the subject of an appeal to the South Carolina Court of Appeals and thereafter, Certiorari was granted and an opinion issued by the South Carolina Supreme Court, which helped to define legal and equitable claims. This matter was also placed in the purview of the Bankruptcy Court for a period of time due to actions of a defendant, which caused certain filings to remove the matter from the Bankruptcy Court. Thereafter, the plaintiff went into receivership and was taken over by an agency of the Federal Government, the Resolution Trust Corporation, which caused the matter to be transferred to Federal Court. Eventually we were able to successfully convince the Federal Court to issue a Summary Judgment Order granting foreclosure. Besides the issues decided on appeal, as reported in 294 S.C. 27, 362 S.E.2d 308, and 298 S.C. 514, 381 S.E.2d 903, this case also epitomized the difficulties that can be encountered and necessarily overcome in what may appear to be initially a relatively straight forward matter.
(d) State v. Limme Arther, 1985-1998. This was a death penalty case. I was court appointed with another counsel to provide the defense for Mr. Arther, who was ultimately convicted of armed robbery and murder with an ax. At Mr. Arther's first trial, he was convicted and given the death sentence; however, due to objections made by myself and other trial counsel, because of improper arguments and statements by the solicitor, the Supreme Court overturned the death sentence and returned it for new sentencing hearing. At the second trial of the death penalty phase, due to the intervention of Attorney David Bruck, who was also appointed as defense counsel for Mr. Arther, this matter was tried only by a circuit judge, without a jury, and the death sentence was then imposed. The Supreme Court reviewed this and returned the matter for the imposition of a life sentence. This case was reported in 290 S.C. 291, 350 S.E.2d 187 (1986), and 296 S.C. 495, 374 S.E.2d 291 (1998).
(e) McCormac v. The Town of Pawleys Island, et al. While I was not trial counsel for either party in this matter, I was the court appointed Special Referee. This case involved an appeal from the decision of the Town of Pawleys Island Zoning Board of Appeals, in which that Board granted a variance for the construction of a residence. As the non-jury trial judge in this matter, I reversed the decision of the Zoning Board of Appeals. The Town and the other parties appealed this matter to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, and in an unpublished opinion number 95-UP-077, filed March 23, 1995, my decision was upheld and my order was adopted as the decision on appeal.
•Mr. John listed five civil appeals which he has personally handled as follows:
(a) State v. Sapps, 295 S.C. 484, 369 S.E.2d 145 (1988). I filed this appeal on behalf of a defendant who was convicted of first degree criminal sexual conduct and kidnaping. The main issue on appeal was whether or not it was proper for the solicitor, in cross examination, to ask the defendant whether other witnesses were lying, thereby forcing the defendant to attack the veracity and truthfulness of other witnesses, thereby improperly invading an area to be determined by the jury. The South Carolina Supreme Court overturned the conviction and returned the matter for new trial. Later this party pled guilty to lessor charges, more reflective of his limited involvement in the crime.
(b) Kincaid v. The Landing Development Corporation, et al., 289 S.C. 89, 344 S.E.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1986). This was a significant construction case that I developed for trial, along with John R. Clarke, Esquire, and upon a successful verdict being rendered to our client, an appeal was taken by the defendants. The verdict was upheld by the Court of Appeals, and certain important areas in construction litigation were clarified by this decision, including qualification of expert witnesses, sufficiency of damage information, and liability of interrelated corporations. I wrote the appeal brief in this matter and participated in the oral arguments with John R. Clarke, Esquire.
(c) Roundtree Villas Association, Inc. v. 4701 Kings Corp., et. al., 282 S.C. 415, 321 S.E.2d 46 (1984). This was a construction case which I developed for trial with John R. Clarke, Esquire, and upon a successful jury verdict, an appeal was taken by the defendants. The Supreme Court returned the matter for a new trial, in which the plaintiff was again successful. This matter is significant because it did extend liability when a lending agency undertakes to make repairs on a building it previously only participated in by financing. There is then a common law duty which arises to use due care in the repairs, thereby making the lender liable for any damages caused by negligent repairs. I wrote the appeal brief in this matter and participated in the oral arguments with John R. Clarke, Esquire.
(d) Piedmont Aviation, Inc. v. Quinn, 294 S.C. 502, 366 S.E.2d 31, (Ct. App) 1988. I was retained to write the appeal brief for the plaintiff in this matter by the trial counsel, and they used these arguments I developed at oral arguments. The jury verdict was upheld by the Court of Appeals which helped define the two issue rule.
(e) Note: for the above cases, no trial briefs are available. Since all of these matters have been concluded, the trial briefs were destroyed as extraneous and are no longer available. Therefore, for the last Appeal I am listing the case of:
Tilghman v. Tilghman, which is currently on appeal to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, Docket Number 95-DR-26-2983. Though this is a Family Court appeal, I believe it is relevant in that the main area on appeal does deal with the corroboration of evidence, which may have applicability in civil matters. Further, I am able to provide copies of my Initial Brief of Appellant, as well as my Reply Brief of Appellant.
(9) Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. John's temperament would be excellent.
(10) Miscellaneous:
Mr. John is married to Susan Watts John.
Mr. John reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional organizations:
(a) South Carolina Bar Association (1978-present);
(b) Horry County Bar Association (1978-present).
Mr. John provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, educational, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a) Rotary International and local North Myrtle Beach Club (1987- present, member of the local club's Board of Directors and held numerous committee chairmanships; Paul Harris Sustaining Member and has received the perfect attendance award ever since joining in 1987);
(b) Optimist International and local North Myrtle Beach Club (1987- 1996, member of the Board of Directors and has held various officer positions);
(c) Citadel Alumni Association and Citadel Brigadier Club (1975- present);
(d) Horry County Citadel Club (1980-present);
(e) U.S.C. Alumni Association and U.S.C. Gamecock Club (1978- present).
Commission's Findings: QUALIFIED
(1) Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Judge Thomas meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service on the Circuit Court.
Judge Thomas was born on October 20, 1957. She is 40 years old and a resident of Pawleys Island, South Carolina. Judge Thomas provided in her application that she has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1986.
(2) Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Judge Thomas.
Judge Thomas demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Judge Thomas testified that she has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Judge Thomas testified that she is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the screening report.
(3) Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Judge Thomas to be intelligent and knowledgeable. Her performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Judge Thomas provided that, as an attorney, she has complied with the minimum CLE requirements. As a judge, she has attended numerous CLEs through the SC Bar programs and judicial conferences, exceeding the minimum requirements.
Judge Thomas provided that she lectured for the following programs:
(a) August 6, 1993 - "Restructured State Government & The State of Administrative Law" - Speaker;
(b) April 26, 1996 - "So You Want to be a Judge" - Woman in Law, Columbia, SC (speaking from legislative perspective about judicial elections).
(4) Character:
The Commission's investigation of Judge Thomas did not reveal any evidence of complaints, grievances, or criminal allegations made against her. The Commission's investigation of Judge Thomas did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Judge Thomas has handled her financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Judge Thomas was punctual and attentive in her dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with her diligence and industry.
(5) Reputation:
Judge Thomas reported that her Martindale-Hubbell rating was unknown.
Judge Thomas reported that she was elected to the South Carolina House of Representatives Seat 108 representing Georgetown/Horry counties in November 1992 and re-elected in 1994.
(6) Physical Health:
Judge Thomas appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(7) Mental Stability:
Judge Thomas appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office she seeks.
(8) Experience:
Judge Thomas was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1986.
From January 1987 to September 1987, Judge Thomas worked at the Law Offices of Kenneth W. Thornton in Georgetown as an associate in Family and Circuit Court matters. From September 1987 to August 1988, she worked with Rubillo & Thomas, in Georgetown as a Partner in Family and Circuit Court matters. From August 1988 to January 1993, she was a sole practitioner in Pawleys Island, working in Family and Circuit Court matters. From January 1993 to January 1994, she was with Thomas & Gundling in Pawleys Island as a Partner in Family and Circuit Court matters. From January 1994 to May 1994, Judge Thomas was with Lawrimore, Thomas, Gundling & Kelaher, PA, in Pawleys Island as a Partner in Family and Circuit Court matters. From May 1994 to January 1995, she was with Thomas, Gundling & Kelaher in Pawleys Island as a Partner in Family and Circuit Court matters. From January 1995 to July 1996, she was a sole practitioner in Pawleys Island, working in Family and Circuit Court matters.
Judge Thomas was elected to the Circuit Court At-Large Seat 1 in May 1996. She was re-elected to that position in May 1997.
•Judge Thomas listed her five most significant orders or opinions as follows:
(a) State of S.C. v. Jeffrey Becka, 95-GS-26-1615;
(b) State of S.C. v. William J. Greene, 94-GS-22-139;
(c) Quality Towing Inc. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 96-CP-26-1414;
(d) Margaret Kizer v. Atco International, 94-CP-38-570;
(e) Gerald R. Baker v. S.C. Dept. of Revenue & Taxation, 96-CP-26- 3376.
(9) Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Judge Thomas' temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10) Miscellaneous:
Judge Thomas is married to Don Thomas and has three children: James Austin Thomas (age 11); Kristen Lee Thomas (age 9); Kelly Ann Thomas (age 9).
Judge Thomas reported that she was a member of the following bar associations and professional organizations:
(a) Georgetown County Bar Association (Treasurer 1992);
(b) South Carolina Bar Association;
(c) South Carolina Trial Lawyers Association;
(d) Association of Trial Lawyers of America;
(e) American Bar Association;
(f) South Carolina Judge's Association.
Judge Thomas provided that she was a member of the following civic, charitable, educational, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a) Rotary International;
(b) St. Paul's Waccamaw UMC (Former Board Chairperson);
(c) Pawleys Island Merchants Association (Former Board Member);
(d) Pawleys Retreat, POA (Former Board Member);
(e) Horry/Georgetown HUB Group (Former Board Member).
Commission's Findings: QUALIFIED
(1) Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. Wilson meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service on the Circuit Court.
Mr. Wilson was born on July 24, 1951. He is 46 years old and a resident of Conway, South Carolina. Mr. Wilson provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1977.
(2) Ethical Fitness:
Mr. Wilson reported that he had been sued personally.
•Mr. Wilson stated the following instances in which he has been sued professionally:
(a) Julann Prince v. Ralph Wilson (94-26-791) - This law suit arose out of Mr. Wilson's 1994 re-election. An assistant working in his office was terminated. She later filed for the Office of Solicitor and made representations that she was terminated for political reasons. Mr. Wilson released a copy of her termination letter explaining why she had been fired. She then filed suit for slander and defamation. The suit was dismissed for lack of merit.
(b) Leon Roberts v. Ralph J. Wilson & SLED Agents, et al. (4:94- 2843-22). This suit involved an investigation into criminal activity of officers in the Myrtle Beach Police Department. Leon Roberts and several other officers were indicted by the Horry County Grand Jury after an extensive SLED investigation. The indictments were later dismissed by an appointed conflict prosecutor. Roberts then filed a federal lawsuit claiming the SLED investigation was flawed, that Mr. Wilson should have known of the mishandling, and that he was prejudiced. The case was dismissed.
(c) Hugh Turbeville v. Ralph J. Wilson and Myrtle Beach Police Department, et al. (91-CP-26-4106 and 4:91-2656-19 AH). This is a pro se action by a prisoner for an alleged violation of civil rights filed in state and federal court. The case was dismissed.
Mr. Wilson reported that he had to pay a penalty to the State Ethics Commission for not timely filing updated quarterly campaign reports from his 1994 re-election. The forms were filed and the penalty was paid.
Mr. Wilson demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. Wilson testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. Wilson testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the screening report.
(3) Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. Wilson to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. Wilson provided that during the previous five years he has averaged 30 to 45 hours per year in CLEs. He noted that these hours far exceed the minimum requirements set by the Bar. The vast majority of these CLEs have been out of state, such as the annual conference for prosecutors involved in capital litigation (Association of Government Lawyers in Capital Litigation), the Annual South Carolina Solicitor's Conference, and the annual meetings of the National Bar Association. In addition, he has attended seminars sponsored by the South Carolina Bar involving the Rules of Evidence and Criminal Law Updates.
(4) Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. Wilson did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Wilson has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission noted that Mr. Wilson was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
Nine witnesses testified in opposition to Mr. Wilson's candidacy and two witnesses testified in support of Mr. Wilson's candidacy.
Dr. Gary Smith testified about incidents that occurred in 1995 when Dr. Smith was the Superintendent of the Horry County Schools. A grand jury indicted Dr. Smith for misconduct in office regarding computer purchases. Dr. Smith alleged that he gave evidence to Mr. Wilson prior to the grand jury hearing that the computers were properly purchased. Further, he alleged that the State Auditor's office admitted they were mistaken when they first reported the problem. Dr. Smith alleged that Mr. Wilson refused to dismiss the case and sought other indictments against Dr. Smith for political reasons.
Mr. Wilson responded that he had a responsibility to prosecute the case once the indictments were handed down by the grand jury. He further testified that the matter was brought to his attention by SLED, and that Dr. Smith subsequently signed an affidavit admitting improprieties in return for dismissal of the charges.
Richard Heath, the former School Board Chairman of Horry County, testified to the same events surrounding the above indictment. Mr. Heath, who was also charged, alleged that he sought a speedy trial four months after the grand jury indictment. The motion was denied but the Solicitor's Office was instructed to try the case before October 31st. Mr. Heath further alleged that Mr. Wilson stated he would recuse himself on the case. On October 29th, the charges were dismissed and Mr. Wilson then sought a new indictment. Prior to the trial, the charges were dismissed again. Mr. Heath alleged that the events were political in nature.
Mr. Wilson responded that the case was dropped without his knowledge or approval, and that was the reason a new indictment was sought. Further, Mr. Wilson responded that he did not promise to recuse himself.
Ms. Patti Hilton, a current member of the Horry County School Board, testified that the entire Board voted on the computer contracts, and that it was her opinion that Mr. Wilson selectively chose to indict only Dr. Smith and Mr. Heath for political reasons; Mr. Wilson then deliberately delayed their trials.
Mr. Wilson responded that his office received several complaints which he turned over to SLED to investigate. It was his intention to bring all of the charges at once, so he delayed the trials until the investigations were complete.
Mr. J. Chappell Dew, a current member of the Horry County Board of Education, testified that Mr. Wilson issued a subpoena to each Board member to attend a meeting in Mr. Wilson's office.
Mr. Wilson responded that he knew the subpoenas had no legal effect, but he wanted to ensure that the Board members would meet with him.
Ms. Desiree Scott, the mother of a man who died when he jumped off a balcony while in police custody, alleged that she repeatedly, unsuccessfully requested copies of the autopsy report. She further alleged that Mr. Wilson lied to the media when he stated that her son jumped as a result of drugs when the toxicology report indicated otherwise. Ms. Scott testified that several months passed and that Mr. Wilson gave her a copy of the autopsy report after he released it to the media.
Mr. Wilson responded that a witness in the room with Ms. Scott's son relayed information that matched the police's account of facts surrounding the jump from the balcony. Further, Mr. Wilson responded that he disclosed to Ms. Scott that he would release the autopsy report as soon as the investigation was completed. Mr. Wilson testified that he met with Ms. Scott on at least two occasions and explained to her what he was doing and why. He testified that a third meeting was not kept by Ms. Scott.
Ms. Rachael A. Dain, a victim's advocate unconnected to any particular organization, alleged that she had statements from eight women who had been molested by a magistrate and an attorney. She further alleged that for political reasons, Mr. Wilson only pursued charges against the magistrate and not the attorney.
Mr. Wilson responded that he carefully looked into the cases referenced above and that he concluded that he did not have enough evidence to prosecute the attorney.
Ms. Shirley Register alleged that Mr. Wilson used false information to obtain an arrest warrant against one of her family members. She further alleged that Mr. Wilson destroyed DNA evidence, illegally sealed case files, and did not comply with Freedom of Information Act requests.
Mr. Wilson responded that the police department, not the Solicitor's office, sought the arrest warrant. He further responded that he had a policy of not releasing files until the appellate process was complete. He also responded that he turned the DNA test results over to the defense and offered them samples. Mr. Wilson testified that the defense did not want the samples, so he told SLED to do whatever they normally do with the samples. In this case, the samples are now missing and presumed destroyed.
Ms. Julaan Prince alleged that Mr. Wilson should have recused himself from hearing particular cases involving public offices, such as the Myrtle Beach Police Department and the South Carolina Highway Patrol, that were being prosecuted by the 15th Circuit Solicitor's Office. She also alleged that Mr. Wilson made personnel changes regarding the assistant solicitors and their secretaries; that she was terminated from the Solicitor's office because of Mr. Wilson's concerns regarding her intentions to run for solicitor; and that after her termination, Mr. Wilson threatened to report her to SLED for interfering with an investigation in which she represented the mother of a murder victim.
Mr. Wilson responded that he had problems with Ms. Prince after he demoted her from deputy to assistant solicitor and that these problems existed over a year prior to her termination. Mr. Wilson responded that regarding the Myrtle Beach Police Department and the Highway Patrol, it is his policy not to recuse himself unless he has some personal connection to the case. Motions eventually were made and granted for his recusal in the two above cases.
Mr. Wilson testified that the secretaries were reassigned as a result of the number of secretaries not growing as quickly as the number of assistant solicitors. In essence, each secretary had to work for more than one assistant solicitor.
Mr. Wilson testified that it was no secret that Ms. Prince intended to run against him, but their working relationship developed problems long before Ms. Prince's intention to seek office as Solicitor.
Mr. Wilson further testified that he met with Ms. Prince and the victim's mother, expressed to them that the autopsy was critical evidence in the case, and said that he would release it after his investigation was completed. He stated that Ms. Prince then contacted the pathologist attempting to obtain the autopsy report, and that she did not reveal until later in that conversation that she was no longer with the Solicitor's office. Mr. Wilson admits sending Ms. Prince a letter, but asserted that it was not threatening.
Ms. Cindy Faye Lancaster alleged that at some point during the prosecution of her rape case, she became distressed with the way the Solicitor's office was handling the case. She sent a letter to the State Ombudsman's office expressing her concerns. She then alleged that Mr. Wilson told his assistant solicitors to dismiss the case in retaliation for her contacting the Ombudsman's office.
Mr. Wilson responded that when this rape case was tried, it resulted in a hung jury. His most experienced rape prosecutor worked on the case, as well as an investigator who was a retired FBI agent. When the jury was polled, they said they did not believe the story of the victim and that was the reason the case resulted in a hung jury. When the experienced prosecutor concluded that she could not win the case, Mr. Wilson decided to dismiss the case. Mr. Wilson testified that the dismissal had nothing to do with Ms. Lancaster contacting the Ombudsman's office.
Mr. Robert Lee testified in support of Mr. Wilson. Mr. Lee practices law in Florence and testified that he became acquainted with Mr. Wilson as Solicitor when Mr. Lee was appointed on a capital case in Marlboro County. Mr. Lee testified that the case was over two years old with over ten defendants and a total of fifteen lawyers involved. Mr. Wilson had the case ready for trial in three months.
Mr. Lee testified that none of the lawyers in the case were from Horry County, but rather from Columbia, Camden, Florence, and Darlington. None of the attorneys knew Mr. Wilson or had tried a case with him. They found him to be more than forthright, and he gave open access to the evidence.
Mr. Lee further testified, "I found him to be an incredible person to deal with[.]" Mr. Lee stated that Mr. Wilson was even-tempered, honest, and that he "recognized that he had a duty not just to the State, but to the defense and to the law."
Mr. Don Zelenka testified in support of Mr. Wilson and stated that he was asked by the Attorney General to appear before the Commission on behalf of that office. Mr. Zelenka testified that he has known Mr. Wilson since law school. At the Attorney General's office, Mr. Zelenka was initially assigned to state post conviction relief cases in which an attorney's competence is usually challenged. Mr. Zelenka further testified that when Mr. Wilson was a public defender, Mr. Wilson made it clear about the good quality of his representation of his clients during the post conviction relief action. In addition, according to Mr. Zelenka, Mr. Wilson also acknowledged any deficiencies in his representation.
During the time Mr. Wilson was at the Solicitor's office, Mr. Zelenka was Chief Deputy Attorney General over the Criminal Division. Mr. Zelenka testified that he found Mr. Wilson to be a very willing public servant and he found professionally that Mr. Wilson "left no stone unturned."
The Commission carefully considered the information presented, factoring in the nature of the complaints. Balanced with the fact that Mr. Wilson has enjoyed election twice as Solicitor, the Commission concluded that there were questions about Mr. Wilson's judgment in indicting the school board members and subsequently dismissing those cases. However, in Mr. Wilson's role as Solicitor, his actions were not disqualifying and not without explanation.
The Commission did find troubling Mr. Wilson's misuse and abuse of his subpoena power regarding the school board members. However, all of the citizens involved were represented by counsel and their counsel failed to object to or disregard the unauthorized subpoena.
In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, the Commission concluded that Mr. Wilson's conduct did not disqualify him as a candidate.
(5) Reputation:
Mr. Wilson reported that he is not listed in Martindale-Hubbell. He has been an elected official since 1981 and a prosecutor since 1988.
Mr. Wilson reported that between 1983 and 1986, he was appointed by County Council to the Horry County Airport Committee. Between 1985 and 1986, he was appointed by the Conway City Council to the Planning and Zoning Board. From 1986 through 1992, Mr. Wilson served as an at-large member of the Conway City Council. In 1990 and again in 1994, Mr. Wilson was elected Solicitor for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit.
(6) Physical Health:
Mr. Wilson appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7) Mental Stability:
Mr. Wilson appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8) Experience:
Mr. Wilson was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1977.
Since graduation from law school, Mr. Wilson worked for the Neighborhood Legal Assistance Program, Charleston Division Branch Office in Conway, South Carolina, from 1977 to 1979. His primary duties included representation of indigents in civil and administrative hearings, including Family Court, Social Security Administration, and appeals to Federal Court and Federal Court Civil matters, as well as Magistrate's Court and landlord-tenant matters.
Between 1979 and 1981, Mr. Wilson was the managing attorney for Neighborhood Legal Assistance Branch Office, supervising five attorneys and five support staff. During this time, he continued to maintain a full caseload.
Between 1981 and 1988, Mr. Wilson worked as an assistant Public Defender for Horry County. His duties were to represent indigent defendants charged with criminal offenses. His caseload consisted of only General Sessions Court offenses ranging from shoplifting--second offense to murder and death penalty cases.
In 1985, his full-time Public Defender position changed to a part-time contractual relationship. In 1985, he became a solo private practitioner and engaged in the general practice of law. His practice was approximately 40% criminal law due to his contract with the Horry County Public Defender's Office.
Between 1981 and 1988, Mr. Wilson personally acted as lead or sole attorney in over 75 murders, armed robbery, burglary, and other felony jury trials. During this same period, he acted as lead counsel on five death penalty trials and co-counsel on three more cases involving the death penalty. Additionally, he personally handled one appeal to the State Supreme Court, Frank Sosebee v. State, 284 S.C. 411, 326 S.E.2d 654 (1984).
Between January 1988 and 1991, Mr. Wilson was appointed Chief Deputy Solicitor for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit. His responsibility was to supervise all staff, including all six assistant solicitors, two investigators, and ten secretarial staff. He managed the court docket, advised law enforcement and court personnel and handled and prosecuted major felony crimes such as murder, armed robbery, felony DUI, and kidnapping.
In November 1991, Mr. Wilson was elected Solicitor for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit and was re-elected in 1994. He is the prosecutor for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, which includes Horry and Georgetown counties. He is responsible for the prosecution of all criminal cases in the circuit and is a constitutional officer. As Solicitor, Mr. Wilson has personally prosecuted over 75 murders, rapes, felony drug, and felony DUI jury trials. While maintaining a heavy personal caseload, he has been able to increase his staff from six to 21 attorneys, increase support staff from ten to 35, and more than double his local budget to reduce the caseload of office attorneys from over 300 cases to under 100 cases.
Mr. Wilson reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a) Federal: None
(b) State: Almost daily
(c) Other: Magistrate's Court infrequently
Mr. Wilson reported the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a) Civil: 0%
(b) Criminal: 100%
(c) Domestic: 0%
Mr. Wilson reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a) Jury: 25% - 30%
(b) Non-jury: 70% - 75%
Mr. Wilson provided that he usually acted as sole counsel, and an assistant solicitor would aid him occasionally.
•The following is Mr. Wilson's account of his most significant litigated matters:
(a) State v. Johnnie Kenneth Register, 92-GS-26-525, 419 S.E.2d 771, 1992 and 476 S.E.2d 153. This case involved one of the most gruesome murders in the history of the State, and certainly the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit. It was one of the first death penalty cases to rely on contested DNA evidence. The case contained a number of significant constitutional and legal issues.
(b) State v. Rebecca Smith, 90-GS-26-1274, 309 S.C. 442, 424 S.E.2d 496(1992). This case involved the murder and robbery of her husband by herself, her paramour, her son and a witchcraft believing nephew. This case was significant because it was his first prosecution of a death case. Smith became the first woman to receive a death sentence in South Carolina in almost 50 years. The case was latter remanded by the Supreme Court, and she received a life sentence on re-trial.
(c) State v. Frank Sosebee, 1984---284 S.C. 441, 326 S.E.2d 654 (1984). Mr. Sosebee was a soldier stationed at Myrtle Beach Air Force Base. He was accused of rape and kidnaping. This case is significant because as a young, inexperienced attorney, a Public Defender with less than two years of courtroom experience, he encountered a judge who was rude, intimidating and who consistently invoked his opinions about his client's guilt in the trial of the case. He personally handled the appeal to the State Supreme Court because he felt his client had been denied a fair trial.
(d) State v. Beans & Stoltz, 95-GS-26-1195, S.C. Supreme Court Opinion 2699. This case involved nude dancing, lewd and lascivious conduct at a local adult club. This case is important because it represented his efforts to clean up the proliferation of lewd and lascivious conduct in Myrtle Beach. Additionally, significant State and Constitutional law questions were involved.
(e) State v. J. Archie Lee, 92-GS-26-1881, 1952, 1957, 93-GS-26- 441, 442, 440 and 1881. Mr. Lee was a well known local politician who became a Magistrate in Horry County. Multiple women charged they went to Lee for legal matters and he would fondle, touch their breasts, ask for sex, and touch their buttocks. He used his office to exact sexual favors. Lee pleaded guilty to multiple counts of misconduct. Later the Federal authorities indicted Lee for Civil Rights violations. He was sentenced to one year in prison, which he is now serving.
Mr. Wilson listed no civil appeals that he has personally handled.
Mr. Wilson reported that he served as a part-time municipal recorder for the Town of Atlantic Beach from 1982 to 1984. This court primarily handled traffic-related offenses and city ordinance violations.
(9) Judicial Temperament:
Several witnesses testified in opposition to Mr. Wilson's candidacy. Many of the concerns were directed at Mr. Wilson's temperament and fitness for judicial office. An overview of the witnesses' testimony is outlined above in the "Character" section. The Commission was troubled by the manner in which the entire school board incident was handled by Mr. Wilson, as well as the abuse of the subpoenas and would caution him in the use of the power of his office. However, in viewing Mr. Wilson's career in total, the Commission does not think the allegations regarding Mr. Wilson's temperament should disqualify him from judicial office.
(10) Miscellaneous:
Mr. Wilson is married to Jennifer Denise Peters Wilson and has four children: Kia T. Wilson (graduate student, age 23); Ralph J. Wilson, Jr. (undergraduate student, age 22); Hannah M. Wilson (age 1); and Rachel L. Wilson (3 months).
Mr. Wilson reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional organizations:
(a) Horry County Bar (member since 1979);
(b) South Carolina Bar (member since 1977);
(c) National Bar Association (member since 1988);
(d) National Association of District Attorneys (member since 1990);
(e) Association of Government Attorneys in Capital Litigation (member since 1989).
Mr. Wilson provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, educational, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a) Friendship Baptist Church (Trustee, Co-chairman Budget Committee);
(b) Anchor Bank Advisory Board;
(c) Craig Wall School of Business Board;
(d) Sea Haven Boys Home;
(e) Horry County United Way Board;
(f) Horry County Branch of American Heart Fund;
(g) Horry County Branch of American Cancer Society.
Mr. Wilson reported that in 1994 he received the South Carolina Advocate of the Year Award presented by the South Carolina Coalition Against Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault. In 1995, he received The Daniel McLeod Award presented by the South Carolina Department of Revenue. In 1996, Mr. Wilson received the Certificate of Appreciation presented by the greater Saint Stephen AME Church for outstanding service.
•Mr. Wilson stated, "I think it is important for you to know that while in law school, I worked two jobs, teaching tutorials to first year black law students and worked at the Richland County Public Defender's Office. My wife and I had two children, one born the month before I entered law school and the second born at the end of my first year of law school. In spite of this, I graduated on time, took the bar, and passed the first time. Because of this I graduated deeply in debt, having borrowed through student loans and family. The next five or six years were difficult times financially. However, I survived that period clearing up[.]"
Commission's Findings: QUALIFIED
(1) Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. Cothran meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Master-in-Equity.
Mr. Cothran was born on December 12, 1921. He is 76 years old and a resident of Manning, South Carolina. Mr. Cothran provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since 1949.
(2) Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. Cothran.
Mr. Cothran reported that he had been sued. His office closed a loan for a client who had two judgments against him. The office paid off the judgments to the holder. The holder was supposed to use some of the proceeds to pay a joint credit card between the two but failed to do so ($3,800). When the bank sued the client, he made Mr. Cothran a party and cross-claimed. A motion for summary judgment was granted in Mr. Cothran's favor.
Mr. Cothran demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. Cothran testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. Cothran testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the screening report.
(3) Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. Cothran to be intelligent and knowledgeable. The Commission further found that Mr. Cothran has met expectations in the area of professional and academic ability.
Mr. Cothran reported that he had 12 hours of CLE in 1995. He reported that he took 18.42 hours in 1996. He took 15 hours of CLE in 1997. Prior to this, Mr. Cothran reported that he was exempt due to his 30 years of practice.
Mr. Cothran reported that he taught a variety of night classes at Veterans' School for approximately three years at twelve hours a week.
(4) Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. Cothran did not reveal any evidence of complaints, grievances, or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. Cothran did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Cothran has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
Mr. Cothran reported that he owns a one-third interest in a 69-lot trailer park.
The Commission also noted that Mr. Cothran was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5) Reputation:
Mr. Cothran reported that he served in the military from January 20, 1942, to September 10, 1945. He was in the Army Air Corps, T/Sgt. 14073070. He received a Honorable Discharge.
Mr. Cothran reported his Martindale-Hubbell rating as "AV."
Mr. Cothran reported that he was asked to run for election to continue as a probate judge and special referee in June 1996. He further reported that he lost by three votes.
(6) Physical Health:
Mr. Cothran appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7) Mental Stability:
Mr. Cothran appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8) Experience:
Mr. Cothran was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in 1949.
Since his graduation from law school, Mr. Cothran reported he started a general practice in 1950 and has had a number of partners over the years. His son joined him in his practice in 1977. Mr. Cothran was then appointed as a Probate Judge on June 6, 1995.
Mr. Cothran reported the frequency of his court appearances during the last five years as follows:
(a) Federal: None;
(b) State: Bi-weekly
(c) Other: Probate-Weekly
Mr. Cothran reported the percentage of his practice involving civil, criminal, and domestic matters during the last five years as follows:
(a) Civil: 100%
(b) Criminal: 0%
(c) Domestic: 0%
Mr. Cothran reported the percentage of his practice in trial court during the last five years as follows:
(a) Jury: 5%
(b) Non-jury: 95%
Mr. Cothran provided that he most often served as sole counsel.
•Mr. Cothran stated his most significant litigated matters as follows:
(a) Cook v. Cook, Florence County;
(b) Jackson v. Jackson, Sumter County;
(c) Two Lee v. Burgess, Clarendon County. (Mr. Cothran stated he broke attorney J.K. Breedin's will although the time for contesting had expired.
Mr. Cothran stated his expertise was property matters involving future interest and unborn and future born interest that other law firms said could not be done. However, Mr. Cothran did a number of them.
Mr. Cothran reported that he has personally handled civil appeals. However, he is unable to remember the names because when he was appointed as Probate Judge, his files were packed in boxes and stored in his attic and in the office where his son still practices. It would take months to find them. He thinks he appealed to the Supreme Court personally four times and won all four. One other time before the Supreme Court, his associate argued and lost. Mr. Cothran argued as an associate attorney once before the Court of Appeals and lost. He had one case which he tried in District Court in Charleston and won. The government appealed to Richmond but dropped it before it was argued.
Mr. Cothran reported that he has been a probate judge since June 1995.
(9) Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. Cothran's temperament has been and would continue to be excellent.
(10) Miscellaneous:
Mr. Cothran is a widower. He has two children: R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr. (Deputy Solicitor, age 46); and Deborah Cothran Joseph (Secretary, age 42).
Mr. Cothran reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional organizations:
(a) South Carolina Bar Association (Circuit Vice President in the 1960s);
(b) Clarendon County Bar Association (President in the 1960s or 1970s).
Mr. Cothran provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, educational, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a) Manning Lions Club (Charter Member at age 18);
(b) American Legion (President twice).
Commission's Findings: QUALIFIED
(1) Constitutional Qualifications:
Based on the Commission's investigation, Mr. Davis meets the qualifications prescribed by law for judicial service as a Master-in-Equity.
Mr. Davis was born on October 28, 1946. He is 51 years old and a resident of West Columbia, South Carolina. Mr. Davis provided in his application that he has been a resident of South Carolina for at least the immediate past five years and has been a licensed attorney in South Carolina since November 1975.
(2) Ethical Fitness:
The Commission's investigation did not reveal any evidence of unethical conduct by Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis reported that on two occasions he has been sued along with the Supreme Court by a pro se litigant. Both cases were dismissed by the Federal Courts.
Mr. Davis demonstrated an understanding of the Canons of Judicial Conduct and other ethical considerations important to judges, particularly in the areas of ex parte communications, acceptance of gifts and ordinary hospitality, and recusal.
Mr. Davis testified that he has not:
(a) sought or received the pledge of any legislator prior to screening;
(b) sought or been offered a conditional pledge of support by a legislator pending the outcome of screening; or
(c) asked third persons to contact members of the General Assembly prior to screening.
Mr. Davis testified that he is aware of the Commission's 48-hour rule regarding the formal and informal release of the Screening Report.
(3) Professional and Academic Ability:
The Commission found Mr. Davis to be intelligent and knowledgeable. His performance on the Commission's practice and procedure questions met expectations.
Mr. Davis reported that he has attended the South Carolina Judicial Conference every year since 1977. He has attended SC-Bar sponsored CLE seminars on a variety of subjects (Real Estate, Appellate Practice, etc.). He has attended several ABA-sponsored seminars for Appellate Court clerks and on Bar Admissions.
Mr. Davis provided that he has lectured at the South Carolina Bar Association CLE and JCLE Seminars. The topics on which he lectured included Appellate Court Rules, Circuit Court Practice, and Probate Court Practice. He has also lectured on Appellate Court Practice at a CLE sponsored by the Lexington County Bar Association.
Mr. Davis reported that he had published the following article: Motions in the South Carolina Supreme Court, South Carolina Lawyer, Volume 1, (Number 2,) September/October 1989, Page 13.
(4) Character:
The Commission's investigation of Mr. Davis did not reveal any evidence of complaints, grievances, or criminal allegations made against him. The Commission's investigation of Mr. Davis did not indicate any evidence of a troubled financial status. Mr. Davis has handled his financial affairs responsibly.
The Commission also noted that Mr. Davis was punctual and attentive in his dealings with the Commission, and the Commission's investigation did not reveal any problems with his diligence and industry.
(5) Reputation:
Mr. Davis reported that he served as a Captain on active duty in the U.S. Army from 1968-1972 (Captain, Corps of Engineers). He was a Captain on reserve duty from 1972-1980 and was Honorably Discharged in 1980 (Captain JAG Corps).
Mr. Davis reported that he is listed in Martindale-Hubbell as a Clerk of Court. Because he is not engaged in the private practice of law, he is not rated.
Mr. Davis reported that he served as a Notary Public from 1976-1986. He has served as Clerk of Court for the South Carolina Supreme Court since 1983.
(6) Physical Health:
Mr. Davis appears to be physically capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(7) Mental Stability:
Mr. Davis appears to be mentally capable of performing the duties of the office he seeks.
(8) Experience:
Mr. Davis was admitted to the South Carolina Bar in November 1975.
After his graduation from law school, Mr. Davis served as a law clerk to J. Woodrow Lewis, Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court, from 1975 to 1976. He was in private practice from 1976-1977 in the areas of real estate, domestic, probate, business, and tax law.
From 1977 until 1983, Mr. Davis was the Chief Staff Attorney for the South Carolina Supreme Court doing 70% Criminal, 20% Civil, and 10% Domestic work. In this position he supervised eight other attorneys. Since 1983, Mr. Davis has been the Clerk of Court for the South Carolina Supreme Court.
(9) Judicial Temperament:
The Commission believes that Mr. Davis' temperament would be excellent.
(10) Miscellaneous:
Mr. Davis is married to Rose McLeod Davis. He has three children: Clyde Norwood Davis, III (Civil Engineer at Duke Power Co., age 28); Preston Lee Davis (self-employed salesman, age 26); Joel Anthony Davis (University of SC, junior-Mechanical Engineering, age 21).
Mr. Davis reported that he was a member of the following bar associations and professional organizations:
(a) South Carolina Bar Association;
(b) Former member of Executive Committee of the National Conference of Appellate Court Clerks; and
(c) Former member of Executive Committee of the Committee on Appellate Staff Attorneys.
Mr. Davis provided that he was a member of the following civic, charitable, educational, social, or fraternal organizations:
(a) Grace Bible Alliance Church (Elder and Governing Board Member);
(b) Christian Prison Ministries, Inc. (Vice Chairman);
(c) Second Chance Ministries (Chairman).
•Mr. Davis stated, "I am regularly in Court; however, it is as Clerk to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, a position I have held for 15 years. My previous legal experience includes over six years as Chief Staff Attorney of the Supreme Court, one year as law clerk to former Chief Justice J. Woodrow Lewis, and one year in the general practice of law with Timothy Farr of Greenville, South Carolina.
In my position as Clerk of Court, I have maintained daily contact with the law. I have listened to hundreds of oral arguments, most of which focused on some alleged trial error, and have drafted numerous opinions and orders. For the last 15 years I have proof-read every opinion issued by the Court. I have been heavily involved in drafting various Rules of Court. These duties have given me a unique perspective on trial practice and have prepared me to handle the trial duties of a judge.
The Clerk of Court is the chief managerial officer for the Court, with responsibilities over Bar Admissions, and a 30,000 volume law library as well as the entire clerical operation. I have daily contact with other court and governmental officials, attorneys, litigants, members of the press and the general public. I have learned to deal politely, yet effectively, with a wide variety of people in all types of situations.
The Court has delegated to me the discretion to rule upon some procedural motions and the leeway to resolve procedural problems not covered directly by the rules of Appellate Practice. In performing all these duties I have developed strong people skills as well as a clear understanding of how a judge should conduct himself or herself.
As Chief Staff Attorney at the Supreme Court for seven years, I supervised the work of eight attorneys. Our work involved reviewing the trial court records, summarizing the facts, researching the issues and drafting a report to the Court on each case. Often I was called upon to defend both my work and the work of other staff attorneys in oral presentation to the Court.
As a result of reading literally hundreds of trial transcripts, I am familiar with not only the substantive law, but also the procedural and evidentiary aspects of a trial. I have been exposed to a broad range of cases including criminal, tort, contract, real estate, probate, family, tax and administrative law.
I have been in private practice, starting a law firm in Greenville with a law school classmate. Consequently, I do understand the time and financial demands of a law practice and the stress these demands place upon lawyers and their families.
I served several years as a military officer, two of which were as a Company Commander. This experience helped develop the strength of character to make the decisions necessary to get a job done correctly and in a timely manner.
There are other very important qualities of a good judge such as the ability to work with people, fairness, impartiality, good work habits, an even-tempered personality, and the ability to listen well and decide each case on its own merits. I submit that I have demonstrated these characteristics in my work at the Court.
I have had over 20 years working closely with the finest judges in South Carolina, listening, learning and gaining insight into the judicial system that few have had the privilege of doing. I believe my years of working as a lawyer for the South Carolina Supreme Court is equivalent to a varied private practice.
I believe that after reviewing the breadth of my work experience, you will find I am in a position of knowing and understanding the entire judicial system and that my unique work experience will be an asset to the bench."
The following persons were unanimously found legally qualified:
F. Lee Prickett, Jr. First Judicial Circuit Court, Seat 1
James F. Walsh, Jr. First Judicial Circuit Court, Seat 1
James C. Williams, Jr. First Judicial Circuit Court, Seat 1
John R. McCravy, III Eighth Judicial Circuit Court, Seat 1
John M. Rucker Eighth Judicial Circuit Court, Seat 1
Wyatt T. Saunders, Jr. Eighth Judicial Circuit Court, Seat 1
Steven H. John Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Seat 2
Paula H. Thomas Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Seat 2
Ralph J. Wilson Fifteenth Judicial Circuit Court, Seat 2
Ralph F. Cothran Master-in-Equity, Clarendon County
Clyde N. Davis, Jr. Master-in-Equity, Lexington County
Respectfully submitted:
/s/Rep. F.G. Delleney, Jr., Chm. /s/Senator Glenn F. McConnell, V-Chm.
/s/Senator Edward E. Saleeby /s/Senator Thomas L. Moore
/s/Rep. Ralph W. Canty /s/Rep. William Douglas Smith
/s/Dr. Harry M. Lightsey, Jr. /s/Judge Curtis G. Shaw
/s/Richard S. Fisher, Esquire /s/Mrs. Amy Johnson McLester
Rep. CATO, from the Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry, submitted a favorable report, with amendments, on:
S. 442 -- Senator Leatherman: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 12-45-90, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO ACCEPTABLE FORMS OF PAYMENT OF COUNTY TAXES, SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR PAYMENT BY CREDIT CARD, SUBJECT TO APPROVAL AND IMPOSITION OF A VOLUNTARY AND NONREFUNDABLE SURCHARGE BY THE COUNTY GOVERNING BODY.
Ordered for consideration tomorrow.
Rep. CATO, from the Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry, submitted a favorable report, with amendments, on:
S. 718 -- Senator O'Dell: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 40-55-55 SO AS TO PROHIBIT PRACTICING PSYCHOLOGY WITHOUT A LICENSE; TO AMEND SECTION 40-55-50, RELATING TO ACTS CONSTITUTING PRACTICING AS A PSYCHOLOGIST SO AS TO FURTHER SPECIFY WHAT ACTS CONSTITUTE SUCH PRACTICE; TO AMEND SECTION 40-55-80, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO PSYCHOLOGY LICENSE AND APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS SO AS TO REMOVE THE PROVISIONS THAT A PERSON MAY HAVE A DOCTOR'S DEGREE IN AN ALLIED FIELD RATHER THAN IN PSYCHOLOGY AND THAT A LICENSE MAY BE AWARDED WITHOUT EXAMINATION; TO AMEND SECTION 40-55-90, RELATING TO EXEMPTIONS FROM PSYCHOLOGY LICENSURE SO AS TO FURTHER SPECIFY AND CLARIFY THESE EXEMPTIONS; AND TO AMEND SECTION 40-55-170, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE PSYCHOLOGY PRACTICE ACT SO AS TO CLARIFY THAT IT IS UNLAWFUL FOR A PERSON TO PRACTICE OR OFFER TO PRACTICE PSYCHOLOGY IN VIOLATION OF CHAPTER 55, TITLE 40, TO INCREASE PENALTIES, AND TO REQUIRE THE BOARD TO REFER POSSIBLE VIOLATIONS TO THE SOLICITOR.
Ordered for consideration tomorrow.
Rep. CATO, from the Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry, submitted a favorable report, on:
S. 1170 -- Banking and Insurance Committee: A BILL TO AMEND CHAPTER 19, TITLE 38, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO DOMESTIC MUTUAL INSURERS, BY ADDING ARTICLE 13 SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR THE REORGANIZATION OF A DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN MUTUAL INSURER AS A DOMESTIC MUTUAL INSURANCE HOLDING COMPANY SYSTEM.
Ordered for consideration tomorrow.
Rep. CATO, from the Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry, submitted a favorable report, on:
S. 1212 -- Senators Saleeby and McConnell: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 38-9-200, AS AMENDED, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO CAPITAL, SURPLUS, RESERVES, AND OTHER FINANCIAL MATTERS REGARDING INSURANCE COMPANIES, REINSURANCE CREDITS, AND LIABILITY REDUCTIONS, SO AS TO REVAMP THE SECTION BY DELETING CERTAIN PROVISIONS AND LANGUAGE AND BY ADDING PROVISIONS THAT PROVIDE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT THE ASSUMING INSURER SHALL SUBMIT TO EXAMINATION OF ITS BOOKS AND RECORDS BY THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND BEAR THE EXPENSE OF EXAMINATION, THAT CREDIT FOR REINSURANCE SHALL NOT BE GRANTED UNLESS THE FORM OF THE TRUST AND ANY AMENDMENTS TO THE TRUST HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER OF THE STATE WHERE THE TRUST IS DOMICILED OR THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER OF ANOTHER STATE WHO, PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF THE TRUST AGREEMENT, HAS ACCEPTED PRINCIPAL REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF THE TRUST, THAT THE FORM OF THE TRUST AND ANY TRUST AMENDMENTS MUST BE FILED WITH THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER OF EVERY STATE IN WHICH CEDING INSURER BENEFICIARIES OF THE TRUST ARE DOMICILED, THAT THE TRUST FUND FOR A SINGLE ASSUMING INSURER SHALL CONSIST OF FUNDS IN TRUST IN AN AMOUNT NOT LESS THAN THE ASSUMING INSURER'S LIABILITIES ATTRIBUTABLE TO REINSURANCE CEDED BY UNITED STATES CEDING INSURERS, AND THAT THE ASSUMING INSURER SHALL MAINTAIN A TRUSTEED SURPLUS OF NOT LESS THAN TWENTY MILLION DOLLARS.
Ordered for consideration tomorrow.
Rep. CATO, from the Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry, submitted a favorable report, on:
S. 1215 -- Senators Saleeby and McConnell: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 38-27-510, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO REHABILITATION AND LIQUIDATION OF INSURERS, FORMAL PROCEEDINGS, AND LIABILITY OF THE REINSURER, SO AS TO PROVIDE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT THE ORIGINAL INSURED OR POLICYHOLDER SHALL NOT HAVE ANY RIGHTS AGAINST THE REINSURER WHICH ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY SET FORTH IN THE REINSURANCE CONTRACT OR OTHER AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REINSURER AND THE ORIGINAL INSURED OR POLICYHOLDER.
Ordered for consideration tomorrow.
Rep. HARRISON, from the Committee on Judiciary, submitted a favorable report, on:
S. 757 -- Senators Ravenel and Mescher: A BILL TO AMEND CHAPTER 11, TITLE 6, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO SPECIAL PURPOSE DISTRICTS, BY ADDING SECTION 6-11-65, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT ELECTORS OF A SPECIAL PURPOSE DISTRICT MAY PETITION FOR A REFERENDUM ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE SPECIAL PURPOSE DISTRICT SHOULD BE ELECTED, BY ADDING SECTION 6-11-66 TO PROVIDE THAT IN THOSE DISTRICTS WHICH ADOPT THE REFERENDUM THE COMMISSIONERS WILL BE ELECTED ON AN AT-LARGE BASIS IN A NON-PARTISAN ELECTION AT THE GENERAL ELECTION; AND TO AMEND SECTION 6-11-70 OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO THE ELECTION OF BOARD MEMBERS, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY TO ELECTIONS HELD PURSUANT TO THIS ACT.
Ordered for consideration tomorrow.
Rep. HARRISON, from the Committee on Judiciary, submitted a favorable report, on:
S. 758 -- Senator Fair: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 16-3-1090 SO AS TO CREATE THE FELONY CRIME OF ASSISTING SUICIDE, TO PROVIDE PENALTIES, TO PROVIDE FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF, TO PROVIDE A CIVIL CAUSE OF ACTION, TO AUTHORIZE PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES, AND TO PROVIDE FOR PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE.
Ordered for consideration tomorrow.
Rep. HARRISON, from the Committee on Judiciary, submitted a favorable report, with amendments, on:
H. 4977 -- Rep. McLeod: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 56-5-6240, AS AMENDED, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO THE FORFEITURE, CONFISCATION, AND DISPOSITION OF VEHICLES SEIZED FROM A PERSON CONVICTED OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR OR DRUGS, OR WHILE HIS LICENSE IS SUSPENDED, SO AS TO REVISE THE PROCEDURE TO DISPOSE OF A FORFEITED VEHICLE IF THE CONVICTED PERSON FAILS TO FILE AN APPEAL WITHIN TEN DAYS OF HIS CONVICTION.
Ordered for consideration tomorrow.
Rep. J. BROWN, from the Committee on Medical, Military, Public and Municipal Affairs, submitted a favorable report, on:
S. 936 -- Senators J. Verne Smith and Drummond: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 40-19-125, SO AS TO AUTHORIZE STUDENT PERMITS ALLOWING STUDENTS ENROLLED IN AN ACCREDITED MORTUARY SCIENCE COLLEGE IN SOUTH CAROLINA TO ENGAGE IN THE PRACTICE OF FUNERAL SERVICE.
Ordered for consideration tomorrow.
Rep. J. BROWN, from the Committee on Medical, Military, Public and Municipal Affairs, submitted a favorable report, on:
S. 981 -- Senator Giese: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 40-35-230, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO THE LICENSURE OF COMMUNITY RESIDENTIAL CARE FACILITY ADMINISTRATORS, SO AS TO REQUIRE AN ASSOCIATE DEGREE WITH ONE YEAR OF ON-SITE SUPERVISED EXPERIENCE RATHER THAN A HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION.
Ordered for consideration tomorrow.
Rep. J. BROWN, from the Committee on Medical, Military, Public and Municipal Affairs, submitted a favorable report, with amendments, on:
H. 5003 -- Rep. Miller: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 6-7-130, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO THE MEMBERSHIP OF A REGIONAL COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENT, SO AS TO REQUIRE MEMBERSHIP ON THE POLICYMAKING BODY OF THE COUNCIL OF A RESIDENT MEMBER OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY FROM EACH COUNTY COMPRISING THE COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS WHEN THE AGREEMENT CREATING THE COUNCIL PROVIDES FOR MEMBERSHIP OF ANY MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THAT POLICYMAKING BODY.
Ordered for consideration tomorrow.
Rep. J. BROWN, from the Committee on Medical, Military, Public and Municipal Affairs, submitted a favorable report, on:
H. 4876 -- Rep. Cromer: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 32-8-320, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO PERSONS WHO MAY AUTHORIZE CREMATION OF A DECEDENT, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT A PERSON DESIGNATED AS AGENT FOR THIS PURPOSE BY THE DECEDENT IN A WILL OR OTHER VERIFIED AND ATTESTED DOCUMENT HAS THE FIRST PRIORITY TO AUTHORIZE CREMATION OF A DECEDENT.
Ordered for consideration tomorrow.
Rep. QUINN, from the Committee on Invitations and Memorial Resolutions, submitted a favorable report, on:
S. 993 -- Senators J. Verne Smith, Passailaigue, Alexander, Anderson, Branton, Bryan, Cork, Courson, Courtney, Drummond, Elliott, Fair, Ford, Giese, Glover, Gregory, Grooms, Hayes, Holland, Hutto, Jackson, Land, Lander, Leatherman, Leventis, Martin, Matthews, McConnell, McGill, Mescher, Moore, O'Dell, Patterson, Peeler, Rankin, Ravenel, Reese, Russell, Ryberg, Saleeby, Setzler, Short, Thomas, Waldrep, Washington and Wilson: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO MEMORIALIZE THE COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL TO REINSTATE "SHOELESS JOE" JACKSON AS A MEMBER IN GOOD STANDING IN PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL.
Ordered for consideration tomorrow.
The following was introduced:
H. 5163 -- Rep. Delleney: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO EXTEND THE SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA TO THE CHIEF OF THE RICHBURG VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, BARNETTE (BARNEY) NICHOLS, OF CHESTER COUNTY UPON RECEIVING THE JAMES B. MURPHY SOUTH CAROLINA FIREFIGHTER OF THE YEAR AWARD, AN HONOR PRESENTED ANNUALLY BY THE SOUTH CAROLINA FIREMEN'S ASSOCIATION.
The Concurrent Resolution was agreed to and ordered sent to the Senate.
The following was introduced:
H. 5164 -- Reps. Young and Woodrum: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO RECOGNIZE AND CONGRATULATE FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF SUMTER UPON THE CELEBRATION OF ITS ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY.
The Concurrent Resolution was agreed to and ordered sent to the Senate.
The following Bill and Joint Resolutions were introduced, read the first time, and referred to appropriate committees:
H. 5165 -- Rep. Rhoad: A JOINT RESOLUTION TO REQUIRE A REFERENDUM TO BE CONDUCTED AT THE TIME OF THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1998, AT WHICH TIME THE QUALIFIED ELECTORS OF BAMBERG COUNTY SHALL DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE BAMBERG COUNTY HOSPITAL REMAINS OPEN AND TO PROVIDE THAT IF A MAJORITY OF THE ELECTORS VOTING IN THE REFERENDUM VOTE "YES", THE HOSPITAL MAY NOT BE CLOSED FOR THREE YEARS.
On motion of Rep. RHOAD, with unanimous consent, the Joint Resolution was ordered placed on the Calendar without reference.
H. 5166 -- Judiciary Committee: A JOINT RESOLUTION TO APPROVE REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, RELATING TO CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES, DESIGNATED AS REGULATION DOCUMENT NUMBER 2269, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1, CHAPTER 23, TITLE 1 OF THE 1976 CODE.
Without reference.
S. 1098 -- Senator Anderson: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 20-7-2725(A)(4), CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO DAY CARE CENTER EMPLOYMENT SO AS TO EXEMPT CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS FROM THE PROHIBITION AGAINST BEING EMPLOYED AS DAY CARE PROVIDERS.
Referred to Committee on Judiciary.
The following was introduced:
H. 5167 -- Reps. Harvin and Young: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO CONGRATULATE MISS LORI M. GILSTRAP OF CLARENDON COUNTY ON BEING SELECTED MISS SOUTH CAROLINA NATIONAL TEENAGER AND TO WISH HER MUCH SUCCESS AS SHE COMPETES FOR THE TITLE OF AMERICA'S NATIONAL TEENAGER.
The Concurrent Resolution was agreed to and ordered sent to the Senate.
The roll call of the House of Representatives was taken resulting as follows.
Allison Altman Bailey Barfield Barrett Battle Bauer Baxley Beck Bowers Breeland Brown, G. Brown, J. Brown, T. Campsen Carnell Cato Cave Chellis Clyburn Cobb-Hunter Cooper Cotty Cromer Dantzler Davenport Delleney Edge Emory Fleming Gamble Gourdine Govan Hamilton Harris Harrison Harvin Haskins Hawkins Hines, J. Hines, M. Hinson Howard Jennings Jordan Keegan Kelley Kennedy Kinon Kirsh Klauber Knotts Koon Lanford Law Leach Lee Limehouse Littlejohn Lloyd Loftis Mack Maddox Martin Mason McAbee McCraw McGee McKay McLeod McMaster Meacham Miller Moody-Lawrence Neilson Pinckney Rhoad Rice Riser Robinson Rodgers Sandifer Scott Seithel Sharpe Sheheen Simrill Smith, D. Smith, R. Spearman Stille Stoddard Stuart Townsend Tripp Trotter Vaughn Walker Webb Whatley Whipper Wilder Wilkins Witherspoon Woodrum Young
I came in after the roll call and was present for the Session on Wednesday, May 20.
Robert W. Harrell, Jr. Harry R. Askins Victoria T. Mullen Fletcher Nathaniel Smith, Jr. Michael E. Easterday James Emerson Smith, Jr. Richard M. Quinn, Jr. Henry E. Brown, Jr. William D. Boan Alma W. Byrd Willie B. McMahand John G. Felder Annette Young-Brickell Timothy C. Wilkes Ralph W. Canty Joseph H. Neal
LEAVES OF ABSENCE
The SPEAKER granted Rep. PHILLIPS a leave of absence for the day due to illness.
The SPEAKER granted Rep. INABINETT a leave of absence for the day.
The SPEAKER granted Rep. BYRD a temporary leave of absence to attend a funeral.
Rep. GOVAN signed a statement with the Clerk that he came in after the roll call of the House and was present for the Session on Tuesday, May 19.
Announcement was made that Dr. Thomas Gibbons of Columbia is the Doctor of the Day for the General Assembly.
Rep. T. BROWN presented to the House the Hemingway High School Tigers Basketball Team, AA State Basketball Champions, their coaches and other school officials.
Rep. COTTY and the Kershaw County Delegation presented to the House the Lugoff-Elgin High School "Demons" Wrestling Team, 1998 Class AAA State Champions, their coaches and other school officials.
The following Bills and Joint Resolutions were taken up, read the third time, and ordered sent to the Senate.
H. 5143 -- Rep. Fleming: A BILL TO ENACT THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF UNION COUNTY SCHOOL BOND-PROPERTY TAX RELIEF ACT SO AS TO AUTHORIZE THE IMPLEMENTATION FOLLOWING REFERENDUM APPROVAL OF A SALES AND USE TAX IN UNION COUNTY NOT TO EXCEED TWO PERCENT FOR DEBT SERVICE ON GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS ISSUED FOR SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION AND RENOVATION OR FOR DIRECT PAYMENTS FOR SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION AND RENOVATION; AND TO AMEND ACT 79 OF 1955, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF UNION COUNTY, SO AS TO DELETE PROVISIONS PERTAINING TO CERTAIN PROCEDURAL MATTERS OF THE BOARD AND COMPENSATION OF BOARD MEMBERS.
H. 5150 -- Rep. Clyburn: A JOINT RESOLUTION TO PROVIDE THAT THE SCHOOL DAY OF MAY 8, 1998, MISSED BY THE STUDENTS OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF EDGEFIELD COUNTY WHEN THE SCHOOLS OF THE DISTRICT WERE CLOSED DUE TO SEVERE STORMS AND TORNADOES OCCURRING THE NIGHT OF MAY 7, IS EXEMPTED FROM THE MAKE-UP REQUIREMENT OF THE DEFINED MINIMUM PLAN THAT SCHOOL DAYS MISSED DUE TO EXTREME WEATHER OR OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES BE MADE UP.
H. 4408 -- Reps. Meacham, Neilson, Sandifer, Bailey, Govan, Woodrum, McKay, Kirsh, Martin, Maddox, Canty, Mullen, Young-Brickell, Byrd, Inabinett, Neal, McGee, D. Smith, Lanford and Rice: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 39-5-25 SO AS TO MAKE IT AN UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACT OR PRACTICE IN THE CONDUCT OF TRADE OR COMMERCE FOR A PERSON WHO MAILS CERTAIN MERCHANDISE CATALOGUES OR CERTAIN BROCHURES, LEAFLETS, FLYERS, OR OTHER ITEMS OF MAIL TO A RECIPIENT TO FAIL TO HONOR THE RECIPIENT'S REQUEST THAT THE MAILER CEASE SENDING SUCH CATALOGUES, BROCHURES, LEAFLETS, FLYERS, OR OTHER ITEMS OF MAIL AND TO PROVIDE FOR RELATED MATTERS.
H. 5141 -- Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs Committee: A JOINT RESOLUTION TO APPROVE REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, RELATING TO NATURAL PUBLIC SWIMMING AREAS, DESIGNATED AS REGULATION DOCUMENT NUMBER 2261, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1, CHAPTER 23, TITLE 1 OF THE 1976 CODE.
The following Bills were read the third time, passed and, having received three readings in both Houses, it was ordered that the title of each be changed to that of an Act, and that they be enrolled for ratification.
S. 1013 -- Senator Lander: A BILL TO AMEND TITLE 46, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING CHAPTER 50 SO AS TO ENACT THE SOUTHERN INTERSTATE DAIRY COMPACT ACT OF 1997, TO PROVIDE THAT THE GOVERNOR MAY EXECUTE AN INTERSTATE DAIRY COMPACT WITH THE DESIGNATED COMPACT STATES SO AS TO ADOPT THE SOUTHERN INTERSTATE DAIRY COMPACT, TO PROVIDE WHEN THE COMPACT BECOMES OPERATIVE AND EFFECTIVE, AND THAT WHEN THE COMPACT BECOMES EFFECTIVE, IT IS THE POLICY OF THIS STATE TO PERFORM AND CARRY OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMPACT, TO PROVIDE THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE IS THE COMPACT ADMINISTRATOR FOR THIS STATE, TO PROVIDE FOR THE STATE'S DELEGATION TO THE SOUTHERN INTERSTATE DAIRY COMPACT COMMISSION, AND FOR MEMBERSHIP, APPOINTMENTS, TERMS, AND FILLING OF VACANCIES ON THE DELEGATION, TO PROVIDE FOR PER DIEM AND REIMBURSEMENT OF TRAVEL EXPENSES FOR MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION, TO PROVIDE FOR FUNDING, FACILITIES, ASSISTANCE, AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND DATA FROM OTHER STATE OFFICERS, AGENCIES, AND EMPLOYEES, AND FROM PRIVATE PERSONS BY LAWFUL MEANS, TO ASSIST THE DELEGATION IN CARRYING OUT THE PURPOSES OF THE COMPACT, TO PROVIDE FOR THE ADOPTION OF RULES AND REGULATIONS AS NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THE COMPACT AND THIS CHAPTER, INCLUDING PROVISIONS FOR THE REVOCATION OR FORFEITURE OF LICENSES, AND TO PROVIDE CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMPACT, RELATED RULES AND REGULATIONS, OR THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CHAPTER.
S. 1167 -- Senator Holland: A BILL TO AMEND TITLE 26, CODE OF THE LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING CHAPTER 5, SO AS TO ENACT THE "SOUTH CAROLINA
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE ACT" WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE LEGAL STATUS OF ELECTRONIC RECORDS AND ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES, AND AUTHORIZES THE BUDGET AND CONTROL BOARD AND SECRETARY OF STATE TO PROMULGATE REGULATIONS RELATED TO ELECTRONIC COMMERCE.
The following Bill was taken up.
S. 1110 -- Senators McConnell and Saleeby: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 38-3-240, AS AMENDED, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND THE CONVERSION OF CERTAIN LICENSES TO A BIENNIAL FEE-COLLECTION PERIOD, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT AN AGENT TRANSACTING THE BUSINESS OF INSURANCE SHALL PAY A LICENSE FEE FOR TWO YEARS TO THE DEPARTMENT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER SEPTEMBER 1, 1992, AND EVERY TWO YEARS AFTER THAT TIME WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER SEPTEMBER FIRST, RATHER THAN JULY FIRST, EVERY EVEN-NUMBERED YEAR; TO AMEND SECTION 38-9-40, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO THE INSURANCE LAW, CAPITAL, SURPLUS, RESERVES, AND OTHER FINANCIAL MATTERS, AND THE DUTY OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE TO NOTIFY INSURERS OF CERTAIN REQUIRED AMOUNTS, SO AS TO REQUIRE THAT A SCHEDULE OF THE REQUIRED AMOUNTS MUST BE MAINTAINED BY EACH INSURER, AND TO DELETE THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE SCHEDULE BE PUBLISHED IN ALL SUCCEEDING ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DEPARTMENT THAT ARE SUBMITTED TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY THROUGH THE GOVERNOR; TO AMEND SECTION 38-45-90, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO INSURANCE BROKERS AND SURPLUS LINES INSURANCE, THE DUTIES OF BROKERS WHEN PLACING BUSINESS WITH NONADMITTED INSURERS, AND CERTAIN STATEMENTS AND REPORTS, SO AS TO, AMONG OTHER THINGS, DELETE THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE LIST ALL ELIGIBLE SURPLUS LINES INSURERS IN ITS ANNUAL REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE WHO SHALL SUBMIT THIS REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY; AND TO REPEAL SECTIONS 38-3-70, RELATING TO CERTAIN ANNUAL REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, AND 38-79-10, RELATING TO THE REQUIREMENT THAT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CLAIMS BE FILED BY INSURERS WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE.
The Labor, Commerce and Industry Committee proposed the following Amendment No. 1 (Doc Name P:\AMEND\BBM\9907MM.98), which was adopted.
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking all after the enacting words and inserting:
/SECTION 1. Section 38-3-240(A)(6) of the 1976 Code, as amended by Section 532 of Act 181 of 1993, is further amended to read:
"(6) An agent transacting the business of insurance in this State shall pay a license fee for two years to the department within thirty days after September 1, 1992, and every two years after that time within thirty days after July September 1st every even-numbered year."
SECTION 2. Section 38-9-40 of the 1976 Code, as amended by Section 535 of Act 181 of 1993, is further amended to read:
"Section 38-9-40. The director or his designee shall notify each licensed insurer that does not comply with Section 38-9-10 or 38-9-20 of the amounts of capital and surplus if a stock insurer, or the amount of surplus if a mutual insurer, the insurer shall maintain in order to continue to remain licensed in this State. A schedule of the amounts required to must be maintained by each insurer so notified must be published in all succeeding annual reports of the Insurance department that are submitted to the General Assembly through the Governor, as required by Section 38-3-70. This schedule must be revised annually as to those insurers whose minimum capital and surplus requirements are increased periodically as required by Section 38-9-30."
SECTION 3. Section 38-39-90 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"Section 38-39-90. (a) When a premium service agreement contains a power of attorney enabling the company to cancel any insurance contract listed in the agreement, the insurance contract may not be canceled by the premium service company unless the cancellation is effectuated in accordance with this section.
(b) The premium service company shall deliver the insured at least ten days' written notice of its intent to cancel the insurance contract unless the default is cured within the ten-day period.
(c) Not less than five days after the expiration of the notice, the premium service company may thereafter request in the name of the insured cancellation of the insurance contract by delivering to the insurer a notice of cancellation. The insurance contract must be canceled as if the notice of cancellation had been submitted by the insured himself, but without requiring the return of the insurance contract. The premium service company shall also deliver a notice of cancellation to the insured at his last address as set forth in its records by the date the notice of cancellation is delivered to the insurer. It is sufficient to give notice either by delivering it to the person or by depositing it in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to the last address of the person. Notice delivered in accordance with the provisions of this statute shall be sufficient proof of delivery.
(d) All statutory, regulatory, and contractual restrictions providing that the insurance contract may not be canceled unless notice is given to a governmental agency, mortgagee, or other third party apply where cancellation is effected under this section. The insurer shall give the prescribed notice in behalf of itself or the insured to any governmental agency, mortgagee, or other third party by the second business day after the day it receives the notice of cancellation from the premium service company and shall determine the effective date of cancellation taking into consideration the number of days' notice required to complete the cancellation.
(e) Whenever an insurance contract is canceled, the insurer shall return whatever gross unearned premiums are due under the insurance contract to the premium service company which financed the premium for the account of the insured.
(f) If the crediting of return premiums to the account of the insured results in a surplus over the amount due from the insured, the premium service company shall hold the surplus in a fiduciary capacity and promptly refund the excess to the insured. No refund is required if it amounts to less than three dollars.
(g) Cancellations of insurance contracts by premium service companies must be effected exclusively by the forms, method, and timing set forth in this chapter."
SECTION 4. Section 38-45-90 of the 1976 Code, as amended by Section 672 of Act 181 of 1993, is further amended to read:
"Section 38-45-90. At the request of a licensed resident broker, the director or his designee may approve certain nonadmitted insurers as eligible surplus lines insurers to write business on risks located in this State that one or more insurers licensed in this State to write that line of business in this State have declined to write. The director or his designee may require the broker to submit, on behalf of the insurer, documents necessary to satisfy him that the insurer is licensed in its home state, that it is solvent, and that its operation is not hazardous to the policyholders. The director or his designee may require the broker or the insurer to file additional documents at any given time to maintain the insurer's status as an eligible surplus lines insurer. The director or his designee may withdraw his approval at any time the insurer fails to meet any of the requirements. The department shall list all eligible surplus lines insurers in its annual report to the Director of the Department of Insurance who shall submit this report to the General Assembly. While the insurer maintains its status as an eligible surplus lines insurer, a duly licensed resident broker may, under the terms of this chapter, place business with the insurer. An insurance broker shall exercise due care in the placing of insurance. Each broker transacting business in the State during a calendar year shall annually file with the department within thirty days after December thirty-first a detailed report of this business. The report must be in the form the director or his designee prescribes. The broker's books, papers, and accounts must at all times be open to the inspection of the director or his appointee designee."
SECTION 5. Section 38-61-20 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 181 of 1993, is further amended by adding:
"(D) Nothing in this chapter precludes the issuance of a life insurance contract that includes an optional accident, health, or accident and health insurance rider. However, the optional accident, health, or accident and health insurance rider must be filed with and approved by the director pursuant to Section 38-71-310, 38-71-720, or 38-71-740 as appropriate and comply with all applicable sections of Chapter 71 of this title and, in addition, in the case of long term care insurance, Chapter 72 of this title."
SECTION 6. Section 38-71-310 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 181 of 1993, is amended by adding:
"(F) Nothing in this chapter precludes the issuance of an individual accident, health, or accident and health insurance policy that includes an optional life insurance rider. However, the optional life insurance rider must be filed with and approved by the director pursuant to Section 38-61-20 and comply with all applicable sections of Chapter 63 and, in addition, in the case of a life insurance rider with accelerated long term care benefits, Chapter 72 of this title."
SECTION 7. Section 38-71-720 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 181 of 1993, is further amended to read:
"Section 38-71-720. (A) No A policy or contract of group accident, group health, or group accident and health insurance may not be issued or delivered in this State, nor may any application, endorsement, or rider which becomes a part of the policy be used, until a copy of the form thereof has been filed with and approved by the director or his designee except as exempted by regulation of the department as permitted by Section 38-61-20. The director or his designee may disapprove the form if the form:
(1) does not meet the requirements of law,;
(2) contains any provisions which are unfair, deceptive, ambiguous, misleading, or unfairly discriminatory,; or
(3) is going to be solicited by means of advertising, communication, or dissemination of information which is deceptive or misleading.
However, if no action has been taken to approve or disapprove a policy, contract, certificate, application, endorsement, or rider after the documents have been filed for ninety days, they may be issued and delivered until or unless subsequently disapproved by the director or his designee. This time period may be extended thirty days if the director or his designee gives written notice to the filer that he needs additional time to review the filing. The director or his designee shall, as soon as is practicable, shall notify in writing the insurer which has filed the form of his approval or disapproval. In the event of disapproval If disapproved, the notice must contain the reasons for disapproval and the insurer is entitled to a public hearing thereon on it. At any time after having given written approval, thereof the director or his designee may, after a public hearing of which at least thirty days' written notice has been given, may withdraw approval if he finds that the forms:
(1) do not meet the requirements of law,;
(2) contain any provisions which are unfair, deceptive, ambiguous, misleading, or unfairly discriminatory,; or
(3) are being solicited by means of advertising, communication, or dissemination of information which is deceptive or misleading.
The withdrawal of approval must be effected by written notice to the insurer and the insurer is entitled to a public hearing thereon on it. Any action or decision of the director or his designee to withdraw approval may be appealed to the Administrative Law Judge Division in accordance with Section 38-3-210.
(B) Nothing in this chapter precludes the issuance of a policy or contract of group accident, group health, or group accident and health insurance that includes an optional life insurance rider. However, the optional life insurance rider must be filed with and approved by the director pursuant to Section 38-61-20 and comply with all applicable sections of Chapter 65 and, in addition, in the case of a life insurance rider with accelerated long term care benefits, Chapter 72 of this title."
SECTION 8. Section 38-81-370 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"Section 38-81-370. The association is governed by a board of seven directors, one of whom is appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to represent the general public and three of whom are members of the South Carolina Bar appointed by the Governor. Three directors are elected by cumulative voting by members of the association, whose votes in the election must be weighed in accordance with each member's net direct premiums written during the preceding calendar year. The approved plan of operation of the association may make provision for combining insurers under common ownership or management into groups or voting, assessment, and all other purposes and may provide that not more than one of the officers or employees of such a group may serve as a director at any one time. The insurer representatives of the board of directors must be elected at a meeting of the members or their authorized representatives, which must be held at a time and place designated by the board of directors. The board shall elect a chairman and other necessary officers."
SECTION 9. Section 38-89-160 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"Section 38-89-160. The association is governed by a board of seven directors, one of whom is appointed by the Governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, to represent the general public and three of whom are day care owners or operators appointed by the Governor. Three directors are elected by cumulative voting by members of the association, whose votes in the election must be weighed in accordance with each member's net direct premiums written during the preceding calendar year. The approved plan of operation of the association may make provision for combining insurers under common ownership or management into groups for voting, assessment, and all other purposes and may provide that not more than one of the officers or employees of the group may serve as a director at any one time. The insurer representatives of the board of directors must be elected at a meeting of the members or their authorized representatives, which must be held at a time and place designated by the board of directors. The board shall elect a chairman and other necessary officers."
SECTION 10. The Department of Insurance may promulgate regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this act.
SECTION 11. Sections 38-3-70, 38-79-10, and 38-81-10 of the 1976 Code are repealed.
SECTION 12. This act takes effect upon approval by the Governor./
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. MASON explained the amendment.
The amendment was then adopted.
The Bill, as amended, was read the second time and ordered to third reading.
The following Bill was taken up.
S. 994 -- Senators Short, Jackson and Gregory: A BILL TO AMEND TITLE 34, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO BANKING, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY, BY ADDING CHAPTER 39 SO AS TO ENACT THE SOUTH CAROLINA DEFERRED PRESENTMENT SERVICES ACT, PROVIDING FOR LICENSING AND REGULATION OF PERSONS OFFERING DEFERRED PRESENTMENT SERVICES.
Rep. WHATLEY moved to adjourn debate upon the Bill until Thursday, May 21.
Rep. CATO moved to table the motion, which was agreed to.
The Labor, Commerce and Industry Committee proposed the following Amendment No. 1 (Doc Name P:\AMEND\DKA\4994MM.98), which was adopted.
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking all after the enacting words and inserting:
/ SECTION 1. Title 34 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
Section 34-39-110. This chapter may be cited as the 'South Carolina Deferred Presentment Services Act'.
Section 34-39-120. As used in this chapter, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the term:
(1) 'Board' means the State Board of Financial Institutions.
(2) 'Check' means a check signed by the maker and made payable to a person licensed pursuant to this chapter. The name of the maker must be preprinted on the face of the check. 'Counter checks' and checks without the name of the maker preprinted on the face of the check may not be accepted by a licensee.
(3) 'Deferred presentment services' means a transaction pursuant to a written agreement involving the following combination of activities in exchange for a fee:
(a) accepting a check dated on the date it was written; and
(b) holding the check for a period of time before presentment for payment or deposit.
(4) 'Licensee' means a person licensed to provide deferred presentment services pursuant to this chapter.
(5) 'Person' means an individual, group of individuals, partnership, association, corporation, or other business unit or legal entity.
(6) 'Location' means the entire space in which deferred presentment services are provided. The space must be completely separated from any space where goods or services are sold or leased. The location must be separately staffed and must not have a common entrance with any other business not permitted by this chapter.
Section 34-39-130. (A) A person may not engage in the business of deferred presentment services without first obtaining a license pursuant to this chapter. A separate license is required for each location from which the business is conducted. The licensee shall post its license to engage in the business of deferred presentment services at each location licensed pursuant to this chapter.
(B) A person engaged in the business of deferred presentment services on the effective date of this chapter may continue to engage in the business without a license until the board has acted upon the application for a license, but the application must be filed within sixty days after the effective date of this chapter.
Section 34-39-140. This chapter does not apply to:
(1) a bank, savings institution, credit union, or farm credit system organized under the laws of the United States or any state; and
(2) a person principally engaged in the bona fide retail sale of goods or services who, either as an incident to or independently of a retail sale or service and not holding itself out to be a deferred presentment service, from time to time cashes checks, drafts, or money orders without a fee or other consideration.
Section 34-39-150. (A) An application for licensure pursuant to this chapter must be in writing, under oath, and on a form prescribed by the board. The application must set forth all of the following:
(1) the legal name and residence and business addresses of the applicant and, if the applicant is a partnership, association, or corporation, of every member, officer, managing employee, and director of it;
(2) the location of the registered office of the applicant;
(3) the registered agent of the applicant if the applicant is required by other law to have a registered agent;
(4) the addresses of the locations to be licensed; and
(5) other information concerning the financial responsibility, background experience, and activities, such as other partnerships, associations, and corporations located at or adjacent to the licensed location, of the applicant and its members, officers, managing employees, and directors as the board requires.
(B) Upon receipt of an application in the form prescribed by the board, accompanied by the required fee, the board shall investigate whether the qualifications for licensure are satisfied. If the board finds that the qualifications are satisfied, it shall issue to the applicant a license to engage in the deferred presentment services business. If the board fails to issue a license, it shall notify the applicant of the denial and the reasons for it. The provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act apply to the appeal of the denial of a license.
(C) The application must be accompanied by payment of an application fee of two hundred fifty dollars and an investigation fee of five hundred dollars. These fees are not refundable or abatable. If the license is granted, however, payment of the application fee satisfies the fee requirement for the first license year or its remainder.
(D) A license expires annually and may be renewed upon payment of a license fee of two hundred fifty dollars. The annual license renewal fee for an applicant with more than one location is two hundred fifty dollars for the first location and fifty dollars for each additional location.
Section 34-39-160. To qualify for a license issued pursuant to this chapter, an applicant shall have:
(1) a minimum net worth, determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, of at least twenty-five thousand dollars available for the operation of each location; and
(2) the financial responsibility, character, experience, and general fitness so as to command the confidence of the public and to warrant belief that the business is operated lawfully, honestly, fairly, and efficiently.
Section 34-39-170. (A) A licensee may not advance monies on the security of a check unless the account on which the presented check is drawn is a legitimate, open, and active account.
(B) A licensee, in every location conducting business under a license issued pursuant to this chapter, conspicuously shall post and at all times display a notice stating the fee charged for deferred presentment services. A licensee shall file with the board a statement of the fees charged at every location licensed for deferred presentment services.
(C) A licensee shall endorse in the name of the licensee every check, draft, or money order presented by the licensee for payment or deposit.
Section 34-39-180. (A) A licensee may defer the presentment or deposit of a check for up to thirty-one days pursuant to the provisions of this section.
(B) The face amount of a check taken for deferred presentment or deposit may not exceed three hundred dollars, exclusive of the fees allowed in Section 34-39-180(E).
(C) Each check must be documented by a written agreement signed by both the customer and the licensee. The written agreement must contain the name or trade name of the licensee, the transaction date, the amount of the check, and a statement of the total amount of fees charged, expressed both as a dollar amount and as an effective annual percentage rate (APR). The written agreement must authorize expressly the licensee to defer presentment or deposit of the check until a specific date, not later than thirty-one days from the date the check is accepted by the licensee.
(D) The board shall require each licensee to issue a standardized consumer notification and disclosure form in compliance with state and federal truth-in-lending laws before entering into a deferred presentment agreement.
(E) A licensee shall not charge, directly or indirectly, a fee or other consideration in excess of fifteen percent of the face amount of the check for accepting a check for deferred presentment or deposit. The fee or other consideration authorized by this subsection may be imposed only once for each written agreement. Records must be kept by each licensee with sufficient detail to ensure that the fee or other consideration authorized by this subsection may be imposed only once for each written agreement.
(F) A check accepted for deferred presentment or deposit pursuant to this chapter may not be repaid from the proceeds of another check accepted for deferred presentment or deposit by the same licensee or an affiliate of the licensee. A licensee shall not renew or otherwise extend presentment of a check or withhold the check from deposit, for old or new consideration, for a period beyond the time set forth in the written agreement with the customer.
(G) If a check is returned to the licensee from a payer financial institution due to insufficient funds, closed account, or stop payment order, the licensee may pursue all legally available civil means to collect the check including, but not limited to, the imposition of a returned check charge as provided in Section 34-11-70(a), except that the service charge imposed by the licensee shall not exceed the lesser of ten dollars or the fee imposed by the financial institution on the licensee for the returned check. An individual who issues a personal check to a licensee under a deferred presentment agreement is not subject to criminal penalty.
Section 34-39-190. (A) A person subject to the provisions of this chapter shall maintain in its offices books, accounts, and records, as the board may reasonably require and establish by regulation. The books, accounts, and records must be kept with sufficient detail to ensure that the provisions of Section 34-39-180(E) are met. The books, accounts, and records must be maintained separately from other business in which the person is engaged and must be retained for at least three years.
(B) The board may examine the books, accounts, and records to determine compliance with this chapter and with the regulations adopted pursuant to it. The licensee examined pursuant to this section must pay the cost of the examination to the board.
Section 34-39-200. A person required to be licensed pursuant to this chapter may not:
(1) charge fees in excess of those authorized by this chapter;
(2) engage in the business of:
(i) making loans of money or extension of credit;
(ii) discounting notes, bills of exchange, items, or other evidences of debt; or
(iii) accepting deposits or bailments of money or items, except as expressly provided by Section 34-39-180;
(3) use or cause to be published or disseminated advertising communication which contains false, misleading, or deceptive statements or representations;
(4) conduct business at premises or locations other than locations licensed by the board;
(5) engage in unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent practices, including unconscionable conduct in violation of Section 37-5-108;
(6) alter or delete the date on a check accepted by the licensee;
(7) accept an undated check or a check dated on a date other than the date on which the licensee accepts the check;
(8) require a customer to provide security for the transaction or require the customer to provide a guaranty from another person;
(9) engage in the retail sale of goods or services, other than deferred presentment services and Level I check-cashing services as defined in Section 34-41-10, at the location licensed pursuant to this chapter, provided, however, that a sale of money orders, postage stamps, payment of utility bills with no additional fee to the customer, vending machines for food or beverage, facsimile services, Western Union services, or postal boxes at rates not higher than allowed by the United States Postal Service is not the sale of goods or services prohibited by this subsection;
(10) be licensed pursuant to Section 12-21-2720(a)(3) to operate a video poker machine; or
(11) permit others to engage in an activity prohibited by this section at a location licensed pursuant to this chapter.
Section 34-39-210. (A) The board may suspend or revoke a license issued pursuant to this chapter if, after notice and opportunity for hearing, the board issues written findings that the licensee has:
(1) violated this chapter or applicable state or federal law;
(2) made a false statement on the application for a license under the chapter;
(3) refused to permit investigation by the board as authorized by this chapter;
(4) failed to comply with an order of the board;
(5) demonstrated incompetency or untrustworthiness to engage in the business of deferred presentment services; or
(6) been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit.
(B) The board may not suspend or revoke a license issued pursuant to this chapter unless the licensee has been given notice and opportunity for hearing in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act.
Section 34-39-220. If the board determines that a person subject to the provisions of this chapter has violated this chapter or regulations adopted pursuant to it, the board, upon notice and opportunity for hearing in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act, may order the person to cease and desist from the violations and to comply with this chapter. The board may designate a hearing officer or hearing panel to conduct hearings or take other action as necessary pursuant to this section and may seek the assistance of the Attorney General or the Department of Consumer Affairs in enforcing compliance with this chapter. The board may enforce compliance with an order issued pursuant to this section by the imposition and collection of civil penalties authorized in this chapter.
Section 34-39-230. The board may order and impose civil penalties upon a person subject to the provisions of this chapter for violations of this chapter or its regulations in an amount not to exceed one thousand dollars for each violation. The board also may order repayment of unlawful or excessive fees charged to customers.
Section 34-39-240. The board, upon a determination that a violation of Section 34-39-130 is wilfull, may refer the violation to the Attorney General or to the appropriate circuit solicitor for criminal prosecution. A wilfull violation of Section 34-39-130 is a Class B misdemeanor, and each transaction involving unlawful deferred presentment constitutes a separate offense.
Section 34-39-250. The business of deferred presentment services conducted in accordance with this chapter is not subject to or controlled by any other state statute governing the imposition of interest, fees, or loan charges, or the extension of credit.
Section 34-39-260. The board may promulgate regulations pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter, to provide for the protection of the public, and to assist licensees in interpreting and complying with this chapter."
SECTION 2. Title 34 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
Section 34-41-10. As used in this chapter, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, the term:
(1) 'Board' means the State Board of Financial Institutions.
(2) 'Cashing' means providing currency for payment instruments but does not include the bona fide sale or exchange of travelers checks and foreign denomination payment instruments.
(3) 'Level I check-cashing service' means any person or entity engaged in the business of cashing checks, drafts, or money orders for a fee, service charge, or other consideration.
(4) 'Level II check-cashing services' means any person or entity engaged in the business of cashing checks, drafts, or money orders for a fee, service charge, or other consideration. A Level II licensee may not be licensed to engaged in the business of deferred presentment.
(5) 'Licensee' means a person or entity licensed to engage in either a Level I or Level II check-cashing services pursuant to this chapter.
(6) 'Person' means an individual, partnership, association, or corporation.
Section 34-41-20. (A) No person or other entity may engage in the business of either Level I or Level II check-cashing services without first obtaining a license pursuant to this chapter. No person or other entity providing a Level I or Level II check-cashing service may avoid the requirements of this chapter by providing a check or other currency equivalent instead of currency when cashing payment instruments.
(B) A person providing Level I or Level II check-cashing services on the effective date of this chapter may continue to engage in the business without a license until the board has acted upon the application for a license, but the application must be filed within sixty days after the effective date of this chapter.
Section 34-41-30. This chapter shall not apply to:
(1) a bank, savings institution, credit union, or farm credit system organized under the laws of the United States or any state; and
(2) any person or entity principally engaged in the bona fide retail sale of goods or services, who either as an incident to or independently of a retail sale or service and not holding itself out to be a Level I or Level II check-cashing service, from time to time cashes checks, drafts, or money orders without a fee or other consideration.
Section 34-41-40. (A) An application for licensure pursuant to this chapter must be in writing, under oath, and on a form prescribed by the board. The application shall set forth all of the following:
(1) the name and address of the applicant;
(2) if the applicant is a firm or partnership, the name and address of each member of the firm or partnership;
(3) if the applicant is a corporation, the name and address of each officer, director, registered agent, and principal;
(4) the addresses of the locations of the business to be licensed; and
(5) other information concerning the financial responsibility, background experience, and activities, such as other partnerships, associations, and corporations located at or adjacent to the licensed location, of the applicant and its members, officers, directors, and principals as the board requires.
(B) The board may make such investigations as the board considers necessary to determine if the applicant has complied with all applicable provisions of this chapter and state and federal law.
(C) The application must be accompanied by payment of a two hundred fifty dollar application fee and a five hundred dollar investigation fee. These fees are not refundable or abatable, but, if the license is granted, payment of the application fee shall satisfy the fee requirement for the first license year or remaining part of it.
(D) Licenses shall expire annually and may be renewed upon payment of a license fee of two hundred fifty dollars plus a fifty dollar fee for each branch location certificate issued under a license.
Section 34-41-42. For the purposes of this chapter, all mobile check-cashing services must:
(1) be licensed as a Level I licensee;
(2) be a registered and licensed armored vehicle in accordance with the laws of this State;
(3) be considered a 'Branch' of a check-cashing business for purposes of licensure through this chapter; and
(4) keep records in accordance with this chapter that are returned daily to either the main office or another nonmobile branch of the business.
Section 34-41-50. (A) Each licensee and applicant shall have and maintain liquid assets of at least fifty thousand dollars for each licensee.
(B) Upon the filing and investigation of an application, and compliance by the applicant with Section 34-41-40, and this section, the board shall issue and deliver to the applicant the license applied for to engage in business pursuant to this chapter at the locations specified in the application, provided that the board finds that the financial responsibility, character, reputation, experience, and general fitness of the applicant and its members, officers, directors, and principals are such as to warrant belief that the business will be operated efficiently and fairly, in the public interest, and in accordance with law. If the board fails to make these findings, a license may not be issued, and the board shall notify the applicant of the denial and the reasons for it. The provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act apply to the appeal of the denial of a license.
Section 34-41-60. (A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a check-cashing service licensed pursuant to this chapter may not directly or indirectly charge or collect fees or other consideration for check-cashing services in excess of the following:
(1) two percent of the face amount of the check or three dollars, whichever is greater, for checks issued by the federal government, state government, or any agency of the state or federal government, or any county or municipality of this State;
(2) two percent of the face amount of the check or three dollars, whichever is greater, for printed payroll checks. For purposes of this item, 'printed' means type written, electronically generated, or computer generated; and
(3) seven percent of the face amount of the check or five dollars, whichever is greater, for all other checks, including handwritten payroll checks, or for money orders.
(B) A licensee may not advance monies on the security of any check unless the account from which the check being presented is drawn is legitimate, open, and active. A licensee who cashes a check for a fee shall deposit the check not later than five days from the date the check is cashed.
(C) A licensee shall ensure that in every location conducting business under a license issued pursuant to this chapter, there is posted conspicuously and at all times displayed a notice stating the fees charged for cashing checks, drafts, and money orders. A licensee further shall ensure that notice of the fees currently charged at every location is filed with the board.
(D) A licensee shall endorse every check, draft, or money order presented by the licensee for payment in the name of the licensee.
(E) Each check must be documented by a written agreement signed by both the customer and the licensee. In the case of an automated check-cashing machine, a printed receipt of the transaction between the customer and the licensee shall constitute an agreement. The written agreement must contain the name or trade name of the licensee, the transaction date, the amount of the check, and a statement of the total amount of fees charged.
Section 34-41-70. (A) Each person required to be licensed pursuant to this chapter shall maintain in its offices such books, accounts, and records as the board reasonably may require. The books, accounts, and records must be maintained separate from any other business in which the person is engaged and must be retained for a period prescribed by the board.
(B) The licensee shall ensure that each customer cashing a check is provided a receipt showing the name or trade name of the licensee, the transaction date, amount of the check, and the fee charged.
(C) The board may examine the books, accounts, and records in order to determine whether the person is complying with this chapter and rules adopted pursuant to it. The cost of the examination must be paid by the licensee and must be determined by the board.
Section 34-41-80. No person required to be licensed pursuant to this chapter shall do any of the following:
(1) charge fees in excess of those authorized pursuant to this chapter;
(2) engage in the business of:
(i) making loans of money or extension of credit;
(ii) discounting notes, bills of exchange, items, or other evidences of debt; or
(iii) accepting deposits or bailments of money or items;
(3) use or cause to be published or disseminated any advertising communication which contains any false, misleading, or deceptive statement or representation;
(4) conduct business at premises or locations other than locations licensed by the board;
(5) engage in unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent practices, including unconscionable conduct in violation of Section 37-5-108;
(6) cash a check, draft, or money order made payable to a payee other than a natural person unless the licensee has previously obtained appropriate documentation from the executive entity of the payee clearly indicating the authority of the natural person or persons cashing the check, draft, or money order on behalf of the payee;
(7) as a Level I licensee, engage in the retail sale of goods or services, other than check-cashing services and deferred presentment services, at the location licensed pursuant to this chapter, provided, however, that a sale of money orders, postage stamps, payment of utility bills with no additional fee to the customer, vending machines for food or beverage, facsimile services, Western Union services, or postal boxes at rates not higher than allowed by the United States Postal Service is not the sale of goods or services prohibited by this subsection;
(8) as a Level II licensee, engage in the business of deferred presentment as provided in Chapter 39 of Title 34;
(9) be licensed pursuant to Section 12-21-2720(a)(3) to operate a video poker machine; or
(10) permit others to engage in an activity prohibited by this section at a location licensed pursuant to this chapter.
Section 34-41-90. (A) The board may suspend or revoke any license or licenses issued pursuant to this chapter if, after notice and opportunity for hearing, the board issues written findings that the licensee has engaged in any of the following conduct:
(1) violated this chapter or applicable state or federal law or rules;
(2) made a false statement on the application for a license pursuant to this chapter;
(3) refused to permit investigation by the board authorized pursuant to this chapter;
(4) failed to comply with an order of the board;
(5) demonstrated incompetency or untrustworthiness to engage in the business of check cashing; or
(6) has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor involving fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit.
(B) The board may not suspend or revoke any license issued pursuant to this chapter unless the licensee has been given notice and opportunity for hearing in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act.
Section 34-41-100. If the board determines that a person required to be licensed pursuant to this chapter has violated this chapter or regulations promulgated pursuant to this chapter, the board, upon notice and opportunity for hearing in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act, may order the person to cease and desist from the violations and to comply with this chapter. The board may designate a hearing officer or hearing panel to conduct hearings or take other action as necessary pursuant to this section and may seek the assistance of the Attorney General or the Department of Consumer Affairs in enforcing compliance with this chapter. The board may enforce compliance with an order issued pursuant to this section by the imposition and collection of civil penalties authorized pursuant to this chapter.
Section 34-41-110. The board may order and impose civil penalties upon any person required to be licensed pursuant to this chapter for violations of this chapter or regulations promulgated under it. Civil penalties shall not exceed one thousand dollars for each violation. The board also may order repayment of unlawful or excessive fees charged to customers.
Section 34-41-120. The board, upon a determination that a violation of Section 34-41-20 is wilfull, may refer a violation to the Attorney General or to the appropriate circuit solicitor for criminal prosecution. A violation of Section 34-41-20 by a person required to obtain a license pursuant to this chapter is a Class B misdemeanor and each transaction involving the unlawful cashing of a check, draft, or money order constitutes a separate offense.
Section 34-41-130. The board may promulgate regulations necessary to carry out the purposes of this chapter, to provide for the protection of the public, and to assist licensees in interpreting and complying with this chapter."
SECTION 3. If any provision of these chapters or its application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or application of these chapters which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to that end, the provisions of these chapters are declared to be severable.
SECTION 4. Section 34-29-100(a) of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 135 of 1995, is further amended to read:
"(a) Each licensee shall keep and use in his business such full and correct books and accounting records as are in accordance with sound and accepted accounting principles and practices and such books and records, including cards used in the card system, if any, as are in accord with the rules and regulations lawfully made by the board. Each licensee shall preserve such books, accounts, and records, including cards used in the card system, if any, for at least two years after making the final entry on any loan recorded thereon in them. The renewal or refinancing of a loan shall constitute a final entry. Notwithstanding any other provision of law or regulation, each licensee, subject to the approval of the Director of the Consumer Finance Division of the South Carolina Board of Financial Institutions, may retain books and records in any other medium, electronic or otherwise, that conforms with the requirements of these chapters."
SECTION 5. This act takes effect upon approval by the Governor./
Amend title to conform.
Rep. GAMBLE explained the amendment.
The amendment was then adopted.
The Bill, as amended, was read the second time and ordered to third reading.
The following Bill was taken up.
H. 4359 -- Reps. Law and Cato: A BILL TO AMEND TITLE 34, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO BANKING, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY, BY ADDING CHAPTER 39 SO AS TO ENACT THE SOUTH CAROLINA DEFERRED PRESENTMENT SERVICES ACT, PROVIDING FOR LICENSING AND REGULATION OF PERSONS OFFERING DEFERRED PRESENTMENT SERVICES.
Rep. CATO moved to recommit the Bill, which was agreed to.
On motion of Rep. McGEE, with unanimous consent, the following Bill was ordered recalled from the Committee on Education and Public Works.
S. 1195 -- Senator Leatherman: A BILL TO AMEND ARTICLE 9, CHAPTER 11, TITLE 55, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO THE PEE DEE REGIONAL AIRPORT DISTRICT, SO AS TO CHANGE THE COMPOSITION OF THE GOVERNING BODY BY REMOVING DARLINGTON COUNTY FROM MEMBERSHIP ON THE GOVERNING BODY; REDUCE THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT BY REMOVING DARLINGTON COUNTY; LIMIT THE NUMBER OF TERMS A MEMBER MAY SERVE; AUTHORIZE THE GOVERNING BODIES OF THE COUNCILS COMPOSING THE AUTHORITY TO INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS OF THE AUTHORITY; AUTHORIZE THE AUTHORITY TO LICENSE, LEASE, SUBLEASE, RENT, SELL, OR OTHERWISE PROVIDE FOR THE USE OF REAL PROPERTY IN ADDITION TO OTHER PROPERTY; DELETE THE POWER OF THE AUTHORITY TO DEVELOP AN INDUSTRIAL OR BUSINESS PARK; DELETE THE POWER TO DIRECT THE AUDITORS OF THE COUNTIES COMPOSING THE AUTHORITY TO LEVY A TAX ON THE PROPERTIES WITHIN THE DISTRICT; AUTHORIZE THE AUTHORITY TO DEVELOP LANDS LEASED BY, SUBLEASED BY, OWNED BY, OR UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE AUTHORITY; PROVIDE THAT ALL FINES AND FORFEITURES COLLECTED UNDER THIS ARTICLE MUST BE FORWARDED TO THE COUNTY WHERE THE FINAL DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IS MADE INSTEAD OF TO THE DISTRICT; DELETE PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE AUTHORITY DEPOSITING OR EXPENDING MONIES, ACCEPTING DONATIONS, ISSUING NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, AND THE AUTHORITY TO ISSUE BONDS; CHANGE THE USES OF REVENUES DERIVED BY THE AUTHORITY FROM THE OPERATION OF REVENUE PRODUCING FACILITIES; DELETE PROVISIONS WHICH PROHIBITED THE AUTHORITY FROM CONSTITUTING ALL OR PART OF THE LANDS OWNED BY, LEASED BY, SUBLEASED BY, OR UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE AUTHORITY AS AN INDUSTRIAL OR BUSINESS PARK UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 13 OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE CONSTITUTION; DELETE THE PROVISION RELATING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INDUSTRIAL OR BUSINESS PARK; AND TO PROVIDE THAT NOTHING IN THIS ARTICLE SHALL PROHIBIT ANNEXATION BY THE CITY OF FLORENCE OF THE PROPERTY OF THE DISTRICT.
On motion of Rep. R. SMITH, with unanimous consent, the following Bill was ordered recalled from the Committee on Ways and Means.
S. 1078 -- Senators Ryberg, Hutto, Moore, Setzler, Washington and Matthews: A BILL TO AMEND CHAPTER 12, TITLE 31, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, KNOWN AS THE "MILITARY FACILITIES REDEVELOPMENT LAW" RELATING TO REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO ACQUIRE AND DISPOSE OF FEDERAL MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, SO AS TO BROADEN THE AUTHORITY TO INCLUDE ACQUISITION AND DISPOSAL OF BOTH REAL PROPERTY AND PERSONAL PROPERTY CLASSIFIED AS EQUIPMENT, IN CONNECTION WITH BOTH FEDERAL MILITARY INSTALLATIONS AND OTHER FEDERAL DEFENSE SITES.
Rep. COBB-HUNTER asked unanimous consent to recall S. 547 from the Committee on Ways and Means.
Rep. ROBINSON objected.
Rep. SHEHEEN asked unanimous consent to recall S. 78 from the Committee on Judiciary.
Rep. HARRISON objected.
Rep. HOWARD asked unanimous consent to recall S. 249 from the Committee on Judiciary.
Rep. SIMRILL objected.
Rep. TOWNSEND asked unanimous consent to recall S. 1188 from the Committee on Education and Public Works.
Rep. COBB-HUNTER objected.
Rep. RODGERS asked unanimous consent to recall H. 4667 from the Committee on Judiciary.
Rep. HOWARD objected.
Rep. WILDER asked unanimous consent to recall S. 1163 from the Committee on Medical, Military, Public and Municipal Affairs.
Rep. SCOTT objected.
The Senate amendments to the following Bill were taken up for consideration.
H. 3760 -- Reps. Moody-Lawrence, F. Smith, Mason, Cromer, Lee, J. Hines, Neilson, Littlejohn, Seithel, Maddox, J. Smith, Cave, Govan, Lloyd, Gourdine, Clyburn, Harvin, McMahand, Hinson, Kinon, Kennedy, M. Hines, McCraw, Parks, Howard, T. Brown, Stille, Allison, Limbaugh, Byrd, Hodges, Inabinett, Davenport, Kirsh, Neal, Bowers, Rodgers, Carnell, Riser, Baxley, Mack, Witherspoon, Canty, Phillips, Wilder, Breeland, Limehouse, Simrill, Jennings, Whipper and Cobb-Hunter: A
BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 44-41-345, SO AS TO REQUIRE A FEMALE WHO IS PREGNANT, UNMARRIED, AND UNDER EIGHTEEN TO COMPLETE A PREGNANCY PREVENTION EDUCATION COURSE CONDUCTED BY COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENTS; TO PROVIDE FOR THE COURSE CONTENT; AND TO REQUIRE PROFESSIONALS PROVIDING HEALTH CARE TO REFER THESE WOMEN TO THE APPROPRIATE HEALTH DEPARTMENT AS A COMPONENT OF THEIR HEALTH CARE.
Rep. SPEARMAN moved to adjourn debate upon the Senate amendments until Tuesday, June 2.
Rep. J. BROWN moved to table the motion.
Rep. EASTERDAY demanded the yeas and nays, which were taken resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Breeland Brown, G. Brown, J. Canty Cave Emory Govan Harvin Hines, J. Hines, M. Lee Lloyd Mack McLeod McMahand Miller Moody-Lawrence Sheheen Smith, F. Whipper Wilder
Those who voted in the negative are:
Allison Altman Askins Barrett Bauer Baxley Beck Bowers Campsen Cato Chellis Cooper Cotty Cromer Dantzler Davenport Delleney Easterday Edge Fleming Gamble Hamilton Harrell Harris Harrison Hinson Jennings Jordan Keegan Kelley Kinon Kirsh Klauber Knotts Koon Law Leach Limehouse Littlejohn Loftis Maddox Martin McAbee McCraw McGee McMaster Meacham Mullen Neilson Quinn Rhoad Rice Riser Robinson Rodgers Sandifer Seithel Sharpe Simrill Smith, D. Smith, R. Spearman Stille Stuart Townsend Tripp Trotter Vaughn Webb Whatley Wilkins Witherspoon Woodrum Young
So, the House refused to table the motion.
The question then recurred to the motion to adjourn debate until Tuesday, June 2, which was agreed to.
I voted no on the motion to table the motion to adjourn debate on H. 3760 until June 2, 1998.
Rep. JAMES EMERSON SMITH, JR.
When the vote to table the motion on the motion to adjourn debate on H. 3760 was taken I was momentarily out of the chamber greeting a group of elementary students. I tried to get to my desk in time to vote, without avail. I would have voted no on the tabling motion. On the voice vote which followed, I voted "aye" to adjourn debate. It is my desire to defeat this Bill this session.
Rep. TERRY E. HASKINS
The Senate amendments to the following Bill were taken up for consideration.
H. 4754 -- Reps. Witherspoon, Sharpe, Bailey, Clyburn, Simrill, Meacham, Seithel, Inabinett, Mason, Littlejohn, McKay, Rodgers, Miller, Rhoad, Walker, Battle, Lloyd, Barfield, McMahand, J. Hines, Dantzler, Stille and Leach: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 50-11-1910, AS AMENDED, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO THE SALE OF DEER PARTS, SO AS TO PROHIBIT THE SALE OF LIVE DEER AND CERTAIN DEER PARTS, INCLUDING CERTAIN VENISON, ANTLERS, AND GAMETES, AND TO REVISE THE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION; AND TO AMEND SECTION 50-11-1920, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO SALE OF VENISON IN EATING ESTABLISHMENTS, SO AS TO ALLOW SALE OF VENISON NOT ONLY BY FOOD SERVICE ESTABLISHMENTS, BUT ALSO BY OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENTS AND WHOLESALE FOOD DISTRIBUTORS WHO COMPLY WITH INSPECTION, RECORDKEEPING, AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS.
Rep. WITHERSPOON explained the Senate amendment.
The Senate amendments were agreed to, and the Bill, having received three readings in both Houses, it was ordered that the title be changed to that of an Act, and that it be enrolled for ratification.
The Senate amendments to the following Bill were taken up for consideration.
H. 4486 -- Reps. Jennings, Inabinett, Kirsh, Meacham, H. Brown, Spearman, Moody-Lawrence, Neilson, J. Hines, Cobb-Hunter, Seithel, Bailey, Battle, D. Smith, Tripp, Harrison, Rodgers, Leach, Scott, Gamble, Govan, McCraw, Riser, Stille, Stuart, Young-Brickell, Vaughn, Keegan, Neal, Kelley, Loftis, Witherspoon, Cato, A. Harris, Wilder, Stoddard, McMaster, Jordan, Martin and Cromer: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 20-4-140 SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT A VALID PROTECTION ORDER RELATED TO DOMESTIC OR FAMILY VIOLENCE ISSUED IN ANOTHER STATE IS VALID IN THIS
STATE AND MUST BE ENFORCED AS IF IT WERE ISSUED IN THIS STATE; TO PROVIDE THE PREREQUISITES TO AND PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCING SUCH ORDER; TO PROVIDE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL IMMUNITY; AND TO AMEND SECTION 16-25-50 RELATING TO PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION OF AN ORDER OF PROTECTION FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SO AS TO ALSO APPLY THE PENALTIES TO VIOLATIONS OF ORDERS ISSUED IN ANOTHER STATE.
Rep. COTTY explained the Senate amendment.
The Senate amendments were agreed to, and the Bill, having received three readings in both Houses, it was ordered that the title be changed to that of an Act, and that it be enrolled for ratification.
The Senate amendments to the following Bill were taken up for consideration.
H. 4569 -- Reps. Cato and Gamble: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 40-58-67 SO AS TO REQUIRE ANNUAL CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION FOR LICENSED MORTGAGE LOAN BROKERS AND ORIGINATORS; TO AMEND SECTIONS 40-58-10, 40-58-20, 40-58-30, 40-58-50, 40-58-55, 40-58-60, 40-58-65, 40-58-80, AND 40-58-110, ALL AS AMENDED, RELATING TO REGULATION OF MORTGAGE LOAN BROKERS, SO AS TO REQUIRE LICENSING RATHER THAN REGISTRATION OF MORTGAGE LOAN BROKERS, TO REQUIRE TWO YEARS' EXPERIENCE WORKING AS AN ORIGINATOR BEFORE INITIAL LICENSING AND TO PROVIDE EXCEPTIONS, TO DEFINE "ORIGINATOR"; TO ALLOW BROKERS PROPERLY REGISTERED BEFORE OCTOBER 1, 1998, TO CONTINUE TO ACT AS MORTGAGE LOAN BROKERS WITHOUT REGARD TO EXPERIENCE OR EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS ADDED BY THIS ACT, TO AUTHORIZE THE SUSPENSION OF A LICENSE FOR VIOLATIONS, AND TO INCREASE THE INITIAL APPLICATION FEE AND ANNUAL RENEWAL FEE FROM FIVE TO SIX HUNDRED DOLLARS AND IMPOSE A TWENTY-FIVE DOLLAR ADDITIONAL ANNUAL RENEWAL FEE FOR EACH ORIGINATOR.
Rep. CATO made the Point of Order that the Senate amendments were improperly before the House for consideration since its number and title have not been printed in the House Calendar at least one statewide legislative day prior to second reading.
The SPEAKER sustained the Point of Order.
The following Bill was read the third time, passed and, having received three readings in both Houses, it was ordered that the title be changed to that of an Act, and that it be enrolled for ratification.
S. 1084 -- Senator Land: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 56-1-2070(B)(2)(b) OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO THE COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE LICENSES, BY ADOPTING FEDERAL EXEMPTIONS ALLOWING FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF CERTAIN HAZARDOUS WASTE MATERIALS WHICH POSE NO SUBSTANTIAL THREAT TO PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY WHEN USED IN NORMAL FARMING OPERATIONS.
The motion period was dispensed with on motion of Rep. HASKINS.
The following Bill was taken up.
S. 1058 -- Senators Ravenel, Washington and McConnell: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 49-29-230, AS AMENDED, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO THE DESIGNATION OF PORTIONS OF CERTAIN RIVERS IN THE STATE AS SCENIC RIVERS UNDER THE "SOUTH CAROLINA SCENIC RIVERS ACT OF 1989", SO AS TO DESIGNATE A PORTION OF THE ASHLEY RIVER AS A SCENIC RIVER.
Rep. DAVENPORT explained the Bill.
Pursuant to Rule 7.7 the yeas and nays were taken resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Allison Altman Askins Barrett Battle Bauer Baxley Beck Bowers Breeland Brown, J. Campsen Canty Carnell Cato Cave Chellis Cooper Davenport Delleney Easterday Edge Emory Fleming Gamble Gourdine Govan Hamilton Harrell Harris Harrison Harvin Haskins Hawkins Hines, J. Hines, M. Hinson Jennings Keegan Kinon Kirsh Klauber Knotts Koon Lanford Leach Limehouse Lloyd Loftis Mack Maddox Martin Mason McCraw McGee McLeod McMaster Meacham Miller Moody-Lawrence Neilson Pinckney Rhoad Rice Riser Robinson Rodgers Sandifer Scott Seithel Sharpe Sheheen Simrill Smith, D. Smith, J. Smith, R. Spearman Stille Stuart Tripp Trotter Vaughn Webb Whatley Wilder Wilkins Witherspoon Woodrum Young
Those who voted in the negative are:
So, the Bill was read the second time and ordered to third reading.
The SPEAKER granted Rep. KENNEDY a leave of absence for the remainder of the day.
The following Bill was taken up.
S. 174 -- Senator Giese: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 56-1-286 SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR A SIX-MONTH'S SUSPENSION OF THE DRIVER'S LICENSE OF A PERSON UNDER THE AGE OF TWENTY-ONE OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE WHO HAS A BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT IN EXCESS OF TWO ONE-HUNDREDTHS OF ONE PERCENT, TO PROVIDE THAT LICENSED DRIVERS UNDER TWENTY-ONE HAVE CONSENTED TO BE TESTED, TO LIMIT TESTING TO INCIDENTS IN WHICH A PERSON HAS BEEN ARRESTED FOR A TRAFFIC OFFENSE, TO PRESCRIBE THE METHOD AND PROCEDURES FOR TESTING AND REQUIRE AN AUTOMATIC SIX-MONTH'S SUSPENSION FOR REFUSAL TO BE TESTED, TO PROVIDE THAT THE SUSPENSION BEGINS IMMEDIATELY UPON THE OFFICER TAKING POSSESSION OF THE LICENSE, TO PROVIDE FOR AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING ON THE SUSPENSION AT THE DRIVER'S REQUEST, AND TO PROVIDE THAT A PERSON WHOSE LICENSE IS SUSPENDED IS NOT REQUIRED TO FILE PROOF OF FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY.
The Judiciary Committee proposed the following Amendment No. 1 (Doc Name P:\AMEND\GGS\22092CM.98), which was adopted.
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking all after the enacting words and inserting the following:
/SECTION 1. Section 56-1-10 of the 1976 Code, as amended, is further amended by adding:
"(16) 'Alcohol' means a substance containing any form of alcohol including, but not limited to, ethanol, methanol, propanol, and isopropanol.
(17) 'Alcohol concentration' means:
(a) the number of grams of alcohol for each one hundred milliliters of blood by weight; or
(b) as determined by the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division for other bodily fluids."
SECTION 2. Article 1, Chapter 1, Title 56 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
"Section 56-1-286. (A) In addition to any other penalty imposed by law unless otherwise prohibited in this section, including additional driver's license suspensions, the Department of Public Safety must suspend the driver's license, permit, or nonresident operating privilege of, or deny the issuance of a license or permit to a person under the age of twenty-one who drives a motor vehicle and has an alcohol concentration of two one-hundredths of one percent or more. The department shall not suspend a person's privilege to drive under this section if the person's privilege to drive has been suspended for a violation of Section 20-7-8920, 20-7-8925, or 56-5-2930 arising from the same incident.
(B) A person under the age of twenty-one who drives a motor vehicle in this State is considered to have given consent to chemical tests of his breath or blood for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol.
(C) A law enforcement officer who has arrested a person under the age of twenty-one for a violation of Chapter 5 of this title (Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways), or any other traffic offense established by a political subdivision of this State, and has probable cause to believe that the person under the age of twenty-one has consumed alcoholic beverages and driven a motor vehicle may order the testing of the person arrested to determine the person's alcohol concentration.
A law enforcement officer may detain and order the testing of a person to determine the person's alcohol concentration if the officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle is being driven by a person under the age of twenty-one who has consumed alcoholic beverages.
(D) A test must be administered at the direction of the primary investigating law enforcement officer. At the direction of the officer, the person first must be offered a breath test to determine the person's alcohol concentration. If the person physically is unable to provide an acceptable breath sample because he has an injured mouth or is unconscious or dead, or for any other reason considered acceptable by licensed medical personnel, a blood sample may be taken. The breath test must be administered by a person trained and certified by the State Law Enforcement Division, using methods approved by the division. The primary investigating officer may administer the test if the person's conduct during the twenty-minute pre-test waiting period is videotaped pursuant to Section 56-5-2953(A)(2)(d). Blood samples must be obtained by physicians licensed by the State Board of Medical Examiners, registered nurses licensed by the State Board of Nursing, or other medical personnel trained to obtain these samples in a licensed medical facility. Blood samples must be obtained and handled in accordance with procedures approved by the division. The division shall administer the provisions of this subsection and shall promulgate regulations necessary to carry out its provisions. The costs of the tests administered at the direction of the officer must be paid from the general fund of the State.
The person tested or giving samples for testing may have a qualified person of his choice conduct additional tests at the person's expense and must be notified in writing of that right. A person's request or failure to request additional blood tests is not admissible against the person in any proceeding. The failure or inability of the person tested to obtain additional tests does not preclude the admission of evidence relating to the tests or samples taken at the direction of the officer. The officer must provide affirmative assistance to the person to contact a qualified person to conduct and obtain additional tests. Affirmative assistance shall, at a minimum, include providing transportation for the person to the nearest medical facility which provides blood tests to determine a person's alcohol concentration. If the medical facility obtains the blood sample but refuses or fails to test the blood to determine the person's alcohol concentration, SLED must test the blood and provide the result to the person and to the officer. Failure to provide affirmative assistance upon request to obtain additional tests bars the admissibility of the breath test result in any judicial or administrative proceeding.
(E) A qualified person and his employer who obtain samples or administer the tests or assist in obtaining samples or administering of tests at the direction of the primary investigating officer are immune from civil and criminal liability unless the obtaining of samples or the administering of tests is performed in a negligent manner. A person may not be required by the officer ordering the tests to obtain or take any sample of blood or urine.
(F) If a person refuses upon the request of the primary investigating officer to submit to chemical tests as provided in subsection (C), the department must suspend his license, permit, or any nonresident operating privilege, or deny the issuance of a license or permit to him for:
(1) six months; or
(2) one year if the person, within the five years preceding the violation of this section, has been previously convicted of violating Section 56-5-2930 or 56-5-2945 or any other law of this State or another state that prohibits a person from driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or another drug or has had a previous suspension imposed pursuant to Section 56-1-286 or 56-5-2951.
(G) If a person submits to a chemical test and the test result indicates an alcohol concentration of two one-hundredths of one percent or more, the department must suspend his license, permit, or any nonresident operating privilege, or deny the issuance of a license or permit to him for:
(1) three months; or
(2) six months if the person, within the five years preceding the violation of this section, has been previously convicted of violating Section 56-5-2930 or 56-5-2945 or any other law of this State or another state that prohibits a person from driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any other drug or has had a previous suspension imposed pursuant to Section 56-1-286 or 56-5-2951.
(H) A test may not be administered or samples taken unless the person has been informed in writing that:
(1) he does not have to take the test or give the samples, but that his privilege to drive must be suspended or denied for at least six months if he refuses to submit to the tests and that his refusal may be used against him in court;
(2) his privilege to drive must be suspended for at least three months if he takes the test or gives the samples and has an alcohol concentration of two one-hundredths of one percent or more;
(3) he has the right to have a qualified person of his own choosing conduct additional independent tests at his expense;
(4) he has the right to request an administrative hearing within ten days of the issuance of the notice of suspension; and
(5) he must enroll in an Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program within ten days of the issuance of the notice of suspension.
The primary investigating officer must notify promptly the department of the refusal of a person to submit to a test requested pursuant to this section as well as the test result of any person who submits to a test pursuant to this section and registers an alcohol concentration of two one-hundredths of one percent or more. The notification must be in a manner prescribed by the department.
(I) If the test registers an alcohol concentration of two one-hundredths of one percent or more or if the person refuses to be tested, the primary investigating officer must issue a notice of suspension, and the suspension is effective beginning on the date of the alleged violation of this section. The person, within ten days of the issuance of the notice of suspension, must enroll in an Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program pursuant to Section 56-5-2990. If the person does not enroll in an Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program within ten days, the suspension remains in effect, a temporary alcohol restricted license must not be issued, and an administrative hearing may not be requested. If the person drives during the period of suspension without a temporary alcohol restricted license, the person must be penalized for driving while his license is suspended pursuant to Section 56-1-460.
(J) Within ten days of the issuance of the notice of suspension the person may:
(1) obtain a temporary alcohol restricted license by filing with the department a form after enrolling in an Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program. A thirty dollar fee must be assessed for obtaining a temporary alcohol restricted license. Twenty-five dollars of the fee must be retained by the department for supplying and maintaining all necessary vehicle videotaping equipment. The remaining five dollars must be retained by the department for administrative costs associated with the issuance of the temporary alcohol restricted licenses. The temporary alcohol restricted license allows the person to drive without any restrictive conditions pending the outcome of the administrative hearing provided for in this section, or the final decision or disposition of the matter; and
(2) request an administrative hearing.
At the administrative hearing if:
(a) the suspension is upheld, the person's driver's license, permit, or nonresident operating privilege must be suspended or the person must be denied the issuance of a license or permit for the remainder of the suspension periods provided for in subsections (F) and (G);
(b) the suspension is overturned, the person shall have his driver's license, permit, or nonresident operating privilege reinstated and is not required to complete the Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program in which he is enrolled. Any costs paid by the person to the Department of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Services pursuant to Section 56-5-2990 must be refunded.
(K) The periods of suspension provided for in subsections (F) and (G) begin on the day the notice of suspension is issued and continue until the person applies for a temporary alcohol restricted license and requests an administrative hearing.
(L) If a person does not request an administrative hearing, he shall have waived his right to the hearing and his suspension must not be stayed, but shall continue for the periods provided for in subsections (F) and (G).
(M) The notice of suspension shall advise the person of the requirement to enroll in an Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program and of his right to obtain a temporary alcohol restricted driver's license and to request an administrative hearing. The notice of suspension also shall advise the person that if he does not enroll in an Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program and does not request an administrative hearing within ten days of the issuance of the notice of suspension, he shall have waived his right to the administrative hearing, and the suspension continues for the periods provided for in subsections (F) and (G).
(N) An administrative hearing must be held within ten days after the request for the hearing is received by the department. However, upon a showing of exigent circumstances by either party, a continuance may be granted not to exceed thirty days. The scope of the hearing is limited to whether the person:
(1) was lawfully arrested or detained;
(2) was advised in writing of the rights enumerated in subsection (H);
(3) refused to submit to a test pursuant to this section; or
(4) consented to taking a test pursuant to this section, and the:
(a) reported alcohol concentration at the time of testing was two one-hundredths of one percent or more;
(b) individual who administered the test or took samples was qualified pursuant to this section; and
(c) test administered and samples taken were conducted pursuant to this section and division procedures.
Nothing in this section prohibits the introduction of evidence at the administrative hearing on the issue of the accuracy of the breath test result.
A written order must be issued to the person upholding the suspension of the person's license, permit, or nonresident's operating privilege, or denying the issuance of a license or permit within ten days after the conclusion of the administrative hearing. If the suspension is upheld, the person must receive credit for the number of days his license was suspended before he received a temporary alcohol restricted license and requested the administrative hearing.
(O) An administrative hearing is a contested proceeding under the Administrative Procedures Act, and a person has a right to judicial review pursuant to that act. The filing of a petition for review in the circuit court stays the suspension until a final decision is issued.
(P) A person who is unconscious or otherwise in a condition rendering him incapable of refusal is considered to be informed and not to have withdrawn the consent provided for in subsection (B) of this section.
(Q) When a nonresident's privilege to drive a motor vehicle in this State has been suspended under the procedures of this section, the department shall give written notice of the action taken to the motor vehicle administrator of the state of the person's residence and of any state in which he has a license or permit.
(R) A person required to submit to a test must be provided with a written report including the time of arrest, the time of the tests, and the results of the tests before any proceeding in which the results of the tests are used as evidence. A person who obtains additional tests shall furnish a copy of the time, method, and results of any additional tests to the officer before any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in which the person attempts to use the results of the additional tests as evidence.
(S) A person whose driver's license or permit is suspended under this section is not required to file proof of financial responsibility.
(T) The department shall administer the provisions of this section, not including subsection (D), and shall promulgate regulations necessary to carry out its provisions.
(U) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no suspension imposed pursuant to this section is counted as a demerit or result in any insurance penalty for automobile insurance purposes if at the time he was stopped, the person whose license is suspended had an alcohol concentration that was less than eight one-hundredths of one percent."
SECTION 3. Section 56-1-2030 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 149 of 1993, is further amended to read:
"Section 56-1-2030. As used in this article:
(1) 'Alcohol' means a substance containing any form of alcohol including, but not limited to, ethanol, methanol, propanol, and isopropanol.
(2) 'Alcohol concentration' means:
(a) the number of grams of alcohol for each one hundred milliliters of blood; or
(b) as determined by the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division for other bodily fluids.
(3) 'Commercial driver driver's license' means a license issued in accordance with the requirements of the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (Title XII of Public Law 99-570) to an individual which authorizes the individual to drive a class of commercial motor vehicle.
(4)(2) 'Commercial Driver Driver's License Information System' means the information system established pursuant to the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 to serve as a clearinghouse for locating information related to the licensing and identification of commercial motor vehicle drivers.
(5)(3) 'Commercial driver driver's instruction permit' means a permit issued pursuant to Section 56-1-2080(D) of this article.
(6)(4) 'Commercial motor vehicle' means a motor vehicle designed or used to transport passengers or property if the vehicle:
(a) the vehicle has a gross vehicle weight rating of twenty-six thousand one or more pounds;
(b) the vehicle is designed to transport sixteen or more persons, including the driver; or
(c) the vehicle is transporting hazardous materials and is required to be placarded in accordance with 49 C.F.R. part 172, subpart F.
(7)(5) 'CMVSA' means the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (Title XII of Public Law 99-570).
(8)(6) 'Controlled substance' means a substance so classified under Section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6)) listed on Schedules I through V of 21 C.F.R. part 1308, as revised from time to time.
(9)(7) 'Conviction' means an unvacated adjudication of guilty, or a determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original jurisdiction or an authorized administrative tribunal, an unvacated forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure the person's appearance in court, the payment of a fine or court cost, or violation of a condition of release without bail, regardless of whether or not the penalty is rebated, suspended, or probated.
(10)(8) 'Disqualification' means a withdrawal of the privilege to drive a commercial motor vehicle.
(11)(9) 'Drive' means to drive, operate, or be in physical control of a motor vehicle.
(12)(10) 'Driver' means a person who drives a commercial motor vehicle, or who is required to hold a commercial driver driver's license.
(13)(11) 'Driver Driver's license' means a license issued to an individual which authorizes the individual to drive a motor vehicle.
(14)(12) 'Employer' means a person, including the United States, a state, or a political subdivision of a state who owns or leases a commercial motor vehicle or assigns a person to drive a commercial motor vehicle.
(15)(13) 'Endorsement' means a special authorization to drive certain types of vehicles or to transport certain types of property or a certain number of passengers.
(16) 'Felony' means an offense under state or federal law that is punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year.
(17)(14) 'Foreign jurisdiction' means a jurisdiction other than a state of the United States.
(18)(15) 'Gross vehicle weight rating' means the actual weight or the value specified by the manufacturer as the maximum loaded weight of a single or a combination vehicle or the registered gross weight, whichever is greater. The gross vehicle weight rating of a combination vehicle (commonly referred to as the 'gross combination weight rating') is the gross vehicle weight rating of the power unit plus the gross vehicle weight rating of a towed unit.
(19)(16) 'Hazardous materials' has the meaning as that found in Section 103 of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (49 U.S.C. 1801, et seq.).
(20)(17) 'Motor vehicle' means every a vehicle which is self-propelled and every a vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires but not operated upon rails, except a vehicle moved solely by human power and motorized wheelchairs.
(21)(18) 'Out of service order' means a temporary prohibition against driving a commercial motor vehicle.
(22)(19) 'Recreational vehicle' means a self-propelled or towed vehicle that is equipped to serve as temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel purposes and is used solely as a family/personal conveyance.
(23)(20) 'Restriction' means a prohibition against driving certain types of vehicles or a requirement that the driver comply with certain conditions when driving a motor vehicle.
(24)(21) 'Serious traffic violation' means a conviction when operating a commercial motor vehicle of:
(a) excessive speeding, involving a single charge for a speed fifteen miles an hour or more above the speed limit;
(b) reckless driving, including charges of driving a commercial motor vehicle in a wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property;
(c) improper or erratic traffic lane changes;
(d) following the vehicle ahead too closely; or
(e) a violation of a state or local law related to motor vehicle traffic control, other than a parking violation, arising in connection with an accident or collision resulting in death or serious bodily injury to a person.
(25)(22) 'State' means a state or territory of the United States and the District of Columbia and the federal government and a province or territory of Canada.
(26)(23) 'Tank vehicle' means a vehicle that is designed to transport a liquid or gaseous material within a tank that either is attached permanently or temporarily to the vehicle and which has a capacity of one thousand gallons or more.
(27)(24) 'United States' means the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
(28)(25) 'Farm related vehicle' means a vehicle used:
(a) in custom harvester operations,;
(b) in livestock feeding operations,; or
(c) by an agri-chemical business or a company which hauls agri-chemical products to a farm.
(29)(26) 'Seasonal restricted commercial driver's license' means a commercial driver's license issued under the authority of the waiver promulgated by the Federal Department of Transportation (57 Federal Register 13650) by the department to an individual who has not passed the knowledge or skill test required of other commercial driver's license holders. This license authorizes operation of a commercial motor vehicle only on a seasonal basis, stated on the license, by a seasonal employee of a custom harvester, livestock feeder, agri-chemical operation, and company hauling agri-chemical products to a farm within one hundred fifty miles of the place of business."
SECTION 4. Section 56-5-2930 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"Section 56-5-2930. It is unlawful for any a person who is a habitual user of narcotic drugs or any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquors, narcotic drugs, barbiturates, paraldehydes or drugs, herbs or any other substance of like character, whether synthetic or natural, to drive any a motor vehicle within this State while under the:
(1) influence of alcohol to the extent that the person's mental and physical abilities are materially and appreciably impaired;
(2) influence of any other drug or a combination of other drugs or substances which cause impairment to the extent that the person's mental and physical abilities are materially and appreciably impaired; or
(3) combined influence of alcohol and any other drug or drugs, or substances which cause impairment to the extent that the person's mental and physical abilities are materially and appreciably impaired.
For purposes of this section 'drug' means illicit or licit drug, a combination of licit or illicit drugs, a combination of alcohol and an illicit drug, or a combination of alcohol and a licit drug."
SECTION 5. Section 56-5-2940(1) of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"(1) By a fine of two three hundred dollars or imprisonment for not less than forty-eight hours nor more than thirty days, for the first offense. However, in lieu of the forty-eight hour minimum imprisonment the court may provide for forty-eight hours of public service employment. The minimum forty-eight hour imprisonment or public service employment must be served at a time when the person is off from work and does not interfere with his regular employment under terms and conditions as the court considers proper. However, the court may not compel an offender to perform public service employment in lieu of the minimum sentence."
SECTION 6. The 1976 Code is amended by adding:
"Section 56-5-2946. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person must submit to either one or a combination of chemical tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of alcohol and drugs if there is probable cause to believe that the person violated or is under arrest for a violation of Section 56-5-2945.
The tests must be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer who has probable cause to believe that the person violated or is under arrest for a violation of Section 56-5-2945. The administration of one test does not preclude the administration of other tests. The resistance, obstruction, or opposition to testing pursuant to this section is evidence admissible at the trial of the offense which precipitated the requirement for testing. A person who is tested or gives samples for testing may have a qualified person of his choice conduct additional tests at his expense and must be notified of that right. A person's request or failure to request additional blood or urine tests is not admissible against the person in the criminal trial.
The provisions of Section 56-5-2950, relating to the administration of tests to determine a person's alcohol concentration, additional tests at the person's expense, the availability of other evidence on the question of whether or not the person was under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of them, availability of test information to the person or his attorney, and the liability of medical institutions and persons administering the tests are applicable to this section and also extend to the officer requesting the test, the State or its political subdivisions, or governmental agency, or entity which employs the officer making the request, and the agency, institution, or employer, either governmental or private, of persons administering the tests. Notwithstanding any other provision of state law pertaining to confidentiality of hospital records or other medical records, information regarding tests performed pursuant to this section must be released, upon subpoena, to a court, prosecuting attorney, defense attorney, or law enforcement officer in connection with an alleged violation of Section 56-5-2945."
SECTION 7. Section 56-5-2950 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 497 of 1994, is further amended to read:
"Section 56-5-2950. (a) A person who operates drives a motor vehicle in this State is considered to have given consent to chemical tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol or drugs or the combination of alcohol and drugs if arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was operating driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of them. A breath test must be administered at the direction of a law enforcement officer who has apprehended arrested a person for operating driving a motor vehicle in this State while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of them. At the direction of the arresting officer, the person first must be offered a breath test to determine the person's alcohol concentration of his blood. If the person is physically unable to provide an acceptable breath sample because he has an injured mouth, or is unconscious, or dead, or for another any other reason considered acceptable by the licensed medical personnel, the arresting officer may request a blood sample may to be taken. If the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is under the influence of drugs other than alcohol, the officer may order that a urine sample be taken for testing. If the breathalyzer reading alcohol concentration is ten eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight of alcohol in the person's blood or above, the officer may not require additional tests of the person as provided in this chapter. The breath test must be administered by a person trained and certified by SLED, using methods approved by SLED. The arresting officer may not administer the tests if the person's conduct during the twenty-minute pre-test waiting period is videotaped pursuant to Section 56-5-2953(A)(2)(d). Before the breath test is administered, an eight one-hundredths of one percent simulator test must be performed and the result must reflect a reading between 0.076 percent and 0.084 percent. Blood and urine samples must be taken obtained by physicians licensed by the State Board of Medical Examiners, registered nurses licensed by the State Board of Nursing, and other medical personnel trained to take obtain the samples in a licensed medical facility. Blood samples or and urine samples must be obtained and handled in accordance with procedures approved by SLED.
No tests may be administered or samples taken obtained unless the person has been informed in writing that:
(1) he does not have to take the test or give the samples but that his privilege to drive must be suspended or denied for at least ninety days if he refuses to submit to the tests and that his refusal may be used against him in court;
(2) his privilege to drive must be suspended for at least thirty days if he takes the tests or gives the samples and has an alcohol concentration of fifteen one-hundredths of one percent or more;
(3) he has the right to have a qualified person of his own choosing conduct additional independent tests at his expense;
(4) he has the right to request an administrative hearing within ten days of the issuance of the notice of suspension; and
(5) he must enroll in an Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program within ten days of the issuance of the notice of suspension.
A hospital, physician, qualified technician, chemist, or registered nurse who takes obtains the samples or conducts the test or participates in the process of taking obtaining the samples or conducting the test in accordance with this section is not subject to a cause of action for assault, battery, or another cause contending that the drawing of blood or taking samples at the request of the arrested person or a law enforcement officer was wrongful. This release from liability does not reduce the standard of medical care required of the person taking obtaining the samples or conducting the test. This qualified release also applies to the employer of the person who conducts the test or takes obtains the samples.
The person tested or giving samples for testing may have a qualified person of his own choosing conduct additional tests at his expense and must be notified in writing of that right. A person's failure to request additional blood or urine tests is not admissible against the person in the criminal trial. The failure or inability of the person tested to obtain additional tests does not preclude the admission of evidence relating to the tests or samples taken obtained at the direction of the law enforcement officer.
The arresting officer shall must provide reasonable affirmative assistance to the person to contact a qualified person to conduct and obtain additional tests. Affirmative assistance, at a minimum, includes providing transportation for the person to the nearest medical facility which provides blood tests to determine a person's alcohol concentration. If the medical facility obtains the blood sample but refuses or fails to test the blood sample to determine the person's alcohol concentration, SLED must test the blood sample and provide the result to the person and to the arresting officer. Failure to provide affirmative assistance upon request to obtain additional tests bars the admissibility of the breath test result in any judicial or administrative proceeding.
SLED shall administer the provisions of this subsection and may shall make regulations necessary to carry out its provisions. The costs of the tests administered at the direction of the law enforcement officer must be paid from the general fund of the State.
A qualified person who obtains samples or administers the tests or assists in obtaining samples or the administration of tests at the direction of a law enforcement officer is released from civil and criminal liability unless the obtaining of samples or tests is performed in a negligent manner. No person may be required by the arresting officer, or by another law enforcement officer, to obtain or take any sample of blood or urine.
(b) In any the criminal prosecution for the a violation of Section 56-5-2930 or 56-5-2945 relating to operating driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of them, the amount of alcohol concentration in the person's blood at the time of the alleged violation test, as shown by chemical analysis of the person's breath or other body fluids, gives rise to the following inferences:
(1) If there the alcohol concentration was at that time five one-hundredths of one percent or less by weight of alcohol in the person's blood, it is conclusively presumed that the person was not under the influence of alcohol.
(2) If there the alcohol concentration was at that time in excess of five one-hundredths of one percent but less than ten eight one-hundredths of one percent by weight of alcohol in the person's blood, that fact does not give rise to any inference that the person was or was not under the influence of alcohol, but that fact may be considered with other competent evidence in determining the guilt or innocence of the person.
(3) If there the alcohol concentration was at that time ten eight one-hundredths of one percent or more by weight of alcohol in the person's blood, it may be inferred that the person was under the influence of alcohol.
The provisions of this section must not be construed as limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon the question of whether or not the person was under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of them.
(c) Any A person who is unconscious or otherwise in a condition rendering him incapable of refusal is considered to be informed and not to have withdrawn the consent provided by subsection (a) of this section.
(d) If a person under arrest refuses, upon the request of a law enforcement officer, to submit to chemical tests as provided in subsection (a) of this section, none may be given, but the department, on the basis of a report of the law enforcement officer that the arrested person was operating a motor vehicle in this State while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of them and that the person had refused to submit to the tests shall suspend his license or permit to drive, or any nonresident operating privilege for a period of ninety days. If the person is a resident without a license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in this State, the department shall deny to the person the issuance of a license or permit for a period of ninety days after the date of the alleged violation. The ninety-day period of suspension begins with the day after the date of the notice required to be given, unless a hearing is requested as provided, in which case the ninety-day period begins with the day after the date of the order sustaining the suspension or denial of issuance. The report of the arresting officer must include what grounds he had for believing that the arrested person had been operating a motor vehicle in this State while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of them. If the arrested person took the chemical breath test but refused to provide a blood or urine sample, the report of the arresting officer must include what were his grounds for believing that the arrested person was under the influence of drugs other than alcohol. If a person who refuses, upon the request of a law enforcement officer, to submit to chemical tests as provided in subsection (a) of this section, pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or forfeits bond for a first offense violation of Section 56-5-2930, within thirty days of arrest, the period of the suspension of driving privileges under this section must be canceled and any suspension of driving privileges under Section 56-5-2990 for a first conviction may not exceed six months.
(e) Upon suspending the license or permit to drive or nonresident operating privilege of any person, or upon determining that the issuance of a license or permit must be denied to the person, as hereinbefore in this section directed, the department shall notify immediately the person in writing and, upon his request, shall afford him an opportunity for a hearing in accordance with the State Administrative Procedures Act, except that the scope of the hearing for the purposes of this section must be limited to the issues of whether the person was placed under arrest, whether the person had been informed that he did not have to take the test but that his privilege to drive would be suspended or denied if he refused to submit to the test, and whether he refused to submit to the test upon request of the officer. The department shall order that the suspension or determination that there should be a denial of issuance either be rescinded or sustained.
(f) When it is finally determined under the procedures of this section that a nonresident's privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State has been suspended, the department shall give information in writing of the action taken to the motor vehicle administrator of the state of the person's residence and of any state in which he has a license.
(g)(d) Any A person required to submit to tests by the arresting law enforcement officer must be provided with a written report including the time of arrest, the time of the tests, and the results of the tests prior to before any trial or other proceedings proceeding in which the results of the tests are used as evidence. Any A person administering a test at the request of the defendant shall record in writing who obtains additional tests must furnish a copy of the time, method, and results of the any test and promptly furnish a copy to the arresting officer prior to before any trial, hearing, or other proceedings proceeding in which the person attempts to use the results of the additional test tests are used as evidence.
(h) Any person whose driver's license or permit is suspended for failure to take the tests required by this section and who is not convicted of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of them is not required to file proof of insurance under the Financial Responsibility Act, and no record of he suspension may be shown on any of his records."
SECTION 8. The 1976 Code is amended by adding:
"Section 56-5-2951. (A) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend the driver's license, permit, or nonresident operating privilege of or deny the issuance of a license or permit to a person who drives a motor vehicle and refuses to submit to a test provided for in Section 56-5-2950 or has an alcohol concentration of fifteen one-hundredths of one percent or more. The arresting officer shall issue a notice of suspension which is effective beginning on the date of the alleged violation of Section 56-5-2930 or Section 56-5-2945.
(B) If the test registers an alcohol concentration of eight one-hundredths of one percent or more, the person, within ten days of the issuance of the notice of suspension, must enroll in an Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program pursuant to Section 56-5-2990.
(C) If the person does not enroll in an Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program within ten days, the suspension remains in effect, a temporary alcohol restricted license must not be issued, and an administrative hearing may not be requested. If the person drives during the period of suspension without a temporary alcohol restricted license, the person must be penalized for driving while his license is suspended pursuant to Section 56-1-460.
(D) Within ten days of the issuance of the notice of suspension the person may:
(1) obtain a temporary alcohol restricted license by filing with the department a form after enrolling in an Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program. A thirty dollar fee must be assessed for obtaining a temporary alcohol restricted license. Twenty-five dollars of the fee must be retained by the department for supplying and maintaining all necessary vehicle videotaping equipment. The remaining five dollars must be retained by the department for administrative costs associated with the issuance of the temporary alcohol restricted licenses. The temporary alcohol restricted license allows the person to drive without any restrictive conditions pending the outcome of the administrative hearing provided for in subsection (G), or the final decision or disposition of the matter; and
(2) request an administrative hearing.
At the administrative hearing if:
(a) the suspension is upheld, the person's driver's license, permit, or nonresident operating privilege must be suspended or the person must be denied the issuance of a license or permit for the remainder of the suspension period provided for in subsection (J);
(b) the suspension is overturned, the person shall have his driver's license, permit, or nonresident operating privilege reinstated and is not required to complete the Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program in which he is enrolled. Any costs paid by the person to the Department of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Services pursuant to Section 56-5-2990 must be refunded.
The provisions of this subsection do not affect the trial for a violation of Section 56-5-2930 or Section 56-5-2945.
(E) The period of suspension provided for in subsection (J) begins on the day the notice of suspension is issued and continues until the person applies for a temporary alcohol restricted license and requests an administrative hearing.
(F) If a person does not request an administrative hearing, he shall have waived his right to the hearing and his suspension must not be stayed, but continues for the period provided for in subsection (J).
(G) The notice of suspension shall advise the person of the requirement to enroll in an Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program and of his right to obtain a temporary alcohol restricted driver's license and request an administrative hearing. The notice of suspension also shall advise the person that if he does not request an administrative hearing within ten days of the issuance of the notice of suspension, he shall have waived his right to the administrative hearing, and the suspension continues for the period provided for in subsection (J).
(H) An administrative hearing must be held within ten days after the request for the hearing is received by the department. However, upon a showing of exigent circumstances by either party, a continuance may be granted not to exceed thirty days. The scope of the hearing must be limited to whether the person:
(1) was lawfully arrested or detained;
(2) was advised in writing of the rights enumerated in Section 56-5-2950;
(3) refused to submit to a test pursuant to Section 56-5-2950; or
(4) consented to taking a test pursuant to Section 56-5-2950, and the:
(a) reported alcohol concentration at the time of testing was fifteen one-hundredths of one percent or more;
(b) individual who administered the test or took samples was qualified pursuant to Section 56-5-2950; and
(c) tests administered and samples obtained were conducted pursuant to Section 56-5-2950 and division procedures.
Nothing in this section prohibits the introduction of evidence at the administrative hearing on the issue of the accuracy of the breath test result.
A written order must be issued to the person upholding the suspension of the person's license, permit, or nonresident's operating privilege, or denying the issuance of a license or permit within ten days after the conclusion of the administrative hearing. If the suspension is upheld, the person must receive credit for the number of days his license was suspended before he received a temporary alcohol restricted license and requested the administrative hearing.
(I) An administrative hearing is a contested proceeding under the Administrative Procedures Act, and a person has a right to judicial review pursuant to that act. The filing of a petition for review in the circuit court stays the suspension until a final decision is issued.
(J)(1) The period of a driver's license, permit, or nonresident operating privilege suspension for, or denial of issuance of a license or permit to an arrested person who has no previous convictions for violating Section 56-5-2930 or 56-5-2945 or any other law of this State or another state that prohibits a person from driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or another drug within the ten years preceding a violation of this section, and who has had no previous suspension imposed pursuant to Section 56-5-2950 or 56-5-2951 within the ten years preceding a violation of this section is:
(a) ninety days for a person who refuses to submit to a test pursuant to Section 56-5-2950; or
(b) thirty days for a person who takes a test pursuant to Section 56-5-2950 and has an alcohol concentration of fifteen one-hundredths of one percent or more.
(2) The period of a driver's license, permit, or nonresident operating privilege suspension for, or denial of issuance of a license or permit to an arrested person who has been convicted previously for violating Section 56-5-2930 or 56-5-2945 or any other law of this State or another state that prohibits a person from driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any other drug within the ten years preceding a violation of this section, or who has had a previous suspension imposed pursuant to Section 56-5-2950 or 56-5-2951 within the ten years preceding a violation of this section is one hundred eighty days if he refuses to submit to a test pursuant to Section 56-5-2950 or sixty days if he takes a test pursuant to Section 56-5-2950 and has an alcohol concentration of fifteen one-hundredths of one percent or more.
(K) When a nonresident's privilege to drive a motor vehicle in this State has been suspended under the provisions of this section, the department must give written notice of the action taken to the motor vehicle administrator of the state of the person's residence and of any state in which he has a license or permit.
(L) The department shall not suspend the privilege to drive of a person under the age of twenty-one pursuant to Section 56-1-286 if the person's privilege to drive has been suspended under this section arising from the same incident.
(M) A person whose driver's license or permit is suspended pursuant to this section is not required to file proof of financial responsibility.
(N) An insurer may not increase premiums on or add surcharges to the automobile insurance of a person charged with a violation of Sections 56-1-286, 56-5-2930, or 56-5-2945 or any other law of this State or another state that prohibits a person from driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any other drug unless he is convicted of the violation.
(O) The department shall administer the provisions of this section and shall promulgate regulations necessary to carry out its provisions."
SECTION 9. The 1976 Code is amended by adding:
"Section 56-5-2953. (A) A person who violates Section 56-5-2930 or 56-5-2945 shall have his conduct at the incident site and the breath test site videotaped.
(1) The videotaping at the incident site must:
(a) begin not later than the activation of the officer's blue lights and conclude after the arrest of the person for a violation of Section 56-5-2930 or a probable cause determination that the person violated Section 56-5-2945; and
(b) include the person being advised of his Miranda rights, if required by state or federal law, before any field sobriety tests are administered, if the tests are administered.
(2) The videotaping at the breath site:
(a) must be completed within three hours of the person's arrest for a violation of Section 56-5-2930 or 56-5-2945 or a probable cause determination that the person violated Section 56-5-2945, unless compliance is not possible because the person needs emergency medical treatment considered necessary by licensed medical personnel;
(b) shall include the reading of Miranda rights, if required by state or federal law, the entire breath test procedure, the person being informed that he is being videotaped, and that he has the right to refuse the test;
(c) shall include the person taking or refusing the breath test, and the actions of the breath test operator while conducting the test;
(d) shall also include the person's conduct during the required twenty-minute pre-test waiting period, unless the officer submits a sworn affidavit certifying that it was physically impossible to videotape this waiting period. However, if the arresting officer administers the breath test, then the person's conduct during the twenty-minute pre-test waiting period must be videotaped.
The videotapes of the incident site and of the breath test site are admissible pursuant to the South Carolina Rules of Evidence in a criminal, administrative, or civil proceeding by any party to the action.
(B) Nothing in this section may be construed as prohibiting the introduction of other evidence in the trial of a violation of Section 56-5-2930 or 56-5-2945. Failure by the arresting officer to produce the videotapes required by this section is not alone a ground for dismissal of any charge made pursuant to Section 56-5-2930 or 56-5-2945 if the arresting officer submits a sworn affidavit certifying that the videotape equipment at the time of the arrest, probable cause determination, or breath test device was in an inoperable condition, stating reasonable efforts have been made to maintain the equipment in an operable condition, and certifying that there was no other operable breath test facility available in the county of arrest or, in the alternative, submits a sworn affidavit certifying that it was physically impossible to produce the videotape because the person needed emergency medical treatment, or exigent circumstances existed. Further, in circumstances including, but not limited to, road blocks, traffic accident investigations, and citizens' arrests, where an arrest has been made and the videotaping equipment has not been activated by blue lights, the failure by the arresting officer to produce the videotapes required by this section is not alone a ground for dismissal. However, as soon as videotaping is practicable in these circumstances, videotaping should begin and conform with the provisions of this section. Nothing in this section prohibits the court from considering any other valid reason for the failure to produce the videotape based upon the totality of the circumstances, nor do the provisions of this section prohibit the person from offering evidence relating to the arresting law enforcement officer's failure to produce the videotape.
(C) A videotape must not be disposed of in any manner except for its transfer to a master tape for consolidation purposes until the results of any legal proceeding in which it may be involved finally are determined.
(D) SLED is responsible for purchasing, maintaining, and supplying all necessary videotaping equipment for use at the breath test sites. SLED also is responsible for monitoring all breath test sites to ensure the proper maintenance of videotaping equipment. The Department of Public Safety is responsible for purchasing, maintaining, and supplying all videotaping equipment for use in all law enforcement vehicles used for traffic enforcement. The Department of Public Safety also is responsible for monitoring all law enforcement vehicles used for traffic enforcement to ensure proper maintenance of videotaping equipment.
(E) Beginning one month from the effective date of this act, one hundred percent of the funds received in accordance with Section 14-1-208 (B) must be remitted and retained by SLED to equip all breath test sites with videotaping devices and supplies. Once all breath test sites have been equipped fully with videotaping devices and supplies, eighty-seven and one-half (87.5) percent of the funds received in accordance with Section 14-1-208 (B) must be remitted and retained by the Department of Public Safety to purchase, maintain, and supply videotaping equipment for vehicles used for traffic enforcement. The remaining twelve and one-half (12.5) percent of the funds received in accordance with Section 14-1-208 (B) must be remitted and retained by SLED to purchase, maintain, and supply videotaping equipment for the breath test sites. Funds must be remitted to the Department of Public Safety and SLED on a monthly basis. The Department of Public Safety and SLED are authorized to carry forward any unexpended funds received in accordance with Section 14-1-208 (B) as of June thirtieth of each year, and to expend these carried forward funds for the purchase, maintenance, and supply of videotaping equipment. The Department of Public Safety and SLED shall report the revenue received under this section and the expenditures for which the revenue was used as required in the department's and SLED's annual appropriation request to the General Assembly.
(F) The Department of Public Safety and SLED shall promulgate regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this section."
SECTION 10. Section 56-5-2990 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act No. 258 of 1997, is further amended to read:
"Section 56-5-2990. The department shall suspend the driver's license of a person who is convicted, receives sentence upon a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere, or forfeits bail posted for the a violation of Section 56-5-2930 or for the violation of another law or ordinance of this State or of a municipality of this State that prohibits a person from operating driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drugs, or narcotics for six months for the first conviction, plea of guilty or of nolo contendere, or forfeiture of bail, ; one year for the second conviction, plea of guilty or of nolo contendere, or forfeiture of bail,; two years for the third offense, conviction, plea of guilty or of nolo contendere, or forfeiture of bail; and a permanent revocation of the driver's license for the fourth and or subsequent offenses conviction, plea of guilty or of nolo contendere, or forfeiture of bail. Only those violations which occurred within ten years including and immediately preceding the date of the last violation shall constitute prior violations within the meaning of this section. However, if the third conviction occurs within five years from the date of the first offense, then the department shall suspend the driver's license for four years. A person whose license is revoked following conviction for a fourth offense as provided in this section is forever barred from being issued any license by the Department of Public Safety to operate a motor vehicle except as provided in Section 56-1-385.
Any person whose license is suspended under the provisions of this section, Section 56-1-286, or 56-5-2951 must be notified of suspension by the department of the suspension and of the requirement to be evaluated by enroll in and successfully complete an Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program certified by the Department of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Services prior to reinstatement of the license. An assessment of the degree extent and kind nature of the alcohol and drug abuse problem, if any, of the applicant must be prepared and a plan of education or treatment, or both, must be developed based upon the assessment for the applicant. Entry into and successful completion of the services, if such the services are necessary, recommended in the plan of education or treatment, or both, developed for the applicant is a mandatory requirement of the restoration of driving privileges to the applicant. The applicant shall bear the cost of the services to be determined by the administering agency Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program and approved by the Department of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Services. The cost may not exceed seventy-five dollars for assessment, one hundred twenty-five dollars for education services, two hundred twenty-five dollars for treatment services, and three hundred dollars in total for any and all services. No applicant may be denied services due to an inability to pay. The applicant shall be terminated from the Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program no later than six months after the date of program enrollment shall determine if the applicant has successfully completed services within six months of the date of enrollment or shall certify that the person is making satisfactory progress toward completion of the program. If the applicant has not successfully completed the services as directed by the Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program by the end of the six-month period of enrollment within six months of enrollment, a hearing must be provided by the administering agency Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program and if further needed by whose decision is appealable to the Department of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Services. If the applicant is unsuccessful in the Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program, the department may restore the privilege to operate drive a motor vehicle upon the recommendation of the Medical Advisory Board as utilized by the department if it determines public safety and welfare of the petitioner may not be endangered.
The department and the Department of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Services shall develop procedures necessary for the communication of information pertaining to relicensing or otherwise. Such These procedures must be consistent with the confidentiality laws of the State and the United States. Successful completion of education, treatment services, or both, for purposes of receiving a provisional driver's license as stipulated in Section 56-1-1330 may be substituted in lieu of services received under the authority of this section at the discretion of the applicant. If the driver's license of any person is suspended by authority of this section, no insurance company may refuse to issue insurance to cover the remaining members of his family, but the insurance company is not liable for any actions of the person whose license has been suspended or who has voluntarily turned his license in to the department."
SECTION 11. A study committee is created to examine state law relating to the requirements for the transportation, possession, and consumption of alcoholic liquors in minibottles and to examine amendments to state law pertaining to alcoholic liquor by the drink. The committee shall consist of eleven voting members as follows:
(1) four members from the Senate to be appointed by the President Pro Tempore of the Senate at least one of whom must be a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee and one of whom must be a member of the Senate Finance Committee;
(2) four members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House at least one of whom must be a member of the House Judiciary Committee and one of whom must be a member of the House Ways and Means Committee;
(3) three members to be appointed by the Governor.
In addition seven nonvoting members are to be appointed by the Governor as follows:
(1) one member from the Department of Public Safety;
(2) one member from the Department of Revenue;
(3) one member chosen from a list of recommendations made by MADD;
(4) one member from the Department of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Services;
(5) one member from SLED;
(6) one member chosen from a list of recommendations made by the Hospitality Association of South Carolina; and
(7) one member chosen from a list of recommendations made by the South Carolina Council of Alcohol Authorities.
The voting members of the study committee shall elect a chairman and shall meet at times and places as the chairman determines to be necessary. The expenses of the legislative members of the study committee must be paid from the approved accounts of their respective bodies. The expenses of the gubernatorial appointees must be paid by the Governor's Office.
The committee must be staffed by personnel assigned by the Chairman of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees. The committee shall report its findings to the General Assembly no later than the first day of the 1999 legislative session and upon this report is terminated.
SECTION 12. Section 14-1-208 (A) and (B) of the 1976 Code as last amended by Act 141 of 1997, are further amended to read:
"(A) Beginning January 1, 1995, and continuously after that date, a person who is convicted of, or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or forfeits bond for an offense tried in municipal court must pay an amount equal to 64 74 percent of the fine imposed as an assessment. This assessment must be paid to the municipal clerk of court and deposited with the city treasurer for remittance to the State Treasurer. The assessment is based upon that portion of the fine that is not suspended and assessments must not be waived, reduced, or suspended.
(B) The city treasurer must remit 18.75 16.22 percent of the revenue generated by the assessment imposed in subsection (A) to the municipality to be used for the purposes set forth in subsection (D), 13.51 percent of the revenue generated by the assessment imposed in subsection (A) to the State Treasurer to be used as set forth in Section 56-5-2953(E), and remit the balance of the assessment revenue to the State Treasurer on a monthly basis by the fifteenth day of each month and make reports on a form and in a manner prescribed by the State Treasurer. Assessments paid in installments must be remitted as received."
SECTION 13. All proceedings pending and all rights and liabilities existing, acquired, or accrued at the time this act takes effect are saved. The provisions of this act apply prospectively to crimes and offenses committed on or after the effective date of this act.
SECTION 14. Sections 56-1-10, 56-1-286, 56-1-2030, 56-5-2946, 56-5-2930, 56-5-2990, 56-31-60, and SECTIONS 11 and 12 of this act take effect upon approval by the Governor. The provisions in Section 56-5-2950 pertaining to an alcohol concentration of eight one hundredths of one percent or more take effect on January 1, 2001; all other provisions in Section 56-5-2950 take effect upon approval by the Governor. The provisions in Section 56-5-2953(A), (B), and (C) take effect for each law enforcement vehicle used for traffic enforcement as soon as the law enforcement vehicle used for traffic enforcement is equipped with a videotaping device. The provisions in Section 56-5-2953(A), (B), and (C) take effect for each breath test site as soon as the breath test site is equipped with a videotaping device. The provisions in Section 56-5-2953(D) and (E) take effect upon approval by the Governor. The provisions in Section 56-5-2953(F) take effect one year after approval by the Governor. The Chief of SLED and the Director of the Department of Public Safety shall report to the General Assembly when all breath test sites and law enforcement vehicles used for traffic enforcement are equipped./
Amend title to conform.
Rep. JENNINGS explained the amendment.
Rep. ALTMAN spoke against the amendment.
Reps. HASKINS and C0BB-HUNTER spoke in favor of the amendment.
Rep. COBB-HUNTER continued speaking.
The amendment was then adopted.
Rep. JENNINGS proposed the following Amendment No. 2 (Doc Name P:\AMEND\GGS\22097CM.98), which was adopted.
Amend the bill, as and if amended Section 56-1-286(J)(2)(b) as contained in SECTION 2, by deleting Department of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Services/ before / pursuant / and inserting / certified Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program/ on line 30, page 174-5.
Amend further Section 56-5-2951(D)(2)(b) as contained in SECTION 8 by deleting /Department of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Services/ before /pursuant/ and inserting /certified Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program/ on line 2, page 174-18.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. JENNINGS explained the amendment.
The amendment was then adopted.
Reps. HARRISON and JENNINGS proposed the following Amendment No. 3 (Doc Name P:\AMEND\GGS\22100CM.98), which was adopted.
Amend the bill, as and if amended, SECTION 14, page 174-26, by deleting line 15 and inserting / provisions in Sections 56-5-2950 and 56-5-2951 pertaining to an alcohol /.
Amend further SECTION 14, page 174-26, by deleting line 17 and inserting /effect on January 1, 2001; all other provisions in Sections 56-5-2950 and 56-5-2951/.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. JENNINGS explained the amendment.
The amendment was then adopted.
Reps. JENNINGS and SIMRILL proposed the following Amendment No. 4 (Doc Name P:\AMEND\GGS\22127CM.98), which was adopted.
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking SECTION 3, beginning on Page 174-7, in its entirety and inserting:
/SECTION 3. Section 56-1-2030 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 149 of 1993, is further amended to read:
"Section 56-1-2030. As used in this article:
(1) 'Alcohol' means a substance containing any form of alcohol including, but not limited to, ethanol, methanol, propanol, and isopropanol.
(2) 'Alcohol concentration' means:
(a) the number of grams of alcohol for each one hundred milliliters of blood; or
(b) as determined by the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division for other bodily fluids.
(3) 'Commercial driver driver's license' means a license issued in accordance with the requirements of the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (Title XII of Public Law 99-570) to an individual which authorizes the individual to drive a class of commercial motor vehicle.
(4)(2) 'Commercial Driver Driver's License Information System' means the information system established pursuant to the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 to serve as a clearinghouse for locating information related to the licensing and identification of commercial motor vehicle drivers.
(5)(3) 'Commercial driver driver's instruction permit' means a permit issued pursuant to Section 56-1-2080(D) of this article.
(6)(4) 'Commercial motor vehicle' means a motor vehicle designed or used to transport passengers or property if the vehicle:
(a) the vehicle has a gross vehicle weight rating of twenty-six thousand one or more pounds;
(b) the vehicle is designed to transport sixteen or more persons, including the driver; or
(c) the vehicle is transporting hazardous materials and is required to be placarded in accordance with 49 C.F.R. part 172, subpart F.
(7)(5) 'CMVSA' means the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (Title XII of Public Law 99-570).
(8)(6) 'Controlled substance' means a substance so classified under Section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802(6)) listed on Schedules I through V of 21 C.F.R. part 1308, as revised from time to time.
(9)(7) 'Conviction' means an unvacated adjudication of guilty, or a determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in a court of original jurisdiction or an authorized administrative tribunal, an unvacated forfeiture of bail or collateral deposited to secure the person's appearance in court, the payment of a fine or court cost, or violation of a condition of release without bail, regardless of whether or not the penalty is rebated, suspended, or probated.
(10)(8) 'Disqualification' means a withdrawal of the privilege to drive a commercial motor vehicle.
(11)(9) 'Drive' means to drive, operate, or be in physical control of a motor vehicle.
(12)(10) 'Driver' means a person who drives a commercial motor vehicle, or who is required to hold a commercial driver driver's license.
(13)(11) 'Driver Driver's license' means a license issued to an individual which authorizes the individual to drive a motor vehicle.
(14)(12) 'Employer' means a person, including the United States, a state, or a political subdivision of a state who owns or leases a commercial motor vehicle or assigns a person to drive a commercial motor vehicle.
(15)(13) 'Endorsement' means a special authorization to drive certain types of vehicles or to transport certain types of property or a certain number of passengers.
(16)(14) 'Felony' means an offense under state or federal law that is punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year.
(17)(15) 'Foreign jurisdiction' means a jurisdiction other than a state of the United States.
(18)(16) 'Gross vehicle weight rating' means the actual weight or the value specified by the manufacturer as the maximum loaded weight of a single or a combination vehicle or the registered gross weight, whichever is greater. The gross vehicle weight rating of a combination vehicle (commonly referred to as the 'gross combination weight rating') is the gross vehicle weight rating of the power unit plus the gross vehicle weight rating of a towed unit.
(19)(17) 'Hazardous materials' has the meaning as that found in Section 103 of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (49 U.S.C. 1801, et seq.).
(20)(18) 'Motor vehicle' means every a vehicle which is self-propelled and every a vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires but not operated upon rails, except a vehicle moved solely by human power and motorized wheelchairs.
(21)(19) 'Out of service order' means a temporary prohibition against driving a commercial motor vehicle.
(22)(20) 'Recreational vehicle' means a self-propelled or towed vehicle that is equipped to serve as temporary living quarters for recreational, camping, or travel purposes and is used solely as a family/personal conveyance.
(23)(21) 'Restriction' means a prohibition against driving certain types of vehicles or a requirement that the driver comply with certain conditions when driving a motor vehicle.
(24)(22) 'Serious traffic violation' means a conviction when operating a commercial motor vehicle of:
(a) excessive speeding, involving a single charge for a speed fifteen miles an hour or more above the speed limit;
(b) reckless driving, including charges of driving a commercial motor vehicle in a wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property;
(c) improper or erratic traffic lane changes;
(d) following the vehicle ahead too closely; or
(e) a violation of a state or local law related to motor vehicle traffic control, other than a parking violation, arising in connection with an accident or collision resulting in death or serious bodily injury to a person.
(25)(23) 'State' means a state or territory of the United States and the District of Columbia and the federal government and a province or territory of Canada.
(26)(24) 'Tank vehicle' means a vehicle that is designed to transport a liquid or gaseous material within a tank that either is attached permanently or temporarily to the vehicle and which has a capacity of one thousand gallons or more.
(27)(25) 'United States' means the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
(28)(26) 'Farm related vehicle' means a vehicle used:
(a) in custom harvester operations,;
(b) in livestock feeding operations,; or
(c) by an agri-chemical business or a company which hauls agri-chemical products to a farm.
(29)(27) 'Seasonal restricted commercial driver's license' means a commercial driver's license issued under the authority of the waiver promulgated by the Federal Department of Transportation (57 Federal Register 13650) by the department to an individual who has not passed the knowledge or skill test required of other commercial driver's license holders. This license authorizes operation of a commercial motor vehicle only on a seasonal basis, stated on the license, by a seasonal employee of a custom harvester, livestock feeder, agri-chemical operation, and company hauling agri-chemical products to a farm within one hundred fifty miles of the place of business."/
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. JENNINGS explained the amendment.
The amendment was then adopted.
Rep. SIMRILL proposed the following Amendment No. 5 (Doc Name P:\AMEND\GJK\21498CM.98), which was adopted.
Amend the bill, as and if amended, in Section 56-1-286(K) of the 1976 Code, as contained in SECTION 2, by inserting /, or at the expiration of any other suspensions,/ after /issued/ on line 33, page 174-5.
Amend the bill further, as and if amended, in Section 56-5-2951(E) as contained in SECTION 8, by inserting /, or at the expiration of any other suspensions,/ after /issued/ on line 7, page 174-18.
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend totals and title to conform.
Rep. SIMRILL explained the amendment.
The amendment was then adopted.
Reps. JENNINGS and SIMRILL proposed the following Amendment No. 6 (Doc Name P:\AMEND\GGS\22126CM.98), which was adopted.
Amend the bill, as and if amended, Section 56-5-2953(B) as contained in SECTION 9, by deleting /of arrest/ on Line 23, Page 174-21./
Amend title to conform.
Rep. JENNINGS explained the amendment.
The amendment was then adopted.
Rep. SIMRILL proposed the following Amendment No. 7 (Doc Name P:\AMEND\KGH\15612CM.98), which was tabled.
Amend the bill, as and if amended, SECTION 14, by deleting /2001/ and insertiing /1999/ on line 17, Page 174-26.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. SIMRILL explained the amendment.
Rep. KNOTTS spoke against the amendment.
Rep. JENNINGS spoke against the amendment.
Reps. COTTY and SIMRILL spoke in favor of the amendment.
Rep. JENNINGS moved to table the amendment, which was agreed to.
Rep. SIMRILL proposed the following Amendment No. 8 (Doc Name P:\AMEND\KGH\15611CM.98), which was tabled.
Amend the bill, as and if amended, SECTION 14, by deleting /January 1, 2001/ and inserting /July 1, 1999/ on line 17, Page 174-26.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. SIMRILL explained the amendment.
Rep. JENNINGS moved to table the amendment, which was agreed to.
Rep. HARRISON proposed the following Amendment No. 9 (Doc Name P:\AMEND\BBM\9905AC.98), which was adopted.
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking Section 56-5-2953(E), as contained in SECTION 9, Page 174-22, and inserting:
/(E) Beginning one month from the effective date of this act, all of the funds received in accordance with Section 14-1-208(C)(9) must be expended by SLED to equip all breath test sites with videotaping devices and supplies. Once all breath test sites have been equipped fully with videotaping devices and supplies, eighty-seven and one-half (87.5) percent of the funds received in accordance with Section 14-1-208(C)(9) must be expended by the Department of Public Safety to purchase, maintain, and supply videotaping equipment for vehicles used for traffic enforcement. The remaining twelve and one-half (12.5) percent of the funds received in accordance with Section 14-1-208(C)(9) must be expended by SLED to purchase, maintain, and supply videotaping equipment for the breath test sites. Funds must be distributed by the State Treasurer to the Department of Public Safety and SLED on a monthly basis. The Department of Public Safety and SLED are authorized to carry forward any unexpended funds received in accordance with Section 14-1-208(C)(9) as of June thirtieth of each year, and to expend these carried forward funds for the purchase, maintenance, and supply of videotaping equipment. The Department of Public Safety and SLED shall report the revenue received under this section and the expenditures for which the revenue was used as required in the department's and SLED's annual appropriation request to the General Assembly./
Amend the bill further by deleting SECTION 12, beginning on Page 174-25, and inserting:
/SECTION 12. Section 14-1-208 (A), (B), and (C) of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 141 of 1997, is further amended to read:
"(A) Beginning January 1, 1995, and continuously after that date, a person who is convicted of, or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or forfeits bond for an offense tried in municipal court must pay an amount equal to 64 74 percent of the fine imposed as an assessment. This assessment must be paid to the municipal clerk of court and deposited with the city treasurer for remittance to the State Treasurer. The assessment is based upon that portion of the fine that is not suspended, and assessments must not be waived, reduced, or suspended.
(B) The city treasurer must remit 18.75 16.22 percent of the revenue generated by the assessment imposed in subsection (A) to the municipality to be used for the purposes set forth in subsection (D) and remit the balance of the assessment revenue to the State Treasurer on a monthly basis by the fifteenth day of each month and make reports on a form and in a manner prescribed by the State Treasurer. Assessments paid in installments must be remitted as received.
(C) The State Treasurer shall deposit the assessments received as follows:
(1) 25.79 21.63 percent for programs established pursuant to Chapter 21 of Title 24 and the Shock Incarceration Program as provided in Article 13, Chapter 13 of Title 24;
(2) 25.5 21.39 percent to the Department of Public Safety program of training in the fields of law enforcement and criminal justice;
(3) .67 .56 percent to the Department of Public Safety to defray the cost of erecting and maintaining the South Carolina Law Enforcement Hall of Fame. When funds collected pursuant to this item exceed the necessary costs and expenses of the Hall of Fame operation and maintenance as determined by the Department of Public Safety, the department may retain the surplus for use in its law enforcement training programs;
(4) 19.06 15.98 percent for the State Office of Victim Assistance;
(5) 6.97 5.84 percent to the general fund;
(6) 19.38 16.26 percent to the Office of Indigent Defense for the defense of indigents;
(7) 1.63 1.37 percent to the Department of Mental Health to be used exclusively for the treatment and rehabilitation of drug addicts within the department's addiction center facilities;
(8) 1.0 .84 percent to the Attorney General's Office for a fund to provide support for counties involved in complex criminal litigation. For the purposes of this item, 'complex criminal litigation' means criminal cases in which the State is seeking the death penalty and has served notice as required by law upon the defendant's counsel and the county involved has expended more than one hundred thousand dollars for a particular case in direct support of operating the court of general sessions and for prosecution-related expenses. The Attorney General shall develop guidelines for determining what expenses are reimbursable from the fund and shall approve all disbursements from the fund. Funds must be paid to a county for all expenditures authorized for reimbursement under this item except for the first one hundred thousand dollars the county expended in satisfying the requirements for reimbursement from the fund; however, money disbursed from this fund must be disbursed on a 'first received, first paid' basis. When revenue in the fund reaches five hundred thousand dollars, all revenue in excess of five hundred thousand dollars must be credited to the general fund of the State. Unexpended revenue in the fund at the end of the fiscal year carries over and may be expended in the next fiscal year.;
(9) 16.13 percent for the programs established pursuant to Section 56-5-2953(E)."/
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. JENNINGS explained the amendment.
The amendment was then adopted.
Reps. HARRISON, JENNINGS, HASKINS and SIMRILL proposed the following Amendment No. 13 (Doc Name P:\AMEND\JIC\5654AC.98), which was adopted.
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by deleting SECTION 4 of the bill beginning on page 174-10 and inserting:
/SECTION 4. Section 56-5-2930 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"Section 56-5-2930. It is unlawful for any a person who is a habitual user of narcotic drugs or any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquors, narcotic drugs, barbiturates, paraldehydes or drugs, herbs or any other substance of like character, whether synthetic or natural, to drive any a motor vehicle within this State while under the:
(1) influence of alcohol to the extent that the person's faculties are materially and appreciably impaired;
(2) influence of any other drug or a combination of other drugs or substances which cause impairment to the extent that the person's faculties are materially and appreciably impaired; or
(3) combined influence of alcohol and any other drug or drugs, or substances which cause impairment to the extent that the person's faculties are materially and appreciably impaired.
For purposes of this section 'drug' means illicit or licit drug, a combination of licit or illicit drugs, a combination of alcohol and an illicit drug, or a combination of alcohol and a licit drug."/
Amend title to conform.
Rep. JENNINGS explained the amendment.
The amendment was then adopted.
Rep. EASTERDAY proposed the following Amendment No. 14 (Doc Name P:\AMEND\BBM\9915JM.98), which was ruled out of order.
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by adding an appropriately-numbered SECTION to read:
/SECTION ____. A. Section 61-4-100 of the 1976 Code, as added by Act 415 of 1996, is amended to read:
"Section 61-4-100. A. If a person is charged with a violation of Section 61-4-50 (the unlawful sale of beer or wine to minors), the minor must also be charged with a violation of Section 20-7-370 20-7-8920 (unlawful purchase or possession of beer or wine). In addition, if the minor violated Section 61-4-60 (false information as to age) or if an adult violated Section 61-4-80 (unlawful purchase of beer or wine for a person who cannot lawfully buy), these persons must also be charged with their violations.
Unless the provisions of this section are complied with, no person charged with a violation of Section 61-4-50 may be convicted of the offense.
Nothing in this section requires that charges made pursuant to this section be prosecuted to conclusion; but rather this determination must be made in the manner provided by law.
Nothing in this section requires a minor to be charged with a violation of Section 20-7-8920 or Section 61-4-60 if the minor purchases the beer or wine as part of an investigation being conducted by state or local law enforcement and the minor is eighteen years of age or older."
B. This section takes effect upon approval by the Governor./
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. EASTERDAY explained the amendment.
Rep. SCOTT raised a Point of Order that Amendment No. 14 was not germane to the Bill.
Rep. EASTERDAY argued contra.
SPEAKER WILKINS sustained the Point of Order and ruled the amendment out of order.
Rep. SIMRILL proposed the following Amendment No. 15 (Doc Name P:\AMEND\KGH\15613CM.98), which was adopted.
Amend the bill, as and if amended, Section 56-1-286(F)(2), as contained in SECTION 2, by inserting /, 56-5-2950/ before /or/ on line 39, Page 174-3.
Amend further, Section 56-1-286(G)(2), as contained in SECTION 2, by inserting /, 56-5-2950/ before /or/ on line 10, Page 174-4.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. SIMRILL explained the amendment.
The amendment was then adopted.
The question then recurred to the passage of the Bill, as amended, on second reading.
Pursuant to Rule 7.7 the yeas and nays were taken resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Allison Askins Bailey Barfield Barrett Battle Bauer Baxley Beck Boan Bowers Brown, G. Brown, H. Brown, J. Campsen Canty Carnell Cato Cave Chellis Clyburn Cobb-Hunter Cooper Cotty Cromer Dantzler Davenport Delleney Easterday Edge Emory Felder Fleming Gamble Gourdine Govan Hamilton Harrell Harris Harrison Harvin Haskins Hawkins Hines, J. Hines, M. Hinson Howard Jennings Jordan Keegan Kelley Kinon Kirsh Klauber Knotts Koon Lanford Law Leach Lee Limehouse Littlejohn Lloyd Loftis Mack Maddox Martin Mason McCraw McGee McLeod McMahand McMaster Meacham Miller Moody-Lawrence Mullen Neal Neilson Pinckney Quinn Rhoad Rice Riser Robinson Rodgers Sandifer Scott Seithel Sharpe Sheheen Simrill Smith, D. Smith, J. Smith, R. Spearman Stille Stoddard Stuart Townsend Tripp Trotter Vaughn Walker Webb Whipper Wilder Wilkes Wilkins Witherspoon Woodrum Young Young-Brickell
Those who voted in the negative are:
Altman
So, the Bill, as amended, was read the second time and ordered to third reading.
The following Bill was taken up.
S. 477 -- Senator Ryberg: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 12-6-3500, SO AS TO ALLOW A CREDIT IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE TAXES PAID ON QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLAN CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE TAXPAYER WHILE RESIDING IN ANOTHER STATE WHICH DID NOT EXEMPT SUCH CONTRIBUTIONS FROM ITS STATE INCOME TAX AND TO PROVIDE THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE SHALL PRESCRIBE THE METHOD OF CLAIMING THE CREDIT WHICH MUST BE SPREAD OVER THE LIFE EXPECTANCY OF THE TAXPAYER.
Rep. VAUGHN explained the Bill.
The question then recurred to the passage of the Bill on second reading.
Pursuant to Rule 7.7 the yeas and nays were taken resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Allison Altman Bailey Barfield Barrett Battle Bauer Baxley Beck Boan Brown, G. Brown, H. Campsen Carnell Cato Cave Chellis Cobb-Hunter Cooper Cotty Cromer Dantzler Davenport Delleney Easterday Edge Emory Felder Fleming Gamble Gourdine Govan Hamilton Harrell Harris Harrison Harvin Haskins Hawkins Hinson Howard Jennings Jordan Keegan Kelley Kinon Kirsh Knotts Koon Lanford Leach Lee Limehouse Littlejohn Lloyd Loftis Martin Mason McAbee McCraw McGee McLeod McMaster Meacham Miller Moody-Lawrence Mullen Neilson Pinckney Quinn Rhoad Rice Riser Rodgers Sandifer Scott Seithel Sharpe Simrill Smith, J. Smith, R. Spearman Stille Stuart Townsend Tripp Trotter Vaughn Walker Webb Whatley Wilder Wilkes Wilkins Witherspoon Woodrum Young
Those who voted in the negative are:
Law Robinson
So, the Bill was read the second time and ordered to third reading.
The following Bill was taken up.
S. 1069 -- Senator Holland: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 7-15-455, SO AS TO AUTHORIZE THE STATE ELECTION COMMISSION TO ESTABLISH, IN COOPERATION WITH THE FEDERAL VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, A PILOT PROJECT FOR THE PURPOSE OF PERMITTING ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL AND OVERSEAS CITIZENS TO TRANSMIT THEIR VOTES BY USE OF AN ELECTRONIC MEDIUM USING THE INTERNET, TO PROVIDE THAT THE PILOT PROJECT TERMINATES DECEMBER 31, 2000, TO REQUIRE THE STATE ELECTION COMMISSION TO REPORT THE RESULTS OF THE PILOT PROJECT AND RECOMMEND TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY POSSIBLE FUTURE APPLICATIONS WHICH MAY BE UTILIZED FOR VOTING BY ELECTRONIC MEANS USING THE INTERNET; AND TO REPEAL SECTION 7-15-455, EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 31, 2000.
Rep. HARRISON explained the Bill.
Rep. KIRSH spoke against the Bill.
Rep. KIRSH moved to table the Bill and demanded the yeas and nays, which were taken resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Bailey Brown, J. Byrd Cato Dantzler Davenport Edge Gamble Gourdine Haskins Hines, M. Howard Kirsh Leach Lee Littlejohn Lloyd Loftis Mack Mason McMahand Meacham Neal Rhoad Scott Simrill Smith, F. Vaughn Walker Whipper Witherspoon Young-Brickell
Those who voted in the negative are:
Allison Barfield Barrett Battle Bauer Baxley Beck Boan Bowers Brown, G. Brown, H. Campsen Canty Cave Chellis Cobb-Hunter Cooper Cotty Cromer Delleney Easterday Emory Fleming Govan Hamilton Harrell Harris Harrison Harvin Hawkins Hines, J. Hinson Jennings Keegan Kinon Klauber Knotts Koon Lanford Law Limehouse Maddox Martin McAbee McCraw McGee McLeod McMaster Miller Moody-Lawrence Mullen Neilson Quinn Rice Riser Robinson Rodgers Sandifer Seithel Sharpe Smith, D. Smith, R. Spearman Stille Stuart Townsend Tripp Trotter Webb Whatley Wilder Wilkes Wilkins Woodrum Young
So, the House refused to table the Bill.
Rep. KIRSH moved to recommit the Bill.
Rep. HARRISON moved to table the motion, which was not agreed to.
The question then recurred to the motion to recommit the Bill.
Rep. HARRISON demanded the yeas and nays, which were taken resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Bailey Brown, J. Brown, T. Byrd Cato Cave Dantzler Edge Gamble Gourdine Haskins Hines, J. Hines, M. Howard Keegan Kelley Kirsh Leach Littlejohn Lloyd Loftis Mack Mason McMahand Meacham Moody-Lawrence Neal Pinckney Rhoad Rodgers Scott Simrill Smith, F. Smith, J. Vaughn Walker Whipper Wilkins Witherspoon Young-Brickell
Those who voted in the negative are:
Allison Altman Barrett Battle Bauer Baxley Beck Boan Bowers Brown, H. Campsen Canty Carnell Chellis Cooper Cotty Cromer Davenport Delleney Easterday Emory Fleming Hamilton Harrell Harris Harrison Harvin Hawkins Hinson Jennings Kinon Klauber Knotts Koon Lanford Law Lee Limehouse Maddox Martin McAbee McCraw McGee McLeod McMaster Miller Mullen Neilson Quinn Rice Riser Robinson Sandifer Seithel Sharpe Smith, D. Smith, R. Spearman Stille Townsend Tripp Trotter Webb Whatley Wilder Wilkes Woodrum Young
So, the House refused to recommit the Bill.
Rep. ROBINSON spoke in favor of the Bill.
Rep. HASKINS spoke against the Bill.
Rep. BOWERS spoke in favor of the Bill.
Rep. HAWKINS spoke in favor of the Bill.
Rep. HASKINS moved to continue the Bill.
Rep. HARRISON demanded the yeas and nays, which were taken resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Allison Barfield Brown, G. Cato Cave Dantzler Edge Gamble Gourdine Govan Haskins Hines, M. Hinson Howard Keegan Kelley Kirsh Leach Littlejohn Lloyd Loftis Mack Mason McMahand Meacham Moody-Lawrence Neal Pinckney Rhoad Rice Rodgers Scott Simrill Smith, D. Smith, F. Smith, J. Vaughn Walker Whipper Wilkins Witherspoon Woodrum Young-Brickell
Those who voted in the negative are:
Bailey Barrett Battle Bauer Beck Boan Bowers Breeland Brown, H. Byrd Campsen Canty Chellis Cooper Cotty Cromer Davenport Delleney Easterday Emory Felder Fleming Hamilton Harrell Harris Harrison Harvin Hawkins Hines, J. Jennings Jordan Kinon Klauber Knotts Koon Lanford Law Lee Limehouse Maddox Martin McAbee McCraw McGee McLeod McMaster Miller Mullen Neilson Quinn Riser Robinson Sandifer Seithel Sharpe Smith, R. Spearman Stille Stuart Townsend Tripp Trotter Webb Whatley Wilder Young
So, the House refused to continue the Bill.
Rep. G. BROWN spoke against the Bill.
Rep. VAUGHN moved that the House do now adjourn.
Rep. CROMER demanded the yeas and nays, which were taken resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Allison Brown, G. Cato Cave Dantzler Davenport Felder Gamble Govan Harris Haskins Hines, J. Hines, M. Howard Jordan Kirsh Leach Lee Loftis McMahand Meacham Rhoad Rice Scott Sharpe Smith, F. Stille Vaughn Walker Whipper Young-Brickell
Those who voted in the negative are:
Barfield Barrett Battle Bauer Beck Boan Bowers Brown, H. Campsen Canty Chellis Cooper Cotty Cromer Delleney Easterday Emory Hamilton Harrell Harrison Hawkins Hinson Keegan Kelley Kinon Klauber Knotts Koon Lanford Law Limehouse Lloyd Martin Mason McCraw McGee McLeod McMaster Miller Mullen Neal Neilson Pinckney Quinn Riser Robinson Rodgers Sandifer Seithel Simrill Smith, J. Smith, R. Spearman Stuart Tripp Trotter Webb Wilder Wilkins Woodrum Young
So, the House refused to adjourn.
The question then recurred to the passage of the Bill on second reading.
Pursuant to Rule 7.7 the yeas and nays were taken resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Barrett Battle Bauer Beck Boan Bowers Breeland Brown, H. Campsen Canty Cave Chellis Cooper Cotty Cromer Delleney Easterday Emory Felder Fleming Gourdine Hamilton Harrell Harris Harrison Harvin Hawkins Hines, J. Hinson Howard Jennings Kinon Klauber Knotts Koon Lanford Law Lee Limehouse Lloyd Maddox Martin McAbee McCraw McGee McLeod McMahand McMaster Miller Mullen Neal Neilson Quinn Riser Robinson Sandifer Seithel Sharpe Smith, J. Smith, R. Spearman Stille Stuart Tripp Trotter Webb Whatley Wilder Woodrum Young
Those who voted in the negative are:
Barfield Brown, G. Cato Dantzler Davenport Edge Gamble Haskins Hines, M. Keegan Kelley Kirsh Leach Littlejohn Loftis Mack Mason Meacham Moody-Lawrence Pinckney Rhoad Rice Rodgers Scott Simrill Smith, D. Smith, F. Vaughn Walker Wilkins Witherspoon Young-Brickell
So, the Bill, was read the second time and ordered to third reading.
The following Bill was taken up.
S. 778 -- Senator Bryan: A BILL TO AMEND VARIOUS SECTIONS OF CHAPTER 47, TITLE 23, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO PUBLIC SAFETY COMMUNICATION, SO AS TO ADD APPROPRIATE DEFINITIONS; ESTABLISH A MONTHLY COMMERCIAL MOBILE RADIO SERVICE (CMRS) 911 CHARGE FOR EACH CMRS CONNECTION WITH A SOUTH CAROLINA BILLING ADDRESS OR MOBILE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER CONTAINING A SOUTH CAROLINA AREA CODE; TO ESTABLISH THE CMRS EMERGENCY TELEPHONE SERVICE BOARD AND PROVIDE FOR ITS COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONS; TO PROVIDE FOR ALLOCATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE REVENUES GENERATED BY THE COLLECTION OF THE CMRS 911 CHARGES; AND TO EXEMPT CERTAIN CMRS PROVIDERS, OR SERVICE SUPPLIERS, AND THEIR OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, ASSIGNS, OR AGENTS FROM CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN CONNECTION WITH DEVELOPMENT, DESIGN, INSTALLATION, OPERATION, MAINTENANCE, PERFORMANCE, OR PROVISION OF 911 SERVICE AND PROVISION OF SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION TO GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES.
The Labor, Commerce and Industry Committee proposed the following Amendment No. 1 (Doc Name P:\AMEND\DKA\4998MM.98), which was adopted.
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking all after the enacting words and inserting:
/SECTION 1. Section 23-47-10 of the 1976 Code is amended to read as follows:
"Section 23-47-10. As used in this chapter:
(1) '911 charge' means a fee to the local government for the 911 service start-up equipment costs, subscriber notification costs, addressing costs, billing costs, and nonrecurring and recurring installation, maintenance service, and network charges of a service supplier providing 911 service as provided in this chapter.
(2) '911 system' or '911 service' means an emergency telephone system that provides the user of the public telephone system with the ability to reach a public safety answering point by dialing the digits 911. The term 911 system or service also includes 'enhanced 911 service', which means an emergency telephone system with 911 service, and in addition, directs 911 calls to appropriate public safety answering points by selective routing based on the geographical location from which the call originated and provides the capability for automatic number identification and automatic location identification features.
(3) 'Addressing' means the assigning of a numerical address and street name (the name may be numerical) to each location within a local government's geographical area necessary to provide public safety service as determined by the local government. This address replaces any route and box number currently in place in the '911' data base and facilitates quicker response by public safety agencies.
(4) 'Automatic location identification' means an enhanced 911 service capability that enables the automatic display of the address.
(5) 'Automatic number identification' means an enhanced 911 service capability that enables the automatic display of the telephone number used to place a 911 call.
(6) 'Basic 911 system' means a 911 system or 911 service without enhancement.
(7) '911 plan' means a plan for the 911 system, enhanced 911 system, or an
(8) 'Customer' means the local government subscribing to 911 service from a service supplier.
(9) 'Enhanced 911 network features' means selective routing, automatic number identification, and location identification.
(10) 'Enhancement' means any addition to a 911 system such as automatic number identification, selective routing of calls, or other future technological advancements, as determined by the Public Service Commission.
(11) 'Exchange access facility' means the access from a particular telephone subscriber's premises to the telephone system of a service supplier. Exchange access facilities include service supplier provided access lines, PBX trunks, and Centrex network access registers, all as defined by the South Carolina Public Service Commission. Exchange access facilities do not include service supplier owned and operated telephone pay station lines, or wide area telecommunications service (wats), foreign exchange (fx), or incoming lines.
(12) 'Local government' means any city, county, or political subdivision of the State.
(13) 'Mapping' means the development of a computerized geographical display system of roads and structure where emergency response may be required.
(14) 'Public safety agent' means a functional agency which provides fire fighting, law enforcement, medical, or other emergency services.
(15) 'Public safety answering point' (PSAP) means a communications facility operated on a twenty-four hour basis which first receives 911 calls from persons in a 911 service area and which may directly dispatch public safety services or extend, transfer, or relay 911 calls to appropriate public safety agencies. A PSAP may be designated to primary or secondary exchange service, referring to the order in which calls are directed for answering.
(16) 'Regional systems' means the formation of two or more local governments or multi-jurisdictional systems for the purpose of jointly forming and funding 911 systems.
(17) 'Service supplier' means a person, company, or corporation, public or private, providing local exchange telephone service and subject to regulation by the South Carolina Public Service Commission.
(18) 'Tariff rate' means the recurring or nonrecurring rates billed by the service supplier as stated in the service supplier's tariff and approved by the Public Service Commission, which represents the service supplier's recurring charges for exchange access facilities, exclusive of all taxes, fees, licenses, or similar charges.
(19) 'Telephone subscriber' or 'subscriber' means a person or entity to whom exchange telephone service, either residential or commercial, is provided and in return for which the person or entity is billed on a monthly basis. When the same person, business, or organization has several telephone access lines, each exchange access facility constitutes a separate subscription.
(1) '911 charge' means a fee for the 911 service start-up equipment costs, subscriber notification costs, addressing costs, billing costs, and nonrecurring and recurring installation, maintenance service, and network charges of a service supplier providing 911 service as provided in this chapter.
(2) '911 system' or '911 service' means an emergency telephone system that provides the user of the public telephone system with the ability to reach a public safety answering point by dialing the digits 911. The term 911 system or service also includes 'enhanced 911 service', which means an emergency telephone system with 911 service and, in addition, directs 911 calls to appropriate public safety answering points by selective routing based on the geographical location from which the call originated and provides the capability for automatic number identification and automatic location identification features.
(3) '911 plan' means a plan for the 911 system, enhanced 911 system, or any amendment to the plan developed by a county or municipality.
(4) 'Basic 911 system' means a system by which the various emergency functions provided by public safety agencies within each local government's jurisdiction may be accessed utilizing the three-digit number 911, but no available options of enhanced systems are included in the system.
(5) 'Enhanced 911 network features' means selective routing, automatic number identification, and location identification.
(6) 'Enhanced 911 system' means enhanced 911 service, which is a telephone exchange communications service consisting of telephone network features and public safety answering points designated by the local government which enables users of the public telephone system to access a 911 public safety communications center by dialing the digits 911. The service directs 911 calls to appropriate public safety answering points by selective routing based on the geographical location from which the call originated and provides the capability for automatic number identification and automatic location identification.
(7) 'Addressing', with respect to non-CMRS exchange access service, means the assigning of a numerical address and street name (the name may be numerical) to each location within a local government's geographical area necessary to provide public safety service as determined by the local government. This address replaces any route and box number currently in place in the '911' database and facilitates quicker response by public safety agencies.
(8) 'Automatic location identification' means an enhanced 911 service capability that enables the automatic display of information.
(9) 'Automatic number identification' means an enhanced 911 service capability that enables the automatic display of the seven-digit number used to place a 911 call.
(10) 'Board' means the South Carolina State Budget and Control Board.
(11) 'Committee' means the CMRS Emergency Telephone Service Advisory Committee established in this chapter.
(12) 'CMRS Connection' means each mobile number assigned to a CMRS customer.
(13) 'Commercial Mobile Radio Service' (CMRS) means commercial mobile service under Sections 3(27) and 332(d), Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 (47 U.S.C. Section 151, et seq.), Federal Communications Commission Rules, and the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. The term includes any wireless two-way communication device, including radio-telephone communications used in cellular telephone service, personal communication service, or the functional and/or competitive equivalent of a radio-telephone communications line used in cellular telephone service, a personal communication service, or a network radio access line. The term does not include services that do not provide access to 911 service, a communication channel suitable only for data transmission, a wireless roaming service or other nonlocal radio access line service, or a private telecommunications system.
(14) 'Customer' means the local government subscribing to 911 service from a service supplier.
(15) 'Enhancement' means any addition to a 911 system such as automatic number identification, selective routing of calls, or other future technological advancements, as determined by the Public Service Commission for non-CMRS exchange access companies.
(16) 'Exchange access facility' means the access from a particular telephone subscriber's premises to the telephone system of a service supplier. Exchange access facilities include service supplier provided access lines, PBX trunks, and Centrex network access registers, all as defined by the South Carolina Public Service Commission. Exchange access facilities do not include service supplier owned and operated telephone pay station lines, or wide area telecommunications service (wats), foreign exchange (fx), or incoming lines.
(17) 'Local government' means any city, county, or political subdivision of the State.
(18) 'Mapping' means the development of a computerized geographical display system of roads and structures where emergency response may be required.
(19) 'Public safety agent' means a functional agency which provides fire fighting, law enforcement, medical, or other emergency services.
(20) 'Public safety answering point' (PSAP) means a communications facility operated on a twenty-four hour basis which first receives 911 calls from persons in a 911 service area and which may directly dispatch public safety services or extend, transfer, or relay 911 calls to appropriate public safety agencies. A PSAP may be designated to a primary or secondary exchange service, referring to the order in which calls are directed for answering.
(21) 'Regional systems' means the formation of two or more local governments or multi-jurisdictional systems for the purpose of jointly forming and funding 911 systems.
(22) 'Selective routing' means the method employed to direct 911 calls to the appropriate public safety answering point based on the geographical location from which the call originated.
(23) 'Service subscriber' means any person, company, corporation, business, association, or party not exempt from county or municipal taxes or utility franchise assessments who is provided telephone (local exchange access facility) service in the political subdivision or CMRS service.
(24) 'Service supplier' means any person, company, or corporation, public or private, providing exchange telephone service or CMRS service to end users.
(25) 'Rate' means the recurring or nonrecurring rates billed by the service supplier, which represents the service supplier's recurring charges for exchange access facilities, exclusive of all taxes, fees, licenses, or similar charges.
(26) 'Telephone subscriber' or 'subscriber' means a person or entity to whom exchange telephone service, either residential or commercial, is provided and in return for which the person or entity is billed on a monthly basis. When the same person, business, or organization has several telephone access lines, each exchange access facility constitutes a separate subscription."
SECTION 2. Section 23-47-50(F) of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"(F) Fees collected by the service supplier pursuant to this section are not subject to any tax, fee, or assessment, nor are they considered revenue of the service supplier. A monthly CMRS 911 charge is levied for each CMRS connection for which there is a mobile identification number containing an area code assigned to South Carolina by the North American Numbering Plan Administrator. The amount of the levy shall be set annually by the board at the level not to exceed the average monthly telephone (local exchange access facility) 911 charges paid in South Carolina. The committee may calculate the CMRS 911 charge based upon a review of one or more months during the year preceding the calculation of telephone (local exchange access facility) charges paid in South Carolina. The CMRS 911 charge must have uniform application and must be imposed throughout the State; however, trunks or service lines used to supply service to CMRS providers shall not be subject to a CMRS 911 levy. On or before the twentieth day of the second month succeeding each monthly collection of the CMRS 911 charges, every CMRS provider shall file with the Department of Revenue a return under oath, in a form prescribed by the department, showing the total amount of fees collected for the month and, at the same time, shall remit to the department the fees collected for that month. The department shall place the collected fees on deposit with the State Treasurer. The funds collected pursuant to this subsection are not general fund revenue of the State and must be kept by the State Treasurer in a fund separate and apart from the general fund to be expended as provided in Section 23-47-65."
SECTION 3. Section 23-47-50 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
"(G)(1) Fees collected by the service supplier pursuant to this section are not subject to any tax, fee, or assessment, nor are they considered revenue of the service supplier.
(2) A 911 charge, including a CMRS 911 charge, shall be added to the billing by the service supplier to the service subscriber and may be stated separately.
(3) A billed subscriber shall be liable for any 911 charge, including a CMRS 911 charge, imposed under this chapter until it has been paid to the service supplier."
SECTION 4. Chapter 47, Title 23 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
"Section 23-47-65. (A)(1) The CMRS Emergency Telephone Services Advisory Committee is created to assist the board in carrying out its responsibilities in implementing a wireless enhanced 911 system consistent with FCC Docket Number 94-102. The committee shall be appointed by the Governor and shall consist of: the State Auditor, ex officio; the Director of the Office of Information Resources, Budget and Control Board, ex officio; two CMRS providers licensed to do business in the State; two 911 system employees; and one telephone (local exchange access facility) service supplier licensed to do business in the State; and one consumer. Local governments and related organizations such as NENA may recommend PSAP Committee members, and industry representatives may recommend wireline and CMRS Committee members to the Governor. There is no expense reimbursement or per diem payment from the fund created by the CMRS surcharge made to members of the committee.
(2) All committee members, except the ex officio members, must be appointed for a three-year term by the Governor. Committee members may be appointed to one subsequent term.
(3) In the event a vacancy arises, it must be filled for the remainder of the term in the manner of the original appointment. A partial term does not count towards the term limits, however service for three-fourths or more of a term constitutes service for a term.
(4) Any committee member who terminates his holding of the office or employment which qualified him for appointment shall cease immediately to be a member of the committee; the person appointed to fill the vacancy shall do so for the unexpired term of the member whom he succeeds.
(5) The committee shall establish its own procedures with respect to the selection of officers, quorum, place, and conduct of meetings.
(B) The responsibilities of the committee with respect to CMRS emergency telephone services are:
(1) Advise the board on technical issues regarding the implementation of a wireless E911 system, especially matters concerning appropriate systems and equipment to be acquired by CMRS providers and PSAPS, to assure the compatibility of the systems and equipment and the ability of the systems and equipment to comply with the requirements of FCC Docket Number 94-102.
(2) Recommend systems and equipment for which reimbursement may be allowed to CMRS providers and PSAPS under the provisions of this chapter, which are compatible with each other as needed for the public's safety, and will not result in wasteful spending on inappropriate or redundant technology.
(C) The responsibilities of the board with respect to CMRS emergency telephone services are:
(1) upon approval of the board, the State Treasurer shall manage and disburse the funds from the account in the following manner:
(a) distribute not more than thirty-nine percent of the total monthly revenues in the interest bearing account to PSAP administrators based on CMRS 911 call volume for expenses incurred for the answering, routing, and proper disposition of CMRS 911 calls;
(b) hold and distribute not to exceed fifty-seven percent of the total monthly revenues in the interest-bearing account solely for the purposes of complying with applicable requirements of FCC Docket Number 94-102. These funds may be utilized by the PSAP and the CMRS providers licensed to do business in this State for the following purposes in connection with compliance with the FCC requirements: upgrading, acquiring, maintaining, programming, and installing necessary data, hardware, and software. Invoices detailing specific expenses for these purposes must be presented to the board in connection with any request for reimbursement, and the request must be approved by a majority vote of the board, upon recommendation of the committee. Any invoices presented to the board for reimbursements of costs not described by this section may be approved only by a unanimous vote of the committee, but in no event shall reimbursement be made for costs unrelated to compliance with applicable requirements of FCC Docket Number 94-102;
(c) utilize an amount not to exceed two percent of the monthly fees collected to compensate the independent auditor provided for herein and for expenses which the board is authorized to incur by contract, or otherwise, for provision of any administrative, legal, support, or other services to assist the board in fulfilling its responsibilities under this act;
(d) with the State Auditor's Office and the State Treasurer, prepare annual reports outlining fees collected and monies disbursed to PSAP and CMRS providers, and submit annual reports outlining monies disbursed for operations of the board;
(e) retain an independent, private auditor, as provided in the Consolidated Procurement Code, for the purposes of receiving, maintaining, and verifying the accuracy of any proprietary information submitted to the board by CMRS providers or PSAP's, and assisting the board in its duties, including its annual calculation of the average 911 charges pursuant to Section 23-47-50(f) and in any cost studies it may conduct. Due to the confidential and proprietary nature of the information submitted by CMRS providers, the information may not be released to a party other than the State Auditor and is expressly exempt from disclosure pursuant to Chapter 4 of Title 30. The information collected by the auditor shall only be released in aggregate amounts that do not identify or allow identification of numbers of subscribers or revenues attributable to an individual CMRS provider;
(f) annually calculate the average 911 charge as provided in Section 23-47-50(F);
(g) conduct a cost study to be submitted to the House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee one year from the effective date of this section and thereafter at the board's discretion. The board may include any information it deems appropriate to assist the General Assembly in determining whether future legislation is necessary or appropriate, but the report must include information to assist in determining whether to adjust the CMRS 911 charge to reflect actual costs incurred by PSAP's or CMRS providers for compliance with applicable requirements of FCC Docket Number 94-10.
(2) The board must take appropriate measures to maintain the confidentiality of the proprietary information described in Section 23-47-65(B)(2)(e). This information may be disclosed to board members only in the event a dispute arises with respect to the board's discharge of its responsibilities under Section 23-47-65(B)(2) which necessitates such disclosure. The information shall also be exempt from disclosure pursuant to Chapter 4 of Title 30. Members of the board may not disclose the information to any third parties, including their employers.
(3) The board must take appropriate measures to see that all CMRS service suppliers comply with the requirements of Section 23-47-50(F).
(4) The board shall convene the committee, and consult with it concerning the performance of the responsibilities assigned to the board and to the committee in this chapter, and the development and maintenance of the State's CMRS emergency telephone services and system.
(5) The board shall report as required or suggested by this chapter, and shall promulgate any regulations, and take such further actions, as are appropriate in implementing it.
(C) CMRS providers are entitled to retain two percent of the fees collected as reimbursement for collection and handling of the CMRS 911 charge.
(D) At the end of the three-year term, on August 1, 2001, the committee's existence terminates and all its duties and powers devolve to the executive director of the State Budget and Control Board, except that the committee may continue to exist and function upon adoption by the General Assembly of a joint resolution extending its existence past August 1, 2001."
SECTION 5. Section 23-47-70 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
"(C) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in no event shall any CMRS service supplier or its officers, employees, assigns, or agents be liable for civil damages or criminal liability in connection with the development, design, installation, operation, maintenance, performance, or provision of 911 service unless such event was the result of reckless, willful, or wanton conduct of the CMRS service supplier or its officers, employees, assigns, or agents.
No CMRS service supplier or its officers, employees, assigns, or agents shall be liable for civil damages or criminal liability in connection with the release of subscriber information to any governmental entity as required under the provisions of this chapter."
SECTION 6. Chapter 47, Title 23 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
"Section 23-47-75. (A) CMRS location information obtained by safety personnel or for public safety personnel for public safety purposes is not public information under the Freedom of Information Act.
(B) A person may not disclose or use, for any purpose other than for the 911 or other emergency calling system, information contained in the data base of the telephone network portion of a 911 or other emergency calling system established pursuant to this chapter."
SECTION 7. If any provision of this act or the application thereof is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.
SECTION 8. This act takes effect upon approval by the Governor, with the committee commencing operations on August 1, 1998, and CMRS collection of surcharges commencing on November 1, 1998./
Amend title to conform.
Rep. MEACHAM explained the amendment.
The amendment was then adopted.
Rep. MEACHAM proposed the following Amendment No. 2 (Doc Name P:\AMEND\DKA\3008MM.98), which was adopted.
Amend the report of the Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry, as and if amended, Section 23-47-50(F), SECTION 2, page 778-6, line 33 by deleting /amount of the levy shall be set annually by the board at the level not/ and inserting:
/amount of the levy must be approved annually by the board at a level not/.
Amend further, Section 23-47-65(A)(1), SECTION 4, page 778-7, line 34, by deleting /NENA/ and inserting:
/the National Emergency Number Association/.
Amend further, Section 23-47-65(C)(1)(b), SECTION 4, page 778-9, by deleting beginning on line 3 /a majority vote of the board, upon recommendation of the committee/ and inserting:
/the board, upon recommendation of a majority vote of the committee/.
Amend further, Section 23-47-65(C)(1)(e), SECTION 4, page 778-9, line 23, by deleting /board/ and inserting:
/committee/.
Amend further, Section 23-47-65(C)(2) and (3), SECTION 4, page 778-10, line 3, after /board/, by inserting / and committee /; line 5, after /board/, by inserting / and committee /; line 6, after /board's/, by inserting / and committee's /; line 7, by deleting /its/ and inserting / their /; and line 12, after /board/, by inserting / and committee /.
Amend further, Section 23-47-65(D), SECTION 4, page 778-10, by deleting beginning on line 28 /executive director of the State Budget and Control Board/ and inserting / board /.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. MEACHAM explained the amendment.
The amendment was then adopted.
Rep. KIRSH spoke against the Bill.
Rep. MEACHAM spoke in favor of the Bill.
Rep. CATO moved that the House do now adjourn, which was adopted.
Further proceedings were interrupted by adjournment, the pending question being consideration of the Bill, Rep. MEACHAM having the floor.
The Senate returned to the House with concurrence the following:
H. 5145 -- Reps. Klauber, Carnell and McAbee: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE PROFOUND SORROW OF THE MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA TO THE FAMILY AND MANY FRIENDS OF THE LATE MRS. ELEANOR METTS MUNDY OF GREENWOOD COUNTY, PUBLISHER AND BOARD CHAIRMAN OF THE INDEX-JOURNAL.
H. 5146 -- Rep. McMahand: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO RECOGNIZE THE REVEREND SAMUEL NILES MADDEN, PASTOR OF MT. ZION BAPTIST CHURCH IN FOUNTAIN INN, FOR HIS THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF DEVOTED PASTORAL SERVICE AND HIS DEDICATION TO CHRISTIAN EDUCATION THROUGH HIS LEADERSHIP IN THE CONGRESS OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION AND THE TUMBLING SHOALS ASSOCIATION.
H. 5155 -- Rep. Scott: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO COMMEND MR. ROOSEVELT SANDY GILLIAM FOR HIS MANY ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND SERVICE TO THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA.
H. 5156 -- Reps. Govan, Sharpe, Stuart, Felder, Cobb-Hunter, Allison, Altman, Askins, Bailey, Barfield, Barrett, Battle, Bauer, Baxley, Beck, Boan, Bowers, Breeland, G. Brown, H. Brown, J. Brown, T. Brown, Byrd, Campsen, Canty, Carnell, Cato, Cave, Chellis, Clyburn, Cooper, Cotty, Cromer, Dantzler, Davenport, Delleney, Easterday, Edge, Emory, Fleming, Gamble, Gourdine, Hamilton, Harrell, A. Harris, Harrison, Harvin, Haskins, Hawkins, J. Hines, M. Hines, Hinson, Howard, Inabinett, Jennings, Jordan, Keegan, Kelley, Kennedy, Kinon, Kirsh, Klauber, Knotts, Koon, Lanford, Law, Leach, Lee, Limehouse, Littlejohn, Lloyd, Loftis, Mack, Maddox, Martin, Mason, McAbee, McCraw, McGee, McKay, McLeod, McMahand, McMaster, Meacham, Miller, Moody-Lawrence, Mullen, Neal, Neilson, Phillips, Pinckney, Quinn, Rhoad, Rice, Riser, Robinson, Rodgers, Sandifer, Scott, Seithel, Sheheen, Simrill, D. Smith, F. Smith, J. Smith, R. Smith, Spearman, Stille, Stoddard, Townsend, Tripp, Trotter, Vaughn, Walker, Webb, Whatley, Whipper, Wilder, Wilkes, Wilkins, Witherspoon, Woodrum, Young and Young-Brickell: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION COMMENDING AND THANKING CHESTER J. TOMSON, JR., FOR HIS DEDICATED SERVICE AS COUNTY DIRECTOR OF ORANGEBURG COUNTY AND EXTENDING BEST WISHES TO HIM UPON HIS RETIREMENT FROM THIS POSITION, JUNE 30, 1998.
H. 5161 -- Reps. Cave and Rhoad: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO CONGRATULATE JARED DANIEL MOBLEY OF BARNWELL COUNTY ON THE OCCASION OF HIS GRADUATION FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA SCHOOL OF LAW AND TO WISH HIM THE VERY BEST AS HE FURTHERS HIS LEGAL EDUCATION AT THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW.
H. 5163 -- Rep. Delleney: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO EXTEND THE SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS OF THE MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA TO THE CHIEF OF THE RICHBURG VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, BARNETTE (BARNEY) NICHOLS, OF CHESTER COUNTY UPON RECEIVING THE JAMES B. MURPHY SOUTH CAROLINA FIREFIGHTER OF THE YEAR AWARD, AN HONOR PRESENTED ANNUALLY BY THE SOUTH CAROLINA FIREMEN'S ASSOCIATION.
H. 5164 -- Reps. Young and Woodrum: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO RECOGNIZE AND CONGRATULATE FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH OF SUMTER UPON THE CELEBRATION OF ITS ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY.
H. 5167 -- Reps. Harvin and Young: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO CONGRATULATE MISS LORI M. GILSTRAP OF CLARENDON COUNTY ON BEING SELECTED MISS SOUTH CAROLINA NATIONAL TEENAGER AND TO WISH HER MUCH SUCCESS AS SHE COMPETES FOR THE TITLE OF AMERICA'S NATIONAL TEENAGER.
At 1:20 P.M. the House in accordance with the motion of Rep. BARFIELD adjourned in memory of Harold M. Huggins of Nichols, to meet at 10:00 A.M. tomorrow.
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