Indicates Matter Stricken
Indicates New Matter
The House assembled at 10:00 a.m.
Deliberations were opened with prayer by Rev. Charles E. Seastrunk, Jr. as follows:
Our thought for today is from Psalm 104:24: "How many are your works, O Lord! In wisdom you made them all."
Let us pray. O God, thank You for the wonders of Your creation and for Your open-handed love. In Your wisdom You provide faithful people to serve in Your world. Give them insight and the courage to know the truth and do it. Help all of us to keep in mind whom we serve. Look in favor upon our Nation, President, State and leaders. Provide safety for our defenders of freedom. In Your Holy name. Amen.
Pursuant to Rule 6.3, the House of Representatives was led in the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America by the SPEAKER.
After corrections to the Journal of the proceedings of yesterday, the SPEAKER ordered it confirmed.
Rep. ALLEN moved that when the House adjourns, it adjourn in memory of Gwendolyn Williams Blassengale of Greenville, which was agreed to.
The following were received and referred to the appropriate committees for consideration:
Document No. 2964
Agency: Board of Education
Statutory Authority: 1976 Code Sections 59-5-60, 59-21-510 et seq., 59-33-10 et seq.
Utilization of Generic Teacher Certification
Received by Speaker of the House of Representatives
March 16, 2005
Document No. 2942
Agency: Board of Education
Statutory Authority: 1976 Code Sections 59-5-60, 59-30-10, 59-39-100, No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. Section 6301 et seq.
Graduation Requirements
Received by Speaker of the House of Representatives
March 16, 2005
Referred to Education and Public Works Committee
Legislative Review Expiration July 14, 2005 (Subject to Sine Die Revision)
Document No. 2962
Agency: Department of Health and Environmental Control
Statutory Authority: 1976 Code Sections 44-1-140, 44-4-100 et seq., 25-1-440
Implementation of Emergency Health Powers Act
Received by Speaker of the House of Representatives
March 16, 2005
Referred to Medical, Military, Public and Municipal Affairs Committee
Legislative Review Expiration July 14, 2005 (Subject to Sine Die Revision)
The following Bills were introduced, read the first time, and referred to appropriate committees:
H. 3781 (Word version) -- Rep. Harrison: A BILL TO AMEND CHAPTER 1, TITLE 40, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO PROFESSIONS AND OCCUPATIONS, SO AS TO UPDATE CERTAIN LANGUAGE IN THE CHAPTER, TO DEFINE CERTAIN ADDITIONAL TERMS, TO PROVIDE FOR THE RENEWAL OF A PRACTICE AUTHORIZATION, TO CHANGE THE PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY THE DIVISION OF PROFESSIONAL AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING, TO PROVIDE THAT BOARDS ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION MUST INCLUDE TWO OR MORE PUBLIC MEMBERS AND
H. 3782 (Word version) -- Rep. Hayes: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 49-29-230, AS AMENDED, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO CERTAIN SCENIC RIVER DESIGNATIONS, SO
The roll call of the House of Representatives was taken resulting as follows:
Agnew Allen Altman Anderson Anthony Bailey Bales Ballentine Barfield Bingham Bowers Brady Branham Breeland G. Brown J. Brown R. Brown Cato Ceips Chalk Chellis Clark Clyburn Coates Cobb-Hunter Coleman Cooper Dantzler Davenport Delleney Edge Emory Frye Funderburk Govan Hagood Haley Hamilton Hardwick Harrell Harrison Hayes Herbkersman J. Hines M. Hines Hinson Hiott Hosey Huggins Jefferson Jennings Kennedy Kirsh Leach Lee Limehouse Littlejohn Loftis Lucas Mack Mahaffey McCraw McGee Merrill Miller J. M. Neal Norman Owens Parks Perry Phillips Pinson M. A. Pitts Rice Rivers Sandifer Scarborough Scott Simrill Sinclair Skelton D. C. Smith F. N. Smith G. M. Smith G. R. Smith J. E. Smith J. R. Smith W. D. Smith Stewart Talley Taylor Thompson Toole Townsend Umphlett Vaughn Vick Walker Weeks
White Whitmire Wilkins Witherspoon Young
I came in after the roll call and was present for the Session on Wednesday, March 16.
James Battle Bessie Moody-Lawrence Daniel Tripp Becky Martin Gloria Haskins Alan D. Clemmons Bill Cotty Denny Neilson Joseph Neal Walton McLeod Edward H. "Ted" Pitts Jackson "Seth" Whipper Harry Ott Todd Rutherford Jeffrey D. Duncan Alex Harvin Thad Viers Leon Howard
The SPEAKER granted Rep. RHOAD a leave of absence for the day due to a death in the family.
Rep. MACK signed a statement with the Clerk that he came in after the roll call of the House and was present for the Session on Thursday, March 3.
Rep. MACK signed a statement with the Clerk that he came in after the roll call of the House and was present for the Session on Thursday, March 10.
Announcement was made that Dr. M. David Mitchell of Spartanburg is the Doctor of the Day for the General Assembly.
In accordance with House Rule 5.2 below:
"5.2 Every bill before presentation shall have its title endorsed; every report, its title at length; every petition, memorial, or other paper, its prayer or substance; and, in every instance, the name of the member
Bill Number: H. 3685 (Word version)
Date: ADD:
03/16/05 KIRSH
Bill Number: H. 3213 (Word version)
Date: ADD:
03/16/05 HERBKERSMAN
Bill Number: H. 3741 (Word version)
Date: ADD:
03/16/05 ALLEN
Bill Number: H. 3741 (Word version)
Date: ADD:
03/16/05 SIMRILL
Bill Number: H. 3741 (Word version)
Date: ADD:
03/16/05 BAILEY
The following Bill was taken up:
H. 3716 -- Ways and Means Committee: A BILL TO MAKE APPROPRIATIONS AND TO PROVIDE REVENUES TO MEET THE ORDINARY EXPENSES OF STATE GOVERNMENT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR BEGINNING JULY 1, 2005; TO REGULATE THE EXPENDITURE OF SUCH FUNDS; AND TO FURTHER PROVIDE FOR THE OPERATION OF STATE GOVERNMENT DURING THE FISCAL YEAR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Rep. HARRELL proposed the following Amendment No. 132 (Doc Name h:\legwork\house\amend\h-wm\002\3rd museum 47k.doc), which was adopted:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, Part IA, Section 19, MUSEUM COMMISSION, page 133, line 11, opposite /Other Operating Expenses/ by increasing the amount(s) in Columns 3 and 4 by:
Column 3 Column 4
47,000 47,000
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend totals and titles to conform.
Rep. HARRELL explained the amendment.
The amendment was then adopted.
The question then recurred to the passage of the Bill, as amended, on third reading.
Rep. HARRELL demanded the yeas and nays which were taken, resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Agnew Allen Altman Anderson Bailey Bales Ballentine Barfield Bingham Bowers Brady Branham Breeland G. Brown J. Brown R. Brown Cato Ceips Chalk Chellis Clark
Clemmons Clyburn Coates Cobb-Hunter Coleman Cooper Dantzler Davenport Delleney Edge Emory Frye Funderburk Govan Hagood Haley Hamilton Hardwick Harrell Harrison Haskins Hayes Herbkersman J. Hines M. Hines Hinson Hiott Hosey Huggins Jefferson Jennings Kennedy Kirsh Leach Lee Limehouse Littlejohn Lucas Mack Mahaffey Martin McCraw McGee Merrill Miller Norman Ott Owens Parks Perry Phillips Pinson M. A. Pitts Rice Sandifer Scarborough Scott Simrill Sinclair Skelton D. C. Smith F. N. Smith G. M. Smith J. E. Smith J. R. Smith W. D. Smith Stewart Talley Taylor Thompson Toole Townsend Umphlett Vaughn Vick Viers Walker Weeks White Whitmire Wilkins Witherspoon Young
Those who voted in the negative are:
Tripp
So, the Bill, as amended, was read the third time and ordered sent to the Senate.
On H. 3716, I intended to vote "yea" in favor of the Bill, and I am instructing that the record indicate a yes vote by me on this Bill. The vote on this Bill should be recorded as 105-0.
Rep. Dan Tripp
I was temporarily out of the Chamber when the vote was taken on H. 3716. I would have voted in favor of the Bill.
Rep. Mike Anthony
On Tuesday, March 15, 2005, I was meeting with a constituent on a local Delegation matter and was outside the Chamber when the vote on the budget, H. 3716 was taken. If present in the Chamber, I would have voted in favor of the budget.
Rep. John Graham Altman
The following Joint Resolution was taken up, read the third time, and ordered sent to the Senate:
H. 3717 (Word version) -- Ways and Means Committee: A JOINT RESOLUTION TO APPROPRIATE MONIES FROM THE CAPITAL RESERVE FUND FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004-2005.
The following Bill was read the third time, passed and, having received three readings in both Houses, it was ordered that the title be changed to that of an Act, and that it be enrolled for ratification:
S. 426 (Word version) -- Senator Land: A BILL TO AMEND ACT 355 OF 2004, RELATING TO THE CLARENDON COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICTS' PROPERTY TAX RELIEF ACT, AND THE ONE PERCENT SALES TAX AUTHORIZED TO BE IMPOSED IN CLARENDON COUNTY FOR SCHOOL CONSTRUCTION, SO AS TO DELETE THE EXEMPTION ALLOWED IN THE CLARENDON COUNTY SALES AND USE TAX FOR FOOD WHICH MAY BE PURCHASED WITH UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD COUPONS.
The following Bills and Joint Resolution were taken up, read the second time, and ordered to a third reading:
S. 598 (Word version) -- Senators Sheheen and Lourie: A BILL TO AMEND ACT 930 OF 1970, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO SCHOOL TRUSTEES FOR KERSHAW COUNTY, SO AS TO REVISE THE ELECTION DISTRICTS FROM WHICH THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES ARE ELECTED; AND TO DESIGNATE A MAP NUMBER FOR THE MAP ON WHICH THESE LINES OF THE ELECTION DISTRICTS FOR TRUSTEES ARE DELINEATED AND MAINTAINED BY THE OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS OF THE STATE BUDGET AND CONTROL BOARD.
S. 493 (Word version) -- Labor, Commerce and Industry Committee: A JOINT RESOLUTION TO APPROVE REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION-ENVIRONMENTAL CERTIFICATION BOARD, RELATING TO CHAPTER REVISION, DESIGNATED AS REGULATION DOCUMENT NUMBER 2931, PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1, CHAPTER 23, TITLE 1 OF THE 1976 CODE.
Rep. OTT explained the Joint Resolution.
S. 339 (Word version) -- Senator Leatherman: A BILL TO AMEND ARTICLE 7, CHAPTER 21, TITLE 12 OF THE 1976 CODE, BY ADDING SECTION 12-21-1085, TO PROVIDE WITH CERTAIN EXCEPTIONS THAT THE TAXES PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE 7 ARE IN LIEU OF ALL OTHER TAXES ON BEER AND WINE.
Rep. HARRELL explained the Bill.
The following Bill was taken up:
S. 3 (Word version) -- Senators Leatherman, Verdin, Gregory and Grooms: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 56-3-3950, AS AMENDED, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO THE "KEEP SOUTH CAROLINA BEAUTIFUL" SPECIAL LICENSE PLATES, SO AS TO REVISE THE ALLOCATION OF THE FEES
Reps. TOWNSEND and J. M. NEAL proposed the following Amendment No. 1 (Doc Name COUNCIL\SWB\6422CM05), which was adopted:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking all after the enacting words and inserting:
/ SECTION 1. Section 56-3-3950 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 459 of 1996, is further amended to read:
"Section 56-3-3950. The department may issue a special commemorative 'Keep South Carolina It Beautiful' motor vehicle license plate for use by owners on their private passenger motor vehicles to establish a special fund to be used by the Department of Transportation for the purposes of beautifying enhancing the state's roads and highways. These enhancements may include landscaping, wildflower plantings, scenic easements, or other highway enhancement projects. The Department of Transportation, in implementing this program, may not expend beautification funds for wildflowers without prior approval of the South Carolina Department of Agriculture. The Department of Agriculture shall ensure, before granting approval, that the varieties of wildflowers used in beautification are not harmful to agriculture at or near a proposedd project. The biennial fee for the commemorative license plate is fifty-four dollars, and of this amount twenty-four dollars. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, of the fees collected for this special license plate, the Comptroller General shall place sufficient funds into a special restricted account to be used by the Department of Motor Vehicles to defray the department's expenses in producing and administering this special license plate. Any remaining funds must be placed in a special 'Keep South Carolina Beautiful Fund Highway Beautification Fund' established within and administered by the Department of Transportation. This biennial fee is in addition to the regular motor vehicle registration fee set forth in Article 5, Chapter 7 of this title. The commemorative plate must be of the same size and general design of regular motor vehicle license plates and must be imprinted with the words 'Keep South Carolina It Beautiful'. The plates must be issued or revalidated for a biennial period which expires twenty-four months from the month they are issued."
SECTION 2. This act takes effect upon approval by the Governor. /
Rep. J. M. NEAL explained the amendment.
The amendment was then adopted.
The Bill, as amended, was read the second time and ordered to third reading.
The following Bill was taken up:
H. 3778 (Word version) -- Reps. Harrison, Wilkins, Cato, W. D. Smith, Merrill, Jennings, J. E. Smith and Chellis: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 15-38-15 SO AS TO PROVIDE IN AN ACTION TO RECOVER DAMAGES RESULTING FROM PERSONAL INJURY, WRONGFUL DEATH, DAMAGE TO PROPERTY, OR TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR ECONOMIC LOSS OR NONECONOMIC LOSS, JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY DOES NOT APPLY TO A DEFENDANT WHO IS LESS THAN FIFTY PERCENT AT FAULT; TO PROVIDE FOR APPORTIONMENT OF PERCENTAGES OF FAULT AMONG DEFENDANTS; AND TO PROVIDE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION DO NOT APPLY TO A DEFENDANT WHOSE CONDUCT IS WILFUL, WANTON, RECKLESS, GROSSLY NEGLIGENT, INTENTIONAL, OR CONDUCT INVOLVING THE USE, SALE, OR POSSESSION OF ALCOHOL OR ILLEGAL OR ILLICIT DRUGS.
Rep. JENNINGS made the Point of Order that the Bill was improperly before the House for consideration since its number and title have not been printed in the House Calendar at least one statewide legislative day prior to second reading.
The SPEAKER sustained the Point of Order.
Rep. CATO moved to waive Rule 5.15, which was agreed to by a division vote of 66 to 20.
The Senate amendments to the following Bill were taken up for consideration:
H. 3008 (Word version) -- Reps. Cato, Bales, Clark, Barfield, Huggins, Frye, Sandifer, E. H. Pitts, Taylor, Anthony, Bailey, Battle, Bingham, Ceips, Chalk, Chellis, Clemmons, Cooper, Dantzler, Davenport, Duncan, Edge, Hamilton, Hardwick, Harrell, Hinson, Kirsh, Leach, Limehouse, Littlejohn, Loftis, McCraw, Norman, Owens, Perry, Pinson, Rice, Simrill, Skelton, D. C. Smith, G. R. Smith, J. R. Smith, Stewart, Thompson, Toole, Townsend, Tripp, Umphlett, Vaughn, Vick, Viers, Walker, White, Whitmire, Wilkins, Witherspoon, Coates, Brady, Ballentine, Ott, Mahaffey, Haley, Hagood, Bowers and Young: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING CHAPTER 32 TO TITLE 15, SO AS TO ENACT THE "SOUTH CAROLINA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, CITIZENS, AND SMALL BUSINESS PROTECTION ACT OF 2005", PROVIDING FOR DEFINITIONS OF THE TERMS "DAMAGES", "FAULT", AND "PERSON", SEVERAL LIABILITY IN AN ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE, OR WRONGFUL DEATH, A PROCEDURE FOR ASSESSING PERCENTAGES OF FAULT, JOINT LIABILITY ON ALL WHO CONSCIOUSLY AND DELIBERATELY PURSUE A COMMON PLAN TO COMMIT A TORTIOUS ACT, PLACEMENT OF THE BURDEN OF PROVING FAULT ON THE PERSON SEEKING TO ESTABLISH FAULT, AND AN EXCEPTION TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CHAPTER; TO AMEND SECTION 15-3-640, RELATING TO AN ACTION BASED UPON A DEFECTIVE OR UNSAFE IMPROVEMENT TO REAL PROPERTY, SO AS TO DECREASE THE TIME AN ACTION MAY BE BROUGHT FROM THIRTEEN TO SIX YEARS AFTER THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION OF THE IMPROVEMENT; TO AMEND SECTION 15-7-30, RELATING TO ACTIONS THAT MUST BE TRIED WHERE THE DEFENDANT RESIDES, SO AS TO DEFINE KEY TERMS AND TO PROVIDE FACTORS FOR THE COURT TO
Rep. CATO moved to adjourn debate on the Senate Amendments.
Rep. SCOTT moved to table the motion.
Rep. SCOTT demanded the yeas and nays which were taken, resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Agnew Allen Breeland G. Brown J. Brown R. Brown Funderburk Govan Hamilton J. Hines M. Hines Hosey Jefferson Jennings Kennedy Mack J. H. Neal Parks Scott J. E. Smith Thompson Weeks White
Anderson Anthony Bailey Bales Ballentine Barfield Battle Bingham Bowers Brady Cato Ceips Chellis Clark Clemmons Clyburn Coates Coleman Cotty Dantzler Davenport Delleney Edge Emory Frye Hagood Haley Hardwick Harrell Hayes Herbkersman Hinson Kirsh Leach Limehouse Littlejohn Loftis Lucas Mahaffey Martin McCraw McGee Miller Norman Owens Perry Phillips Rice Sandifer Scarborough Simrill Sinclair Skelton D. C. Smith F. N. Smith G. R. Smith J. R. Smith W. D. Smith Stewart Talley Taylor Toole Townsend Tripp Umphlett Vaughn Vick Viers Walker Whitmire Wilkins Young
So, the House refused to table the motion.
The question then recurred to the motion to adjourn debate on the Senate Amendments, which was agreed to.
The following Concurrent Resolution was taken up:
H. 3722 (Word version) -- Reps. Littlejohn and W. D. Smith: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO REQUEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION NAME THE PORTION OF CANNONS CAMPGROUND ROAD IN SPARTANBURG COUNTY FROM ITS INTERSECTION WITH SOUTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY 110 TO
Whereas, Lance Corporal Travis Fox served his country with great honor and dignity as a United States Marine; and
Whereas, he distinguished himself as a member of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment at Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii; and
Whereas, while bravely serving his country outside Fallujah, Iraq, he along with six other Marines were tragically slain by a car bomb; and
Whereas, the twenty-five year old Marine leaves his bride Casie to mourn his loss; and
Whereas, it is both fitting and proper for the members of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina to name a portion of Cannons Campground Road in Spartanburg County in honor of this outstanding and distinguished son of South Carolina. Now, therefore,
Be it resolved by the House of Representatives, the Senate concurring:
That the members of the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina, by this resolution, request that the Department of Transportation name the portion of Cannons Campground Road in Spartanburg County, from its intersection with South Carolina Highway 110 to Drayton Avenue "Lance Corporal Travis Fox Memorial Highway" and to erect appropriate markers or signs along this portion of highway that contain the words "Lance Corporal Travis Fox Memorial Highway".
Be it further resolved that a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Department of Transportation.
The Concurrent Resolution was adopted and sent to the Senate.
The following Bill was taken up:
H. 3778 (Word version) -- Reps. Harrison, Wilkins, Cato, W. D. Smith, Merrill, Jennings, J. E. Smith and Chellis: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 15-38-15 SO AS TO PROVIDE IN AN ACTION TO RECOVER DAMAGES RESULTING FROM PERSONAL INJURY, WRONGFUL DEATH, DAMAGE TO PROPERTY, OR TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR ECONOMIC LOSS OR NONECONOMIC LOSS, JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY DOES NOT APPLY TO A DEFENDANT WHO IS LESS THAN FIFTY PERCENT AT FAULT; TO PROVIDE FOR APPORTIONMENT OF PERCENTAGES OF FAULT AMONG DEFENDANTS; AND TO PROVIDE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION DO NOT APPLY TO A DEFENDANT WHOSE CONDUCT IS WILFUL, WANTON, RECKLESS, GROSSLY NEGLIGENT, INTENTIONAL, OR CONDUCT INVOLVING THE USE, SALE, OR POSSESSION OF ALCOHOL OR ILLEGAL OR ILLICIT DRUGS.
Rep. KENNEDY moved to recommit the Bill to the Committee on Judiciary.
Rep. CATO moved to table the motion.
Rep. J. E. SMITH demanded the yeas and nays which were taken, resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Anthony Bailey Bales Ballentine Barfield Battle Bingham Bowers Brady Cato Ceips Chellis Clark Clemmons Coates Coleman Cooper Cotty Dantzler Davenport Delleney Edge Emory Frye Hagood Haley Hamilton
Hardwick Harrison Herbkersman Hinson Huggins Kirsh Leach Limehouse Littlejohn Loftis Lucas Mahaffey Martin McGee McLeod Merrill Miller J. M. Neal Neilson Norman Ott Owens Perry M. A. Pitts Rice Sandifer Scarborough Simrill Sinclair Skelton D. C. Smith F. N. Smith G. M. Smith G. R. Smith J. R. Smith W. D. Smith Stewart Talley Taylor Thompson Toole Townsend Umphlett Vaughn Viers Walker White Whitmire Wilkins Witherspoon Young
Those who voted in the negative are:
Agnew Anderson Branham Breeland G. Brown R. Brown J. Hines M. Hines Hosey Jefferson Jennings Kennedy Mack Moody-Lawrence J. H. Neal Parks Rivers Rutherford Scott J. E. Smith Vick Weeks
So, the motion to recommit the Bill was tabled.
Reps. HARRISON, WILKINS, CATO, W. D. SMITH and MERRILL proposed the following Amendment No. 1 (Doc Name COUNCIL\MS\7367AHB05), which was adopted:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking all after the enacting words and inserting:
/ SECTION 1. Chapter 38, Title 15 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
"Section 15-38-15. (A) In an action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death, damage to property, or to recover damages for economic loss or for noneconomic loss such as mental distress, loss of enjoyment, pain, suffering, loss of reputation, or loss of companionship resulting from tortious conduct, if indivisible damages are determined to be proximately caused by more than one defendant, joint and several liability does not apply to a defendant whose conduct is determined to be less than fifty percent of the total fault for the indivisible damages as compared with the total of:
(1) the fault of all the defendants; and
(2) the fault or comparative negligence, if any, of plaintiff.
A defendant whose conduct is determined to be less than fifty percent of the total fault is liable only for that percentage of the indivisible damages determined by the jury or trier of fact.
(B) Apportionment of percentages of fault among defendants is to be determined as provided in subsection (C).
(C) The jury, or the court if there is no jury, shall:
(1) specify the amount of damages;
(2) determine the percentage of fault, if any, of plaintiff and the amount of recoverable damages pursuant to applicable rules concerning comparative negligence; and
(3) upon a motion by at least one defendant, when there is a verdict pursuant to items (1) and (2) for damages against two or more defendants for the same indivisible injury, death, or damage to property, specify in a separate verdict pursuant to the procedures described in subitem (b) the percentage of liability that proximately caused the indivisible injury, death, damage to property, or economic loss from tortious conduct, as determined pursuant to item (1), that is attributable to each defendant whose actions are a proximate cause of the indivisible injury, death, or damage to property. In determining the percentage attributable to each defendant, any fault of the plaintiff, as determined by item (2), will be included so that the total of the percentages of fault attributed to the plaintiff and to the defendants must be one hundred percent. In calculating the percentage of fault attributable to each defendant, inclusion of any percentage of fault of the plaintiff as determined in item (2) shall not reduce the amount of the plaintiff's recoverable damages as determined pursuant to item (2). For this purpose:
(a) the court may determine that two or more persons are to be treated as a single party. This treatment must be used when two or more defendants acted in concert or when, by reason of agency,
(b) after the initial verdict awarding damages is entered and before the special verdict on percentages of liability is rendered, the parties must be allowed oral argument, with the length of the argument subject to the discretion of the trial judge, on the determination of the percentage attributable to each defendant. However, no additional evidence is allowed.
(D) A defendant retains the right to assert that another potential tortfeasor, whether or not a party, contributed to the alleged injury or damages and may be liable for any or all of the damages alleged by another party.
(E) Notwithstanding the application of this section, setoff from any settlement received from a potential tortfeasor before the verdict must be applied in proportion to each defendant's percentage of liability as determined pursuant to subsection (C).
(F) This section does not apply to a defendant whose conduct is determined to be wilful, wanton, reckless, grossly negligent, intentional, or conduct involving the use, sale, or possession of alcohol or illegal or illicit drugs."
SECTION 2. The repeal or amendment by this act of any law, whether temporary or permanent or civil or criminal, does not affect pending actions, rights, duties, or liabilities founded thereon, or alter, discharge, release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under the repealed or amended law, unless the repealed or amended provision shall so expressly provide. After the effective date of this act, all laws repealed or amended by this act must be taken and treated as remaining in full force and effect for the purpose of sustaining any pending or vested right, civil action, special proceeding, criminal prosecution, or appeal existing as of the effective date of this act, and for the enforcement of rights, duties, penalties, forfeitures, and liabilities as they stood under the repealed or amended laws.
SECTION 3. If any section, subsection, paragraph, subparagraph, sentence, clause, phrase, or word of this act is for any reason held to be unconstitutional or invalid, such holding shall not affect the constitutionality or validity of the remaining portions of this act, the General Assembly hereby declaring that it would have passed this act, and each and every section, subsection, paragraph, subparagraph, sentence, clause, phrase, and word thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one or more other sections, subsections, paragraphs,
Rep. WILKINS explained the amendment.
Rep. HARRISON spoke in favor of the amendment.
Rep. JENNINGS spoke against the amendment.
Rep. JENNINGS spoke against the amendment.
Rep. JENNINGS continued speaking.
Rep. J. E. SMITH spoke against the amendment.
Rep. HARRISON spoke in favor of the amendment.
Rep. COTTY spoke in favor of the amendment.
Rep. COBB-HUNTER spoke against the amendment.
Rep. COBB-HUNTER spoke against the amendment.
Rep. SKELTON spoke in favor of the amendment.
Rep. SKELTON spoke in favor of the amendment.
Rep. CATO moved cloture on the entire matter.
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Bailey Ballentine Barfield Battle Bingham Brady Cato Ceips Chalk Chellis Clark Clemmons Cooper Cotty Dantzler Davenport Edge Emory Frye Hagood Hamilton Hardwick Harrell Harrison Haskins Herbkersman Hinson Hiott Huggins Kirsh Leach Lee Limehouse Littlejohn Loftis Lucas Mahaffey Martin McCraw McGee Merrill Norman Owens Perry Pinson E. H. Pitts Rice Sandifer Scarborough Simrill Sinclair Skelton F. N. Smith G. M. Smith G. R. Smith J. R. Smith Stewart Talley Taylor Toole Townsend Umphlett Vaughn Walker White Whitmire Wilkins Witherspoon Young
Those who voted in the negative are:
Agnew Allen Anderson Anthony Bowers Branham Breeland G. Brown J. Brown R. Brown Clyburn Coates Cobb-Hunter Coleman Delleney Funderburk Govan J. Hines M. Hines Hosey Jefferson Jennings Mack McLeod Miller Moody-Lawrence J. H. Neal
Neilson Ott Parks Rivers Rutherford Scott J. E. Smith Thompson Tripp Vick Weeks Whipper
So, cloture was ordered.
Rep. J. E. SMITH spoke against the amendment.
Rep. WILKINS spoke in favor of the amendment.
Rep. JENNINGS moved to table the amendment.
Rep. YOUNG demanded the yeas and nays which were taken, resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Anderson Breeland G. Brown R. Brown Hosey Jennings Kennedy Mack Rivers Rutherford J. E. Smith Whipper
Those who voted in the negative are:
Agnew Allen Anthony Bailey Bales Ballentine Barfield Battle Bingham Bowers Brady Branham J. Brown Cato Ceips Chalk Chellis Clark Clemmons Clyburn Cobb-Hunter Coleman Cooper Cotty Dantzler Davenport Delleney Duncan Edge Emory Frye Funderburk Govan
Hagood Haley Hamilton Hardwick Harrell Harrison Haskins Hayes Herbkersman J. Hines M. Hines Hinson Huggins Jefferson Kirsh Leach Lee Limehouse Littlejohn Loftis Lucas Mahaffey Martin McCraw McGee McLeod Merrill Miller Moody-Lawrence J. H. Neal J. M. Neal Neilson Norman Ott Owens Parks Perry Phillips Pinson E. H. Pitts Rice Sandifer Scarborough Scott Simrill Sinclair Skelton D. C. Smith F. N. Smith G. M. Smith G. R. Smith J. R. Smith W. D. Smith Stewart Talley Taylor Thompson Toole Townsend Tripp Umphlett Vaughn Vick Walker Weeks White Whitmire Wilkins Witherspoon Young
So, the House refused to table the amendment.
The question then recurred to the adoption of the amendment, which was agreed to.
Reps. JENNINGS and J. E. SMITH proposed the following Amendment No. 2 (Doc Name COUNCIL\MS\7369AHB05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking all after the enacting words and inserting:
/ SECTION 1. Chapter 38, Title 15 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
"Section 15-38-15. (A) In an action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death, damage to property, or to recover damages for economic loss or for noneconomic loss such as mental distress, loss of enjoyment, pain, suffering, loss of reputation, or loss of companionship resulting from tortious conduct, if indivisible damages are determined to be proximately caused by more than one defendant, joint and several liability does not apply to a defendant whose conduct is determined to be less than fifty percent of the total fault for the indivisible damages as compared with the total of:
(1) the fault of all the defendants; and
(2) the fault or comparative negligence, if any, of plaintiff.
A defendant whose conduct is determined to be less than fifty percent of the total fault is liable only for that percentage of the indivisible damages determined by the jury or trier of fact.
(B) Apportionment of percentages of fault among defendants is to be determined as provided in subsection (C).
(C) The jury, or the court if there is no jury, shall:
(1) specify the amount of damages;
(2) determine the percentage of fault, if any, of plaintiff and the amount of recoverable damages pursuant to applicable rules concerning comparative negligence; and
(3) upon a motion by at least one defendant, when there is a verdict pursuant to items (1) and (2) for damages against two or more defendants for the same indivisible injury, death, or damage to property, specify in a separate verdict pursuant to the procedures described in subitem (b) the percentage of liability that proximately caused the indivisible injury, death, damage to property, or economic loss from tortious conduct, as determined pursuant to item (1), that is attributable to each defendant whose actions are a proximate cause of the indivisible injury, death, or damage to property. In determining the percentage attributable to each defendant, any fault of the plaintiff, as determined by item (2), will be included so that the total of the percentages of fault attributed to the plaintiff and to the defendants must be one hundred percent. In calculating the percentage of fault attributable to each defendant, inclusion of any percentage of fault of the plaintiff as determined in item (2) shall not reduce the amount of the plaintiff's recoverable damages as determined pursuant to item (2). For this purpose:
(a) the court may determine that two or more persons are to be treated as a single party. This treatment must be used when two or more defendants acted in concert or when, by reason of agency,
(b) after the initial verdict awarding damages is entered and before the special verdict on percentages of liability is rendered, the parties must be allowed oral argument, with the length of the argument subject to the discretion of the trial judge, on the determination of the percentage attributable to each defendant. However, no additional evidence is allowed.
(c) The amount due the plaintiff from each liable defendant must be determined by taking the amount of damages established by the jury pursuant to item (1)
and multiplying that figure by the percentage of fault determined by the jury for each liable defendant pursuant to item (3); provided, however, that joint and several liability shall apply to any liable defendant determined by the jury:
( i) to be fifty percent or more responsible for the indivisible damages of the plaintiff;
( ii) to have engaged in conduct determined to be wilful, wanton, reckless, grossly negligent, or intentional; or
(iii) to have engaged in conduct involving the use, sale, or possession of illegal or illicit alcohol or drugs.
(D) A defendant retains the right to assert that another potential tortfeasor, whether or not a party, contributed to the alleged injury or damages and may be liable for any or all of the damages alleged by another party.
(E) Notwithstanding the application of this section, setoff from any settlement received from a potential tortfeasor before the verdict must be applied in proportion to each defendant's percentage of liability as determined pursuant to subsection (C).
(F) This section does not apply to a defendant whose conduct is determined to be wilful, wanton, reckless, grossly negligent, intentional, or conduct involving the use, sale, or possession of alcohol or illegal or illicit drugs."
SECTION 2. The repeal or amendment by this act of any law, whether temporary or permanent or civil or criminal, does not affect pending actions, rights, duties, or liabilities founded thereon, or alter, discharge, release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under the repealed or amended law, unless the repealed or amended provision shall so expressly provide. After the effective date of this act, all laws repealed or amended by this act must be taken and treated as remaining in full force and effect for the purpose of
Rep. JENNINGS explained the amendment.
Rep. HARRISON spoke against the amendment.
Rep. CATO moved to table the amendment.
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Anthony Bailey Bales Ballentine Barfield Battle Bingham Brady Cato Ceips Chalk Chellis Clark Clemmons Coates Cooper Cotty Dantzler Davenport Duncan Edge Frye Hagood Haley Hamilton Hardwick Harrell Harrison Haskins Herbkersman Hinson Huggins Kennedy Kirsh Leach Lee Limehouse Littlejohn Loftis Lucas Mahaffey Martin McCraw McGee Merrill Norman Owens Perry Phillips Pinson E. H. Pitts M. A. Pitts Rice Sandifer Scarborough Simrill Sinclair Skelton D. C. Smith F. N. Smith G. M. Smith G. R. Smith J. R. Smith W. D. Smith Stewart Talley Taylor Thompson Toole Townsend Tripp Umphlett Vaughn Vick Walker White Whitmire Wilkins Witherspoon Young
Those who voted in the negative are:
Agnew Allen Anderson Bowers Branham Breeland G. Brown Clyburn Cobb-Hunter Coleman Delleney Emory Funderburk Govan M. Hines
Hosey Jefferson Jennings Mack McLeod Miller Moody-Lawrence J. H. Neal J. M. Neal Neilson Parks Rivers Rutherford Scott J. E. Smith Weeks Whipper
So, the amendment was tabled.
Rep. J. E. SMITH spoke against the Bill.
The SPEAKER granted Rep. HARRELL a leave of absence.
Rep. J. E. SMITH continued speaking.
Rep. YOUNG moved that the House recede until 2:00 p.m., which was agreed to.
Further proceedings were interrupted by the House receding, the pending question being consideration of the Bill, cloture having been ordered.
At 2:00 p.m. the House resumed, the SPEAKER in the Chair.
The question of a quorum was raised.
A quorum was later present.
The SPEAKER granted Rep. DUNCAN a temporary leave of absence.
Debate was resumed on the following Bill, the pending question being the consideration of the Bill, cloture having been ordered:
H. 3778 (Word version) -- Reps. Harrison, Wilkins, Cato, W. D. Smith, Merrill, Jennings, J. E. Smith and Chellis: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 15-38-15 SO AS TO PROVIDE IN AN ACTION TO RECOVER DAMAGES RESULTING FROM PERSONAL INJURY, WRONGFUL DEATH, DAMAGE TO PROPERTY, OR TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR ECONOMIC LOSS OR NONECONOMIC LOSS, JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY DOES NOT APPLY TO A DEFENDANT WHO IS LESS THAN FIFTY PERCENT AT FAULT; TO PROVIDE FOR APPORTIONMENT OF PERCENTAGES OF FAULT AMONG DEFENDANTS; AND TO PROVIDE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION DO NOT APPLY TO A DEFENDANT WHOSE CONDUCT IS WILFUL, WANTON, RECKLESS, GROSSLY NEGLIGENT, INTENTIONAL, OR CONDUCT INVOLVING THE USE, SALE, OR POSSESSION OF ALCOHOL OR ILLEGAL OR ILLICIT DRUGS.
Rep. J. E. SMITH moved to continue the Bill.
Rep. RICE demanded the yeas and nays which were taken, resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Anderson G. Brown Hosey Jennings McLeod Moody-Lawrence Scott F. N. Smith J. E. Smith Weeks
Those who voted in the negative are:
Agnew Bailey Bales Ballentine Barfield Battle Bingham Brady Cato Clemmons Clyburn Cooper Dantzler Davenport Delleney
Frye Funderburk Haley Hamilton Hardwick Harrell Haskins Hayes Hinson Hiott Jefferson Kennedy Kirsh Leach Lee Littlejohn Loftis Lucas Mahaffey Martin McCraw McGee Miller Neilson Norman Ott Owens Phillips Pinson E. H. Pitts Rice Simrill D. C. Smith G. M. Smith J. R. Smith W. D. Smith Talley Taylor Thompson Toole Umphlett Vaughn Vick Walker White Whitmire Wilkins Witherspoon Young
So, the House refused to continue the Bill.
Rep. JENNINGS spoke against the Bill.
Rep. JENNINGS continued speaking.
Rep. SCOTT spoke against the Bill.
Rep. J. E. SMITH requested that the Bill be read in its entirety, pursuant to Article 3, Section 18 of the S.C. Constitution.
The Reading Clerk read the Bill.
Pursuant to Rule 7.7 the Yeas and Nays were taken resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Allen Anderson Anthony Bailey Bales Ballentine
Barfield Battle Bingham Bowers Brady Branham J. Brown R. Brown Cato Ceips Chalk Clark Clyburn Coleman Cooper Cotty Dantzler Davenport Delleney Emory Frye Funderburk Haley Hamilton Hardwick Harrell Harrison Haskins Hayes J. Hines M. Hines Hinson Hiott Hosey Huggins Jefferson Kennedy Kirsh Leach Lee Littlejohn Lucas McCraw McGee McLeod Merrill Miller J. M. Neal Norman Ott Owens Parks Phillips Pinson E. H. Pitts M. A. Pitts Rice Rutherford Scarborough Scott Simrill Sinclair D. C. Smith F. N. Smith G. M. Smith G. R. Smith J. R. Smith Stewart Talley Thompson Toole Umphlett Vaughn Vick Weeks Whitmire Wilkins Witherspoon Young
Those who voted in the negative are:
J. E. Smith Whipper
So, the Bill, as amended, was read the second time and ordered to third reading.
I was temporarily out of the Chamber during the vote on H. 3778. I would have voted "yea" in favor of the Bill.
Rep. J. Adam Taylor
I was out of the Chamber in an emergency Rules meeting when the roll call vote was taken on H. 3778. If I had been present in the Chamber, I would have voted "yea" in favor of the Bill.
Rep. Robert S. Perry, Jr.
I was out of the Chamber in an emergency Rules meeting when the roll call vote was taken on H. 3778. If I had been present in the Chamber, I would have voted "yea" in favor of the Bill.
Rep. Brian White
Rep. CATO moved that the House recur to the Morning Hour, which was agreed to.
On motion of Rep. PHILLIPS, with unanimous consent, the following was taken up for immediate consideration:
H. 3783 (Word version) -- Reps. Phillips and Wilkins: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO FIX WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 2005, IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE FOLK HERITAGE AWARDS, AS THE DATE FOR THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE TO MEET IN JOINT SESSION IN THE HALL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE PURPOSE OF ELECTING MEMBERS OF THE BOARDS OF TRUSTEES OF THE CITADEL, COASTAL CAROLINA UNIVERSITY, SOUTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY, WIL LOU GRAY OPPORTUNITY SCHOOL, AND WINTHROP UNIVERSITY TO SUCCEED THOSE MEMBERS WHOSE TERMS EXPIRE IN 2005, OR WHOSE POSITIONS OTHERWISE MUST BE FILLED; AND TO ESTABLISH A PROCEDURE REGARDING NOMINATIONS AND NOMINATING AND SECONDING SPEECHES FOR THE CANDIDATES FOR THESE OFFICES DURING THE JOINT SESSION.
(1) That the House of Representatives and the Senate meet in joint session in the Hall of the House of Representatives on Wednesday, April 27, 2005, immediately before the Folk Heritage Awards, for the purpose of electing members of the boards of trustees of The Citadel, Coastal Carolina University, South Carolina State University, Wil Lou Gray Opportunity School, and Winthrop University to succeed those members whose terms expire in 2005, or whose positions otherwise must be filled; and
(2) that all nominations be made by the Chairman of the Joint Legislative Committee which screened the candidates for the above offices and that no further nominating nor any seconding speeches be made during the joint session by members of the General Assembly on behalf of any of the candidates.
The Concurrent Resolution was agreed to and ordered sent to the Senate.
The following Bill was introduced, read the first time, and referred to appropriate committee:
H. 3784 (Word version) -- Rep. White: A BILL TO AMEND ARTICLES 1 AND 3, CHAPTER 47 OF TITLE 4O, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO THE PRACTICE OF PHYSICIANS, SURGEONS, AND OSTEOPATHS, SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR THE COMPOSITION OF THE STATE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS AND PROVIDE FOR ITS POWERS AND DUTIES; PROVIDE FOR THE MEDICAL DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION, ITS COMPOSITION, POWERS, AND DUTIES; DEFINE CERTAIN TERMS; PROVIDE THAT OSTEOPATHIC PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS HAVE THE SAME RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS OF OTHER SCHOOLS OF MEDICINE WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES; PROVIDE THE RESTRICTIONS ON PRACTICING MEDICINE AND PROVIDE FOR LICENSED AND UNLICENSED PERSONS; PROVIDE REQUIREMENTS FOR LIMITED AND TEMPORARY LICENSES; PROVIDE
On motion of Rep. KIRSH, with unanimous consent, it was ordered that S. 339 (Word version) be read the third time tomorrow.
The Senate amendments to the following Bill were taken up for consideration:
H. 3008 (Word version) -- Reps. Cato, Bales, Clark, Barfield, Huggins, Frye, Sandifer, E. H. Pitts, Taylor, Anthony, Bailey, Battle, Bingham, Ceips, Chalk, Chellis, Clemmons, Cooper, Dantzler, Davenport, Duncan, Edge, Hamilton, Hardwick, Harrell, Hinson, Kirsh, Leach, Limehouse, Littlejohn, Loftis, McCraw, Norman, Owens, Perry, Pinson, Rice, Simrill, Skelton, D. C. Smith, G. R. Smith, J. R. Smith, Stewart, Thompson, Toole, Townsend, Tripp, Umphlett, Vaughn, Vick, Viers, Walker, White, Whitmire, Wilkins, Witherspoon, Coates, Brady, Ballentine, Ott, Mahaffey, Haley, Hagood, Bowers and Young: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING CHAPTER 32 TO TITLE 15, SO AS TO ENACT THE "SOUTH CAROLINA ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, CITIZENS, AND SMALL BUSINESS PROTECTION ACT OF 2005", PROVIDING FOR DEFINITIONS OF THE TERMS "DAMAGES", "FAULT", AND "PERSON", SEVERAL LIABILITY IN AN ACTION FOR PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE, OR WRONGFUL DEATH, A PROCEDURE FOR ASSESSING PERCENTAGES OF FAULT, JOINT LIABILITY ON ALL WHO CONSCIOUSLY AND DELIBERATELY PURSUE A COMMON PLAN TO COMMIT A TORTIOUS ACT, PLACEMENT OF THE BURDEN OF PROVING FAULT ON THE PERSON SEEKING TO ESTABLISH FAULT, AND AN EXCEPTION TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CHAPTER; TO AMEND SECTION 15-3-640, RELATING TO AN ACTION BASED UPON A DEFECTIVE OR UNSAFE IMPROVEMENT TO REAL PROPERTY, SO AS TO DECREASE THE TIME AN ACTION MAY BE BROUGHT FROM THIRTEEN TO SIX YEARS AFTER THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLETION OF THE IMPROVEMENT; TO AMEND SECTION 15-7-30, RELATING TO ACTIONS THAT MUST BE TRIED WHERE THE DEFENDANT RESIDES, SO AS TO DEFINE KEY TERMS AND TO PROVIDE FACTORS FOR THE COURT TO CONSIDER WHEN DETERMINING THE PRINCIPAL PLACE OF
Rep. JENNINGS proposed the following Amendment No. 19A (Doc Name COUNCIL\MS\7283AHB05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking in its entirety Section 15-32-40, as contained in SECTION 3, and inserting:
/ Section 15-32-40. (A) Joint and several liability must be imposed on the following:
(1) a defendant whose fault is greater than twenty percent;
(2) those defendants who consciously and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, or actively take part in it;
(3) a defendant who commits an intentional tort;
(4) a defendant who by reason of agency, employment, or other legal relationship is vicariously responsible for the conduct of another party; or
(5) a defendant whose liability arises pursuant to another provision of law that otherwise provides for joint and several liability.
(B) A defendant held jointly and severally liable pursuant to the provisions of this section has a right of contribution from other defendants held jointly and severally liable pursuant to this section to the extent provided for by Chapter 38, Title 15.
(C) A defendant held jointly and severally liable pursuant to subsection (A)(2) must be held jointly and severally liable only for the total portion of fault assessed to those defendants with whom he acted in concert.
(D) A defendant held jointly and severally liable pursuant to subsection (A)(4) must be held jointly and severally liable only for the total portion of fault assigned to the other party. For purposes of determining a share of fault a defendant who by reason of agency, employment, or other legal relationship is vicariously responsible for the conduct of another party and the other party shall be treated as a single party.
(E) In an action subject to this chapter, a party seeking to establish that two or more defendants in an action should be treated as a single party for purposes of assigning a portion of fault based on common law principles of piercing the corporate veil affirmatively shall plead and the court shall determine, based on common law principles of piercing the corporate veil, whether these defendants should be treated as a single party so that the conduct of one defendant is attributed to the others or the individual shares of fault are aggregated for the purpose of applying joint and several liability as provided in subsection (A).
(F) In a jury trial in any action in which the comparative fault of the parties or non-parties is an issue for determination by the jury, the trial court shall not instruct the jury on the effect of its finding as to the degree or percentage of negligence or fault of a party or non-party. /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. J. E. SMITH explained the amendment.
Rep. CATO moved to table the amendment.
Rep. J. E. SMITH demanded the yeas and nays which were taken, resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Agnew Anthony Bailey Ballentine Barfield Battle Bingham Brady Cato Ceips Chalk Clark
Clyburn Coleman Cooper Cotty Dantzler Davenport Delleney Edge Emory Frye Funderburk Haley Hamilton Hardwick Harrell Haskins J. Hines Hinson Hiott Huggins Kennedy Kirsh Leach Lee Limehouse Littlejohn Lucas McCraw McGee McLeod J. M. Neal Norman Phillips E. H. Pitts M. A. Pitts Rice Sandifer Scarborough Simrill Skelton D. C. Smith F. N. Smith G. M. Smith G. R. Smith J. R. Smith Stewart Talley Taylor Thompson Toole Townsend Umphlett Vaughn Vick White Whitmire Wilkins Witherspoon Young
Those who voted in the negative are:
Allen Anderson Bowers Breeland G. Brown J. Brown R. Brown M. Hines Hosey Jefferson Mack Moody-Lawrence Rutherford J. E. Smith Weeks Whipper
So, the amendment was tabled.
Reps. JENNINGS and F. N. SMITH proposed the following Amendment No. 20A (Doc Name COUNCIL\MS\7275AHB05), which was ruled out of order:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking SECTION 3 in its entirety and inserting:
/ SECTION 3. Chapter 38, Title 15 is amended to read:
Section 15-38-10. This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.
Section 15-38-15. (A) In an action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death, or damage to property, if the damages are determined to be proximately caused by more than one defendant, each defendant against whom recovery is allowed is liable to the claimant only for the defendant's proportionate share of the recoverable damages except as provided in subsection (D).
(B) The proportionate share of damages for which each defendant is liable is calculated by multiplying the damages by a fraction in which the numerator is the defendant's percentage of liability determined pursuant to subsection (C), and
the denominator is the total of the percentages of liability determined pursuant to subsection (C), to be attributable to all defendants whose actions are a proximate cause of the injury, death, or damage to property including settled or released persons pursuant to Section 15-38-50. A percentage of liability attributable to the claimant may not be included in the denominator of the fraction.
(C) The jury or court, if there is no jury, shall specify:
(1) the amount of damages;
(2) findings of fact necessary for the court to specify recoverable damages; and
(3) the percentage of liability that proximately caused the injury, death, or damage to property in relation to one hundred percent, that is attributable to each defendant whose actions are a proximate cause of the injury, death, or damage to property including settled or released persons pursuant to Section 15-38-50.
(D)(1) Upon motion by the claimant to open the judgment filed, after good faith efforts by the claimant to collect from a liable defendant, at least one year but not more than two years after judgment becomes final through lapse of time or through exhaustion of appeal, whichever occurs later, the court shall determine whether all or part of a defendant's proportionate share of the recoverable damages is not collectible from that defendant, and shall reallocate that amount among the other defendants in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(2) The court shall order that the portion of the amount not collectible be reallocated among the other defendants. The court shall reallocate to the other defendants an amount equal to the amount not collectible of recoverable damages multiplied by a fraction in which
(3) The defendant whose liability is reallocated remains subject to contribution pursuant to the provisions of this chapter and to any continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment.
Section 15-38-20. (A) Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, where two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them.
(B) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata proportionate share of the common liability as determined by the jury or court at the time of judgment, and his total recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata proportionate share as determined by the jury or court at the time of judgment. No tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond his own pro rata proportionate share of the entire liability as determined by the jury or court at the time of judgment.
(C) There is no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death.
(D) A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable.
(E) A liability insurer, who by payment has discharged in full or in part the liability of a tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full its obligation as insurer, is subrogated to the tortfeasor's right of contribution to the extent of the amount it has paid in excess of the tortfeasor's pro rata proportionate share of the common liability as determined by the jury or court at the time of judgment. This provision does not limit or impair any right of subrogation arising from any other relationship.
(F) This chapter does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law. Where one tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity from another, the right of the indemnity obligee is for indemnity and not contribution, and the indemnity obligor is not entitled to contribution from the obligee for any portion of his indemnity obligation.
(G) This chapter does not apply to breaches of trust or of other fiduciary obligation.
Section 15-38-30. In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire liability (1) their relative degrees of fault shall not be considered; (2) if equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute a single share; and (3) principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall apply.
Section 15-38-40. (A) Whether or not judgment has been entered in an action against two or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be enforced by separate action.
(B) Where a judgment has been entered in an action against two or more tortfeasors for the same injury or wrongful death, contribution may be enforced in that action by judgment in favor of one against other judgment defendants by motion upon notice to all parties to the action. Provided, however, contribution may not be enforced in the action until the issue of liability, and the resulting damages against the defendant or defendants named in the action, and the proportionate fault of the defendant is determined. Once the issue of liability has been resolved, subject to Section 15-38-20(B), a defendant has the right to seek contribution against any judgment defendant and other persons who were not made parties to the action.
(C) If there is a judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, any separate action by him to enforce contribution must be commenced within one year after the party seeking contribution has made the final payment in excess of that party's share of the judgment after the judgment has become final by lapse of time for appeal or after appellate review.
(D) If there is no judgment for the injury or wrongful death against the tortfeasor seeking contribution, his right of contribution is barred unless he has either (1) discharged by payment the common liability within the statute of limitations period applicable to claimant's right of action against him and has commenced his action for contribution within one year after payment, or (2) agreed while action is pending against him to discharge the common liability and has within one year after the agreement paid the liability and commenced his action for contribution.
(E) The recovery of a judgment for an injury or wrongful death against one tortfeasor does not of itself discharge the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless the judgment is satisfied. The satisfaction of the judgment does not impair any right of contribution.
(F) The judgment of the court in determining the liability of the several defendants to the claimant for an injury or wrongful death shall be binding as among such defendants in determining their right to contribution.
Section 15-38-50. When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death:
(1) it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide, but it reduces the claim against the others to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and
(2) it discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.
Section 15-38-60. This chapter shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those that enact it.
Section 15-38-65. No payment shall be made from state appropriated funds or other public funds to satisfy claims or judgments against governmental entities or governmental employees acting within the scope of their official duties arising under the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. The South Carolina Tort Claims Act is the exclusive and sole remedy for any tort committed by an employee of a governmental entity while acting within the scope of his official duty. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act shall not apply to governmental entities.
Section 15-38-70. All acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter are hereby repealed." /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. CATO raised the Point of Order that Amendment No. 20A was out of order in that it was identical to Amendment No. 7.
Rep J.E. SMITH argued contra.
SPEAKER WILKINS sustained the Point of Order.
Rep. J. E. SMITH proposed the following Amendment No. 22A (Doc Name COUNCIL\GJK\20339SD05), which was tabled:
Rep. J. E. SMITH explained the amendment.
Rep. CATO moved to table the amendment.
Rep. J. E. SMITH demanded the yeas and nays which were taken, resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Agnew Bailey Bales Ballentine Barfield Battle Bingham Brady Cato Ceips Chalk Clark Clyburn Cotty Dantzler Davenport Delleney Edge Frye Funderburk Haley Hardwick Harrell Harrison J. Hines Hinson Hiott Huggins Kirsh Leach Limehouse Lucas Mahaffey McCraw McGee Norman Ott Owens Phillips E. H. Pitts M. A. Pitts Rice Sandifer Scarborough Simrill D. C. Smith F. N. Smith G. M. Smith G. R. Smith J. R. Smith Stewart Talley Taylor Thompson Toole Townsend Umphlett Vaughn Vick Whitmire Witherspoon Young
Those who voted in the negative are:
Anderson R. Brown Hosey Jefferson Mack McLeod Moody-Lawrence Rivers Rutherford J. E. Smith Weeks Whipper
So, the amendment was tabled.
I was out of the Chamber in an emergency Rules meeting when the roll call vote was taken on Amendment No. 22A to H. 3008. If I had been present in the Chamber, I would have voted to table the Amendment.
Rep. Robert S. Perry, Jr.
I was out of the Chamber in an emergency Rules meeting when the roll call vote was taken on Amendment No. 22A to H. 3008. If I had been present in the Chamber, I would have voted to table the Amendment.
Rep. Brian White
Rep. J. E. SMITH proposed the following Amendment No. 23A (Doc Name COUNCIL\GJK\20338SD05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, in Section 15-38-15 of the 1976 Code, as contained in SECTION 6, by striking / fifty percent/ on line 9, page 12, and on line 13, page 12 and inserting /forty-six percent /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. J. E. SMITH explained the amendment.
Rep. YOUNG moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 49 to 13.
Rep. J. E. SMITH proposed the following Amendment No. 24A (Doc Name COUNCIL\GJK\20337SD05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, in Section 15-38-15 of the 1976 Code, as contained in SECTION 6, by striking / fifty percent/ on line 9, page 12, and on line 13, page 12 and inserting /forty-seven percent /
Rep. J. E. SMITH explained the amendment.
Rep. YOUNG moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 56 to 16.
Rep. J. E. SMITH proposed the following Amendment No. 25A (Doc Name COUNCIL\GJK\20336SD05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, in Section 15-38-15 of the 1976 Code, as contained in SECTION 6, by striking / fifty percent/ on line 9, page 12, and on line 13, page 12 and inserting /forty-eight percent /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. J. E. SMITH explained the amendment.
Rep. YOUNG moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 47 to 10.
Rep. J. E. SMITH proposed the following Amendment No. 26A (Doc Name COUNCIL\GJK\20335SD05), which was ruled out of order:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, in Section 15-38-15 of the 1976 Code, as contained in SECTION 6, by striking / fifty percent/ on line 9, page 12, and on line 13, page 12 and inserting /forty-nine percent /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
SPEAKER WILKINS stated that Amendment No. 26A was out of order under Rule 8.3, being dilatory.
Rep. J. E. SMITH argued contra.
Rep. RUTHERFORD argued contra.
SPEAKER WILKINS ruled that under Rule 8.3, the Amendment was out of order.
Rep. J. E. SMITH explained the amendment.
Rep. YOUNG moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 65 to 12.
Rep. J. E. SMITH proposed the following Amendment No. 28A (Doc Name COUNCIL\NBD\11588AC05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, Section 15-38-15(A)(1) page 12 on lines 9 and 13 by deleting /fifty/ and inserting /forty-four/.
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. J. E. SMITH explained the amendment.
Rep. YOUNG moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 55 to 5.
Reps. J. E. SMITH and G. M. SMITH proposed the following Amendment No. 29A (Doc Name COUNCIL\NBD\11587AC05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, Section 34-31-20 page 13, immediately after line 39 by inserting:
/(C) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (A), in addition to the interest on a money decree or judgment, as provided for in subsection (B), interest also accrues in such cases prior to judgment being rendered in the same amount of interest provided for in subsection (B)./
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. RUTHERFORD explained the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 56 to 10.
Rep. J. E. SMITH proposed the following Amendment No. 30A (Doc Name COUNCIL\NBD\11591AC05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, Section 15-38-15(A)(1) page 12 on lines 9 and 13 by deleting /fifty/ and inserting /forty-one/.
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. RUTHERFORD explained the amendment.
Rep. CATO moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 57 to 8.
Rep. J. E. SMITH proposed the following Amendment No. 31A (Doc Name COUNCIL\NBD\11592AC05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, Section 15-38-15(A)(1) page 12 on lines 9 and 13 by deleting /fifty/ and inserting /forty/.
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. RUTHERFORD explained the amendment.
Rep. YOUNG moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 46 to 7.
Rep. J. E. SMITH proposed the following Amendment No. 32A (Doc Name COUNCIL\NBD\11590AC05), which was ruled out of order:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, Section 15-38-15(A)(1) page 12 on lines 9 and 13 by deleting /fifty/ and inserting /forty-two/.
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
SPEAKER WILKINS stated that Amendment No. 32A was out of order under Rule 8.3 and Mason's Section 401(1) in that it was dilatory.
Rep. JENNINGS proposed the following Amendment No. 33A (Doc Name COUNCIL\SWB\6416AHB05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking SECTION 3 in its entirety and inserting:
/ SECTION 3. Section 15-7-30 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"Section 15-7-30 (A) As used in this section:
(1) 'Domestic corporation' means a 'domestic corporation' as defined in Section 33-1-400.
(2) Domestic limited partnership' means a 'domestic limited partnership' as defined in Section 33-42-20.
(3) 'Domestic limited liability company' means a 'domestic limited liability partnership' as defined in Section 33-41-1110 with its principal place of business within this State.
(4) 'Domestic limited liability partnership' means a 'domestic limited liability partnership' as defined in Section 33-41-1110 with its principal place of business within this State.
(5) 'Foreign corporation' means a 'foreign corporation' as defined in Section 33-1-400.
(6) 'Foreign limited partnership' means a 'foreign limited partnership' as defined in Section 33-42-20.
(7) 'Foreign limited liability company' means a 'foreign limited liability partnership' as defined in Section 33-41-1150 with its principal place of business outside this State.
(8) 'Foreign limited liability partnership' means a 'foreign limited liability partnership' as defined in Section 33-41-1150 with its principal place of business outside this State.
(9) 'Nonresident individual' means a person who is not domiciled in this State.
(10) 'Principal place of business' means:
(a) the corporation's home office location from which the corporation's officers direct, control, or coordinate its activities within the State;
(b) the location of the corporation's manufacturing, sales, or purchasing facility within the State if the corporation does not have a home office within the State; or
(c) the location at which the majority of corporate activity takes place if the corporation has multiple centers of manufacturing, sales, or purchasing located within the State if the corporation does not have a home office within the State and has more than one manufacturing, sales, or purchasing facility within the State. The following factors may be considered when determining the location at which the majority of corporate activity takes place:
(i) the number of employees located in any one county;
(ii) the authority of the employees located in any one county;
(iii) the tangible corporate assets that exist in any one county.
(11) 'Resident individual' means a person who is domiciled in this State.
(B) In all other cases not provided for in Sections 15-7-10, 15-7-20, or 15-78-100, the action shall must be tried in the county in which the defendant resides at the time of the commencement of the action where it properly may be brought and tried against the defendant according to the provisions of this section. If there be is more than one defendant, then the action may be tried in any county in which one or more of the defendants to such action resides at the time of the commencement of the action where the action properly may be maintained against one of the defendants pursuant to this section. If none of the parties shall reside in the State the action may be tried in any county which the plaintiff shall designate in his complaint. This section is subject however to the power of the court in the county where the action properly may be maintained according to this section to change the place of trial as provided in Section 15-7-100 or as otherwise in certain cases as provided by law.
(C) A civil action tried pursuant to this section against a resident individual defendant must be brought and tried in the county in which the:
(1) defendant resides at the time the cause of action arose; or
(2) most substantial part of the alleged act or omission giving rise to the cause of action occurred.
(D) A civil action tried pursuant to this section against a nonresident individual defendant must be brought and tried in the county in which the:
(1) most substantial part of the alleged act or omission giving rise to the cause of action occurred; or
(2) plaintiff resides at the time the cause of action arose, or if the plaintiff is a domestic corporation, domestic limited partnership, domestic limited liability company, domestic limited liability partnership, foreign corporation, foreign limited partnership, foreign limited liability company, or foreign limited liability partnership, at its principal place of business at the time the cause of action arose.
(E) A civil action tried pursuant to this section against a domestic corporation, domestic limited partnership, domestic limited liability company, or domestic limited liability partnership, must be brought and tried in the county in which the:
(1) corporation, limited partnership, limited liability company, or limited liability partnership has its principal place of business at the time the cause of action arose; or
(2) most substantial part of the alleged act or omission giving rise to the cause of action occurred.
(F) A civil action tried pursuant to this section against a foreign corporation required to possess a certificate of authority pursuant to the provisions of Section 33-15-101 et seq., a foreign limited partnership required to possess a certificate of authority pursuant to the provisions of Section 33-15-101 et seq., foreign limited liability company required to possess a certificate of authority pursuant to the provisions of Section 33-15-101 et seq., or foreign limited liability partnership required to possess a certificate of authority pursuant to the provisions of Section 33-15-101 et seq. must be brought and tried in the county in which the:
(1) most substantial part of the alleged act or omission giving rise to the cause of action occurred; or
(2) foreign corporation, foreign limited partnership, foreign limited liability company, or foreign limited liability partnership has its principal place of business at the time the cause of action arose.
(G) A civil action tried pursuant to this section against a foreign corporation not required to possess a certificate of authority pursuant the provisions of Section 33-15-101 et seq., foreign limited partnership not required to possess a certificate of authority pursuant to the provisions of Section 33-15-101 et seq., foreign limited liability company not required to possess a certificate of authority pursuant to the provisions of Section 33-15-101 et seq., or foreign limited liability partnership not required to possess a certificate of authority pursuant to the provisions of Section 33-15-101 et seq. must be brought and tried in the county in which the:
(1) most substantial part of the alleged act or omission giving rise to the cause of action occurred;
(2) plaintiff resides at the time the cause of action arose, or if the plaintiff is a domestic corporation, domestic limited partnership, domestic limited liability company, domestic limited liability partnership, foreign corporation, foreign limited partnership, foreign limited liability company, or foreign limited liability partnership, at its principal place of business at the time the cause of action arose; or
(3) foreign corporation, foreign limited partnership, foreign limited liability company, or foreign limited liability partnership has its principal place of business at the time the cause of action arose.
(H) Owning property and transacting business in a county is insufficient in and of itself to establish the principal place of business for a corporation for purposes of this section." /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. RUTHERFORD explained the amendment.
Rep. YOUNG moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 35 to 9.
Rep. JENNINGS proposed the following Amendment No. 34A (Doc Name COUNCIL\SWB\6415AHB05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking SECTION 3 in its entirety and inserting:
/ SECTION 3. Section 15-7-30 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"Section 15-7-30. (A) As used in this section:
( 1) 'Domestic corporation' means a 'domestic corporation' as defined in Section 33-1-400.
( 2) 'Domestic limited partnership' means a 'domestic limited partnership' as defined in Section 33-42-20.
( 3) 'Domestic limited liability company' means a 'domestic limited liability partnership' as defined in Section 33-41-1110 with its principal place of business within this State.
( 4) 'Domestic limited liability partnership' means a 'domestic limited liability partnership' as defined in Section 33-41-1110 with its principal place of business within this State.
( 5) 'Foreign corporation' means a 'foreign corporation' as defined in Section 33-1-400.
( 6) 'Foreign limited partnership' means a 'foreign limited partnership' as defined in Section 33-42-20.
( 7) 'Foreign limited liability company' means a 'foreign limited liability partnership' as defined in Section 33-41-1150 with its principal place of business outside of the State.
( 8) 'Foreign limited liability partnership' means a 'foreign limited liability partnership' as defined in Section 33-41-1150 with its principal place of business outside of the State.
( 9) 'Nonresident individual' means a person who is not domiciled in this State.
(10) 'Principal place of business' means:
(a) the corporation's home office location from which the corporation's officers direct, control, or coordinate its activities within the State;
(b) the location of the corporation's manufacturing, sales, or purchasing facility within the State if the corporation does not have a home office within the State; or
(c) the location at which the majority of corporate activity takes place if the corporation has multiple centers of manufacturing, sales, or purchasing located within the State. The following factors may be considered when determining the location at which the majority of corporate activity takes place:
( i) the number of employees located in any one county;
( ii) the authority of the employees located in any one county; and
(iii) the tangible corporate assets that exist in any one county; and
(11) 'Resident individual' means a person who is domiciled in this State.
(B) In all other cases not provided for in Sections 15-7-10, 15-7-20, or 15-78-100, and except as provided in Section 15-7-100, the action shall must be tried in the county in which the defendant resides at the time of the commencement of the action it properly may be brought and tried against the defendant according to the provisions of this section. If there be is more than one defendant, then the action may be tried in any county in which one or more of the defendants to such action resides at the time of the commencement of the an action properly may be maintained against one of the defendants pursuant to
(C) A civil action tried pursuant to this section against a resident individual defendant must be brought and tried in the county in which the:
(1) defendant resides at the time the cause of action arose; or
(2) cause of action arose.
(D) A civil action tried pursuant to this section against a nonresident individual defendant must be brought and tried in the county in which the:
(1) plaintiff resides at the time the cause of action arose; or
(2) cause of action arose.
(E) A civil action tried pursuant to this section against a domestic corporation, domestic limited partnership, domestic limited liability company, or domestic limited liability partnership must be brought and tried in the county in which the:
(1) corporation's principal place of business at the time the cause of action arose; or
(2) cause of action arose.
(F) A civil action tried pursuant to this section against a foreign corporation, foreign limited partnership, foreign limited liability company, or foreign limited liability partnership must be brought and tried in the county in which the:
(1) plaintiff resides at the time the cause of action arose;
(2) foreign corporation, foreign limited partnership, foreign limited liability company, or foreign limited liability partnership has its principal place of business in this State at the time the cause of action arose; or
(3) cause of action arose." /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. J. E. SMITH explained the amendment.
Rep. YOUNG moved to table the amendment.
Rep. YOUNG demanded the yeas and nays which were taken, resulting as follows:
Agnew Bailey Ballentine Barfield Battle Bingham Bowers Brady Cato Ceips Chalk Clark Dantzler Delleney Emory Frye Hagood Haley Hardwick Harrell Harvin Haskins Herbkersman J. Hines M. Hines Hinson Hiott Huggins Jefferson Kirsh Leach Limehouse Loftis Mahaffey Martin McGee McLeod Norman Owens E. H. Pitts Rice Sandifer Scarborough Skelton D. C. Smith G. R. Smith J. R. Smith Stewart Talley Thompson Toole Umphlett Vaughn Vick Viers Walker White Whitmire Wilkins Witherspoon Young
Those who voted in the negative are:
Anderson R. Brown Hosey Jennings Moody-Lawrence Rivers J. E. Smith Weeks
So, the amendment was tabled.
Rep. JENNINGS proposed the following Amendment No. 35A (Doc Name COUNCIL\PT\2463AHB05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking SECTION 6 in its entirety and inserting:
/ SECTION 6. Title 15 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
Section 15-32-10. Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, as used in this section:
(1) 'Damages' means pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, mental anguish, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, humiliation, another theory of damages, including, but not limited to, fear of loss or illness or injury, loss of earnings and earning capacity, loss of income, medical expenses and medical care, rehabilitation services, custodial care, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair or replacement of property, costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment, loss of business or employment opportunities, and other objectively verifiable monetary losses. Damages does not include punitive damages.
(2) 'Fault' means an act or omission of a person which is a proximate cause of injury or death to another person, damages to property, tangible or intangible, or economic injury including, but not limited to, negligence, malpractice, strict liability, absolute liability, or failure to warn. Fault does not include a tort resulting from an act or omission committed with a specific intent to cause injury or damage to another or to property.
(3) 'Person' means an individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, society, joint stock company, or other entity, including a governmental entity or unincorporated association of persons.
Section 15-32-20. In an action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the liability of each defendant for damages is several only and may not be joint. Each defendant is liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault, and a separate judgment must be rendered against the defendant for that amount. To determine the amount of judgment to be entered against each defendant, the court, with regard to each defendant, shall multiply the total amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff by the percentage of each defendant's fault, and the amount calculated for each defendant is the maximum recoverable against that defendant.
Section 15-32-30. (A) At any time after an action is commenced against one or more defendants for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, a defendant may join as a co-defendant to the action any person who may be liable to the plaintiff for the personal injury,
(B) A defendant has one hundred twenty days following service of the summons and complaint to join a co-defendant pursuant to this section, during which time all applicable statutes of limitation are tolled.
Section 15-32-40. Joint liability must be imposed on all who consciously and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, or actively take part in it or any person or entity vicariously liable for the act of another. A person held jointly liable pursuant to the provisions of this section has a right of contribution from his fellow defendants acting in concert. A defendant must be held responsible only for the portion of fault assessed to those with whom he acted in concert pursuant to the provisions of this section.
Section 15-32-50. The burden of alleging and proving fault is upon the person who seeks to establish fault.
Section 15-32-55. When charging a jury on several liability the court shall also disclose to the jury the applicable insurance coverage limits for all defendants in the action.
Section 15-32-60. This section may not be construed to create a cause of action or to alter the immunity of a person.
Section 15-32-70. This chapter does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law.
Section 15-32-80. The provisions of this chapter do not apply to a motion or an action brought pursuant to the provisions of the South Carolina Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act as contained in Section 15-38-40.
Section 15-32-90. The provisions of this chapter do not affect any right, privilege, or provision of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act as contained in Chapter 78, Title 15 or the South Carolina Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act as contained in Chapter 56, Title 33." /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. JENNINGS explained the amendment.
Rep. HINSON moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 40 to 9.
Section 15-32-10. Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, as used in this section:
(1) 'Damages' means pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, mental anguish, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, humiliation, another theory of damages, including, but not limited to, fear of loss or illness or injury, loss of earnings and earning capacity, loss of income, medical expenses and medical care, rehabilitation services, custodial care, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair or replacement of property, costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment, loss of business or employment opportunities, and other objectively verifiable monetary losses. Damages does not include punitive damages.
(2) 'Fault' means an act or omission of a person which is a proximate cause of injury or death to another person, damages to property, tangible or intangible, or economic injury including, but not limited to, negligence, malpractice, strict liability, absolute liability, or failure to warn. Fault does not include a tort resulting from an act or omission committed with a specific intent to cause injury or damage to another or to property.
(3) 'Person' means an individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, society, joint stock company, or other entity, including a governmental entity or unincorporated association of persons.
Section 15-32-20. In an action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the liability of each defendant for damages is several only and may not be joint. Each defendant is liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault, and a separate judgment must be rendered against the defendant for that amount. To determine the amount of judgment to be entered against each defendant, the court, with regard to each defendant, shall multiply the total amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff by the percentage of each
Section 15-32-30. (A) At any time after an action is commenced against one or more defendants for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, a defendant may join as a co-defendant to the action any person who may be liable to the plaintiff for the personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death alleged in the plaintiff's complaint. That person must be joined to the action by service of a summons and complaint pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure.
(B) A defendant has one hundred twenty days following service of the summons and complaint to join a co-defendant pursuant to this section, during which time all applicable statutes of limitation are tolled.
Section 15-32-40. Joint liability must be imposed on all who consciously and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, or actively take part in it or any person or entity vicariously liable for the act of another. A person held jointly liable pursuant to the provisions of this section has a right of contribution from his fellow defendants acting in concert. A defendant must be held responsible only for the portion of fault assessed to those with whom he acted in concert pursuant to the provisions of this section.
Section 15-32-45. In an action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the liability of each defendant for damages is joint and several if the defendant had a duty not to injure the plaintiff and breached that duty. A person held jointly liable pursuant to the provisions of this section has a right of contribution from the other defendants.
Section 15-32-50. The burden of alleging and proving fault is upon the person who seeks to establish fault.
Section 15-32-60. This section may not be construed to create a cause of action or to alter the immunity of a person.
Section 15-32-70. This chapter does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law.
Section 15-32-80. The provisions of this chapter do not apply to a motion or an action brought pursuant to the provisions of the South Carolina Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act as contained in Section 15-38-40.
Section 15-32-90. The provisions of this chapter do not affect any right, privilege, or provision of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act as contained in Chapter 78, Title 15 or the South Carolina Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act as contained in Chapter 56, Title 33." /
Rep. JENNINGS explained the amendment.
Rep. HINSON moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 49 to 11.
Rep. JENNINGS proposed the following Amendment No. 37A (Doc Name COUNCIL\PT\2466AHB05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking SECTION 6 in its entirety and inserting:
/ SECTION 6. Title 15 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
Section 15-32-10. Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, as used in this section:
(1) 'Damages' means pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, mental anguish, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, humiliation, another theory of damages, including, but not limited to, fear of loss or illness or injury, loss of earnings and earning capacity, loss of income, medical expenses and medical care, rehabilitation services, custodial care, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair or replacement of property, costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment, loss of business or employment opportunities, and other objectively verifiable monetary losses. Damages does not include punitive damages.
(2) 'Fault' means an act or omission of a person which is a proximate cause of injury or death to another person, damages to property, tangible or intangible, or economic injury including, but not limited to, negligence, malpractice, strict liability, absolute liability, or failure to warn. Fault does not include a tort resulting from an act or omission committed with a specific intent to cause injury or damage to another or to property.
(3) 'Person' means an individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, society, joint stock company, or other entity, including a governmental entity or unincorporated association of persons.
Section 15-32-20. In an action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the liability of each defendant for damages is several only and may not be joint. Each defendant is liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault, and a separate judgment must be rendered against the defendant for that amount. To determine the amount of judgment to be entered against each defendant, the court, with regard to each defendant, shall multiply the total amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff by the percentage of each defendant's fault, and the amount calculated for each defendant is the maximum recoverable against that defendant.
Section 15-32-30. (A) At any time after an action is commenced against one or more defendants for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, a defendant may join as a co-defendant to the action any person who may be liable to the plaintiff for the personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death alleged in the plaintiff's complaint. That person must be joined to the action by service of a summons and complaint pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure.
(B) A defendant has one hundred twenty days following service of the summons and complaint to join a co-defendant pursuant to this section, during which time all applicable statutes of limitation are tolled.
Section 15-32-40. Joint liability must be imposed on all who consciously and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, or actively take part in it or any person or entity vicariously liable for the act of another. A person held jointly liable pursuant to the provisions of this section has a right of contribution from his fellow defendants acting in concert. A defendant must be held responsible only for the portion of fault assessed to those with whom he acted in concert pursuant to the provisions of this section.
Section 15-32-45. In an action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death due to an intentional tort or toxic tort, the liability of each defendant for damages is joint and several. A person held jointly liable pursuant to the provisions of this section has a right of contribution from the other defendants.
Section 15-32-50. The burden of alleging and proving fault is upon the person who seeks to establish fault.
Section 15-32-60. This section may not be construed to create a cause of action or to alter the immunity of a person.
Section 15-32-70. This chapter does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law.
Section 15-32-80. The provisions of this chapter do not apply to a motion or an action brought pursuant to the provisions of the South Carolina Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act as contained in Section 15-38-40.
Section 15-32-90. The provisions of this chapter do not affect any right, privilege, or provision of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act as contained in Chapter 78, Title 15 or the South Carolina Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act as contained in Chapter 56, Title 33." /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. J. E. SMITH explained the amendment.
Rep. HINSON moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 52 to 13.
Rep. JENNINGS proposed the following Amendment No. 38A (Doc Name COUNCIL\PT\2464AHB05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking SECTION 6 in its entirety and inserting:
/ SECTION 6. Title 15 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
Section 15-32-10. Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, as used in this section:
(1) 'Damages' means pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, mental anguish, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, humiliation, another theory of damages, including, but not limited to, fear of loss or illness or injury, loss of earnings and earning capacity, loss of income, medical expenses and medical care, rehabilitation services, custodial care, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair or replacement of property, costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment, loss of business or employment opportunities, and other objectively verifiable monetary losses. Damages does not include punitive damages.
(2) 'Fault' means an act or omission of a person which is a proximate cause of injury or death to another person, damages to property, tangible or intangible, or economic injury including, but not limited to, negligence, malpractice, strict liability, absolute liability, or
(3) 'Person' means an individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, society, joint stock company, or other entity, including a governmental entity or unincorporated association of persons.
Section 15-32-20. In an action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the liability of each defendant for damages is several only and may not be joint. Each defendant is liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault, and a separate judgment must be rendered against the defendant for that amount. To determine the amount of judgment to be entered against each defendant, the court, with regard to each defendant, shall multiply the total amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff by the percentage of each defendant's fault, and the amount calculated for each defendant is the maximum recoverable against that defendant.
Section 15-32-30. (A) At any time after an action is commenced against one or more defendants for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, a defendant may join as a co-defendant to the action any person who may be liable to the plaintiff for the personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death alleged in the plaintiff's complaint. That person must be joined to the action by service of a summons and complaint pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure.
(B) A defendant has one hundred twenty days following service of the summons and complaint to join a co-defendant pursuant to this section, during which time all applicable statutes of limitation are tolled.
Section 15-32-40. Joint liability must be imposed on all who consciously and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, or actively take part in it or any person or entity vicariously liable for the act of another. A person held jointly liable pursuant to the provisions of this section has a right of contribution from his fellow defendants acting in concert. A defendant must be held responsible only for the portion of fault assessed to those with whom he acted in concert pursuant to the provisions of this section.
Section 15-32-45. In an action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the liability of each defendant for damages is joint and several if the use of alcohol or drugs by a defendant contributed to the injury. A person held jointly liable pursuant to the
Section 15-32-50. The burden of alleging and proving fault is upon the person who seeks to establish fault.
Section 15-32-60. This section may not be construed to create a cause of action or to alter the immunity of a person.
Section 15-32-70. This chapter does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law.
Section 15-32-80. The provisions of this chapter do not apply to a motion or an action brought pursuant to the provisions of the South Carolina Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act as contained in Section 15-38-40.
Section 15-32-90. The provisions of this chapter do not affect any right, privilege, or provision of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act as contained in Chapter 78, Title 15 or the South Carolina Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act as contained in Chapter 56, Title 33." /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. J. E. SMITH explained the amendment.
Rep. HINSON moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 49 to 11.
Rep. JENNINGS proposed the following Amendment No. 39A (Doc Name COUNCIL\SWB\6418AHB05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking SECTION 6 in its entirety and inserting:
/ SECTION 6. Title 15 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
Section 15-32-10. Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, as used in this section:
(1) 'Damages' means pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, mental anguish, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, humiliation, another theory of damages, including, but not limited to, fear of loss or illness or injury, loss of earnings and earning capacity, loss of income, medical expenses and medical care, rehabilitation services, custodial care, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of
(2) 'Fault' means an act or omission of a person which is a proximate cause of injury or death to another person, damages to property, tangible or intangible, or economic injury including, but not limited to, negligence, malpractice, strict liability, absolute liability, or failure to warn. Fault does not include a tort resulting from an act or omission committed with a specific intent to cause injury or damage to another or to property.
(3) 'Person' means an individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, society, joint stock company, or other entity, including a governmental entity or unincorporated association of persons.
Section 15-32-20. In an action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the liability of each defendant for damages is several only and may not be joint. Each defendant is liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault, and a separate judgment must be rendered against the defendant for that amount. To determine the amount of judgment to be entered against each defendant, the court, with regard to each defendant, shall multiply the total amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff by the percentage of each defendant's fault, and the amount calculated for each defendant is the maximum recoverable against that defendant.
Section 15-32-30. (A) At any time after an action is commenced against one or more defendants for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, a defendant may join as a co-defendant to the action any person who may be liable to the plaintiff for the personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death alleged in the plaintiff's complaint. That person must be joined to the action by service of a summons and complaint pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure.
(B) A defendant has one hundred twenty days following service of the summons and complaint to join a co-defendant pursuant to this section, during which time all applicable statutes of limitation are tolled.
Section 15-32-40. (A) Joint and several liability must be imposed on the following:
(1) a defendant whose fault is greater than twenty percent;
(2) those defendants who consciously and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, or actively take part in it;
(3) a defendant who commits an intentional tort;
(4) a defendant who by reason of agency, employment, or other legal relationship is vicariously responsible for the conduct of another party; or
(5) a defendant whose liability arises pursuant to another provision of law that otherwise provides for joint and several liability.
(B) A defendant held jointly and severally liable pursuant to the provisions of this section has a right of contribution from other defendants held jointly and severally liable pursuant to this section to the extent provided for by Chapter 38, Title 15.
(C) A defendant held jointly and severally liable pursuant to subsection (A)(2) must be held jointly and severally liable only for the total portion of fault assessed to those defendants with whom he acted in concert.
(D) A defendant held jointly and severally liable pursuant to subsection (A)(4) must be held jointly and severally liable only for the total portion of fault assigned to the other party. For purposes of determining a share of fault a defendant who by reason of agency, employment, or other legal relationship is vicariously responsible for the conduct of another party and the other party shall be treated as a single party.
(E) In an action subject to this chapter, a party seeking to establish that two or more defendants in an action should be treated as a single party for purposes of assigning a portion of fault based on common law principles of piercing the corporate veil affirmatively shall plead and the court shall determine, based on common law principles of piercing the corporate veil, whether these defendants should be treated as a single party so that the conduct of one defendant is attributed to the others or the individual shares of fault are aggregated for the purpose of applying joint and several liability as provided in subsection (A).
(F) In a jury trial in any action in which the comparative fault of the parties or non-parties is an issue for determination by the jury, the trial court shall not instruct the jury on the effect of its finding as to the degree or percentage of negligence or fault of a party or non-party.
Section 15-32-50. The burden of alleging and proving fault is upon the person who seeks to establish fault.
Section 15-32-60. This section may not be construed to create a cause of action or to alter the immunity of a person.
Section 15-32-70. This chapter does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law.
Section 15-32-80. The provisions of this chapter do not apply to a motion or an action brought pursuant to the provisions of the South Carolina Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act as contained in Section 15-38-40.
Section 15-32-90. The provisions of this chapter do not affect any right, privilege, or provision of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act as contained in Chapter 78, Title 15 or the South Carolina Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act as contained in Chapter 56, Title 33." /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. JENNINGS explained the amendment.
Rep. KENNEDY spoke against the amendment.
Rep. YOUNG moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 51 to 7.
Rep. JENNINGS proposed the following Amendment No. 40A (Doc Name COUNCIL\SWB\6419AHB05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking SECTION 6 in its entirety and inserting:
/ SECTION 6. Title 15 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
Section 15-32-10. Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, as used in this section:
(1) 'Damages' means pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, mental anguish, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, humiliation, another theory of damages, including, but not limited to, fear of loss or illness or injury, loss of earnings and earning capacity, loss of income, medical expenses and medical care, rehabilitation services, custodial care, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair or replacement of property, costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment, loss of business or employment
(2) 'Fault' means an act or omission of a person which is a proximate cause of injury or death to another person, damages to property, tangible or intangible, or economic injury including, but not limited to, negligence, malpractice, strict liability, absolute liability, or failure to warn. Fault does not include a tort resulting from an act or omission committed with a specific intent to cause injury or damage to another or to property.
(3) 'Person' means an individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, society, joint stock company, or other entity, including a governmental entity or unincorporated association of persons.
Section 15-32-20. In an action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the liability of each defendant for damages is several only and may not be joint. Each defendant is liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault, and a separate judgment must be rendered against the defendant for that amount. To determine the amount of judgment to be entered against each defendant, the court, with regard to each defendant, shall multiply the total amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff by the percentage of each defendant's fault, and the amount calculated for each defendant is the maximum recoverable against that defendant.
Section 15-32-30. (A) At any time after an action is commenced against one or more defendants for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, a defendant may join as a co-defendant to the action any person who may be liable to the plaintiff for the personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death alleged in the plaintiff's complaint. That person must be joined to the action by service of a summons and complaint pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure.
(B) A defendant has one hundred twenty days following service of the summons and complaint to join a co-defendant pursuant to this section, during which time all applicable statutes of limitation are tolled.
Section 15-32-40. Joint liability must be imposed on all who consciously and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, or actively take part in it or any person or entity vicariously liable for the act of another. A person held jointly liable pursuant to the provisions of this section has a right of contribution from his fellow defendants acting in concert. A defendant must be held
Section 15-32-50. The burden of alleging and proving fault is upon the person who seeks to establish fault.
Section 15-32-60. This section may not be construed to create a cause of action or to alter the immunity of a person.
Section 15-32-70. This chapter does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law.
Section 15-32-80. The provisions of this chapter do not apply to a motion or an action brought pursuant to the provisions of the South Carolina Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act as contained in Section 15-38-40.
Section 15-32-90. The provisions of this chapter do not affect any right, privilege, or provision of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act as contained in Chapter 78, Title 15 or the South Carolina Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act as contained in Chapter 56, Title 33." /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. KENNEDY raised the Point of Order that Amendment No. 40A was dilatory.
The SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE overruled the Point of Order.
Rep. J. E. SMITH explained the amendment.
Rep. J. E. SMITH continued speaking.
Rep. YOUNG moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 52 to 7.
Rep. JENNINGS proposed the following Amendment No. 41A (Doc Name COUNCIL\SWB\6417AHB05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking SECTION 6 in its entirety and inserting:
/ SECTION 6. Title 15 of the 1976 Code is amended by adding:
Section 15-32-10. Unless the context clearly requires otherwise, as used in this section:
(1) 'Damages' means pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, mental anguish, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation, humiliation, another theory of damages, including, but not limited to, fear of loss or illness or injury, loss of earnings and earning capacity, loss of income, medical expenses and medical care, rehabilitation services, custodial care, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs of repair or replacement of property, costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment, loss of business or employment opportunities, and other objectively verifiable monetary losses. Damages does not include punitive damages.
(2) 'Fault' means an act or omission of a person which is a proximate cause of injury or death to another person, damages to property, tangible or intangible, or economic injury including, but not limited to, negligence, malpractice, strict liability, absolute liability, or failure to warn. Fault does not include a tort resulting from an act or omission committed with a specific intent to cause injury or damage to another or to property.
(3) 'Person' means an individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, society, joint stock company, or other entity, including a governmental entity or unincorporated association of persons.
Section 15-32-20. In an action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, the liability of each defendant for damages is several only and may not be joint. Each defendant is liable only for the amount of damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault, and a separate judgment must be rendered against the defendant for that amount. To determine the amount of judgment to be entered against each defendant, the court, with regard to each defendant, shall multiply the total amount of damages recoverable by the plaintiff by the percentage of each defendant's fault, and the amount calculated for each defendant is the maximum recoverable against that defendant.
Section 15-32-30. (A) At any time after an action is commenced against one or more defendants for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, a defendant may join as a co-defendant to the action any person who may be liable to the plaintiff for the personal injury,
(B) A defendant has one hundred twenty days following service of the summons and complaint to join a co-defendant pursuant to this section, during which time all applicable statutes of limitation are tolled.
Section 15-32-40. (A) Joint and several liability must be imposed on the following:
(1) a defendant whose fault is greater than forty percent;
(2) those defendants who consciously and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, or actively take part in it;
(3) a defendant who commits an intentional tort;
(4) a defendant who by reason of agency, employment, or other legal relationship is vicariously responsible for the conduct of another party; or
(5) a defendant whose liability arises pursuant to another provision of law that otherwise provides for joint and several liability.
(B) A defendant held jointly and severally liable pursuant to the provisions of this section has a right of contribution from other defendants held jointly and severally liable pursuant to this section to the extent provided for by Chapter 38, Title 15.
(C) A defendant held jointly and severally liable pursuant to subsection (A)(2) must be held jointly and severally liable only for the total portion of fault assessed to those defendants with whom he acted in concert.
(D) A defendant held jointly and severally liable pursuant to subsection (A)(4) must be held jointly and severally liable only for the total portion of fault assigned to the other party. For purposes of determining a share of fault a defendant who by reason of agency, employment, or other legal relationship is vicariously responsible for the conduct of another party and the other party shall be treated as a single party.
(E) In an action subject to this chapter, a party seeking to establish that two or more defendants in an action should be treated as a single party for purposes of assigning a portion of fault based on common law principles of piercing the corporate veil affirmatively shall plead and the court shall determine, based on common law principles of piercing the corporate veil, whether these defendants should be treated as a single party so that the conduct of one defendant
(F) In a jury trial in any action in which the comparative fault of the parties or non-parties is an issue for determination by the jury, the trial court shall not instruct the jury on the effect of its finding as to the degree or percentage of negligence or fault of a party or non-party.
Section 15-32-50. The burden of alleging and proving fault is upon the person who seeks to establish fault.
Section 15-32-60. This section may not be construed to create a cause of action or to alter the immunity of a person.
Section 15-32-70. This chapter does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law.
Section 15-32-80. The provisions of this chapter do not apply to a motion or an action brought pursuant to the provisions of the South Carolina Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act as contained in Section 15-38-40.
Section 15-32-90. The provisions of this chapter do not affect any right, privilege, or provision of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act as contained in Chapter 78, Title 15 or the South Carolina Solicitation of Charitable Funds Act as contained in Chapter 56, Title 33." /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. J. E. SMITH explained the amendment.
Rep. HINSON moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 36 to 4.
Rep. JENNINGS proposed the following Amendment No. 42A (Doc Name COUNCIL\PT\2462AHB05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking SECTION 12 in its entirety and inserting:
/ SECTION 12. Sections 15-36-20, 15-36-30, 15-36-40, and 15-36-50 of the 1976 Code are repealed. /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. J. E. SMITH explained the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 47 to 7.
Rep. JENNINGS proposed the following Amendment No. 43A (Doc Name COUNCIL\PT\2461AHB05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking SECTION 3 in its entirety and inserting:
/ SECTION 3. Section 15-7-30 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
"Section 15-7-30. (A) As used in this section:
( 1) 'Domestic corporation' means a 'domestic corporation' as defined in Section 33-1-400.
( 2) 'Domestic limited partnership' means a 'domestic limited partnership' as defined in Section 33-42-20.
( 3) 'Domestic limited liability company' means a 'domestic limited liability partnership' as defined in Section 33-41-1110 with its principal place of business within this State.
( 4) 'Domestic limited liability partnership' means a 'domestic limited liability partnership' as defined in Section 33-41-1110 with its principal place of business within this State.
( 5) 'Foreign corporation' means a 'foreign corporation' as defined in Section 33-1-400.
( 6) 'Foreign limited partnership' means a 'foreign limited partnership' as defined in Section 33-42-20.
( 7) 'Foreign limited liability company' means a 'foreign limited liability partnership' as defined in Section 33-41-1150 with its principal place of business outside of the State.
( 8) 'Foreign limited liability partnership' means a 'foreign limited liability partnership' as defined in Section 33-41-1150 with its principal place of business outside of the State.
( 9) 'Nonresident individual' means a person who is not domiciled in this State.
(10) 'Principal place of business' means:
(a) the corporation's home office location from which the corporation's officers direct, control, or coordinate its activities within the State;
(b) the location of the corporation's manufacturing, sales, or purchasing facility within the State if the corporation does not have a home office within the State; or
(c) the location at which the majority of corporate activity takes place if the corporation has multiple centers of manufacturing, sales, or purchasing located within the State. The following factors may be considered when determining the location at which the majority of corporate activity takes place:
( i) the number of employees located in any one county;
( ii) the authority of the employees located in any one county; and
(iii) the tangible corporate assets that exist in any one county; and
(11) 'Resident individual' means a person who is domiciled in this State.
(B) In all other cases not provided for in Sections 15-7-10, 15-7-20, or 15-78-100, and except as provided in Section 15-7-100, the action shall must be tried in the county in which the defendant resides at the time of the commencement of the action it properly may be brought and tried against the defendant according to the provisions of this section. If there be is more than one defendant, then the action may be tried in any county in which one or more of the defendants to such action resides at the time of the commencement of the an action properly may be maintained against one of the defendants pursuant to this section. If none of the parties shall reside in the State the action may be tried in any county which the plaintiff shall designate in his complaint. This section is subject however to the power of the court to change the place of trial in certain cases as provided by law.
(C) A civil action tried pursuant to this section against a resident individual defendant must be brought and tried in the county in which the:
(1) plaintiff resides at the time the cause of action arose;
(2) defendant resides at the time the cause of action arose; or
(3) cause of action arose.
(D) A civil action tried pursuant to this section against a nonresident individual defendant must be brought and tried in the county in which the:
(1) plaintiff resides at the time the cause of action arose; or
(2) cause of action arose.
(E) A civil action tried pursuant to this section against a domestic corporation, domestic limited partnership, domestic limited liability company, or domestic limited liability partnership must be brought and tried in the county in which the:
(1) plaintiff resides at the time the cause of action arose;
(2) corporation's principal place of business at the time the cause of action arose; or
(3) cause of action arose.
(F) A civil action tried pursuant to this section against a foreign corporation, foreign limited partnership, foreign limited liability company, or foreign limited liability partnership must be brought and tried in the county in which the:
(1) plaintiff resides at the time the cause of action arose;
(2) foreign corporation, foreign limited partnership, foreign limited liability company, or foreign limited liability partnership has its principal place of business in this State at the time the cause of action arose; or
(3) cause of action arose." /
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. J. E. SMITH explained the amendment.
Rep. YOUNG moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 38 to 7.
Rep. JENNINGS proposed the following Amendment No. 44A (Doc Name COUNCIL\NBD\11593AHB05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by striking SECTION 5 in its entirety and inserting:
/SECTION 5. Section 15-36-10 of the 1976 Code, as last amended by Act 432 of 1988, is further amended to read:
"Section 15-36-10. Any person who takes part in the procurement, initiation, continuation, or defense of any civil proceeding is subject to being assessed for payment of all or a portion of the attorney's fees and court costs of the other party if:
(1) he does so primarily for a purpose other than that of securing the proper discovery, joinder of parties, or adjudication of the claim upon which the proceedings are based; and
(2) the proceedings have terminated in favor of the person seeking an assessment of the fees and costs.
As used in this chapter, "person" is defined to mean any individual, corporation, company, association, firm, partnership, society, joint stock company, and any other entity, including any governmental entity or unincorporated association of persons. (A)(1) Each pleading filed in a civil or administrative action on behalf of a party who is represented by an attorney must be signed by at least one attorney of record who is an active member of the South Carolina Bar and must include the address and telephone number of the attorney signing the document.
(2) Each document filed in a civil or administrative action by a party who is not represented by an attorney must be signed by the party and must include the address and telephone number of the party.
(3) The signature of an attorney or a pro se litigant constitutes a certificate to the court that he:
(a) has read the document;
(b) reasonably believes that under the facts his claim may be warranted pursuant to the existing law or, if it is not warranted pursuant to the existing law, a good faith argument exists for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
(c) believes in good faith that his procurement, initiation, continuation, or defense of a civil cause is not intended to merely harass or injure the other party; and
(d) believes that it is not frivolous, interposed for delay, or brought for a purpose other than securing proper discovery, joinder of parties, or adjudication of the claim upon which the proceedings are based.
(4) An attorney or pro se litigant participating in a civil or administrative action or defense may be sanctioned for filing a frivolous pleading, motion, or document and for making frivolous arguments.
(5) A party may be sanctioned if he fails in good faith to fully disclose facts necessary to put his attorney under notice that the claim or defense he seeks is frivolous.
(B)(1) If a document is not signed or does not comply with this section, it must be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the attorney or the party.
(2) If a document is signed in violation of this section or a party has violated subsection (A)(4), the court, upon its own motion or
(3) Sanctions may include:
(a) an order for the party or pro se litigant to pay the reasonable costs and attorneys fees;
(b) an order for the attorney to pay a reasonable fine to be paid to the court; or
(c) a directive of a nonmonetary nature designed to deter the person from bringing a future frivolous action or defense or an action or defense in bad faith.
(4) In determining whether an attorney, pro se litigant, or party has violated this act, the court shall take into account the:
(a) number of parties;
(b) complexity of the claims and defenses;
(c) length of time available to the attorney or party to investigate and conduct discovery; and
(d) information disclosed or undisclosed to the attorney or pro se litigant through discovery and adequate investigation.
(C) A person is entitled to notice and an opportunity to respond before the imposition of sanctions pursuant to the provisions of this section. A court or party proposing a sanction pursuant to the provisions of this section shall notify the court and all parties of the conduct determined to constitute a violation of the provisions of this section and explain the basis for the potential sanction imposed. Upon notification the attorney or party has thirty days to:
(1) withdraw the document or argument constituting a violation of the provisions of this section;
(2) respond to the allegations of violation of the provisions of this section; or
(3) mitigate the effects of the violation of the provisions of this section in a manner the court deems tantamount to withdrawal pursuant to subsection (C)(1); and
(4) provide all parties and the court with:
(a) written notification of withdrawal as provided in subsection (C)(1);
(b) a copy of the response indicated in subsection (C)(2); or
(c) an explanation of mitigation indicated in subsection (C)(3).
(D) The provisions of this section apply in addition to all other remedies available at law or in equity."/
Rep. J. E. SMITH explained the amendment.
Rep. HINSON moved to table the amendment.
Rep. YOUNG demanded the yeas and nays which were taken, resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Allen Anthony Bailey Bales Barfield Battle Bingham Bowers Brady Branham J. Brown Cato Ceips Chalk Chellis Clark Clemmons Coates Coleman Cotty Dantzler Davenport Delleney Edge Frye Funderburk Hagood Hamilton Hardwick Harrell Haskins Hayes Herbkersman Hinson Hiott Huggins Jefferson Kennedy Kirsh Leach Lee Limehouse Loftis Lucas McCraw McGee McLeod J. M. Neal Neilson Norman Ott Owens Perry M. A. Pitts Rice Sandifer Scarborough Sinclair Skelton D. C. Smith G. M. Smith G. R. Smith J. R. Smith Stewart Talley Taylor Thompson Toole Umphlett Vaughn Vick Viers White Wilkins Witherspoon Young
Anderson Breeland G. Brown R. Brown Harvin Hosey Jennings Mack Rivers Rutherford Scott J. E. Smith Weeks
So, the amendment was tabled.
Rep. SCOTT moved that the House do now adjourn.
Rep. YOUNG demanded the yeas and nays which were taken, resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Agnew Breeland R. Brown Delleney Funderburk Hosey Howard Jefferson Kirsh Mack Rivers Rutherford Scott J. E. Smith Vick
Those who voted in the negative are:
Allen Anderson Anthony Bailey Bales Ballentine Barfield Battle Bingham Bowers Brady Branham G. Brown Cato Ceips Chalk Chellis Clark Clemmons Clyburn Coates Cooper Cotty Dantzler Davenport Edge Emory Frye Govan Hagood Haley Hamilton Hardwick Harvin Haskins Hayes Herbkersman Hinson Hiott Huggins Kennedy Leach
Lee Limehouse Loftis Lucas Mahaffey Martin McCraw McGee McLeod Merrill J. M. Neal Neilson Norman Owens Parks Perry Pinson E. H. Pitts M. A. Pitts Rice Sandifer Scarborough Sinclair Skelton D. C. Smith G. M. Smith G. R. Smith J. R. Smith Stewart Talley Taylor Thompson Toole Umphlett Vaughn Viers Walker Weeks White Wilkins Witherspoon Young
So, the House refused to adjourn.
Rep. J. E. SMITH proposed the following Amendment No. 45A (Doc Name COUNCIL\NBD\11484AC05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by deleting SECTIONS 1, 2, 10, and 11 of the bill in its entirety.
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. J. E. SMITH explained the amendment.
Rep. YOUNG moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 48 to 6.
Rep. J. E. SMITH proposed the following Amendment No. 46A (Doc Name COUNCIL\NBD\11483AC05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by deleting SECTIONS 1, 2, 9, and 11 of the bill in its entirety.
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. RUTHERFORD explained the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 45 to 6.
Rep. J. E. SMITH proposed the following Amendment No. 47A (Doc Name COUNCIL\NBD\11482AC05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by deleting SECTIONS 1, 2, 9, and 10 of the bill in its entirety.
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. RUTHERFORD explained the amendment.
Rep. YOUNG moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 42 to 6.
Rep. J. E. SMITH proposed the following Amendment No. 48A (Doc Name COUNCIL\NBD\11481AC05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by deleting SECTIONS 1, 2, 8, and 11 of the bill in its entirety.
Renumber sections to conform.
Amend title to conform.
Rep. RUTHERFORD explained the amendment.
Rep. SKELTON raised the Point of Order that Amendment No. 48A was dilatory.
ACTING SPEAKER CATO overruled the Point of Order.
Rep. RUTHERFORD continued speaking.
Rep. YOUNG moved to table the amendment.
The amendment was then tabled by a division vote of 40 to 5.
Rep. J. E. SMITH proposed the following Amendment No. 49A (Doc Name COUNCIL\NBD\11480AC05), which was tabled:
Amend the bill, as and if amended, by deleting SECTIONS 1, 2, 8, and 10 of the bill in its entirety.
Rep. RUTHERFORD explained the amendment.
Rep. YOUNG moved to table the amendment, which was agreed to.
The question then recurred to concur or non-concur in the Senate Amendments.
Rep. CATO demanded the yeas and nays which were taken, resulting as follows:
Those who voted in the affirmative are:
Agnew Allen Anderson Anthony Bailey Bales Ballentine Barfield Battle Bingham Bowers Brady Branham Breeland G. Brown J. Brown R. Brown Cato Ceips Chalk Chellis Clark Clemmons Clyburn Coates Cobb-Hunter Coleman Cooper Cotty Dantzler Davenport Delleney Duncan Edge Emory Frye Funderburk Govan Hagood Haley Hamilton Hardwick Harrell Harrison Harvin Haskins Hayes Herbkersman M. Hines Hinson Hiott Hosey Howard Huggins Jefferson Jennings Kennedy Kirsh Leach Lee Littlejohn Loftis Lucas Mack Mahaffey Martin McCraw McGee McLeod Merrill Miller Moody-Lawrence
J. H. Neal J. M. Neal Neilson Norman Ott Owens Parks Perry Pinson E. H. Pitts M. A. Pitts Rice Rivers Rutherford Sandifer Scarborough Scott Simrill Sinclair Skelton D. C. Smith F. N. Smith G. M. Smith G. R. Smith J. E. Smith J. R. Smith W. D. Smith Stewart Talley Taylor Thompson Toole Townsend Umphlett Vaughn Vick Walker Weeks White Whitmire Wilkins Witherspoon Young
Those who voted in the negative are:
The Senate amendments were agreed to, and the Bill having received three readings in both Houses, it was ordered that the title be changed to that of an Act, and that it be enrolled for ratification.
I was out of the Chamber temporarily when the vote was taken on H. 3008. I would have voted in favor of the Bill.
Rep. Chip Limehouse
Rep. CATO moved that the House recur to the Morning Hour, which was agreed to.
The following was received:
Columbia, S.C., March 16, 2005
Mr. Speaker and Members of the House:
S. 326 (Word version) -- Senators Ritchie, Gregory, Sheheen, J. V. Smith and Ryberg: A BILL TO AMEND ACT 258 OF 2004, RELATING TO THE AQUATIC LIFE PROTECTION ACT, SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT DO NOT APPLY TO ANY NEW, MODIFIED, OR RENEWAL PERMIT CONTAINING WHOLE EFFLUENT TOXICITY (WET) PERMIT LIMITS WHICH WAS DRAFTED AND PENDING ISSUANCE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL ON THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ACT, SO LONG AS THE WET PERMIT LIMITS CONTAINED IN THE PERMIT ARE ACCEPTABLE TO THE PERMITTEE.
and has ordered the Bill Enrolled for Ratification.
Very respectfully,
President
Received as information.
The following was received from the Senate:
Columbia, S.C., March 16, 2005
Mr. Speaker and Members of the House:
The Senate respectfully informs your Honorable Body that it nonconcurs in the amendments proposed by the House to H. 3373:
H. 3373 (Word version) -- Reps. W. D. Smith, Walker, Sinclair, Davenport, Littlejohn, Mahaffey and Talley: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 57-23-810 SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT THE PORTION OF ROADSIDE VEGETATION ADJACENT TO INTERSTATE HIGHWAY 26, INTERSTATE HIGHWAY 85, AND INTERSTATE HIGHWAY 585 IN SPARTANBURG COUNTY MAY BE MOWED BEYOND THIRTY FEET FROM THE PAVEMENT.
Very respectfully,
President
Whereupon, the Chair appointed Reps. W. D. SMITH, TALLEY and LEE to the Committee of Conference on the part of the House and a message was ordered sent to the Senate accordingly.
The following was introduced:
H. 3785 (Word version) -- Reps. Haley, E. H. Pitts, Huggins, Clark, Frye, Toole, Bingham and Ballentine: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO EXPRESS THE PROFOUND SORROW OF THE MEMBERS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA UPON THE DEATH OF LANCE CORPORAL JOSHUA TORRENCE, OF LEXINGTON COUNTY, AND TO EXTEND THE DEEPEST SYMPATHY TO HIS FAMILY AND MANY FRIENDS.
The Concurrent Resolution was agreed to and ordered sent to the Senate.
The following was introduced:
H. 3786 (Word version) -- Reps. Duncan, Taylor and M. A. Pitts: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO REQUEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION NAME THE INTERSECTION OF UNITED STATES HIGHWAY 76 AND BARNES ROAD/TEMPLETON ROAD IN LAURENS COUNTY THE "JAMES E. 'BUBBA' NORRIS INTERSECTION" AND TO ERECT APPROPRIATE MARKERS OR SIGNS AT THIS INTERSECTION THAT CONTAIN THE WORDS "JAMES E. 'BUBBA' NORRIS INTERSECTION".
The Concurrent Resolution was ordered referred to the Committee on Invitations and Memorial Resolutions.
The following was introduced:
H. 3787 (Word version) -- Reps. Taylor, M. A. Pitts and Duncan: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO REQUEST THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION NAME THE PORTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY 101 FROM ITS INTERSECTION WITH SOUTH CAROLINA HIGHWAY 14 TO ITS INTERSECTION WITH INTERSTATE HIGHWAY 385 IN LAURENS COUNTY THE "CHARLES M. CULBERTSON MEMORIAL HIGHWAY" AND ERECT APPROPRIATE MARKERS OR SIGNS ALONG THIS PORTION OF HIGHWAY THAT CONTAIN THE WORDS "CHARLES M. CULBERTSON MEMORIAL HIGHWAY".
The Concurrent Resolution was ordered referred to the Committee on Invitations and Memorial Resolutions.
The following was introduced:
S. 623 (Word version) -- Senator Ryberg: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO MEMORIALIZE THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS TO PASS AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO ENACT IMMEDIATELY A WELL-FUNDED, MULTI-YEAR REAUTHORIZATION OF FEDERAL AND HIGHWAY TRANSIT PROGRAMS.
The Concurrent Resolution was ordered referred to the Committee on Invitations and Memorial Resolutions.
The following Bills were introduced, read the first time, and referred to appropriate committees:
H. 3788 (Word version) -- Rep. Skelton: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 44-53-271 SO AS TO REQUIRE THAT OVER THE COUNTER DRUGS CONTAINING PSEUDOEPHEDRINE MUST BE DISPENSED BY A LICENSED PHARMACIST OR A LICENSED PHARMACY TECHNICIAN AND TO PROVIDE A PROCEDURE FOR THE SALE OF THESE DRUGS; BY ADDING SECTION 44-53-272 SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT IT IS UNLAWFUL TO
H. 3789 (Word version) -- Reps. M. A. Pitts, Taylor and Duncan: A BILL TO AMEND ACT 779 OF 1988, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO ELECTION OF LAURENS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARDS OF TRUSTEES, SO AS TO SET THE ELECTIONS AT THE TIME OF THE GENERAL ELECTION AND TO PROVIDE THAT THE TERMS OF TRUSTEES WHOSE TERMS EXPIRE PRIOR TO THE ELECTION OF NEW TRUSTEES ARE EXTENDED UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED AND TAKE OFFICE.
On motion of Rep. M. A. PITTS, with unanimous consent, the Bill was ordered placed on the Calendar without reference.
H. 3790 (Word version) -- Reps. M. A. Pitts, Taylor and Duncan: A BILL TO AMEND ACT 778 OF 1988, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO THE CREATION OF THE REGISTRATION AND ELECTIONS COMMISSION FOR LAURENS COUNTY, SO AS TO INCREASE THE COMMISSION FROM NINE TO ELEVEN MEMBERS AND STAGGER TERMS OF THE NEW MEMBERS.
On motion of Rep. M. A. PITTS, with unanimous consent, the Bill was ordered placed on the Calendar without reference.
H. 3791 (Word version) -- Reps. Cobb-Hunter, Cotty and J. H. Neal: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 59-20-90 SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT ALL PUBLIC MONIES DISTRIBUTED TO SCHOOLS IN THIS STATE MUST BE DISTRIBUTED PURSUANT TO THE EDUCATION
S. 49 (Word version) -- Senators Hayes, Elliott, Hutto, Leventis, Rankin, Patterson, Land, Short, Richardson, Lourie, McConnell and Courson: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 38-71-290 SO AS TO REQUIRE HEALTH INSURANCE PLANS TO PROVIDE COVERAGE FOR TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS OR ALCOHOL OR SUBSTANCE ABUSE, TO ALLOW A PLAN THAT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR MANAGEMENT OF CARE OR THE SAME DEGREE OF MANAGEMENT OF CARE FOR ALL HEALTH CONDITIONS TO PROVIDE COVERAGE FOR SUCH TREATMENT THROUGH A MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATION, TO ESTABLISH TREATMENT CONDITIONS TO QUALIFY FOR COVERAGE, AND TO REQUIRE THE DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE TO REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE FISCAL IMPACT.
Referred to Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry
S. 67 (Word version) -- Senators Short, Elliott and Ford: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 6-11-1460 SO AS TO ENACT THE "VOLUNTEER FIREFIGHTER JOB PROTECTION ACT", PROHIBITING AN EMPLOYER FROM FIRING A VOLUNTEER FIREFIGHTER WHO MISSES TIME AT WORK AS A RESULT OF RESPONDING TO AN EMERGENCY IN THE COURSE OF PERFORMING HIS DUTIES AS A VOLUNTEER FIREFIGHTER, ALLOWING THE EMPLOYER TO REQUIRE A WRITTEN STATEMENT AND REASONABLE NOTICE AND TO DEDUCT TIME LOST FROM THE EMPLOYEE'S REGULAR PAY, TO CREATE A CIVIL CAUSE OF ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF THIS ACT AND PROVIDE REMEDIES, AND TO MAKE THIS ACT APPLICABLE TO A VOLUNTEER FIREFIGHTER FOR A FIRE AUTHORITY
S. 117 (Word version) -- Senators Ritchie, Fair and Richardson: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 59-150-350, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO ADMINISTRATION OF THE EDUCATION LOTTERY ACCOUNT, SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR A SCHOLARSHIP RESERVE ACCOUNT, FUNDED BY EXCESS LOTTERY PROCEEDS AND INVESTMENT EARNINGS, FOR THE EXCLUSIVE PURPOSE OF MAINTAINING FUNDING OF CERTAIN SCHOLARSHIPS, GRANTS, AND ASSISTANCES IF CERTIFIED NET LOTTERY PROCEEDS AND INVESTMENT EARNINGS ARE INSUFFICIENT TO FUND THEM, TO DEFINE "EXCESS", AND TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF THE RESERVE TO THREE PERCENT OF THE EDUCATION LOTTERY ACCOUNT REVENUE FOR THE LATEST COMPLETED FISCAL YEAR.
Referred to Committee on Ways and Means
S. 202 (Word version) -- Senators Sheheen, Lourie and Campsen: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 39-5-175 SO AS TO PROVIDE THAT A LENDER WHO DELIVERS AN UNSOLICITED CHECK TO A PERSON MUST DISCLOSE THAT THE CHECK SECURES A LOAN, THE TERMS OF THE LOAN, AND NOTICE THAT BY NEGOTIATING THE CHECK THE RECIPIENT HAS ENTERED INTO A LOAN AGREEMENT, TO PROVIDE PROTECTION AND RECOURSE FOR INTENDED PAYEES IF AN UNSOLICITED CHECK IS CASHED FRAUDULENTLY, AND TO PROVIDE THAT A VIOLATION OF THIS SECTION IS AN UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICE AND SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATE PENALTIES AND ENFORCEMENT.
Referred to Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry
S. 289 (Word version) -- Senator Gregory: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 50-11-2420, AS AMENDED, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO COMMERCIAL FUR LICENSES, SO AS TO INCREASE THE LICENSE FEES; TO AMEND SECTION 50-11-2460, AS AMENDED, RELATING TO THE TRAPPING OF FURBEARERS, SO AS TO FURTHER PROVIDE FOR THE TYPES OF TRAPS WHICH MAY BE USED; TO AMEND SECTION 50-11-
S. 348 (Word version) -- Senators Thomas and J. V. Smith: A BILL TO AMEND SECTION 45-2-70 OF THE 1976 CODE, RELATING TO THE POSTING OF RULES IN LODGING ESTABLISHMENTS, TO REQUIRE THE POSTING OF A NOTICE REQUIRED BY SECTION 45-5-80; TO AMEND CHAPTER 5, TITLE 45 BY
S. 509 (Word version) -- Senator Elliott: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING SECTION 40-7-255 SO AS TO PROVIDE FOR THE REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF PERSONS WHO PRACTICE HAIR BRAIDING, INCLUDING REQUIRING A REGISTRATION FEE, A SIX-HOUR BOARD-APPROVED HAIR BRAIDING COURSE, AND AN EXAMINATION; AND TO AMEND SECTION 40-7-20, RELATING TO DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED IN CONNECTION WITH THE LICENSURE AND REGULATION OF BARBERS, SO AS TO DEFINE "HAIR BRAIDING".
Referred to Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry
S. 581 (Word version) -- Senator Lourie: A BILL TO AMEND THE CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, BY ADDING CHAPTER 14 TO TITLE 41 SO AS TO ENACT THE "BOILER SAFETY ACT" TO PROVIDE THAT THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LICENSING AND REGULATION SHALL PROMULGATE REGULATIONS FOR THE SAFE INSTALLATION, MAINTENANCE, AND REPAIR OF BOILERS IN THIS STATE, INCLUDING STANDARDS FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION AND FOR BOILERS IN USE; TO EXEMPT CERTAIN BOILERS FROM REGULATION UNDER THIS CHAPTER; TO IDENTIFY STANDARDS FOR WORKING PRESSURE OF A BOILER; TO AUTHORIZE THE APPOINTMENT OF A CHIEF BOILER INSPECTOR, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ENFORCING THE LAWS OF THIS STATE REGULATING THE
On motion of Rep. CATO, with unanimous consent, it was ordered that H. 3778 (Word version) be read the third time tomorrow.
On motion of Rep. WITHERSPOON, with unanimous consent, it was ordered that S. 493 (Word version) be read the third time tomorrow.
On motion of Rep. TOWNSEND, with unanimous consent, it was ordered that S. 3 (Word version) be read the third time tomorrow.
On motion of Rep. COTTY, with unanimous consent, it was ordered that S. 598 (Word version) be read the third time tomorrow.
Rep. CATO moved that when the House adjourns today that it adjourn to meet in Local Session tomorrow at 10:00 a.m., Local Session on Friday, March 18, at 10:00 a.m., Local Session on Wednesday, March 23, at 10:00 a.m., and Local Session on Thursday, March 24, at 10:00 a.m., which was agreed to.
Rep. CATO moved that pursuant to House Rule 6.1(b) the House meet on Tuesday, March 22, at 12:00 noon for the exclusive purpose of the introduction and referral of bills and receipt and reading of communications and committee reports and to adjourn immediately thereafter with no roll to be taken, which was agreed to.
Rep. CATO moved that the House accept any invitation that may be received from the Senate to ratify Acts between March 21 and March 24, 2005, which was agreed to.
Rep. CATO moved that the House do now adjourn, which was agreed to.
The Senate returned to the House with concurrence the following:
H. 3771 (Word version) -- Reps. Breeland, Agnew, Allen, Altman, Anderson, Anthony, Bailey, Bales, Ballentine, Barfield, Battle, Bingham, Bowers, Brady, Branham, G. Brown, J. Brown, R. Brown, Cato, Ceips, Chalk, Chellis, Clark, Clemmons, Clyburn, Coates, Cobb-Hunter, Coleman, Cooper, Cotty, Dantzler, Davenport, Delleney, Duncan, Edge, Emory, Frye, Funderburk, Govan, Hagood, Haley, Hamilton, Hardwick, Harrell, Harrison, Harvin, Haskins, Hayes, Herbkersman, J. Hines, M. Hines, Hinson, Hiott, Hosey, Howard, Huggins, Jefferson, Jennings, Kennedy, Kirsh, Leach, Lee, Limehouse, Littlejohn, Lloyd, Loftis, Lucas, Mack, Mahaffey, Martin, McCraw, McGee, McLeod, Merrill, Miller, Moody-Lawrence, J. H. Neal, J. M. Neal, Neilson, Norman, Ott, Owens, Parks, Perry, Phillips, Pinson, E. H. Pitts, M. A. Pitts, Rhoad, Rice, Rivers, Rutherford, Sandifer, Scarborough, Scott, Simrill, Sinclair, Skelton, D. C. Smith, F. N. Smith, G. M. Smith, G. R. Smith, J. E. Smith, J. R. Smith, W. D. Smith, Stewart, Talley, Taylor, Thompson, Toole, Townsend, Tripp, Umphlett, Vaughn, Vick, Viers, Walker, Weeks, Whipper, White, Whitmire, Wilkins, Witherspoon and Young: A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION TO CONGRATULATE THE CLASS OF 1955 OF ALLEN UNIVERSITY AS IT CELEBRATES ITS FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY AND TO COMMEND THE MEMBERS OF THIS OUTSTANDING CLASS FOR THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEIR COMMUNITY, STATE, AND NATION.
At 5:40 p.m. the House, in accordance with the motion of Rep. ALLEN, adjourned in memory of Gwendolyn Williams Blassengale of Greenville, to meet at 10:00 a.m. in Local Session tomorrow.
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