Current Status Introducing Body:House Bill Number:4073 Primary Sponsor:Gonzales Committee Number:25 Type of Legislation:GB Subject:Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act Residing Body:House Current Committee:Judiciary Computer Document Number:BBM/10448JM.93 Introduced Date:19930414 Last History Body:House Last History Date:19930414 Last History Type:Introduced, read first time, referred to Committee Scope of Legislation:Statewide All Sponsors:Gonzales Type of Legislation:General Bill
Bill Body Date Action Description CMN Leg Involved
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4073 House 19930414 Introduced, read first time, 25
referred to Committee
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TO AMEND CHAPTER 23, TITLE 27, CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA, 1976, RELATING TO PAROL, FRAUDULENT, AND OTHER VOID GIFTS OR CONVEYANCES, SO AS TO ELIMINATE ALL OF THE PROVISIONS OF THAT CHAPTER REGARDING "PAROL, FRAUDULENT, AND OTHER VOID GIFTS OR CONVEYANCES" AND IN SUBSTITUTION THEREFOR TO ENACT THE "UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT".
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of South Carolina:
SECTION 1. Chapter 23, Title 27 of the 1976 Code is amended to read:
Section 27-23-01. Citation of chapter. This chapter is known and may be cited as the `Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act'.
SECTION 27-23-05. DEFINITIONS. As used in this chapter:
(1) `Affiliate' means:
(i) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities,
(A) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or
(B) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote;
(ii) a corporation 20 percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities,
(A) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the securities; or
(B) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not in fact exercised the power to vote;
(iii) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or
(iv) a person who operates the debtor's business under a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's assets.
(2) `Asset' means property of a debtor, but the term does not include:
(i) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;
(ii) property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or
(iii) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.
(3) `Claim' means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.
(4) `Creditor' means a person who has a claim.
(5) `Debt' means liability on a claim.
(6) `Debtor' means a person who is liable on a claim.
(7) `Insider' includes:
(i) if the debtor is an individual,
(A) a relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(B) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(C) a general partner in a partnership described in clause (B); or
(D) a corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;
(ii) if the debtor is a corporation,
(A) a director of the debtor;
(B) an officer of the debtor;
(C) a person in control of the debtor;
(D) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(E) a general partner in a partnership described in clause (D); or
(F) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor;
(iii) if the debtor is a partnership,
(A) a general partner in the debtor;
(B) a relative of a general partner in, or a general partner of, or a person in control of the debtor;
(C) another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(D) a general partner in a partnership described in clause (C); or
(E) a person in control of the debtor;
(iv) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor; and
(v) a managing agent of the debtor.
(8) `Lien' means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien.
(9) `Person' means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(10) `Property' means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
(11) `Relative' means an individual related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law, a spouse, or an individual related to a spouse within the third degree as so determined, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.
(12) `Transfer' means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.
(13) `Valid lien' means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings.
(1) The definition of `affiliate' is derived from Section 101(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
(2) The definition of `asset' is substantially to the same effect as the definition of `assets' in Section 1 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. The definition in this Act, unlike that in the earlier Act, does not, however require a determination that the property is liable for the debts of the debtor. Thus, an unliquidated claim for damages resulting from personal injury or a contingent claim of a surety for reimbursement, contribution, or subrogation may be counted as an asset for the purpose of determining whether the holder of the claim is solvent as a debtor under Section 2 of this Act, although applicable law may not allow such an asset to be levied on and sold by a creditor. Cf. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Goldman (In re Ollag Construction Equipment Corp.), 578 F.2d 904, 907-09 (2d Cir. 1978).
Subparagraphs (i), (ii), and (iii) provide clarification by excluding from the term not only generally exempt property but also an interest in a tenancy by the entirety in many states and an interest that is generally beyond reach by unsecured creditors because subject to a valid lien. This Act, like its predecessor and the Statute of 13 Elizabeth, declares rights and provides remedies for unsecured creditors against transfers that impede them in the collection of their claims. The laws protecting valid liens against impairment by levying creditors, exemption statutes, and the rules restricting levyability of interest in entireties property are limitations on the rights and remedies of unsecured creditors, and it is therefore appropriate to exclude property interests that are beyond the reach of unsecured creditors from the definition of `asset' for the purposes of this Act.
A creditor of a joint tenant or tenant in common may ordinarily collect a judgment by process against the tenant's interest, and in some states a creditor of a tenant by the entirety may likewise collect a judgment by process against the tenant's interest. See 2 American Law of Property 10, 22, 28-32 (1952); Craig, An Analysis of Estates by the Entirety in Bankruptcy, 48 Am.Bankr.L.J. 255, 258-59 (1974). The levyable interest of such a tenant is included as an asset under this Act.
The definition of `assets' in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act excluded property that is exempt from liability for debts. The definition did not, however, exclude all property that cannot be reached by a creditor through judicial proceedings to collect a debt. Thus, it included the interest of a tenant by the entirety although in nearly half the states such an interest cannot be subjected to liability for a debt unless it is an obligation owed jointly by the debtor with his or her cotenant by the entirety. See 2 American Law of Property 29 (1952); Craig, An Analysis of Estates by the Entirety in Bankruptcy, 48 Am.Bankr.L.J. 255, 258 (1974). The definition in this Act requires exclusion of interests in property held by tenants by the entirety that are not subject to collection process by a creditor without a right to proceed against both tenants by the entirety as joint debtors.
The reference to `generally exempt' property in Section 27-23-05(2)(ii) recognizes that all exemptions are subject to exceptions. Creditors having special rights against generally exempt property typically include claimants for alimony, taxes, wages, the purchase price of the property, and labor or materials that improve the property. See Uniform Exemptions Act Section 10 and the accompanying Comment. The fact that a particular creditor may reach generally exempt property by resorting to judicial process does not warrant its inclusion as an asset in determining whether the debtor is insolvent.
Since this Act is not an exclusive law on the subject of voidable transfers and obligations (see Comment (8) to Section 27-23-20 infra), it does not preclude the holder of a claim that may be collected by process against property generally exempt as to other creditors from obtaining relief from a transfer of such property that hinders, delays, or defrauds the holder of such a claim. Likewise the holder of an unsecured claim enforceable against tenants by the entirety is not precluded by the Act from pursuing a remedy against a transfer of property held by the entirety that hinders, delays, or defrauds the holder of such a claim.
Nonbankruptcy law is the law of a state or federal law that is not part of the Bankruptcy Code, Title 11 of the United States Code. The definition of an `asset' thus does not include property that would be subject to administration for the benefit of creditors under the Bankruptcy Code unless it is subject under other applicable law, state or federal, to process for the collection of a creditor's claim against a single debtor.
(3) The definition of `claim' is derived from
Section 101(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. Since the purpose of this Act is primarily to protect unsecured creditors against transfers and obligations injurious to their rights, the words `claim' and `debt' as used in the Act generally have reference to an unsecured claim and debt. As the context may indicate, however, usage of the terms is not so restricted. See, e.g. Sections 27-23-05(1)(i)(B) and 27-23-05(8).
(4) The definition of `creditor' in combination with the definition of `claim' has substantially the same effect as the definition of `creditor' under Section 1 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. As under that Act, the holder of an unliquidated tort claim or a contingent claim may be a creditor protected by this Act.
(5) The definition of `debt' is derived from Section 101(11) of the Bankruptcy Code.
(6) The definition of `debtor' is new.
(7) The definition of `insider' is derived from Section 101(28) of the Bankruptcy Code. The definition has been restricted in clauses (i)(C), (ii)(E), and (iii)(D) to make clear that a partner is not an insider of an individual, corporation, or partnership if any of these latter three persons is only a limited partner. The definition of `insider' in the Bankruptcy Code does not purport to make a limited partner an insider of the partners or of the partnership with which the limited partner is associated, but it is susceptible of a contrary interpretation and one which would extend unduly the scope of the defined relationship when the limited partner is not a person in control of the partnership. The definition of `insider' in this Act also differs from the definition in the Bankruptcy Code in omitting the reference in 11 U.S.C. Section 101(28)(D) to an elected official or relative of such an official as an insider of a municipality. As in the Bankruptcy Code (see 11 U.S.C. Section 102(3)), the word `includes' is not limiting, however. Thus, a court may find a person living with an individual for an extended time in the same household or as a permanent companion to have the kind of close relationship intended to be covered by the term `insider'. Likewise, a trust may be found to be an insider of a beneficiary.
(8) The definition of `lien' is derived from paragraphs (30), (31), (43), and (45) of Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code, which define `judicial lien', `lien', `security interest', and `statutory lien' respectively.
(9) The definition of `person' is adapted from paragraphs (28) and (30) of Section 1-201 of the Uniform Commercial Code, defining `organization' and `person' respectively.
(10) The definition of `property' is derived from Section 1-201(33) of the Uniform Probate Code. Property includes both real and personal property, whether tangible or intangible, and any interest in property, whether legal or equitable.
(11) The definition of `relative' is derived from Section 101(37) of the Bankruptcy Code but is explicit in its references to the spouse of a debtor in view of uncertainty as to whether the common law determines degrees of relationship by affinity.
(12) The definition of `transfer' is derived principally from Section 101(48) of the Bankruptcy Code. The definition of `conveyance' in Section 1 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act was similarly comprehensive, and the references in this Act to `payment of money, release, lease, and the creation of a lien or incumbrance' are derived from the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. While the definition in the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act did not explicitly refer to an involuntary transfer, the decisions under that Act were generally consistent with an interpretation that covered such a transfer. See, e.g., Hearn 45 St. Corp. v. Jano, 283 N.Y. 139, 27 N.E.2d 814, 128 A.L.R. 1285 (1940) (execution and foreclosure sales); Lefkowitz v. Finkelstein Trading Corp., 14 F.Supp. 898, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1936) (execution sale); Langan v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 277 App.Div. 1090, 101 N.Y.S.2d 36 (4th Dept. 1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 932, 100 N.E.2d 189 (1951) (mortgage foreclosure); Catabene v. Wallner, 16 N.J.Super. 597, 602, 85 A.2d 300, 302 (1951) (mortgage foreclosure).
(13) The definition of `valid lien' is new. A valid lien includes an equitable lien that may not be defeated by a judicial lien creditor. See, e.g., Pearlman v. Reliance Insurance Co., 371 U.S. 132, 136 (1962) (upholding a surety's equitable lien in respect to a fund owing a bankrupt contractor).
Section 27-23-10. Conveyances to defraud creditors are void. INSOLVENCY.
Every feoffment, gift, grant, alienation, bargain and conveyance of lands, tenements or hereditaments, goods and chattels, or of any of them, or of any lease, rent, commons or other profit or charge out of the same, by writing or otherwise, and every bond, suit, judgment and execution which may be had or made to or for any intent or purpose to delay, hinder or defraud creditors and others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, accounts, damages, penalties and forfeitures shall be deemed and taken (only as against that person or persons, his or their heirs, successors, executors, administrators and assigns, and every of them, whose actions, suits, debts, accounts, damages, penalties and forfeitures by such guileful, covinous or fraudulent devices and practices, as is aforesaid, are, shall or might be in any ways disturbed, hindered, delayed or defrauded) to be clearly and utterly void, frustrate and of no effect, any pretense, color, feigned consideration, expressing of use, or any other matter or thing to the contrary notwithstanding.
(a) A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than all of the debtor's assets, at a fair valuation.
(b) A debtor who is generally not paying his [or her] debts as they become due is presumed to be insolvent.
(c) A partnership is insolvent under subsection (a) if the sum of the partnership's debts is greater than the aggregate, at a fair valuation, of all of the partnership's assets, and the sum of the excess of the value of each general partner's nonpartnership assets over the partner's nonpartnership debts.
(d) Assets under this section do not include property that has been transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred in a manner making the transfer voidable under this chapter.
(e) Debts under this section do not include an obligation to the extent it is secured by a valid lien on property of the debtor not included as an asset.
(1) Subsection (a) is derived from the definition of "insolvent" in Section 101(29)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. The definition in subsection (a) and the correlated definition of partnership insolvency in subsection (c) contemplate a fair valuation of the debts as well as the assets of the debtor. As under the definition of the same term in Section 2 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act exempt property is excluded from the computation of the value of the assets. See Section 27-23-05(2) supra. For similar reasons interests in valid spendthrift trusts and interests in tenancies by the entireties that cannot be severed by a creditor of only one tenant are not included. See the Comment to Section 27-23-05(2) supra. Since a valid lien also precludes an unsecured creditor from collecting the creditor's claim from the encumbered interest in a debtor's property, both the encumbered interest and the debt secured thereby are excluded from the computation of insolvency under this Act. See Section 27-23-05(2) supra and subsection (e) of this section.
The requirement of Section 550(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code that a transferee be "without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer" in order to be protected has been omitted as inappropriate. Knowledge of the facts rendering the transfer voidable would be inconsistent with the good faith that is required of a protected transferee. Knowledge of the voidability of a transfer would seem to involve a legal conclusion. Determination of the voidability of the transfer ought not to require the court to inquire into the legal sophistication of the transferee.
(2) Section 27-23-10(b) establishes a rebuttable presumption of insolvency from the fact of general nonpayment of debts as they become due. Such general nonpayment is a ground for the filing of an involuntary petition under Section 303(h)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. See also U.C.C. Section 1-201(23), which declares a person to be "insolvent" who "has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business." The presumption imposes on the party against whom the presumption is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of insolvency as defined in Section 27-23-10(a) is more probable than its existence. See Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974 Act), Rule 301(a). The 1974 Uniform Rule 301(a) conforms to the Final Draft of Federal Rule 301 as submitted to the United States Supreme Court by the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence. "The so-called 'bursting bubble' theory, under which a presumption vanishes upon the introduction of evidence which would support a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact, even though not believed, is rejected as according presumptions too `slight and evanescent' an effect." Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 301. See also 1 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Evidence Paragraph 301 [01] (1982).
The presumption is established in recognition of the difficulties typically imposed on a creditor in proving insolvency in the bankruptcy sense, as provided in subsection (a). See generally Levit, The Archaic Concept of Balance-Sheet Insolvency, 47 Am.Bankr.L.J. 215 (1973). Not only is the relevant information in the possession of a noncooperative debtor but the debtor's records are more often than not incomplete and inaccurate. As a practical matter, insolvency is most cogently evidenced by a general cessation of payment of debts, as has long been recognized by the laws of other countries and is now reflected in the Bankruptcy Code. See Honsberger, Failure to Pay One's Debts Generally as They Become Due: The Experience of France and Canada, 54 Am.Bankr.L.J. 153 (1980); J. MacLachlan, Bankruptcy 13, 63-64, 436 (1956). In determining whether a debtor is paying its debts generally as they become due, the court should look at more than the amount and due dates of the indebtedness. The court should also take into account such factors as the number of the debtor's debts, the proportion of those debts not being paid, the duration of the nonpayment, and the existence of bona fide disputes or other special circumstances alleged to constitute an explanation for the stoppage of payments. The court's determination may be affected by a consideration of the debtor's payment practices prior to the period of alleged nonpayment and the payment practices of the trade or industry in which the debtor is engaged. The case law that has developed under Section 303(h)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code has not required a showing that a debtor has failed or refused to pay a majority in number and amount of his or her debts in order to prove general nonpayment of debts as they become due. See, e.g., Hill v. Cargill, Inc. (In re Hill), 8 B.R. 779, 3 C.B.C.2d 920 (Bk.D.Minn. 1981) (nonpayment of three largest debts held to constitute general nonpayment, although small debts were being paid); In re All Media Properties, Inc., 5 B.R. 126, 6 B.C.D. 586, 2 C.B.C.2d 449 (Bk.S.D.Tex. 1980) (missing significant number of payments or regularly missing payments significant in amount said to constitute general nonpayment; missing payments on more than 50% of aggregate of claims said not to be required to show general nonpayment; nonpayment for more than 30 days after billing held to establish nonpayment of a debt when it is due); In re Kreidler Import Corp., 4 B.R. 256, 6 B.C.D. 608, 2 C.B.C.2d 159 (Bk.D.Md. 1980) (nonpayment of one debt constituting 97% of debtor's total indebtedness held to constitute general nonpayment). A presumption of insolvency does not arise from nonpayment of a debt as to which there is a genuine bona fide dispute, even though the debt is a substantial part of the debtor's indebtedness. Cf. 11 U.S.C. Section 303(h)(1), as amended by Section 426(b) of Public Law No. 98-882, the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.
(3) Subsection (c) is derived from the definition of partnership insolvency in Section 101(29)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code. The definition conforms generally to the definition of the same term in Section 2(2) of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act.
(4) Subsection (d) follows the approach of the definition of "insolvency" in Section 101(29) of the Bankruptcy Code by excluding from the computation of the value of the debtor's assets any value that can be realized only by avoiding a transfer of an interest formerly held by the debtor or by discovery or pursuit of property that has been fraudulently concealed or removed.
(5) Subsection (e) is new. It makes clear the purpose not to render a person insolvent under this section by counting as a debt an obligation secured by property of the debtor that is not counted as an asset. See also Comments to Sections 27-23-05(2) and 27-23-10(a) supra.
Section 27-23-15. VALUE.
(a) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured or satisfied, but value does not include an unperformed promise made otherwise than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish support to the debtor or another person.
(b) For the purposes of Sections 27-23-20(a)(2) and 27-23-25, a person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement.
(c) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact substantially contemporaneous.
(1) This section defines "value" as used in various contexts in this Act, frequently with a qualifying adjective. The word appears in the following sections:
27-23-20(a)(2) ("reasonably equivalent value");
27-23-20(b)(8) ("value ... reasonably equivalent");
27-23-25(a) ("reasonably equivalent value");
27-23-25(b) ("present, reasonably equivalent value");
27-23-40(a) ("reasonably equivalent value");
27-23-40(b), (c), (d), and (e) ("value");
27-23-40(f)(1) ("new value"); and
27-23-40(f)(3) ("present value").
(2) Section 27-23-15(a) is adapted from Section 548(d)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. See also Section 3(a) of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. The definition in Section 27-23-15 is not exclusive. "Value" is to be determined in light of the purpose of the Act to protect a debtor's estate from being depleted to the prejudice of the debtor's unsecured creditors. Consideration having no utility from a creditor's viewpoint does not satisfy the statutory definition. The definition does not specify all the kinds of consideration that do not constitute value for the purposes of this Act--e.g., love and affection. See, e.g., United States v. West, 299 F.Supp. 661, 666 (D.Del. 1969).
(3) Section 27-23-15(a) does not indicate what is "reasonably equivalent value" for a transfer or obligation. Under this Act, as under Section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, a transfer for security is ordinarily for a reasonably equivalent value notwithstanding a discrepancy between the value of the asset transferred and the debt secured, since the amount of the debt is the measure of the value of the interest in the asset that is transferred. See, e.g., Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Holy Family Polish Nat'l Catholic Church, Carnegie, Pa., 341 Pa. 390, 19 A.2d 360 (1941). If, however, a transfer purports to secure more than the debt actually incurred or to be incurred, it may be found to be for less than a reasonably equivalent value. See e.g., In re Peoria Braumeister Co., 138 F.2d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1943) (chattel mortgage securing a $3,000 note held to be fraudulent when the debt secured was only $2,500); Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v. Jirasek, 254 Mich. 131, 140, 235 N.W. 836, 839 (1931) (quitclaim deed given as mortgage held to be fraudulent to the extent the value of the property transferred exceeded the indebtedness secured). If the debt is a fraudulent obligation under this Act, a transfer to secure it as well as the obligation would be vulnerable to attack as fraudulent. A transfer to satisfy or secure an antecedent debt owed an insider is also subject to avoidance under the conditions specified in Section 27-23-25(b).
(4) Section 3(a) of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act has been thought not to recognize that an unperformed promise could constitute fair consideration. See McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46 Harv.L.Rev. 404, 414 (1933). Courts construing these provisions of the prior law nevertheless have held unperformed promises to constitute value in a variety of circumstances. See, e.g., Harper v. Lloyd's Factors, Inc., 214 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1954) (transfer of money for promise of factor to discount transferor's purchase-money notes given to fur dealer); Schlecht v. Schlecht, 168 Minn. 168, 176-77, 209 N.W. 883, 886-87 (1926) (transfer for promise to make repairs and improvements on transferor's homestead); Farmer's Exchange Bank v. Oneida Motor Truck Co., 202 Wis. 266, 232 N.W. 536 (1930) (transfer in consideration of assumption of certain of transferor's liabilities); see also Hummel v. Cernocky, 161 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1947) (transfer in consideration of cash, assumption of a mortgage, payment of certain debts, and agreement to pay other debts). Likewise a transfer in consideration of a negotiable note discountable at a commercial bank, or the purchase from an established, solvent institution of an insurance policy, annuity, or contract to provide care and accommodations clearly appears to be for value. On the other hand, a transfer for an unperformed promise by an individual to support a parent or other transferor has generally been held voidable as a fraud on creditors of the transferor. See, e.g., Springfield Ins. Co. v. Fry, 267 F.Supp. 693 (N.D.Okla. 1967); Sandler v. Parlapiano, 236 App.Div. 70, 258 N.Y.Supp. 88 (1st Dep't 1932); Warwick Municipal Employees Credit Union v. Higham, 106 R.E. 363, 259 A.2d 852 (1969); Hulsether v. Sanders, 54 S.D. 412, 223 N.W. 335 (1929); Cooper v. Cooper, 22 Tenn.App. 473, 477, 124 S.W.2d 264, 267 (1939); Note, Rights of Creditors in Property Conveyed in Consideration of Future Support, 45 Iowa L.Rev. 546, 550-62 (1960). This Act adopts the view taken in the cases cited in determining whether an unperformed promise is value.
(5) Subsection (b) rejects the rule of such cases as Durrett v. Washington Nat. Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980) (nonjudicial foreclosure of a mortgage avoided as a fraudulent transfer when the property of an insolvent mortgagor was sold for less than 70% of its fair value); and Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982) (nonjudicial foreclosure held to be fraudulent transfer if made without fair consideration). Subsection (b) adopts the view taken in Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid (In re Madrid), 21 B.R. 424 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on another ground, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984), that the price bid at a public foreclosure sale determines the fair value of the property sold. Subsection (b) prescribes the effect of a sale meeting its requirements, whether the asset sold is personal or real property. The rule of this subsection applies to a foreclosure by sale of the interest of a vendee under an installment land contract in accordance with applicable law that requires or permits the foreclosure to be effected by a sale in the same manner as the foreclosure of a mortgage. See G.Osborne, G.Nelson, & D.Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law 83-84, 95-97 (1979). The premise of the subsection is that "a sale of the collateral by the secured party as the normal consequence of default . . . [is] the safest way of establishing the fair value of the collateral . . .." 2 G.Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property, 1227 (1965).
If a lien given an insider for a present consideration is not perfected as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser or is so perfected after a delay following an extension of credit secured by the lien, foreclosure of the lien may result in a transfer for an antecedent debt that is voidable under Section 27-23-25(b) infra. Subsection (b) does not apply to an action under Section 27-23-20(a)(1) to avoid a transfer or obligation because made or incurred with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor.
(6) Subsection (c) is an adaptation of Section547(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. A transfer to an insider for an antecedent debt may be voidable under Section 27-23-25(b) infra.
Section 27-23-20. Conveyances to deceive purchasers are void. TRANSFERS FRAUDULENT AS TO PRESENT AND FUTURE CREDITORS.
Every conveyance, grant, charge, lease, estate, encumbrance and limitation of use or uses of, in or out of any lands, tenements or other hereditaments whatsoever which may be had or made for the intent and of purpose to defraud and deceive such person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, as shall purchase in fee simple, fee tail, for life, lives or years such lands, tenements and hereditaments, or any part and parcel thereof, or to defraud and deceive such as have or shall purchase any rent, profit or commodity in or out of the same, or any part thereof, shall be deemed and taken (only as against such person and persons, bodies politic and corporate, his and their heirs, successors, executors, administrators and assigns and against all and every other person and persons lawfully having or claiming by, from or under them, or any of them, which shall have so purchased, for money or other good consideration such lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any part or parcel thereof, or any rent, profit or commodity in or out of them) to be utterly void, frustrate and of no effect, any pretense, color, feigned consideration or expressing of any use or uses to the contrary notwithstanding.
(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(1) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or
(2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he [or she] would incur debts beyond his [or her] ability to pay as they became due.
(b) In determining actual intent under subsection (a)(1), consideration may be given, among other factors, to whether:
(1) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(2) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer;
(3) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(4) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit;
(5) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(6) the debtor absconded;
(7) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(8) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;
(9) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
(10) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and
(11) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.
(1) Section 27-23-20(a)(1) is derived from Section 7 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Factors appropriate for consideration in determining actual intent under paragraph (1) are specified in subsection (b).
(2) Section 27-23-20(a)(2) is derived from Sections 5 and 6 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act but substitutes "reasonably equivalent value" for "fair consideration." The transferee's good faith was an element of "fair consideration" as defined in Section 3 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, and lack of fair consideration was one of the elements of a fraudulent transfer as defined in four sections of the Uniform Act. The transferee's good faith is irrelevant to a determination of the adequacy of the consideration under this Act, but lack of good faith may be a basis for withholding protection of a transferee or obligee under Section 8 infra.
(3) Unlike the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act as originally promulgated, this Act does not prescribe different tests when a transfer is made for the purpose of security and when it is intended to be absolute. The premise of this Act is that when a transfer is for security only, the equity or value of the asset that exceeds the amount of the debt secured remains available to unsecured creditors and thus cannot be regarded as the subject of a fraudulent transfer merely because of the encumbrance resulting from an otherwise valid security transfer. Disproportion between the value of the asset securing the debt and the size of the debt secured does not, in the absence of circumstances indicating a purpose to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, constitute an impermissible hindrance to the enforcement of other creditors' rights against the debtor-transferor. Cf. U.C.C. Section 9-311.
(4) Subparagraph (i) of Section 27-23-20(a)(2) is an adaptation of Section 5 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act but substitutes "unreasonably small [assets] in relation to the business or transaction" for "unreasonably small capital." The reference to "capital" in the Uniform Act is ambiguous in that it may refer to net worth or to the par value of stock or to the consideration received for stock issued. The special meanings of "capital" in corporation law have no relevance in the law of fraudulent transfers. The subparagraph focuses attention on whether the amount of all the assets retained by the debtor was inadequate, i.e., unreasonably small, in light of the needs of the business or transaction in which the debtor was engaged or about to engage.
(5) Subsection (b) is a nonexclusive catalogue of factors appropriate for consideration by the court in determining whether the debtor had an actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud one or more creditors. Proof of the existence of any one or more of the factors enumerated in subsection (b) may be relevant evidence as to the debtor's actual intent but does not create a presumption that the debtor has made a fraudulent transfer or incurred a fraudulent obligation. The list of factors includes most of the badges of fraud that have been recognized by the courts in construing and applying the Statute of 13 Elizabeth and Section 7 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Proof of the presence of certain badges in combination establishes fraud conclusively--i.e., without regard to the actual intent of the parties--when they concur as provided in Section 27-23-20(a)(2) or in Section 27-23-25. The fact that a transfer has been made to a relative or to an affiliated corporation has not been regarded as a badge of fraud sufficient to warrant avoidance when unaccompanied by any other evidence of fraud. The courts have uniformly recognized, however, that a transfer to a closely related person warrants close scrutiny of the other circumstances, including the nature and extent of the consideration exchanged. See 1 G. Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences Section 307 (Rev. ed. 1940). The second, third, fourth, and fifth factors listed are all adapted from the classic catalogue of badges of fraud provided by Lord Coke in Twyne's Case, 3 Coke 80b, 76 Eng.Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601). Lord Coke also included the use of a trust and the recitation in the instrument of transfer that it "was made honestly, truly, and bona fide," but the use of the trust is fraudulent only when accompanied by elements or badges specified in this Act, and recitals of "good faith" can no longer be regarded as significant evidence of a fraudulent intent.
(6) In considering the factors listed in Section 27-23-20(b) a court should evaluate all the relevant circumstances involving a challenged transfer or obligation. Thus the court may appropriately take into account all indicia negativing as well as those suggesting fraud, as illustrated in the following reported cases:
(a) Whether the transfer or obligation was to an insider: Salomon v. Kaiser (In re Kaiser), 722 F.2d 1574, 1582-83 (2d Cir. 1983) (insolvent debtor's purchase of two residences in the name of his spouse and the creation of a dummy corporation for the purpose of concealing assets held to evidence fraudulent intent); Banner Construction Corp. v. Arnold, 128 So.2d 893 (Fla.Dist.App. 1961) (assignment by one corporation to another having identical directors and stockholders constituted a badge of fraud); Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Cormaney, 258 Iowa 237, 138 N.W.2d 50 (1965) (transfer between spouses said to be a circumstance that shed suspicion on the transfer and that with other circumstances warranted avoidance); Hatheway v. Hanson, 230 Iowa 386, 297 N.W. 824 (1941) (transfer from parent to child said to require a critical examination of surrounding circumstances, which, together with other indicia of fraud, warranted avoidance); Lumpkins v. McPhee, 59 N.M. 442, 286 P.2d 299 (1955) (transfer from daughter to mother said to be indicative of fraud but transfer held not to be fraudulent due to adequacy of consideration and delivery of possession by transferor).
(b) Whether the transferor retained possession or control of the property after the transfer: Harris v. Shaw, 224 Ark. 150, 272 S.W.2d 53 (1954) (retention of property by transferor said to be a badge of fraud and, together with other badges, to warrant avoidance of transfer); Stephens v. Reginstein, 89 Ala. 561, 8 So. 68 (1890) (transferor's retention of control and management of property and business after transfer held material in determining transfer to be fraudulent); Allen v. Massey, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 351 (1872) (joint possession of furniture by transferor and transferee considered in holding transfer to be fraudulent); Warner v. Norton, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 448 (1857) (surrender of possession by transferor deemed to negate allegations of fraud).
(c) Whether the transfer or obligation was concealed or disclosed: Walton v. First National Bank, 13 Colo. 265, 22 P. 440 (1889) (agreement between parties to conceal the transfer from the public said to be one of the strongest badges of fraud); Warner v. Norton, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 448 (1857) (although secrecy said to be a circumstance from which, when coupled with other badges, fraud may be inferred, transfer was held not to be fraudulent when made in good faith and transferor surrendered possession); W.T. Raleigh Co. v. Barnett, 253 Ala. 433, 44 So.2d 585 (1950) (failure to record a deed in itself said not to evidence fraud, and transfer held not to be fraudulent).
(d) Whether, before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, a creditor sued or threatened to sue the debtor: Harris v. Shaw, 224 Ark. 150, 272 S.W. 2d 53 (1954) (transfer held to be fraudulent when causally connected to pendency of litigation and accompanied by other badges of fraud); Pergrem v. Smith, 255 S.W.2d 42 (Ky.App. 1953) (transfer in anticipation of suit deemed to be a badge of fraud; transfer held fraudulent when accompanied by insolvency of transferor who was related to transferee); Bank of Sun Prairie v. Hovig, 218 F.Supp. 769 (W.D.Ark. 1963) (although threat or pendency of litigation said to be an indicator of fraud, transfer was held not to be fraudulent when adequate consideration and good faith were shown).
(e) Whether the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets: Walbrun v. Babbitt, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 577 (1872) (sale by insolvent retail shop owner of all of his inventory in a single transaction held to be fraudulent); Cole v. Mercantile Trust Co., 133 N.Y. 164, 30 N.E. 847 (1892) (transfer of all property before plaintiff could obtain a judgment held to be fraudulent); Lumpkins v. McPhee, 59 N.M. 442, 286 P.2d 299 (1955) (although transfer of all assets said to indicate fraud, transfer held not to be fraudulent because full consideration was paid and transferor surrendered possession).
(f) Whether the debtor had absconded: In re Thomas, 199 F. 214 (N.D.N.Y. 1912) (when debtor collected all of his money and property with the intent to abscond, fraudulent intent was held to be shown).
(g) Whether the debtor had removed or concealed assets: Bentley v. Young, 210 F. 202 (S.D.N.Y 1914), aff'd, 223 F. 536 (2d Cir. 1915) (debtor's removal of goods from store to conceal their whereabouts and to sell them held to render sale fraudulent); Cioli v. Kenourgios, 59 Cal.App. 690, 211 P. 838 (1922) (debtor's sale of all assets and shipment of proceeds out of the country held to be fraudulent notwithstanding adequacy of consideration).
(h) Whether the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred: Toomay v. Graham, 151 S.W.2d 119 (Mo.App. 1941) (although mere inadequacy of consideration said not to be a badge of fraud, transfer held to be fraudulent when accompanied by badges of fraud); Texas Sand Co. v. Shield, 381 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1964) (inadequate consideration said to be an indicator of fraud, and transfer held to be fraudulent because of inadequate consideration, pendency of suit, family relationship of transferee, and fact that all nonexempt property was transferred); Weigel v. Wood, 355 Mo. 11, 194 S.W.2d 40 (1946) (although inadequate consideration said to be a badge of fraud, transfer held not to be fraudulent when inadequacy not gross and not accompanied by any other badge; fact that transfer was from father to son held not sufficient to establish fraud).
(i) Whether the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or obligation was incurred: Harris v. Shaw, 224 Ark. 150, 272 S.W. 2d 53 (1954) (insolvency of transferor said to be a badge of fraud and transfer held fraudulent when accompanied by other badges of fraud); Bank of Sun Prairie v. Hovig, 218 F.Supp. 769 (W.D. Ark. 1963) (although the insolvency of the debtor said to be a badge of fraud, transfer held not fraudulent when debtor was shown to be solvent, adequate consideration was paid, and good faith was shown, despite the pendency of suit); Wareheim v. Bayliss, 149 Md. 103, 131 A. 27 (1925) (although insolvency of debtor acknowledged to be an indicator of fraud, transfer held not to be fraudulent when adequate consideration was paid and whether debtor was insolvent in fact was doubtful).
(j) Whether the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred: Commerce Bank of Lebanon v. Halladale A Corp., 618 S.W. 2d 288, 292 (Mo.App. 1981) (when transferors incurred substantial debts near in time to the transfer, transfer was held to be fraudulent due to inadequate consideration, close family relationship, the debtor's retention of possession, and the fact that almost all the debtor's property was transferred).
(7) The effect of the two transfers described in Section 27-23-20(b)(11), if not avoided, may be to permit a debtor and a lienor to deprive the debtor's unsecured creditors of access to the debtor's assets for the purpose of collecting their claims while the debtor, the debtor's affiliate or insider, and the lienor arrange for the beneficial use or disposition of the assets in accordance with their interests. The kind of disposition sought to be reached here is exemplified by that found in Northern Pacific Co. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913), the leading case in establishing the absolute priority doctrine in reorganization law. There the Court held that a reorganization whereby the secured creditors and the management-owners retained their economic interests in a railroad through a foreclosure that cut off claims of unsecured creditors against its assets was in effect a fraudulent disposition (id. at 502-05). See Frank, Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization, 19 Va. L.Rev. 541, 693 (1933). For cases in which an analogous injury to unsecured creditors was inflicted by a lienor and a debtor, see Jackson v. Star Sprinkler Corp. of Florida, 575 F.2d 1223, 1231-34 (8th Cir. 1978); Heath v. Helmick, 173 F.2d 157, 161-62 (9th Cir. 1949); Toner v. Nuss, 234 F.S. 457, 461-62 (E.D.Pa. 1964); and see In re Spotless Tavern Co., Inc., 4 F.Supp. 752, 753, 755 (D.Md. 1933).
(8) Nothing in Section 27-23-20(b) is intended to affect the application of Section 2-402(2), 9-205, 9-301, or 6-105 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 2-402(2) recognizes the generally prevailing rule that retention of possession of goods by a seller may be fraudulent but limits the application of the rule by negating any imputation of fraud from "retention of possession in good faith and current course of trade by a merchant-seller for a commercially reasonable time after a sale or identification." Section 9-205 explicitly negates any imputation of fraud from the grant of liberty by a secured creditor to a debtor to use, commingle, or dispose of personal property collateral or to account for its proceeds. The section recognizes that it does not relax prevailing requirements for delivery of possession by a pledgor. Moreover, the section does not mitigate the general requirement of Section 9-301(1)(b) that a nonpossessory security interest in personal property must be accompanied by notice-filing to be effective against a levying creditor. Finally, like the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act this Act does not pre-empt the statutes governing bulk transfers, such as Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Compliance with the cited sections of the Uniform Commercial Code does not, however, insulate a transfer or obligation from avoidance. Thus a sale by an insolvent debtor for less than a reasonably equivalent value would be voidable under this Act notwithstanding compliance with the Uniform Commercial Code.
Section 27-23-25. TRANSFERS FRAUDULENT AS TO PRESENT CREDITORS.
(a) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was insolvent at that time or the debtor became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.
(b) A transfer made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor whose claim arose before the transfer was made if the transfer was made to an insider for an antecedent debt, the debtor was insolvent at that time, and the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent.
(1) Subsection (a) is derived from Section 4 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. It adheres to the limitation of the protection of that section to a creditor who extended credit before the transfer or obligation described. As pointed out in Comment (2) accompanying Section 27-23-20, this Act substitutes "reasonably equivalent value" for "fair consideration."
(2) Subsection (b) renders a preferential transfer--i.e., a transfer by an insolvent debtor for or on account of an antecedent debt--to an insider vulnerable as a fraudulent transfer when the insider had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent. This subsection adopts for general application the rule of such cases as Jackson Sound Studios, Inc. v. Travis, 473 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1973) (security transfer of corporation's equipment to corporate principal's mother perfected on eve of bankruptcy of corporation held to be fraudulent); In re Lamie Chemical Co., 296 F. 24 (4th Cir. 1924) (corporate preference to corporate officers and directors held voidable by receiver when corporation was insolvent or nearly so and directors had already voted for liquidation); Stuart v. Larson, 298 F. 223 (8th Cir. 1924), noted 38 Harv.L.Rev. 521 (1925) (corporate preference to director held voidable). See generally 2 G. Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences 386 (rev. ed. 1940). Subsection (b) overrules such cases as Epstein v. Goldstein, 107 F.2d 755, 757 (2d Cir. 1939) (transfer by insolvent husband to wife to secure his debt to her sustained against attack by husband's trustee); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Jirasek, 254 Mich. 131, 139, 235 N.W. 836, 389 (1931) (mortgage given by debtor to his brother to secure an antecedent debt owed the brother sustained as not fraudulent).
(3) Subsection (b) does not extend as far as
Section 8(a) of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and
Section 548(b) of the Bankruptcy Code in rendering voidable a transfer or obligation incurred by an insolvent partnership to a partner, who is an insider of the partnership. The transfer to the partner is not vulnerable to avoidance under Section 27-23-20(b) unless the transfer was for an antecedent debt and the partner had reasonable cause to believe that the partnership was insolvent. The cited provisions of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and the Bankruptcy Act make any transfer by an insolvent partnership to a partner voidable. Avoidance of the partnership transfer without reference to the partner's state of mind and the nature of the consideration exchanged would be unduly harsh treatment of the creditors of the partner and unduly favorable to the creditors of the partnership.
Section 27-23-30. Punishment of parties to fraudulent conveyances. WHEN TRANSFER IS MADE OR OBLIGATION IS INCURRED.
All parties to such feigned, covinous and fraudulent gifts, grants, leases, charges or conveyances, or being privy to and knowing of them, or any of them, who shall wittingly or willingly put in use, avow, maintain, justify or defend them, or any of them, as true, simple and done, had or made bona fide or upon good consideration, of or to the disturbance or hindrance of the purchaser or purchasers, lessees or grantees, their heirs, successors, executors, administrators or assigns or such as have or shall lawfully claim anything by, from or under them, or any of them, shall incur the penalty and forfeiture of one year's value of such lands, tenements and hereditaments so purchased or charged, the one moiety whereof shall be for the use of the State and the other moiety to the party or parties grieved by such feigned and fraudulent gift, grant, lease, conveyance, encumbrance or limitation of use, to be recovered by action in any court of competent jurisdiction; and also, being thereof lawfully convicted, shall suffer imprisonment for one-half year.
For the purposes of this chapter:
(1) a transfer is made:
(i) with respect to an asset that is real property other than a fixture, but including the interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of the asset, when the transfer is so far perfected that a good-faith purchaser of the asset from the debtor against whom applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest in the asset that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and
(ii) with respect to an asset that is not real property or that is a fixture, when the transfer is so far perfected that a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien otherwise than under this chapter that is superior to the interest of the transferee;
(2) if applicable law permits the transfer to be perfected as provided in paragraph (1) and the transfer is not so perfected before the commencement of an action for relief under this chapter, the transfer is deemed made immediately before the commencement of the action;
(3) if applicable law does not permit the transfer to be perfected as provided in paragraph (1), the transfer is made when it becomes effective between the debtor and the transferee;
(4) a transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the asset transferred;
(5) an obligation is incurred:
(i) if oral, when it becomes effective between the parties; or
(ii) if evidenced by a writing, when the writing executed by the obligor is delivered to or for the benefit of the obligee.
(1) One of the uncertainties in the law governing the avoidance of fraudulent transfers and obligations is the difficulty of determining when the cause of action arises. Subsection (b) clarifies this point in time. For transfers of real estate Section 27-23-30(1) fixes the time as the date of perfection against a good faith purchaser from the transferor and for transfers of fixtures and assets constituting personalty, the time is fixed as the date of perfection against a judicial lien creditor not asserting rights under this Act. Perfection typically is effected by notice-filing, recordation, or delivery of unequivocal possession. See U.C.C. Sections 9-302, 9-304, and 9-305 (security interest in personal property perfected by notice-filing or delivery of possession to transferee); 4 American Law of Property Section 17.10-17.12 (1952) (recordation of transfer or delivery of possession to grantee required for perfection against bona fide purchaser from grantor). The provision for postponing the time a transfer is made until its perfection is an adaptation of Section 548(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. When no steps are taken to perfect a transfer that applicable law permits to be perfected, the transfer is deemed by paragraph (2) to be perfected immediately before the filing of an action to avoid it; without such a provision to cover that eventuality, an unperfected transfer would arguably be immune to attack. Some transfers--e.g., an assignment of a bank account, creation of a security interest in money, or execution of a marital or premarital agreement for the disposition of property owned by the parties to the agreement--may not be amenable to perfection as against a bona fide purchaser or judicial lien creditor. When a transfer is not perfectible as provided in paragraph (11), the transfer occurs for the purpose of this Act when the transferor effectively parts with an interest in the asset as provided in Section 27-23-05(12) supra.
(2) Paragraph (4) requires the transferor to have rights in the asset transferred before the transfer is made for the purpose of this section. This provision makes clear that its purpose may not be circumvented by notice-filing or recordation of a document evidencing an interest in an asset to be acquired in the future. Cf. Bankruptcy Code Section 547(e); U.C.C. Section 9-203(1)(c).
(3) Paragraph (5) is new. It is intended to resolve uncertainty arising from Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d 979, 989-91, 997 (2d Cir. 1981), insofar as that case holds that an obligation of guaranty may be deemed to be incurred when advances covered by the guaranty are made rather than when the guaranty first became effective between the parties. Compare Rosenberg, Intercorporate Guaranties and the Law of Fraudulent Conveyances: Lender Beware, 125 U.Pa.L.Rev. 235, 256-57 (1976).
An obligation may be avoided as fraudulent under this Act if it is incurred under the circumstances specified in Section 27-23-20(a) or Section 27-23-25(a). The debtor may receive reasonably equivalent value in exchange for an obligation incurred even though the benefit to the debtor is indirect. See Rubin v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 661 F.2d at 991-92; Williams v. Twin City Co., 251 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1958); Rosenberg, supra at 243-46.
Section 27-23-35. REMEDIES OF CREDITORS.
(a) In an action for relief against a transfer or obligation under this chapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in Section 27-23-40, may obtain:
(1) avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim;
(2) an attachment or other provisional remedy against the asset transferred or other property of the transferee in accordance with the procedure prescribed by statute;
(3) subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with applicable rules of civil procedure,
(i) an injunction against further disposition by the debtor or a transferee, or both, of the asset transferred or of other property;
(ii) appointment of a receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the transferee; or
(iii) any other relief the circumstances may require.
(b) If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim against the debtor, the creditor, if the court so orders, may levy execution on the asset transferred or its proceeds.
(1) This section is derived from Sections 9 and 10 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Section 9 of that Act specified the remedies of creditors whose claims have matured, and Section 10 enumerated the remedies available to creditors whose claims have not matured. A creditor holding an unmatured claim may be denied the right to receive payment for the proceeds of a sale on execution until his claim has matured, but the proceeds may be deposited in court or in an interest-bearing account pending the maturity of the creditor's claim. The remedies specified in this section are not exclusive.
(2) The availability of an attachment or other provisional remedy has been restricted by amendments of statutes and rules of procedure to reflect views of the Supreme Court expressed in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and its progeny. This judicial development and the procedural changes that followed in its wake do not preclude resort to attachment by a creditor in seeking avoidance of a fraudulent transfer or obligation. See, e.g., Britton v. Howard Sav. Bank, 727 F.2d 315, 317-20 (3d Cir. 1984); Computer Sciences Corp. v. Sci-Tek Inc., 367 A.2d 658, 661 (Del. Super. 1976); Great Lakes Carbon Corp. v. Fontana, 54 A.D.2d 548, 387 N.Y.S. 2d 115 (1st Dep't 1976). Section 27-23-35(a)(2) continues the authorization for the use of attachment contained in Section 9(b) of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, or of a similar provisional remedy, when the state's procedure provides therefor, subject to the constraints imposed by the due process clauses of the United States and state constitutions.
(3) Subsections (a) and (b) of Section 10 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act authorized the court, in an action on a fraudulent transfer or obligation, to restrain the defendant from disposing of his property, to appoint a receiver to take charge of his property, or to make any order the circumstances may require. Section 10, however, applied only to a creditor whose claim was unmatured. There is no reason to restrict the availability of these remedies to such a creditor, and the courts have not so restricted them. See, e.g., Lipskey v. Voloshen, 155 Md. 139, 143-45, 141 Atl. 402, 404-05 (1928) (judgment creditor granted injunction against disposition of property by transferee, but appointment of receiver denied for lack of sufficient showing of need for such relief); Matthews v. Schusheim, 36 Misc. 2d 918, 922-23, 235 N.Y.S.2d 973, 976-77, 991-92 (Sup.Ct. 1962) (injunction and appointment of receiver granted to holder of claims for fraud, breach of contract, and alimony arrearages; whether creditor's claim was mature said to be immaterial); Oliphant v. Moore, 155 Tenn. 359, 362-63, 293 S.W. 541, 542 (1927) (tort creditor granted injunction restraining alleged tortfeasor's disposition of property).
(4) As under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, a creditor is not required to obtain a judgment against the debtor-transferor or to have a matured claim in order to proceed under subsection (a). See Section 27-23-05(3) and (4) supra; American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 166 N.E. 783, 65 A.L.R. 244 (1929); 1 G. Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences 129 (Rev.ed. 1940).
(5) The provision in subsection (b) for a creditor to levy execution on a fraudulently transferred asset continues the availability of a remedy provided in Section 9(b) of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. See, e.g., Doland v. Burns Lbr. Co., 156 Minn. 238, 194 N.W. 636 (1923); Montana Ass'n of Credit Management v. Hergert, 181 Mont. 442, 449, 453, 593 P.2d 1059, 1063, 1065 (1979); Corbett v. Hunter, 292 Pa.Super. 123, 128, 436 A.2d 1036, 1038 (1981); see also American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 6, 166 N.E. 783, 784, 65 A.L.R. 244, 247 (1929) ("In such circumstances he [the creditor] might find it necessary to indemnify the sheriff and, when the seizure was erroneous, assumed the risk of error"); McLaughlin, Application of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, 46 Harv.L.Rev. 404, 441-42 (1933).
(6) The remedies specified in Section 27-23-35, like those enumerated in Sections 9 and 10 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, are cumulative. Lind v. O. N. Johnson Co., 204 Minn. 30, 40, 282 N.W. 661, 667, 119 A.L.R. 940 (1939) (Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act held not to impair or limit availability of the "old practice" of obtaining judgment and execution returned unsatisfied before proceeding in equity to set aside a transfer); Conemaugh Iron Works Co. v. Delano Coal Co., Inc., 298 Pa. 182, 186, 148 A. 94, 95 (1929) (Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act held to give an "additional optional remedy" and not to "deprive a creditor of the right, as formerly, to work out his remedy at law"); 1 G. Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences 120, 130, 150 (Rev.ed. 1940).
Section 27-23-40. Conveyances made upon good consideration DEFENSES, LIABILITY, AND PROTECTION OF TRANSFEREE.
Nothing contained in Sections 27-23-10 to 27-23-30 shall extend or be construed to impeach, defeat, make void or frustrate any conveyance, assignment of lease, assurance, grant, charge, lease, estate, interest or limitation of use or uses of, in, to or out of any lands, tenements or hereditaments at any time had or made upon or for good consideration and bona fide to any person or body politic or corporate, anything mentioned to the contrary notwithstanding.
(a) A transfer or obligation is not voidable under Section 27-23-20(a)(1) against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably equivalent value or against any subsequent transferee or obligee.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a transfer is voidable in an action by a creditor under Section 27-23-35(a)(1), the creditor may recover judgment for the value of the asset transferred, as adjusted under subsection (c), or the amount necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered against:
(1) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made; or
(2) any subsequent transferee other than a good-faith transferee or obligee who took for value or from any subsequent transferee or obligee.
(c) If the judgment under subsection (b) is based upon the value of the asset transferred, the judgment must be for an amount equal to the value of the asset at the time of the transfer, subject to adjustment as the equities may require.
(d) Notwithstanding voidability of a transfer or an obligation under this chapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of the value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to
(1) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred;
(2) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or
(3) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment.
(e) A transfer is not voidable under Section 27-23-20(a)(2) or Section 27-23-25 if the transfer results from:
(1) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the termination is pursuant to the lease and applicable law; or
(2) enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
(f) A transfer is not voidable under Section 27-23-35(b):
(1) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor after the transfer was made unless the new value was secured by a valid lien;
(2) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the insider; or
(3) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the debtor and the transfer secured present value given for that purpose as well as an antecedent debt of the debtor.
(1) Subsection (a) states the rule that applies when the transferee establishes a complete defense to the action for avoidance based on Section 27-23-20(a)(1). The subsection is an adaptation of the exception stated in Section 9 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act. The person who invokes this defense carries the burden of establishing good faith and the reasonable equivalence of the consideration exchanged. Chorost v. Grand Rapids Factory Showrooms, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 276, 280 (D.N.J. 1948), aff'd, 172 F.2d 327, 329 (3d Cir. 1949).
(2) Subsection (b) is derived from Section 550(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. The value of the asset transferred is limited to the value of the levyable interest on the transferor, exclusive of any interest encumbered by a valid lien. See Section 27-23-05(2) supra.
(3) Subsection (c) is new. The measure of the recovery of a defrauded creditor against a fraudulent transferee is usually limited to the value of the asset transferred at the time of the transfer. See, e.g., United States v. Fernon, 640 F.2d 609, 611 (5th Cir. 1981); Hamilton Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Halstead, 134 N.Y. 520, 31 N.E. 900 (1892); cf. Buffum v. Peter Barceloux Co., 289 U.S. 227 (1932) (transferee's objection to trial court's award of highest value of asset between the date of the transfer and the date of the decree of avoidance rejected because an award measured by value as of time of the transfer plus interest from that date would have been larger). The premise of Section 27-23-40(c) is that changes in value of the asset transferred that occur after the transfer should ordinarily not affect the amount of the creditor's recovery. Circumstances may require a departure from that measure of the recovery, however, as the cases decided under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and other laws derived from the Statute of 13 Elizabeth illustrate. Thus, if the value of the asset at the time of levy and sale to enforce the judgment of the creditor has been enhanced by improvements of the asset transferred or discharge of liens on the property, a good faith transferee should be reimbursed for the outlay for such a purpose to the extent the sale proceeds were increased thereby. See Bankruptcy Code Section 550(d); Janson v. Schier, 375 A.2d 1159, 1160 (N.H. 1977); Anno., 8 A.L.R. 527 (1920). If the value of the asset has been diminished by severance and disposition of timber or minerals or fixtures, the transferee should be liable for the amount of the resulting reduction. See Damazo v. Wahby, 269 Md. 252, 257, 305 A.2d 138, 142 (1973). If the transferee has collected rents, harvested crops, or derived other income from the use or occupancy of the asset after the transfer, the liability of the transferee should be limited in any event to the net income after deduction of the expense incurred in earning the income. Anno., 60 A.L.R.2d 593 (1958). On the other hand, adjustment for the equities does not warrant an award to the creditor of consequential damages alleged to accrue from mismanagement of the asset after the transfer.
(4) Subsection (d) is an adaptation of Section 548(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. An insider who receives property or an obligation from an insolvent debtor as security for or in satisfaction of an antecedent debt of the transferor or obligor is not a good faith transferee or obligee if the insider has reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.
(5) Subsection (e)(1) rejects the rule adopted in Darby v. Atkinson (In re Farris), 415 F.Supp. 33, 39-41 (W.D.Okla. 1976), that termination of a lease on default in accordance with its terms and applicable law may constitute a fraudulent transfer. Subsection (e)(2) protects a transferee who acquires a debtor's interest in an asset as a result of the enforcement of a secured creditor's rights pursuant to and in compliance with the provisions of Part 5 of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Cf. Calaiaro v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank (In re Ewing), 33 B.R. 288, 9 C.B.C.2d 526, CCH B.L.R. Paragraph 69,460 (Bk.W.D.Pa. 1983) (sale of pledged stock held subject to avoidance as fraudulent transfer in Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code), rev'd, 36 B.R. 476 (W.D.Pa. 1984) (transfer held not voidable because deemed to have occurred more than one year before bankruptcy petition filed). Although a secured creditor may enforce rights in collateral without a sale under Section 9-502 or Section 9-505 of the Code, the creditor must proceed in good faith (U.C.C. Section 9-103) and in a "commercially reasonable" manner. The "commercially reasonable" constraint is explicit in U.C.C. Section 9-502(2) and is implicit in Section 9-505. See 2 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property 1224-27 (1965).
(6) Subsection (f) provides additional defenses against the avoidance of a preferential transfer to an insider under Section 27-23-25(b).
Paragraph (1) is adapted from Section 547(c)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, which permits a preferred creditor to set off the amount of new value subsequently advanced against the recovery of a voidable preference by a trustee in bankruptcy to the debtor without security. The new value may consist not only of money, goods, or services delivered on unsecured credit but also of the release of a valid lien. See, e.g., In re Ira Haupt & Co., 424 F.2d 722, 724 (2d Cir. 1970); Baranow v. Gibraltor Factors Corp. (In re Hygrade Envelope Co.), 393 F.2d 60, 65-67 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 837 (1968); In re John Morrow & Co., 134 F.686, 688 (S.D.Ohio 1901). It does not include an obligation substituted for a prior obligation. If the insider receiving the preference thereafter extends new credit to the debtor but also takes security from the debtor, the injury to the other creditors resulting from the preference remains undiminished by the new credit. On the other hand, if a lien taken to secure the new credit is itself voidable by a judicial lien creditor of the debtor, the new value received by the debtor may appropriately be treated as unsecured and applied to reduce the liability of the insider for the preferential transfer.
Paragraph (2) is derived from Section 546(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, which excepts certain payments made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs from avoidance by the trustee in bankruptcy as preferential transfers. Whether a transfer was in the "ordinary course" requires a consideration of the pattern of payments or secured transactions engaged in by the debtor and the insider prior to the transfer challenged under Section 5(b). See Tait & Williams, Bankruptcy Preference Laws: The Scope of Section 547(c)(2), 99 Banking L.J. 55, 63-66 (1982). The defense provided by paragraph (2) is available, irrespective of whether the debtor or the insider or both are engaged in business, but the prior conduct or practice of both the debtor and the insider-transferee is relevant.
Paragraph (3) is new and reflects a policy judgment that an insider who has previously extended credit to a debtor should not be deterred from extending further credit to the debtor in a good faith effort to save the debtor from a forced liquidation in bankruptcy or otherwise. A similar rationale has sustained the taking of security from an insolvent debtor for an advance to enable the debtor to stave off bankruptcy and extricate itself from financial stringency. Blackman v. Bechtel, 80 F.2d 505, 508-09 (8th Cir. 1935); Olive v. Tyler (In re Chelan Land Co.), 257 F.497, 5 A.L.R. 561 (9th Cir. 1919); In re Robin Bros. Bakeries, Inc., 22 F.S. 662, 663-64 (N.D.Ill. 1937); see Dean v. Davis, 242 U.S. 438, 444 (1917). The amount of the present value given, the size of the antecedent debt secured, and the likelihood of success for the rehabilitative effort are relevant considerations in determining whether the transfer was in good faith.
Section 27-23-45. EXTINGUISHMENT OF [CAUSE OF ACTION].
A [cause of action] with respect to a fraudulent transfer or obligation under this chapter is extinguished unless action is brought:
(a) under Section 27-23-20(a)(1), within 4 years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred or, if later, within one year after the transfer or obligation was or could reasonably have been discovered by the claimant;
(b) under Section 27-23-20(a)(2) or 27-23-25(a), within 4 years after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred; or
(c) under Section 27-23-25(b), within one year after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred.
(1) This section is new. Its purpose is to make clear that lapse of the statutory periods prescribed by the section bars the right and not merely the remedy. See Restatement of Conflict of Laws 2d Section 143 Comments (b) and (c) (1971). The section rejects the rule applied in United States v. Gleneagles Inv. Co., 565 F.S. 556, 583 (M.D.Pa. 1983) (state statute of limitations held not to apply to action by United States based on Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act).
(2) Statutes of limitations applicable to the avoidance of fraudulent transfers and obligations vary widely from state to state and are frequently subject to uncertainties in their application. See Hesson, The Statute of Limitations in Actions to Set Aside Fraudulent Conveyances and in Actions Against Directors by Creditors of Corporations, 32 Cornell L.Q. 222 (1946); Annos., 76 A.L.R. 864 (1932), 128 A.L.R. 1289 (1940), 133 A.L.R. 1311 (1941), 14 A.L.R.2d 598 (1950), and 100 A.L.R.2d 1094 (1965). Together with Section 27-23-30, this section should mitigate the uncertainty and diversity that have characterized the decisions applying statutes of limitations to actions to fraudulent transfers and obligations. The periods prescribed apply, whether the action under this Act is brought by the creditor defrauded or by a purchaser at a sale on execution levied pursuant to Section 27-23-35(b) and whether the action is brought against the original transferee or subsequent transferee. The prescription of statutory periods of limitation does not preclude the barring of an avoidance action for laches. See Section 10 and the accompanying Comment infra.
Section 27-23-46. SUPPLEMENTARY PROVISIONS.
Unless displaced by the provisions of this chapter, the principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relating to principal and agent, estoppel, laches, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, insolvency, or other validating or invalidating cause, supplement its provisions.
This section is derived from Section 11 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and Section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The section adds a reference to "laches" in recognition of the particular appropriateness of the application of this equitable doctrine to an untimely action to avoid a fraudulent transfer. See Louis Dreyfus Corp. v. Butler, 496 F.2d 806, 808 (6th Cir. 1974) (action to avoid transfers to debtor's wife when debtor was engaged in speculative business held to be barred by laches or applicable statutes of limitations); Cooch v. Grier, 30 Del.Ch. 255, 265-66, 59 A.2d 282, 287-88 (1948) (action under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act held barred by laches when the creditor was chargeable with inexcusable delay and the defendant was prejudiced by the delay).
Section 27-23-47. UNIFORMITY OF APPLICATION AND CONSTRUCTION.
This chapter shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this chapter among states enacting it.
Section 27-23-50. No leases, estates or interests shall be assigned, granted or surrendered by parol.
No leases, estates or interests, either of freehold, term of years or uncertain interests, of, in, to or out of any lands, tenements or hereditaments shall at any time be assigned, granted or surrendered, unless it be by deed or note, in writing signed by the party so assigning, granting or surrendering them, or his agent thereunto lawfully authorized by writing or by act and operation of law.
Section 27-23-60. All estates, interests of freehold or terms of years, and any uncertain interests of, in, to or out of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, made or created by livery or seizin only or by parol and not put in writing and signed by the parties so making or creating them, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized by writing, shall have the force and effect of estates at will only and shall not, either in law or equity, be deemed or taken to have any other or greater force or effect, any consideration for making any such parol lease or estate or any former law or usage to the contrary notwithstanding, except leases not exceeding the term of one year from the time of entry whereupon the rent reserved to the landlord during such term shall amount unto two-thirds parts, at least, of the full improved value of the thing demised.
Section 27-23-70. No parol gift of any chattel shall be valid against subsequent creditors, purchasers or mortgagees, except when the donee shall live separate and apart from the donor and actual possession shall, at the time of the gift, be delivered to and remain and continue in the donee, his executors, administrators or assigns.
Section 27-23-90. If any person shall make any conveyance, gift, grant, demise, charge, limitation of use or uses or assurance of, in or out of any lands, tenements or hereditaments with any clause, provision, article or condition of revocation, determination or alteration at his will or pleasure of such conveyance, assurance, grant, limitation of uses or estates of, in or out of such lands, tenements, or hereditaments or of, in or out of any part or parcel of them, contained or mentioned in writing, deed or indenture of such assurance, conveyance, grant or gift, and, after such conveyance, grant, gift, demise, charge, limitation of uses or assurance so made or had, shall bargain, sell, demise, grant, convey or charge such lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any part or parcel thereof, to any person or body politic and corporate, for money or other good consideration paid or given (such first conveyance, assurance, gift, grant, demise, charge or limitation not by him revoked, made void or altered according to the power and authority reserved or expressed unto him in or by such secret conveyance, assurance, gift or grant), then the former conveyance, assurance, gift, demise or grant, as touching such lands, tenements and hereditaments so after bargained, sold, conveyed, demised or charged, against such bargainees, vendees, lessees, grantees and every of them, their heirs, successors, executors, administrators and assigns, and against every person who shall lawfully claim anything by, from or under them or any of them, shall be deemed, taken and adjudged to be void, frustrate and of no effect; provided, that no lawful mortgage made bona fide and without fraud or covin, upon good consideration, shall be impeached or impaired by force of anything in this chapter contained."
SECTION 2. Except as may otherwise be specifically provided herein, this act takes effect upon approval by the Governor.